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## PREFACE

This is the tenth annual volume of *International Documents on Palestine*, which is published jointly by the Institute for Palestine Studies and the University of Kuwait. The purpose of the series is to put on record the attitudes and policies relating to the Palestine question and the Arab-Israeli conflict of the states and organizations directly and indirectly involved. The collection is divided into three sections: United Nations, International (including Israel) and Arab World.

The United Nations section contains the reports or parts of reports relevant to the Middle East, as well as resolutions adopted by the United Nations and its specialized agencies. It should be noted that United Nations annual reports in this volume cover a period from the middle of 1975 to the middle of 1976; the second half of 1976 will be covered in the annual reports for 1977. In view of the importance of the Security Council's debate on the question of Palestine, the closing session of the debate, held in January 1976, has been included *in toto* in the United Nations section instead of appearing as individual statements in the other two sections.

The documents contained in the International and Arab World sections have been selected from material, written or oral, originating from governments or groupings of states and their officials and, to a minor extent, from individuals and institutions which represent significant groups of opinion or which are actually or potentially involved in matters relating to the Palestine question. Such material includes treaties, joint communiqués, policy statements, speeches, parliamentary proceedings, interviews and resolutions adopted by conferences and congresses.

In considering items for selection, the editors have evaluated their significance in terms of policy regarding the area or as a record of the events of the year. The developments of the year are dominated by the civil war in Lebanon, regarding which the Palestinian dimension and its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict are dealt with in some detail, while the internal Lebanese dimension is judged to be outside the scope of the series. The growing tension between the Israeli authorities and the Arab population both of Israel and the occupied territories also receives attention. Of course, the international debate and the diplomatic moves of the USSR and the United States have also been included in this volume.

In selection no attempt has been made to achieve full geographical representation. The distribution of documents among countries both in the International and the Arab World sections reflects the editors' perceptions of those countries' involvement in, and influence on, events and developments during the year. A large number of countries are represented only indirectly through resolutions and statements of regional organizations such as the Conference of Islamic States and the OAU.

The majority of documents in the Arab World section have been selected from the comprehensive documentary collection *Arab Documents on Palestine* published by the Institute in Arabic.

Documents in the International and the Arab World sections are arranged chronologically. When a specific date could not be ascertained, the formula of “early”, “mid” or “late” added to the month has been used and the document placed in the approximate chronological sequence. Place is normally designated by city if it is indicated on the document, reliably reported or can safely be assumed; only UN documents carry no indication of place. Within the United Nations section documents are arranged with reference to the organization’s internal structure and only within subsections are documents arranged chronologically.

When documents have been reproduced only in part this is indicated in the wording of the title and footnote or, in some cases, by the word “excerpt (s)” after the title of the document.

The term “joint communiqué” has been used loosely and does not necessarily imply that the document concerned is a joint communiqué in the diplomatic sense.

In the case of documents issued originally in a language other than English the editors have, as far as possible, used English translations published by recognized journals or agencies of the country of origin.

In such instances, the footnote simply states “English text” with no reference to the original language. In cases where unofficial English translations have been used they have, when possible, been checked with the original. Other material has been translated especially for this volume.

The spelling of names of persons and places is left unchanged in texts appearing in their original versions. In documents translated for this volume, familiar Arabic names appear in a form common in the English language press; others are written in a form which, while avoiding diacritical marks, reflects the Arabic spelling as closely as possible.

Abbreviations (e.g. PLO for Palestine Liberation Organization) in the text will be found in the index with a cross reference to the full name.

The Institute for Palestine Studies is pleased to express its gratitude to the University of Kuwait, and particularly to its President and its Secretary-General, for invaluable aid towards the publication of this volume.

The Institute also extends its thanks to the staffs of the libraries of the American University of Beirut, the Palestine Research Centre and the UN Information Centre in Beirut for their cooperation.

THE INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES

## LIST OF SOURCES

Below is a list of the parliamentary records, documentary series, newspapers and periodicals consulted in the compilation of this book, with their publisher when relevant and not obvious, and their place and frequency of publication.

<i>Africa Diary</i>	New Delhi	weekly
<i>al-Ahram</i>	Cairo	daily
<i>al-Akhbar</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>al-Akhbar</i>	Cairo	daily
<i>Al Hamishmar</i> (Mapam)	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>al-Amal</i> (Phalangist Party)	Beirut	daily
<i>al-Amal</i>	Tunis	daily
<i>American Journal of International Law</i>	Washington, D.C.	quarterly
<i>al-Anba</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>al-Anba</i>	Rabat	daily
<i>al-Anwar</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>Arab Palestinian Resistance</i> (Palestine Liberation Army)	Damascus	monthly
<i>Arab Report and Record</i>	London	monthly
<i>L'Arche</i>	Paris	monthly
<i>Asian Recorder</i>	New Delhi	weekly
<i>Australia Foreign Affairs Record</i> (Foreign Ministry)	Canberra	monthly
<i>al-Baath</i>	Damascus	daily
<i>al-Balagh</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>Bemahane</i> (Army General Staff, Office of Education)	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>Bulletin des Presse und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung</i> (Office of Information, Federal Government)	Bonn	irregular
<i>Bulletin of the Institute for Palestine Studies</i>	Beirut	twice a month

<i>Canada: Statements and Speeches</i> (Ministry of External Affairs, Canada)	Ottawa	irregular
<i>Christian Attitudes on Jews and Judaism</i> (Institute of Jewish Affairs in association with the World Jewish Congress)	London	6 times a year
<i>The Church and the Jewish People Newsletter</i> (World Council of Churches)	Geneva	quarterly
<i>Congressional Record</i>	Washington, D.C.	daily
<i>Current Digest of the Soviet Press</i> (American Association for the Advance- ment of Slavic Studies, Ohio State University)	Columbus, Ohio	weekly
<i>Davar</i> (Histadrut)	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>Department of State Bulletin</i>	Washington, D.C.	weekly
<i>Dis Politika Foreign Policy</i>	Ankara	quarterly
<i>al-Dustur</i>	Amman	daily
<i>al-Dustur</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>Europa Archiv</i>	Bonn	twice a month
<i>L'Express</i>	Paris	weekly
<i>al-Fajr al-Jadid</i>	Tripoli	daily
<i>Filastin al-Thawra</i> (Palestine Liberation Organization)	Beirut	weekly
<i>Foreign Affairs</i> (Council on Foreign Affairs)	New York	quarterly
<i>Foreign Affairs Bulletin</i> (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)	East Berlin	3 times a month
<i>Foreign Affairs Record</i> (Indian Council for World Affairs)	New Delhi	monthly
<i>Free Palestine</i>	London	monthly
<i>The Guardian Weekly</i>	Manchester	weekly
<i>Haaretz</i>	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>al-Hadaf</i> (PFLP)	Beirut	weekly
<i>Hatzofeh</i> (National Religious Party)	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>al-Hawadith</i>	Beirut	weekly



<i>al-Hurriya</i> (Communist Action Organization; DFLP)	Beirut	weekly
<i>Ila al-Amam</i> (PFLP-GC)	Beirut	weekly
<i>International Affairs</i> (All Union Society)	Moscow	monthly
<i>International Herald Tribune</i>	Paris	daily
<i>Israel Digest</i> (World Zionist Organisation)	Jerusalem	twice a month
<i>Israel Magazine</i>	Tel Aviv	monthly
<i>al-Ittihad</i> (Communist Party of Israel-RAKAH)	Haifa	twice a week
<i>The Jerusalem Post</i>	Jerusalem	daily
<i>Jeune Afrique</i>	Paris	weekly
<i>Jewish Affairs</i> (US Communist Party)	New York	6 times a year
<i>Jewish Chronicle</i>	London	weekly
<i>Jewish Frontier</i> (Labor Zionist Alliance)	New York	monthly
<i>Jewish Observer and Middle East Review</i>	London	weekly
<i>Journal of Palestine Studies</i> (Institute for Palestine Studies)	Beirut	quarterly
<i>al-Jumhuriya</i>	Baghdad	daily
<i>Keesing's Contemporary Archives</i>	Bath	weekly
<i>Knesset Records</i>	Jerusalem	daily
<i>The Link</i> (Americans for Middle East Understanding)	New York	6 times a year
<i>Maariv</i>	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>MAPAM Bulletin</i>	Tel Aviv	quarterly
<i>MERIP Reports</i> (Middle East Research and Information Project)	Washington, D.C.	quarterly
<i>Middle East International</i> (Council for the Advancement of Arab- British Understanding)	London	monthly
<i>Middle East Journal</i> (Middle East Institute)	Washington, D.C.	monthly

<i>Middle East Review</i> (American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East)	New York	quarterly
<i>Monday Morning</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>Le Monde</i>	Paris	daily
<i>Moscow News</i> (Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries)	Moscow	weekly
<i>al-Muharrir</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>al-Murabit</i> (Independent Nasserites-Murabitun)	Beirut	weekly
<i>al-Nahar</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>National Jewish Monthly</i> (B'nai B'rith)	Washington, D.C.	monthly
<i>Near East Report</i> (America Israel Public Affairs Committee)	Washington, D.C.	weekly
<i>New Outlook</i> (Jewish-Arab Institute)	Tel Aviv	monthly
<i>New Times</i>	Moscow	weekly
<i>New York Times</i>	New York	daily
<i>New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review</i> (Foreign Ministry)	Wellington	monthly
<i>Newsweek-International edition</i>	New York	weekly
<i>al-Nida</i> (Lebanese Communist Party)	Beirut	daily
<i>Le Nouvel Observateur</i>	Paris	weekly
<i>Orient</i> (Deutsches Orient-Institut)	Hamburg	quarterly
<i>L'Orient-Le Jour</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>Pakistan Horizon</i> (Pakistan Institute of International Affairs)	Karachi	quarterly
<i>Palestine Digest</i> (Arab League)	Washington, D.C.	monthly
<i>Peking Review</i>	Peking	weekly
<i>al-Rai</i>	Amman	daily
<i>Rasd, Idhaat Israil</i> (Palestine Liberation Organization)	Beirut	daily

<i>Relazioni Internazionali</i>	Milan	weekly
<i>Review of International Affairs</i>	Belgrade	twice a month
<i>Revista de Política Internacional</i>	Madrid	quarterly
<i>Revue Romaine d'Etudes Internationales</i>	Bucharest	quarterly
<i>al-Riyad</i>	Riyad	daily
<i>Rose al-Yusuf</i>	Cairo	weekly
<i>al-Safir</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>San Francisco Examiner</i>	San Francisco	daily
<i>al-Sayyad</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>al-Shaab</i>	Algiers	daily
<i>Shu'un Filastiniya</i> (Palestine Liberation Organization)	Beirut	monthly
<i>al-Siyasa</i>	Kuwait	daily
<i>Soviet News</i> (Embassy of the USSR)	London	weekly
<i>Der Spiegel</i>	Hamburg	weekly
<i>La Stampa</i>	Turin	daily
<i>Summary of World Broadcasts</i> (British Broadcasting Corporation)	London	daily
<i>Survey of Current Affairs</i> (Central Office of Information, UK)	London	monthly
<i>Survival</i> (International Institute for Strategic Studies)	London	6 times a year
<i>al-Talai</i> (Saiqa)	Damascus	weekly
<i>al-Thawra</i>	Baghdad	daily
<i>Time-International edition</i>	New York	weekly
<i>The Times</i>	London	daily
<i>Tricontinental</i>	Havana	monthly
<i>UD-informasion</i> (Foreign Ministry)	Oslo	irregular
<i>al-Usubi al-Arabi</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>USSR and Third World</i> (Central Asian Research Centre)	London	8 times a year
<i>UN Monthly Chronicle</i>	New York	monthly
<i>Wafa-Arabic and English editions</i> (Palestine Liberation Organization)	Beirut	daily

*World Marxist Review Information Bulletin*

Toronto

monthly

*Yediot Aharonot*

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United Nations





# Annual Reports Submitted to the General Assembly

## 1

### **Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization: Questions Relating to the Middle East<sup>1</sup>**

August, 1976

#### *A. Search for peaceful settlement*

##### 1. Consideration by the General Assembly

1. At its thirtieth session, the General Assembly considered the situation in the Middle East and the question of Palestine.<sup>2</sup>

2. On 10 November 1975, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions on the question of Palestine.

3. In resolution 3375 (XXX), the Assembly requested the Security Council to consider and adopt the necessary resolutions and measures in order to enable the Palestinian people to exercise its inalienable national rights in accordance with Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX); and called for the invitation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to participate in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East held under the auspices of the United Nations, on an equal footing with other parties, on the basis of resolution 3236 (XXIX). The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to inform the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East of the resolutions, to take all necessary steps to secure the invitation of the PLO to participate in the work of the Conference as well as in all other efforts for peace, and to submit a report on this matter to the Assembly as soon as possible.

4. In resolution 3376 (XXX), the General Assembly, recognizing that the problem of Palestine continued to endanger international peace and

security, reaffirmed its resolution 3236 (XXIX) and expressed its grave concern that no progress had been achieved towards the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights in Palestine, including the right to self-determination and the right to national independence and sovereignty, or towards the exercise by the Palestinians of their inalienable right to return to their homes and property from which they had been displaced and uprooted. The Assembly decided to establish a Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and requested it to consider and recommend to the Assembly a programme of implementation, designed to enable the Palestinian people to exercise the rights recognized in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 3236 (XXIX), taking into account all the powers conferred by the Charter of the United Nations upon the principal organs of the United Nations. The Assembly authorized the Committee to establish contact with, and to receive and consider suggestions and proposals from, any State and intergovernmental regional organization and PLO, and requested the Secretary-General to provide the Committee with all the necessary facilities for the performance of its tasks. The Assembly further requested the Committee to submit its report and recommendations to the Secretary-General no later than 1 June 1976 and requested him to transmit the report to the Security Council, which was asked to consider, as soon as possible after 1 June 1976, the question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of the inalienable rights recognized in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 3236 (XXIX), and to inform the Committee of the action taken by the Council. The Assembly authorized the Committee to submit to it, at its thirty-first session, a report containing the Committee's observation and recommendations.

5. On 5 December, the General Assembly adopted resolution 3414 (XXX) on the situation in the Middle East by which it reaffirmed the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, condemned Israel's continued occupation of

<sup>1</sup> Part I, Chapter 1 of *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1975–15 June 1976, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 1* (UN doc. A/31/1), pp. 3–14.

<sup>2</sup> For the debate in explanation of the two resolutions adopted in this connection, see doc. 10 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

Arab territories and requested all States to desist from supplying that country with military or economic aid as long as it continued to occupy those territories and to deny the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. The Assembly also requested the Security Council to take all the necessary measures for the speedy implementation, according to an appropriate time-table, of all relevant resolutions of the Assembly and the Council aiming at the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the area through a comprehensive settlement, worked out with the participation of all the parties concerned, including PLO, and within the framework of the United Nations, designed to ensure complete Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories as well as full recognition of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people. Furthermore, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to inform all concerned, including the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, and to follow up the implementation of the resolution and report thereon to the Council and to the Assembly at its thirty-first session,

6. On 17 December, the General Assembly appointed the members of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. In this connexion, Israel reiterated that it would in no way co-operate with this Committee.

7. The three resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirtieth session were brought to the attention of the President of the Security Council by the Secretary-General (S/11908, S/11919 and S/11920).

8. On 19 November, the Secretary-General also brought resolution 3375 (XXX) to the attention of the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East. In reply, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that his Government had consistently advocated the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East (A/31/44-S/11931).<sup>3</sup> The Soviet Union believed that the only reliable way of reaching a fundamental settlement of the Middle East problem was through joint collective efforts by all the parties directly concerned, including the Arab people of Palestine represented by PLO. The Soviet Union continued

to hold the firm view that the most appropriate forum for working out fundamental decisions on a Middle East settlement based on the relevant decisions of the Security Council and the Assembly was the Geneva Peace Conference. The Soviet Union resolutely advocated the speediest possible resumption of that Conference with the full and equal participation of the representatives of PLO.

## 2. Work of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People

9. The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, established by General Assembly resolution 3376 (XXX) (see above), met during the period 26 February to 19 May 1976 and, in accordance with paragraph 7 of that resolution, submitted its report to the Secretary-General for transmittal to the Security Council (S/12090).<sup>4</sup>

10. In its report, the Committee recommended an expanded and more influential role by the United Nations in promoting a solution to the question of Palestine and in the implementation of such a solution. In suggesting a phased implementation of the right of the Palestinians to return to their homes, the Committee recommended, *inter alia*, that the Security Council should request the immediate implementation of its resolution 237 (1967) and that such implementation should not be related to any other conditions. It recommended also that the United Nations, in co-operation with the States directly involved, and the Palestine Liberation Organization should proceed to make the necessary arrangements to enable Palestinians displaced between 1948 and 1967 to exercise their right to return to their homes and property in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions, particularly General Assembly resolution 194 (III).

11. For the implementation of the right to self-determination, national independence and sovereignty, the Committee recommended that a time-table should be established by the Security Council for the complete withdrawal, no later than 1 June 1977, of Israeli occupation forces from those areas occupied in 1967. If necessary, temporary peace-keeping forces were to be provided

<sup>3</sup> Doc. 36 below.

<sup>4</sup> Doc. 4 below.

by the Council to facilitate the process of withdrawal. It also recommended that the Council should request Israel to desist from the establishment of new settlements and to withdraw during that period from settlements established since 1967 in the occupied territories. Israel was also to be requested to abide by the provisions of the General Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949 and to declare its recognition of the applicability of that Convention. The evacuated territories should be taken over by the United Nations with the co-operation of the League of Arab States and subsequently handed over to PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. The Committee also recommended that, as soon as the independent Palestinian entity had been established, the United Nations, in co-operation with the States directly involved and the Palestinian entity, should, taking into account General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX), make further arrangements for the full implementation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, the resolution of outstanding problems and the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region, in accordance with all relevant United Nations resolutions.

12. In accordance with paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 3376 (XXX), the report was transmitted to the Security Council for consideration by it, as soon as possible after 1 June 1976, of the question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of the inalienable rights recognized in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 3236 (XXIX). The Council considered the report at eight meetings starting on 9 June.<sup>5</sup>

### 3. Consideration by the Security Council

13. In its resolution 381 (1975) of 30 November 1975 on the extension of the mandate of UNDOF, the Security Council, having expressed concern over the continued state of tension in the area, decided to reconvene on 12 January 1976 to continue the debate on the Middle East problem, including the Palestinian question, taking into account all relevant United Nations resolutions. Following the adoption of that resolution, the

President of the Council made an oral statement<sup>6</sup> to the effect that it was the understanding of the majority of the Council that, when the Council reconvened in accordance with paragraph (a) of resolution 381 (1975), the representative of PLO would be invited to participate in the debate (S/11889).

14. The Security Council met on 12 January 1976 and decided to invite the representative of PLO to participate in the debate, on the basis that the invitation to that organization would confer on it the same rights of participation as were conferred when a Member State was invited to participate under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council. The Council had before it a draft resolution (S/11940),<sup>7</sup> by which the Council would, *inter alia*, affirm that the Palestinian people should be enabled to exercise its inalienable right of self-determination, including the right to establish an independent state in Palestine, and that Israel should withdraw from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967. The draft resolution was not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Security Council.<sup>8</sup>

15. Between 9 January and 20 February, the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council received several communications relating to the consideration of the item by the Council.

16. By a letter dated 9 January (A/31/43-S/11928),<sup>9</sup> the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitted the text of a statement in which his Government reiterated its views on the Middle East problem. It pointed out that, while conditions for the achievement of an over-all settlement had become more favourable, Israel continued to oppose any real progress towards settlement by refusing to withdraw from occupied lands or to recognize the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine. Israel's policy had long been encouraged by certain States which continued to bypass the Geneva Peace Conference and to seek separate arrangements. Such a policy could only further aggravate the situation and increase the danger of new military explosions in the region. The Soviet Government believed that the Security Council

<sup>6</sup> Doc. 12 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>7</sup> Doc. 15 below.

<sup>8</sup> See doc. 10 below.

<sup>9</sup> Doc. 36 below.

<sup>5</sup> See doc. 17 below for the vetoed draft resolution arising out of these meetings.

must base its discussion of the Middle East problem on its resolutions and those of the General Assembly and that its discussion should result in creating the necessary conditions for the resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference.

17. In a letter dated 10 January (S/11929), the representative of Mexico declared that his Government considered the Middle East situation to be the most serious potential threat to world peace and that a comprehensive solution to the problem was necessary, within the framework of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations. Mexico also believed that the permanent members of the Security Council should demonstrate by action that they wished those resolutions implemented.

18. In connexion with the debate in the Security Council and the participation of PLO, the representative of Israel, in a letter dated 14 January (S/11932), drew the attention of the Council to the Palestinian National Covenant, the political programme of PLO and various statements made by Palestinian leaders which, he said, demonstrated that the principles and purposes of that organization were incompatible with and contrary to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.

19. Within the framework of his contacts with the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, the Secretary-General, on 27 January, addressed to them identical letters inquiring about their thinking regarding ways of making progress towards a solution to the Middle East problem.

20. In reply, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated, in a letter of 12 February (A/31/53-S/11985),<sup>10</sup> that the efforts of Israel and its supporters to keep the question of a settlement of the Middle East problem deadlocked, as demonstrated by the results of the recent debate in the Security Council, was a subject of concern. Because of the position of one of its permanent members, the Council had not been able to reach a decision, although the overwhelming majority of the members spoke in favour of specific measures to achieve a comprehensive settlement. With few exceptions, Member States had expressed in the General Assembly, as well as in the Council, the view that genuine peace in the Middle East was impossible unless

Israel withdrew its troops from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and unless the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine were safeguarded and the right of all States of the region to independent existence was guaranteed. It had become evident that the only reliable way to achieve agreement on all the questions involved in a settlement was the resumption, after careful preparation, of the work of the Geneva Peace Conference with the participation of all those directly concerned, including PLO and the Co-Chairmen of the Conference.

21. In his reply of 20 February (A/31/54-S/11991)<sup>11</sup> to the Secretary-General's letter, the Secretary of State of the United States of America indicated that his country shared the Secretary-General's sense of the urgency of pursuing the goal of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and was determined to continue the efforts towards meaningful negotiations. He remarked, however, that there would be no chance of further progress if the negotiating framework were disrupted. The latter was sufficiently flexible and could provide the basis for working out fair and durable solutions to all of the issues involved. Furthermore, the United States had repeatedly affirmed that there would be no permanent peace unless it included arrangements that took into account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people. Having recognized the need for a degree of flexibility on the particular procedures through which the momentum of practical progress in the negotiating process might be maintained, the United States had agreed that a resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference, after careful preparation, would serve the goal of achieving such progress. As a way of proceeding, the United States had proposed a preparatory conference of those who had participated so far in negotiations, and indicated that it was also prepared to consider holding bilateral consultations with the Soviet Union in advance of such a conference.

<sup>10</sup> Doc. 50 below.

<sup>11</sup> Doc. 53 below

## B. Status of the cease-fire

### 1. Egypt-Israel sector

#### (a) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF 16 JULY 1975 ON THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE

22. In conjunction with the expiration of the mandate of UNEF, the Secretary-General issued on 16 July 1975 a report (S/11758) in which he gave a detailed account of the Force's activities for the period from 13 April to 15 July 1975. He pointed out that, during that period, the situation in the UNEF area of operations had remained quiet and that both sides had continued to extend their co-operation to the Force. He observed, however, that the situation in the Middle East as a whole continued to be fundamentally unstable and that the possibility of maintaining the prevailing quiet would depend on further progress in the search for a just and lasting settlement as called for by the Security Council.

23. The Secretary-General considered that the continued presence of UNEF was essential not only to maintain quiet in the sector, but also to provide an atmosphere conducive to further efforts towards the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and to assist in such efforts. In that connexion, he had been informed that the Government of Israel favoured a further extension of the mandate of UNEF for six months. The Secretary-General had also been informed that, while the Government of Egypt did not consent to renew further the mandate of UNEF, it was not against the proper use of the Force.

24. The position of the Government of Egypt was set forth in detail in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt on 14 July 1975 (S/11757).<sup>12</sup> After recalling the various decisions taken by the Security Council in the aftermath of the October 1973 war, including the establishment of UNEF, the Minister stated that, in early 1975, efforts had been deployed to achieve a further disengagement agreement which had been designed to pave the way for the Geneva Peace Conference, but that those efforts had failed owing to Israel's policy of intransigence and procrastination. None the less, in April 1975

Egypt had agreed to the renewal of the mandate of the Force for an additional period of three months and had taken certain practical steps designed to stimulate the process of peace. It had done so on the understanding that the operation of UNEF was temporary in nature and that its role was also to assist in further efforts for the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East. The Minister further asserted that Israel's attitude had shown that it was more interested in perpetuating its occupation of Egyptian territories than in assisting the efforts towards a lasting peace. Under those circumstances, Egypt could not be expected to consent to a further renewal of the mandate of UNEF, although it did not object to the proper use of the Force.

25. On 16 July, in connexion with that letter, the Acting Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations drew the attention of the Secretary-General (S/11759) to a statement made by the Prime Minister of Israel in which, after indicating that his Government had already agreed to the extension of the mandate of UNEF, he stated that Israel was observing its commitments under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on Disengagement of Forces of 18 January 1974 (S/11198, annex)<sup>13</sup> on a basis of reciprocity. If Egypt were interested in not harming that Agreement, it would also have to honour the maintenance and authority of the Force and to refrain from any move which would increase tension in the region.

#### (b) CONSIDERATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL

26. On 23 July, the President of the Security Council issued a note (S/11771) indicating that the Council, on 21 July, had approved the text of an appeal to be addressed to the President of Egypt on behalf of the Council. In that appeal, the President of the Council, taking into account the gravity of the situation in the Middle East, expressed his belief that a further extension of the mandate of UNEF would contribute to the creation of an atmosphere conducive to progress towards agreement on a just and lasting peace in the area. He therefore appealed to the President of Egypt to reconsider his Government's attitude in the matter, assured him that the Council followed the situation very closely and emphasized the importance of achieving further progress towards

<sup>12</sup> Doc. 263 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>13</sup> Doc. 50 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

a just and lasting peace and preventing a stalemate in the area.<sup>14</sup>

27. The note also indicated that, on 23 July, the President of the Security Council had received a reply from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt (S/11771, para. 3), who stated that his Government, having noted the Council's concern over the situation in the Middle East and its emphasis on the importance of achieving further progress towards a just and lasting peace in the area, had accepted a further extension of the mandate of UNEF for an additional three-month period, that is, until 24 October 1975.<sup>15</sup>

28. On 24 July, the Security Council, with two members (China and Iraq) not participating, adopted resolution 371 (1975) by which the Council, taking into account Egypt's letter of 14 July to the Secretary-General and the appeal addressed on 21 July to the Government of Egypt on behalf of the Council, and expressing satisfaction for the reply of that Government thereto, called upon the parties concerned to implement immediately resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, decided that the mandate of UNEF should be extended for three months, that is, until 24 October 1975, and requested the Secretary-General to submit at the end of that period a report on the situation in the Middle East and on the steps taken to implement the resolution.

(c) AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL  
OF 4 SEPTEMBER 1975

29. In a report submitted on 2 September 1975 (S/11818), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of the preliminary action he had taken in relation to the Agreement between Egypt and Israel, which was initialled by the parties on 1 September. In that connexion, the Secretary-General indicated that he had instructed Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo to proceed to Geneva in order to be available and to preside at the forthcoming meetings of the Military Working Group of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, where a detailed protocol for the implementation of the Agreement was to be prepared.

30. In an addendum to the report (S/11818/Add. 1 and Corr. 1),<sup>16</sup> issued on the same day,

the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the text of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel and, in a further report dated 4 September (S/11818/Add. 2), he informed the Council that the Agreement had been signed by the representatives of the two parties at Geneva on 4 September and that the signing had been witnessed by General Siilasvuo.

31. The Agreement provides that the conflict between Egypt and Israel and in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force and that the two sides are determined to reach a final and just settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973. The Agreement is regarded by the parties as a significant step towards a just and lasting peace, but it is not a final peace agreement.

32. The Agreement further provides that the parties shall continue to observe the cease-fire and to refrain from all military and para-military actions against each other. It defined the principles for the new deployment of the military forces of the parties and it set forth in an annex the details concerning such redeployment and all other relevant matters, including the definition of lines and areas, the buffer zones, the limitation on armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance installations and the United Nations functions. The detailed implementation of the agreement was to be determined by the Military Working Group of the Peace Conference on the Middle East.

33. The Agreement also provides that UNEF is essential and shall continue its functions and that its mandate shall be extended annually. A joint commission established under the Agreement will function under the aegis of the Chief Coordinator of United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East in order to consider any problem arising from the Agreement and to assist UNEF in the execution of its mandate.

34. The Agreement is supplemented by a document relating to the early warning system referred to in article IV, in which the United States of America proposed that there should be (a) two surveillance stations to provide strategic early warning—one operated by Egyptian and one operated by Israeli personnel; (b) three watch stations operated by United States civilian personnel in the Mitla and Giddi passes to provide

<sup>14</sup> Doc. 11 in *ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> Doc. 271 in *ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> Doc. 148 in *ibid.*

tactical early warning and (c) three unmanned electronic sensor fields at both ends of each pass and in the general vicinity of each station.

35. On 23 September, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council (S/11818/Add.4) that, on 22 September, the Military Working Group had completed its work on the Protocol to the Agreement between Egypt and Israel and that the Protocol had been signed by the representative of Egypt and initialled by the representatives of Israel. On 10 October (S/11818/Add.5 and Corr. 1), the Secretary-General reported to the Council that the representatives of Israel had signed the Protocol, which had entered into force.

(d) OPERATION OF UNEF AND REPORT OF  
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF  
17 OCTOBER 1975

36. In a note dated 19 August 1975 (S/11808), the President of the Security Council reported to the Council a proposal of the Secretary-General concerning the future co-ordination of peace-keeping operations in the Middle East. According to this proposal, Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, the Commander of UNEF, would be appointed Chief Co-ordinator of United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East, and Major-General Bengt Liljestrand, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, would be appointed Commander of UNEF, while Major-General Hannes Philipp would remain as Commander of UNDOF. After consultations with the members of the Council, the President informed the Secretary-General that the Council had given its consent to the proposed appointment of General Liljestrand as Commander of UNEF. The Council also agreed with the Secretary-General's proposal concerning General Siilasvuo. In this connexion, it should also be mentioned that subsequently the Secretary-General appointed Major-General Emmanuel Alexander Erskine as Chief of Staff of UNTSO with effect from 1 January 1976.

37. In connexion with the expiration of the mandate of UNEF, the Secretary-General submitted on 17 October 1975 a report (S/11849) on the activities of the Force covering the period from 15 July to 16 October. After describing the composition and deployment of the Force, as well as its accommodation and logistics, the Secretary-General outlined the activities of UNEF for the

period under review. He indicated that the Force had continued to carry out its specific tasks under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on Disengagement of Forces of 18 January 1974. On the problem of restrictions on the freedom of movement of personnel of certain contingents, he indicated that the problem still existed despite his efforts and those of the Force Commander. He again reaffirmed his position that UNEF had to function as an integrated and efficient military unit, contingents of which served on an equal basis under the Force Commander.

38. Regarding the responsibilities entrusted to UNEF under the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 4 September (S/11818/Add.1 and Corr.1, annex) and the Protocol thereto of 22 September 1975 (S/11818/Add.5 and Corr.1, annex), the Secretary-General stated that those responsibilities were more extensive than the ones the Force had been discharging under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on Disengagement of Forces and that its new operational areas would be much larger. Among the new functions entrusted to UNEF during the initial stage, he mentioned the exercise of good offices in the transfer of oilfields, installations and infrastructures, the monitoring of the redeployment of forces and the escorting of Egyptian personnel to and from the site of the Egyptian surveillance station. The Force's long-term functions included the supervision of agreed limitations, as specified in the annex to the Agreement and the Protocol, the establishment and manning of checkpoints and observation posts, as well as patrolling functions, escorting and other activities. In view of the more extensive responsibilities entrusted to UNEF, the Secretary-General felt that additional military personnel and equipment would be needed to enable the Force to function adequately, including the reinforcement of non-logistic contingents of UNEF by a total of approximately 750 all ranks and the strengthening of the logistics contingents by some 86 personnel.

39. With regard to the implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973), the Secretary-General, after recalling the efforts made at several levels as at 16 July 1975 to advance the implementation of the resolution, stated that those efforts had continued during the period under review. In that connexion, he referred in particular to article 1 of the Agreement of 4 September 1975 between Egypt and Israel, where the

two Governments had agreed that the conflict between them should not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means, and that they were determined to reach a final settlement by means of the negotiations called for by resolution 338 (1973).

40. In conclusion the Secretary-General cautioned that, in spite of the prevailing quiet in the sector and although the interim Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 4 September 1975 was an important development, any relaxation of the search for a comprehensive settlement could be dangerous in the months ahead. He expressed the hope that urgent efforts would be undertaken by all concerned to tackle the Middle East problem in all its aspects and reiterated his conviction that the presence of UNEF remained essential not only to help maintain the cease-fire called for by the Security Council in resolution 338 (1973), but also to assist in the implementation of the new Agreement. In the circumstances and considering the relevant provisions of the Agreement, the Secretary-General recommended the extension of the mandate of UNEF.

#### (e) CONSIDERATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL

41. On 23 October, the Security Council met to consider the report of the Secretary-General on UNEF (S/11849) and, with two members (China and Iraq) not participating, adopted resolution 378 (1975) by which the Council, after having examined the report, decided that the mandate of UNEF should be extended for an additional period of one year, that is, until 24 October 1976. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to submit at the end of that period a report on the developments in the situation and the steps taken to implement resolution 338 (1973).

## 2. Israel-Syria sector

#### (a) OPERATION OF UNDOF AND REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

42. In a note dated 9 July (S/11750), the President of the Security Council reported that, on 7 July, the Secretary-General had indicated to him his intention, if the Council so consented, to appoint Colonel Hannes Philipp of Austria as Commander of UNDOF. Colonel Philipp had been acting temporarily as Officer-in-Charge,

since Brigadier-General Gonzalo Briceño Zevallos of Peru had been released, at the request of his Government, from his assignment as Interim Commander of the Force. The Secretary-General understood that it was the intention of the Austrian Government to confer shortly upon Colonel Philipp the title of Major-General. The President of the Council, following consultations with the Council members, had informed the Secretary-General on 8 July that the Council consented to the proposed appointment.

43. With regard to the replacement of the Peruvian contingent, which had been withdrawn as from 20 July 1975 at the request of the Government of Peru, the President of the Security Council issued a note on 22 July (S/11768) in which he indicated that the Secretary-General had proposed the replacement of that contingent by one from Iran. The President, following consultations with the members of the Council, informed the Secretary-General that the Council agreed with his proposal.

44. In connexion with the expiration of the mandate of UNDOF, the Secretary-General, on 24 November, submitted to the Security Council a report (S/11883) giving an account of the activities of the Force during the period from 22 May to 24 November. The Secretary-General stated that, during that period, the situation in the UNDOF area of operations had remained generally quiet and that both parties had continued generally to comply with the cease-fire and with the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces (S/11302/Add.1, annex 1).

45. As in previous reports on the Force, the Secretary-General provided details about its deployment, rotation, accommodation and logistics. With regard to its freedom of movement, he felt that the arrangements that had been worked out had fallen short of what was provided for in the Protocol to the Agreement on Disengagement, but he indicated that the efforts were continuing in order to secure full acceptance of this principle. He also reported that UNDOF mine-clearing teams had continued their work and increased the area accessible to foot and vehicle patrols.

46. Concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973), the Secretary-General stated that efforts to advance the implementation of the resolution had continued on several levels, including the contacts between the



two Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East and between them and other parties concerned. He indicated that he had remained involved in those efforts and that his current visit to the area in November 1975 was directly related to them.

47. The Secretary-General further observed that the existing quiet was a precarious one. The Agreement on Disengagement, he added, was not a peace agreement, but only a step towards a just and durable peace on the basis of Security Council resolution 338 (1973). Unless further progress could be made towards the objective set forth in that resolution, the situation in the area would remain unstable and would become increasingly dangerous. Therefore he considered that the continued presence of UNDOF was essential not only to maintain quiet in the Israel-Syria sector, but also to provide an atmosphere conducive to further peace efforts and to assist in such efforts, if required. The Secretary-General, who was at the time undertaking a visit to the area to discuss with the parties concerned the existing situation in all its aspects, including the question of the extension of the UNDOF mandate, indicated that he would report to the Council on the latter question as soon as possible.

48. In a further report, dated 28 November (S/11883/Add.1), the Secretary-General indicated that, between 22 and 27 November, he had held talks with the leaders of the Syrian Arab Republic, Israel, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan.

49. In the Syrian Arab Republic, President Assad had expressed his strong disappointment to the Secretary-General that no progress had been made in the negotiating field with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic since 1974, when UNDOF was established, and indicated that it was thus difficult for his country to approve the prolongation of the mandate of UNDOF. The Syrian Arab Republic wished the Security Council to deal with the substance of the Middle East problem, including the Palestinian question. Furthermore it would not participate in the Geneva Peace Conference or any other forum of negotiations unless PLO were a participant. Subsequently, however, President Assad declared his readiness to agree to a renewal of the mandate of UNDOF for another six-month period, combined with a specific provision that the Council would reconvene in January 1976 to hold a substantive debate on the Middle

East problem, including the Palestinian question, with the participation of representatives of PLO.

50. Israel, on the other hand, regarded UNDOF as an integral part of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces of 31 May 1974, and remained opposed to linking the extension of its mandate to the form of further negotiations. It was willing to negotiate at any time with the Syrian Arab Republic, but not with PLO. Once the mandate was extended, Israel would be ready to participate in a reconvened Geneva Peace Conference on the understanding that only the original participants would be at the Conference. Israel considered that Security Council resolution 338 (1973) provided the basis for negotiations, but did not accept the Council as the negotiating body for the Middle East problem.

51. With regard to his talks with the leaders of Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon, the Secretary-General stated that those talks had been most useful and that they had contributed considerably to his understanding of the over-all situation in the Middle East.

52. In conclusion, the Secretary-General reiterated his conviction that the presence of UNDOF was essential not only to maintain quiet in the Israel-Syria sector, but also to provide an atmosphere conducive to further negotiation efforts. In the light of the consultations he had had in the area, he proposed the extension of its mandate for a further six-month period on the assumption that the Council would reach agreement on a corresponding decision, taking due account of the positions put forward by the parties.

#### (b) CONSIDERATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL

53. On 30 November, the Security Council considered the report of the Secretary-General on UNDOF (S/11883 and Add.1) and, with two members (China and Iraq) not participating, adopted resolution 381 (1975), by which the Council decided to renew the mandate of UNDOF for another period of six months. As indicated above (see para. 13), the Council also decided to reconvene on 12 January 1976 to continue the debate on the Middle East problem, including the Palestinian question, taking into account all relevant United Nations resolutions.

54. As the mandate of UNDOF was to expire

in May 1976, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a comprehensive report on the operations of the Force covering the period from 25 November 1975 to 24 May 1976 (S/12083). The Secretary-General stated that, during that period, UNDOF had been able to carry out the tasks entrusted to it and that, in his capacity as Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East, Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo had continued to take part in high-level contacts and, as occasion required, in meetings between the military representatives of both Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic concerning the functioning of the Force.

55. With regard to the freedom of movement of the Force, he pointed out that, despite efforts made towards resolving that question, the arrangements that had been worked out fell short of what was required. However, efforts were continuing to secure full acceptance of that important principle.

56. Concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973), the Secretary-General stated that efforts to that effect had continued on several levels, including the contacts with the parties concerned and the two Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East. He indicated that he had remained actively involved in those efforts.

57. In an additional report submitted on 27 May following his visit to Damascus (S/12083/Add. 1), the Secretary-General observed that the situation in the UNDOF area of operations had remained quiet, there being no incidents of a serious nature. He added, however, that the situation in the area as a whole remained tense and unstable and cautioned that, unless progress could be achieved towards a just and durable peace, the situation in the Middle East would become increasingly dangerous. He reiterated his conviction that the presence of UNDOF continued to be essential not only to maintain quiet in the sector, but also to provide an atmosphere conducive to further peace efforts. He therefore recommended that the Security Council should extend the mandate of UNDOF for a further period of six months, indicating in that connexion that the Governments of the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel had given assent to the proposed extension.

58. On 28 May, the Security Council considered the report of the Secretary-General on UNDOF

(S/12083 and Add.1) and, with two members (China and the Libyan Arab Republic) not participating, adopted resolution 390 (1976), by which the Council, after calling upon the parties concerned to implement immediately Council resolution 338 (1973), decided to renew the mandate of UNDOF for another period of six months, and requested the Secretary-General to submit at the end of that period a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement resolution 338 (1973).

### 3. Israel-Lebanon sector

#### (a) REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND COMMUNICATIONS BY THE PARTIES

59. During the period under review, the cease-fire situation in the Israel-Lebanon sector was the subject of periodic reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council based on information submitted by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO (S/11663 and Add.1-5, 6-15, 16-19, 20-24, and 25-27). These reports showed that, during that period, the situation in the sector was marked by frequent incidents, including overflights by Israeli forces aircraft, air attacks against Lebanon and firing incidents across the Armistice Demarcation Line. Israeli forces personnel continued to occupy daily, during daylight hours, five positions located on the Lebanese side of the Armistice Demarcation Line. The reports also contained complaints received by UNTSO from the Lebanese authorities concerning violations of the cease-fire by Israeli forces and summaries of inquiries carried out by United Nations military observers on some of these complaints at the request of the Lebanese authorities.

60. Certain incidents were also the subject of communications to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council by Israel and Lebanon.

61. By a letter dated 7 July (A/10131-S/11747), Lebanon informed the Secretary-General that Israeli artillery had shelled a number of villages in southern Lebanon along a wide front and that Israeli forces had penetrated into Lebanon and demolished several houses and kidnapped civilians. On 8 July, Israel replied (A/10133-S/11749) that Lebanon had misrepresented the facts in order to mislead public opinion. Israel had only taken action against a number of PLO

terrorists based in the southern part of Lebanon, from which they had set out on murder missions against civilian localities in Israel. In view of the virtual control exercised over parts of Lebanese territory by PLO and the close co-operation between that organization and the Government of Lebanon, Israel had no choice but to exercise its inherent right of self-defence and to take all the necessary measures to protect its citizens and its territory. A further letter was sent by Lebanon on 24 July on this subject (A/10161-S/11776).

62. In letters dated 6 and 21 August, Lebanon brought to the attention of the Secretary-General further attacks by Israel against Lebanese territory. On 6 August, Lebanon complained (A/10171-S/11791) that Israeli forces, supported by artillery, had launched land, sea and air attacks on the town of Tyre (Sour), killing four Lebanese army officers and two civilians and destroying 15 houses. On 21 August, Lebanon again complained (A/10206-S/11810 and Corr.1) that on the previous day Israeli aircraft had raided two villages located at more than 150 kilometres from the Lebanese-Israeli border. Those raids, Lebanon observed, undertaken on the eve of a peaceful mission to the Middle East by the Secretary of State of the United States, indicated that Israel was not prepared to create the necessary conditions for a just and lasting peace in the area.

63. By letters dated 4 and 12 September (A/10216-S/11821, A/10231-S/11822), Lebanon also charged that raids carried out by Israeli aircraft against the Palestinian Refugee Camp at Burghuliyeh and the adjacent fields had resulted in casualties and substantial damage to property.

64. Between mid-June and the end of August, Israel addressed to the Secretary-General several letters regarding the continuing activities of terrorist organizations and their unabated attacks against Israeli towns and villages from Lebanese territory. Israel stated that such attacks had resulted in several casualties among the civilian population and that some of the terrorists who participated in those attacks had also been killed in clashes with Israeli security forces. Israel again held Lebanon responsible for the situation (A/10118-S/11726), A/10120-S/11728, A/10134-S/11755, A/10170-S/11790 and A/10173-S/11792).

#### (b) CONSIDERATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL

65. On 3 December, Lebanon requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the massive air attack, launched the preceding day by Israel on refugee camps and villages in various parts of Lebanon, causing heavy casualties among the civilian population (S/11892).

66. On the same day, Egypt also requested an urgent meeting of the Council to discuss the Israeli attack and requested the participation of PLO in the Council's debate (S/11893).

67. In connexion with that debate, the representative of Algeria transmitted, on 4 December (S/11897), a declaration adopted by the Coordinating Committee of the Non-Aligned Countries in the United Nations asking the Security Council to condemn Israel's act of aggression and to take steps to restrain that country from launching attacks against its neighbours and terrorizing the Palestinian refugees.<sup>17</sup>

68. On 4 December, the Security Council decided to invite PLO to participate in its debate, on the basis that that invitation conferred upon that organization the same rights of participation as were conferred when a Member State was invited to participate under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council.

69. In its consideration of the item between 4 and 8 December, the Security Council had before it a draft resolution (S/11898), by which the Council would, *inter alia*, strongly condemn Israel for its premeditated air attacks against Lebanon, call upon it to desist from such attacks and warn it that, if the attacks were repeated, the Council would have to consider taking appropriate steps to give effect to its decisions.

70. The draft resolution was not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Security Council.<sup>18</sup>

### C. Situation in occupied territories

#### (a) COMMUNICATIONS FROM MEMBER STATES

71. In letters to the Secretary-General dated 29 July (A/10163-S/11780) and 31 July 1975 (A/10164-S/11784), respectively, Israel and Egypt stated their views regarding the transfer in February 1975 of several Bedouin families in the Sinai.

<sup>17</sup> Doc. 200 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>18</sup> See doc. 205 in *ibid*.

Israel stated that the transfer was motivated by imperative military and security reasons, while Egypt accused Israel of invoking pretexts for carrying out its repressive policies.

72. By a letter dated 7 August, the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Jordan transmitted the text of a telegram (A/10178-S/11799), addressed to the Secretary-General by Jordan's Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, concerning violations perpetrated by Israel against the sanctity and physical integrity of the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron, including numerous acts of desecration of the Mosque, obstruction of the worshippers in their prayers and the assignment of a large part of the Mosque for use by Jews. On 20 August, Israel replied (A/10204-S/11809) that, in contrast to Jordan's record in the matter prior to 1967, Israel's policy regarding all the Holy Places had been to guarantee free access to members of all faiths and to ensure orderly conditions of worship to members of every religion. As the Cave of Machpela was holy to both Judaism and Islam, arrangements had been made to enable both Muslims and Jews to worship in an orderly manner based on mutual respect.

73. On 1 March 1976, the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic requested the circulation of a letter (S/12000) addressed to the President of the Security Council on 23 February by the Acting Permanent Observer of PLO, who charged that following a Jerusalem magistrate court's ruling that Jews had the right to pray in the sacred Al-Haram Al-Sharif, the ruling Zionist groups had announced their plans to organize "pray-ins" in the Mosque. The ruling, he pointed out, was in violation of several Council resolutions, including resolution 252 (1968). Furthermore, it had sparked a wave of violent demonstrations in most major West Bank towns and in East Jerusalem, which in turn had brought about acts of repression by the Israeli authorities, resulting in death and injuries to many Palestinians.

74. On 12 March, the representative of Saudi Arabia transmitted to the Secretary-General (A/31/63-S/12012) the text of a statement by members of the Islamic Conference, which had met to consider the grave situation in occupied Arab Jerusalem resulting from recent Israeli violations of Security Council resolutions concerning the status of the Holy City and the profanation of the Al-Aqsa Mosque. The members of the Conference

referred in particular to the recent magistrate court's ruling that Jews had the right to pray in the Mosque and regarded it as a part of the systematic and persistent policy of the Israeli occupation authorities aiming at gradually obliterating the Moslem and Christian heritage in the Holy City, in violation of United Nations resolutions. While taking note with appreciation of the efforts made by the Secretary-General as a result of the representations made to him by the Islamic Group, they requested him and the President of the Security Council to take immediate steps to stop the Israeli violations and to keep under urgent attention the situation in the Holy City and in the rest of the occupied territories.<sup>19</sup>

#### (b) CONSIDERATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL

75. By a letter dated 19 March (S/12017), the representatives of the Libyan Arab Republic and Pakistan requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the serious situation arising from recent developments in the occupied territories. They also requested that the representatives of PLO be invited to participate in the debate, as on previous occasions.

76. The Security Council met from 22 to 25 March to consider the matter. On 22 March, it decided to invite PLO to participate in its deliberations on the question under the same conditions as at previous meetings. On 25 March, the Council considered a draft resolution (S/12022) whereby it would, *inter alia*, call on Israel to refrain from all measures against the Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories, to respect and uphold the inviolability of the Holy Places which were under its occupation, to desist from the expropriation of or encroachment upon Arab lands and properties or the establishment of Israeli settlements thereon in the occupied Arab territories, to desist from all other actions and policies designed to change the legal status of the City of Jerusalem and to rescind measures already taken to that effect.<sup>20</sup>

77. The draft resolution was not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.

78. On 14 April, the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Libyan Arab Republic requested the circulation of a letter (S/12052) addressed to the President

<sup>19</sup> Doc. 65 below.

<sup>20</sup> Doc. 16 below.

of the Security Council by the Acting Permanent Observer of PLO, who drew the attention of the Council to the acquisition by Israel of "vast amounts" of Palestinian lands, through purchase or expropriation, and requested the Council to assume its responsibilities by putting an end to such acts and seriously considering the termination of the Israeli occupation.

79. On the same day, the representative of Oman, acting as Chairman of the Arab Group, conveyed (S/12053) to the Secretary-General the Group's deep concern about the continuous violation by Israel of United Nations resolutions and of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 by secretly acquiring land in the occupied Arab territories, and requested him to send his representative or a representative of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories to the area to look into that matter.

80. On 30 March, the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic drew the attention of the President of the Security Council (S/12029) to a letter addressed to him by the Acting Permanent Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the United Nations concerning Israel's policy of repression against the Palestinian people in the occupied territories. The Council was requested to assume its responsibility and to take immediate measures to put an end to the explosive situation.

81. On 3 May, the representative of Egypt drew the attention of the President of the Security Council to the latest developments on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (S/12066), which resulted from the continuation of Israeli occupation and terrorist practices, and requesting an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the continued deterioration of the situation.

82. The Security Council held seven meetings between 4 and 26 May to consider the request of Egypt, at the conclusion of which the President of the Council said that he was authorized to make a statement which had emerged from consultations with the members of the Council. It declared that the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War was applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967. The occupying Power was therefore asked strictly to respect the provisions

of that text and to refrain from and rescind any measures which would violate them. In this connexion, the measures taken by Israel in the occupied Arab territories, establishment of settlements, were deplored. These measures, which cannot prejudice the outcome of the efforts to achieve peace, constitute an obstacle to peace. The Security Council should continue to follow the situation closely.<sup>21</sup>

#### D. Assistance to Palestine refugees

##### 1. Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA

83. On 12 September 1975, the Commissioner-General of UNRWA submitted his annual report for the period 1 July 1974 to 30 June 1975. The report reviewed the Agency's programmes and the efforts it had made for the relief, health, education and training of the Palestine refugees. It gave an account of the political and economic environment in which the Agency's operations were carried on and stressed once again the financial difficulties of the Agency and the serious implications they had for its activities.

84. The Commissioner-General pointed out that the continuing civil strife in Lebanon had further aggravated the situation of the refugees and disrupted the Agency's activities, not only in Lebanon itself, but in the Syrian Arab Republic and Jordan as well. While the Agency could do little to improve its operations in Lebanon, efforts had been made to maintain services in the Syrian Arab Republic, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip through guidance from Agency headquarters, where vital services were provided on a centralized basis.

85. With respect to the financial condition of UNRWA, the Commissioner-General pointed out that the Agency was going through the worst financial crisis in its history, with an estimated deficit of \$55 million for 1976.<sup>22</sup>

##### 2. Report of the Secretary-General

86. On 16 September 1975, the Secretary-General submitted a report (A/10253) in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 3331 D (XXIX) of 17 December 1974, concerning the displaced

<sup>21</sup> Doc. 13 below.

<sup>22</sup> Doc. 3 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

persons in the Israeli-occupied territories, by which the Assembly had called upon Israel to take immediate steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants, to desist from all measures that obstructed their return, including measures affecting the physical and demographic structure of the occupied territories, and to take effective steps for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they had been removed in the Gaza Strip, to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation and to desist from carrying out military attacks on refugee camps. In reply to the Secretary-General's request for information on the implementation of that resolution, Israel stated that, despite the conditions prevailing in the occupied territories, it had continued to facilitate the return of persons displaced in 1967. The measures taken by the Israeli authorities in the Gaza Strip were designed to ensure the safety of the inhabitants of the area. Similarly, the military operations undertaken by the Israeli defence forces in Lebanon were directed solely against the PLO terror organization, which maintained training bases in those camps. The report also included information received from the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, according to which there had been further demolition of shelters in the Gaza area. Some of the refugees affected by that action had been provided with alternative accommodation, but most remained inadequately housed.<sup>23</sup>

### 3. Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine

87. By a note issued on 30 September 1975, the Secretary-General circulated a report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/10271) prepared in pursuance of paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 3331 A (XXIX) of 17 December 1974, by which the Commission was requested to exert continued efforts towards the implementation of paragraph 11 of Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 concerning the repatriation or compensation of Palestine refugees. In its report, which covered the period from 30 September 1974 to 29 September 1975, the Commission stated that, despite encouragement provided by the efforts which had been

made towards a Middle East settlement, the circumstances governing the possibilities opened to it had remained essentially unchanged. The Commission expressed the hope that recent developments would enable it to carry forward its work vigorously.<sup>24</sup>

### 4. Reports of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA

88. On 26 September 1975, the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East submitted a special report (A/10268) in which it drew attention to the Agency's critical financial position, pointing out that, despite the generosity of many Governments in responding to the appeals made by the Secretary-General, the Commissioner-General and the Working Group, the 1975 budget of UNRWA had remained in heavy deficit and that the Agency's working capital was almost completely exhausted. The Working Group expressed the view that the Agency's services to the Palestine refugees must be maintained at least at their present level until a just settlement of this problem was achieved. It further believed that any reductions in UNRWA's services would result in widespread human suffering and unforeseeable political consequences. The Assembly therefore called upon all Member States to make sufficient contributions urgently to cover the Agency's \$13.2 million deficit.

89. On 6 November, the Working Group also submitted its annual report (A/10334) in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 3330 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974. The report emphasized the Agency's critical financial situation, which might lead, unless additional contributions were received in the immediate future, to a complete suspension of the Agency's services. The Working Group expressed the opinion that any reduction in the services provided by the Agency would have serious implications for the refugees themselves, for the countries in which they lived and for the prospects for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East as a whole. It further expressed the belief that the continuation of the Agency's services was an obligation of the United Nations acting on behalf of the international community and urged that Governments, particularly those which had

<sup>23</sup> Doc. 5 in *ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> Doc. 7 in *ibid.*

not contributed in the past or had so far contributed inadequately, be willing to reconsider seriously their position and contribute more generously.

## 5. Consideration by the General Assembly

90. On 8 December 1975, the General Assembly adopted four resolutions on this item.

91. In resolution 3419 A (XXX), the General Assembly endorsed the efforts of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA to continue to provide humanitarian assistance, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and in serious need of continued assistance as a result of the June 1967 hostilities.

92. In resolution 3419 B (XXX), the General Assembly, *inter alia*, noted with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine had been unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of Assembly resolution 194 (III); requested the Commission to exert continued efforts towards that end and to report as appropriate, but not later than 1 October 1976; and called upon all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of UNRWA, particularly in the light of the budgetary deficit projected in the Commissioner-General's report.

93. In resolution 3419 C (XXX), the General Assembly reaffirmed the right of the displaced inhabitants to return to their homes and camps in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, and reiterated its call upon Israel to take effective steps immediately for the return of the displaced inhabitants and to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation, and to desist from further removal of refugees and destruction of their shelters. The Assembly condemned Israeli military attacks on refugee camps and called upon Israel immediately to desist from such attacks.

94. In resolution 3419 D (XXX), the General Assembly commended the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA for its work and requested it to continue its efforts, in co-operation with the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General, for the financing of the Agency for a further period of one year.

## 6. Activities of UNRWA

95. On 1 July 1975, there were 1,632,707

refugees registered with UNRWA in all categories, of whom 827,905 received basic rations. Less than 36 per cent of the refugees were living in refugee camps, including 98,663 (together with about 44,607 displaced persons) in the emergency camps established in east Jordan and in the Syrian Arab Republic after June 1967. The inhabitants of these emergency camps and an even larger number of displaced refugees and other displaced persons living outside camps were still prevented by the Israeli authorities from returning for residence to the Israeli-occupied West Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights.

96. The disturbances in Lebanon, which started in March 1975, increased in intensity during the following months and, from September onwards, there was a progressive collapse of the normal framework of security within which United Nations operations were carried on. Loss of life and damage to property were very heavy and all sections of the population, including Palestine refugees, were affected. Damage was caused to Agency schools and other installations and to shelters in refugee camps in and around Beirut. The fighting, in which rockets, mortars and artillery were used in addition to small automatic arms, disrupted the provision of services to the refugees in Lebanon, although these services were maintained at a surprisingly high level for much of the year in the north and the south of the country. Because operations were brought to a standstill in the port of Beirut, the main port of entry for supplies to Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic, these Fields were also affected until supplies could be rerouted. United Nations offices in Beirut remained closed for long periods because staff could not reach them safely and, as communications were also frequently disrupted, it became impossible for UNRWA headquarters to function effectively in that city.

97. As a result of the emergency and in order to ensure supervision and support of operations in all Fields, temporary headquarters were established elsewhere from January 1976 onwards. The shortage of accommodation and inadequacy of other facilities in the area made it necessary to move part of the headquarters to Amman and part to Vienna, the intention being, however, to consolidate the headquarters office as soon as possible in the area of operations, either at Beirut or in Amman. The Lebanon Field Office con-

tinued to provide services to refugees in Lebanon under the most difficult conditions.

98. At the end of June 1975, the Agency still had a deficit of \$22.4 million for 1975 in a budget of \$124.3 million and the threat of reductions in services to the Palestine refugees was imminent. The financial crisis was so severe that it appeared the Agency would be forced to cease or suspend all of its operations before the end of 1975. Collapse was avoided only by the provision of substantial special contributions during the second half of the year in response to urgent appeals by the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General. Even with this additional income, the deferment of commitment of funds for school buildings and the forgoing of the make-up of short issues of flour that occurred earlier in the year for logistical reasons, the Agency was barely able to maintain services, and the year ended with about \$1.8 million of the deficit still not covered and a significant reduction in the already inadequate working capital.

99. The financial position for 1976 gave rise to even greater anxiety, the deficit at the beginning of the year being no less than \$55 million in a budget that had risen to \$139 million because of increased commodity costs, local inflation and unfavourable exchange rates for the United States dollar against local Arab currencies of payment. Additional contributions received or pledged, lower flour prices and improved exchange rates for the United States dollar had reduced the deficit to some \$43 million in a budget of \$130 million by the end of April, but its persistence at this level portended drastic reductions in services, including the highly valued education programme, unless adequate funds were assured within a matter of weeks. Expenditure for the budget (calendar) year 1976 on the education programme—including the education of children in UNRWA/UNESCO schools (approximately 300,000 in the 1975–1976 school year), vocational and teacher training in eight centres, and university scholarships—is estimated at \$60.1 million (46.2 per cent). Expenditure on medical and environmental health services in 1976 is estimated at about \$14.5 million (11.2 per cent). Basic rations, supplementary feeding for especially vulnerable groups of the refugee population and other relief programmes account for \$49 million (37.7 per cent). The balance comprises other costs not

readily allocated to the normal Agency programmes for \$6.4 million (4.9 per cent), of which about half is a consequence of the temporary relocation of Agency headquarters.

100. Questions arising from the large-scale demolition of refugee shelters by the Israeli authorities in the Gaza Strip in 1971, notably inadequate rehousing, have been dealt with in the Secretary-General's report (A/9740) submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3089 C (XXVIII)<sup>25</sup> and in the Commissioner-General's report for the period 1 July 1974 to 30 June 1975.

101. Detailed information on the activities of UNRWA from 1 July 1975 to 30 June 1976 will be found in the report of the Commissioner-General.

## 2

### **Report of the Security Council: Questions Concerning the Middle East<sup>26</sup>**

**November, 1976**

#### **A. The situation in the Middle East: status of the cease-fire**

##### **1. THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE (UNEF)**

##### *(a) Communications to the Security Council received between 15 June and 15 July 1975*

5. By a note dated 15 July 1975 (S/11757), the Secretary-General brought to the attention of the Security Council the text of a letter addressed to him on 14 July by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, in which it was recalled that despite the failure of efforts to achieve a further disengagement agreement that would pave the way for the resumption of the Geneva Conference, attributed in the letter to Israel's intransigence and procrastination, the Government of Egypt had agreed in April to the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) until 24 July but had underlined the temporary nature of the Force and its functions as a first step in the implementation

<sup>25</sup> Doc. 4 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

<sup>26</sup> Part I, Chapter 1 of *Report of the Security Council, 16 June 1975–15 June 1976, Official Reports of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 2* (UN doc. A/31/2), pp. 2–19.



of Security Council resolutions 338 (1973) and 242 (1967). Israel had profited from the relative prevailing quiet to further its occupation rather than to assist efforts aimed at achieving a lasting peace. Under the circumstances, Egypt could not be expected to consent to the continued occupation of its territory and did not agree to a further renewal of the UNEF mandate, although it was not against the proper use of the Force.<sup>27</sup>

6. In a letter dated 16 July (S/11759), the representative of Israel, with reference to the above letter, drew attention to a statement of the same date by the Prime Minister of Israel, in which he had indicated that his Government had agreed to the extension of the UNEF mandate and stated that Israel was observing its commitments under the Agreement on Disengagement of Forces on a basis of reciprocity. If Egypt was interested in not harming that Agreement, it would also have to honour the maintenance and authority of the Force and refrain from any move which increased tension in the region.

(b) *Extension of the mandate of UNEF until  
24 October 1975*

(i) *Report of the Secretary-General dated 16 July  
1975*

7. As the mandate of UNEF was due to expire on 24 July 1975, the Secretary-General submitted a report on 16 July (S/11758) on the operations of the Force for the period 13 April to 15 July 1975. During that period, he stated, the situation in the UNEF area of operations had remained stable. As of 15 July, the Force's personnel totalled 3,919 men, excluding the Canadian and Polish logistic components assigned to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). The report indicated that the functions and guidelines of the Force, as well as the specific tasks assigned to it, had remained unchanged. Indicating that the problem of restrictions on the freedom of movement of personnel of certain contingents still existed, despite the efforts that he and the Force Commander had made, the Secretary-General maintained that UNEF must function as an integrated and efficient military unit, that its contingents must serve on an equal basis under the command of the Force Commander and that

no differentiation could be made regarding the United Nations status of the various contingents. During the period, he added, there had been no significant violations of the agreements.

8. Pursuant to the request made to him in Security Council resolution 368 (1975) to report on the measures taken to implement resolution 338 (1973), the Secretary-General stated that he had indicated in his report on UNDOF (S/11694) that efforts had been made on several levels to advance matters and that he had lost no opportunity to try to contribute to that process. Those efforts had continued at high-level meetings among the parties concerned, including the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, but he was not in a position to inform the Council of the results.

9. In conclusion, the Secretary-General observed that although the situation in the UNEF area of operations had remained quiet, the situation in the Middle East as a whole continued to be fundamentally unstable. The possibility of maintaining the prevailing quiet would depend on further progress in the search for a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East problem. He considered that the continued presence of UNEF was essential not only to maintain quiet in the sector but to provide an atmosphere conducive to further efforts to the achievement of a just and lasting peace and to assist in such efforts. In that connexion, the Government of Egypt had informed him that although it did not consent to further renewal of the mandate of UNEF, it was not against the proper use of the Force. The Government of Israel had indicated that it favoured a further extension of the mandate of UNEF for six months.

(ii) *Consideration at the 1832nd and 1833rd  
meetings (21–24 July 1975)*

10. At its 1832nd meeting on 21 July, the Security Council included the following item in its agenda without objection:

“The situation in the Middle East:

“Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force (S/11758).”

11. The President referred to prior consultations and read out the text of a draft appeal to be addressed to the President of Egypt on behalf of the Council. Before the President put the text of the appeal to the vote, statements were made

<sup>27</sup> Doc. 263 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

by the representatives of China and Iraq.

DECISION: *At its 1832nd meeting, on 21 July 1975, the Security Council adopted the appeal by 13 votes to none. Two members (China and Iraq) did not participate in the vote.*

12. The text of the appeal read as follows:

"Based on discussions I have held with the Secretary-General and members of the Security Council, and taking account of the gravity of the situation in the Middle East, I believe a further extension of the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force would make in the present circumstances a significant contribution to creating an atmosphere conducive to progress towards agreement on a just and lasting peace in the area. Therefore, on behalf of the Security Council, I appeal to you to reconsider the attitude of Egypt on the situation. I assure you that the Security Council, appreciative of the constructive measures already taken towards peace, follows the situation very closely and emphasizes the importance of achieving further progress towards a just and lasting peace and preventing a stalemate in the Middle East."<sup>28</sup>

13. In a note dated 23 July 1975 (S/11771), the President of the Security Council indicated that on 21 July, immediately following the meeting, he had communicated the appeal to the President of Egypt. The note also reproduced the text of the reply the President of the Security Council had received on 23 July from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt.<sup>29</sup> It stated that the Egyptian Government, having noted the Council's concern over the situation in the Middle East and its emphasis on the importance of achieving further progress towards a just and lasting peace in the area, accepted the further extension of the mandate of UNEF for an additional three-month period, until 24 October 1975.

14. At the 1833rd meeting on 24 July, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Egypt and Israel, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

15. The Council had before it a draft resolution (S/11774/Rev.1), which the President stated had been prepared in the course of consultations among all the members of the Security Council. The draft resolution read as follows:

"*The Security Council,*

"*Recalling its resolutions 338 (1973) of 22 Octo-*

*ber, 340 (1973) of 25 October and 341 (1973) of 27 October 1973, 346 (1974) of 8 April and 362 (1974) of 23 October 1974 and 368 (1975) of 17 April 1975,*

"*Taking into account the letter dated 14 July 1975 addressed by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the Secretary-General (S/11757),*

"*Bearing in mind the appeal addressed by the President of the Security Council to the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt on 21 July 1975 (S/11771) and expressing satisfaction for the reply of the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt thereto (S/11771),*

"*Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force (S/11758),*

"*Expressing concern at the continued state of tension in the area and the lack of progress towards the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East,*

"*1. Calls upon the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973);*

"*2. Decides to renew the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force for a period of three months, that is, until 24 October 1975;*

"*3. Requests the Secretary-General to submit at the end of this period or at any time in the intervening period a report on the situation in the Middle East and the steps taken to implement resolution 338 (1973)."*

16. In accordance with the procedure agreed upon during consultations, the Council proceeded to the vote on the draft resolution.

DECISION: *At the 1833rd meeting, on 24 July 1975, the draft resolution (S/11774/Rev.1) was adopted by 13 votes to none as resolution 371 (1975). Two members (China and Iraq) did not participate in the vote.*

17. Following the vote, statements were made by the Secretary-General, by the representatives of Egypt, Israel, China, Iraq, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Costa Rica, Japan, Sweden, the United Republic of Cameroon, Guyana, Mauritania, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, France, the United Republic of Tanzania and by the President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of Italy. The representatives of Egypt,

<sup>28</sup> Doc. 11 in *ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> Doc. 271 in *ibid.*

China, Israel and the USSR spoke in exercise of the right of reply.

(c) *Appointment of the Chief Co-ordinator of UNTSO, UNEF and UNDOF operations in the Middle East*

18. By a note dated 19 August (S/11808), the President of the Security Council indicated that on 4 August he had been informed by the Secretary-General that he considered it useful to all concerned to establish a co-ordinating mechanism for the activities and administration of the three peace-keeping operations in the Middle East, namely, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO), UNEF and UNDOF. Therefore, should the Council agree, he proposed to appoint Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, currently Commander of UNEF, Chief Co-ordinator of UNTSO, UNEF and UNDOF operations in the Middle East, and to appoint Major-General Bengt Liljestrand, then Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Commander of UNEF. General Siilasvuo would continue as necessary to discharge his functions in relation to the Military Working Group of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East and would be responsible for liaison and contact with the parties on important matters relating to peace-keeping in the Middle East. Following consultations with the members of the Council, the President had informed the Secretary-General on 15 August that the Council had given its consent to the proposals outlined in the Secretary-General's letter, noting that the delegations of China and Iraq had dissociated themselves from the matter.

(d) *Reports of the Secretary-General on the Agreement between Egypt and Israel*

19. In a report dated 2 September (S/11818), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of the preliminary action he had taken in relation to the new Agreement between Egypt and Israel, which the parties had initialled on 1 September and would sign in Geneva on 4 September. Lieutenant-General Siilasvuo had been instructed to proceed to Geneva in order to be available to preside at the forthcoming meetings of the Military Working Group of the Geneva Peace Conference, where preparation of a detailed protocol for the implementation of the Agreement was to take

place.<sup>30</sup>

20. In an addendum issued the same day (S/11818/ Add. 1 and Corr. 1), the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the text of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel, and, in a further report dated 4 September (S/11818/Add.2), he informed the Council that the signing of the Agreement by the representatives of the two parties in Geneva on 4 September had been witnessed by Lieutenant-General Siilasvuo. In another addendum dated 8 September (S/11818/Add.3), he circulated a reproduction of the map mentioned in the Agreement.<sup>31</sup>

21. The Agreement between Egypt and Israel consisted of nine articles and an annex. The parties agreed that the conflict between them and in the Middle East should not be resolved by military force and that they were determined to continue their efforts to reach a final and just settlement by means of negotiations within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference called for by Security Council resolution 338 (1973). They further agreed to continue to observe the ceasefire and to refrain from all military and paramilitary actions against each other. Article IV of the Agreement laid down the principles for the new deployment of the military forces of the parties and indicated that the details concerning such redeployment and all other relevant matters, including the definition of lines and areas, the buffer zones, the limitations on armament and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance installations and the United Nations functions would all be in accordance with the provisions of the annex and map, which were an integral part of the Agreement and its Protocol of implementation. The Agreement also stressed that the United Nations Emergency Force was essential and should continue its functions and that its mandate should be extended annually. A joint commission was established under the Agreement to function under the aegis of the Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations peace-keeping missions in the Middle East in order to consider any problems arising from the Agreement and to assist the Force in the execution of its mandate.

22. In addition to the annex and map, the

<sup>30</sup> Docs. 148 and 164 in *ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> Printed on p. 262 in *ibid.*

Agreement was supplemented by a document relating to the early warning system referred to in article IV, in which the United States proposed that there should be (a) two surveillance stations to provide strategic early warning, one operated by Egyptian and one operated by Israeli personnel; (b) three watch stations operated by American civilian personnel in the Mitla and Gidi Passes to provide tactical early warning; and (c) three unmanned electronic sensor fields at both ends of each Pass and in the general vicinity of each station. The document provided additional details regarding the number of technicians involved, their status and the functions they were to perform.

23. In a report dated 23 September (S/11818/Add. 4), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that on 22 September the Military Working Group had completed its work on the Protocol of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel and that the Protocol had been signed by the representative of Egypt and initialled by the representatives of Israel. In a further report dated 10 October (S/11818/Add.5 and Corr.1), he reported that the representatives of Israel had also signed the Protocol, which had thus entered into force. Annexed to the report were the full text of the Protocol and relevant maps.

(e) *Extension of the mandate of UNEF  
until 24 October 1976*

(i) *Report of the Secretary-General dated 17 October 1975*

24. In connexion with the expiration of the mandate of UNEF on 24 October, the Secretary-General submitted a report on 17 October (S/11849) covering the period from 15 July to 16 October 1975 and providing a comprehensive picture of the activities of the Force in pursuance of the mandate laid down by the Security Council. After describing the composition and deployment of the Force, as well as its accommodations and logistics, the Secretary-General outlined the activities of UNEF for the period under review. He indicated that the Force had continued to carry out its specific tasks under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on Disengagement of Forces of 18 January 1974. He noted that the problem of restrictions on the freedom of movement of personnel of certain contingents continued, despite his efforts and those of the Force Commander, and

reaffirmed his position that the Force had to function as an integrated and efficient military unit, all contingents of which served on an equal basis under the Commander of the Force.

25. Regarding the responsibilities entrusted to the Force under the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 4 September and spelled out later in the Protocol of 22 September, the Secretary-General stated that those responsibilities were more extensive than the ones the Force had been discharging under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on Disengagement of Forces of 18 January 1974 and that its new operational areas would be much larger. The additional military personnel and equipment that were considered necessary to enable the Force to function adequately included the reinforcement of the non-logistic contingents of UNEF by approximately 750 men of all ranks; the strengthening of the Polish logistics contingent by 50 officers and men and of the Canadian logistics contingent by 36 personnel; the reinforcement of the air unit by four helicopters, one Buffalo aircraft and two STOL (short take-off and landing) aircraft and their crews; and the establishment of a naval unit of four vessels for coastal patrol functions.

26. Regarding the financial aspects, he indicated that the increase in the cost of the Force for a period of one year, ending on 24 October 1976, was tentatively estimated at \$32 million over and above the authorized level of \$65 million for the previous year.

27. With regard to the implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, the Secretary-General stated that the efforts made at several levels to advance the implementation of the resolution to which he had referred in his previous report (S/11758) had continued during the period under review. In that connexion, he referred in particular to article I of the Agreement of 4 September 1975 between Egypt and Israel, wherein the two Governments had agreed that the conflict between them should be resolved by peaceful means and expressed their determination to reach a final settlement by means of negotiations as called for by resolution 338 (1973).

28. In conclusion, the Secretary-General cautioned that, in spite of the prevailing quiet in the sector, and although the Agreement of September 1975 was an important development, any relaxa-

tion of the search for a comprehensive settlement could be dangerous in the months ahead. He expressed the hope that urgent efforts would be undertaken by all concerned to tackle the Middle East problem in all its aspects and reiterated his conviction that the presence of UNEF remained essential. Consequently, he recommended the extension of its mandate.

(ii) *Consideration at the 1851st meeting (23 October 1975)*

29. At its 1851st meeting on 23 October, the Security Council included the following item in its agenda without objection

"The situation in the Middle East:

"Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force (S/11849)."

30. The President announced that the Council had before it a draft resolution (S/11856) which had been drawn up during consultations among the members of the Council, who had agreed that statements on it should be made after the vote. The draft resolution read as follows:

"*The Security Council,*

"*Recalling its resolutions 338 (1973) of 22 October, 340 (1973) of 25 October and 341 (1973) of 27 October 1973, 346 (1974) of 8 April and 362 (1974) of 23 October 1974, 368 (1975) of 17 April and 371 (1975) of 24 July 1975,*

"*Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force (S/11849),*

"*Having noted the developments in the situation in the Middle East,*

"*Having further noted the Secretary-General's view that any relaxation of the search for a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem could be especially dangerous in the months to come and that it is his hope, therefore, that urgent efforts will be undertaken by all concerned to tackle the Middle East problem in all its aspects, with a view both to maintaining quiet in the region and to arriving at the comprehensive settlement called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973),*

"1. *Decides*

"(a) To call upon all the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973);

"(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force for a period of one year, that is, until 24 October 1976;

"(c) To request the Secretary-General to submit at the end of this period a report on the developments in the situation and the steps taken to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973);

"2. *Expresses its confidence* that the Force will be maintained with maximum efficiency and economy."

31. Before the vote, the Secretary-General referred to the new reinforcements in personnel and equipment required by the Force to carry out its tasks under the Agreement between Egypt and Israel, as well as to the new financial burden that those new reinforcements would impose on the Organization. He assured the Council that in considering the recommendations from the field in that regard, he had in mind the need for the maximum possible economy compatible with the effective discharge by the Force of its task.

32. The President then read out a letter dated 23 October from the Foreign Minister of Egypt stating that his Government consented to a further extension of the mandate of the Force for one year, until 24 October 1976.

DECISION: *At the 1851st meeting, on 23 October 1975, the draft resolution (S/11856) was adopted by 13 votes to none, as resolution 378 (1975). Two members (China and Iraq) did not participate in the vote.*

33. Following the voting, the Council heard statements by the representatives of Iraq, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, the USSR, the United States, China, Mauritania, Guyana, the United Republic of Cameroon, Italy, the Byelorussian SSR, Costa Rica, the United Republic of Tanzania and the President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of Sweden.

(f) *Further communications received between 23 October 1975 and 15 June 1976*

34. By a letter dated 1 December (S/11896), the Secretary-General referred to the indication in his report on UNEF of 17 October (S/11849) of the need to add a naval unit for coastal patrol duties as a result of the Force's new functions under the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 4 September. He informed the Council that, following consultations on the subject, the Government of Iran had expressed its readiness to provide a naval unit for service with UNEF and that he proposed to accept that offer.

35. In a note dated 27 May 1976 (S/12089), the President of the Security Council stated that the

Secretary-General, on 20 May, had informed him, in connexion with the UNEF requirement of four helicopters and their crews, that after the Canadian Government had indicated that it could not accede to his request, the Australian Government had expressed its willingness to provide them. He then noted that since the parties had no objection to the attachment of Australian helicopters to UNEF, he proposed to accept the offer of the Australian Government. On 27 May, the President of the Security Council had informed the Secretary-General that the Council had duly taken note of his intention to accept the offer of the Australian Government, although the Soviet Union had expressed reservations about any additional expenditure, and China and the Libyan Arab Republic had dissociated themselves from the matter.

## 2. THE UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE

### (a) *Communications to the Council received in July 1975*

36. In a note dated 9 July 1975 (S/11750), the President of the Security Council stated that the Secretary-General, on 7 July, had informed him of his intention, if the Security Council so consented, to appoint Colonel Hannes Philipp Commander of UNDOF and that after consultations with the members of the Council, he had informed the Secretary-General on 8 July that the Council consented to the proposed appointment and that China dissociated itself from the matter.

37. In a note dated 22 July (S/11768), the President stated that on 3 July the Secretary-General had informed him of the Peruvian Government's wish to withdraw its contingent from UNDOF as of 20 July. Since efforts to provide a replacement contingent from among the Latin American countries had been unsuccessful, the Secretary-General was approaching Governments from other regional groups. During consultations on 21 July, the Secretary-General had informed the Council that the Government of Iran had expressed its readiness to provide a contingent. On the same day, the President of the Council had informed the Secretary-General that the Council agreed to the proposed replacement, bearing in mind the need to maintain the effectiveness of the Force while taking into account the accepted principle of equitable geographical

distribution, and that China dissociated itself from the matter.

### (b) *Extension of the mandate of UNDOF until 30 May 1976*

#### (i) *Report of the Secretary-General dated 24 November 1975*

38. Before the expiration of the mandate of UNDOF on 30 November, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council on 24 November (S/11883), giving an account of the activities of the Force during the period from 22 May to 24 November 1975. The Secretary-General stated that during that period the situation in the UNDOF area of operations had remained generally quiet and that both parties had continued generally to comply with the cease-fire and with the Agreement on Disengagement of Forces. Although the arrangements that had been worked out for the freedom of movement of the Force had fallen short of what was provided for in the Protocol to the Agreement on Disengagement, efforts were continuing to secure full acceptance of that principle. Moreover, UNDOF mine-clearing teams had continued their work and had increased the area accessible to foot and vehicle patrols. He also stated that efforts to advance the implementation of resolution 338 (1973) had continued on several levels, including the contacts between the two Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East and between them and other parties concerned. He indicated that he had remained involved in those efforts and that the visit to the area that he was currently engaged in was directly related to them.

39. The Secretary-General observed that the prevailing quiet remained precarious, as the Agreement on Disengagement was not a peace agreement but only a step towards a just and durable peace on the basis of Security Council resolution 338 (1973). He considered that the continued presence of UNDOF was essential to maintain quiet in the Israel-Syria sector and to provide an atmosphere conducive to further peace efforts and to assist in such efforts, if required. He was currently visiting the area to discuss the situation in all its aspects with the parties concerned and would report to the Security Council as soon as possible on the question of the extension of the UNDOF mandate.

40. In a further report dated 28 November (S/11883/Add.1), the Secretary-General stated that between 22 and 27 November he had held talks in the Middle East with the leaders of the Syrian Arab Republic, Israel, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan.

41. The President of the Syrian Arab Republic had expressed strong disappointment that no progress had been made in the negotiating process with respect to his country since the establishment of UNDOF in 1974. Without a prospect for progress in the negotiating process, his Government found it difficult to approve prolongation of the UNDOF mandate. It wished the Security Council to deal with the substance of the Middle East problem, including the Palestinian question, but would not participate in the Geneva Peace Conference or any other forum so long as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was not a participant. Following extensive discussions, the President of the Syrian Arab Republic had declared his readiness to agree to a renewal of the UNDOF mandate for another six-month period, provided that the Security Council would reconvene in January 1976 to hold a substantive debate on the Middle East problem, including the Palestinian question, with the participation of representatives of PLO.

42. Israel had informed the Secretary-General that it regarded UNDOF as an integral part of the Disengagement Agreement between Israeli and Syrian Forces of May 1974 and remained opposed to linking the extension of its mandate to further negotiations. It was willing to negotiate at any time with the Syrian Arab Republic, but not with PLO. Once the UNDOF mandate was extended, Israel was ready to participate in a reconvened Geneva Peace Conference on the understanding that only the original participants would attend. It considered that Security Council resolution 338 (1973) provided the basis for negotiations but did not accept the Security Council as the negotiating body for the Middle East problem.

43. The Secretary-General stated that his talks with the leaders of Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon had been most useful and had contributed considerably to his understanding of the over-all situation in the Middle East.

44. In conclusion, the Secretary-General reiterated his conviction that the presence of UNDOF was essential not only to maintain quiet in the

Israel-Syria sector but to provide an atmosphere conducive to further negotiating efforts. In the light of the consultations that he had had, he proposed the extension of its mandate for a further six-month period, on the assumption that the Council would reach agreement on a corresponding decision, taking due account of the positions put forward by the parties.

(ii) *Consideration at the 1856th meeting (30 November 1975)*

45. At the 1856th meeting, on 30 November, the Security Council included the following item in its agenda:

"The situation in the Middle East:

"Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/11883 and Add.1)."

46. The President drew attention to a draft resolution (S/11888) sponsored by Guyana, Mauritania, the United Republic of Cameroon and the United Republic of Tanzania, and to a draft statement (S/11889), also submitted by those sponsors, which it had been agreed he would read into the meeting record after the Council had voted on the draft resolution.

47. The representative of Guyana then introduced the draft resolution (S/11888), which read as follows:

"*The Security Council,*

"*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/11883 and Add. 1),

"*Having noted* the discussions of the Secretary-General with all parties concerned on the situation in the Middle East,

"*Expressing concern* over the continued state of tension in the area,

"*Decides:*

"(a) To reconvene on 12 January 1976, to continue the debate on the Middle East problem including the Palestinian question, taking into account all relevant United Nations resolutions;

"(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for another period of six months;

"(c) To request the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed on further developments."

48. The representative of the United States made a brief statement, after which the Council proceeded to the vote.

DECISION: *At the 1856th meeting, on 30 November 1975, the draft resolution (S/11888) was adopted by 13 votes to none as resolution 381 (1975). Two members (China and Iraq) did not participate in the voting.*

49. In accordance with the agreement reached at the consultations between members, the President read the following statement (S/11889):

"It is the understanding of the majority of the Security Council that when it reconvenes on 12 January 1976 in accordance with paragraph (a) of Security Council resolution 381 (1975), of 30 November 1975, the representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization will be invited to participate in the debate."<sup>32</sup>

50. Following the vote, statements were made by the Secretary-General and by the representatives of China, Mauritania, the United Republic of Cameroon, Iraq, Costa Rica, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Byelorussian SSR, the United States, Sweden, the United Republic of Tanzania and the President, speaking in his capacity as representative of the USSR.

(c) *Communications received from the parties in November and December 1975*

51. By a note verbale dated 21 November (S/11885), the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic transmitted the text of a letter addressed to the Commander of UNDOF, in which the Syrian delegate to the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission had submitted charges concerning two Israeli violations of the Geneva Agreement on Disengagement that had resulted in two deaths and had requested that measures be taken to prevent the repetition of such acts.

52. In a letter dated 21 November (S/11882), the representative of Israel described incidents that had occurred on 28 October and 20 November, when civilian targets in Israel had been attacked by terrorists from the Syrian Arab Republic, and emphasized the special responsibility of the Syrian Government for such acts, which constituted a serious violation of the Agreement on Disengagement. Those charges were rejected by the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic in a letter dated 26 November (S/11886), in which he declared that nothing in the Agreement on Disengagement could be construed as imposing any responsibility on the Syrian Government in relation to the struggle of the Palestinian liberation fighters.

The representative of Israel, in a further letter dated 3 December (S/11894), replied that under the Agreement on Disengagement both sides were obliged to prevent any violations of the cease-fire originating in their respective territories.

(d) *Extension of the mandate of UNDOF until 30 November 1976*

(i) *Report of the Secretary-General dated 24 May 1976*

53. As the six-month mandate of UNDOF was to expire on 30 May 1976, the Secretary-General submitted a comprehensive report on its operations covering the period from 25 November 1975 to 24 May 1976 (S/12083 and Add.1).

54. The Secretary-General stated that the Force had continued to supervise the area of separation and inspect the areas of limitation of armaments and forces, thus contributing to the maintenance of the cease-fire. In his capacity as Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East, Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo had continued to take part in high-level contacts and, as occasion required, in meetings between the military representatives of both Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic concerning the functioning of the Force.

55. Regarding the financial aspects, he indicated that should the Security Council renew the mandate beyond 31 May, the costs for the Force's maintenance up to 31 October 1976 would be within the level of the authorization to enter into commitments provided by the General Assembly.

56. On 27 May, following his trip to Damascus, the Secretary-General submitted an additional report, in which he observed that the situation in the UNDOF area of operations had remained quiet, there having been no incidents of a serious nature. Nevertheless, the situation in the Middle East as a whole remained tense and unstable and would become increasingly dangerous unless progress could be achieved towards a just and durable peace in the area.

57. Efforts to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973), he reported, had continued on several levels, including contacts that he had maintained with all the parties concerned, as well as with the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, and he intended to continue his efforts towards the resumption of the negotiating process called for by the Security Council. In the circumstances, he considered

<sup>32</sup> Doc. 12 in *ibid.*



the presence of UNDOF to be essential; accordingly, he recommended that the mandate of the Force be extended for a further period of six months until 30 November, a proposal to which the Governments of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic had given their assent.

(ii) *Consideration at the 1923rd meeting (28 May 1976)*

58. At its 1923rd meeting on 28 May, the Security Council included the following item in its agenda:

“The situation in the Middle East:

“Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/12083 and Add.1).”

59. The Secretary-General made a statement.

60. The representative of Guyana introduced a draft resolution (S/12088) sponsored by Benin, Guyana, Pakistan, Panama, Romania and the United Republic of Tanzania, which read as follows:

[*Printed as doc. 26 below.*]

DECISION: *At the 1923rd meeting, on 28 May 1976, the six-Power draft resolution (S/12088) was adopted by 13 votes to none as resolution 390 (1976). Two members (China and the Libyan Arab Republic) did not participate in the voting.*

61. Following the vote, statements were made by the representatives of China, the USSR, the United States, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Libyan Arab Republic, Romania, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy, Japan, Pakistan, Benin, Panama and the President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of France. The representatives of the USSR and the United Kingdom made further statements.

### 3. THE SITUATION IN THE ISRAEL-LEBANON SECTOR

#### (a) *Reports of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization*

62. During the period under review the situation in the Israel-Lebanon sector continued to be the subject of reports on the status of the cease-fire in the sector submitted by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and transmitted to the Security Council by the Secretary-General. From 16 June 1975 to 15 June 1976, the Chief of Staff issued monthly reports in which he assessed the frequency of incidents in the sector, the number of incidents of firing across

or of crossing of the armistice demarcation line as reported by UNTSO observation posts, the frequency of jet flights over Lebanese territory, the complaints submitted by the parties and the results of UNTSO investigations. Those reports were issued in addenda to document S/11663. When occasion warranted, the Chief of Staff also issued special reports on individual incidents or complaints by the parties.

63. In reports dated 16 June and 1 July (S/11663/Add.5 and 6), covering the month of June 1975, the Chief of Staff indicated that activity in the sector had remained at a low level. On 15 June, Israeli jet aircraft had attacked a Lebanese village with bombs and rockets, causing material damage. Lebanon had submitted 55 complaints about artillery attacks against Lebanese territory, overflights by Israeli jets or penetration by Israeli naval craft into Lebanese territorial waters.

64. During the month of July, the Chief of Staff submitted three special reports (S/11663/Add.7-9), in which he indicated that there had been an increase in activity, particularly on 6-7 July, 19-20 July and 23 July. The over-all report for July (S/11663/Add.10) cited 79 cases of firing across the armistice demarcation line or across the line between Lebanon and Israeli-occupied Syrian territory, 4 cases of firing across or within Lebanese territorial waters, 5 crossing violations and 43 overflights of Lebanese territory by Israeli jet aircraft. Lebanese authorities had submitted 91 complaints, some of which had been the subject of UNTSO inquiries and investigations.

65. During the month of August, three special reports (S/11663/Add.11-13) were submitted concerning a firing incident on 4 August, a jet aircraft attack on two Lebanese villages on 20 August and an exchange of fire on 29/30 August. For the month as a whole, it was reported (S/11663/Add.14) that activity had been relatively high but primarily localized in the western part of the sector. The reports indicated that there had been 111 cases of firing across the armistice demarcation line or across the line between Lebanese and Israeli-occupied Syrian territory. They also indicated that there had been 37 flights by Israeli aircraft over Lebanese territory, as well as overflights by unidentified jet aircraft. In that period, Lebanon had submitted 95 complaints of various aerial and ground violations by Israel.

66. In the month of September, one special

report (S/11663/Add.15) concerned a Lebanese complaint of Israeli jet aircraft attacks on two coastal villages on 3 September. The report for the month as a whole (S/11663/Add.16) indicated that activity had remained relatively high during the first half of the month but had decreased slightly during the second half. United Nations observers had recorded 101 cases of firing across the armistice demarcation line. During that period, Lebanon had submitted 80 complaints about Israeli jet overflights, penetration by Israeli naval vessels into Lebanese territorial waters and firing on targets located in Lebanese territory.

67. During the months of October and November no special reports were submitted. Incidents in the sector, according to the monthly reports (S/11663/Add.17 and 18), followed the same pattern as in previous months, with about 115 cases of firing across the armistice demarcation line, several flights by Israeli jet aircraft over Lebanese territory and 135 Lebanese complaints of Israeli violation of the cease-fire.

68. In a special report dated 2 December (S/11663/Add.19), it was indicated that Israeli jet aircraft had attacked in the vicinity of the town of Nabatiye. The report covering the developments during the month of December (S/11663/Add.20) indicated that there had been 42 cases of firing across the armistice demarcation line, with mortar, automatic weapons and artillery. There had been also 26 overflights by Israeli aircraft. The Lebanese authorities had submitted 60 complaints about firing by Israeli forces on Lebanese territory, flights by Israeli jets over Lebanon and penetration by Israel forces patrols into Lebanese territory.

69. The reports covering January and February 1976 (S/11663/Add.21 and 23) indicated a low level of activity during those months. A special report (S/11663/Add.22) on 27 February concerned a Lebanese complaint that an Israeli force that had penetrated Lebanese territory on 26 February, dynamited a house and caused material damage and the death of a Lebanese citizen. Another special report on 3 March (S/11663/Add.24) concerned a Lebanese complaint that Israeli forces had dynamited a house in another village, causing material damage, and had abducted three Lebanese citizens.

70. Reports on developments in March, April and May (S/11663/Add.25-27) indicated that

activity had remained at a low level, with few cases of firing across the armistice demarcation line and fewer complaints from the Lebanese authorities. However, Israeli forces personnel had continued to occupy daily, during daylight hours, five positions on the Lebanese side of the armistice demarcation line.

(b) *Communications containing complaints from the parties*

71. Between 15 June and 12 September, the representatives of Israel and Lebanon addressed a number of letters to the Secretary-General containing charges and countercharges of violations of the General Armistice Agreement of 1949 and of United Nations resolutions.

72. In letters dated 15 and 16 June (S/11726 and S/11728), Israel charged that a four-man squad which had infiltrated Israeli territory from Lebanon had seized a house in a village located in Upper Galilee, killed two persons and wounded three others. The four terrorists had been killed by Israeli soldiers. Israel stated that PLO, which had taken credit for the attack, was in virtual control of parts of Lebanese territory and that the Government of Lebanon bore a heavy responsibility for that fact. In addition, PLO terrorists had directed their fire from Lebanese territory against the towns of Nahariya and Metula and the village of Kfar Giladi.

73. In a letter dated 16 June (S/11727), Lebanon charged that twice in the previous day, a large formation of Israeli jets had attacked the village of Kfar Chouba, killing one person, wounding three others and destroying many houses.

74. In a letter dated 7 July (S/11747), Lebanon charged that the previous night, Israeli artillery had shelled a number of villages in southern Lebanon, killing one woman and wounding two other persons.

75. In a reply dated 8 July (S/11749), Israel stated that Lebanon had misrepresented the facts by pretending that peaceful villages had been attacked, when in fact the action had been taken against PLO terrorist bases in those areas from which murder missions were launched against Israeli villages.

76. In a letter dated 14 July (S/11755), Israel charged that on 13 July PLO terrorists based in Lebanon had fired against the town of Nahariya

and other areas in Israel, wounding two women.

77. In a letter dated 24 July (S/11776), Lebanon charged that on 23 July Israeli forces had crossed the southern border, demolished two houses and kidnapped seven persons, while Israeli soldiers had fired across the border, killing two persons and wounding 10 others.

78. In letters dated 5 and 6 August (S/11790 and S/11792), Israel complained of a series of acts of violence committed against Israel from Lebanese territory by members of PLO between 15 July and 6 August resulting in the death of one soldier and one terrorist and the wounding of several other persons. Israel charged that PLO had been boasting that its missions had been endorsed by recent resolutions of the General Assembly, giving substance to Israel's warnings that those resolutions had become a source of encouragement and support for PLO terrorist activities.

79. In a letter dated 6 August (S/11791), Lebanon charged that on 5 August Israeli forces had launched a land, sea and air attack on the coastal town of Tyre in southern Lebanon and that the Israeli air force had bombarded four towns in southern Lebanon. Four Lebanese officers and seven civilians had been killed, 12 persons had been wounded and 15 houses had been destroyed.

80. In a letter dated 21 August (S/11810 and Corr.1), Lebanon complained that on the previous day Israeli aircraft had raided two villages located more than 150 kilometres from the frontier, killing three civilians and wounding 15 others. Those raids, undertaken on the eve of a peaceful mission to the Middle East by the Secretary of State of the United States, indicated that Israel was not prepared to create the necessary conditions for a just and lasting peace in the area.

81. In a letter dated 26 August (S/11817), Israel submitted complaints of six attacks against Israel by PLO terrorists from Lebanese territory between 7 and 20 August, which, it noted, had been mounted during the negotiations for an interim agreement between Israel and Egypt and had been meant to sabotage the peace mission of the Secretary of State of the United States.

82. In letters dated 4 and 12 September (S/11821 and S/11822), Lebanon complained that Israel had committed five acts of aggression between 28 August and 11 September, using Phantom jets against several localities, including a Palestine refugee camp. Those attacks had resulted in the

destruction of many houses, substantial damage to other property, the death of two children and the wounding of six other people.

(c) *Requests for a meeting and consideration at the 1859th to 1862nd meetings (4–8 December 1975)*

83. In a letter dated 3 December (S/11892), the representative of Lebanon requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider massive air attacks launched by Israel on 2 December against refugee camps and villages in various parts of Lebanon that had caused heavy casualties among the civilian population.

84. In a letter of the same date (S/11893) the representative of Egypt also requested an urgent meeting of the Council to discuss the Israeli attack and asked that PLO be allowed to participate in the debate.

85. By a letter dated 4 December (S/11897), the representative of Algeria transmitted the text of a declaration adopted by the Co-ordinating Committee of the Non-Aligned Countries asking the Security Council to condemn Israel's acts of aggression and to take steps to restrain that country from launching attacks against its neighbours and terrorizing the Palestinian refugees.<sup>33</sup>

86. At its 1859th meeting on 4 December 1975, the Security Council included the following item in its agenda:

“The situation in the Middle East:

“(a) Letter dated 3 December 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11892);

“(b) Letter dated 3 December 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11893).”

87. The President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Egypt, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

88. The President drew attention to the Egyptian request for PLO participation in the debate and to a similar proposal made during consultations by the representatives of Guyana, Iraq, Mauritania, the United Republic of Cameroon and the United Republic of Tanzania. That proposal,

<sup>33</sup> Doc. 200 in *ibid.*

he pointed out, was not being submitted under rule 37 or rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure but, if it were adopted by the Council, the invitation to PLO to participate in the debate would confer on it the same rights to participation as were conferred when a Member State was invited under rule 37.

89. Before the Council proceeded to vote, the representatives of France, the United States, Italy, Japan, Iraq, the USSR, the Byelorussian SSR and Mauritania and the President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of the United Kingdom, made statements on the proposal.

DECISION: *At its 1859th meeting, on 4 December 1975, the Security Council adopted the five-Power proposal by a vote of 9 in favour to 3 against (Costa Rica, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America), with 3 abstentions (France, Italy, Japan).*

90. Following the vote, the representative of Costa Rica made a statement.

91. In accordance with the decision of the Council, the PLO representative was invited to participate in the debate.

92. The Council began its discussion of the question with statements by the representatives of Lebanon, Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as by the PLO representatives.

93. At the 1860th meeting on 5 December, the representatives of the United States, the USSR and Japan made statements.

94. At the 1861st meeting on 8 December, the representative of the United Republic of Cameroon introduced a draft resolution (S/11898) sponsored by Guyana, Iraq, Mauritania, the United Republic of Cameroon and the United Republic of Tanzania, the text of which read as follows:

*"The Security Council,*

*"Having considered the question inscribed in its agenda at the 1859th meeting,*

*"Having noted the contents of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon (S/11892) and of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Egypt (S/11893),*

*"Having heard the statements of the Permanent Representatives of Lebanon, Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic and the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization,*

*"Recalling its previous relevant resolutions,*

*"Deploring Israel's defiance of these resolutions,*

*"Grieved at the tragic loss of human life caused*

*by indiscriminate and massive Israeli air attacks,*  
*"Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation resulting from Israel's violation of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity and of Security Council resolutions,*

*"Convinced that Israeli massive air attacks against Lebanon were premeditative in nature,*

*"1. Strongly condemns the Government of Israel for its premeditated air attacks against Lebanon in violation of its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and of Security Council resolutions;*

*"2. Calls upon Israel to desist forthwith from all military attacks against Lebanon;*

*"3. Issues once again a solemn warning to Israel that if such attacks were repeated, the Council would have to consider taking appropriate steps and measures to give effect to its decisions."*

95. At the same meeting, the Council heard statements by the representatives of Guyana, Sweden, France, China and Mauritania.

96. At the 1862nd meeting, also held on 8 December, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representative of Saudi Arabia, at his request, to participate in the discussions without the right to vote.

97. The Council concluded its discussions of the question with statements by the representatives of the Byelorussian SSR, Iraq, the United Republic of Tanzania and the United States.

98. In the course of his statement, the representative of the United States introduced amendments (S/11901)<sup>34</sup> providing for the addition of the following new paragraphs to the draft resolution:

*"4. Condemns all acts of violence, especially those which result in the tragic loss of innocent civilian life, and urges all concerned to refrain from any further acts of violence;*

*"5. Calls upon all parties to refrain from any action which might endanger negotiations aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East."*

99. Before the vote on the United States amendments, statements were made by the representatives of the United Republic of Cameroon and Saudi Arabia.

100. The representative of Italy, under rule 33, paragraph 3, of the provisional rules of procedure, moved the adjournment of the meeting. Fol-

<sup>34</sup> Doc. 205 in *ibid.*

lowing a statement by the representative of Iraq, the motion for adjournment was put to the vote and received 6 votes in favour (Costa Rica, France, Italy, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America) to 8 against, with 1 abstention (Japan) and was not adopted, having failed to receive the majority of the votes.

101. The representative of Iraq made a statement, after which the Council proceeded to vote separately on the two United States amendments (S/11901) and then on the five-Power draft resolution (S/11898).

*DECISION: At the 1862nd meeting, on 8 December 1975, each of the two United States amendments (S/11901) received 7 votes in favour and none against, with 6 abstentions (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Guyana, Mauritania, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania). Neither of the amendments was adopted, having failed to obtain the required majority. Two members (China and Iraq) did not participate in the vote.*

*The five-Power draft resolution (S/11898) received 13 votes in favour and 1 against (United States of America), with 1 abstention (Costa Rica), and was not adopted, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.*

102. Following the voting, statements in explanation of vote were made by the representatives of Italy, Costa Rica, Sweden and the United States and by the President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of the United Kingdom.

103. Further statements were made by the representatives of Lebanon, Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as by the representative of PLO.

(d) *Other communications*

104. By a letter dated 25 May 1976 (S/12084), the representative of Algeria transmitted a message addressed to the Secretary-General by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria concerning the position taken by the French Government. The Foreign Minister considered that the dispatch of a French expeditionary force to Lebanon was likely to aggravate the Lebanese crisis and would introduce a very dangerous precedent in the practice of international relations in violation of the principles of the United Nations concerning respect for the political independence, territorial

integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. He further expressed the hope that the Secretary-General would make every effort to discourage a venture which was incompatible with any code of international morality and was calculated to undermine the very basis of the United Nations Charter.<sup>35</sup>

105. In a reply dated 27 May (S/12087), the representative of France rejected as untrue the allegations about French policy towards Lebanon, which he said was motivated by the concern to preserve Lebanon's unity, integrity and sovereignty. Should the President of the Lebanese Republic and the parties concerned with the civil war, including Lebanese parties and interested Arab countries, deem it helpful, France would be prepared to contribute to the necessary machinery to consolidate the cease-fire. France's offer would be made good only if there were a request from the constituted authorities and a consensus of all the parties concerned with the conflict. France's initiative showed its willingness to make a temporary and limited contribution to the process of restoring peace. In that context, it was particularly inappropriate to suggest that there had been an alleged threat of military intervention by France in Lebanon.<sup>36</sup>

## B. The situation in the occupied Arab territories

### 1. COMMUNICATIONS TO THE COUNCIL RECEIVED BETWEEN 15 JUNE 1975 AND 12 MARCH 1976

106. During the period under review, the Security Council received a number of communications on the situation in the occupied Arab territories relating in particular to the situation in Jerusalem and its Holy Places and to terrorism.

107. By a note dated 17 July 1975 (S/11762), the Secretary-General drew the attention of the members of the Security Council to Commission on Human Rights resolution 6 A (XXXI), of 21 February 1975 entitled "Question of the violation of human rights in the territories occupied as a result of hostilities in the Middle East".

108. In a letter dated 29 July (S/11780), the representative of Israel stated that for imperative military and security reasons, 400 Bedouin families had been transferred from an area in the Sinai to

<sup>35</sup> Doc. 253 below.

<sup>36</sup> Doc. 105 below.

another of their choice where employment opportunities and living conditions were better. In a reply dated 31 July (S/11784), the representative of Egypt noted Israel's admission of the forcible mass transfer of some of the population in the Sinai and rejected Israel's attempt to justify that action by reason of military necessity and security. The representative of Israel, in a reply dated 8 August (S/11797), charged that Egypt's actions in instigating a campaign of terrorism in the Gaza Strip had created the situation which required the transfer of some members of the Bedouin tribes to safer areas.

109. By a letter dated 7 August (S/11799), the representative of Jordan transmitted the text of a telegram addressed to the Secretary-General by Jordan's Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, charging that Israel had violated the sanctity and physical integrity of the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron by numerous acts of desecration, obstruction of worshippers in their prayers and the assignment of a large part of the mosque for use by Jews. In a reply dated 20 August (S/11809), the representative of Israel stated that in contrast to Jordan's record in the matter prior to 1967, Israel's policy regarding all the Holy Places had been to guarantee free access to members of all faiths and to ensure orderly conditions of worship to members of every religion. As the Cave of Machpela was holy to both Judaism and Islam, arrangements had been made to enable both Moslems and Jews to worship there in an orderly manner.

110. In a letter dated 4 November (S/11878), the representative of Israel charged that an explosive charge had been set off by PLO terrorists in the centre of Jerusalem near Zion Square, killing 6 persons and wounding more than 30 others, and that a second explosive charge had been discovered but immediately defused. It was Israel's view that the recent resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, including the resolution against Zionism, had encouraged PLO to commit further acts of terrorism.

111. By a letter dated 1 March 1976 (S/12000), the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic requested the circulation of a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council on 23 February by the Acting Permanent Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the United Nations, in which it was charged that after

a Jerusalem magistrate court had ruled that Jews had the right to pray in the Al-Aqsa Mosque, some Zionist groups had announced their plans to organize "pray-ins" in the mosque. The PLO representative stated that the ruling was in violation of several Security Council resolutions, including resolution 252 (1968). Furthermore, it had sparked a wave of violent demonstrations in most major West Bank towns and in East Jerusalem, which, in turn, had brought about acts of repression by the Israeli authorities that had caused death and injury to many Palestinians.

112. By a letter dated 2 March (S/12012), the representative of Saudi Arabia transmitted the text of a statement issued by the Islamic Conference, which had met to consider the grave situation in occupied Arab Jerusalem resulting from recent Israeli violations of Security Council resolutions concerning the status of the Holy City and the profanation of the Al-Aqsa Mosque. The members of the Conference regarded the recent ruling of the Jerusalem magistrate court as part of the systematic and persistent policy of the Israeli occupation authorities aimed at gradually obliterating the Moslem and Christian heritage in the city of Jerusalem in violation of United Nations resolutions. They noted with appreciation the efforts made by the Secretary-General and requested him and the President of the Security Council to take immediate steps to stop the Israeli violations and to keep the situation in the Holy City and in the rest of the occupied territories under urgent attention.

## 2. REQUEST FOR A MEETING AND CONSIDERATION AT THE 1893RD TO 1899TH MEETINGS (22-25 MARCH 1976)

113. In a letter dated 19 March (S/12017), the representatives of the Libyan Arab Republic and Pakistan requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the serious situation arising from recent developments in the occupied Arab territories. Stating that the situation had continued to deteriorate in Jerusalem and other parts of the occupied West Bank and was becoming explosive, they called on the Council to take prompt and effective measures to halt the deterioration of the situation and put an end to Israeli defiance of its decisions on Jerusalem. They also requested that representatives of PLO be

invited to participate in the debate, as on previous occasions.

114. At its 1893rd meeting on 22 March, the Security Council included the following item in its agenda without objection:

“Request by the Libyan Arab Republic and Pakistan for consideration of the serious situation arising from recent developments in the occupied Arab territories:

“Letter dated 19 March 1976 from the Permanent Representatives of the Libyan Arab Republic and Pakistan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12017).”

115. The President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yugoslavia, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The President also drew attention to the request of the representatives of the Libyan Arab Republic and Pakistan that the representatives of PLO be invited to participate in the debate on the item and pointed out that, as on previous occasions, the invitation was not being proposed under rule 37 or rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, but if approved by the Council, it would confer on PLO the same rights of participation as were conferred on a Member State when it was invited to participate in the debate under rule 37. The representatives of the United States and Pakistan made statements concerning the proposal.

*DECISION: At the 1893rd meeting, on 22 March 1976, the Security Council adopted the proposal by a vote of 11 in favour to 1 against (United States of America), with 3 abstentions (France, Italy, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).*

116. Following the vote, statements were made by the representatives of France and Italy.

117. The Council then began its consideration of the item and heard statements by the representatives of the Libyan Arab Republic and Egypt, as well as by the representative of PLO.

118. At the 1894th meeting, also on 22 March, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representative of Saudi Arabia, at his request, to participate in the debate. The Council continued its discussion with statements by the representatives of Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Israel, Yugoslavia, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. At the same meeting, the representative of

PLO and the representative of the United Kingdom spoke on points of order.

119. At the 1895th meeting on 23 March, the Council continued its discussion with statements by the representatives of the USSR, France, China and Egypt. The representatives of Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel spoke in exercise of the right of reply, as did the representative of PLO.

120. At the 1896th meeting, also on 23 March, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representative of Iraq, at his request, to participate in the debate. Statements were made by the representatives of the United States and Romania. The representatives of Saudi Arabia, Yugoslavia and the USSR spoke in exercise of the right of reply.

121. At the 1897th meeting on 24 March, the Council continued its discussion. The President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Bangladesh, India, Mauritania and Tunisia, at their request, to participate in the debate. The representatives of Italy, Panama, Japan, Bangladesh, Iraq, India, Tunisia and Mauritania spoke. The representatives of Israel, Iraq, India, the Libyan Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia, as well as the representative of PLO, made statements in exercise of the right of reply. The representative of PLO and the representatives of the United States and the USSR spoke on points of order.

122. At the 1898th meeting on 25 March, the Council continued its discussion with statements by the representatives of Guyana, Sweden, the United Republic of Tanzania and the United Kingdom.

123. At the 1899th meeting, also on 25 March, statements were made by the representatives of Saudi Arabia, Israel and Jordan, and by the President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of Benin.

124. At the same meeting, the representative of Pakistan introduced a draft resolution (S/12022) sponsored by Benin, Guyana, Pakistan, Panama and the United Republic of Tanzania which read as follows:

*[Printed as doc. 16 below.]*

125. The representatives of the United States, Italy, and France made statements, following which the Council proceeded to vote on the draft resolution before it.

*DECISION: At the 1899th meeting, on 25 March*

*1976, the five-Power draft resolution (S/12022) received 14 votes in favour and 1 against (United States of America) and was not adopted, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.*

126. Following the vote, statements were made by the representatives of the Libyan Arab Republic and the USSR. The representative of PLO and the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Egypt also made statements.

### 3. COMMUNICATIONS TO THE COUNCIL RECEIVED BETWEEN 22 MARCH AND 4 MAY 1976

127. By a letter dated 22 March (S/12020), the representative of Israel transmitted the text of resolutions adopted in December 1975 by the third plenary meeting of the Jerusalem Committee, which had been established by the Mayor of Jerusalem and was composed of 70 outstanding international personalities and served as a world advisory council on matters pertaining to the restoration and beautification of the city.

128. In a letter dated 29 March (S/12028), the representative of Israel, citing a statement made by the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic at the 1897th meeting of the Council to the effect that the "racist entity in the Middle East must be destroyed one day", quoted Articles 23 and 24 of the Charter of the United Nations pertinent to the election of non-permanent members of the Security Council and stated that his Government protested the call for the destruction of a Member State of the United Nations in the Security Council. In a reply dated 6 April (S/12038), the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic stated that the representative of Israel had chosen to interpret the call for destruction of the "racist entity in the Middle East" as a call for the destruction of a Member State. However, the destruction of racism was a leading principle of the United Nations.

129. By a letter dated 30 March (S/12029), the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic transmitted the text of a letter from the Acting Permanent Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization charging Israeli occupation authorities with a persistent policy of brutal repression against the Palestinian people in occupied Palestine, referring to two incidents on 28 March in the occupied territories and requesting the Council to take immediate and effective measures to put an end to

the explosive situation and to deal with the prolonged occupation, which was the true cause of the mounting resistance of the Palestinians in the occupied territories.

130. By a letter dated 14 April (S/12052), the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic requested the circulation of a letter from the Acting Permanent Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization, who charged that Israel had acquired vast amounts of Palestinian lands through purchase or expropriation and requested the Council to put an end to such acts and seriously consider the termination of the Israeli occupation.

131. In a letter of the same date (S/12053), the representative of Oman, acting as Chairman of the Arab group, conveyed to the Secretary-General the group's deep concern about the continuous violation by Israel of United Nations resolutions and of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, by secretly acquiring land in the occupied Arab territories. The letter requested the Secretary-General to send to the area his representative or a representative of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories to look into the matter.

### 4. REQUEST FOR A MEETING AND CONSIDERATION AT THE 1916TH TO 1922ND MEETINGS (4-26 MAY 1976)

132. By letters dated 22 April and 4 May (S/12058 and S/12067), the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic requested the circulation of two letters from the Acting Permanent Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization, who charged that on 17 April, Zionist demonstrators had marched through the occupied West Bank in support of Israel's policy of territorial expansion and the establishment of Jewish settlements. Counterdemonstrations had caused clashes with Israel forces and many Palestinians had been killed or wounded. On 1 May, Israeli troops had again opened fire on unarmed Palestinian demonstrators opposing Israel's illegal occupation, killing one Palestinian and injuring many others.

133. In a letter dated 3 May (S/12066), the representative of Egypt drew the attention of the Council to the situation created on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a result of the con-



tinuation of the Israeli occupation and the determination of the Palestinian people to resist Israeli aggression. He requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the continued deterioration of the situation and asked that PLO be invited to participate in the debate.

134. At the 1916th meeting on 4 May, the Security Council included the following item in its agenda without objection:

"The situation in the occupied Arab territories:

"Letter dated 3 May 1976 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12066)."

135. At that meeting, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

136. At the same meeting, the President drew attention to the request contained in the letter from the representative of Egypt (S/12066) that representatives of PLO be invited to participate in the debate and, as on previous occasions, noted that the proposal was not formulated under rule 37 or rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, but that if it was adopted by the Council, the invitation to PLO would confer on it the same rights of participation as those conferred on a Member State under rule 37.

137. The representative of the United States made a statement concerning that proposal.

*DECISION: At its 1916th meeting, on 4 May 1976, the Security Council adopted the proposal by 11 votes to 1 (United States of America), with 3 abstentions (France, Italy, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).*

138. The Council then began its discussion of the item with a statement by the representative of Egypt. The representative of the USSR and the President spoke on a procedural point.

139. At the 1917th meeting on 5 May, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representative of Saudi Arabia, at his request, to participate in the discussion. The representative of PLO and the representatives of Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Israel and Saudi Arabia made statements. The representatives of Egypt and Jordan, as well as the representative of PLO, spoke in exercise of the right of reply.

140. At the 1918th meeting on 10 May, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited

the representatives of Kuwait, Somalia, the Sudan, and Yemen, at their request, to participate in the discussion. The Council then heard statements by the representatives of Kuwait, the USSR, and China. The representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic, the United States and the USSR spoke in exercise of the right of reply.

141. At the 1919th meeting on 12 May, the Council heard statements by the representatives of the Sudan, Somalia, Israel and Egypt. The representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic, the Sudan, the USSR and Somalia, as well as the representative of PLO, spoke in exercise of the right of reply.

142. At the 1920th meeting on 14 May, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representative of Qatar, at his request, to participate in the discussion. The Council continued its debate with statements by the representatives of the Libyan Arab Republic, Qatar and Benin.

143. At the 1921st meeting on 20 May, the Council resumed its discussion of the item and heard statements by the representatives of Romania, Pakistan, Panama and Egypt.

144. At the 1922nd meeting on 26 May, the Council concluded its consideration of the item. At that meeting, the President declared that on the basis of consultations with all the members of the Council, he was authorized to make the following statement:

[*Printed as doc. 13 below.*]

145. Following the statement by the President, the representatives of Guyana, Japan, the Libyan Arab Republic, the United States, China, Pakistan, Benin, Israel, Jordan, Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as the representative of PLO made statements in reference thereto. The representative of the Libyan Arab Republic spoke in exercise of the right of reply. The President also made a statement.

##### 5. SUBSEQUENT COMMUNICATIONS TO THE COUNCIL

146. By a letter dated 13 May (S/12073), the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic requested the circulation of a letter from Rabbi Uri Blau for the Jerusalem Neturei Karta, protesting the closing of ritual slaughter-houses in Jerusalem by Israeli officials as a violation of religious freedom.

147. By a letter dated 18 May (S/12078), the

representative of the Libyan Arab Republic requested the circulation of a letter from the Acting Permanent Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization, charging that Israeli occupation troops had murdered a young girl in Nablus and expressing the deep concern of his organization about the lack of action by the Council to put an end to Israel's illegal occupation.

### C. The Middle East problem including the Palestinian question

#### 1. COMMUNICATIONS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL REGARDING RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS THIRTIETH SESSION

148. By a letter dated 11 December 1975 (S/11908), the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the text of General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX) of 10 November 1975, entitled "Invitation to the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the efforts for peace in the Middle East". He drew particular attention to paragraph 1, by which the Assembly had requested the Security Council to consider and adopt the necessary resolutions and measures in order to enable the Palestinian people to exercise its inalienable national rights in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX).

149. By a letter dated 18 December (S/11919), the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the text of General Assembly resolution 3376 (XXX) of 10 November, entitled "Question of Palestine", in paragraph 8 of which the Assembly requested the Security Council to consider, as soon as possible after 1 June 1976, the question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of the inalienable rights recognized in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 3236 (XXIX).

150. By a further letter dated 18 December (S/11920), the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the text of General Assembly resolution 3414 (XXX) of 5 December, entitled "The situation in the Middle East". He drew particular attention to paragraph 4, by which the Assembly requested the Security Council to take all necessary measures for the speedy implementation of all relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council aimed at the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region, worked out with the participation of all parties concerned, including PLO.

151. By a letter dated 9 January 1975 (S/11931), the representative of the USSR transmitted the text of a letter addressed to the Secretary-General by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR in connexion with General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX).<sup>37</sup> The Foreign Minister stated that his Government had consistently advocated the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and believed that the only reliable way of reaching a fundamental settlement of that problem was through joint collective efforts by all the parties directly concerned, including the Arab people of Palestine represented by PLO. On 9 November, the Soviet Union had proposed to the United States that as Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East they should take a joint initiative for its resumption. His Government continued to hold the firm view that that Conference was the most appropriate forum for working out fundamental decisions on a Middle East settlement based on the relevant United Nations resolutions and resolutely advocated its speediest possible resumption with the full and equal participation of PLO.

#### 2. CONSIDERATION AT THE 1870TH TO 1879TH MEETINGS (12-26 JANUARY 1976)

152. In its resolution 381 (1975) of 30 November 1975, extending the mandate of UNDOF, the Security Council had also decided to reconvene on 12 January 1976 to continue the debate on the Middle East problem, including the Palestinian question, taking into account all relevant United Nations resolutions.

153. Consequently, the Security Council, at its 1870th meeting on 12 January 1976, included the following item in its agenda without objection: "The Middle East problem including the Palestinian question".

154. At that meeting, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Arab Emirates, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

155. At the same meeting, the President referred to the statement made by the President of the Council at the 1856th meeting on 30 November

<sup>37</sup> Doc. 36 below.

1975 following the adoption of resolution 381 (1975), in which the Council had decided to reconvene on 12 January. In that statement, the President had expressed the understanding of the majority of the Security Council that when it reconvened on 12 January 1976 in accordance with paragraph (a) of resolution 381 (1975), the representatives of PLO would be invited to participate in the debate. With that statement in mind, the President put forward the proposal that the representative of PLO be invited to participate in the current debate, pointing out that the proposal was not being made under rule 37 or rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, but that if it was adopted, the invitation would confer on PLO the same rights of participation as were conferred when a Member State was invited to participate under rule 37.

156. The representatives of the United States, the Libyan Arab Republic, the USSR, Panama, Romania, the United Kingdom and Pakistan made statements regarding the President's proposal. Further statements before the vote on the proposal were made by the representatives of the United States and the USSR.

*DECISION: At its 1870th meeting, on 12 January 1976, the Security Council adopted the proposal by a vote of 11 in favour to 1 against (United States of America), with 3 abstentions (France, Italy, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).*

157. Following the vote, statements were made by the representatives of France and Italy. A statement was made by the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic, and a point of order by the representative of the United States.

158. The Council then began its consideration of the question with a statement by the representative of PLO. The representative of the Libyan Arab Republic made a further statement.

159. At the 1871st meeting on 13 January, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representative of Yugoslavia, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The Council heard statements by the representatives of Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates.

160. At the 1872nd meeting on 14 January, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representative of Mauritania, at his request, to participate in the discussion. Statements were made by the representatives of Qatar, Guyana,

Japan, France and Sweden.

161. At the 1873rd meeting on 15 January, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The Council heard statements by the representatives of Pakistan, the USSR, the United Kingdom, Benin and Saudi Arabia.

162. At the 1874th meeting, held on the same day, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representative of Iraq, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The representatives of Kuwait, Yugoslavia and China made statements. The representatives of the USSR, China and the Libyan Arab Republic spoke in exercise of the right of reply.

163. At the 1875th meeting on 16 January, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representative of Guinea, at her request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The Council continued its discussion with statements by the representatives of Mauritania and Romania.

164. At the 1876th meeting on 19 January, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of the German Democratic Republic, India, Morocco, the Sudan and the Yemen Arab Republic, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. Statements were made by the representatives of the United States, Italy, Panama, Iraq, India, Morocco, Guinea, the German Democratic Republic and the Yemen Arab Republic.

165. At the 1877th meeting on 21 January, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Algeria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Hungary, Poland and Tunisia, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. Continuing its debate, the Council heard statements by the representatives of the Libyan Arab Republic, the Sudan, Bulgaria, Tunisia, Hungary, Algeria and Poland.

166. At the 1878th meeting on 22 January, the Council concluded its general debate with statements by the representatives of Democratic Yemen, Cuba and Czechoslovakia and by the President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania.

167. At the 1879th meeting on 26 January,<sup>38</sup> the representative of Pakistan introduced a draft resolution (S/11940) sponsored by Benin, Guyana, Pakistan, Panama, Romania and the United Republic of Tanzania which read as follows: [Printed as doc. 15 below.]

168. The representative of the United Kingdom introduced an amendment (S/11942) to the six-Power draft resolution which provided for the addition of the following new operative paragraph:

“3. *Reaffirms* the principles and provisions of its resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and declares that nothing in the foregoing provisions of the present resolution supersedes them.”

169. On the proposal of the representative of Pakistan, the meeting was then suspended.

170. Following resumption of the meeting, the President indicated that he would put to the vote, first, the amendment of the United Kingdom (S/11942) and, then, the six-Power draft resolution (S/11940).

171. Before the vote on the amendment, statements were made by the representatives of the United States, France, Japan, the USSR, Italy, the Libyan Arab Republic, the United Kingdom and Pakistan. The representative of the USSR and the President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, made further statements.

*DECISION: At the 1879th meeting, on 26 January 1976, the United Kingdom amendment (S/11942) received 4 votes in favour (France, Italy, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) and 2 against (China, Libyan Arab Republic), with 9 abstentions and was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required majority.*

172. Before the Council proceeded to vote on the six-Power draft resolution (S/11940), statements were made by the representatives of China and the United Kingdom.

*DECISION: At the 1879th meeting, on 26 January 1976, the six-Power draft resolution (S/11940) received 9 votes in favour and 1 against (United States of America), with 3 abstentions (Italy, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) and was not adopted, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council. Two members (China and the Libyan Arab Republic) did not participate in the vote.*

173. Thereafter, the Secretary-General made a

statement. Further statements were made by the representatives of the United States, France, Japan, the USSR, Romania, Panama, Sweden, Italy, Benin and the Libyan Arab Republic and by the President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania. Statements were also made by the representatives of Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as by the representative of PLO.

### 3. OTHER COMMUNICATIONS RECEIVED BETWEEN 1 JANUARY AND 15 JUNE 1976

174. By a letter dated 9 January (S/11928 and Corr.1), the representative of the USSR transmitted the text of a statement, in which his Government set forth its views regarding the situation in the Middle East.<sup>39</sup> It pointed out, in particular, that while conditions for the achievement of an over-all settlement had become more favourable, Israel, long encouraged by certain States which continued to bypass the Geneva Peace Conference and were seeking separate arrangements, continued to oppose any real progress towards settlement by refusing to withdraw from the occupied lands and to recognize the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine. In order to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, it was necessary to solve three basic problems which were organically linked: Israeli troops must be withdrawn from all Arab territories they occupied in 1967; the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including its inalienable right to create its own State, must be ensured; the security of all Middle Eastern States and their right to independent existence must be guaranteed. The recognition of the need to resolve the Palestine problem in the framework of a Middle East settlement was increasingly gaining ground. Such recognition had been reflected in the latest resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, which had clearly stated that the Arab people of Palestine was one of the principal parties to a Middle East settlement, and the Palestine Liberation Organization was its legitimate representative. The Soviet Government believed that the Security Council must base its discussion of the Middle East problem on its 1967 and 1973 resolutions and those of the General Assembly and that its discussion should result in creating the necessary conditions

<sup>38</sup> For the full record of this meeting, see doc. 10 below.

<sup>39</sup> Doc. 36 below.

for the resumption of the Geneva Conference.

175. In a letter dated 10 January (S/11929), the representative of Mexico declared that Mexico considered the Middle East situation to be the most serious potential threat to world peace and that a comprehensive solution to the problem was necessary within the framework of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations. Mexico also believed that the permanent members of the Security Council should demonstrate by action that they wished those resolutions implemented.

176. By a letter dated 14 January (S/11932), the representative of Israel transmitted the text of an article by Y. Harkabi entitled "The Palestinian National Covenant, an Israeli Commentary". The representative of Israel commented on the PLO political programme and various statements made by its leaders, which, he said, demonstrated that the principles and purposes of that organization were incompatible with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.

177. By letters dated 12 and 20 February (S/11985 and S/11991),<sup>40</sup> the representatives of the USSR and of the United States transmitted the replies of their respective Governments to a letter which the Secretary-General had addressed to them on 27 January, in maintaining contacts with the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, inquiring about their thinking on ways of making progress towards a solution of the problem.

178. In his reply (S/11985), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR stated that Israel's continuing occupation of the Arab territories and its disregard of the rights of the Palestine people perpetuated the danger of a new military explosion. The efforts of Israel and those who supported it to keep the settlement of the Middle East problem deadlocked, as demonstrated by the results of the recent debate in the Security Council, was a subject of concern. Because of the position of one of its permanent members, the Council had not been able to reach a decision, although the overwhelming majority of its members had spoken in favour of specific measures to achieve a comprehensive settlement. With few exceptions, Members of the United Nations had expressed, in the General Assembly and the Security Council, the view that

genuine peace in the Middle East was impossible unless Israel withdrew its troops from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and unless the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine were safeguarded and the right of all States of the region to independent existence was guaranteed. It had become evident that the only reliable way to achieve agreement on all the questions involved in a settlement was to resume, after careful preparation, the work of the Geneva Peace Conference, with the participation of all those directly concerned, including PLO and the Co-Chairmen of the Conference. Without the participation of the Palestinians, the Geneva Conference would be not a forum for business-like negotiations but a camouflage aimed at creating a semblance of negotiations.

179. In his reply (S/11991), the Secretary of State of the United States stated that he shared the Secretary-General's sense of urgency of pursuing the goal of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and was determined to continue the efforts towards meaningful negotiations. He remarked, however, that there would be no chance of further progress if the negotiating framework were to be disrupted. That framework, he added, was sufficiently flexible and could provide the basis for working out fair and durable solutions to all of the issues involved. Furthermore, the United States had repeatedly affirmed that there would be no permanent peace unless it included arrangements that took into account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people. Recognizing the need for a degree of flexibility on the particular procedures through which the momentum of progress in the negotiating process might be maintained, the United States had agreed that a resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference, after careful preparation, would serve the goal of achieving such progress. As a practical way of proceeding, the United States had proposed a preparatory conference of those who had participated so far in the negotiations. It was also prepared to consider holding bilateral consultations with the USSR in advance of such a preparatory conference.

180. By a letter dated 29 April (S/12063), the representative of the USSR transmitted a statement by the Soviet Government dated 28 April,<sup>41</sup> calling for an over-all political settlement of the

<sup>40</sup> Docs. 50 and 53 below.

<sup>41</sup> Doc. 91 below.

problem of the Middle East based on the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories; the satisfaction of the legitimate national demands of the Arab people of Palestine, including their inalienable right to establish their own State; and international guarantees for the security and inviolability of the frontiers of all Middle Eastern States. It favoured the resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference, with the participation of PLO, possibly in two stages, so that all organizational questions might be solved in the initial stage and appropriate working bodies established. The Soviet Union was prepared to appoint its representatives to such meetings without delay. In the statement it was stressed that the previous year's separate arrangements concerning some minor segments of the Israeli-occupied territories, by side-stepping the key questions in any Middle East settlement, had not only failed to alleviate the situation but had even further aggravated it, as had been demonstrated by the events in Lebanon.

181. By a letter dated 19 May (S/12080),<sup>42</sup> the representative of Bulgaria transmitted a statement of the Bulgarian Government on the Middle East, in which it expressed its full agreement with the statement of the Soviet Union of 28 April and endorsed the proposals contained therein for the solution of the Middle East conflict.

#### 4. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE EXERCISE OF THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE

182. By a note dated 29 May (S/12090), the Secretary-General, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 3376 (XXX) of 10 November 1975, transmitted to the Security Council the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People established pursuant to the above-mentioned resolution.<sup>43</sup>

183. In its report, the Committee summarized its deliberations, which had centred on such questions as the right of return, the right to self-determination and to national independence and sovereignty, the status of Jerusalem, the elements of a programme to implement the inalienable rights of the Palestinians and the interrelationship of the question of Palestine and the Middle East problem.

184. The Committee stressed the inalienable right of Palestinians to return to their homes and proposed a two-phase programme to implement the exercise of that right. The first phase involved the return of Palestinians displaced in the June 1967 war. The Committee recommended that the Security Council should request the immediate implementation of its resolution 237 (1967) and that such implementation should not be related to any other conditions. It further recommended that the resources of the International Committee of the Red Cross and/or the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East might be employed to assist in the solution of any logistical problems involved in the resettlement of those Palestinians returning to their homes. For the second phase, dealing with Palestinians displaced between 1948 and 1967, the Committee recommended that the United Nations, in co-operation with the States directly involved and PLO, should proceed to make the necessary arrangements to enable those Palestinians to exercise their right to return to their homes and property or to receive just compensation in accordance with General Assembly resolution 194 (III).

185. In order to implement the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, national independence and sovereignty, the Committee recommended that a time-table should be established by the Security Council for the complete withdrawal, no later than 1 June 1977, of Israeli occupation forces from the areas occupied in 1967. If necessary, temporary peace-keeping forces should be provided by the Council to facilitate the process of withdrawal. It also recommended that the Council should request Israel to desist from the establishment of new settlements and to withdraw during that period from settlements established since 1967 in the occupied territories. Israel was also to be requested to abide by the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949 and to declare its recognition of the applicability of that Convention. The evacuated territories should be taken over by the United Nations, with the co-operation of the League of Arab States, and subsequently handed over to PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. The Committee also recommended that, as soon as the independent Palestinian entity

<sup>42</sup> Doc. 94 below.

<sup>43</sup> Doc. 4 below.

had been established, the United Nations, in co-operation with the States directly involved and that entity, should make further arrangements, taking into account General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX), for the full implementation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, the resolution of outstanding problems and the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region, in accordance with all relevant United Nations resolutions.

#### 5. CONSIDERATION AT THE 1924TH MEETING (9 JUNE 1976)

186. At its 1924th meeting on 9 June, the Security Council included the following item in its agenda without objection:

“The question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights:

“Report of the Committee established under General Assembly resolution 3376 (XXX) (S/12090).”

187. The President read out the text of a letter dated 9 June from the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People asking to address the Security Council in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee, together with the Rapporteur of that Committee.

188. The President, with the consent of the Council, extended an invitation under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure to the Chairman, the Rapporteur and other members of the Committee.

189. The President also read out the text of a letter also dated 9 June from the representatives of the Libyan Arab Republic and Pakistan requesting that, as on previous occasions, the representative of PLO be invited to participate in the debate on the item. He noted that the proposal was not put forward under rule 37 or 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, but that if it was adopted by the Council, the invitation would confer on PLO the same rights of participation as those conferred when a Member State was invited to participate under rule 37.

190 The representative of the United States made a statement in regard to that proposal.

*DECISION: At its 1924th meeting, on 9 June 1976, the Security Council adopted the proposal by a vote of 11 in favour to 1 against (United States of America), with 3 abstentions (France, Italy, United Kingdom of*

*Great Britain and Northern Ireland).*

191. The President, then, with the consent of the Council, also invited the representatives of Cuba, Egypt, Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, at their request, to participate in the debate without the right to vote.

192. At the same meeting, the Council began its consideration of the question with a statement by the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, who introduced the report of the Committee. The Rapporteur of the Committee also made a statement, as did one of the Vice-Chairmen of the Committee and the representative of Cuba.

### 3

#### **Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA (Introduction)<sup>44</sup>**

**September 15, 1976**

1. During the year 1 July 1975 to 30 June 1976 the dominant feature in the Agency's area of operations was the situation in Lebanon, which degenerated from what the previous year's report<sup>45</sup> had termed civil disturbances into an anarchic civil war of appalling violence. In this conflict the Palestine refugees in Lebanon were inextricably involved, since, whatever its causes, remote or proximate, one factor was the dimensions of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. The refugees in Lebanon, half of them residing in camps and half outside, were therefore vitally affected by the fighting. (The position in regard to camps, including the responsibility for them, has been explained in previous reports, notably in paragraph 22 of the report for 1974/75, paragraph 22 of the report for 1973/74, paragraph 16 of the report for 1972/73 and paragraphs 55 to 57 of the report for 1970/71 and is referred to again in footnote 8 of this report.)<sup>46</sup> Because of conditions in Lebanon no figures are yet available for refugee casualties but they are likely to be numerous and they have been accompanied by other hardships. The para-

<sup>44</sup> Introduction to *Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1975-30 June 1976, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 13* (UN doc. A/31/13), pp. 1-18.

<sup>45</sup> Doc. 3 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>46</sup> Not included in this excerpt.

lysis of normal economic life deprived of their employment the high proportion of refugees who supplement UNRWA's assistance by working in agriculture, construction, transport and other industries. UNRWA's own services to the refugees were disrupted, though, as can be seen from paragraphs 24 to 27 in the general operations section of this introduction, the extent to which it was possible to maintain services in the north and south was surprising. Many refugees fled the camps and suburbs of Beirut for the south, among them some who had earlier left the south to seek work in Beirut or to escape the effects of the Israeli attacks of 1974 and 1975. In the other host countries the refugees watched the worsening events in Lebanon with feelings of dismay and impotence.

2. The Agency's administration was, of course, directly affected, both the headquarters in Beirut and the Lebanon Field Office. From September 1975 onwards offices were closed more frequently and for longer periods, and communications, internal and external, deteriorated. It gradually became clear that, unless there were more solid grounds for expecting a return to normal conditions, Agency headquarters must be moved temporarily from Beirut because it could no longer discharge effectively its responsibility for the direction, supervision and support of its programmes in the other fields of operation. After reviewing the situation on his return from the General Assembly in December and consulting the Secretary-General, the Commissioner-General decided that the headquarters must be moved as soon as possible in the interest of continuation of the Agency's mandate as a whole. The reasons for which part of the headquarters moved to Amman and part to Vienna are given in paragraph 24 below. Upon vacation by headquarters of its office premises in Beirut they were occupied by the Lebanon Field Office, which had already begun to move from Sin el-Fil (in the vicinity of Tal Za'atar), an area to which access had been rendered precarious by the fighting. Unless there has been a sustained improvement in the situation in Beirut which gives a reasonable assurance of acceptable working conditions and security and would justify return to Beirut, the intention is that the headquarters should be reunited in Amman by the end of 1976 and should remain there at least until after a decision has been taken

by the General Assembly on the extension of the Agency's mandate beyond 1978.

3. The persistently expressed desire of the refugees to return to the homes they left in 1948 found support in the report<sup>47</sup> of a committee established by the General Assembly at its thirtieth session, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. Among the Committee's recommendations directly affecting the refugees were the return of Palestine refugees and others displaced in 1967 to their original place of refuge or homes and the right of the Palestine refugees to return to their original homes or to receive compensation in lieu thereof, in accordance with the recommendations in paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, recalled annually in resolutions of the General Assembly and in the Commissioner-General's reports. At the request of the Committee, the Commissioner-General provided the Committee with information regarding the distribution within UNRWA's area of operations of the Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA. In recommending that return should take place in two phases, the Committee suggested, in paragraph 68 of its report, that in the first phase UNRWA might assist in "the solution of any logistical problems involved in the resettlement of those returning to their homes" and, "in co-operation with the host countries and the Palestine Liberation Organization, in the identification of the displaced Palestinians". The report (S/12090) was submitted by the Committee to the Security Council through the Secretary-General. The Council considered the report in June 1976 but no resolution was adopted. The report of the Committee will be before the General Assembly at its thirty-first session. There was meantime no significant progress during the year in the return to their original place of refuge or home of refugees and other persons displaced in 1967. The Secretary-General will submit a report on this subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session under Assembly resolution 3419 C (XXX).<sup>48</sup>

#### *Finance and management*

4. During 1975/76 UNRWA experienced the most serious financial crisis of its history: in the

<sup>47</sup> Doc. 4 below.

<sup>48</sup> Doc. 6 below.



final quarter of 1975 it was on the brink of suspension of services and on 30 June 1976 it was again in the same situation. The incompatibility of UNRWA's system of financing with the obligations it is expected to assume was again demonstrated, and, despite the generosity of many contributors, no solution to this chronic problem is yet in sight.

5. As last year's report stated, on 30 June 1975 the level of income was still inadequate to maintain programmes in full until the end of the financial year on 31 December and the deficit stood at \$13.2 million. There had been no improvement by the end of September 1975, and the Agency was approaching the situation described in paragraph 13 of last year's report in which it would default on its contractual obligations and the Commissioner-General would be in breach of UNRWA's Financial Regulations. The Commissioner-General therefore made a special report to the Secretary-General, informing him that unless sufficient additional contributions were received by 15 November 1975, the Agency would have to cease operations after 30 November 1975, depriving the Palestine refugees registered with it of education, health and relief services and terminating the appointments of staff, with all the hardship and other repercussions that would ensue. Fortunately, by 15 November additional contributions amounting to about \$6 million were received, and the Commissioner-General concluded that, by deferring some non-recurrent capital expenditure and forgoing the make-up of short issues of rations that had occurred earlier in the year for logistical reasons, the Agency could maintain its programmes until the end of the year. In the latter part of the year an improvement in exchange rates, and purchase of flour at a much lower price, contributed to a small surplus of \$1.8 million when the 1975 accounts were finally closed.

6. In his statement to the Special Political Committee on 11 November 1975 (see A/SPC/SR. 974), the Commissioner-General explained that UNRWA's financial situation comprised three distinct but related aspects or problems: first, the primary budgetary problem of insufficiency of income to meet expenditure; second, the problem of an insufficiency of cash at any particular time to meet cash expenditures which are then due; and third, the problem of an insuf-

ficiency of assets to cover liabilities, including contingent liabilities should these become due.

7. The first two problems are straightforward, once it is appreciated as regards the second of them—insufficiency of cash at any particular time—that contributions are paid irregularly during the year, mainly because the budgetary years of Member States do not always coincide with UNRWA's budget year (the calendar year), and that UNRWA's working capital is now no more than the equivalent of a month's expenditure and is, moreover, partly in the form of commodities. The third problem is more complex and is perhaps the most important because, in effect, it sets the limit beyond which the Agency cannot continue to incur expenditure in conditions of budgetary deficit.

8. The complexity of the third problem arises from the Agency's contractual obligations to pay separation benefits to its large local staff if alternative employment cannot be found for them, and from the effective doubling of the amount due in such benefits if UNRWA were forced to terminate the appointments of its staff because funds were insufficient to maintain services of the refugees. The Agency has assumed that, under conditions of orderly liquidation after a decision of the General Assembly that the Agency's task had been completed, slightly less than half of the staff would be found alternative employment and no separation benefits would be payable to them. Consequently, the Agency practice has been to take into account separation benefits only for slightly more than half of the staff in calculating the liabilities which it must have sufficient assets to cover. If, however, there is an abrupt cessation of operations in circumstances of financial breakdown, the Agency could not hope to find adequate alternative employment for even half of its staff and full funding of separation benefits would be required, thereby doubling the cost to the Agency of providing for separation benefits.

9. Thus, after a certain point in the year which, given the low level of working capital, tends to be a function of the size of the deficit, the Agency, having maintained services during the initial months and given time for response to appeals for additional funds, finds itself in a position in which a financial collapse is precipitated by the potential strain on its assets imposed by the liability for separation benefits. If, on the other

hand, sufficient funds can be found to maintain services until the end of the year, with possibly some minor adjustment of expenditure, as has happened so far, there is no need to provide for additional separation benefits, since the prospect of suspension of services, and therefore of termination of staff in circumstances in which adequate alternative employment cannot be found for even half of them, has receded. A new cycle then begins with the new year: during the first months pledged income for the new year is sufficient to cover expenditure on services for that period and also to provide for normal liabilities.

10. The Agency's unfunded liability for separations benefits for its large local staff is thus a serious aggravation of its financial difficulties. The amount required if circumstances are such that separation benefits must be paid out to all staff, who number about 15,900, is of the order of \$20 million at present. In the Agency's chronic financial weakness, this aggravation could only be avoided if the General Assembly were prepared to ease the burden on UNRWA's assets, either by approving a special allocation of funds from the United Nations budget to increase UNRWA's working capital or by agreeing in advance to accept a contingent liability against the United Nations budget for separation benefits for UNRWA's local staff in the event of liquidation of the Agency. The effect would still be that the Agency would be dependent on voluntary contributions to meet expenditure on services but that the risk of premature suspension of all services and termination of staff because of the unfunded liability for separation benefits would be removed.

11. Even if action on the basis indicated were taken, there would still remain the problem, to which no solution has yet been found, of ensuring equivalence between pledged income and expenditure required to maintain normal programmes. So far it has been impossible to obtain an assurance from the beginning of the year of the full amount of funds the Agency requires to finance the programmes the General Assembly expects to be maintained. If, in default, the Agency is to limit expenditure from the beginning of the year to what pledged income will support, increasing services only as pledged income increases, some guidance must be given to the Commissioner-General on the priorities to be observed in limiting expenditure in this way. So far there has been

reluctance by the General Assembly and by the UNRWA Advisory Commission to give such guidance. There are also very serious practical problems, as the Commissioner-General explained in his statement to the Special Political Committee last year, because UNRWA operates ongoing programmes most of which cannot simply be turned on and off, e.g. the education and health programmes, and because parts of some programmes are financed by special contributions. There are also constraints of a political nature that cannot be ignored.

12. The working capital of UNRWA is defined as the excess at any time of its assets (including unpaid pledges) over its liabilities, and its depletion is shown by a comparison of figures for 1967, 1972 and 1976. In 1967, with a budget of \$40.5 million, working capital at the beginning of the year was \$14.3 million, the equivalent of 35 per cent of the budget or about four months' expenditure, and \$12.1 million of working capital was in cash. Normal separation benefits were budgeted for in liabilities at \$4 million and were amply covered by working capital. By 1972, while the budget had risen to \$52.1 million, working capital had decreased to \$5 million, representing 9.5 per cent of the budget or little more than one month's expenditure; only \$3.5 million was in cash, while separation benefits had increased to \$5.9 million. The drastic effects of world inflation, reflected in the prices of commodities and other supplies, and of local inflation, reflected through the cost of living in local staff remuneration, coupled with adverse exchange rates between major donors' currencies and local currencies, greatly increased the cost of operations in more recent years. In 1976 estimated expenditure to maintain services in full is estimated at \$127.7 million, but working capital at the beginning of 1976 was only \$10.8 million, about one month's expenditure; \$1.9 million of it was provisionally reserved to meet Provident Fund capital losses, and only \$5.9 million was in cash, while the liability for normal separation benefits for local staff (i.e. for about half the local staff) had risen to \$11.4 million (at the rates of exchange then prevailing between the United States dollar and local currencies).

13. Expenditure figures for the period 1973–1976 are:

1973	\$ 62.5 million
1974	\$ 88.1 million

1975	\$ 111.8 million
1976	\$ 127.7 million (revised estimate)

It will be noted from these figures of expenditure that the rate of increase has been much reduced, almost entirely because of more favourable exchange rates for the Agency and lower commodity prices, principally for flour. Despite the unforeseen cost of moving the headquarters from Beirut and continuing local inflation, the revised expenditure figure for 1976, \$127.7 million—a reduction of \$12 million on the original estimate—represents an increase of 14 per cent over 1975, compared with increases of 41 per cent and 26.9 per cent in 1974 and 1975 respectively over the preceding year. It will be noted that between 1974 and 1975 income rose from \$89.2 million to \$113.6 million, an increase of 27.3 per cent. For 1976, however, income will drop to \$98.9 million, a decrease of about 13 per cent unless additional contributions are received.

14. It is against this background that the Agency's current financial crisis must be seen. On 8 December 1975, after the announcement of pledges in the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the General Assembly for the Announcement of Voluntary Contributions to UNRWA had failed to assure the Agency of sufficient funds to maintain programmes in full for the whole of 1976, the Commissioner-General informed the General Assembly (see A/PV.2430) that he proposed to review the financial position in April 1976 and make reductions in services sufficient to reduce the deficit by one half, and that he would again review the position at the end of June. When he reviewed the position in April, the deficit was no less than \$32 million, and to reduce it by one half would have necessitated reductions in the education programmes, i.e. closing of schools in the course of the school year or reduction in the health service, involving risk to refugee health (and in both cases, of course, the discharge of large numbers of staff). In view of the situation in the area of

operations, especially in Lebanon, he decided that such drastic reductions should be deferred while further efforts to raise funds were made. Reductions in relief services would not have produced the required amount in economies, because a large part of the commodities used is donated. Taking into account the cash position, however, the Commissioner-General decided that the Agency could not afford to purchase more flour after March unless the financial position improved very substantially (and none has been purchased since then). As a result there were reductions in flour issues from May onwards in some fields and in others a ration of 10 kg. was maintained only by borrowing from the Government against an undertaking by the Agency to repay later from donated supplies or by running down stocks, the implication in both cases being that no flour would be available for issue later in the year unless more could be bought or was donated.

15. On 30 June 1976, the revised statement of expenditure to maintain services in full in 1976 was \$127.7 million; pledged and other income was estimated at \$98.2 million; there was thus a deficit of \$29.5 million. The Agency's assets, including unpaid pledges for 1976 and inventories of supplies at book value, amounted to \$62.4 million; liabilities, including a liability for payment of separation benefits to half the local staff, amount to \$16.7 million.

16. The table below extrapolates these figures, monthly expenditure on services at the current rate being deducted from assets. If the figure for separation benefits had to be doubled for the reason given above, there would not be sufficient assets available for this purpose by the end of September because some assets consist of contributions made for special purposes and presumably could not therefore be used to meet liquidation expenses and it is unlikely that the full book value of supply assets could be realized.

*Estimated assets and liabilities as of 30 June 1976*  
(in thousands of US dollars)

	As at end June	As at end July	As at end Aug.	As at end Sept.	As at end Oct.	As at end Nov.	As at end Dec.
<i>Assets</i>							
Cash assets (including unpaid pledges and accounts receivable)	45 300	37 900	30 000	22 700	15 400	8 100	800
Supply assets (including undelivered pledges)	17 073	14 731	11 429	9 552	7 298	5 044	2 390
	62 373	52 631	41 429	32 252	22 698	13 144	3 190
<i>Liabilities</i>							
Accounts payable (estimated)	3 000	3 000	3 000	3 000	3 000	3 000	3 000
Liquidation of commitments	1 000	1 000	1 000	1 000	1 000	1 000	1 000
Provision for staff separation benefits (normal)	12 700	12 785	12 870	13 055	13 140	13 225	13 310
	16 700	16 785	16 870	17 055	17 140	17 225	17 310
Excess of assets over liabilities	45 673	35 846	24 559	15 197	5 558	(4 081)	(14 120)
Provision for additional staff separation benefits required to cover all staff	11 725	11 800	12 805	12 050	12 130	12 235	12 285
Net excess of assets over liabilities on basis of liability for all staff	33 948	24 046	11 754	3 147	(6 572)	(16 316)	(26 405)

17. In view of financial regulation 9.5, which states that commitments cannot be entered into unless there is an assurance that funds will be available to meet them, on the basis of these calculations the Commissioner-General would therefore have been forced to plan suspension of operations after 15 September 1976 unless additional contributions were received. At this point the contractual obligation to give staff 30 day's notice of termination of their appointments would become relevant, and because of the difficulty of ensuring that notices reach staff in time, these notices would have had to be issued late in July. The position subsequently improved, a lower estimate of expenditure in 1976 being justified by the final figures for 1975 on production of the 1975 accounts in July, recalculation of the cost of separation benefits on the basis of recent more favourable exchange rates reducing this

liability, and some additional income being pledged. Nevertheless, at the time this report was being completed, the threatened date for the suspension of operations, if sufficient contributions were not received, had been postponed only to 30 November and the issue of termination notices to late October.

*General operations*

18. Refugees registered with the Agency as of 30 June 1976 totalled 1,668,205, an increase by natural growth of 2.2 per cent during the year under review. Foot-note *a* to table 1 of annex I, which gives the total registered refugee population, explains that these statistics "are based on the Agency's registration records, which do not necessarily reflect the actual refugee population owing to factors such as unreported deaths and births

[or] false or duplicate registrations". The footnote explains further that the statistics include registered refugees who are no longer within the area of operations. The Agency is primarily concerned with those refugees to whom it actually provides services and has not the resources to concern itself with changes in family composition affecting persons who, because of their families' income levels or absence from the area, do not receive services and have not reported such changes. Subject to this qualification the Agency continues, within the limits of its ability, to keep its records current and, in the light of its experience with rectification of the registration rolls, of use of health facilities and of school population, believes that the margin of error in the registration figure should not be exaggerated. It is relevant in this connexion that there is a school population of over 280,000 between the ages of 6 and 15/16 in elementary and preparatory classes of UNRWA/UNESCO schools. It will be noted from table 2 of annex I that the number of births to Palestine refugee families notified to the Agency during the period 1950 to 1975 is almost matched by the total of deletions from registration for rations during the same period, in each case over 900,000. It is worth remembering also that Palestine refugees registered with the Agency do not include all Palestinians who left that part of Palestine which became Israel in 1948, since many were able to fend for themselves without assistance; still less, of course, does it include all Palestinians.

19. The distribution of the refugees by place of registration within the Agency's area of operations (Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, east Jordan, West Bank and the Gaza Strip) is shown in table 4 of annex 1. The largest concentrations of refugees are in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, under Israeli occupation (38.2 per cent), and in east Jordan (38.6 per cent). Much smaller proportions are in Lebanon (11.9 per cent) and in the Syrian Arab Republic (11.3 per cent). Of the approximately 645,000 registered refugees in east Jordan, over 360,000 are members of families who originally sought refugee there in 1948, as many as 50,000 are believed to belong to families who moved from the West Bank to east Jordan between the hostilities of 1948 and 1967, and over 220,000 belong to families who fled from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during or immediately after the hostilities of 1967.

20. The Agency provides three kinds of service to the refugees: education, including general education and vocational and teacher training; relief, mainly the basic rations; and health services, with emphasis on preventive medicine. Of the three, education is the largest element in the Agency's 1977 budget (\$68.9 million), relief is substantial (\$50.8 million), and health is the smallest (\$15.9 million). The host Governments supplement the services of UNRWA by providing, in some cases, upper secondary and university education, access to hospitals and other medical facilities, sites and water supplies, and in other ways. In the Syrian Arab Republic and in Jordan, the host Governments bear the financial burden of caring for an estimated 300,000 persons displaced from territory occupied by Israel in 1967 who are not refugees registered with UNRWA.

21. Only about one half of the registered refugees (49.6 per cent) received the Agency monthly basic ration of flour, rice, sugar and cooking oil, which is distributed to refugees living in and out of camps. The ration does not constitute a balanced diet, as it is deficient in vitamins derived from fresh food-stuffs and in animal protein. Absence, high family income, award of university scholarships or graduation from UNRWA/UNESCO training centres disqualify for receipt of rations. The largest single group of potentially eligible non-recipients, however, are young children who are excluded because of ration ceilings, and who totalled 471,095.

22. The function of UNRWA is to provide the services described in paragraph 20 above to eligible Palestine refugees registered with the Agency. Its functions do not include the administration or policing of refugee camps. There are no "UNRWA camps" in this sense. Somewhat more than a third of the refugees registered with UNRWA live in refugee camps and the Agency provides services to them, but it also provides services to refugees outside the camps. Some few UNRWA installations connected with the provision of services exist only in camps (for example, camp services offices), but most exist both in and outside camps (schools, ration distribution centres, clinics) and some only outside (vocational and teacher training centres, central warehouses and the Agency's headquarters and field offices). (For further details on the camps, UNRWA's relationship to them, and shelters and other buildings in

them, see foot-note 8 below<sup>49</sup> and the sections of previous annual reports cited therein.) The registered camp population represented 35.8 per cent of total registered refugees, varying from 59.4 per cent in the Gaza Strip to 25.3 per cent in the West Bank. In general, the maintenance and repair of the camp shelters in which the refugees live is the responsibility of the refugees themselves.

23. The Agency's provision of services to refugees throughout the area of operations was made much more difficult by the fighting in Lebanon. Armed conflict continued from late June 1975 into the first few days of the reporting period, subsided during July and August and was renewed in September. From mid-September onwards, except for intermittent periods of relative calm, the conflict increased in intensity and affected more and more of the country and consequently more and more of the Agency's operations. In the nine months from October 1975 to June 1976, what had been essentially periodic outbursts of relatively disorganized factional gun battles confined largely to Beirut developed into larger-scale military activity akin to civil war. A particularly disturbing aspect of the situation was the free hand given to ordinary criminals by the general breakdown in law and order and by the release of many from the prisons by armed bands. Crimes of violence, theft and extortion—unrelated to the politically motivated civil conflict—increased alarmingly.

24. Both of the UNRWA offices located in Beirut—Agency headquarters and the Lebanon Field Office—felt the effects of the conflict. There were two related but separate consequences: first, the personal safety of staff and their dependants was threatened and, second, it became increasingly difficult to carry on the Agency's operations not only in Lebanon but, as regards the rest of the area of operations, from Lebanon. The Lebanon Field Office's ability to carry on operations in Lebanon was most seriously affected and, because headquarters would function less and less effectively as central management for the area as a whole, operations in Syria, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza suffered as well. The threat to personal safety was met in part by the voluntary evacuation of dependants of staff members of United Nations

organizations, beginning in late October 1975. The disruption of work in headquarters was at first palliated by the redeployment of programme personnel (mainly from the Education and Health Departments) on extended mission elsewhere in the area in the period from October to December and, subsequently, early in January, more radically dealt with by the temporary relocation of headquarters in Amman and Vienna. The Agency would have preferred to have the whole of headquarters moved to Amman but since available office space in Amman was quite limited, priority was given to accommodating there headquarters personnel whose duties required frequent travel, consultation and close supervision in the area of operations. A smaller group, made up of administrative and legal personnel, whose functions are normally performed without the same frequent travel and consultation in the area, were sent on temporary duty to Vienna, where fully equipped office space, communications facilities and administrative services were provided until March, when the Agency leased its own space on a temporary basis. With the help of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) the Vienna contingent became immediately operational on arrival in January. It was only in June 1976 that sufficient office space had become available and had been adequately enough equipped to accommodate fully all of the departments moved to Amman. The Agency leased a building under construction that could eventually accommodate the Vienna unit, if it were decided later in the year to reunite headquarters in Amman rather than return to Beirut.

25. Although the division of Headquarters created some new problems and the Agency was anxious to reunite headquarters in the area of operations, it at least became possible to perform essential functions again, and communications with the area of operations could be adequately maintained. Work backlogs resulting from the inability of staff to get to the office in Beirut were eliminated and headquarters-field communications, the flow of supplies and the Agency's financial operations were restored to nearly normal, except as they related to Lebanon (though even as regards Lebanon communications with Beirut were better from Vienna than from Amman). An important by-product of the relocation of headquarters, although it was undertaken at

<sup>49</sup> Not included in this excerpt.

the time primarily for operational reasons, was of course the elimination of the threat to the personal safety of headquarters staff and therefore to the viability of the whole operation.

26. The Lebanon Field Office continued to operate as effectively as it could in the circumstances, but during the entire year under review, except for brief periods totalling a few weeks, only a fraction of its employees were able to reach the field's central office in Beirut. The situation with respect to subordinate area offices elsewhere in Lebanon was much closer to normal than in Beirut during the summer of 1975 but with the spread of fighting their operations, too, were seriously curtailed. Rations were distributed when it was possible to supply the distribution centres and the refugees were able to reach them—and both were possible to a surprising extent. Health services suffered but these, too, were continued to the best of the Agency's ability. Progressively during the reporting period, the Agency was forced to suspend much of its general education, teacher training and vocational training in Lebanon, since in many parts of the country neither teaching staff nor students could safely reach the UNRWA/UNESCO schools and training centres. The fighting undoubtedly resulted in casualties amongst refugees and probably also amongst the large staff of over 2,000, but the Agency cannot yet determine how many. There was extensive damage to UNRWA installations and refugee shelters in camps in and around Beirut and, to a lesser extent, elsewhere in Lebanon. School books and furniture, flour and other food supplies and medicines were looted. In mid-June United Nations international staff were evacuated after security in western Beirut deteriorated still further, shelling intensified, internal communication even in this restricted area was disrupted and work had become impossible. As the Lebanon Field Office was cut off from both north and south Lebanon at this time, the three UNRWA international staff were evacuated with a view to their safety, to rest and recuperation after a period of severe strain and heavy responsibility, and to consideration of means of maintaining direction of the operation in Lebanon from some centre other than Beirut. Such routine operations as were feasible, including distribution of rations in some areas, continued under local staff with whom contact was maintained directly

from headquarters.

27. In addition to the problems created by internal conflict, during July, August, September and December of 1975, Israeli air raids and attacks from the sea caused serious loss of life among refugees and damage to Agency installations and refugee shelters. In total, 42 registered refugees were reported killed and 101 registered refugees reported injured during these attacks. Damage to UNRWA installations in these attacks is estimated at \$120,000 and destruction or damage to refugee shelters, mostly privately built, at \$200,000. In Nabatieh Camp, reconstruction of Agency installations destroyed during an Israeli air raid in 1974 was nearly completed when they were again slightly damaged during another raid in December 1975. Shelter reconstruction in this camp has not been started because of the fighting. In some other camps, the reconstruction and repair of shelters destroyed or damaged during Israeli attacks proceeded on a self-help basis with the Agency providing building materials.

28. In the other fields, the Agency's education/training, relief and health programmes continued as normally as possible given the disruption at headquarters in Beirut and the adverse effect of the Agency's financial difficulties on the supply of flour—the most important ration component. The Agency was forced by its financial difficulties to stop purchasing flour as of March 1976 and by 1 May was assured of only five months' supply of flour through contributions in kind for the remaining seven months of the year. In all fields in 1976, the prospect was of one month without flour and two months in which rice would be substituted for flour in whole or in part although which months these would be in any field would depend upon delivery schedules for donated flour and whether flour could be borrowed from host Governments against later repayment from donated flour.

29. In the Syrian Arab Republic, supply operations increased considerably in volume as they were shifted from Beirut to Latakia. The Syrian Government made further improvements in conditions in the refugee camps, particularly by extending the supply of electricity in some camps.

30. In east Jordan, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, the Agency continued to distribute rations on behalf of the Government to 197,618 persons

displaced as a result of the Arab-Israeli hostilities of 1967 but not registered with the Agency as Palestine refugees. Self-help projects costing \$77,500 were completed, paid for mainly by the refugees, the Government of Jordan, municipalities and voluntary agencies.

31. In the West Bank, numerous self-help projects were carried out, improving living conditions in the camps. The refugees organized protest meetings, submitted petitions and engaged in some sit-in demonstrations in UNRWA offices in reaction to announcements that the Agency's flour resources would permit issue of a 10-kg. ration in only five of the seven months beginning in May.

32. In Gaza, the Agency carried out limited improvements in housing in two camps, refugee self-help projects were completed in several camps, and the Israeli authorities began construction of three paved roads in one camp. Two housing projects were completed by the Israeli authorities near Rafah and two others were nearing completion near Khan Younis and Gaza town. Three hundred and twenty-one refugee families from Rafah Camp and 81 refugee families from Beach Camp bought some of the housing thus provided and moved into these projects. As a condition of purchase, with few exceptions the Israeli authorities, over Agency objections, and without compensating the Agency for shelters it had built, required the refugees to demolish shelters in the camps they had left. The Agency would prefer to have vacated shelters reallocated to other refugees, particularly those whose housing was demolished in 1971 and who were subsequently identified by the Israeli authorities and the Agency as hardship cases or as having unsatisfactory housing.<sup>50</sup> (A separate report on the demolition of shelters and progress in rehousing their occupants is made by the Secretary-General in response to General Assembly resolution 3419 C (XXX).<sup>50</sup> The practice of punitive demolitions was continued by the Israeli authorities as recorded in paragraph 178 below (see also A/31/240).

### *Health*

33. The Agency continued to promote the health of the refugees living in and outside camps through integrated family health care with

emphasis on preventive medicine, nutritional protection of particularly vulnerable groups and health education. Despite budgetary stringency, modest improvements were achieved in accordance with a three-year (1974–1976) health development plan designed to overcome deficiencies in the current health programme.

34. Continuous surveillance was maintained over the important communicable diseases. A limited outbreak of cholera occurred in October 1975 in Damascus, giving rise to eight cases among the refugees. The rapid and efficient control measures taken in close co-operation with the Ministry of Health succeeded in containing the outbreak, which arose from infection introduced by transiting pilgrims.

35. Medical care was provided at almost the same level as in previous years in all fields except Lebanon, where the persistent fighting caused serious disruption. The paralysis of the Beirut port led to delay and interruption in the procurement of drugs for the neighbouring countries, particularly Syria and Jordan. These deficiencies were palliated by local purchase of essential items.

36. Governments and non-governmental bodies again rendered valuable assistance to the Agency's health programme by providing funds, staff, specialized technical advice and guidance, some free hospital services, medical supplies, layettes and food-stuffs, and by co-operating in mass vaccination campaigns. Some donors met the operational costs of individual units, such as health centres, mother-and-child clinics or rehydration/nutrition centres. Funds were also received for professional and vocational training at universities and other institutions in various courses related to public health. The Commissioner-General would like to record his appreciation of this valuable assistance and of the co-operation which the Agency has received from Ministries of Health in the Agency's area of operations.

37. The World Health Organization (WHO) continued its secondment of the Agency's Director of Health and four other public health experts for the technical direction of the health programme. The Twenty-ninth World Health Assembly examined the report of the Director-General of WHO entitled "Health assistance to refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East", which also embodied an abbreviated version of the annual

<sup>50</sup> Doc. 6 below.



report of the Director of Health, UNRWA, for the year 1975, and adopted resolution WHA 29.69.<sup>51</sup>

### *Education*

38. Satisfactory progress was made in the education of refugees during the 1975/1976 school year in all fields except Lebanon. Refugee children numbering 288,893–13,587 more than in 1974/1975—attended the 592 UNRWA/UNESCO schools staffed by 8,360 teachers and headteachers. Double-shifting had to be resorted to on an increased scale since limited funds permitted only a modest school construction programme; Syria and east Jordan were the fields worst affected, with 84.7 per cent and 91 per cent, respectively, of the total school population on double-shift.

39. Like all other Agency activities in Lebanon, education was disrupted by the prolonged fighting. Schools in the Beirut area, covering about 24 per cent of all refugee pupils in UNRWA/UNESCO schools in Lebanon, were especially affected and remained closed for all but one month of the school year. Schools in the south (Sidon and Tyre areas), in contrast to last year, had an almost normal school year, with little disruption until June 1976, while schools in the north and Bekaa areas suffered intermittent interruption. The Sibilin Training Centre near Sidon remained closed for the whole school year.

40. The temporary transfer of the headquarters of the UNRWA/UNESCO Department of Education to Amman was accomplished without any significant disruption of the programme, although some delays in the production and distribution of training materials for Institute of Education in-service courses were experienced. About 70 staff, together with the files, furniture and equipment of the headquarters Department of Education, were transferred from Beirut and eventually established in two rented buildings in Amman over a three-month period from the initial movement on 29 December 1975.

### *Relations with other organs of the United Nations system*

41. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and WHO continued their collaboration with UNRWA in

the conduct of the education and health programmes, thereby assuring professional competence in these two fields. The UNESCO staff, including associate experts made available to UNRWA from or through UNESCO, without reimbursement, numbered 28 at the beginning and 23 at the end of the period under review.

42. The agreement providing for co-operation between the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNESCO and UNRWA in the operation of the UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education was reviewed and there were discussions on its extension for a further two years from 31 December 1976, the termination date of the present agreement. By providing the salaries of three local staff and the cost of some materials and equipment, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) continued its support of the extension services through which the experience of the Institute is made available to Ministries of Education in the region, the provision of those services being co-ordinated by the UNESCO Regional Office for Education in the Arab States, the UNICEF Regional Office and UNRWA.

43. The United Nations Children's Fund continued to extend certain procurement services free of charge and acted as a supplier to the Agency of its competitively-priced pharmaceuticals. The Agency assisted UNICEF with the transport of supplies in the area of operations.

44. When the Agency was forced to relocate part of its headquarters in Vienna, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) extended most valuable assistance, providing temporary accommodation, office equipment and furniture, and supporting administrative services without which the headquarters units transferred to Vienna could not have begun to function there so speedily.

45. In the Syrian Arab Republic the Agency made available 20 per cent of its workshop capacity for the servicing of vehicles of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) against reimbursement of the cost.

46. The Agency's accounts for 1975 were audited by the Auditor-General of Colombia on behalf of the United Nations Board of Auditors.

<sup>51</sup> Doc. 33 below.

*Assistance from voluntary agencies and  
other non-governmental organizations*

47. The Commissioner-General gratefully acknowledges the generous assistance provided by voluntary agencies, business and professional organizations and individuals, without which many projects would not have been carried out for lack of funds.

48. Projects financed by these contributions are noted in the appropriate sections of the present report and all contributions made direct to UNRWA are shown in table 17 of annex I. The main contributors were: American Near East Refugee Aid, Inc. (ANERA); the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO); Australians Care for Refugees (AUSTCARE); the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation; the Canadian Save the Children Fund (CANSAVE); the Christian Reformed World Relief Committee of the United States of America; the Danish Refugee Council; Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI-AGIP) of Italy; the International Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs; the Lutheran World Federation; the Mennonite Central Committee; the Norwegian Refugee Council; OXFAM of the United Kingdom; the Swedish Save the Children Federation (Rädda Barnen); the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada; the United Kingdom Save the Children Fund; the Women's Auxiliary of UNRWA; the World Alliance of Young Men's Christian Associations; the World Health Foundation of Iran; and Zonta International.

49. The Commissioner-General also wishes to pay tribute to the devoted service rendered direct to the refugees by the voluntary agencies in the Agency's area of operations.

*Conclusion*

50. In the last two reports the Commissioner-General has expressed concern about the Agency's ability to maintain its regular programmes, under its mandate from the General Assembly, in conditions of chronic financial instability and in a turbulent operating environment. There has been even greater cause for concern in 1975/76. As feared, the budgetary crises of 1975 and 1976 have been more acute, and the latter, occurring earlier in the year, has already brought the Agency to the brink of suspension of services. At the beginning of 1976, having surmounted the financial

difficulties of 1975, the Agency was forced, after months of extreme disruption of work, to move headquarters for the first time in 25 years and to split headquarters into two temporary units, one of them outside the area of operations. During the worst period, in June 1976, at the end of the reporting year, operations in Lebanon were almost entirely paralysed. Survival as a functioning organization in these conditions, maintenance of normal operations in Jordan, Syria, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and operation at all in Lebanon imposed a severe strain on the small international staff and would have been impossible without the self-reliance and devotion to the Agency's work of senior Palestinian staff.

51. The ability of the Agency to remain financially and administratively viable until the end of the current extension of its mandate on 30 June 1978 cannot be taken for granted. It will require both a better assurance of financial resources and a better understanding of the Agency's financial and operating problems. The exclusive identification of UNRWA with camps and relief is out of date and the time long past when UNRWA's financial problems could be dealt with as if it were a purely temporary relief organization, to be financed on a hand-to-mouth basis by periodic appeals to humanitarian sentiment. Over the 25 years of UNRWA's existence it has developed services of a recurrent, quasi-governmental kind, notably in education and training, which cannot be accommodated to an uncertain income. To staff these services, it has recruited and given professional training to thousands of Palestinian staff members—the total Palestinian staff now employed is about 15,900. In developing in this way UNRWA has acquired institutional characteristics, including staff liabilities which are inescapable. When these liabilities become current rather than contingent, through forced insolvency and suspension of services, as is now threatened, UNRWA is obliged to divert assets from the maintenance of programmes to meet the liabilities or must look to the General Assembly to do so. It is the existence of these liabilities that precipitates the crisis of insolvency and suspension of services.

52. When the then Director of UNRWA proposed to the General Assembly in 1960 a more positive policy of expansion of education and training, he concluded the introduction to his report

for 1959–1960 by saying: “The Palestine refugee problem has a bearing on the stability and peace of the Middle East and hence on the stability and peace of the world. It is in this broad context that the Director requests the General Assembly to make its decision.”<sup>52</sup> The programme of education and training, carried out by UNRWA with the co-operation of UNESCO, is the most constructive assistance the United Nations has been able to give the Palestine refugees and it also makes

a valuable contribution to economic and social progress in the whole region. The Agency’s mandate has since been renewed periodically by the General Assembly on the understanding that UNRWA would maintain its regular programmes, including education and training. The financial consequences of this commitment now face the Agency and the General Assembly with the problem how it can continue to be effectively fulfilled.

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<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, *Fifteenth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/4478), para. 44 [original note].

## Special Reports Submitted to the General Assembly

### 4

#### Report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People<sup>53</sup>

July 21, 1976

#### LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

21 July 1976

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 12 July 1976 informing me, in accordance with paragraph 9 of General Assembly resolution 3376 (XXX), of the action taken by the Security Council on the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, transmitted to it by you, as requested by paragraph 8 of resolution 3376 (XXX).

At a meeting on 21 July, the Committee considered the action taken by the Security Council<sup>54</sup> and was of the opinion that the observations on the Committee's recommendations, particularly those voiced by members of the Council who had voted against the draft resolution before the Council, or abstained on it, had been based on considerations beyond the scope of the Committee's mandate. The observations have, however, been noted and will be brought to the attention of the General Assembly in an appropriate manner.

The Committee decided unanimously, therefore, to reaffirm the recommendations which had been transmitted to the Security Council and to authorize me to resubmit the report to you for transmittal to the General Assembly for its consideration, in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 3376 (XXX). My letter to you dated 28 May 1976, your letter to me of 12 July 1976 informing me of the action taken by the Security Council and

the draft resolution tabled in the Council have been appended to the report (annexes II to IV).

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

[Signed] Médoune FALL

Chairman

of the Committee on the Exercise  
of the Inalienable Rights of the  
Palestinian People

His Excellency

Mr. Kurt Waldheim

Secretary-General of the United Nations

#### PART ONE. PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE

##### I. INTRODUCTION

1. The question of Palestine, both in its political and human rights aspects, has been before the United Nations since 1947. In the period 1947–1975, the General Assembly and the Security Council between them adopted 188 resolutions, each dealing directly or indirectly with various aspects of this question. All these resolutions, many of which have not been implemented, appear in chronological order in document A/AC.183/L.2. An historical background of the question of Palestine in the United Nations is outlined in document A/AC.183/L.3.

2. During its thirtieth session, the General Assembly, at its 2399th plenary meeting on 10 November 1975, adopted by 93 votes to 18, with 27 abstentions, resolution 3376 (XXX) establishing the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.

3. The following States were appointed members of the Committee by the General Assembly at its 2443rd meeting on 17 December 1975: Afghanistan, Cuba, Cyprus, German Democratic Republic, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Pakistan, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Yugoslavia.

<sup>53</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 35* (UN doc. A/31/35), excluding list of contents and Annex IV (draft resolution S/12119—See doc. 17 below).

<sup>54</sup> The Security Council had considered the report (as required by paragraphs 7 and 8 of General Assembly Resolution 3376 (XXX)) in June, but a draft resolution (doc. 17 below) had been vetoed by the US (see doc. 128 below).

## II. MANDATE OF THE COMMITTEE

4. Paragraph 4 of resolution 3376 (XXX) requested the Committee to consider and recommend to the General Assembly a programme of implementation designed to enable the Palestinian people to exercise the rights recognized in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 3236 (XXIX), taking into account in the formulation of its recommendations all the powers conferred by the Charter upon the principal organs of the United Nations.

5. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX) read as follows:

*"The General Assembly,*

*"....*

*"1. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine including:*

*(a) The right to self-determination without external interference;*

*(b) The right to national independence and sovereignty;*

*"2. Reaffirms also the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return."*

6. Resolution 3376 (XXX) requested the Committee to submit its report and recommendations to the Secretary-General no later than 1 June 1976. The Secretary-General, in his turn, was requested to transmit the report to the Security Council, which was to consider, as soon as possible after 1 June 1976, the question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of the inalienable rights recognized in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 3236 (XXIX). The Secretary-General was also requested to inform the Committee of the action taken on that matter by the Security Council, and the Committee was authorized, taking into consideration the action taken by the Security Council, to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session a report containing its observations and recommendations.

## III. ORGANIZATION OF WORK

### A. Meetings

7. The Committee held 16 formal and 20 informal meetings at United Nations Headquarters during the period from 26 February to 19 May 1976.

### B. Election of officers

8. The Committee elected the following officers at its first and second meetings held on 26 and 27 February respectively:

*Chairman:* Mr. Médoune Fall (Senegal)

*Vice-Chairmen:* Mr. Ricardo Alarcón Quesada (Cuba)

Mr. Mir Abdul Wahab Siddiqi (Afghanistan)

*Rapporteur:* Mr. Victor J. Gauci (Malta)

### C. Agenda

9. The Committee adopted the following agenda at its second meeting on 27 February 1976 (A/AC.183/1):

1. Opening of the session
2. Election of officers
3. Adoption of the agenda
4. Organization of work
5. Preparation of the first report of the Committee and formulation of recommendations in implementation of General Assembly resolution 3376 (XXX)
6. Adoption of the first report

### D. Participation in the work of the Committee

10. The Committee decided at its second meeting to invite the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the work of the Committee as an observer, to attend all its meetings, and to make suggestions and proposals for the consideration of the Committee. Furthermore, the Committee authorized the Chairman to request the Secretary-General to invite all States Members of the United Nations, permanent observers to the United Nations and intergovernmental regional organizations, to participate in the work of the Committee as observers; they were also to be informed that the Committee was ready to receive and to study their suggestions and proposals, made either orally or in writing. This invitation to participate in the work of the Committee was to be brought to the notice particularly of all those States directly interested in the Middle East crisis, the representative of the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and members of the Security Council, especially its permanent members.

11. The following States responded affirmative-

ly to the invitation and participated in the work of the Committee as observers: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, the Libyan Arab Republic, Mauritania and the Syrian Arab Republic. The Palestine Liberation Organization and the League of Arab States also participated in the work of the Committee as observers. In response to the invitation, the representative of Greece made a statement before the Committee. Written communications were received from several States and are contained in documents A/AC.183/L.21 and Add.1 and 2.

12. In the absence of summary records, it was decided that all major statements made in the Committee would be produced as official documents of the Committee. These statements are contained in documents A/AC.183/2; A/AC.183/L.4-20; A/AC.183/L.22-30. At the request of the Committee, the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) addressed on 15 March 1976 a letter to the Chairman of the Committee, providing information on the Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA (A/AC.183/3). A summary of the work of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine from 1948 to date is contained in document A/AC.183/4.

#### IV. SUMMARY OF THE DELIBERATIONS

##### A. *Unique nature of the question of Palestine*

13. The members of the Committee emphasized the fact that the people of Palestine, inheritors of an ancient civilization, had commenced their struggle for independence early in the twentieth century and, as far back as the end of the Second World War, had been ready for independence. Nevertheless, and in spite of the anti-colonialist age that had dawned since the Second World War, the Palestinians, owing to a combination of circumstances, had suffered, instead, dispersal from their homes and deprivation of their inalienable rights and property. For 30 years, hundreds of thousands had been forced to live in destitution, many being cast in the role of refugee not once, but twice or even three times in their lifetime. This tragedy had been recognized by the international community as one that should no longer be tolerated.

##### B. *Role of the Committee*

14. The Committee noted that the inalienable rights of the Palestinians to self-determination, national independence and sovereignty, as well as their inalienable right to return to their homes, had already been affirmed and clearly defined by the General Assembly in its resolution 3236 (XXIX). It noted also that the Assembly, while defining those rights, had recognized the link between them.

15. Consequently, the basic task of the Committee was to formulate a programme of implementation designed to enable the Palestinian people to exercise the rights already affirmed and defined by the General Assembly.

16. Another important responsibility of the Committee was to maintain international concern for progress towards a just solution of the question of Palestine and thereby help promote a lasting peace in the Middle East. To this end, it was suggested that the United Nations should utilize its available resources to focus world attention on, and to strengthen international solidarity with, the plight of the Palestinian people.

17. It was suggested that the Committee should follow the practice of other United Nations bodies which dealt with questions relating to the exercise of the national rights of peoples, by giving precedence to and taking as a basis for discussion, opinions and proposals submitted by the representatives of the people whose national rights were at stake. In this connexion, the Committee's attention was drawn especially to the statement by Mr. Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization and Commander-in-Chief of the Palestine Revolution, before the General Assembly at its 2282nd meeting on 13 November 1974 (A/PV.2282 and Corr.1),<sup>55</sup> and to that of Mr. Farouq Qaddoumi, member of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, at the 1870th meeting of the Security Council on 12 January 1976 (S/PV.1870).<sup>56</sup>

##### C. *Right of return*

18. It was emphasized that the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination could be exercised only in Palestine. Conse-

<sup>55</sup> Doc. 9 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

<sup>56</sup> Doc. 188 below.

quently, the exercise of the individual right of the Palestinian to return to his homeland was a *conditio sine qua non* for the exercise by this people of its rights to self-determination, national independence and sovereignty.

19. In this respect, it was pointed out that Israel was under binding obligation to permit the return of all the Palestinian refugees displaced as a result of the hostilities of 1948 and 1967. This obligation flowed from the unreserved agreement by Israel to honour its commitments under the Charter of the United Nations, and from its specific undertaking, when applying for membership of the United Nations, to implement General Assembly resolutions 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, safeguarding the rights of the Palestinian Arabs inside Israel, and 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, concerning the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes or to choose compensation for their property. This undertaking was also clearly reflected in General Assembly resolution 273 (III). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, also contained relevant provisions concerning these rights. The States directly involved were parties to this Convention.

20. The opinion was expressed that whatever modalities or procedure were envisaged for the implementation of the right of return of the Palestinians—whether such return would be carried out by phases or by quotas according to a definite time-table—that right should be absolute for every Palestinian and must have priority over any other form of substitute arrangements, such as compensation. The Palestinians should be afforded the widest practical opportunities to exercise their right of return, in regard both to the time element and to procedural conditions. Only those Palestinians who would choose not to avail themselves of those opportunities after a pre-determined period of time should be considered as opting for compensation instead of actual repatriation. In this regard, it was recalled that an assessment of the value of the property left behind by displaced Palestinians had been made by the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine and was available on microfilm in the archives of the United Nations.

21. To implement the right of return, a two-phase programme was proposed. In the first phase,

the Palestinians displaced in 1967 should be allowed to return to the territories which have been under Israeli military occupation since 1967. In accordance with Security Council resolution 237 (1967), the return of these Palestinians should be immediate and not related to any other condition.

22. During this first phase, certain preparations should be undertaken for the second phase of such a programme, namely, the phase relating to the Palestinians displaced in 1948 from territories occupied by Israel before 1967. These preparations could involve the following elements:

(a) Designation or creation of a competent agency to be entrusted with the organizational and logistical aspects of the mass return of displaced Palestinians;

(b) Creation and financing of a fund for that purpose;

(c) Registration of displaced Palestinians other than those already registered with UNRWA;

(d) Request by either the Security Council or the General Assembly for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, in accordance with Article 96 of the Charter of the United Nations, on certain legal aspects of the right of the Palestinians to return to their homes.

23. The problems related to the second phase—of Palestinians displaced between 1948 and 1967—would be solved on the basis of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council and by agreement between the parties involved.

24. The suggestion concerning the unconditional return to their homes, in a first phase, of Palestinians displaced in 1967 was unanimously supported by the Committee as a judicious approach in the search for a solution to the question of Palestine. As for its practical implementation, several delegates expressed doubts as to whether those Palestinians would be able to exercise fully their right to return as long as the territories in question remained under foreign occupation. They felt that the presence of Israeli occupying forces might inhibit and adversely influence the free exercise of the right of return of the Palestinian people. In the view of those delegations, it would be more realistic to expect the Palestinians displaced in 1967 to exercise their right of return after Israel had vacated the occupied areas according to an established time-table.

25. It was emphasized that pending its with-

drawal from the areas occupied in June 1967, Israel should release all political prisoners, dismantle its settlements and maintain intact all Arab property.

26. In the process of the withdrawal of the Israeli forces and of the return of the Palestinians displaced in 1967, the United Nations, acting as an intermediary, might be called upon to perform several functions. The United Nations might, for example, be entrusted with taking over from Israel the vacated areas, together with all essential services, which would thereafter be handed over to the Palestinian authorities. UNRWA could be requested by the Committee to have ready the details of the names, addresses and properties of the persons who had fled the country since 5 June 1967 and who wished to return. The United Nations might assist the Palestinian administration in establishing itself in the initial days following Israeli withdrawal. The United Nations might also play a role in establishing communications between the West Bank and Gaza and in arranging access to Jerusalem. To undertake all these responsibilities, including arrangements for the return of the refugees, some special United Nations authority might need to be established.

27. The view was expressed by some delegations that in the performance of such interim functions, the United Nations might seek the co-operation of the League of Arab States, which was ready to contribute to the implementation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

28. It was suggested that, if necessary, the Security Council could establish a temporary United Nations peace-keeping force in the region and provide formal assurances of security so as to facilitate withdrawal by Israel from the occupied areas.

29. It was suggested that certain legal questions could be clarified through an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice; more specifically, the Court could be requested to pronounce itself on the following legal questions:

(a) Whether the recognition by the General Assembly of the inalienable right to return of the displaced Palestinians and the demand by the General Assembly that they be permitted to return were, in fact, an infringement of Israel's sovereignty, particularly in the light of the provisions of General Assembly resolution 181 (II) recommending the Plan of Partition, with its built-in

safeguards for the rights of the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of the then proposed Jewish State, and General Assembly resolution 273 (III), which admitted Israel to membership in the United Nations after recalling both resolutions 181 (II) and 194 (III);

(b) Whether or not certain laws enacted by Israel since 1948—such as the Law of Return, the Nationality Law, the Absentees' Property Law, the Development Authority Law and others—are compatible with the provisions of the Plan of Partition contained in General Assembly resolution 181 (II), by which Israel is bound, and in accordance with which the United Nations itself is the guarantor of the rights of the Palestinian Arabs in the territories occupied by Israel in 1948 and 1949.

30. It was felt that an advisory opinion on the first question might be considered necessary if Israel invoked the principle of sovereignty in order to obstruct the exercise by Palestinians of their inalienable right to return to their homes. An advisory opinion on the second question was prompted by the fact that the above-mentioned laws had a direct bearing on the status and rights of the displaced Palestinians after their return, inasmuch as they may be considered to infringe upon the rights guaranteed to them in section C of part I of the Plan of Partition.

31. Some delegations expressed reservations in principle as to the advisability of requesting the opinion of the International Court of Justice.

32. The attention of the Committee was drawn to the consequences which continued denial of the Palestinians' right to return to their homes could have for peace in the Middle East. The view was expressed that if Israel opposed the peaceful and orderly return of Palestinians, the result could well be an increased determination on the part of Palestinians and other Arabs to restore the rights of Palestinians by means other than peaceful. The growing opposition of the Palestinian population to occupation, as well as the outcome of the municipal elections recently held in the West Bank and other occupied areas, had more than a symbolic significance in this respect.

#### *D. Right to self-determination and to national independence and sovereignty*

33. It was maintained that the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination could be



implemented only if Israel evacuated the Palestinian territory it had occupied by force contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and its resolutions and if Israel permitted the refugees and the displaced Palestinians who had been uprooted or expelled or had fled during and after the hostilities of 1948 and 1967 to return to their homes and property.

34. It was stressed that the establishment of an independent Palestinian State, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, was a prerequisite for peace in the Middle East. Upon the Israeli vacation of the occupied areas and the establishment of an independent Palestinian administration, the Palestinian people would be able to exercise its right to self-determination and to decide its form of government through democratic means. The role of the United Nations in that regard could only be advisory. Once the Palestinian State was established, it could participate, on a basis of equality, in the negotiations for a peace settlement in the Middle East, which would cover the question of secure and recognized boundaries for all States in the region.

35. The opinion was shared that it was up to the Palestinian people, in the exercise of its right to self-determination, to decide when and how its national independence should be expressed within an independent entity of its own and in its territory, Palestine. No other party had the right to dictate to the Palestinian people the form, status or system of its entity or claim the authority to permit or to prevent the establishment of an independent Palestinian entity. The Palestinian people had the right freely to choose its own representatives and form of government. The Palestine Liberation Organization, which had been recognized by the Palestinian people, the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the overwhelming majority of world nations as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, was a guardian of the inalienable rights of this people. The Palestine Liberation Organization, consequently, was entitled to participate as a principal party in all peace efforts to resolve the Middle East problem.

#### *E. Status of Jerusalem*

36. The members of the Committee stressed the special significance of the city of Jerusalem and its holy shrines to three major religions of the

world—Islam, Judaism and Christianity. The international status of the city of Jerusalem, as provided for in General Assembly resolution 181 (II), was recalled.

37. A suggestion was made that the administration of the city of Jerusalem should consist of two main organs: (a) a 45-member legislative body in which the three main religious communities of the city would be equally represented; (b) an executive organ led by a United Nations commissioner appointed by the Secretary-General with the consent of the Security Council.

38. Several delegations were of the view that the question of the city of Jerusalem was beyond the mandate of the Committee. According to one view, during the first phase of the proposed programme of implementation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, Jerusalem should be restored to the situation which had prevailed before the war of June 1967. Its future status could be considered after the establishment of an independent Palestinian entity.

39. It was felt in the Committee that any solution of the delicate problem of Jerusalem should be sought within the framework of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and the religious characteristics of the city and that Israel should be called upon to desist from any actions or policies designed to change the legal status of Jerusalem. In this respect, Security Council resolution 298 (1971), in particular was recalled.

#### *F. Essential elements of a programme of implementation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people*

40. It was suggested that the Committee should recommend in its report that the first phase of the implementation of the right of return should consist of the return to their homes of the Palestinians displaced from territories occupied since 1967.

41. The Committee might recommend that the Security Council demand that the Palestinians displaced in 1967 should be permitted immediately to return to the territories occupied since 1967. Their return should not be related to any other conditions. On the basis of such a decision of the Security Council, the Committee, with the co-operation of appropriate international agencies and participation of parties concerned, could prepare a programme for the implementation of that decision.

42. The Committee could also recommend that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which played a role in the return of some of the displaced persons in the summer of 1967, or UNRWA, which has had a long association with the problem be asked to help organize the envisaged return of the persons concerned. If UNRWA were to undertake this programme, its mandate would have to be adjusted accordingly, and its budget and staff commensurately expanded. However, whether the questions of organization and logistics were entrusted to the ICRC or to UNRWA, the agency in charge would have to perform its duties in constant consultation over the mechanics of the programme with the competent authorities in the host countries, with the Palestine Liberation Organization, and with the occupying Power.

43. It was further proposed that the Committee might strongly recommend that, in conjunction with the immediate return of the Palestinians displaced in 1967 to the territories occupied by Israel since that date, the Security Council should demand, in accordance with the powers conferred upon it by the Charter of the United Nations, that:

(a) Israel desist from the establishment of new settlements in the occupied territories and effectively prevent its citizens from creating any new settlements;

(b) Israel withdraw its citizens from the settlements already established since 1967 in the occupied territories contrary to the provisions of article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and contrary to resolutions of several bodies of the United Nations.

44. In addition, the Committee might urge that the Security Council demand, pending the early termination of the occupation, that Israel abide scrupulously by the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention and declare its recognition of the applicability of that Convention. Effective supervision by ICRC of the application of all the provisions of that Convention—both to the existing population and to the returnees—should be requested by the Council, on the recommendation of the Committee; the Committee should recommend alternative methods and instruments of supervision in case ICRC declined to undertake this responsibility. It was suggested that in formulating its recommendations on this matter,

the Committee should take into account the deliberations which the Security Council held on the situation in the occupied Arab territories.

45. It was further proposed that the Security Council, in accordance with its pertinent resolutions, should demand the urgent withdrawal of Israel from the Palestinian territories occupied since June 1967. The Security Council could provide international guarantees for the peace and security of all States and peoples in the Middle East, thereby hastening the withdrawal of Israel. After Israel's withdrawal, the Palestinian people would be able to decide its own future, in accordance with its right to self-determination.

46. The suggestion was endorsed that the United Nations, which had a historical responsibility towards the Palestinian people, should render to the Palestinian authorities the necessary economic and technical assistance in order to contribute to the economic and social development of the new Palestinian State.

47. It was suggested that the Committee, in formulating its recommendations, might wish to seek widest possible support among Members of the United Nations. To this end informal contacts should be established and maintained with the representatives of States not members of the Committee, who could play a positive role in the question of Palestine in the Security Council and, subsequently, in the General Assembly. The purpose of such an approach would be to formulate the recommendations in such a way as to obtain general support for them both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly.

#### *G. Proposals concerning steps to ensure implementation of the programme*

48. Attention was frequently drawn to the Committee's mandate under resolution 3376 (XXX), by which the Committee, in formulating its programme of implementation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, was required to take into account all the powers conferred by the Charter upon the principal organs of the United Nations. The powers defined in Articles 5, 6, 41, 42 and 96 were particularly mentioned.

49. It was suggested that the Committee recommend, in whatever programme it devised for the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, that the Security Council consider what steps and measures should be taken, in accordance

with its competence under the Charter, if Israel refused to co-operate in the implementation of the proposed programme.

50. If the Security Council was unable to act because of a veto, the Committee should, in its subsequent report, recommend to the General Assembly that it carry out its own responsibilities in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in the light of precedents. It was also suggested that if Israel persisted in its refusal to implement General Assembly resolutions 194 (III) and 181 (II), this would constitute a violation of the conditions of its admission to the United Nations, which would then have to reconsider the matter.

#### H. *Interrelationship between the question of Palestine and the Middle East problem*

51. It was widely emphasized that the question of Palestine, whose essence was the restoration and exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, was of central importance to the solution of the Middle East crisis. A just solution of this question was a *conditio sine qua non* for the settlement of the Middle East problem as a whole and for the creation of the necessary conditions for a just and lasting peace in the area. On the other hand, Palestinian rights could not be achieved outside a comprehensive, just settlement that would include Israel's withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied in June 1967 and the establishment of a just and lasting peace.

52. The view was accordingly expressed that a just and durable settlement in the Middle East must be based on the following fundamental principles:

(a) Israel should withdraw from all the Arab territories occupied since 1967, in accordance with the principle of the inadmissibility of any acquisition of territories by the use of military force and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council;

(b) The Palestinian people should be enabled to exercise its inalienable right to national self-determination, including the right to establish an independent State in Palestine, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; Palestinian refugees wishing to return to their homes and to live in peace with their neighbours should have the right to do so, and those choosing not to return should receive compensation for their properties;

(c) Appropriate arrangements should be made to guarantee, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all the States in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

It was suggested that these principles should be fully taken into account in all international efforts and conferences organized within the framework of the United Nations for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East:

53. It was emphasized that the United Nations should play a greater role in all efforts to solve the Palestinian question and to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East—a role, particularly by the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General, which would cover the entire process, up to and including a final settlement of the problems in the area.

54. On the question of guarantees, reference was made to a statement setting out the position of the USSR, in which was expressed its readiness to participate, together with the United States, the United Kingdom and France, in international guarantees of the security and inviolability of the frontiers of all Middle East countries, either within the United Nations framework or on some other basis. The attention of the Committee was also drawn to the statement of the Government of the USSR on the Middle East, dated 28 April 1976.

55. The opinion was shared that the prevailing situation in the Middle East should not be allowed to stagnate. There was a need to reconvene the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, with the participation of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, on an equal footing with other participants, according to General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX), in order to deal with the problem in all its aspects. In this regard many delegations underlined the particular importance of the invitation extended to the Palestine Liberation Organization by the Security Council to take part in its deliberations on an equal footing with the other participants and called for equal participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East under the auspices of the United Nations.

56. The suggestion was made that since the Security Council remained the only forum in

which all parties to the conflict had been able to meet, this unique circumstance might be more actively utilized for constructive moves towards a settlement. The Committee could also play a role in ascertaining what constructive steps might be taken by the Security Council to overcome the existing impasse and to move towards a general settlement; the members of the Council, assisted by the Secretary-General, either in closed session or through informal consultations, could search for those constructive moves which would contribute to an over-all settlement. The hope was expressed that all the parties concerned would show statesmanship and genuine willingness to negotiate—necessary prerequisites for achieving a comprehensive political settlement of the Middle East problem.

57. Several delegations underlined the importance of the debate in January 1976 in the Security Council on the Middle East problem including the Palestinian question in implementation of Security Council resolution 381 (1975) of 30 November 1975. It was noted that that debate had indicated a constructive change in the approach of the Security Council to the question of the inalienable rights of the Palestinians. The draft resolution (S/1940),<sup>57</sup> proposed by six members of the Security Council but not adopted because of a veto, clearly affirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, as well as the basic elements for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. This draft resolution remained, in spite of its obstruction, the most supported basis for a peaceful and just settlement in the Middle East. It was suggested that the Committee should take into full account the provisions of this draft resolution, as well as the ideas emerging from the Security Council deliberations on this question.

58. Against the background of the reported difficulties in the search for a peaceful solution to the Middle East question, the members of the Committee, within their more limited terms of reference, considered that the recommendations which follow would, in their implementation, constitute a contribution within the framework of the United Nations and would complement efforts towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region.

## PART TWO. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE

### I. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS AND GUIDELINES

59. The question of Palestine is at the heart of the Middle East problem, and, consequently, the Committee stresses its belief that no solution in the Middle East can be envisaged which does not fully take into account the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people.

60. The legitimate and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to return to their homes and property and to achieve self-determination, national independence and sovereignty are endorsed by the Committee in the conviction that the full implementation of these rights will contribute decisively to a comprehensive and final settlement of the Middle East crisis.

61. The participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, on an equal footing with other parties, on the basis of General Assembly resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3375 (XXX) is indispensable in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East which are held under the auspices of the United Nations.

62. The Committee recalls the fundamental principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and stresses the consequent obligation for complete and speedy evacuation of any territory so occupied.

63. The Committee considers that it is the duty and the responsibility of all concerned to enable the Palestinians to exercise their inalienable rights.

64. The Committee recommends an expanded and more influential role by the United Nations and its organs in promoting a just solution to the question of Palestine and in the implementation of such a solution. The Security Council, in particular, should take appropriate action to facilitate the exercise by the Palestinians of their right to return to their homes, lands and property. The Committee, furthermore, urges the Security Council to promote action towards a just solution, taking into account all the powers conferred on it by the Charter of the United Nations.

65. It is with this perspective in view and on the basis of the numerous resolutions of the United Nations, after due consideration of all the facts, proposals and suggestions advanced in the course of its deliberations, that the Committee submits its

<sup>57</sup> Doc. 15 below.

recommendations on the modalities for the implementation of the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

## II. THE RIGHT OF RETURN

66. The natural and inalienable right of Palestinians to return to their homes is recognized by resolution 194 (III), which the General Assembly has reaffirmed almost every year since its adoption. This right was also unanimously recognized by the Security Council in its resolution 237 (1967); the time for the urgent implementation of these resolutions is long overdue.

67. Without prejudice to the right of all Palestinians to return to their homes, lands and property, the Committee considers that the programme of implementation, of the exercise of this right may be carried out in two phases:

### *Phase one*

68. The first phase involves the return to their homes of the Palestinians displaced as a result of the war of June 1967. The Committee recommends that:

(i) The Security Council should request the immediate implementation of its resolution 237 (1967) and that such implementation should not be related to any other condition;

(ii) The resources of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and/or of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, suitably financed and mandated, may be employed to assist in the solution of any logistical problems involved in the resettlement of those returning to their homes. These agencies could also assist, in co-operation with the host countries and the Palestine Liberation Organization, in the identification of the displaced Palestinians;

### *Phase two*

69. The second phase deals with the return to their homes of the Palestinians displaced between 1948 and 1967. The Committee recommends that:

(i) While the first phase is being implemented, the United Nations in co-operation with the States directly involved, and the Palestine Liberation Organization as the interim representative of the Palestinian entity, should proceed to make the necessary arrangements to enable Palestinians

displaced between 1948 and 1967 to exercise their right to return to their homes and property, in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions, particularly General Assembly resolution 194 (III);

(ii) Palestinians not choosing to return to their homes should be paid just and equitable compensation as provided for in resolution 194 (III).

## III. THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY

70. The Palestinian people has the inherent right to self-determination, national independence and sovereignty in Palestine. The Committee considers that the evacuation of the territories occupied by force and in violation of the principles of the Charter and relevant resolutions of the United Nations is a *conditio sine qua non* for the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights in Palestine. The Committee considers, furthermore, that upon the return of the Palestinians to their homes and property and with the establishment of an independent Palestinian entity, the Palestinian people will be able to exercise its rights to self-determination and to decide its form of government without external interference.

71. The Committee also feels that the United Nations has an historical duty and responsibility to render all assistance necessary to promote the economic development and prosperity of the Palestinian entity.

72. To these ends, the Committee recommends that:

(a) A time-table should be established by the Security Council for the complete withdrawal by Israeli occupation forces from those areas occupied in 1967; such withdrawal should be completed no later than 1 June 1977;

(b) The Security Council may need to provide temporary peace-keeping forces in order to facilitate the process of withdrawal;

(c) Israel should be requested by the Security Council to desist from the establishment of new settlements and to withdraw during this period from settlements established since 1967 in the occupied territories. Arab property and all essential services in these areas should be maintained intact;

(d) Israel should also be requested to abide scrupulously by the provisions of the Geneva

Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and to declare, pending its speedy withdrawal from these territories, its recognition of the applicability of that Convention;

(e) The evacuated territories, with all property and services intact, should be taken over by the United Nations, which with the co-operation of the League of Arab States, will subsequently hand over these evacuated areas to the Palestine Liberation Organization as the representative of the Palestinian people;

(f) The United Nations should, if necessary, assist in establishing communications between Gaza and the West Bank;

(g) As soon as the independent Palestinian entity has been established, the United Nations, in co-operation with the States directly involved and the Palestinian entity, should, taking into account General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX), make further arrangements for the full implementation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, the resolution of outstanding problems and the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region, in accordance with all relevant United Nations resolutions;

(h) The United Nations should provide the economic and technical assistance necessary for the consolidation of the Palestinian entity.

## ANNEX I

### *List of documents referred to in report*

1. A/AC.183/1  
Agenda of the first session
2. A/AC.183/2  
Statement of the Permanent Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the Committee
3. A/AC.183/3  
Letter dated 15 March 1976 from the Commissioner General of UNRWA to the Chairman of the Committee
4. A/AC.183/4  
Summary of the work of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine
5. A/PV.2282 and Corr.1 of 13 November 1974  
Statement to the General Assembly of Mr. Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization and Commander-in-Chief of the Pal-

estine Revolution

6. S/PV.1870 of 12 January 1976  
Statement of Mr. Farouq Qaddoumi, member of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, in the Security Council
7. A/AC.183/L.2  
General Assembly and Security Council resolutions relating to the question of Palestine, 1947-1975
8. A/AC.183/L.3  
Brief historical background of the question of Palestine before the United Nations, 1947-1975
9. A/AC.183/L.4-20 and A/AC.183/L.22-30  
Major statements made in the Committee
10. A/AC.183/L.21 and Add.1 and 2  
Communications from States, observers and intergovernmental regional organizations

## ANNEX II

*Letter dated 28 May 1976 from the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to the Secretary-General*

I have the honour to present herewith, on behalf of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, its report requested by General Assembly resolution 3376 (XXX).

The recommendations of the Committee, which appear in part two of the report, represent, as required by paragraph 4 of resolution 3376 (XXX), a programme of implementation designed to enable the Palestinian people to exercise the rights recognized in paragraphs 1 and 2 of General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX).

As required by paragraph 7 of resolution 3376 (XXX), the Committee submits this report to you for transmittal to the Security Council, which under the provisions of paragraph 8 of that resolution is requested to consider, as soon as possible after 1 June 1976, the question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights recognized in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 3236 (XXIX).

[Signed] MÉDOUNE FALL  
Chairman of the  
Committee on the Exercise  
of the Inalienable Rights  
of the Palestinian People

## ANNEX III

*Letter dated 12 July 1976 from the Secretary-General to the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People*

I have the honour to refer to your letter dated 28 May 1976<sup>58</sup> by which, as requested by paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 3376 (XXX), you submitted to me, for transmittal to the Security Council, the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.

On 29 May, I communicated the text of your letter and of the Committee's report (S/12090) to the Security Council which was requested by paragraph 8 of resolution 3376 (XXX) to "consider as soon as possible after 1 June 1976, the question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of the inalienable rights recognized in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 3236 (XXIX)".

In accordance with the General Assembly's request in paragraph 9 of resolution 3376 (XXX) I set out below, for the information of the Committee, the action taken by the Security Council.

At its 1924th meeting, held on 9 June, the Security Council included in its agenda without objection the item entitled "Question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights: report of the Committee established under General Assembly resolution 3376 (XXX) (S/12090)".

The Security Council considered the item in the course of eight meetings held between 9 and 29 June.

In the course of these meetings the representatives of the following 29 Member States were invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, German Democratic Republic, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Yugoslavia.

In accordance with rule 39 of its provisional

rules of procedure, the Security Council also decided to extend invitations to the Chairman, the Rapporteur and other members of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, pursuant to the request contained in a letter from the Chairman of that Committee, and to Mr. Amin Helmy II, Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations, pursuant to the request contained in a letter from the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic.

The Security Council also decided by a vote of 11 in favour to one against (United States of America) with three abstentions (France, Italy and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) to invite, as on previous occasions, the representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the debate, as requested in a letter from the representatives of the Libyan Arab Republic and Pakistan.

The texts of the statements made during consideration of the question by the Security Council are reproduced in the verbatim records of the 1924th, 1928th and 1933rd to 1938th meetings of the Council (S/PV.1924, 1928 and 1933 to 1938), which are transmitted herewith for the information of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.

At the 1938th meeting, on 29 June, the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania introduced a draft resolution (S/12119) sponsored by Guyana, Pakistan, Panama, and the United Republic of Tanzania, the text of which is annexed to this letter.<sup>59</sup>

At the same meeting, the Security Council proceeded to vote on that draft resolution. It received 10 votes in favour, 1 against (United States of America) and 4 abstentions (France, Italy, Sweden and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), and was not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Security Council.

[Signed] KURT WALDHEIM  
Secretary-General

<sup>58</sup> See annex II.

<sup>59</sup> Doc. 17 below.

# Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories<sup>60</sup>

October 1, 1976

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<sup>60</sup> UN doc. A/31/218, excluding Letter of Transmittal and Annexes. Previous reports of the Special Committee have been published as doc. 317 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*, docs. 409 and 412 in *International Documents on Palestine*

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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories was established by the General Assembly in resolution 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968. By that resolution, the General Assembly decided to establish the Special Committee, composed of three Member States; requested the President of the General Assembly to appoint the members of the Special Committee; requested the Government of Israel to receive the Special Committee, to co-operate with it and to facilitate its work; requested the Special Committee to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arose thereafter; and requested the Secretary-General to provide the Special Committee with all the necessary facilities for the performance of its task.

2. The following Member States were appointed on 12 September 1969 to serve on the Special Committee: Somalia, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia. The Government of Sri Lanka appointed Mr. H. S. Amerasinghe, Permanent Representative to the United Nations, as its representative on the Special Committee. The Government of Yugoslavia appointed Mr. Borut Bohte, Associate Professor of

the Faculty of Law of Ljubljana University and Member of the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia, as its representative on the Special Committee. The Government of Somalia appointed Mr. A. A. Farah and subsequently Mr. H. Nur-Elmi, Permanent Representative to the United Nations, as its representative on the Special Committee. On 26 April 1974, the President of the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session informed the Secretary-General that Somalia had decided to withdraw from the Special Committee and that, in conformity with paragraph 2 of Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII), he had appointed Senegal a member of the Special Committee. On 30 April 1974, the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations informed the Secretary-General that his Government had appointed Mr. Keba M'Baye, Chief Justice of Senegal (*Premier Président de la Cour Suprême du Sénégal*), as its representative on the Special Committee.

3. On 5 October 1970, the Special Committee submitted its first report in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968 and 2546 (XXIV) of 11 December 1969. The report was discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 744th to 751st meetings,

from 7 to 11 December 1970. On 15 December 1970, the Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee and adopted resolution 2727 (XXV).

4. On 17 September 1971, the Special Committee submitted its second report (A/8389 and Corr.1 and 2), prepared in accordance with the terms of General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV) and 2727 (XXV). On 10 December 1971, the Special Committee submitted a third report (A/8389/Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1 and 2) containing information which had become available after the completion of its second report. Those reports were discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 798th to 803rd meetings, from 13 to 16 December 1971. On 20 December 1971, the General Assembly considered the report of the Special Political Committee and adopted resolution 2851 (XXVI).

5. On 25 September 1972, the Special Committee submitted its fourth report (A/8828) in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV) and 2851 (XXVI). The report was discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 849th to 855th meetings, from 30 November to 7 December 1972. On 15 December 1972, the Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee and adopted resolution 3005 (XXVII).

6. On 15 October 1973, the Special Committee submitted its fifth report (A/9148) in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV), 2851 (XXVI) and 3005 (XXVII). On 20 November 1973, the Special Committee submitted a supplement to its fifth report (A/9148/Add.1). The report and its supplement were discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 890th and 892nd to 897th meetings, from 19 to 26 November 1973. In addition, the Special Political Committee considered the report of the Secretary-General (A/9237) submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3005 (XXVII). On 7 December 1973, the Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee and adopted resolutions 3092 A and B (XXVIII).

7. On 25 October 1974, the Special Committee submitted its sixth report (A/9817) in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV), 2851 (XXVI), 3005 (XXVII) and 3092 B (XXVIII). The

report was discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 927th to 932nd meetings, from 6 to 12 November 1974. In addition, the Special Political Committee considered the report of the Secretary-General (A/9843) submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3092 B (XXVIII). On 29 November 1974, the Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee and adopted resolutions 3240 A, B and C (XXIX).

8. On 13 October 1975, the Special Committee submitted its seventh report (A/10272) in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV), 2851 (XXVI), 3005 (XXVII), 3092 B (XXVIII) and 3240 A and C (XXIX). The report was discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 985th to 991st meetings, from 26 November to 5 December 1975. In addition, the Special Political Committee considered the report of the Secretary-General (A/10370) submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3240 A and C (XXIX). On 15 December 1975, the Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee and adopted resolutions 3525 A, B, C and D (XXX).

9. The present report has been prepared in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV), 2851 (XXVI), 3005 (XXVII), 3092 B (XXVIII), 3240 A and C (XXIX) and 3525 A and C (XXX).

## II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK

10. The Special Committee continued its work under the rules of procedure contained in its first report to the Secretary-General.

11. The Special Committee held meetings from 16 to 20 February 1976 at Geneva. At these meetings, it reviewed its mandate consequent on the adoption by the General Assembly of resolutions 3525 A and C (XXX). It decided on the organization of its work for the year. The Special Committee decided to continue its system of monitoring information on the occupied territories and to hold periodical meetings to analyse the information to keep track of the occupying Power's policies and practices in the occupied territories. At these meetings, the Special Committee reviewed information on the occupied territories which had become available since 13 October 1975, the date of the adoption of its seventh report (A/10272). The Special Committee held consultations with

the expert engaged for the purpose of carrying out the survey requested by the General Assembly in resolution 3525 C (XXX).

12. The Special Committee held a second series of meetings at Geneva from 4 to 15 June 1976. At these meetings, the Special Committee reviewed information that had become available since its February meetings and examined a number of communications sent by Governments and by private sources that it had received directly or that had been referred to it by the Secretary-General. The Special Committee heard the testimony of one person who had been expelled from the occupied territories on 27 March 1976, and four others who had just left the occupied territories. The Special Committee also heard a report on the progress of the survey of the destruction in Quneitra requested under Assembly resolution 3525 C (XXX).

13. The Special Committee held a third series of meetings from 28 to 30 July 1976 at Geneva. At these meetings, the Special Committee examined information on the occupied territories that had become available since its June meetings and heard the testimony of Mrs. Felicia Langer who was invited by the Special Committee to appear before it. The Special Committee discussed its draft report at these meetings.

14. The Special Committee met again at United Nations Headquarters on 14 and 15 September 1976. At these meetings, the Special Committee considered and adopted its report to the Secretary-General, as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 3525 A and C (XXX).

### III. MANDATE

15. The General Assembly, in resolution 2443 (XXIII) entitled "Respect for and implementation of human rights in occupied territories", decided to establish a Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, composed of three Member States.

16. The mandate of the Special Committee, as set out in the above resolution, was to "investigate Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories".

17. In interpreting its mandate, the Special Committee determined, in its first report, that:

(a) The territories to be considered as occupied territories referred to the areas under Israeli

occupation, namely, the Golan Heights, the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. Following the implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on disengagement of forces of 18 January 1974 and the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces of 31 May 1974, the demarcation of the areas under occupation was altered as indicated in the maps attached to those agreements;

(b) The persons covered by resolution 2443 (XXIII) and therefore the subject of the investigation of the Special Committee were the civilian population residing in the areas occupied as a result of the hostilities of June 1967 and those persons normally resident in the areas that were under occupation but who had left those areas because of the hostilities. However, the Special Committee noted that resolution 2443 (XXIII) referred to the "population", without any qualification as to any segment of the inhabitants in the occupied territories;

(c) The "human rights" of the population of the occupied territories, consisted of two elements, namely, those rights which the Security Council referred to as "essential and inalienable human rights" in its resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967; and secondly, those rights which found their basis in the protection afforded by international law in particular circumstances such as occupation and, in the case of prisoners of war, capture. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 3005 (XXVII), the Special Committee was also required to investigate allegations concerning the exploitation and the looting of the resources of the occupied territories; the pillaging of the archaeological and cultural heritage of the occupied territories; and the interference in the freedom of worship in the holy places of the occupied territories;

(d) The "policies" and "practices" affecting human rights that came within the scope of investigation by the Special Committee referred, in the case of "policies", to any course of action consciously adopted and pursued by the Government of Israel as part of its declared or undeclared intent; while "practices" referred to those actions which, irrespective of whether or not they were in implementation of a policy, reflected a pattern of behaviour on the part of the Israeli authorities towards the Arab population of the occupied areas.

18. Since its inception the Special Committee

has relied on the following international instruments and resolutions in interpreting and carrying out its mandate:

- (a) The Charter of the United Nations;
- (b) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- (c) The Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949;
- (d) Security Council resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967 and 259 (1968) of 27 September 1968;
- (e) General Assembly resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2341 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967 and 2452 A (XXIII) of 19 December 1968;
- (f) Economic and Social Council resolution 1336 (XLIV) of 31 May 1968;
- (g) Commission on Human Rights resolutions 6 (XXIV) of 27 February 1968; and 6 (XXV) of 4 March 1969, and the telegram dispatched to the Government of Israel on 8 March 1968;
- (h) The relevant resolutions of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations and the World Health Organization.

19. In compliance with General Assembly resolution 3005 (XXVII) the Special Committee also referred to The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954 and to the relevant sections of The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land.

#### IV. ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE

20. In the reports that the Special Committee has presented since its inception, it has attempted, as far as possible, to maintain a continuing examination of the situation of the civilians of the occupied territories in order to determine if and to what extent their human rights were being violated. The Special Committee has received several allegations over the years from various sources, such as Governments, individuals and organized bodies. Some of these allegations were made orally before the Special Committee and others in writing. The absence of co-operation by the Government of Israel and the consequent inability of the Special Committee to verify these allegations at first hand made it necessary for the Special Committee to employ the next best available means to inform itself of the situation

of civilians paying due regard to the nature and reliability of the source. It has done this by:

- (a) Hearing oral testimony of persons—inhabitants of the occupied territories, persons who had fled these territories, persons who had been expelled from these territories, visitors recently returned from these territories and Israeli citizens—who could give first-hand account of the situation of civilians in the occupied territories;
- (b) Examining from day to day reports in the Israeli press of occurrences in the occupied territories and of Government of Israel pronouncements concerning the civilian population of the occupied territories and the policies and practices followed in the administration of these territories, including reports of measures taken in the execution of such policies and practices;

- (c) Keeping track of reports appearing in other news media, including the Arab-language press and other sections of the international press.

In its first report (A/8089), the Special Committee relied primarily on the oral testimony of the 146 persons who appeared before it in New York, London, Geneva, Beirut, Damascus, Amman and Cairo, and to a certain extent on written communications received during that period. In subsequent years, as reflected in the reports prepared by the Special Committee, it became evident that the best manner of determining the Israeli policies and practices affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories was to monitor policy statements by members of the Government of Israel and other Israeli leaders and reports of the implementation of plans and measures affecting the civilian population in the occupied territories. In all its reports, the Special Committee has assessed information gathered from these sources. Thus, over 220 persons have appeared and given evidence before the Special Committee.

21. For the purposes of the present report the Special Committee continued to follow the same approach as in previous years. During the period covered by this report, the Special Committee had before it allegations made to it by Governments and heard the testimony of six persons.

22. The Special Committee took note of the following material relevant to its mandate:

- (a) Information in the United Nations documents, some of which contain the text of letters from the Governments of Egypt, Israel, Jordan

and the Syrian Arab Republic;

(b) Information communicated to it by the International Committee of the Red Cross and contained in its publications;

(c) Studies and reports prepared by organizations and individuals engaged in research on Middle East questions, including a report received from the Women's International Democratic Federation;

(d) A special report on Quneitra prepared in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3525 C (XXX).

23. The information available to the Special Committee over the years indicates that, during the period covered by this report, namely, since 13 October 1975:

(a) The policy of annexation and settlement continues to be implemented, new plans have been announced and other settlements have been established in the occupied territories;

(b) The prolonged occupation and the effect of the policies and practices mentioned above have persisted. Violent demonstrations that lasted for several months have taken place, in addition to acts of sabotage which appeared to have been daily occurrences. These incidents have in turn led to arrests of groups of persons, presenting a pattern of mass arrests; other repressive measures have continued, as e.g., curfews, demolition of houses, expulsion and administrative detention;

(c) Civilian inhabitants detained are treated in a manner incompatible with the Fourth Geneva Convention and international humanitarian law in general governing treatment of civilians under detention.

24. The situation described in paragraph 23 (a) to (c) is illustrated by the reports reproduced in paragraphs 25 to 315 below. These reports, through by no means exhaustive, extend over the entire period covered by this report and constitute a representative cross-section of the information received by the Special Committee.

#### A. EVIDENCE OF THE POLICY OF ANNEXATION AND SETTLEMENT, AS PRACTISED IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

##### 1. *Policy of annexation and settlement*

25. The evidence of the policy of annexation and settlement is given in the following paragraphs.

26. On 25 January 1976, *Ha'aretz* reported the

statement by the Defence Minister, Mr. Peres, that "the Jewish people has a basic right to settle anywhere provided that this be carried out without the dispossession of Arabs and without hurting their feelings...".

27. *The Jerusalem Post* and *Ha'aretz* reported, on 11 March 1976, the statement by the Defence Minister that "Israelis have the right to settle everywhere in the West Bank so long as [they] do not deprive the Arabs and take their sensitivities into account".

28. The statement by the Minister of Tourism, Mr. Kol, reported on 24 March 1976 in *The Jerusalem Post*, that he was in favour of Jewish settlements all over the country but only according to Government Plans and approval. Mr. Kol is reported as stating in addition that peace negotiations "...were likely to bring changes to Israel's settlement map".

29. On 22 April 1976, *The Jerusalem Post* reported the statement by the Prime Minister, Mr. Rabin, that "no settlement has been set up in order to be taken down again". In the course of the speech, the Prime Minister is reported as having promised that his Government would make a special effort during the coming years to strengthen and extend Israeli settlement along the Jordan river; and an announcement was made, simultaneously, by the Housing Ministry that five settlements would be established in the Jordan Valley.

30. The report appearing on 27 April 1976 in *Ha'aretz* stated that a plan had been approved by the Ministerial Committee for Settlements of the Occupied Territories whose Chairman is Minister-without-Portfolio, Israel Galili, for the establishment of settlements and drawn up by an inter-kibbutz Commission; the plan envisages 29 settlements to be set up during the next two years and to be implemented after the Government had debated settlement policy. According to this plan, 13 settlements would be established by the end of 1976 and 16 by the end of 1977, and would be distributed as follows:

9 settlements in the Golan Heights;

3 settlements in the Jordan Valley;

2 settlements in the Kfar Etzion area (south east of Jerusalem and west of Bethlehem);

2 settlements on the road to Jerusalem;

4 settlements in the Gaza Strip (Rafah area).

The remaining settlements were to be established

behind the pre-1967 cease-fire lines. On 7 June 1976, a *Ha'aretz* report gave details on the proposal for the 29 new settlements, including their location.

31. The announcement that Mr. Galili was drawing up a detailed plan of settlements to be established in the West Bank, with the full co-ordination of the Prime Minister who was to meet with the Foreign Minister, Mr. Allon, and the Defence Minister, Mr. Peres, to obtain their prior consent to the proposed plan was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 4 May 1976.

32. *The Jerusalem Post* reported on 13 June 1976 the statement by the Foreign Minister, Mr. Allon, that the settlements were not established in order to be abandoned and there were still many to be put up but no settlers were available for them. The Foreign Minister was quoted as saying: "I suggest we stop talking about places which we will not move from and instead establish settlements in vital areas to make it impossible to move us from them". The statement was reportedly made during a speech in which the Foreign Minister criticized a settlement movement claiming the right to settle in the area around Nablus (Northern West Bank).

33. On 9 June 1976, *The Jerusalem Post* reported that the Ministerial Committee for Settlements of the Occupied Territories had given final approval to the establishment of four new settlements, two of which are in the territories occupied in 1967, one in Kfar Etzion area and another near Latrun west of Jerusalem and near the 1949 ceasefire line.

## 2. *Implementation of the policy of annexation and settlement of the occupied territories*

### (a) *The occupied territories as a whole*

34. On 14 December 1975, *Ma'ariv* reported the statement by the Housing Minister, Mr. A. Ofer that 3,859 flats had been constructed in the occupied territories since 1967.

35. On 7 May 1976, *Ha'aretz* quoted Mr. Admoni, Director General of the Zionist Federation's Settlement Department, as stating that 64 settlements had been established since 1967 in the occupied territories.

### (b) *The West Bank, including the part of Jerusalem occupied as a result of the June 1967 hostilities*

36. The announcement of measures taken by the Housing Ministry "to eliminate absentee landlordism" from the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem

by virtue of a Cabinet decision of 6 June 1975 appeared in *The Jerusalem Post* of 1 October 1975.

37. Reference was made in *Ha'aretz* on 2 October 1975 to a plan to "thicken" Israeli settlement of Jerusalem by the construction of three big settlements and 10 new suburbs in the occupied territories outside Jerusalem.

38. The announcement appeared in *Ha'aretz* of 13 October 1975 of a project by the Housing Ministry submitted to the Cabinet for examination, meant to co-ordinate all proposals for the creation of three big settlements consisting of about 20,000 inhabitants each. The report of land purchases in the Nebi-Samwil/Khan-El-Ahmar (site of the Israeli settlement known as "Maaleh-Adumin") appeared in *Ha'aretz* on 14 October 1975. These purchases were reportedly undertaken by the Land of Israel Authority.

39. The announcement of the construction of prefabricated housing to expand a settlement in the West Bank known as "Ofra" was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 14 November 1975.

40. On 20 November 1975, *Ha'aretz* reported on the expropriation of land in the area of the Israeli settlements near Kfar Etzion, which was purportedly on grounds of security.

41. The report of the replacement by Jews of Arab inhabitants of the Jewish quarter appeared in *The Jerusalem Post* on 26 December 1975. According to this report:

The principal factors limiting the pace of the work have been the requirement that all building sites first be probed by archaeologists and the negotiations with Arab residents of the quarter over compensation prior to their evacuation. Today there are only 20 Arab families still living in the quarter; and there are still about 70 Arab-owned shops. Some 6,000 Arab residents have been evacuated over the past eight years. In virtually every case, say Company officials, they received sufficient compensation to enable them to exchange primitive dwellings in the Quarter for larger and more modern housing outside the walls. Of the 600 Jewish families who are to live in the reconstructed quarter, 200 have already moved in. Another 100 are to move in next year and the remaining 300 families in 1977/1978.

42. The statement by the Housing Minister, Mr. Ofer that the peopling of Jerusalem and its area with Jews was a "matter of top priority" and justified the doubling in the number of flats to be built in 1976 was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 25 December 1975.

43. The announcement was made in *Ha'aretz* of 17 December 1975 that a settlement in the West Bank known as "Gitit" was to be converted into a permanent civilian settlement.

44. The decision that the Ministerial Committee for Settlements of the Occupied Territories had decided to establish "without delay" a number of settlements, including one to be known as "Pekaot B" in the Jordan Valley was reported in *Ma'ariv*, on 17 December 1975.

45. The report in *Ma'ariv* on 1 January 1976 stated that the Israeli settlement in Hebron, known as Kiryat-Arba, housed 250 families so far with a total population of 1,500 persons. According to the same report, 200 families were to be moved in during 1976 and 750 apartments were under construction.

46. The report in *Ha'aretz* on 6 January 1976 stated that the inhabitants of Rafat village, south of Ramallah, had complained to the occupation authorities about land expropriation in their region carried out by the Israeli Army.

47. On 21 January 1976, *Ma'ariv* reported on "the preparation" of 650 dunams (1 dunam equals 1/4 acre—1,000 sq m) for the extension of the Israeli settlement at Khan-El-Ahmar, known as "Maaleh-Adumin" and the establishment of "4 big enterprises" which had been authorized for the area.

48. The report on 24 March 1976 in *Ha'aretz* of the statement broadcast by the Jewish National Fund of land purchases in the West Bank, particularly the Ramallah area and south of Ramallah, involving £1 10 million.

49. An establishment of a new settlement during summer 1976 on Bethlehem-Hebron road was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 19 May 1976.

50. Major and Mrs. Cooper gave testimony before the Special Committee during its series of meetings held at Geneva on 9 and 10 June 1976 (A/AC.145/RT.73 and 74). The witnesses stated that, according to an over-all plan of the Israeli Government, a band of settlements would be constructed to include Ramallah and isolate Bethlehem from Hebron; a new industrial complex which was being built along the Jericho road would surround Jerusalem with settlements deep into the West Bank, in the following areas: Ramallah, Jerusalem, Jericho, Kfar-Qaddum, Sebastia, Kufir Malik, Dir Duban, Silwan, El-Kal, Ahina and Ram. Land used for the building of roads had

been expropriated from private owners, while the systematic draining of water for the industries and agriculture in the plain had left the West Bank farmers short of water.

51. The evidence given by Mr. Desmond Sullivan, who appeared before the Special Committee on 11 June 1976 (A/AC.145/RT.75), regarding a plan for building a new housing complex in the Maaleh-Adumin area—between Jerusalem and Jericho, which would be occupied by Israelis only, so as to make Jerusalem Jewish.

52. The transformation of a Nahal settlement into the civilian and permanent settlement of Mechora was announced in *The Jerusalem Post* of 13 July 1976.

53. *The Jerusalem Post* of 15 August 1976 reported on the construction of a new Moshav on the slopes of Mount Gilboa, west of Jenin, to house some 100 families to be drawn from existing settlements in the area.

54. The announcement by Housing Minister, Mr. Ofer, that Arab lands in Beit-Jallah would be expropriated in order to build a suburb in the area was reported in *Ha'aretz* of 5 August 1976. A *Ha'aretz* report of 6 August 1976 stated that 400 dunams of farm land had been fenced off.

#### (c) Gaza Strip

55. It was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 10 October 1975 that 350 housing units had already been constructed in Yamit, the Israeli settlement, and another 100 had been authorized by the Ministerial Committee for Settlements of the Occupied Territories.

56. The announcement of a decision of the Religious Kibbutz Movement to establish a new settlement within two months to be called Netzarim was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 6 November 1975.

57. *The Jerusalem Post* of 7 November 1975 reported a statement by Mr. Toledano, the Prime Minister's Adviser on Arab Affairs that "the Government was willing to pay the Bedouins far more than the law prescribed as long as the tribes accepted a final package deal". On 3 March 1976, *Ma'ariv* reported that 22 Bedouin families had refused money offers and had settled on the approach road to the Israeli settlement known as Yamit.

58. On 23 January 1976 *The Jerusalem Post* reported that 65 families had already moved into Yamit and 235 were expected to move in by

July 1976. The report confirms that the main settlers in Yamit are "English speaking and Russian immigrants".

59. *Ha'aretz* reported on 21 May 1976 that eight or nine new settlements were to be established over the next two years, five in the Rafah area and four in the rest of the Gaza Strip.

60. Written evidence submitted to the Special Committee by Major and Mrs. Cooper and further confirmed by them indicated that construction in the settlement of Yamit in the Rafah Salient had progressed substantially during the first half of 1975.

61. Major and Mrs. Cooper confirmed that the Bedouin population from the village of Abu Shanar had been given three eviction notices in 1975 and had been informed by the Housing Minister that an "orderly" removal of the village northwards was planned with the help of the army. About 10,000 people had been affected by the expropriation of 160,000 dunams in northern Sinai. The following examples of methods used to acquire land were quoted from an article entitled "Democracy ends at Pithat Rafiah", which appeared in *Ha'aretz* on 29 July 1975:

A boy of 9 signs a document by which he "concedes" his land. "Negotiations" with landowners in the Yamit area are held while bulldozers are stationed at the edges of the plots.

Applicants for identity papers or licenses to enter their property are required to sign written concessions as conditions for receiving the documents.

People who worked as teachers or in other government service jobs are fired because they refuse to sell their land.

Youths and criminal elements are made into landowners and fraudulently receive compensation from the Government.

At the Avshalon crossroads, south of Rafah, stands a modern villa. The owner, together with a government worker in El-Arish, 'discovered' many 'landowners' for the Government, and part of the compensation found its way to their pockets. The two of them were arrested and tried, basically because they were not satisfied with forging documents for the 'good' of the Government, but also made sure to line their pockets.

Lately residents of the coastal area near Yamit have been threatened with a transfer to the middle of Sinai. At night they are brought to the authorities, group by group, and heavy pressure is exerted. In at least one instance one man of 55 who refused to sell his land was badly beaten, and his teeth were broken.

Towards sheikhs and notables the government people adopt a policy of temptation: they offer them money

and land in other areas way above the value of their 'Pitha' lands, on condition that they sell their private land and convince others of their tribe to do the same.

62. The following Nahal settlements on the northern Sinai coast and in the Gaza Strip were described by Major and Mrs. Cooper: Nahal Yam, 70 km s.w. of El-Arish and 60 km from the Suez Canal; Nahal Sinai, s.w. of El-Arish and Nahal Dikla, 11 km s.w. of Rafah. In the Gaza Strip, Kfar Darom, east of Deir Al Balah, Nahal Morag near Umm Kalb, Nahal Netzarim, s.w. of Gaza town, Gadish, between Deir Al Balah and Khan Yunis and Tel Or, near Deir Al Balah, whose locations broke up the continuity of the Arab communities in the area.

63. The transformation, in the near future, of two Nahal settlements in the Rafah Salient area into civilian settlements was announced in *The Jerusalem Post* of 6 July 1976. The Nahal settlements concerned were Nahal Succot and Nahal Sinai.

#### (d) Golan Heights

64. The announcement of a project of the Jewish Agency Settlement Department for the establishment of eight settlements in the central area of the Golan Heights appeared in *Ma'ariv* on 8 October 1975.

65. The report in *The Jerusalem Post* on 5 December 1975 announced the start of construction of a new settlement known as "Mazraat Quneitra".

66. The announcement, reported in *The Jerusalem Post* of 2 and 3 December 1975, of formal approval having been given for the establishment of four settlements, gave details on their location and added that, up to then, 18 settlements had been established in the occupied Golan Heights. A similar report on 2 December 1975 in *Ma'ariv* gives further details on these settlements.

67. The statement by Housing Minister, Mr. Ofer, reported on 14 December 1975 in *Ma'ariv* indicated that, thus far, 1,547 apartments had been constructed in the Golan Heights since 1967.

68. On 13 January 1976, *The Jerusalem Post* reported on the establishment of a new settlement in the southern Golan Heights, known as Moshav Ma'aleh Gamla.

69. The announcement in a *Radio-Israel* broadcast on 2 February 1976 quoted the Chairman of a Knesset Working Group, Mr. S. Almogilino, as saying that two settlements were under construction in the Golan Heights and another to be known as Tel Zeit, to start in the spring.



70. The statement by Agriculture Minister, Mr. Uzan, that there was no more possibility for the establishment of agricultural settlements in the Golan Heights, and that industrial settlements only could be established henceforth was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 9 February 1976.

71. On 20 February 1976, *Ma'ariv* reported on a plan by a Haifa firm of consulting engineers, designed to increase the Jewish population of the Golan Heights to 40,000 to 45,000, for submission to the Zionist Federation and the Ministerial Committee for Settlements of the Occupied Territories.

72. On 23 May 1976, *Ma'ariv* reported that 200 housing units were under construction at a new settlement, known as Katzarin, and that settlers were scheduled to move in by the summer of 1977.

(e) *Sinai*

73. On 14 October 1975, *Ma'ariv* reported that the Ministry of the Interior was considering granting municipal status to the Israeli settlements at Sharm-El-Sheikh and Eilat on the Eastern shore of the Sinai peninsula.

74. On 19 December 1975, *Ma'ariv* reported of the establishment of a settlement near El-Arish, known as Nahal Haruvit.

75. The statement was made by the Housing Minister, Mr. Ofer, that "large-scale development activity" was scheduled for 1976 at the Israeli settlement at Sharm-El-Sheikh, known as Ophira and that 500 families were expected there by 1977.

B. EVIDENCE OF TREATMENT OF CIVILIAN DETAINEES  
FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, INCLUDING  
ADMINISTRATIVE DETAINEES

76. Mrs. Felicia Langer, an Israeli lawyer, was heard by the Special Committee during five meetings held from 28 to 30 July 1976. Mrs. Langer's name had been mentioned by several witnesses appearing before the Special Committee since its inception and her name had figured over the years since the occupation as defence counsel for Palestinians and other persons accused of security offences. The Special Committee therefore decided to invite Mrs. Felicia Langer to appear before it. The paragraphs that follow contain a representative sample of information communicated by Mrs. Langer during her appearance before the Special Committee.

1. *Type of courts, and the laws applied, in the occupied territories*

(a) *Types of courts*

(i) *Military courts*

77. Mrs. Langer confirmed that on 7 June 1967 the following military courts empowered to try security offences were established according to the orders of the military governors: in Quneitra for the Golan Heights (following the hostilities of October 1973, the court was established in Majdal-Shams); in Gaza and in El-Arish for the Gaza Strip and Sinai, in Hebron, Nablus and Ramallah for the West Bank.

78. Arab and non-Arab inhabitants of East Jerusalem (also occupied in 1967) and Arabs from the occupied territories charged with committing unlawful acts within the borders of Israel, including East Jerusalem, are tried in the Israeli Court in Lydda, which was made to sit as a military court for these purposes.

79. Military courts have competence to try minors, except in East Jerusalem, where Israeli law, which provides for juvenile courts, is held to apply (A/AC.145/RT.77, p. 8).

80. Mrs. Langer stated that these courts have *in personam* jurisdiction over all persons, whether Palestinian, Israeli or others, who were in the occupied territories, or who had committed security offences in the occupied territories. She referred to the trial of Rabbi Moshe Levinger from the Israeli settlement in Hebron, Kiryat-Arba, who in 1976 was tried at the military court in Ramallah for having insulted an Israeli police officer and interfered with the execution of his duties.

81. Both the Lydda military court and the military courts in the occupied territories are sometimes presided over by one judge in the case of minor offences. A maximum sentence of five years' imprisonment could be pronounced in such cases. For serious offences, there was a panel of three judges, one of whom had to be a lawyer. The rank of the presiding judge could not be less than that of mayor.

(ii) *Non-military, civil and criminal courts*

82. Mrs. Langer stated that the Jordanian courts continued to exist in the West Bank, the laws applicable being those applied before the occupation. In addition, there was concurrent jurisdiction of both military courts and Israeli district courts for certain offences enumerated in

the military regulations, such as membership in an unlawful organization; however, cases arising from the fact of the occupation and involving inhabitants of East Jerusalem were transferred by the Attorney-General to the Lydda military court.

(b) *Laws applicable in military courts*

(i) *Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945*

83. The Regulations were originally promulgated in 1945 during the British Mandate Government of Palestine. Since the military courts are in previous British mandated areas, the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, are applied in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli authorities deemed these regulations to be part of the Jordanian law existing in June 1967. By virtue of them being also part of Israeli law these regulations are the only law applicable in the Lydda military court. In the Golan Heights these Regulations are not applicable, as they were not part of the civil law there.

(ii) *Proclamations and orders by the military governors*

84. These laws, enacted after the occupation, are applicable in the Gaza Strip and Sinai, the West Bank and in the Golan Heights. They are not applicable in Lydda.

(iii) *The Criminal Code (Offences Abroad) Amendment, 1972*

85. Mrs. Langer also referred to this amendment according to which anyone performing an act outside Israel which constitutes a contravention or crime in Israel and whose purpose was to harm Israeli interests on land, sea or air could be tried according to Israeli law, even where the act in question was performed before 1972. This extra-territorial and retroactive law was justified on grounds of security. Mrs. Langer stated that under this law one of her clients was tried for having been trained in arms in the People's Republic of China before 1972 (A/AC.145/RT.77, pp. 28 and 29). Thus, under this retroactive law which was territorially limitless, a person, no matter in which part of the world, could be tried, e.g., for assisting Palestinian victims of the occupation, as this could be construed as being contrary to Israeli interests (A/AC.145/RT.77, p. 14).

(c) *Security offences as provided for in these laws*

86. Mrs. Langer stated that security offences ranged from the more violent ones such as planting

a bomb and other sabotage acts to others of a less serious nature. Since legally there was no way of expressing opposition to the occupation, any form of such expression was an offence for which one could be arrested. These included such acts as: raising a Palestinian flag, writing an anti-Israeli slogan on a wall, singing a Palestinian song, etc. Furthermore, no form of organization being permitted, including student or charity organizations, any existing organization was unlawful, and the maximum penalty under the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945 for belonging to an organization was 10 years' imprisonment. Mrs. Langer stated that there was a tendency to impose harsh sentences for even minor security offences, as exemplified in the cases described below.

87. Mrs. Langer stated (A/AC.145/RT.78,p.26) that assistance to families of political prisoners and families of those who had lost their lives in clashes with the military occupation authorities was construed as assistance to unlawful organizations and therefore forbidden. Thus, apart from the National Insurance in East Jerusalem and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, there was no legal means of assisting destitute families. Mrs. Langer referred to the case of Souad Abu Mayaleh, 30, a school teacher from Ramallah, who was sentenced on 26 April 1976 to 10 years' imprisonment (of which five years were suspended) after being found guilty, *inter alia*, of assisting families in Gaza and Jerusalem.

2. *Procedures and practices followed in the treatment of security detainees, including those held in "administrative" detention, from the moment of their arrest to their release from detention*

(a) *"Administrative" detention*

88. Mrs. Langer also stated that under regulation 111 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations it was possible to hold people in detention indefinitely without bringing any charges or bringing them to trial. This was generally done when no specific charges could be brought against detainees, especially those suspected of being communist or having communist connexions.

89. Mrs. Langer stated that the decision to put a suspect in detention by administrative order is taken by the military governor in the case of

persons in the West Bank, and by the Israeli Army authorities within Israel in the case of citizens of East Jerusalem. Neither the suspect nor the lawyer have any *locus standi* while this decision is made. Theoretically, an appeal lies with the High Court of Justice, but Mrs. Langer stated that the Court had informed her on several occasions that it would not intervene against decisions of the military commanders, who were *prima facie* justified in making them.

90. Another remedy against detention by administrative order is to appeal to the Advisory Committee of Appeal; however, this is an *ex parte* procedure, as neither the suspect nor his lawyer are permitted to be present during the review of the case, while the other party, comprising officers of the security forces, is present. Thus, the suspect is never aware or informed of the suspicions or accusations against him.

91. Mrs. Langer stated that some of the administrative detainees had been released recently, but that several who had been detained since April 1974 were still in prison.

92. Information on several cases of persons held in administrative detention was submitted by Mrs. Langer to the Special Committee. These cases are described in paragraphs 108 *et seq.*

*(b) Procedures and practices in handling security offences*

93. The procedures and practices followed with regard to persons arrested for security offences were described by Mrs. Langer, who gave the Special Committee a detailed account, illustrated by cases she had defended, of the various stages involved.

94. In the following paragraphs, this information is analysed in the context of the following stages:

- (i) At the moment of arrest;
- (ii) During interrogation;
- (iii) During pre-trial detention;
- (iv) Prison conditions during pre-trial detention;
- (v) During trial;
- (vi) Prison conditions in general;
- (vii) Conditions in women's prisons.

*(i) At the moment of arrest*

95. Two cases described to the Special Committee by Mrs. Langer indicate that violence is resorted to, even at the moment of arrest. Mrs. Langer described the case of Ahmed Sheikh Dahdhoul, aged about 50, from Salfit, who had

been recently released from Nablus prison where he had been in administrative detention. Mr. Dahdhoul was arrested in Salfit on 23 March 1976, not long after his release and on the way to Tulkarm where he was to be interrogated, was so severely beaten by the police that he died. An official announcement attributed the cause of death to a heart attack, but at the post mortem it was revealed that there were no traces of a heart attack or stroke (A/AC.145/RT.79, p.4 *et seq.*).

96. Mrs. Langer also referred to the case of Mutaleb Abu Rumeile (described below in para. 104) who was also beaten up at the moment of arrest while still in his house and in the presence of his wife and children. Mrs. Langer stated that this was corroborated by his wife at his trial.

*(ii) During interrogation*

97. Mrs. Langer emphasized the importance of the pre-trial period, as the trial itself was affected to a large extent by the pre-trial proceedings. Mrs. Langer stated that the basic tenets inherent in the principle of a fair trial, such as the right of the arrested person to have a lawyer and inadmissibility of confession obtained under duress, were not respected. The procedure which was followed in nearly all the cases defended by her was as follows: the arrested person is held incommunicado and is made to sign a self-incriminating statement by a police officer or military officer; usually no other witness is present. The statement is often obtained through the use of threats, torture and ill-treatment. In the case of torture and ill-treatment, the person inflicting the ill-treatment is dressed in civilian clothes and is referred to by a nickname, so as to be unidentifiable. He is later produced in court as a witness by the prosecution to support the prosecution's contention that the statement was not obtained under duress.

*(iii) During pre-trial detention*

98. Mrs. Langer stated that in the West Bank, according to the orders of the military authorities, a person could be kept under arrest for a period of six months before trial, and that this period could be renewed indefinitely. She added that, both under Israeli law and under the law applicable in the West Bank, at no stage was there an obligation to provide the detainee with a lawyer; in cases where Mrs. Langer had succeeded in seeing her clients during the period before trial, this was

done at the discretion of the police officer or other authority, and not as of right. Thus, although the High Court of Justice had often stated that a detainee had a vested right to consult a lawyer, this was not the practice, and a detainee was often held incommunicado.

99. Interrogation of the detainee continues during this period. Several cases of ill-treatment were referred to by Mrs. Langer in this context. Some of these cases are described in the following paragraphs.

100. Lutfiya El-Hawari: Mrs. Langer described the detention of her client who had already been previously arrested and released. El-Hawari was subsequently arrested on 12 September 1969 on grounds that 20 detonators had been found in her house. She was taken to the Beit-Shemesh prison where she was held for 15 days, blindfolded, with her hands and feet tied. She was taken to a cell where she had to drink polluted water and where she could hear the howling of dogs. She was threatened that her house would be blown up unless she confessed to knowledge of the detonators, when in fact, her house was demolished a few days after her arrest.

101. Abla Shafik Tahha: Arrested in July 1968 for possession of sabotage material. Mrs. Langer stated that she was able to visit her in Moscoviya prison the following month. During this visit which had taken place in the presence of several people, Mrs. Tahha had informed Mrs. Langer of the treatment to which she had been subjected when in prison. She stated that on her arrest she had been put into a cell with prostitutes, who had ripped off all her clothes in the presence of a policeman, attacked her and beaten her until she had lost consciousness, despite the fact that she was pregnant. The beatings had resulted in a haemorrhage, but Mrs. Tahha's request for a doctor had been refused. Mrs. Langer testified that she had seen bruises on Mrs. Tahha's body. Mrs. Tahha was subsequently tried and sentenced to four years' imprisonment, but was released shortly after her sentencing when her request to emigrate was granted by the West Bank regional commander.

102. Ziad El-Assa (A/AC.145/RT.79, p. 28): Arrested on 23 April 1974 at the age of 17, he was accused of being a communist and of having spread anti-Israeli propaganda. He was detained in Hebron prison where he was interrogated and

severely beaten to extract from him the names of other communists. He was held in detention for 10 days, during which various unsuccessful attempts were made by Mrs. Langer to visit him. On his release from prison, he was immediately put into Bethlehem Hospital, so severe was his condition. He was transferred to Amman for treatment and then from there to Moscow, where he was hospitalized for a period of nine months. At his request Mrs. Langer visited him in Moscow in July 1975, following his treatment there. She stated that even then, his limbs still trembled, his paralysis not having been completely cured. Describing the torture inflicted on him during his detention, he informed Mrs. Langer that he had been beaten on the head, hung from the ceiling while a bottle was inserted into his rectum, blindfolded and given electric shocks. After his legs were half paralysed, he was released and put into hospital. A request by Mrs. Langer that the State of Israel compensate him for having made him a cripple had remained uncontested and unanswered. El-Assa was now in Amman.

103. Mohammed Nagy Bhiz (A/AC.145/RT.77, pp. 11 and 12): Arrested on about 7 November 1968. An attempt by Mrs. Langer to see him a week later was unsuccessful, but from a subsequent visit she was able to ascertain that her client was badly beaten during interrogation, which resulted in injuries to his head and his eye.

104. Mutaleb Abu Rumeile (A/AC.145/RT.79, p. 12 *et seq.*): Arrested on 8 March 1969 in East Jerusalem for possession of arms and membership in an unlawful organization. Mrs. Langer stated that his mental state had regressed to that of an animal's as a result of the torture inflicted on him during his detention. An East Jerusalem doctor, Suhhi Goshi, had ascertained that Rumeile had been traumatized by the colour red, due to the fact that his torturer wore this colour. He was eventually treated in a mental hospital and was cured of this condition which, however, could recur.

105. Anton Yacub Khalis (A/AC.145/RT.78, pp. 28 and 29): Mrs. Langer stated that Khalis had informed her that he was taken to Moscoviya prison after his arrest where he was ill-treated in order to force him to confess that he was a member of an unlawful organization. Khalis had stated that he had been beaten on the stomach on the area where he had an ulcer, was thrown

on his head, kicked and spat on, was given bad food and urine to drink when he was thirsty.

106. Yitzak El-Maraghi (A/AC.145/RT.77, p. 15): Mrs. Langer stated that El-Maraghi had been arrested on 7 March 1969 for having distributed money to poor families in East Jerusalem, some of whom were families of persons detained for security offences. Her assistant, Ali Rafah, was able to see him and informed Mrs. Langer of his condition, swollen hands and a large wound on the top of his head. Mrs. Langer was subsequently able to visit him on several occasions in Damoun prison, where she herself was able to see marks of beatings on his body. Mrs. Langer stated that El-Maraghi informed her that following his arrest he was taken to Moscoviya prison in Jerusalem, where he was beaten on the body with a wooden stick for 21 days until he was swollen all over, and had hot and cold water alternatively poured over him. The beatings, which caused serious injury to his head, were given in order to compel him to give the authorities information on unlawful organizations. No medical treatment being given to the wound in the head, it worsened, and he was finally taken to the hospital of Ramleh prison. Despite the treatment, he suffered from severe headaches as the result of the wound. Following a complaint by Mrs. Langer on his behalf, El-Maraghi, who was never brought to trial, was made to appear before the police for interrogation. Mrs. Langer, who was not asked to be present during this investigation, despite demands to that effect by her client, subsequently received a letter from the police stating that the complaint had been investigated and was found to be baseless. Maraghi was eventually expelled.

(iv) *Prison conditions during pre-trial detention*

107. Mrs. Langer stated that she was able to ascertain that prison conditions of detainees prior to trial were far worse than prison conditions after sentencing (A/AC.145/RT.80, p. 5 *et seq.*). She described a cell in Hebron prison where two of her clients, Musa Mohamed Ali Taqtaqa and Fathi Hashim Tawabita, were incarcerated and which she was permitted to visit on 3 May 1973, together with the Lydda military court which was trying the accused. The dimensions of the cell were 1 1/2 meters by 2 metres and the surface of the walls and of the floor were of rough cement so that a person moving within the cell was constantly injured. There was no light and ventila-

tion consisted of a small opening in the roof. The bed was a mat a centimetre and a half in thickness and a bucket served as a toilet while another bucket contained water. She noted that conditions in cells where convicted prisoners served their sentences, which were shown to her at her request, were far better.

108. The following cases concerning persons detained under regulation 111 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945 ("administrative" detention) were brought to the attention of the Special Committee.

109. Mohamed Atwan (A/AC.145/RT.79, p. 25 *et seq.*): Mrs. Langer stated that he was arrested on 29 April 1974 and that she visited him the following month in Moscoviya prison. An elderly man, Atwan had informed Mrs. Langer that he had been severely beaten during his interrogation. He was released without any charges having been brought against him, but in June 1974 was asked to appear at the offices of the Jerusalem police on three consecutive days for further interrogation. On two such occasions he was severely beaten by four investigators until his physical condition was extremely grave. On the third day of interrogation Atwan visited the office of Mrs. Langer, who testified that his condition was very serious and that he had a haemorrhage in the scrotum. He was hospitalized the same day at Hospice Hospital and subsequently received surgical treatment.

110. Yusuf Abdallah Udwan (A/AC.145/RT.78, pp. 18 and 19): Mrs. Langer stated that she had seen this detainee in Tulkarm prison in April 1969, and that he had been arrested on suspicion that he was a communist. Udwan had described his torture to Mrs. Langer stating that electricity and sticks had been used to torture him and that his torturers put lit matches near his lips to amuse themselves. A complaint describing the ill-treatment was sent by Mrs. Langer to the military governor, who stated in his reply that all her allegations were baseless. Udwan was eventually expelled.

111. Suleiman El-Najab, Khalil Hijazi, Ghassan El-Harb and Jamal Freteh (A/AC.145/RT.78, p. 5 *et seq.*): Mrs. Langer stated that these detainees had been seen by her on 2 July 1974 in Jallameh prison in Haifa. She testified that she saw marks of severe ill-treatment on their bodies, and that these men, some of whom she had seen prior to their arrest, had been completely healthy before

their detention. The detainees bore the marks of the ill-treatment to which they had been subjected: inflammation of the body caused by pouring a burning substance all over the body, including the genitals, and severe beatings—the scars left by this treatment were noted in writing by Mrs. Langer and were observed by the prison guard named as Abu Nabil who subsequently denied having noticed them. A request by Mrs. Langer for an immediate medical examination of the detainees was refused, but an application for an order *nisi* against the Minister of Police and a request for an inquiry commission were granted. Mrs. Langer stated, however, that the procedure of the commission was a travesty of justice since one of the members on the two-man body was notorious for his avid hatred of Arabs and communists. The findings of the commission were that the detainees were lying and that the wounds on their bodies were self-inflicted “in order to smear the Israeli Government”. Suleiman El-Najab and Khalil Hijazi were eventually expelled.

112. Mohammed Abou Gharbieh (A/AC.145/RT.78, p. 4): Aged 38, from East Jerusalem, father of five children, Gharbieh was arrested in April 1974 on the grounds that he had affiliations with communism and the Palestine National Front. He was imprisoned in Jallameh prison in Haifa where Mrs. Langer saw him on 2 July 1974. Gharbieh informed her that after his arrest he had been transferred to a military prison where he was tortured by being beaten on the genitals. He subsequently contracted tuberculosis and was released from Jallameh after two years of imprisonment.

113. Attalah Rashmawi (A/AC.145/RT.78, p. 28): Imprisoned since April 1974 for having communist affiliations, Rashmawi was overwhelmingly elected municipal councillor in the village of Beit-Sahur during the elections in the West Bank held March 1976. An appeal for his release was made by Mrs. Langer on 22 April 1976 but was rejected on grounds of security.

114. Zuheir Amira (A/AC.145/RT.78, pp. 29 and 30): Sentenced in 1971 to three years' imprisonment and five years' suspended sentence for possession of arms and membership in an unlawful organization, on completion of the sentence, Amira received an Administrative Order for further detention of one year; this Order was successively renewed, so that he had been in

detention for more than two years in addition to the sentence he had served. An appeal by Mrs. Langer to the Advisory Committee of Appeal against the administration detention was unsuccessful, as was an order *nisi* against the Minister of Police and the military governor of the West Bank, the latter having informed Mrs. Langer that the detention was necessary as the detainee would otherwise constitute a danger to the public order. The case would be reviewed in September 1976.

115. Other names of detainees mentioned by Mrs. Langer were: Abbas Abdul Hak, Mohammed Sa'ada, Daoud Isametah, an ailing man, Abdul El-Bayart and Tayseer El-Arouri, a professor of mathematics at Bir-Zeit University, who had graduated in physics in Moscow. She stated that the period of detention of the last two named as well as of Ghassan El-Harb and Attallah Rashmawi had been recently extended, despite the fact that some of these cases had been reviewed by the Committee of Appeal. Mrs. Langer added that there was a tendency to propose to detainees “to buy their freedom by leaving the country”, but that she was not aware of any cases where consent was freely given. Such a proposal had been made by the Committee of Appeal to detainee Tayseer El-Arouri who rejected it (A/AC.145/RT.81, p. 10).

#### (v) *During trial*

116. Mrs. Langer stated that at the trial stage the accused may be defended by counsel; if he has no lawyer the court supplies him with one. The lawyer has access to all the documents of the prosecution, and, in general, is not hampered in the performance of his duties.

117. According to Israeli law, when the validity of a confession is questioned by the defence, the prosecution has the burden of proving that the confession of the accused was obtained lawfully. The prosecution does this by bringing witnesses on its behalf, namely, those involved in the interrogation of the accused. The defence also is entitled to produce witnesses, usually the accused himself and other witnesses, if any. This procedure was known as a “trial-within-a-trial”. The court weighs the testimony of both sides and took a decision as to whether the confession was lawfully obtained in which case it was submitted to the court as evidence.

118. Mrs. Langer stated that, judging from her experience in defending Palestinians accused of security offences, the "trial-within-a-trial" was almost always partial, in that judges believed the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses that confessions were obtained from the accused by their own free will and without duress, while the accused were never believed, even when it was possible to show marks of torture and ill-treatment on their bodies. Mrs. Langer emphasized the fact that not once was she able to convince the judges of the true nature of police interrogation. Mrs. Langer referred in this context to the case of Abu Rumeile (already mentioned in the para. 104 above) who had testified to the court at great length during the "trial-within-a-trial" stage on the tortures inflicted on him. The alleged torturers, also questioned by the court, had denied the statements of the accused, and the court had held that the accused's claims were an "Arabic fantasy".

119. Once the above evidence was accepted by the court, the accused's lawyer was allowed to make a case for the defence. However, Mrs. Langer stated that in view of the great importance and credibility given by the court to the accused's statement regardless of the manner in which it was obtained and in view of the court's implicit belief in the prosecution's witnesses, the defence did not have a fair opportunity to defend its client (A/AC.145/RT.77, p. 9 *et seq.* and A/AC.145/RT.78, pp. 2 *et seq.*).

120. To illustrate the bias in the application of these procedures, Mrs. Langer referred to a practice by which it was possible to request the court to undertake an on-the-spot visit to investigate prison conditions, in particular during the "trial-within-a-trial"; despite numerous requests made by her, she had been able to obtain such an inquiry in only two cases. She referred to the trial of Bashir El Khairi, whom she had visited in Ramallah prison during his pre-trial detention and on whom she had observed marks of beating. At the trial the accused had requested the court to visit the cells in the Ramallah prison, so that the court could note that it was the practice in Ramallah prison to beat up political detainees. The court had desisted, on the grounds that this was not within its competence. Mrs. Langer stated that such visits were indeed possible, but that the court in this case had feared that an investigation into conditions under which detainees

were held would leave the *bona fides* of the entire proceedings open to question (as, for example, the courts' implicit belief in the prosecution's witnesses) (A/AC.145/RT.78, pp. 14, 15 and 17).

121. Mrs. Langer referred to the case of Musa Mohamed Ali Taqtaqa and Fathi Hashim Tawabita. Mrs. Langer had obtained permission to visit the Hebron prison cells together with the court, but the judge had held that the cell in question could not have influenced the accused in making his statement under duress and that it was given of his own free will.

122. Where the verdict was "guilty", the accused was given the right to bring character witnesses after being sentenced, and was given the privilege of making a further statement. However, the accused had to avoid making political declarations such as his right to a homeland or devotion to the Palestinian people, as such views were considered "aggravating circumstances" which could result in a harsher sentence. Mrs. Langer cited the cases of Ytzak Maraghi and Hasan Abu Kadeir, charged with membership in the Palestine National Front, rendering services to this organization and the possession and carrying of arms, and who were given heavy sentences (26 years imprisonment in the one case and 15 years in the other) by the Lydda military court after having expressed their pro-Palestinian views in their final statement to the court. An appeal had been made to the High Court of Appeal in Lydda for commuting sentences and an answer was awaited (A/AC.145/RT.78, p. 26).

123. Mrs. Langer stated that there was a current tendency by the military courts in Ramallah, Nablus and Gaza to impose disproportionately heavy sentences for relatively harmless political activities, such as raising the Palestinian flag, spreading leaflets, and writing slogans. She mentioned the case of Mohamed Badagh from Nablus, who received a five-year sentence (of which 2½ years were suspended) for writing slogans against the occupation on a school wall in Kalkilya; Nizam Ataya, from Ramallah, who received a four-year sentence for spreading leaflets and writing anti-Israeli slogans, and Ibrahim Garaybeh, who received a two-year sentence plus three suspended for similar offences.

124. On conviction of the accused, the sentence was approved by the military governor. There

was no right of appeal (except for cases heard by the Lydda military court) but the accused could apply for clemency.

125. Proceedings during the trial were held in Hebrew with interpretations in Arabic, which Mrs. Langer described as satisfactory.

(vi) *Prison conditions in general*

126. In her testimony Mrs. Langer stated that prison conditions varied with each prison, but most inmates complained of the cramped space and danger to their health, due to bad food, lack of proper medical aid, poor ventilation and lack of beds and mattresses. In addition, Israeli law did not recognize a distinction between a political prisoner and a criminal, and both were therefore imprisoned in the same cells. As an example of the danger inherent in such a practice, Mrs. Langer described to the Special Committee the case of Hadda Nimr, a 20-year-old school teacher from Ramallah, who had been sentenced for having received training in arms in the Soviet Union. Nimr was imprisoned in Nablus prison where he was killed by his cell-mate, an Arab who had previously murdered an entire family in Bethlehem, and who was known to the prison authorities as a dangerous element (A/AC.145/RT. 78, pp. 31 and 32).

127. The following other cases, illustrating prison conditions and treatment of prisoners, were referred to by Mrs. Langer.

128. Mohammed Suleiman Kattamesh (A/AC.145/RT. 78, p. 24 *et seq.*): Sentenced on 25 November 1975 to eight years imprisonment for having been trained in arms in the USSR and for activities the Palestine National Front a request for clemency made by his lawyer had not been answered. Meanwhile Kattamesh had been put into Nablus prison, where he had fallen ill. No medical treatment having been given to him, his condition had deteriorated until he was paralysed in both legs and in the right arm and had almost lost sight in the right eye. Following pleas by Mrs. Langer, he was transferred to Sarafand Hospital where he was at the time of submission of evidence. Mrs. Langer had again applied for clemency in view of his physical condition and several mayors and notables had requested his release, but no answer had been received.

129. Samir Shafik Derwish (A/AC.145/RT.78, pp. 23 and 24): Sentenced to 20 years imprisonment

in 1967 for armed infiltration, Derwish made an unsuccessful attempt to escape in 1974. He was twice brought before investigators and during the interrogation was beaten up by prison guards and even by officers of the prison's management. The beatings caused him an open wound on the head and numerous wounds on other parts of the body. He was then put into a cell for 10 days with his hands and feet chained and was threatened that if he did not give the authorities the information they wanted, his mother and brother would be put into administrative detention. On his refusal to co-operate, he was put into solitary confinement for a period of three months and was denied the privilege of a walk. The chains on his hands were left on him until June 1975, for a period of over a year. Derwish then went on a hunger strike in protest against his treatment and after a month was transferred to a common cell with other prisoners. Mrs. Langer had visited him there on several occasions. In March 1976 he was again put into solitary confinement on charges of having incited the other prisoners. Mrs. Langer had last seen him there on 11 June 1976. Other witnesses who had seen marks of beatings on his body were Suleiman El-Najab, an administrative detainee from Ramallah, who was expelled and who was now in Amman and Karl Motel, an Austrian now back in Austria.

(vii) *Conditions in women's prisons*

130. Mrs. Langer stated that many of her female clients had complained of the deplorable conditions in prison. A common practice was to put political prisoners together with prostitutes, and in some cases mentioned by Mrs. Langer, the latter would be asked by prison authorities to beat up the prisoners and harass them. One of her clients, Rasmieh Odeh, incarcerated in Neve-Tirzah prison, complained to Mrs. Langer who visited her there of the harsh attitude of the prison authorities—according to this woman, prison authorities allowed external events to influence them in dealing with the prisoners—e.g., a sabotage act would result in the denial of certain privileges to the prisoners, and collective punishment such as confiscation of books and personal belongings. There were also complaints of inadequate medical treatment. A complaint by Mrs. Langer on these conditions was rejected by the authorities in a letter sent to her in September 1975.



131. Mrs. Langer also described the conditions in the women's prison at Gaza. Following an attempt by Rasmieh Odeh to escape from the Neve-Tirzah prison, where women prisoners are incarcerated in order to be "persuaded" to confess, she was transferred to the Gaza prison which was described by her as "a hell" and where she was kept for more than a month. The dimensions of the cell in which she was kept were 1 × 1 metre, and the cell had no window to the outside. The only window was placed in the direction of the interrogation rooms, so that the screams of those being interrogated could be heard. There was an uncovered toilet in the corner and the cell which was lit by a very strong light, both by night and day, was hot and humid. Prisoners were not given the privilege of a walk although an exception was made in the case of Rasmieh Odeh because of her illness. As regards the other cells, they contained no beds or mattresses, and it was forbidden to lie down during the day. All conversation was forbidden, because "it disturbs the silence and the possibility of recreation of the guards". Contravention of these rules resulted in the offender being prevented from using the outside toilet and being forced to use the toilet in the cell itself, thus worsening the existing conditions both for herself and her cell-mates (written evidence submitted by Mrs. F. Langer in document No. 76/33, pp. 5 and 6).

132. The use of a shower was permitted once a week, which was considered inadequate in view of the hot climate of Gaza, and women were denied the necessary hygienic facilities during menstruation. Medical treatment was said to be virtually non-existent, as medicines prescribed by the doctor were non-available.

133. Complaints by prisoners to the International Red Cross were discouraged. A complainant who later had occasion to ask the prison personnel for something she needed would be told: "Ask the International Red Cross for everything you wish. If you have such a big mouth, try to obtain it from them. From us you will receive nothing."

134. Mrs. Langer also referred to the cases of Mariam El Shahshir, Ayesha Odeh and Hadiya Roman, Palestinian women imprisoned in Neve-Tirzah and who had complained to her about prison conditions. The authorities' answer to a complaint by Mrs. Langer on the above had been that the treatment in the prisons was satisfactory.

A request by Mrs. Langer for a gynaecological examination in the case of Ayesha Odeh, who had complained of sexual abuse, had been rejected, on grounds that the victim herself had not complained to them.

135. Mrs. Langer stated that Hadiya Roman, Fatmah Barnave and Ayesha Odeh were very ill. The latter two, Rasmieh Odeh and Mariam El Shahshir had been sentenced for life. Mrs. Langer stressed that their situation was alarming, in view of the poor conditions in prison and the lack of medical care. She added that the ICRC was aware of their situation, but that their help was limited.

136. Mrs. Langer stated that except in the case of the very ill, those who requested permission to leave the area after having served a long sentence were denied it.

#### C. EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE PROLONGED OCCUPATION IN THE FORM OF MASS MANIFESTATIONS, REGULAR OCCURRENCE OF INCIDENTS, ADOPTION OF REPRESSIVE MEASURES, ILL-TREATMENT, A PATTERN OF MASS ARRESTS, TRIALS AND CONVICTIONS

##### 1. *Mass manifestations and regular occurrence of incidents*

137. The discovery of a booby-trap charge in the Ramallah area was reported on 14 October 1975 in *Ma'ariv*.

138. The shooting and killing of two shepherds near the Syrian-Israeli truce line was reported on 15 October 1975 in *The Jerusalem Post*.

139. The discovery of 41 detonators on a 90-year-old woman on one of the Jordan bridges was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 17 October 1975.

140. Attempt on the life of a new member of the Gaza municipal council was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 22 October 1975.

141. The explosion of a booby-trapped car in Jerusalem was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 29 October 1975.

142. The burning of a car belonging to the Chairman of the Jenin Chamber of Commerce was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 30 October 1975.

143. The shooting and wounding of a Palestinian in the Hebron area by a civil guard was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 4 November 1975.

144. The protest demonstration by 250 students of Bir-Zeit college was reported in *The Jerusalem*

*Post* on 4 November 1975.

145. The destruction of an Israeli hut at Dura near Hebron was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 5 November 1975.

146. The demonstration at Ramallah school was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 9 November 1975.

147. The discovery of a hand-grenade planted under a car in central Nablus was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 9 November 1975.

148. The continuation of disturbances at Ramallah was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 10 November 1975.

149. The demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins held in Nablus, Jenin, Kalkilya, Jericho and Bethlehem were reported in *Ha'aretz* on 13 November 1975.

150. The bomb explosion in Jerusalem was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 13 November 1975.

151. The bomb explosions in Ramallah and El-Bireh were reported in *The Jerusalem Post* and *Ma'ariv* on 16 November 1975.

152. The demonstration in Nablus was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 1 December 1975.

153. The shooting and killing by an Israeli soldier of a Gaza civilian was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 5 December 1975.

154. A throwing of a grenade at an Israeli tractor in the Gaza Strip was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 4 December 1975.

155. The shooting and killing by an Israeli soldier of a civilian in the Gaza Strip was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 9 December 1975.

156. The non-violent demonstrations by 150 secondary school pupils in East Jerusalem and the demonstrations in Nablus were reported in *Ha'aretz* on 8 February 1976.

157. The demonstrations by 300 youths in East Jerusalem were reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 12 February 1976.

158. Violent street riots in Nablus were reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 13 February 1976.

159. The incidents of unrest in Jerusalem, Jericho, Nablus and other West Bank towns were reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 15 February 1976.

160. The demonstrations by 400 women in East Jerusalem were reported in *Ma'ariv* on 14 February 1976.

161. The resignation of the municipal council of Nablus because of clashes between the army

and students was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 8 March 1976.

162. The demonstrations and business strikes in Nablus and neighbouring villages were reported in *Ma'ariv* on 10 March 1976.

163. The riots in Tulkarm, Jenin and the village of Hartiya were reported in *Ma'ariv* on 11 March 1976.

164. The resignations of the municipal councils of the towns of Ramallah, El-Bireh, Bir-Zeit and Silwan were reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 11 March 1976.

165. The riots in Tulkarm, Jericho and in Ramallah district were reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 11 March 1976.

166. The riots in the Balata refugee camp and in Yartah village near Tulkarm and in Atil were reported in *Ma'ariv* on 14 March 1976.

167. The "worsening situation" and riots in East Jerusalem were reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 17 March 1976. The riots in Bethlehem, Beit-Sahur, Hebron, Jericho and Halhul were reported in *Ha'aretz* on 18 March 1976.

168. Further deteriorations were reported in *Ha'aretz* on 17 March 1976 and riots in Azariya and Abu-Dis were noted in the same report.

169. The resignation of the mayor of Jenin was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 22 March 1976. The riots in Hebron and Dahariya were reported in *Ha'aretz* on 23 March 1976. During these riots acts of brutality of Palestinians at the hands of Israeli members of the settlement known as Kiryat-Arba were reported.

170. A *Ha'aretz* report of 8 July 1976 stated that an inquiry into allegations of ill-treatment was continuing.

171. The description of the disturbances which took place on 17 March 1976 in Hebron was given by Dr. Ahmad Hamzi Natsheh, who appeared before the Special Committee during its meetings in June 1976. Dr. Natsheh stated that violent methods were used by the Israeli authorities in quelling the disturbances. He referred to two cases treated by him for injuries sustained during the disturbances, a 17-year-old girl who had a bullet in her right leg and a man from the village of Abu-Dis who was wounded by a bullet in the shoulder. Dr. Natsheh stated that apart from fire-arms the Israeli authorities set dogs on the crowds participating in the demonstrations, as a result of which he recalled that 37 persons were

treated for dog-bites in Hebron hospital.

172. The shooting and killing during a riot of a 10-year-old boy was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 23 March 1976.

173. The riots in Beit-Safafa were reported in *The Jerusalem Post* and *Ha'aretz* on 24 March 1976.

174. The resignation of the Salfit municipal council was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 25 March 1976.

175. The demonstrations by 150 youths in Nablus were reported on 5 April 1976. The riots in Jenin refugee camp were reported in *Ha'aretz* on 7 April 1976.

176. The death of a 42-year-old Palestinian was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 18 April 1976. The death of a 6-year-old Palestinian child was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 18 April 1976.

177. The demonstrations and strikes in Ramallah, Nablus and Jenin were reported in *Ha'aretz* on 19 April 1976.

178. The "violent demonstrations" in Nablus, Jenin and Tulkarm were reported in *Ha'aretz* on 2 May 1976.

179. The explosion of a bomb planted in a motor scooter in Jerusalem was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 4 May 1976.

180. The disturbances in West Bank towns, including business strikes, were reported in *Ha'aretz* on 16 May 1976.

181. The riots in Nablus were reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 17 May 1976.

182. The death of a 22-year-old Palestinian from Nablus was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 2 May 1976.

183. The shooting and killing of a 17-year-old Nablus girl was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 17 May 1976. On 11 August 1976, *The Jerusalem Post* reported that the soldier involved in the incident had been charged with manslaughter and was to be brought to trial.

184. The bomb explosion in Kfar-Saba was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 17 May 1976.

185. The death of a 20-year-old Kalandia Palestinian who was shot was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* and *Ha'aretz* on 18 May 1976.

186. The shooting and killing of a 21-year-old East Jerusalem Palestinian was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* and *Ha'aretz* on 19 May 1976.

187. The same report describes a general strike in East Jerusalem. The riots in several West Bank towns were reported in *The Jerusalem Post*

on 20 May 1976.

188. The wounding of two youths as a result of a clash with a border police patrol in Nablus was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 1 August 1976; the youths were reported to have thrown a Molotov cocktail at the patrol.

189. The shooting and killing of three residents of the Gaza Strip at Shtula by an Israeli army patrol for having attempted to cross the border into Lebanon, were reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 15 August 1976.

190. The several incidents of unrest and disturbances in East Jerusalem and in West Bank towns were reported in the Israeli press during July and August 1976, as a result of the imposition of value added tax (VAT) to be levied in these areas and in the Gaza Strip. The tax was imposed in Israel and in East Jerusalem on 1 July 1976, but was sought to be imposed on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip on 1 August 1976, in order to give Arab businessmen an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the complexities involved. However, an 8 per cent rise in certain items would be imposed in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip on 1 July 1976 in order to match the price rise in Israel. As a result business strikes, demonstrations, clashes with the police and other similar incidents took place in East Jerusalem and in West Bank towns; demonstrators were arrested, curfews were imposed on major West Bank towns and one Nablus resident aged 17, Hashem Jamal Shantir, was killed during clashes with security forces in the Qasbah area of Nablus, as reported in *Ha'aretz* on 5 July 1976. West Bank residents were opposed to the tax which would be levied on merchants whose annual turnover exceeded £ I 75,000 on the grounds that:

(a) It was contrary to international law and Israel's obligations as an occupying Power;

(b) It was not a part of Jordanian law under which the West Bank was administered;

(c) Its imposition would be inequitable, since the average salary of an inhabitant of the occupied territories was half that of his Israeli counterpart.

## 2. Measures of repression and ill-treatment

191. The curfew imposed on part of Jenin was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 30 October 1975.

192. The closing of a women teachers' training college in Ramallah, in retaliation to demonstra-

tions, was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 1 November 1975.

193. The closing of four business establishments, in retaliation to the bombing of Israeli civilian cars in El-Bireh, was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 20 November 1975.

194. The imposition of a curfew in Nablus was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 1 December 1975.

195. The suspension from her job of an El-Bireh secondary school-teacher, Florinda Laham, and reduction of her salary by 90 per cent after she had been sentenced to four months' probation for taking part in a "sit-in" at the school on 31 January 1976 was reported. This information was communicated to the Special Committee by Major and Mrs. Cooper, who described the conduct of the Israeli soldiers who had burst into the school and beaten teachers and pupils, injuring several among them.

196. The ban on travel from Ramallah, Nablus and El-Bireh to Jordan and vice versa was reported in *Al-Hamishmar* on 16 February 1976, in retaliation to demonstrations in those towns. This ban was lifted on 4 March 1976, according to *Ha'aretz*.

197. The closing of a secondary school in El-Bireh for two weeks and another one in Tulkarm was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 29 February 1976.

198. The ban on trade with Jordan and the refusal to issue travel permits to Palestinians was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 4 March 1976.

199. The curfew imposed on Jenin refugee camp and the rounding-up of all the male population of the camp was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 14 March 1976.

200. The curfew imposed on Ramallah, El-Bireh and the El-Amari refugee camp was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 16 March 1976. Mrs. Langer stated to the Special Committee that the long curfew imposed on these towns resulted in tragic consequences for those requiring medical treatment as in the case of Mohammed Yahya El Kurd from East Jerusalem. Severely injured during the demonstrations, El Kurd died from lack of medical care as the surgeon who was in Ramallah was prevented from attending to him because of the curfew in that town.

201. The partial curfew on Halhul and Hebron was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 18 March 1976.

202. The lifting of the curfew on Ramallah and El-Bireh after 10 days was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* and *Ha'aretz* on 26 March 1976.

203. The closing of the Jerusalem daily Arabic language newspaper *Al-Shaab* was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 22 March 1976. The newspaper was allowed to reopen on 7 April 1976.

204. The curfew on Jenin refugee camp was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 7 April 1976.

205. The curfew on West Jenin was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 19 April 1976.

206. The sealing-off of the Nablus Qasbah was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 23 April 1976.

207. The curfew on the Tulkarm refugee camp was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 23 April 1976.

208. The curfews imposed on Nablus and Tulkarm were reported in *Ha'aretz* on 2 May 1976. These curfews were reported lifted in *Ha'aretz* on 7 May 1976.

209. On 4 May 1976, *Ha'aretz* reported the third consecutive day of the curfew on the Nablus Qasbah.

210. The imposition of "preventive" curfews on Nablus and East Jenin was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 16 May 1976.

211. The imposition of "preventive" curfews on Jenin, Nablus and the Balata refugee camp was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* and *Ha'aretz*, on 18 May 1976.

212. The curfew on Ramallah and El-Bireh, in addition to that on Nablus, Jenin and Balata (see preceding para.), was reported in *The Jerusalem Post*, and *Ha'aretz* on 19 May 1976.

213. *The Jerusalem Post* of 27 July 1976 reported that a curfew was imposed on the Balata refugee camp near Nablus following the explosion of a bomb in a Nablus restaurant which killed a policeman and wounded three others.

214. The demolition of a house belonging to a Palestinian suspect was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 17 October 1975; according to the report, the house was demolished the day before the Supreme Court of Israel issued an interim order against the demolition.

215. The demolition of the houses of five Palestinian youths suspected of security offences was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 5 November 1975.

216. The demolition of the house of a Palestinian suspect was reported in *Al-Hamishmar* on 9 November 1975.

217. The demolition, on 15 December 1975, of the house of Ahmed Ali-El-Afghani from the Burej refugee camp in Gaza was brought to the attention of the Special Committee by Mrs. Langer.

The demolition had been carried out because a member of the household had been charged with planting a bomb, and it had left the 11 members of the family homeless. At the trial which was held later the accused was acquitted of the offence. Mrs. Langer stated that it was doubtful whether any restitution was possible, despite the circumstances peculiar to this case.

218. The demolition of the houses of two Palestinian suspects was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 8 January 1976.

219. The demolition of a house in the village of Beit-Ur, belonging to the Osman Osman family, was referred to by Major and Mrs. Cooper. The house sheltered a family of six who were left destitute when the father was arrested after weapons were found in the house.

220. The policy of forbidding families thus rendered homeless from rebuilding their home was described by Major and Mrs. Cooper. In the case referred to in paragraph 217, the 10 remaining members of the family were forced to live in a tent provided by the Red Cross, and the son, who was under administrative detention, was moved to another prison thus making visits difficult.

221. The sealing-off of the home and office of a Nablus lawyer accused of security offences was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 11 February 1976.

222. The demolitions in a village near Nablus of the houses of two Palestinians suspected of membership in an organization involved in sabotage activities were reported in *The Jerusalem Post* of 25 August 1976. The report also stated that another two houses belonging to members of the same organization had been sealed up.

223. Mrs. Langer stated that under Regulation 119 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, mere suspicion that a person was involved in violent acts constituted grounds for a decision to demolish his house. Demolitions could be carried out without prior notice, except for a warning to clear the area. Since the demolition was an arbitrary act carried out immediately, there was no legal procedure involved and the victim had no recourse to the courts.

224. The expulsion of two Palestinian leaders was reported in the Israeli press on 26 March 1976. One of these persons, Dr. H. Natsheh, appeared before the Special Committee during

its meetings in June 1976 and his lawyer, Mrs. Langer, appeared before the Special Committee during its meetings in July 1976. Both testified that the expulsion of Dr. Natsheh was put into effect in spite of the request for an injunction to stay the order and the protest of the judge against such action. Mrs. Langer informed the Special Committee during her appearance before it in July 1976 that her request to Defence Minister Mr. S. Peres, for an annulment of the expulsion order resulted in a negative response.

225. The policy of offering expulsion as an alternative to a long prison sentence, as in the case of Abdul Haziz Zidan, who had been held in detention in Hebron prison, was described by Major and Mrs. Cooper.

226. The reports of the detention of persons without charge or trial; 37 persons were reported held in administrative detention, according to a statement by the Defence Minister, Mr. Peres, in the Knesset which was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 22 January 1976.

227. The description was given by Dr. Natsheh of the case of three Palestinian youths who were kidnapped by Jewish settlers from the settlement of Kiryat-Arba, locked in an enclosure, stripped of their clothes, and left to wild dogs who attacked them. Dr. Natsheh stated that in such cases families are afraid to seek treatment for fear of further repressive acts by the Israeli authorities.

228. Dr. Natsheh also confirmed the death of the following persons during the disturbances in Hebron in March 1976: Medam Hassad Abumile, aged 34, who was severely beaten and later died in Hadassah Hospital of compound fractures and internal haemorrhage and Ahmed Dadhoul, a recently-released administrative detainee, aged about 50, from Salfit, who was beaten by the security forces while being taken to Tulkarm for interrogation, and who also died of fractures and internal haemorrhage as a result of the beating.

229. The death of a former administrative detainee from Nablus after being brutalized by Israeli troops was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* and *Ha'aretz* on 24 March 1976 and again in *Ha'aretz* on 30 March 1976.

230. The death of another Palestinian from wounds inflicted on him by Israeli soldiers was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* and *Ha'aretz* on 26 March 1976.

231. The alleged ill-treatment of an East Jeru-

salem resident [Mustapha El-Kurd] was reported on 2 March 1976 and 28 April 1976.

232. The firing of a rocket at the city of Jerusalem was reported in the *International Herald Tribune* on 8 April 1976.

233. The practice was referred to by Mrs. Felicia Langer whereby Israeli soldiers intimidate Palestinian civilians. An example of these methods is breaking into homes and beating up young people. One such incident which occurred on 18 March 1976 and was witnessed by Mrs. Langer concerned a young boy from Halhul who was being severely beaten and ill-treated by Israeli soldiers. The soldiers had broken into the boy's home, interrupted the family meal and taken him away. The boy was eventually taken to Hadassah Hospital by Mrs. Langer, where he was treated for concussion and bruises.

234. The description given by Mrs. Felicia Langer of the ill-treatment of Lutfiya El-Hawari and Ziad El-Assa is contained in paragraphs 100 and 102 above.

### 3. Pattern of mass arrests, trials and convictions

235. The sentencing<sup>61</sup> of a Nablus civilian to 20 years' imprisonment was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 3 October 1975.

236. The sentencing of a Ramallah civilian to 10 years' imprisonment, was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 5 October 1975.

237. The sentencing of a Nablus civilian to 2 years' imprisonment was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 8 October 1975.

238. The sentencing of a Palestinian from Gaza to two life sentences plus 105 years of imprisonment was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 15 October 1975.

239. The sentencing of a civilian from Sinai to 25 years' imprisonment was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 15 October 1975.

240. The sentencing of 2 Gaza civilians to 6 years' and 2 years' imprisonment, respectively, was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 16 October 1975.

241. On 17 October 1975 the sentencing of a West Bank Palestinian to 7 years' imprisonment was reported in *Ma'ariv*.

242. The arrest of 3 civilians from Ramallah

was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 19 October 1975.

243. The sentencing of 3 Nablus civilians to imprisonment, ranging from 6 months to 4 years was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 19 October 1975.

244. The start of a trial of 44 Palestinians from Jenin was reported in *Ma'ariv* 20 October 1975.

245. The start of a trial of 6 Gaza Palestinians was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 20 October 1975.

246. The start of a trial of 7 Gaza Palestinians was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 20 October 1975.

247. The sentencing of 6 persons from Gaza to imprisonment from 5 years to 135 years was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 21 October 1975.

248. The sentencing of 7 persons (from the group of 44 referred to in para. 244 above) to imprisonment ranging from 5 months to 2 years, was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 21 October 1975.

249. The sentencing of 4 persons from Nablus to imprisonment ranging from 5 years to life was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 21 October 1975.

250. The sentencing of 2 young women from Tulkarm to 2 years' imprisonment each was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 23 October 1975.

251. The sentencing of 3 persons from a refugee camp near Jenin to 2 years' imprisonment was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 28 October 1975.

252. The arrest of 5 persons from Jerusalem was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 29 October 1975.

253. The sentencing of a Jenin civilian to 15 years' imprisonment was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 29 October 1975.

254. The filing of an indictment against 3 female Palestinians was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 31 October 1975.

255. The arrest of 5 persons from Irtas was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 2 November 1975.

256. The sentencing of an Israeli Arab to 15 years' imprisonment was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 4 November 1975.

257. The start of a trial of 16 persons in Nablus was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 5 November 1975.

258. The sentencing of 6 persons from Gaza to imprisonment ranging from 4 years to 20 years was reported in *Al-Hamishmar* on 5 November 1975.

259. The sentencing of 4 civilians in Nablus to 15 years to life imprisonment was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 12 November 1975.

260. The arrest of 10 pupils, all under 18 years of age, in Ramallah after demonstrations in that town was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 12

<sup>61</sup> The sentences given in this section are generally imposed for violations of the Security Instructions, 1967, and the Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, which contemplate offences ranging from contact with saboteurs to responsibility for acts of sabotage causing death or destruction [original note].

November 1975.

261. The summary trial of 100 secondary school students in Ramallah and the imposition of fines ranging from £1 1,000 to 3,000 was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 12 November 1975.

262. The arrest of 13 pupils from Nablus after demonstrations in that town was reported in *Ma'ariv* and *The Jerusalem Post* on 14 November 1975.

263. The summary trial in the West Bank military court of 18 secondary school students and the imposition of "heavy" fines was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 16 November 1975.

264. The summary trial of "several dozen" civilians in Hebron after disturbances in the town was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 17 November 1975.

265. The arrest of a "number of young inhabitants" from East Jerusalem and Ramallah was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 20 November 1975.

266. The sentencing to 5 years imprisonment by the West Bank military court of a Palestinian was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 25 November 1975.

267. The sentencing of a Nablus civilian to 8 years' imprisonment was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 25 November 1975.

268. On 2 December 1975 the sentencing of a Gaza civilian to 25 years was reported in *Ma'ariv*.

269. The sentencing of 11 civilians from a refugee camp near Nablus to imprisonment ranging from 3 to 8 years was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 7 December 1975.

270. The start of a trial of 13 Palestinians from Nablus was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 12 December 1975.

271. The sentencing of a Nablus civilian to 30 years' imprisonment was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 17 December 1975.

272. The arrest of 11 students in Nablus was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 18 December 1975.

273. The "preventive arrest" of an "undisclosed number" of persons was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 19 December 1975.

274. The sentencing of 3 civilians from Khan Yunis to 25 years' imprisonment was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 5 January 1976.

275. The arrest of 6 Palestinians from Nablus was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 9 January 1976.

276. The sentencing of 9 persons from Gaza to imprisonment ranging from 4 years to 16 years was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* and *Ha'aretz* on 26 January 1976.

277. The sentencing of 5 persons from Gaza to imprisonment ranging from 18 months to 2 life sentences plus 159 years was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 27 January 1976.

278. The sentencing of a Gaza civilian to 20 years' imprisonment was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 28 January 1976.

279. The arrest of 16 students and a teacher in El-Bireh was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 1 February 1976.

280. The arrest of 35 Gaza civilians was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 4 February 1976.

281. On 10 February 1976 *The Jerusalem Post* reported the arrest of 23 students and 1 woman from the Jerusalem area, after demonstrations in the city.

282. The arrest of "several" persons after violent riots in Nablus was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 13 February 1976.

283. The sentencing of 5 Gaza civilians to life imprisonment was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 13 February 1976.

284. The arrest of 40 Jerusalem Palestinians (bringing to a total of 100) after demonstrations was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 15 February 1976.

285. Mrs. Langer submitted written evidence to the Special Committee concerning the case of Gamal Abu Gharbieh, aged 22, from East Jerusalem, who was arrested on 25 February 1976 at 1.00 a.m. on suspicion that he had participated in a recent demonstration near the El-Aqsa mosque and that he had distributed an anti-Israeli leaflet. According to the report submitted by Mrs. Langer, Gharbieh was taken to the investigation office of the police station in Moscoviya prison where he was beaten and was ordered to undress and to immerse himself in muddy water. He was beaten until he fainted, put into a prison cell where he was asked by the interrogators to admit the offences with which he had been charged. Following demands by his cell-mates that he be given medical treatment, he was transferred to Hadassah Hospital, where he was examined and was then returned to the prison. Gharbieh was finally released on 3 March 1976 without having been charged. The day following his release he visited Mrs. Langer, who was able to see the marks the beatings had left on his body, and who immediately had him photographed. The photograph, as well as a medical report from the St.

John's Ophthalmic Hospital in Jerusalem, were submitted by Mrs. Langer to the Special Committee. Mrs. Langer's testimony indicated that victims are afraid to report such incidents to the police for fear of further reprisals.

286. The arrest of 7 persons in Tulkarm was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 19 February 1976.

287. The arrest of 200 persons after riots was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 22 February 1976; according to a report in *Ha'aretz* of the same date, 170 persons were arrested.

288. The arrest of 8 youths from East Jerusalem after riots was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* of 17 March 1976.

289. The arrest of 100 civilians in Jerusalem after demonstrations was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 18 March 1976.

290. The arrest of 7 civilians at Salfit after demonstrations was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 30 March 1976.

291. The arrest of 16 persons from East Jerusalem, Ramallah and Nablus after demonstrations, was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 11 April 1976.

292. The arrest of 14 persons from Mitlun village was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 23 April 1976.

293. The sentencing of 4 persons from East Jerusalem and the surrounding area to imprisonment ranging from 15 months to 26 years was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 28 April 1976.

294. The arrest of 30 civilians from East Jerusalem was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 29 April 1976.

295. The arrest of a "cell" composed of an unspecified number of civilians from Nablus, Jerusalem and other towns was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 7 May 1976.

296. The arrest of 18 civilians from Jebeliya village and refugee camp on 12 March 1976 was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 12 May 1976.

297. The sentencing of a Jenin civilian to 12 years' imprisonment was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 12 May 1976.

298. The sentencing of a Ramallah civilian to life imprisonment was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 17 May 1976.

299. The sentencing of 2 persons from Gaza to 20 years' imprisonment each was reported in *Ma'ariv* and *The Jerusalem Post* on 17 May 1976.

300. The arrest of 70 Palestinians after a bus explosion was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 17 May 1976.

301. The arrest of 36 persons after a general

strike in East Jerusalem was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 19 May 1976.

302. The arrest of 90 civilians from East Jerusalem during two weeks, resulting in 77 being remanded in custody for periods from 7 to 15 days, was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 21 May 1976.

303. The arrest of 15 Palestinians from a village near Hebron was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 21 May 1976.

304. The arrest of 20 persons described as "intellectuals" from the West Bank was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 30 May 1976.

305. The arrest of 50 persons in the West Bank, members of the PFLP, was reported in *Ma'ariv* of 12 July 1976.

306. The arrest of 46 persons from the Gaza Strip, suspected of membership in the "Forces of Liberation" group and charged with possession of arms was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* of 15 July 1976.

307. The number of Arab security prisoners held in Israeli jails stood at 3,200 according to a Red Cross report published by *Ha'aretz* on 16 July 1976.

308. The arrest of a young man from Khan-Yunis, suspected of having carried out a sabotage act was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 25 July 1976. The same report also referred to the arrest of 5 members of Fatah from the village of Qablan in the Nablus area.

309. *The Jerusalem Post* reported on 26 July 1976 that Sa'id Mansur Hussein, Faruk Ismail Fida'i and Omar Ramadan, currently serving prison sentences of 15 years were convicted by the Gaza military court to sentences ranging from 6 months to 5 years for attempting to set up a Fatah cell while in prison.

310. The arrest of 12 persons suspected of having planted a sabotage charge in Nablus was reported in *Ha'aretz* of 27 July 1976.

311. Mrs. Langer, who gave evidence before the Special Committee during its meetings in July 1976, stated that there was a current wave of night trials when demonstrators, usually minors, were arrested and summarily tried at night, without being given the possibility of having legal defence, and, in many cases, without notifying the parents. The children, who came from low income families, were heavily fined, and were not given the option of going to prison, so that the fines



constituted an unconscionable burden on their parents. Mrs. Langer stated that, according to the law applicable in the West Bank, parents were responsible for their children's misdemeanours, and were consequently obliged to pay the fines imposed on the children. In cases where families simply did not have the money, the parents themselves were imprisoned. Mrs. Langer added that, even in Jerusalem where there was provision for minors to be tried in juvenile courts, the atmosphere at such trials was one of terror designed to deter young people from participating in anti-Israeli demonstrations or in any other way opposing the occupation. She described one such trial where it was possible for her to appear as counsel for one of the accused, only because the parents were aware that their child was being tried. The children in this case were aged 15, 12 and 9 and despite the lack of evidence that they had, in fact, participated in demonstrations, were given fines ranging from £I 1,000 to 2,000. Furthermore, the indictments were read in Hebrew, and were not understood by the children. An example of heavy fines imposed on young persons was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 4 August 1976 which stated that fines ranging from £I 3,000 to 5,000 were imposed by the military court in Nablus on nine young residents who were summarily tried for having participated in street rioting.

312. The arrest of about 20 young men from the northern West Bank for incitement to participate in riots was reported by *Ma'ariv* on 9 August 1976. The report also referred to the arrest of four people in Tulkarm for attacking a policeman and to the arrest of three men in Nablus on suspicion of having incited students to demonstrate.

313. The house arrest of a Ramallah woman, Mrs. Raymonda Tawil, for "security reasons", was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* of 15 August 1976.

314. The sentencing of Taleh Talebiat, Zaharan Abu Kbeita and Muhammed Shtreit, described as members of El-Fatah, by the military court in Lydda to sentences ranging from 15 years' to life imprisonment for having carried out a series of sabotage acts, was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 25 August 1976. The same report referred to the sentencing by the military court in Ramallah of Mussa Shwamra to 30 months' imprisonment for membership in El-Fatah and for having received training in arms in the Syrian Arab Republic.

315. The sentencing by the Lydda military

court of three East Jerusalem high school students, Majed Jawa'd, Issam Barah and Muhammad Nofal, aged from 17 to 19, was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* of 26 August 1976.

## V. QUNEITRA

316. In resolution 3240 C (XXIX), the General Assembly requested the Special Committee to undertake, with the assistance of experts, a survey of the destruction of Quneitra and to assess the nature, extent and value of the damage caused by such destruction.

317. The Special Committee visited Quneitra on 9 September 1974 and in its report to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session (A/9817) it stated, for a number of reasons given in the report, that it felt "a deep-seated conviction that the total devastation could not but have taken place recently and systematically and prior to the withdrawal of the Israeli forces and that the Israeli occupying authorities were responsible for the devastation of Quneitra". Subsequent to resolution 3240 C (XXIX), the Special Committee, after examining the qualifications of a number of candidates, selected Mr. Edward Gruner and requested him to conduct a preliminary survey of the damage in Quneitra. The Special Committee examined the expert's report and recommended that the survey should be resumed and completed as soon as possible (A/10272, para. 187).

318. In resolution 3525 C (XXX), the General Assembly requested the Special Committee to continue and complete the survey. Accordingly, the Special Committee instructed Mr. Gruner to proceed with the survey; during its meetings from 16 to 20 February 1976 the Special Committee held consultations with the expert in the course of which he outlined the manner in which he proposed to conduct the survey. The Special Committee agreed that the most effective approach would be to have a house-to-house survey on the field by competent engineers. The team was to examine each structure in Quneitra, determine its position, its purpose (house, shop, etc.), type (brick, reinforced concrete, etc.), dimensions, its volume, percentage of destruction, origin of destruction (war, deliberate, other) and value. A team of four surveyors under the direction of the expert established their residence in Quneitra by the end of March 1976 and surveyed the entire

area covered by the town of Quneitra, a process which lasted until the end of July 1976. Mr. Gruner visited the field on four occasions during March, April, June and July to check progress.

319. After consultations on the progress of the survey held during the meetings of the Special Committee in June and July 1976, the expert submitted his report to the Special Committee which examined it during its meetings in September 1976.

320. As instructed, Mr. Gruner presented the Special Committee with a report containing the details requested on each structure found in Quneitra and plotted on enlarged segments of the map of Quneitra; because of the bulk of the report containing data on each structure, the expert also submitted his report separately from the detail collected on the field and this is reproduced as annex III to the present report. The Special Committee is making the full report available concurrently. The house-by-house survey revealed 4,180 structures of which 4,088 were, according to the expert's findings, destroyed by deliberate action. The expert has estimated that the total value of the deliberate damage caused to Quneitra amounted to £S 463,133,694.20.

## VI. CONCLUSIONS

321. In all its reports since the first one in 1970 (A/8089, A/8389 and Add. 1, A/8828, A/9148 and Add. 1, A/9817, A/10272), the Special Committee stated that the main problem affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories had its roots in a policy followed by the Government of Israel directed towards a process of annexation of these territories. This process was shown to be the result of a number of direct or indirect measures or practices. The most serious of the direct measures has been the establishment of Israeli settlements in accordance with previously approved plans of the Government and the transfer of Israeli citizens to these settlements. The information before the Special Committee indicated that 61 settlements have so far been established in the occupied territories. A second direct measure is continued refusal by the Government of Israel of the recognition of the right to return of those persons who had fled the occupied territories during and as a result of the hostilities of June 1967. Examples of indirect measures are the

excessively severe measures adopted by the occupying Power to repress all manifestations or protest against the occupation, including reprisals such as the demolition of houses and prohibition of exports of produce. In each of its reports, the Special Committee has given ample and uncontradicted illustrations of the existence of these measures and of the fact that they form an integral part of the policies and practices followed by the Government of Israel in the occupied territories. The Government of Israel has continued to follow these policies and especially that of annexation and settlement which is in contravention of the letter and spirit of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Special Committee would draw the attention in particular to article 47 and to the concept inherent in the Convention that a military occupation is a temporary status, pending a final peace settlement ending a state of belligerence.

322. As stated by the Special Committee in its second report (A/8389), at the heart of this policy followed by Israel in the occupied territories is the so-called "homeland doctrine" annunciated by the Government of Israel and supported by parliamentary opposition: under this doctrine, the territories occupied as a result of the June 1967 hostilities form part of the natural boundaries of the State of Israel and are not therefore considered as occupied territories within the meaning of international law. The same doctrine treats the civilian population living in these territories—the Palestinians—as being there only on sufferance. This doctrine is totally untenable and did not receive even implicit recognition in the General Assembly resolution that created the state of Israel.

323. In paragraph 47 of the same report, the Special Committee cited, by way of evidence of the existence of such a policy, the establishment by the Government of Israel of a Committee styled "Ministerial Committee for Settlements of the Territories" presided over by a Minister without portfolio, Mr. Israel Galili. Information received since then has confirmed that this body is entrusted with the formulation and implementation of the policy of the Government of Israel in settling the occupied territories. During 1976, the "Qaddum incident" proved this irrefutably. This "incident" stemmed from the establishment of a settlement west of Nablus by a group of Israeli citizens known as the Gush Emunin (described in reports as a

political/religious group) without government authority. This settlement, established in November/December 1975 next to an Israeli Army camp, provoked a series of statements by government members, including Prime Minister Rabin, descriptive of the policy of the Government of Israel in settling the occupied territories. The Qaddum settlement was officially described as "illegal" and alternative sites in the occupied territories have been offered to the settlers who have refused to leave Qaddum because their movement is dedicated to settle in the "heart of Samaria", i.e., the northern part of the West Bank. The Qaddum settlement was still there at the time of the adoption of this report.

324. The Special Committee has followed closely the manner in which this policy of annexation and settlement is being implemented. In its second (A/8389, para. 48, p. 33) and fourth reports (A/8828, para. 91) the Special Committee noted that the Government of Israel invoked reasons of security in justification of measures taken in furtherance of this policy. In its fourth report, the Special Committee listed these measures as follows:

(a) The expulsion of persons from the occupied territories under so-called deportation orders, including professionals and local leaders, several of whom have appeared before the Special Committee;

(b) The transfer of several thousand persons from their homes to other parts of the occupied territory, as for example, the case with occupied Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip;

(c) The expropriation of property, including property belonging to persons transferred from their homes, such as the Gaza Strip (Rafah area and the Akraba area);

(d) The establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territory and the transfer of Israeli nationals to these settlements;

(e) Demolition of houses;

(f) Administrative detention, particularly of local leaders;

(g) The denial of the right to return to their homes of those persons who fled the occupied territory because of the June 1967 hostilities and those deported or otherwise expelled, especially as evidenced by the correspondence on the subject during June-October 1976. "

325. Having regard to the fact the military occupation is in its tenth year, the Special Commit-

tee has, apart from the analytical presentation appearing in paragraphs 25 to 315 above, examined real causes which, in addition to the continuation of the occupation and its inevitable consequences, are responsible for the serious deterioration of the situation in the occupied territories. These causes are found in:

(a) The Government of Israel policy of annexation and settlement;

(b) The practices followed in the treatment of civilian detainees;

(c) The resistance of the civilian population to the measures adopted to implement this policy.

326. In the following paragraphs, the Special Committee analyses the information before it in the light of these three headings.

#### A. THE POLICY OF ANNEXATION AND SETTLEMENT

327. The information received by the Special Committee shows that members of the Government of Israel—as in previous years—continue to make statements affirming government policy on annexation and settlement. These statements make repeated references to the "basic right" of Israeli citizens to settle anywhere in the occupied territories. Other statements reflect the intention of the Government of Israel to retain the areas where settlements have been established. Thus, Mr. Rabin, Prime Minister, in April 1976 stated "no settlement has been set up in order to be taken down again", and Mr. Allon, Foreign Minister, in June 1976, said that "the settlements were not established in order to be abandoned". These statements do not differ from those made by the previous Government of Israel. In its third report, the Special Committee quoted a statement by the Prime Minister, Mrs. Meir, which was reported in *The Jerusalem Post* on 10 October 1971, that "our borders are fixed by the people who live along them. If we retreat, the borders will retreat with us. The danger is then that somebody will fix the boundaries for us" (A/8389/Add.1, para. 11).

328. In addition to such statements confirmatory of the existence of the policy of annexation and settlement, other reports reinforced allegations of its continued implementation. Information received by the Special Committee confirms, for example, the elaboration, during this year, of a plan for the further settlement of the occupied

territories and the beginnings of its execution. After announcements in November 1975 that the Jewish Agency has completed a plan for the establishment of a number of settlements over a two-year period, it was reported in April 1976 that the Ministerial Committee for Settlements of the Occupied Territories had approved a plan for 29 settlements to be established during 1976 and 1977, of which 20 were to be located in the occupied territories. This plan, reportedly discussed in early May 1976 by Mr. Galili, Chairman of the Settlement Committee, Mr. Rabin, Prime Minister, Mr. Allon, Foreign Minister and Mr. Peres, Defence Minister, was given final approval and its execution started in June 1976 with permission being granted for the setting up of one settlement in the Kfar Etzion area and another in the Latrun area.

329. This is further confirmed by such statements as that made in December 1975 by Mr. Ofer, Housing Minister, that, since the occupation, 3,859 apartments had been constructed in the occupied territories. Again in May 1976 the Director-General of the Settlement Department of the Zionist Federation (a semi-official body) Mr. Admoni, announced that 64 settlements had been established in the occupied territories since 1967.

330. The information received by the Special Committee shows that the methods of acquisition of land in the occupied territories continue. These methods may be classified into purchase, outright expropriation and expropriation with payment of compensation. The land acquired by these means is located in areas where settlements have been established. In its fifth report, the Special Committee outlined the provisions of international law on the disposal of property in occupied territories (A/9148, sect I). Purchases are undertaken by such semi-official bodies as Land of Israel Authority and the Zionist Federation. In October 1975, there were reports of land purchases in the Nebi Samwil area (immediately outside Jerusalem and to the north) and in the Khan El-Ahmar area, east of Jerusalem. Nebi Samwil is an Arab village now lying in ruins, where, according to a plan approved in September 1972, 8,000 apartments are to be constructed (A/9148, para. 59).

331. This area has already been the subject of land purchases in previous years: the Special Committee, in its second report, referred to a statement by the Jewish National Fund spokesman in April 1971, to the effect that the Fund had been pur-

chasing land in that area and in Jerusalem and the Kfar Etzion (south east of Jerusalem) areas for the preceding two years. Khan El-Ahmar is on the Jerusalem-Jericho road and the site of an Israeli settlement (known as "Maaleh-Adumin") decided upon by the Government of Israel in November 1974. In its last report, the Special Committee gave details on the establishment of this settlement, including the seizure of several thousands of dunams (one dunam = 1/4 acre = 1,000 sq. m.) of land which had earlier been declared "closed areas" by the Israeli Army (A/10272, para. 78). In January 1976, the Israeli press announced the "preparation" of 650 dunams more land for settlement and authorization for the establishment of four "big enterprises". Again in November 1975, the Israeli press reported the expropriation of land in the area of Kfar Etzion that lies in the midst of the three settlements. In January 1976, land was reported to have been expropriated at Rafat, immediately south of Ramallah and north of Jerusalem. The same area, in March 1976, was the subject of land purchases involving transactions in "tens of millions of Israeli pounds" by the Jewish National Fund, another semi-official body.

332. Expropriation of land continued to take place in the Gaza Strip, according to the information received by the Special Committee. In the southern part of the Gaza Strip, this process is undertaken parallel to the eviction of the inhabitants. The process of annexation and settlement of this area was first reported by the Special Committee in its second report in 1971 when several thousand local inhabitants were relocated from the three major refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, including Rafah (A/8389, para. 48 (h)). In its subsequent reports, (A/8389/Add.1, paras. 17 to 20, A/8828, paras. 42 to 45, A/10272, paras. 41 to 45), the Special Committee noted reports reflecting the follow-up to these measures and the disclosure, in October 1972, of a detailed plan drawn up at the behest of the Defence Ministry for the establishment of a town, and, after a debate within the Government, the decision to construct a "regional centre", taken in December of the same year (A/9148, para. 68). The process of expelling the inhabitants of the Rafah area continues, according to the information received by the Special Committee. In December 1975, Mr. Toledano, the Prime Minister's Adviser on

Arab Affairs, referred to a "package deal" offered to the local inhabitants to give up their claims to land ownership, claims considered by the Government of Israel as unfounded. By March 1976, however, 22 Bedouin families were still refusing money offers and had "squatted" on one of the access roads to "Yamit", the Israeli settlement in the area.

333. The information before the Special Committee shows that the process of annexing the occupied part of Jerusalem continues. In its second report (A/8389, para. 48 (d)), the Special Committee gives details of the "master plan" announced in March 1971 for the construction of housing units in occupied Jerusalem as announced by the then Housing Minister Mr. Sharef. It was reported at that time that the construction would be carried out on expropriated land of which 74 to 80 per cent belonged to Arabs. By that time, according to a statement by Mr. Kollek, Mayor of Jerusalem, 4,000 Arabs had been evacuated from Jerusalem (A/8389, para. 48 (h)). By October 1975, 160 Jewish families had moved into the Jewish Quarter in occupied Jerusalem and 400 families were expected to move in by 1977, out of the projected total of 700. During the same period, plans were reported to construct three large settlements and 10 new suburbs outside Jerusalem, in territory occupied in 1967. These settlements, according to a Housing Ministry project, were to contain a total of approximately 9,000 inhabitants in addition to a 200-villa suburb near Beit Jalla, outside Jerusalem and to the south. The Housing Minister stated in December 1975, with regard to Jerusalem, that populating Jerusalem and its surrounding areas with Jews was "a matter of high priority". He is reported as having stated that this process was being carried out as the Arab inhabitants leave. *The Jerusalem Post*, on 26 December 1975, reported a statement by Mr. Pelleg from the "Company for the Reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter" during a press conference: "the principal factors limiting the pace of the work have been the requirement that all building sites first be probed by archaeologists and the negotiations with Arab residents of the Quarter over compensation prior to their evacuation. . . . Today, there are only 20 Arab families still living in the Quarter, and there are still about 70 Arab-owned shops. Some 6,000 Arab residents have been evacuated over the past 8 years. In

virtually every case, say company officials, they receive sufficient compensation to enable them to exchange primitive dwellings in the Quarter for larger and more modern housing outside the walls. Of the 600 Jewish families who are to live in the reconstructed Quarter, 200 have already moved in. Another 100 are to be moved in next year and the remaining 300 families in 1977/78".

334. In addition to the above, the information received by the Special Committee shows the further development of settlements already established. For example, "Ofra", a settlement in the West Bank, established "illegally" in June 1975 and subsequently "authorized" by the Government (A/10272, para. 86) was reported to have been expanded in November 1975 by the provision of prefabricated houses. Access roads and services had been readied by that time. Similarly, a Nahal settlement (para-military) called "Gitit" in the north-eastern part of the West Bank, near the village of Akraba, was reportedly to be converted to a civilian and permanent settlement in 1976. The Israeli settlement in Hebron, known as "Kiryat-Arba", according to the information received by the Special Committee, continues to expand. The settlement, originated in 1968 and the subject of a complaint by the Government of Jordan (A/7103-S/8609) (A/8389, para. 48 (d) (viii), and A/8389/Add.1, para. 12 (e)) was made "permanent" in 1971 when the "settlers", until then housed in Israeli military quarters in Hebron, were moved into a "permanent" estate for 50 families. In January 1976, the settlement reportedly housed 250 families or 1,500 persons and 750 apartments were under construction. By the end of 1976, 975 apartments were to be completed. In May 1976, there were 2,000 Israeli citizens reported in the settlement and they were said to be "demanding a master plan for their settlement and the allocation of more land". The Special Committee noted information appearing in an Israeli newspaper on 19 May 1976 stating that Arabs, encouraged by the Palestine Liberation Organization, had been constructing "unauthorized houses in areas which had been allocated for the development of Kiryat-Arba in order to hinder its expansion. . . .".

335. Another settlement that was the subject of information received by the Special Committee indicating its expansion is "Yamit" established in 1975 in the southern Gaza Strip in the area of

the Rafah Salient. Information received by the Special Committee during 1975 was analysed in its last report (A/10272, paras. 46 to 58). Up to October 1975, 350 housing units were reported constructed and an additional 100 units authorized by the Ministerial Committee for Settlements of the Occupied Territories. Sixty-five families had moved into the settlement and 235 families were expected to move in by July 1976. It was confirmed that the main settlers were United States and Soviet immigrants.

336. The continuation of execution of plans approved in previous years was shown with regard to the Golan Heights where 18 settlements were reported to have been established by December 1975. In the same month, formal approval was announced for the establishment of four settlements in the Golan Heights. Since 1967, according to a statement by the Housing Minister, Mr. Ofer, made in December 1975, 1,547 apartments were constructed in the Golan Heights. A new settlement was reportedly established at Mazraat Quneitra in December 1975 and another settlement in January 1976 called "Ma'ale Gamla". In May 1976, 200 housing units were under construction in another settlement "Katzarin" with the settlers reportedly expected to move in by summer 1977.

337. New settlements continue to be established in the Sinai, with "Nahal Haruvit" being inaugurated in December 1975. The Israeli settlement at Sharm El-Sheikh, called "Ophira", reportedly was to undergo large-scale development in 1976 and 500 families were planned to move in by 1977.

338. In all its reports, the Special Committee referred to the demolition of the villages in the Latrun Salient and to the establishment of Israeli settlements in the area.

339. In analysing the information received by it, the Special Committee took note of information that brings out a grim aspect of the policy of annexation and settlement. In 1969, Ibrahim Mustafa Ibrahim, mukhtar of Emmaus, appearing before the Commission on Human Rights Special Working Group of Experts established under Commission 6 (XXV), described the events on Tuesday, 6 June 1967 when at 3 o'clock in the morning, the Israeli Army entered Emmaus, forced the villagers to assemble and to quit the village *en masse* after being deprived of their belongings. The mukhtar's

statement gives a detailed and grim picture of the horrors of war and the tragedy of the villagers of Emmaus, Yalu and Beit Nuba, who remain homeless refugees.

340. In stark contrast to the account of Mr. Ibrahim in 1969 stands a report appearing on 14 April 1976 in *The Jerusalem Post* magazine describing a new park known as "Canada Park", which had been set up on the very same site as the villages of Yalu, Emmaus and Deir Ayub. (This park was described by Major and Mrs. D. Cooper who visited it in February 1976 and who appeared before the Special Committee in June 1976 (A/AC.145/RT.73 and 74).) *The Jerusalem Post* magazine report is clearly oblivious of the tragedy of the people of Emmaus, Yalu and Beit Nuba when it speaks of "Canada Park... the newest most imaginative and potentially most popular park in the country, ... on land formerly occupied by three Arab villages—Yalu, Imwas (Emmaus) and Deir Ayub—the first two destroyed after the Six Day war... The villages were duly evacuated and razed. (Deir Ayub had been abandoned in 1948)" and of "1,500 dunams of the orchards left behind by the villagers will become principally a camping ground for Gadna and other youth groups. The remaining third of the park abuts the religious (Ezra) moshav of Mevo Horon...".

341. In its reports, the Special Committee has shown that the policy of annexation and settlement does not manifest itself only in measures aimed at expropriation of property and establishment of settlements. Measures have been taken consistently during the occupation to discourage the civilian population from remaining in the occupied territories and at the same time refusing those who had fled or left their homes in 1967 the right to return.

#### B. TREATMENT OF CIVILIAN DETAINEES

342. The Special Committee invited Mrs. Felicia Langer to appear before it in order to describe to the Special Committee her experiences concerning the treatment of civilians who are suspected of or charged with security offences. In her lengthy and detailed testimony (A/AC.145/RT.77 to 81), Mrs. Langer addressed herself to the procedure and the practices followed by the occupation authorities in arraigning Palestinians and other

persons before the military courts. Section IV, paragraphs 76 to 136 above, gives an analysis of Mrs. Langer's testimony. To a large extent the testimony of Mrs. Langer reviews a situation in which the letter of the law differs widely from its application. To a limited extent, the law purports to afford protection for persons under detention but, in reality, those safeguards are withheld by the responsible authorities. Mrs. Langer quoted several cases occurring regularly since the beginning of the occupation where practice was not consistent with avowed procedure to the detainee's detriment.

343. Mrs. Langer described the system of courts that sit in the occupied territories and the law applied by them. As mentioned in paragraph 83 above, the military courts in the occupied territories apply the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, and the various proclamations and orders issued by the military government, including the Security Instructions. Measures taken under the Defence (Emergency) Regulations are expressly prohibited by the Fourth Geneva Convention as, for example, demolition of houses of suspects and expulsion. The Special Committee has already had occasions in its first report (A/8089, paras. 57 to 60) to pronounce itself on the applicability of these regulations. In that report, the Special Committee noted that the Government of Israel applied these regulations in the West Bank on the grounds that they were part of the Jordanian law in June 1967. The Special Committee noted that the Government of Jordan had contested this assertion and it had contended that these regulations had been abrogated by subsequent legislation promulgated before 1967. In her testimony, Mrs. Langer referred to the fact that the inapplicability of these regulations had been raised in the military court in the West Bank during the early days of the occupation and that the court had held the regulations to be applicable.

344. In its first report the Special Committee took note of these arguments and stated that, regardless of the question of their applicability, the intrinsic validity of the regulations should be examined. The Special Committee noted that the purpose of these regulations of 1945 was to maintain order in a situation of emergency declared to be existing in Palestine which was at that time a territory under British mandate. The territories occupied by Israel as a result of the hostilities in

June 1967 are governed by the Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the protection of the civilians in time of war. This Convention is applicable in the occupied territories, inasmuch as the situation in these territories is one of military occupation.

345. The Special Committee noted that the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, could not be construed as enacted in the occupied territories nor could they be deemed, in conformity with the provisions of the Geneva Convention since, regardless of whether they are part of the Jordanian law or not they contain provisions which are at variance with several principles of humanitarian law. These principles have been almost universally accepted and recognized in international law and even being incorporated in the constitutions of most states. Inasmuch as the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945:

(a) Allow arbitrary and prolonged detention of individuals without charge or trial;

(b) Deny persons, including those under detention, access to courts having jurisdiction over them by substituting other quasi-judicial or administrative bodies that do not offer the procedural safeguards envisaged in the Geneva Conventions and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

(c) Do not allow for proper and adequate legal aid of persons under detention;

(d) Allow for arbitrary deportation of individuals;

(e) Allow for destruction of property as a disciplinary measure irrespective of whether the owner of such property is known to be the offender or not.

These regulations must, to this extent, be pronounced invalid and any act perpetrated under any such invalid provisions *ultra vires*.

346. Furthermore, the Special Committee is of opinion that any law is invalid if such law violates the provisions of the Geneva Convention. This applies to any provision, whether it exists in the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, or in the Security Instructions promulgated by the Israel Defence Forces in any occupied area, or in any other form of legislation or administrative decree concerning the occupied territories. The exceptions made by the Fourth Geneva Convention for reasons of security are limited strictly by that Convention. The Special Committee is not satisfied that, in the generality of cases referred to it, the plea of security is valid.

347. On 9 August 1976, the Special Committee requested the views of the Government of Jordan on the question of the applicability of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945. At the time of the adoption of this report, the Government of Jordan had not yet communicated its views.

348. In her testimony Mrs. Langer referred to several instances of ill-treatment of detainees and described cases where ill-treatment was apparently inflicted at various times during detention. The Special Committee has always exercised the utmost caution in expressing itself on the several allegations of ill-treatment of detainees in the occupied territories. It has acknowledged the difficulty of establishing whether the several allegations of ill-treatment made before it were true or not. Thus in its reports the Special Committee has limited itself to stating that:

despite the compelling nature of the evidence it had received, it was unable to reach a conclusive finding, since this would only be possible after a free investigation by the Special Committee inside the occupied territories. Nevertheless, in these reports the Special Committee has stated its conviction that, on the basis of the evidence before it to date interrogation procedures very frequently involved physical violence (A/10272, para. 183).

After hearing the testimony of Mrs. Langer, the Special Committee is in a position to state that civilian detainees are not afforded the protection given by the Fourth Geneva Convention and the applicable international humanitarian law. This refers both to general conditions and to particular cases. The existing arrangements with the ICRC are obviously inadequate even though that organization is to be commended on the efforts it has made, within the limits imposed by the occupying Power, on behalf of the civilian detainees.

349. The Special Committee acknowledged the delicate nature and seriousness of such charges and the difficulty of conclusive findings; there can be no doubt, however, that the existing arrangements for affording civilian detainees adequate protection have to be radically improved. It is clear to the Special Committee, for example, that the military courts' procedures do not provide adequate opportunity to establish allegations of ill-treatment. The fact that suspects are held incommunicado for as long as necessary after arrest and cannot be seen or contacted by any person—including the ICRC—except his interrogators leaves the detainees at the utter mercy

of the interrogator. Many suspects are not brought to trial, but held for undetermined periods in custody or in administrative detention. Such detainees have no opportunity whatsoever of obtaining protection against duress; in several cases brought to the attention of the Special Committee, detainees who alleged that they were subjected to torture had been detained long enough—without charge or trial—to permit all signs of ill-treatment being erased. In some instances, marks of torture have been noticed by outsiders and eyewitnesses have described such cases to the Special Committee. Mrs. Felicia Langer, who deals daily with cases of civilians accused of security offences, has described several instances where marks of violence were visible on her clients, even when they appeared before the court. The lack of protection of victims of duress is further accentuated by the difficulties faced by alleged victims who seek medical examination and certification of their physical state while their bodies still bear the marks of ill-treatment. Doctors appearing before the Special Committee have admitted frankly their reluctance to “get involved” by issuing medical certificates to such patients for fear of reprisals by the occupation authorities. In a few instances, medical certificates are issued, but even then, these are usually couched in evasive or vague terms. An example is provided in the case of one Mohammed Suleiman Atwan, that occurred in 1974, when he was 65 years of age, who alleged that he had been severely beaten during interrogation between 29 April and 4 June 1974. His poor physical state was noted by Mrs. Langer and her clerk who saw him twice during this period. A medical certificate<sup>62</sup> dated 12 June 1974 states:

Mr. Mohammed Suleiman Atwan, 65 years old, admitted to this hospital on 4 June complaining from:

- (1) epigastric pain and vomiting
- (2) headache and visual heaviness
- (3) pain in the scrotum.

These symptoms started since one week after beating. On examination:

- the patient was completely normal, except signs of depression, epigastric tenderness, oozing of blood from the scrotum.

We kept him for about 10 days under observation but we did not find any abnormal clinical signs. But the

<sup>62</sup> Document No. 76/32 presented by Mrs. Langer on 29 July 1976 [original note].



patient was continuously complaining from visual heaviness, headache and depression; for this we advise the patient to go to a psychiatric physician and ophthalmic hospital to continue his treatment.

350. The few instances where a victim alleged of ill-treatment succeeds in obtaining certification of his physical state, his plea is regularly rejected by the military court or, in those instances where he is not brought to trial, no practical remedy exists. On the contrary, as has been stated before the Special Committee, the potential complainant is deterred from taking action for fear of reprisal by those very same authorities to whom he makes such complaints. This leaves the complainant with no recourse whatsoever. Mrs. Langer told the Special Committee that the military courts have never, to her knowledge, upheld a plea of ill-treatment; she added that this was inconsistent with the practice in Israel where the courts do uphold such pleas where they feel that a case has been made. The grounds stated by the military courts—whenever they are given—for rejecting strong *prima facie* cases of torture indicate the bias in the court. Mrs. Langer cited, for example, cases where the military court attributed the physical state of the accused to “self-inflicted” wounds. The nature of the wounds in some of these cases was such that it was inconceivable that any man could have inflicted them upon himself merely to discredit the Israeli occupying regime.

351. The conclusion that the Special Committee draws from this evidence is that the entire question of treatment of detainees should be examined thoroughly and effectively. The indications that cases of torture have occurred and continue to occur are very strong and the international community cannot afford to connive at a continuation of such an abhorrent practice. The sporadic efforts undertaken by the Israeli authorities—far outnumbered by the serious allegations—have been shown to be insufficient; the same may be said of the ICRC’s efforts which, the record shows, have not arrested the increase in the frequency of allegations of torture over the nine years since the occupation.

352. This conclusion is further strengthened by the examination of the other aspects of the treatment of detainees. Apart from the question of validity of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, and the most serious question of torture, commented upon above, the Special Committee

put a number of cases to Mrs. Langer, taken from the Special Committee’s records and covering the period since the beginning of the occupation. These cases were handled by Mrs. Langer personally and were within her personal knowledge and experience. Mrs. Langer was asked to address herself to the procedures and practices followed during all stages of a civilian’s detention, from the moment of his arrest until his release. From Mrs. Langer’s testimony, and on the basis of the information received by the Special Committee over the years, the Special Committee is able to conclude that certain detainees are deprived of proper protection in that:

(a) They are liable to be detained on any pretext, given the vast and vague definition of offences in the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945;

(b) Suspects, who may never be charged or convicted, have their houses demolished without any remedy available against such measures or indemnity even in cases where they are subsequently acquitted, as in the case of one Ahmed Ali El-Afghani from Gaza in 1975 (A/AC.145/RT.79, p. 13 *et seq.*) whose house was occupied by a family of 11 or in cases where the persons are innocent, as in the case of one Abou Rabaya whose house was demolished because it was adjacent to a detainee’s house that was the subject of a demolition order (*ibid.*). Similarly, they may be expelled by the mere issuance of a deportation order without any grounds being given for such an order;

(c) Ordinary civilians (not necessarily suspects) may be expelled by the military authorities who—as has been seen in Dr. Natsheh’s case on 26 March 1976—can defy with impunity such rudimentary judicial remedies that may be available, as, e.g., a request for a “show cause” order from the higher courts;

(d) Ordinary civilians may be picked up in a public place, detained for several months, tortured and expelled without ever having any charges brought against them, as, e.g., the case of Suleiman El-Najjab in 1974–1975. Mr. El-Najjab appeared before the Special Committee in March 1975, shortly after his expulsion (A/AC.145/RT.69). In its last report, the Special Committee limited itself to stating that the case “deserved examination to establish the facts” (A/10272, paras. 163 and 185). After hearing Mrs. Langer on Mr.

El-Najjab, the Special Committee is in position to state that more facts have been established to show a strong *prima facie* case of torture. Mrs. Langer's statement on Mr. El-Najjab (A/AC.145/RT.78, p. 7 *et seq.*) provides strong corroborative evidence of the allegations of torture brought by Mr. El-Najjab when he appeared before the Special Committee. The Special Committee has no doubt that Mr. El-Najjab's case is one that should be investigated thoroughly;

(e) No safeguards or effective remedies exist or are available to protect detainees during interrogations immediately following their being taken into custody;

(f) Pre-trial detention may be extended without any effective remedies available to the detainee to plead successfully for non-renewal of orders of custody; no lawyer is assigned or made available at this stage;

(g) During trials in military courts, the accused persons' pleas are never upheld, however strong his case, when alleging duress; in the recent phenomenon of "instant trials", most safeguards are laid aside and the accused have virtually no opportunity of pleading their case; acquittals are virtually unknown;

(h) No appeals are possible from judgements of the military courts in the occupied territories, except for civilians from occupied East Jerusalem or for acts taking place there;

(i) Prison conditions are poor, particularly because of over-crowding. This complaint has been made repeatedly by the Special Committee in its reports and the annual report of the ICRC for 1975 states during 1975 "various approaches were made to the detaining Power on the subject of the conditions of the prisons, especially over-crowding". According to ICRC figures "just over 3,000" Palestinians from the occupied territories and from the Arab countries parties to the Middle East conflict, are still being held in 14 prisons, seven of which are located in Israel and seven in the occupied territories (ICRC Annual Report 1975, p. 21). The Special Committee noted reports in the Israeli press of riots occurring on 6 January 1976 at Kfar Yona prison reportedly against prison conditions and again on 2 March 1976 at the same prison, this time against solitary confinement. On 1 April 1976, prisoners at Ramle were reported on strike against prison conditions. No distinction is made between com-

mon criminals and civilians detained for security offences and those detained for political offences. Mrs. Langer informed the Special Committee that this led to serious situations as, for example, the case of one Hadda Nimr who was murdered by a prison inmate, an acknowledged murderer who had already been convicted of murdering six persons;

(j) Conditions of detention of women imprisoned for security offences are the same as those for ordinary criminals. The Special Committee received information on several cases where female Palestinian detainees were beaten by Israeli women prisoners as, for example, Abla Tahha and Lutfiya El-Hawari, mentioned in earlier reports of the Special Committee and more recently the cases of Rasmiya Odeh, Aisha Odeh and Mariam Shahshir, who are still in prison and reportedly very ill. The Special Committee has received several complaints of medical conditions in the prisons to the effect that such assistance as is given is usually too little and too late. The health situation is reported to have deteriorated seriously because of the lack of prompt and adequate medical attention and this has been confirmed directly to the Special Committee by former detainees who appeared before it;

(k) Ordinary civilians may be put under administrative detention without any reason being given other than that they constitute a threat to security, and such detention, during which no charges are brought or trial takes place, may be renewed indefinitely. Persons held under administrative detention are kept in the same prisons and the same conditions as other detainees, that is as common criminals;

(l) Such procedures that may exist purporting to afford review or redress are not invoked and not effective—for example, the existence of an "indemnity committee" which is established to examine claims for compensation from the Israeli Army for damage caused by the military authorities which is not known to have ever functioned. Similarly, the "advisory committee" to review administrative detentions is known to operate against the detainee rather than in his favour so that requests to it for release from administrative detention are met with an unsubstantiated rejection or an order prolonging detention.

## C. EFFECTS OF THE PROLONGED OCCUPATION

353. The policy of annexation and settlement and the practice followed in the treatment of civilian detainees outlined in the preceding paragraphs and the continued application of measures to implement this policy has, over the years since 1967 resulted in a hardening of the resistance of the local civilian population. In its second report, adopted on 17 September 1971, the Special Committee pointed out the existence of a policy designed "to effect radical changes in the physical character and demographic composition of several areas... by the progressive and systematic elimination of every vestige of Palestinian presence in these areas... Such a policy will render more difficult any eventual restoration of the Palestinian people's property and other rights" (A/8389, para. 72). In subsequent reports, the Special Committee continued to stress this aspect of Israeli policy and the negative effect it was having on the civilian population and on the political situation as a whole. In its fifth report, the Special Committee pointed out that "the measures taken by Israel so far are not only a grave infringement of the rights of the civilian population of the occupied territories, but present the most formidable obstacle to peaceful negotiation and to a just settlement of the Middle East problem" (A/9148, para. 150). This was stated on 10 October 1973. The Special Committee continued to illustrate the deterioration of the situation in the occupied territories by giving instances of the continued occurrence of acts of sabotage resulting in the arrest of groups of persons and the adoption of measures of retaliation. In its last report, adopted on 13 October 1975, the Special Committee, in dealing with the analysis of evidence before it, commented on "the abnormal situation of the civilian population living under military occupation". It pointed out the characteristics of life in the occupied territories and referred to the description given before it by persons recently expelled, who had had "several years" experience in responsible positions in the occupied territories. The Special Committee cited reports of incidents that occurred throughout the period covered by that report which, in its view, illustrated the serious state of deterioration reached in these territories. It expressed the opinion that, by October 1975, "the predicament of the civilian

population had become worse, even after due allowance is made for the abnormal conditions inseparable from a state of military occupation" (A/10272, paras. 103-136 and 178).

354. As may be ascertained from the reports referred to, the recurrence of acts of sabotage continued into 1976 and, as in the past, gave rise to numerous arrests of groups of civilians from the occupied territories. The information received by the Special Committee reflects a serious turn for the worse when in November 1975 a demonstration was reported to have been held at Bir-Zeit by students who protested against a proposal to introduce a form of self-government in the occupied territories. This was followed by demonstrations in Ramallah a few days later and, by 13 November 1975, several of the principal towns in the West Bank were the scene of demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins. This includes Nablus, Jenin, Kalkilya, Jericho and Bethlehem. Demonstrations and other disturbances were consequently reported on 1 December 1975. After a short lull, disturbances broke out again in February after the judgement acquitting eight Jewish youths who had been charged with illegally praying on Temple Mount. These demonstrations then spread to the rest of the West Bank and lasted well into May 1976 with reports of violent riots and demonstrations. The intervention of the Israeli Army provoked the death of 12 persons, some of whom were reported to have been killed after being ill-treated by Israeli troops (for example, Ahmed Halhul reported killed after ill-treatment, in *Ha'aretz* on 30 March 1976, and Hamdan Rumeile Tamimi reported on 26 March 1976 in *The Jerusalem Post*).

355. Curfews were imposed in Nablus, Jenin, Ramallah, El-Bireh, Hebron, Halhul and Tulkarm. In Ramallah and El-Bireh the curfew lasted for 10 days and in the other towns its duration varied on an average of one to two days. The Arab Jerusalem newspaper *Al-Shaab* was closed for 14 days and the centre of Nablus was isolated by the construction of a metal fence. During these periods, according to the information received by the Special Committee, reports appeared of "instant trials" where several persons, running into dozens, were apprehended and charged with demonstrating and subjected to heavy fines ranging from £1,000 to 6,000. Persons appearing before the Special Committee who were

present in certain areas during this demonstration testified to the brutality used by Israeli forces in suppressing demonstrations. According to reports received by the Special Committee, Israeli authorities conducted investigation of some army personnel who were alleged to have resorted to excessive force. As may be ascertained from the reports, there was hardly a single day in the occupied territories since October 1975 when there was not a disturbance in the form of a single act of sabotage or a mass demonstration. During periods when the press was not taken up with these disturbances, the pattern of periodic mass arrests, outlined already in the previous reports, continued even this year: for example, *Ha'aretz* reported the arrest of 35 persons on 4 February 1976, 40 from Mitlun village, reported on 23 April 1976 in *Ha'aretz*, 30 from East Jerusalem, reported on 29 April 1976 in *Ma'arin*, and 20, reported in *The Jerusalem Post* of 30 May 1976.

356. In his appearance on 8 June 1976 before the Special Committee, Dr. Ahmed Aziz Natsheh, expelled on 26 March 1976, described to the Special Committee his personal experience of these events which took place prior to his expulsion. He referred in particular to an incident where three Israeli civilians, members of the Israeli settlement in Hebron, Kiryat-Arba, abducted three local young men and set dogs on them. In Hebron hospital, he cited 37 cases of dog bites that were recorded during this period. The Special Committee took note of press reports that confirmed these incidents to have taken place. Again during May, Israeli members of Kiryat-Arba were reported to have ill-treated some inhabitants of Hebron. Parallel to this state of affairs, and consistent with the pattern reflected in the preceding years, the tempo of trials and convictions continued. Apart from those persons convicted for rioting, the information received by the Special Committee reflects the continued handing down of harsh prison sentences. The Special Committee noted that regardless of the legitimacy or otherwise of these sentences, their frequency has continued unabated.

357. It is evident from the above that the situation in the occupied territories is far from that envisaged in the Fourth Geneva Convention. In several specific cases the Convention is violated, as, for example, articles 33, 47, 49 and 53. In general, the state of occupation which has endured for so long

goes counter to the concept of a "temporary *de facto* situation" at the roots of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

358. The Special Committee has, since its first report, urged the General Assembly to assume its responsibilities and to bring the state of occupation to an end. The Special Committee has maintained that this would be the only way in which the human rights of the civilian population of the occupied territories could best be ensured. The proposal<sup>63</sup> made by the Special Committee since its first report was intended to provide a form of protection similar to that of the Protecting Power formula contained in the Fourth Geneva Convention which would better safeguard the rights of the civilian population.

359. The Special Committee's investigations have already covered a period of seven years. This report is the eighth report submitted to the General Assembly. The Special Committee has from its very inception been balked in the discharge of its mandate by the Government of Israel whose obstructionist attitude has regrettably received a surprising degree of support and encouragement from Member States of the United Nations which profess to be interested in human rights. This professed interest, however, appears to be limited to the question of alleged violation of human rights falling within the domestic jurisdiction of

<sup>63</sup> The Special Committee, in each of its reports, has recommended:

"(a) That the States whose territory is occupied by Israel appoint immediately either a neutral State or States, or an international organization which offers all guarantees of impartiality and effectiveness, to safeguard the human rights of the population of the occupied territories;

"(b) That suitable arrangements be made for the proper representation of the interests of the large population in the occupied territories which has not yet been given the opportunity of exercising the right of self-determination; and

"(c) That a neutral State or international organization, as described in (a) above, be nominated by Israel and be associated in this arrangement."

Under this arrangement, the State or States or international organization so nominated might be authorized to undertake the following activities:

"(a) To secure the scrupulous implementation of the provisions relating to human rights contained in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions and in particular to investigate and determine the facts in the case of allegations of the violation of the human rights provisions of these Conventions or of applicable international instruments;

"(b) To ensure that the population of the occupied territories is treated in accordance with the applicable law;

"(c) To report to the States concerned and to the General Assembly of the United Nations on its work" [original note].

States. That situation must be clearly identified from the far more serious situation of people under foreign military occupation whose rights are sought to be safeguarded by the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. It is in this category that the population of the territories occupied by Israel as a result of the June 1967 hostilities falls. The Special Committee therefore finds it most disturbing that a section of the United Nations support an attitude calculated to prevent the enforcement of the Fourth Geneva Convention by denying to a body established by the United Nations itself—the most representative organization in the world—the opportunity of investigating the condition of a people under foreign military occupation. Such an attitude and the support for it result in reducing the Fourth Geneva Convention to a dead letter. If the country whose conduct is in question is permitted to prevent an investigation of its conduct the Fourth Geneva Convention, which constitutes a vital part of international law, would be brought into contempt. It is for the Members of the United Nations to consider in a conscientious manner, what the future of the Fourth Geneva Convention is to be and in particular why any country should be granted special immunity from its provisions.

360. The Special Committee's investigations have in several quarters been criticized as an exercise in propaganda engineered by a faction hostile to Israel. If this criticism is to be accepted as valid there could be no possibility of any investigation being undertaken under the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. The Protecting Power formula has failed in its purpose and people under foreign military occupation have been left completely helpless and at the mercy of the occupying Power. The international community has a clear responsibility to act impartially and free from all political partisanship if it is to secure the scrupulous adherence to the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention and ensure its efficacy.

361. The Special Committee regrets that it has been compelled to make these observations but it has been left with no alternative, except to surrender to such criticism and to accept in silence the impeachment of its integrity which is the only answer brought by the Government of Israel to the serious allegations made against it. The Special Committee must also make it clear that its mandate has been strictly limited to the investigation of policies and practices affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied

territories and does not extend to the allegations of the violations of human rights elsewhere. It is for the United Nations to devise appropriate means of dealing with such other cases.

## VII. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT

362. The present report was approved and signed by the Special Committee on 17 September 1976 in accordance with rule 20 of its rules of procedure.

H.S. AMERASINGHE (Sri Lanka) Chairman

K. M'BAYE (Senegal)

B. BOHTE (Yugoslavia)

## 6

### **Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 3419 C (XXX) regarding the return of the Palestine refugees<sup>64</sup>**

**October 4, 1976**

1. The present report is submitted to the General Assembly in pursuance of its resolution 3419 C (XXX) of 8 December 1975 concerning population and refugees displaced since 1967, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General, after consulting with the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), to report to it at its thirty-first session on Israel's compliance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the resolution. In paragraph 3 of that resolution, the Assembly called upon Israel to take immediate steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants and to desist from all measures that obstructed the return of the displaced inhabitants, including measures affecting the physical and demographic structure of the occupied territories. In paragraph 4, the Assembly reiterated its call upon Israel to take effective steps immediately for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they had been removed in the Gaza Strip, to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation and to desist from further removal of refugees and destruction of their shelters. In paragraph 5, it condemned Israeli military attacks on refugee

<sup>64</sup> UN doc. A/31/240. The resolution is printed as doc. 17 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

camps and called upon Israel to desist from such attacks.

2. By a note verbale dated 20 January 1976, addressed to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations, the Secretary-General drew attention to his reporting responsibility under paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 3419 C (XXX) and requested the Government of Israel to forward to him, as soon as possible, any relevant information on the implementation of the respective provisions of the resolution.

3. By a note verbale dated 8 September 1976, the Permanent Representative of Israel, on instructions from his Government, conveyed to the Secretary-General the following comments:

The Government of Israel has been and is fully conscious of the humanitarian aspects of the problem of the displaced persons who, following the outbreak of the war instigated by the Arab Governments in 1967, fled from the area of hostilities. The Government of Israel has continued to seek to reconcile its desire to assist with the return of displaced persons with its responsibility for the safety, welfare and security of the population in the administered areas and in Israel, as well as the security of the State itself. It is common knowledge that certain Arab Governments continue to furnish aid and support to terrorist organizations grouped together in the PLO, which are established in and operate from their territory against Israel.

Thus the prevailing situation does not permit a large-scale return of these displaced persons. Nevertheless and despite all these difficulties, the Government of Israel has, during this year as in previous years, continued to facilitate the return of persons displaced in 1967. The special arrangements for family reunion and hardship cases have been maintained, and co-operation in this respect with local Arab authorities has continued. It should be pointed out, however, that the facilities established by Israel for the orderly movement of people across the cease-fire lines, are being exploited by certain Arab Governments for purposes of subversion in order to facilitate the entry of terrorists and the transport of explosives into Israel administered territory. Such actions undermine any efforts to improve the situation.

As the Gaza Strip is specifically mentioned in the resolution in question, the Government of Israel wishes to draw attention not only to the greatly improved security situation in the Gaza Strip and the public order and tranquility prevailing there in general, but also to the full employment and the vast amelioration in the economic condition of the refugees and the accelerated rate of development and building.

Of the Gaza Strip's labour force numbering approximately 70,000, about 30,000—refugees and non-refugees alike—travel every day to work in Israel. The wages

which they earn, equal to those of Israeli workers, enable them to achieve a standard of living never enjoyed by them before.

Housing projects have been initiated by Israeli authorities to enable refugees to move out of the camps into relatively spacious one-storey homes of their own (between 750 and 850 square feet of floor space), with electricity and indoor plumbing, at modest cost (about \$6,000 per apartment) and on favourable financial terms (one third down-payment and mortgage arrangements for the balance). So many refugees have shown interest in taking advantage of this opportunity to improve their living conditions that, due to the limited land available for building purposes outside the camps, the authorities are now examining the possibility of providing two- and three-storey houses to refugee families.

The now well-established public order and the economic prosperity are a direct result of the security measures which were taken by the authorities against Arab terror, which was rife in the Gaza Strip until 1971 and which for the most part struck at and grievously harmed the local population.

By contrast, it is impossible to turn a blind eye to the situation in the refugee camps in Lebanon today. The civil war in that country has exposed the complete falsity of the Arab charges against Israel, which have been incorporated into countless General Assembly resolutions condemning Israel without reason or justice.

Recent events in Lebanon have proved what the Government of Israel had been saying for a number of years, namely, that the Arab terror organizations have taken over the refugee camps and have set up in them their operational bases, ammunition dumps, arms stores and training facilities. Arab Member States of the United Nations have made much of Israel's alleged attacks on refugee camps. But Israel has never attacked the refugee camps as such. It has, however, been constrained on occasion to act against the terror installations located in or near the camps. This was because the terror organizations have deliberately and callously turned the civilian population of the camps into hostages, using them as cover for their murderous activities and tools of their propaganda.

The tragic fate of the inhabitants of Tel el-Zaatar is very much a case in point. In the words of André Fontaine, writing on 28 July 1976 in *Le Monde*:

"Their fighters, driven out of Jordan, tightly controlled in Syria, had been confined in camps in Lebanon. Taking advantage of the weakness of the State, they had gradually transformed the camps into bases for launching the raids and attacks which, at the risk of scandalizing world public opinion, maintained an atmosphere of tension in the region and prevented the Arab States which might have been tempted to do so from making peace with Israel."<sup>65</sup>

<sup>65</sup> Quoted in French in the original text [original note].

As a result, UNRWA's activities in Lebanon have been completely paralysed, and the Agency has been forced to move its headquarters to Vienna and Amman. According to a recent article in the Beirut daily newspaper, *Al-Nahar*, the terrorist organizations have even commandeered UNRWA offices in the camps, and confiscated food supplies from the Agency's stores in order to feed their men.

The reports emanating from Lebanon in recent months have made it unnecessary to labour these points. It will suffice therefore to cite the letter dated 17 August 1976 from the Deputy Prime Minister of Lebanon to the President of the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at Colombo, Sri Lanka, which was circulated, together with a letter from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon, as document A/31/179.<sup>66</sup> Mr. Chamoun's letter constitutes a comprehensive indictment of the destructive activities of the Palestinian terrorists in Lebanon and the way in which they have exploited the camps there. To quote Mr. Chamoun:

"The Palestinian revolution is the prime executor of the conspiracy against Lebanon. The Palestinians came to Lebanon 28 years ago as refugees. They were established in camps which they have transformed gradually into military fortifications and in which they set up bases for training terrorists from various nationalities. They have breached the accord concluded with the Lebanese authorities in 1969 by installing heavy weapons in the camps and by preventing the Lebanese security forces from performing their duties therein. They have even occupied the UNRWA offices in the camps. Palestinian elements conspicuously circulated in the cities, streets and public squares with their arms. They set up barriers to check the identity of the peaceful passers-by. Many were kidnapped, tortured and killed. Others were imprisoned for years without any knowledge about their fate. It was only natural that these excesses were bound to lead to an explosion between the Palestinian outlaws and aggressors and the aggrieved Lebanese population. The continuing war since 13 April 1975 has daily revealed new evidence of the Palestinian determination to dominate the country. In their efforts to dominate Lebanon, the Palestinians often hid behind self-styled patriotic parties in Lebanon. And by pretending to support the demands of one group, they have succeeded in causing a division among the Lebanese. The Palestinians besieged cities and villages in the heartland of the Lebanese mountains and their remote summits, far away from the Palestinian camps, and have nothing to do with Palestine. They have also caused the dispersal of the Lebanese Army and security forces. They have continuously rejected the establishment of any regular force in Lebanon to restore and maintain law and order, be it Lebanese, Syrian or foreign. Thus, they were able to effect an un-

veiled occupation of a part of the city of Beirut and of south Lebanon, whereby nothing could be undertaken without their permission. They have taken over the centres of communication such as the Department of Post, Telegraph and Telephone, the Beirut International Airport, and the two harbours of Saida and Tyre. This is outright occupation of Lebanese territory, and a stop must be put to it, if there is a real will to end the present war.

"The reported statement by the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Colombo demanding the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon is nothing but a new and blatant breach of Lebanon's sovereignty and an infringement upon the responsibilities and jurisdiction of its constitutional authorities. Irrespective of the legal basis for the entry of the Syrian forces into Lebanon on 1 June 1976, it remains the absolute right of the legal Lebanese authorities alone to determine the permissibility or otherwise of the Syrian presence in the country. These authorities have the sole right to request the Syrian forces to withdraw from Lebanon. The bitter and dubious fact is that the Palestinians are deliberately disregarding the truth and international law, because their main concern is first and last to prevent the presence in Lebanon of any armed force other than theirs in order to complete their conspiracy against Lebanon's integrity, unity and independence, and to make out of it an alternative national home to their Palestinian homeland which they have abandoned for what they consider to be an easier objective to attain. It is our hope that your Conference will take a clear and courageous step by communicating to the Palestine Liberation Organization, while it is talking about the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon, that it has a duty to begin itself by withdrawing, for Lebanon's land is not its own, but a free and sovereign State whose destiny cannot be determined except by its people alone."

Hence General Assembly resolution 3419 C (XXX), like so many other anti-Israel resolutions, is based on a tissue of false allegations, being part of the Arab propaganda campaign against Israel. On the other hand, events in Lebanon in all their aspects have shown incontrovertibly that the statements made by and on behalf of the Government of Israel on these matters were reliable on every score.

It is enough to compare the tragic fate suffered by Palestinian civilians in Lebanon and indeed by the population of Lebanon as a whole, with the peace, tranquility, prosperity and progress enjoyed in all fields of life by the Arab population, including former refugees, in the areas administered by Israel, in order to recognize resolution 3419 C (XXX) for what it is, a worthless piece of Arab political warfare.

4. With regard to paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 3419 C (XXX), the Secretary-General has obtained from the Commissioner-

<sup>66</sup> Doc. 286 below.

General of UNRWA such information as is available to him on the return of refugees registered with the Agency. As indicated in earlier reports,<sup>67</sup> the Agency is not involved in any arrangements for the return of refugees (nor is the Agency involved in any arrangements for the return of displaced persons who are not registered refugees). Its information is therefore mainly based on requests by returning refugees for transfer of rations to the areas to which they have returned. The Agency would not necessarily be aware of the return of any refugees who did not ask for the provision of rations or services but believes they would be very few in number. So far as is known to the Agency, between 1 July 1975 and 30 June 1976, 250 displaced refugees returned from east Jordan to the West Bank<sup>68</sup> and 44 from east Jordan to the Gaza Strip. In the same period, seven displaced refugees returned to the Gaza Strip from Egypt. Thus, taking into account the estimate given in paragraph 4 of last year's report, the number of displaced refugees who, to the Agency's knowledge, have returned to the occupied territories since June 1967 is slightly less than 8,800.

5. The following report on developments relating to paragraph 4 of the resolution is based on information received from the Commissioner-General.

6. Since the Secretary-General's report (A/10253) was made last year, there have been three cases<sup>69</sup> of the punitive demolition of refugee shelters in the Gaza Strip. The Agency's position, which has been reiterated to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs on several occasions, is that the practice of punitive demolition of shelters is contrary to Israel's obligations under international law. The Agency's claims for compensation still remain unpaid.

7. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of last year's report referred to the situation of refugees whose shelters

were demolished by the Israeli authorities in July-August 1971.<sup>70</sup> So far, only 67 of these families have received free alternative accommodation from the Israeli authorities (i.e. in addition to the 53 hardship cases from the Rafah Camp referred to in para. 7 of last year's report, 14 other families have been accommodated in vacated shelters in the camps). Forty-two of the refugee families who were affected by the 1971 demolitions and who, with others, had constructed makeshift shelters on land near Jabalia Camp, were given eviction notices by the Israeli authorities and eventually had their shelters demolished. These families have now been given permission by the Israeli authorities to reconstruct their shelters on other nearby land as a temporary measure.

8. There have been no further developments in regard to the plans of the Israeli authorities (see para. 8 of last year's report) to provide land and a cash grant of £I 20,000 per family to those still in hardship.

9. The present position is that of a total of 2,554 families affected by demolitions in July-August 1971, only 67 have been provided with free alternative accommodation by the Israeli authorities; that of the 266 families who were found by the Joint Survey of March-July 1973<sup>71</sup> to be in hardship, 208 families still remain in the same state; and that several families who were either reported in the Joint Survey of 1973 as having found adequate temporary accommodation

<sup>67</sup> Doc. 5 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*, doc. 4 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*, and doc. 5 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>68</sup> Some of these may not be displaced refugees but members of the family of a displaced refugee who have now accompanied him on his return or joined him there but who were not themselves displaced in 1967 [original note].

<sup>69</sup> In addition, a refugee family which had purchased housing in one of the housing projects constructed near Rafah by the Israeli military authorities also suffered the demolition of their house as a punitive measure [original note].

<sup>70</sup> In July-August 1971, the Israeli authorities demolished a number of shelters in the Jabalia, Beach and Rafah camps, the stated purpose being to construct access roads within the camps. These demolitions affected 2,554 refugee families comprising 15,855 persons; a total of 7,729 shelter rooms were demolished. The developments in regard to the rehousing of these families are referred to in the Commissioner-General's report to the Secretary-General circulated at the Assembly's twenty-sixth session (A/8383 and Add.1); the Secretary-General's report to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session (A/8814); the Secretary-General's report to the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session (A/9155) and in the reports referred to in foot-note 2 above [original note].

<sup>71</sup> This survey was conducted jointly by the Agency and the Israeli authorities in order to establish the facts regarding the condition of those families affected by the July-August 1971 demolitions who, in the Agency's opinion, were still in need. The survey covered 942 families selected by the Agency on the basis of preliminary surveys made by the Agency of the conditions at that time of the 2,554 families affected by the 1971 demolitions. The Joint Survey established that 706 of the 942 families surveyed were inadequately housed, of whom 266 were considered to be in serious cases of hardship; see A/9155, paras. 6, 7 and 8 [original note].



or who were excluded from the survey on those grounds have since had to move for various reasons, but in most cases because their landlords requested them to leave the overcrowded accommodation either let or lent to them.<sup>72</sup>

10. The Agency is concerned at the lack of progress in the rehousing of the refugee families still in need as a result of the 1971 demolitions. It has continued to press the Israeli authorities both in the Gaza Strip and at the level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for urgent action on this matter and has suggested that an immediate practical step would be to make available free of charge to those refugees who are still in need as a result of the 1971 demolitions, existing vacant accommodation in the housing projects established by the Israeli authorities.

11. In the meantime, demolitions have continued to take place at the instance of the Israeli authorities in the Gaza Strip which have had the effect of reducing the stock of available housing. Apart from the punitive demolitions mentioned in paragraph 6 above, the demolitions have taken place in the following contexts.

12. As indicated in paragraph 7 of last year's report, shelters are demolished, in some cases, to make way for the construction or widening of roads, construction of facilities such as water reservoirs, bus stations, etc. Refugee families whose shelters are required to be demolished in these circumstances are given the option by the Israeli authorities of purchasing accommodation in a Government housing project (or purchasing land for the construction of housing); in the alternative they are allocated shelters vacated in another section of the camp by families who have voluntarily opted for the purchase of new housing. While the Israeli authorities provide loans to refugees who so purchase new accommodation in one or the other of the housing projects, the move of these refugees from their existing shelters is obligatory and they are required eventually to pay for the new housing.

13. Another practice which continues is that refugees whose shelters are not scheduled for demolition but who wish to purchase new accommodation in one or the other of the housing projects established by the Israeli authorities are

required, by the Israeli authorities, to demolish their shelters (unless the authorities indicate that certain shelters are required for reallocation). This practice (as well as that mentioned in paragraph 12 above) has the effect of reducing the available stock of shelter accommodation in the Gaza Strip at a time when there is a pressing need for housing for refugees.

14. In regard to both these practices, the refugees concerned are allowed by the Israeli authorities to salvage materials from their demolished shelter. They are also compensated for private additions or improvements to Agency shelters, but no compensation has been paid for Agency shelters so demolished.

15. In connexion with the above-mentioned practices, in the period from 1 July 1975 to 30 June 1976, a total of 370 families comprising 2,222 persons moved from their shelters in the camps—Rafah and Beach Camps—to new housing (against payment) in one or the other housing project established by the Israeli authorities; 16 other refugee families comprising 114 persons (out of 108 refugee families who purchased plots of land in one of the projects on the basis that they would construct houses to a standard design) have constructed and moved into new housing. A total of 688 shelter rooms were demolished in the camps in this connexion and 28 shelter rooms spared for allocation to 16 other families (comprising 48 persons) who lost their shelters.

16. A further development is that the Israeli authorities have informed a number of refugee families in the Beach Camp (487 families so far) that their shelters are to be demolished. These families were offered the options referred to in paragraph 12 above. The Agency has expressed its concern at this development at a time when a pressing need exists for accommodation to rehouse those who are in need, and has asked for clarification of the intentions of the Israeli authorities in regard to these projected demolitions. Most recently refugees inhabiting 36 shelters in Khan Yunis Camp along a road leading to a new housing project were informed by the Israeli authorities that their shelters were also scheduled for demolition and that they were to discuss their housing plans with the Governor of Khan Yunis. This matter also is being followed up by the Agency.

<sup>72</sup> This development was foreshadowed to some extent in para. 8 of the report for 1974 (A/9155) [original note].

17. The report for 1974<sup>73</sup> referred, in paragraphs 12 to 15, to various contexts in which demolitions had taken place in the Gaza Strip in the period from July 1967 to 30 June 1974 and went on to provide statistics regarding such demolitions and the provision of new housing. It may be useful to summarize the latest position. Between July 1967 and 30 June 1976, 12,544 shelter rooms were demolished in the refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, by or at the instance of the Israeli military authorities (this figure also takes into account cases in which refugee families who wished to purchase housing in one or the other of the housing projects were required by the Israeli military authorities to demolish their shelter accommodation). A total of 4,736 refugee families were affected. According to the Agency's information, in the same period the Israeli military authorities constructed a total of 2,654 housing units comprising 5,821 rooms in one or the other of the housing projects established by them in the Gaza Strip; in addition the Agency, in the same period, constructed, at the expense of the Israeli authorities, 416 units comprising 1,834 rooms for 914 families. On these figures, therefore, the construction of new accommodation has fallen far short of what has been compulsorily demolished. Moreover, the great majority of the units in the housing projects established by the Israeli military authorities have only been offered for sale and not as free replacement housing. According to the Agency's information, of the 4,736 refugee families mentioned above, only 1,074 families have received free alternative accommodation and these include 108 families who were accommodated in vacated shelters. These statistics have been brought to the attention of the Israeli authorities.

18. With regard to paragraph 5 of resolution 3419 C (XXX), the information available to the Commissioner-General of UNRWA indicates that, since 2 December 1975, there have been no Israeli air attacks on refugee camps.<sup>74</sup>

19. With regard to the comments of the Government of Israel relating to UNRWA and its operations, the Commissioner-General of the Agency has made the following observations for the purpose of clarification:

(a) Although the Agency moved its headquarters temporarily to Vienna and Amman at the beginning of 1976 because of the situation in Beirut described in the Commissioner-General's report for the period 1 July 1975 to 30 June 1976,<sup>74a</sup> the Agency's operations in Lebanon, while seriously affected, have not been completely paralysed. Despite difficult conditions, all the Agency's normal services have continued to operate in varying degrees, though with interruptions, throughout 1975 and 1976, except in the worst affected area, Beirut. Recently, emergency relief and medical care have been extended to refugees displaced from camps in eastern Beirut and with the arrival of supplies of commodities through the Syrian Arab Republic, ration distribution has been carried out by local staff under headquarters guidance in all areas.

(b) In the course of the fighting, there has been occupation of Agency buildings and destruction of Agency property by armed men belonging to various factions. In regard specifically to the confiscation of food-stuffs by Palestinian organizations, in the one case, in 1975 (before the headquarters was moved), in which Palestinian organizations were involved a protest made to the Palestine Liberation Organization was followed by restitution. It is relevant to note in this connexion that the valuable food-stuffs, medical supplies and other stores in the Agency's central warehouse in Beirut have escaped looting, owing to the protection provided in the absence of normal government security by an armed unit of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

(c) As the reference to the "Cairo Agreement" in the quotation included in the note of the Government of Israel makes clear, security in camps in Lebanon was not the responsibility of the Agency. The position in regard to the occupation of some Agency buildings in camps in Lebanon referred to in the quotation is described in the Commissioner-General's report to the General Assembly for the period 1 July 1969 to 30 June 1970 and in subsequent reports.

<sup>73</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 38, document A/9740 [original note].

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, *Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/31/13), para. 67.

<sup>74a</sup> Doc. 3 above.

## Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine<sup>75</sup>

October 4, 1976

1. In paragraph 3 of resolution 3419 B (XXX) of 8 December 1975, the General Assembly noted with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine had been unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of Assembly resolution 194 (III) and requested the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation thereof and to report thereon as appropriate, but no later than 1 October 1976. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request.

2. In its twenty-fourth<sup>76</sup> and twenty-fifth<sup>77</sup> reports, covering the periods from 24 December 1965 to 30 September 1966 and from 1 October 1966 to 30 September 1967, the Commission responded to earlier requests by the General Assembly in its resolutions 2052 (XX) of 15 December 1965 and 2154 (XXI) of 17 November 1966, in connexion with the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III). In those reports the Commission noted that examination of various ways in which it might be possible to intensify its efforts with any prospect of advancing matters towards the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) had compelled the conclusion that all the ways envisaged presupposed substantial changes in the situation. The events which had occurred in 1967 and thereafter complicated an already very complex problem. Although the Commission had noted a certain improvement in the situation during the year 1974–1975, the past year has not produced similar progress toward a final settlement.

3. In the course of 1972, in response to formal requests from interested parties, and after consultation with the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, the Commission decided that these interested parties could have access to certain documents<sup>78</sup> of the Commission with the understanding

that the recipient Governments will continue to treat valuation figures contained therein on a confidential basis. Copies of such documents would be furnished on the understanding that any expenses shall be borne by the delegation concerned.

4. In accordance with the Commission's decision to make available to the interested parties upon request copies of certain documents and materials in its possession, and in pursuance of such a request by Egypt, the duplication work was undertaken and completed in June 1974, at which time copies of the relevant set of documents were transmitted to the Permanent Mission of Egypt. On 31 May 1974, the Commission received a request from Jordan for copies of the same set of documents and the Commission agreed that the Permanent Mission of Jordan be supplied also with the same set of documents as Egypt. These were subsequently supplied to Jordan. The Commission also agreed to supply the Permanent Mission of Egypt a second set of microfilm copies of these documents at the Mission's expense. Egypt received this second set of copies in March and May 1975.

5. In accordance with a decision taken by the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People at its ninth meeting on 30 March 1976, the Chairman of that Committee, by a letter dated 31 March 1976, requested the Secretary-General to invite members of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to communicate to it their views and observations on those aspects of the Commission's work which they considered useful for the work of the Committee.

6. In reply to the Chairman's letter, the Secretary-General, by a letter dated 30 April 1976, transmitted to the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People a statement summarizing the work of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine from its inception to date. In his letter, the Secretary-General stated that the summary had been checked for accuracy by members of the Commission. Subsequently, this

<sup>75</sup> UN doc. A/31/254, Annex.

<sup>76</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes*, agenda item 32, document A/6451 [This and following notes are part of the original text].

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, *Twenty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda item 34, document A/6846.

<sup>78</sup> (i) Microfilms of land registers received from the Mandatory

Government;

(ii) RP-1 forms (identification of property parcels including individual valuation figures);

(iii) Index of owners' names (which provides means of direct reference to the holdings recorded in the name of each owner).

summary was issued as a document of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (A/AC.183/4).

7. In response to a further request from the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People "to obtain from the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, an inventory of Arab property in Israel and the territories occupied by Israel", the Commission decided that it had no objection to that Committee, being an organ of the United Nations, having access to the following documents in its possession:

(a) Microfilms of land registers received from the Mandatory Government;

(b) RP-1 forms (indentification of property parcels including individual valuation figures);

(c) Index of owners' names (which provides means of direct reference to the holdings recorded in the name of each owner).

8. The Commission notes that the periods covered by its two previous reports (1974 and 1975)<sup>79</sup> were marked by intensive diplomatic activity directed towards a Middle East settlement which could lead to a just and lasting peace in the area. This momentum was not maintained during the past year, owing in part to the recent developments in the area. Accordingly, the circumstances governing the possibilities open to the Commission have remained up to now essentially unchanged. The Commission, however, hopes that the situation in the region will improve considerably in the near future, enabling it to carry forward its work more vigorously.

## 8

### **Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of General Assembly Resolution 3414 (XXX) on the situation in the Middle East<sup>80</sup>**

October 18, 1976

1. The General Assembly, at its 2429th plenary meeting held on 5 December 1975, adopted resolution 3414 (XXX) on the situation in the Middle East. In paragraph 5 of that resolution, the As-

sembly requested the Secretary-General to inform all concerned, including the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, about the resolution, to follow up its implementation and to report thereon to the Security Council and to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session.

2. By identical letters dated 18 December 1975, addressed respectively to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Secretary of State of the United States of America in their capacity as Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, the Secretary-General brought resolution 3414 (XXX) to their attention. On the same day the Secretary-General transmitted the text of the resolution to the Security Council. In so doing, he drew particular attention to paragraph 4, in which the General Assembly requested the Council to take all necessary measures for the speedy implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Assembly and the Security Council aiming at the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East through a comprehensive settlement, worked out with the participation of all the parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and within the framework of the United Nations.

3. In accordance with a decision taken in its resolution 381 (1975) of 30 November 1975, the Security Council reconvened on 12 January 1976 to continue the debate on the Middle East problem, including the Palestinian question, taking into account all relevant United Nations resolutions. The Council devoted 10 meetings to this debate held from 12 to 26 January,<sup>81</sup> but no resolution was adopted. It is relevant to mention also that subsequently the Security Council held three series of meetings, one on the "request by the Libyan Arab Republic and Pakistan for consideration of the serious situation arising from recent developments in the occupied Arab territories" from 22 to 25 March 1976,<sup>82</sup> another on "the situation in the occupied Arab territories" from 4 to 26 May 1976<sup>83</sup> and the third series on "the question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights" from 9 to 29 June 1976.<sup>84</sup>

<sup>81</sup> The verbatim record of the last of these ten meetings is printed as doc. 10 below. See also doc. 188 below.

<sup>82</sup> See S/PV.1893-1899 [original note; see also doc. 16 below].

<sup>83</sup> See S/PV.1916-1922 [original note; see also doc. 13 below].

<sup>84</sup> See S/PV.1924, 1928 and 1933-1938 [original note; see also doc. 17 below].

<sup>79</sup> Doc. 5 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*, and doc. 7 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>80</sup> UN doc. A/31/270. The resolution is published as doc. 16 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

Likewise, no resolutions were adopted by the Security Council on these occasions.

4. On 26 January 1976, at the conclusion of the Security Council's debate on the Middle East problem including the Palestinian question, the Secretary-General made a statement in which he noted that the discussions of the Council had emphasized the Palestinian dimension of the Middle East problem and had reaffirmed the right of every State in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. He informed the Council that he would be in touch with the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East and the parties concerned on further steps to resume the negotiating process. The next day the Secretary-General addressed identical letters to the Co-Chairmen in which he stated that he was concerned not only at the evident dangers of stalemate and stagnation of the Middle East problem, but also at the prospect of the difficulties which might arise when new deadlines were faced on peace-keeping in the absence of any progress towards a settlement. He then requested the Co-Chairmen to inform him of their views on ways of making progress towards a solution of the Middle East problem.

5. In response to the Secretary-General's communication, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, in a letter dated 12 February 1976 (A/31/53-S/11985, annex),<sup>85</sup> stated that there was no other reliable way to achieve agreement on all the questions involved in a Middle East settlement except through the resumption of the work of the Geneva Peace Conference. He further indicated that the Geneva Peace Conference should be well prepared and that all the parties directly concerned, including the PLO, as well as the Soviet Union and the United States as the Co-Chairmen of the Conference, should participate in its work.

6. In his reply to the Secretary-General dated 20 February 1976 (see A/31/54-S/11991),<sup>86</sup> the Secretary of State of the United States indicated that there would be no chance of progress if the negotiating framework, erected fundamentally around Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, were disrupted. The Secretary of State recalled that the United States had agreed that

a resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference, after careful preparation, would serve the goal of achieving progress in the negotiating process and that in this connexion it had proposed, as a practical way of proceeding, the convening of a preparatory conference of those who had participated so far in negotiations looking towards a settlement within the Geneva Conference framework. The Secretary of State went on to state that the United States was prepared to consider holding bilateral consultations with the Soviet Union in advance of such a preparatory conference.

7. As a follow-up to the communication addressed to the Co-Chairmen, the Secretary-General requested his Personal Representative for the Peace Conference on the Middle East, Under-Secretary-General Roberto E. Guyer, to undertake an exploratory mission to the Middle East. Mr. Guyer visited the area from 25 February to 2 March 1976 and held talks with the parties concerned in Amman, Cairo, Damascus and Jerusalem. Following his visit to the Middle East he met with senior Soviet officials in Moscow on 10 March 1976 and senior American officials in Washington on 26 March 1976 in view of the responsibilities of the Soviet Union and the United States as Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference.

8. On the basis of the findings of Mr. Guyer's exploratory mission, the Secretary-General decided to continue his efforts to find ways and means to resume the negotiating process. Initially he felt it appropriate to make contacts with the representatives of the parties at United Nations Headquarters. In this connexion, identical aide-mémoires were handed to each of those representatives, including that of the PLO, on 1 April 1976. In these aide-mémoires the Secretary-General requested the parties concerned to convey to him any ideas of a procedural or substantive nature which they might have with respect to action to be taken by the United Nations with a view to breaking the impasse in the peace efforts.

9. In their replies all the parties concerned welcomed the Secretary-General's initiative. Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic reiterated their demand for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967. They further underlined the urgency for a comprehensive solution of the Middle East problem. Egypt stated that they wanted the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to

<sup>85</sup> Doc. 50 below.

<sup>86</sup> Doc. 53 below.

reactivate the negotiating process, which should focus on the resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference with the full participation of the PLO. In its reply, the Soviet Union affirmed that the most appropriate forum for working out a solution to the Middle East problem was the Geneva Peace Conference with the participation of all directly concerned parties, including the PLO and the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference. The reply also underlined that the Secretary-General, in his efforts to reactivate the negotiating process, should act in accordance with the relevant decisions of the United Nations, including General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX) of 10 November 1975. The representative of the United States, in conveying the reply of his Government to the Secretary-General, emphasized that it was the intention of the United States to actively pursue contacts with the parties on efforts to bring about an agreement which would end the state of war in the Middle East as soon as the situation in Lebanon had improved. Israel in its reply emphasized that it favoured the reconvening of the Geneva Peace Conference with the original participants in accordance with Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and with the terms stated in the letters dated 18 December 1973 addressed to the Secretary-General by the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively, concerning the Geneva Peace Conference.<sup>87</sup>

10. It seems clear from the replies mentioned above that, while there is general agreement on the necessity of resuming negotiations for a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East problem, there are still important differences of view among the parties concerned. The Secretary-General will continue his efforts towards the resumption of the negotiating process.

**Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of General Assembly Resolution 3375 (XXX) inviting the PLO to take part in all UN activities towards a Middle East settlement<sup>88</sup>**

**October 18, 1976**

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX) of 10 November 1975, in which the Assembly called for the invitation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East which were held under the auspices of the United Nations, on an equal footing with other parties, on the basis of its resolution 3236 (XXIX). The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to inform the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East of the resolution and to take all necessary steps to secure the invitation of PLO to participate in the work of the Conference as well as in all other efforts for peace.

2. The implementation of that resolution is of course closely connected with the efforts undertaken within the framework of the United Nations towards a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. These efforts are described in a report which the Secretary-General submitted on 18 October 1976 in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 3414 (XXX) of 5 December 1975 (A/31/270-S/12210).<sup>89</sup> In order to avoid duplication, references to that report will be made as briefly as possible and only in so far as they have a direct bearing on the subject-matter of Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX).

3. In accordance with the request contained in General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX), the Secretary-General addressed on 19 November 1975 identical letters to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Secretary of State of the United States of America, in their capacity as Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, to bring the resolution to their attention. In this connexion, the Secretary-General requested the Co-Chairmen

<sup>88</sup> UN doc. A/31/271. The resolution is published as doc. 13 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>89</sup> Doc. 8 above.

<sup>87</sup> Doc. 215 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

to keep him informed of any action they might take in relation to the resolution. In his reply to the Secretary-General dated 9 January 1976 (A/3144-S/11931, annex),<sup>90</sup> the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union advocated the speediest possible resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference with the full and equal participation of the representatives of PLO.

4. Shortly after the adoption of General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX), the Security Council met to consider the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). On 30 November, it adopted resolution 381 (1975) by which it renewed the mandate of UNDOF for another period of six months. In the same resolution, the Council also decided to reconvene on 12 January 1976 to continue the debate on the Middle East problem including the Palestinian question. In this connexion, the President of the Security Council made a statement to the effect that it was the understanding of the majority of the Council that when it convened on 12 January 1976 the representative of PLO would be invited to participate in the debate.<sup>90a</sup>

5. In the meantime, the Security Council met on 4 December 1975 to consider complaints submitted by Egypt and Lebanon concerning Israeli air attacks launched on 2 December against refugee camps and villages in Lebanon; it decided to invite the representative of PLO to participate in its debate on the basis that the invitation to that organization would confer on it the same rights of participation as were conferred when a Member State was invited to participate under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council. On this basis the representative of PLO made statements before the Security Council at its 1859th and 1862nd meetings, on 4 and 8 December.<sup>91</sup>

6. As indicated in the Secretary-General's report of 18 October 1976 (A/31/270-S/12210), the Security Council held four series of meetings on the Middle East in 1976, one on "the Middle East problem including the Palestinian question" from 12 to 26 January, another on the "request by the Libyan Arab Republic and Pakistan for consideration of the serious situation arising from recent

developments in the occupied Arab territories" from 22 to 25 March, the third series on "the situation in the occupied Arab territories" from 4 to 26 May and the fourth series on "the question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights" from 9 to 29 June.<sup>92</sup> On each of these occasions, the representative of PLO participated in the Council's debate under the same arrangements as during the Security Council meetings of December 1975. He made statements before the Council at its 1870th and 1879th meetings on 12 and 26 January on the first of these items, at its 1893rd, 1895th, 1897th and 1899th meetings from 22 to 25 March on the second item, at its 1917th, 1919th and 1922nd meetings on 5, 12 and 26 May on the third item and at its 1938th meeting on 29 June on the fourth item.<sup>93</sup>

7. Following the Security Council debate of January 1976 on the Middle East problem including the Palestinian question, the Secretary-General undertook a series of steps aimed at promoting the resumption of the negotiating process in the Middle East. Those steps are described in his report of 18 October 1976 and need not be repeated in detail here. In carrying out each of these steps, due attention was given to the provisions of General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX) as shown below.

8. The Secretary-General's intention to undertake a new initiative was first conveyed to the Security Council in a statement made on 26 January 1976 at the conclusion of the Council's debate on the Middle East problem including the Palestinian question.<sup>94</sup> In that statement the Secretary-General noted that the discussions of the Council had emphasized the Palestinian dimension of the Middle East problem and had reaffirmed the right of every State in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

9. In identical letters addressed to the Co-Chairmen on 27 January, the Secretary-General requested them to let him know their thinking on ways of making progress towards a solution of the Middle East problem. In this connexion, the Secretary-General again drew particular atten-

<sup>92</sup> See S/PV. 1870-1879, 1893-1899, 1916-1922, 1924, 1928 and 1933-1938 [original note]; see doc. 8 above.

<sup>93</sup> See S/PV. 1870, pp. 72-97; S/PV. 1879, pp. 106-112; S/PV. 1893, pp. 23-36; S/PV. 1895, pp. 37-41; S/PV. 1897, pp. 106-107; S/PV. 1899, pp. 81-85; S/PV. 1917, pp. 3-11 and 97-102; S/PV. 1919, pp. 72-76; S/PV. 1922, pp. 67-72; and S/PV. 1938, pp. 36-45 [original note].

<sup>94</sup> See doc. 10 below.

<sup>90</sup> Doc. 36 below.

<sup>90a</sup> Doc. 12 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>91</sup> See S/PV. 1859, pp. 72-79, and S/PV. 1862, pp. 101-109 [original note].

tion to the Palestinian dimension of the Middle East problem as well as the right of all States in the area to live in secure and recognized boundaries.

10. As a follow-up to the communications addressed to the Co-Chairmen, the Secretary-General requested his Personal Representative for the Peace Conference on the Middle East, Under-Secretary-General Roberto E. Guyer, to undertake an exploratory mission to the Middle East from 25 February to 2 March 1976. During that exploratory mission and also during the subsequent talks which Mr. Guyer held in Moscow and Washington, the question of the participation of PLO in peace efforts was discussed. In this connexion, Mr. Guyer met with representatives of PLO at Damascus on 28 February 1976.

11. Following Mr. Guyer's exploratory mission, the Secretary-General addressed identical aide-mémoires to the parties concerned, including PLO, on 1 April 1976, requesting their views as to the action which might be taken by the United Nations in order to break the impasse in the peace efforts.

12. The replies of the parties concerned are set forth in the Secretary-General's report of 18 October 1976 (A/31/270-S/12210, para. 9).<sup>95</sup> In brief, Egypt and the Soviet Union favoured the resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference with full and equal participation of PLO. The Syrian Arab Republic emphasized that any international effort in which PLO did not take part on an equal footing as a main party would contravene the resolutions of the General Assembly. Jordan

stated that it was essential that PLO be included in all efforts towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Israel advocated the reconvening of the Geneva Peace Conference with the original participants. The United States in its reply did not refer to the Geneva Peace Conference but emphasized that it was its intention actively to pursue contacts with the parties on efforts to bring about an agreement to end the state of war in the Middle East. As to PLO, it stated that the implementation of the recommendations contained in the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People could serve as a starting point on the road to peace and that without the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights in its homeland, the prospect for peace remained unattainable.

13. As indicated in the Secretary-General's report of 18 October 1976, it seems clear from the replies of the parties concerned that, while there is general agreement on the necessity of resuming negotiations for a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East problem, there are still important differences of view among the parties concerned, which must be resolved before the negotiating process can be usefully resumed. One of the unsettled questions is the participation of PLO in the Geneva Peace Conference. The Secretary-General wishes to reiterate here his determination to continue his efforts towards the resumption of the negotiating process.

<sup>95</sup> Doc. 8 above.



## Security Council Debate: The Palestine Question

10

### Security Council, 1879th meeting: Statements made in connection with voting on a draft resolution<sup>96</sup>

January 26, 1976

*The meeting was called to order at 4.35 p.m.*

#### ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA

*The agenda was adopted.*

#### THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM INCLUDING THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION

THE PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decisions taken by the Council at previous meetings, I invite the representatives of Egypt, Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Yugoslavia, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Guinea, the German Democratic Republic, India, Morocco, Sudan, Yemen Arab Republic, Cuba, Algeria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Hungary, Poland and Tunisia, in conformity with the usual practice and the relevant provisions of the Charter and the provisional rules of procedure, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Council at its 1870th meeting, I invite the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the discussion.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Abdel Meguid, representative of Egypt; Mr. Sharaf, representative of Jordan; Mr. Allaf, representative of the Syrian Arab Republic; and Mr. Khaddoumi, representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization, took places at the Security Council table; Mr. Ghobash, representative of the United Arab Emirates; Mr. Jamal, representative of Qatar; Mr. Petric, representative of Yugoslavia; Mr. El Hassen, representative of Mauritania; Mr. Baroody, representative of Saudi Arabia; Mr. Bishara, representative of Kuwait; Mr. Al-Shaikhly, representative of Iraq; Mrs. Jeanne Martin Cissé, representative of Guinea; Mr. Florin, representative of the German Democratic Republic; Mr. Jaiṣal, representative of India; Mr. Zaimi, representative of Morocco; Mr.*

*Medani, representative of Sudan; Mr. Sallam, representative of Yemen Arab Republic; Mr. Alarcon, representative of Cuba; Mr. Rahal, representative of Algeria; Mr. Grozev, representative of Bulgaria; Mr. Smid, representative of Czechoslovakia; Mr. Ashtal, representative of Democratic Yemen; Mr. Hollai, representative of Hungary; Mr. Jaroszek, representative of Poland; and Mr. Driss, representative of Tunisia, took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.*

THE PRESIDENT: The Security Council will now continue its examination of the question inscribed on its agenda.

Since our last meeting on 22 January last week, members of the Council have been engaged in informal consultations on the text of a draft resolution which has now been formally submitted by the delegations of Benin, Guyana, Pakistan, Panama, Romania and United Republic of Tanzania in document S/11940.<sup>97</sup>

I understand that the representative of Pakistan wishes to make a statement in introduction of this draft resolution, and accordingly I now call on him to speak.

MR. AKHUND (Pakistan): On behalf of the delegations of Benin, Guyana, Panama, Romania and the United Republic of Tanzania, as well as my own, I submit to the Council for its consideration a draft resolution contained in document S/11940 of 23 January. The draft is the result of two weeks of informal consultations within groups of interested countries, and thereafter between the sponsors and the remaining members of the Council. It is evident that it does not reflect in full the position of any particular group, or even of the sponsors, whose collective position was set out in an earlier working paper. On the other hand, the draft has the merit of reflecting a much wider consensus of views, and for this we are grateful to those members of the Council who helped the sponsors to give the draft its present shape and form. I speak for all of them in conveying our thanks in particular to the Permanent Representatives of France and of Japan for their specific suggestions, and to those of China, Italy, Libya, Sweden and the USSR for their general observations and advice.

<sup>96</sup> UN doc. S/PV.1879, pp. 2-113. For statements made in earlier sessions of this debate see docs. 38 and 188 below.

<sup>97</sup> Doc. 15 below.

We do not expect the draft that is before the Council to prove entirely satisfactory to the parties directly concerned or otherwise involved. Some would have preferred a more forthright statement of the Council's assessment of the situation and more clear-cut provisions for implementing its decisions. Others would apparently prefer to leave matters clouded in some degree of ambiguity, in the belief that such ambiguity can help to obtain the agreement of all concerned to a generally acceptable settlement. We understand that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East will require a process of consultation, discussion and negotiation and that this Council should not itself undertake that task. What the Council can do is lay down the essential elements for an over-all settlement.

That was what the Council attempted to do when, nearly nine years ago, it adopted resolution 242 (1967) and again, after the war of October 1973, resolution 338 (1973), which, recalling the earlier resolution, called for the immediate implementation of that resolution in all its parts. A number of speakers in the present debate have laid considerable stress on the importance of those resolutions as providing a framework for the Middle East settlement. They have asserted that any decision taken at the current session should not override or supplant those resolutions. While taking note of their concern, we should like to say the following. In the first place, in the period between the adoption of resolution 242 (1967) and the outbreak of the October war, a period of some six years, not even a beginning was made towards implementing the settlement visualized in the resolution. Serious and earnest efforts were indeed made to that end, but they proved infructuous. We all know the history of the Jarring mission and the fate of the Rogers plan, among others. The language of the resolution itself was used by one of the parties, namely, Israel, to frustrate every effort at peace-making.

In the second place, resolution 242 (1967) suffers from a serious lacuna in that it speaks only of a "refugee problem" and says not a word about the problem of Palestine which was the origin of the Arab-Israeli conflict and remains the root cause and core of the Middle East question today. Statements made around this table in the course of the current debate show that there is unanimity in the Council on that point. We are gratified to

note that there is virtual unanimity also to the effect that the earlier resolutions of the Council need to be supplemented. The draft that is before the Council is intended to repair the deficiency and give a sense of direction and impetus to the search for peace.

I now come to the draft itself. It is based on three fundamental assumptions concerning the kind of settlement which would be just to all and would therefore endure. In the first place, the problem of Palestinian identity must be plainly and squarely faced. In this context, let me say that the presence of the Palestine Liberation Organization here is a matter of particular satisfaction to my delegation and should be welcomed by all those who have expressed the view that the problem of Palestine is at the heart of the Middle East conflict and must be resolved. It does no good to go on pretending that the Palestinian people do not exist as a national entity, entitled to all the rights and attributes which such status confers and which were in fact taken away from them in the aftermath of the partition of Palestine. Nor is it for outsiders to decide how and in what form and manner the Palestinians should exercise their national rights. The United Nations recognized the right of the Palestinians to have a State of their own at the same time as it sanctioned the establishment of a Jewish State on Palestinian soil. The United Nations also acknowledged that Palestinian refugees must be allowed to return to the homes and properties which they had had to abandon and, if they chose not to return, to receive adequate compensation.

The second element is that Israel must withdraw from the territories it occupied in the war of June 1967, in other words, from the remaining portions of the Sinai and the Golan Heights, from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and from Arab Jerusalem. On this matter the draft reaffirms in its preamble the principle enunciated in the preamble of resolution 242 (1967), a principle which is fundamental to the whole concept of the rule of law on the international plane on which the United Nations is based, namely, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by threat or by use of force. The relevant operative paragraph of our draft makes it clear that the only tenable application of this principle is that Israel must withdraw from all the Arab territories occupied in the 1967 war. Countries may, in the exercise of their sovereignty

and in conditions of complete freedom from coercion, agree between themselves over territorial arrangements. The situation is quite different when a country has seized the territory of another through war. The notion that the United Nations has implicitly sanctioned or should become a party to arrangements which would enable Israel to retain at will portions of territories acquired by the use of force is totally repugnant to the United Nations Charter, finds no sanction in international law and practice and is unjustified by the spirit and a plain reading of resolution 242 (1967). Every State has the right to take such measures as it considers appropriate to ensure and defend the security of its lawful borders. To suggest that a State has the right to extend its borders in the search for security is to give licence to international predacity. The United Nations can under no circumstances countenance, much less become a party to, an attempt to guarantee the security of one country at the expense of the territories of others.

Lastly, not in order of importance or even of chronology but in terms of political logic, arrangements and provisions must be made to create conditions in which all States in the region, including the Palestine State, can live together in peace and reciprocal respect for one another's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.

With these explanations I commend this draft on behalf of its six sponsors to all members of the Council and to those directly interested parties which have participated in the present debate. We are sorry that Israel stayed away from the debate and has instead been crying havoc all over and hurling defiance against the alleged bias and dictation of the United Nations. In truth it is Israel which is maintaining, by the use of force, and wishes to be left alone to continue, its occupation of the territories of its Arab neighbours. Persistence in this policy of force and *diktat* can only breed more violence, engender further bitterness and make ever more remote the prospect of the peace and co-operation which the Israeli Government professes to be seeking and which all the peoples of the Middle East desire and need. The settlement envisaged in the draft offers an alternative to such a policy. In putting it forward, we wish in no way to interfere with the existing process and mechanisms of peace-making, but on

the contrary hope that the peace effort will be resumed with the aim now of reaching a comprehensive and over-all settlement. The draft provides a basis on which such an effort can be made, negotiations held and mediation succeed. We hope that it will receive the approval of all members, for it embodies a reality which cannot be negated and a balance of rights and obligations on which peace can be built and viable relations evolve in the Middle East.

THE PRESIDENT: The floor is now open for discussion of the draft resolution.

MR. RICHARD (United Kingdom): My delegation has made clear from the outset of this debate the importance which we attach to maintaining the principles and the provisions of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), which have established the basic principles for a settlement in the Middle East and a framework within which negotiations towards a settlement should take place. My Government considers that inclusion in the draft now before us of a reaffirmation of those two resolutions is an essential element if this draft resolution is to provide a real contribution towards the progress of the negotiations which we all wish to promote.

My Government has therefore instructed me to submit the following amendment to the draft resolution in document S/11940, which I think has been circulated in English to all members of the Council. I am sorry that there has not been sufficient time so far to have the draft translated into the other working languages. I trust that this omission has not occasioned too great an inconvenience.

The amendment would be to include a new operative paragraph 3 in the draft resolution which would read as follows:

"3. Reaffirms the principles and provisions of its resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and declares that nothing in the foregoing provisions of this resolution supersedes them."

Having listened to the many important and helpful contributions which have been made in this debate, we feel it is clear that resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) are still accepted as valid by the majority, although not all, of the members of this Council. I very much hope, therefore, that the Council will be able to vote in favour of this amendment and thus provide that degree of

balance in the draft resolution which my delegation regards as essential.

**THE PRESIDENT:** The amendment submitted by the representative of the United Kingdom has been circulated to the members of the Council as document S/11942.

**MR. AKHUND (Pakistan):** I cannot say that I am surprised at the amendment just introduced by Ambassador Richard of the United Kingdom, because a little while earlier he informed me of his intention. I am a little bit astonished, I must say.

As I said in the statement which I just made on behalf of the six sponsors of the draft resolution, the text was drafted with the express purpose of giving satisfaction to those members who had expressed concern to us about the precise implications of the adoption of this draft with regard to the earlier resolutions—not merely resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973); there are many other resolutions on the subject of the Middle East and of Palestine. We thought that we had given satisfaction on that score. It seems, however, that the United Kingdom considers that a more formal affirmation is necessary. In view of the fact that the draft which I have just submitted to the Council is the result of consultation not merely among its sponsors, but also between them and a number of other representatives and groups, it is not really possible for me, even speaking only for my delegation, to react to the amendment at this point.

**Mr. President,** I should like to suggest that a little time might be allowed for the necessary consultations and I would propose, if there is no objection, that we might suspend this meeting for perhaps an hour so that we can hold those consultations.

**THE PRESIDENT:** The representative of Pakistan has proposed that we suspend our meeting for one hour. As there is no objection, I shall suspend the meeting now.

*The meeting was suspended at 5 p.m. and resumed at 7.10 p.m.*

**THE PRESIDENT:** Members of the Council have before them the draft resolution contained in document S/11940, submitted by the delegations of Benin, Guyana, Pakistan, Panama, Romania and the United Republic of Tanzania, as already

introduced by the representative of Pakistan.

Members also have before them the amendment submitted by the delegation of the United Kingdom, as introduced by the representative of the United Kingdom and contained in document S/11942.

In accordance with the usual practice and the rules of procedure, the Council will, of course, proceed to vote first on the amendment presented by the delegation of the United Kingdom. Does any member wish to explain his vote on the amendment before the voting?

**MR. MOYNIHAN (United States of America):** The United States has made clear that its responsibility in the Middle East is such that it is required, even if it stands alone, to preserve the framework for negotiations established in Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).

Far from preserving that framework, the draft resolution before us would commence its destruction. It proposes a fundamental and irremediable diminishment of the circumstances of one of the parties. Fundamental rights are elided, equitable entitlements are impaired, and fundamental expectations are of a sudden enshrouded in doubt. These rights, these entitlements and these expectations were incorporated in resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and, it is our feeling that this case is so clear that it would be inappropriate, however unintentionally, it would be incompatible for the same document to both alter these rights, entitlements and expectations and at the same time seek to reaffirm them.

In that circumstance, the United States will abstain on the amendment of the United Kingdom.

**MR. DE GUIRINGAUD (France)** (interpretation from French): On 14 January last, my delegation stressed its attachment to resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) of the Security Council. That being the case, I shall vote in favour of the United Kingdom amendment, which reaffirms those resolutions.

As I indicated at that time, the object of this debate should be to complement and to complete those texts, so that in the search for a settlement in the Middle East all aspects of the situation would be taken into account, whether those resulting from the conflict of 1967 or those concerning the legitimate right of the Palestinian people, as of all other peoples, to an independent State.

The draft resolution submitted by six members of the Security Council which reflects this objective and which does in fact round out resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) leads my delegation to feel that there is no contradiction between that text and the United Kingdom amendment which throws light on the context in which our work must be done. And therefore, I repeat, my delegation will vote in favour of that amendment.

MR. SAITO (Japan): Permit me to make a few remarks on the proposed amendment of the representative of the United Kingdom.

It is a fundamental position of my Government that Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) should be reaffirmed when we consider the Middle East problem including the Palestinian question. At the same time, the draft resolution before us is an achievement produced by the efforts of many Council members and is the result of a delicate compromise. Considering this situation and the importance of the amendment, my delegation needs instruction from its Government. However, because of the lack of time for us to get in contact with our Government to receive instructions, my delegation cannot but abstain and is unable to indicate its definite position on the proposed amendment if it is put to the vote, since voting on it seems to be the general wish of the Security Council.

MR. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): As the representative of the Soviet Union, I entirely share the view that was expressed by the representative of Pakistan, Mr. Akhund, regarding the United Kingdom amendment. He used two English words, "surprised" and "astonished", and he very properly characterized the situation with regard to the introduction of this amendment. During the numerous consultations among the members of the Security Council, the representative of the United Kingdom offered no amendments, no changes to be made in the text of the draft resolution of the six sponsors which has now been put into its final form and officially submitted by the representative of Pakistan on behalf of the group of sponsors in Security Council document S/11940. The draft of the six had been agreed among the members of the Council, with the participation of the representative of the United Kingdom and without any objections on his part.

We all know that the main purpose of the lengthy discussion on the Middle East problem in the Security Council, which lasted several days, and which also included the question of Palestine, was to create favourable conditions for speeding up a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The only recognized forum for this endeavour as we all know, is the Geneva Peace Conference. The adoption by the Security Council of a new and constructive decision was something that an overwhelming majority requested—both the majority of the Security Council and the majority of those who participated in the discussion of this matter in the Council. The negation of resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) was not at all involved, nor was the negation of any resolutions which have been formally adopted by the General Assembly on the Middle East or on Palestine. On the contrary, many of the participants in the discussion of this question referred to those resolutions and requested that the Security Council should continue along the very path that was indicated by the General Assembly in its decisions on the Palestine question. In doing so, many of the speakers stressed that what was involved was the adoption by the Council of new, additional constructive decisions which would not be detrimental to the earlier decisions.

What is the main substance of such new and constructive decisions? In the view of the overwhelming majority of the participants in the discussion of the question, it would be the recognition of the inalienable national rights of the people of Palestine, and this found its reflection in the draft resolution of the six sponsors. It is, if you wish, the very quintessence of this draft resolution. The representative of the United Kingdom himself, in speaking before the Council in the discussion of the Middle East question and the Palestine problem, spoke in favour of the recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people, and to remind him of this I shall now read out a part of his statement in the Council. Here are the very words he used:

In any final settlement in the Middle East a way must be found to take account of the political rights of the Palestinian people and to enable them to express their national identity. (*1873rd meeting, p. 34–35*)

In another passage of his statement the representative of the United Kingdom said:

We must recognize the fundamental importance of the Palestinian problem and take account of the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people. (*Ibid.*, p. 36)

After such observations in the official statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom in the Security Council and in view of the absence of any objections on his part during the consultations among members of the Security Council held this morning at which there was final agreement on the text of the draft resolution of the six sponsors on the settlement of the Middle East question, the general view of the members of the Council was that the delegation of the United Kingdom not only did not object to the recognition of the political rights of the people of Palestine but, on the contrary, was supporting those rights. The unexpected amendment submitted by Mr. Richard indicates the exact opposite. He now wants the Security Council to give, as it were, *carte blanche* to Israel and to its protectors and also after the adoption of the new draft resolution, if it is not killed by somebody's veto, to treat the Palestinian problem only as a problem of refugees and not as a central political problem in the settlement in the Middle East, as was demanded by the overwhelming majority of the participants in the discussion of this matter in the Security Council.

It is for this reason that I have to stress again that it is impossible not to agree with the observations by the representative of Pakistan, who said that the introduction of this amendment certainly creates a very astonishing impression. Therefore there are reasons to regard this action of the representative of the United Kingdom as a direct attempt to undermine the draft resolution of the six which was agreed on in the consultations held today by the members of the Security Council. The adoption of such an amendment would introduce ambiguity and confusion into the substance of the new draft resolution of the Council, if, I repeat, it is by any chance adopted by the Council. By this action Israel and its protectors will be allowed to sabotage the implementation of this new resolution too, as was indeed done with regard to Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). Therefore it is not difficult to realize what is the concealed meaning and the main aim of this amendment. Therefore, the delegation of the USSR will not be able to give its support to it.

MR. VINCI (Italy): At this stage of our deliberations I shall confine myself to stating that my delegation supports and will vote in favour of the amendment submitted by the delegation of the United Kingdom. Speaking on behalf of the Italian delegation on 19 January, I had already advocated a clear reaffirmation of the validity of resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). The adoption of this amendment is therefore considered an important and determining factor in the final position which my delegation will take on the draft resolution contained in document S/11940.

MR. KIKHIA (Libyan Arab Republic): First of all, I regret that our British colleague presented this amendment at the last moment. I think that is not fair for the Council and also for the sponsors of the draft resolution. This draft resolution was prepared after long negotiations and the sponsors deployed every possible effort to take into account the position of all the other members of the Council. They even introduced the provisions and the language of resolution 242 (1967).

I shall not question the intention of His Excellency the Ambassador of the United Kingdom, but I think the presentation of his amendment will have the result of delaying the work of our Council.

The position of my delegation concerning resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) has been reiterated many times during the last session of the General Assembly and also during the present debate in the Security Council. We are convinced that those resolutions have been bypassed by events and developments both inside and outside the United Nations. They are irrelevant as a framework for any just and lasting solution to the Middle East question. General Assembly resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX) reaffirming the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, General Assembly resolution 3376 (XXX) proposing the means designed to enable the Palestinian people to achieve their national rights, and General Assembly resolution 3379 (XXX) condemning Zionism as a racist movement, reflect the profound changes and developments in the attitude of the United Nations and of international public opinion and call for a review of the entire question and the methods of dealing with it.

For that reason, our delegation intends to vote against the amendment in document S/11942.

MR. RICHARD (United Kingdom): I take the

floor for a second time only to answer the tissue of misrepresentations that we have heard from the representative of the Soviet Union. He can throw his arms out as often as he likes; it does not in fact alter the truth. He knows, and everybody sitting around this table who was present during the consultations knows, that it is totally untrue and grossly misleading of him to suggest that this was a draft resolution which was agreed to in the course of consultations. Of course it was not. If it had been an agreed draft resolution it would have been adopted by consensus and there would have been no need to have had it submitted in this way and there would have been no need for a vote. He knows that to be untrue and yet he deliberately comes along and says this to the Security Council and indeed to all those who see fit to listen to our deliberations. Why does he do it, Mr. President?

Time after time we sit here listening to the representative of the Soviet Union. When his pencil goes up I draw breath to see which misrepresentation is to come first. I listen with enormous interest to hear which position of which Government is about to be distorted out of recognition. I have a great affection for the representative of the Soviet Union. I wish he had the same affection for the truth as I have for him.

I shall say only two words about the amendment, although, since the representative of the Soviet Union did me the honour of referring to one of my speeches, perhaps I should do him the honour of referring to the speech he just made. He said the negation of resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) was not involved in the draft resolution submitted by the non-aligned members of the Council. That may or not be true. If in fact it is true, what is the insuperable objection of the representative of the Soviet Union to reaffirming the resolution which he has just told us has not been negated by the draft resolution that is in front of us this evening? Why should it not go in? It would seem a point of sensible clarification which could go into that draft resolution.

As for whether what I have submitted today is in any sense or any shape or form different from my attitude throughout this debate I shall just quote one sentence—although I realize it is an imposition to read one's own speeches to the Council twice—from the statement I made in this debate on 15 January. In speaking of the principles of a

settlement, I said the following:

Those are the basic principles laid down in Security Council resolution 242 (1967), brought into effect as provided in its resolution 338 (1973). Those two resolutions form the widely accepted foundation for a settlement and my Government will oppose any unilateral attempt to alter them or detract from them. (*1873rd meeting, p. 33*)

And I then went on to spell out the third requirement, one not expressed in resolution 242 (1967), that the right of Palestinian people to the expression of their national identity must also be recognized.

The sponsors of this draft resolution are in some ways in a dilemma. If in fact it does not touch resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), what is the objection to putting my amendment in? If it does in fact touch resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), then perhaps some of the fears that some of us may have expressed in the past about this draft resolution might seem to have some justification.

I therefore—I hope in a sober mood, certainly in a more sober mood than that displayed by my colleague from the Soviet Union I trust—really would commend this amendment to the Security Council this evening.

MR. AKHUND (Pakistan): It was a pleasure to listen to Ambassador Richard, and to listen to him twice was a double pleasure. He was addressing the representative of the Soviet Union, but we could not help overhearing him.

I think I might take a few moments to explain the position of Pakistan on this particular matter. When I spoke last I was speaking in a sense as spokesman for the sponsors of the draft resolution.

The delegation of Pakistan finds no great problem with resolution 242 (1967), or for that matter with resolution 338 (1973), or for that matter with any of the other resolutions that were adopted years and years and years ago to deal with the question we are considering today. Our only complaint is that none of those resolutions have moved the dispute towards a settlement.

I am not of course ignoring the relatively limited moves that have been made, but none the less we are pretty much where we were in 1967.

That having been said, we do not regard the resolutions that have been mentioned or any previous resolutions—resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and so on—as having become null and void. We do not believe that the adoption of the draft

before us in its present form will in any way supersede those resolutions.

We are asked in the amendment to reaffirm two resolutions of all those that have been adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly—those two have been singled out—and we are asked to declare that nothing in the foregoing provisions of this resolution supersedes them. Supersedes what? The principles and provisions of resolution 242 (1967).

I would recommend that Ambassador Richard read again the wording of the draft that we have put before the Council. What are the principles and provisions of resolution 242 (1967)? “Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.” We are familiar with the argument that has gone on forever over this particular formulation. Then it continues:

Termination of all claims of states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries...

We have all that. We have reproduced the language, the heart and kernel of resolution 242 (1967), in our draft, and we have done so with the aim of—as I said earlier this afternoon—meeting the views that were put to us in order that at this crucial juncture, when for the first time the Security Council has turned its eyes to the problem which is at the heart of the Middle East conflict, and when for the first time it has taken it up, there should be the widest possible consensus. Yet we are asked at the last minute to consider an amendment. I agree entirely with the representative of France that there is no contradiction between this amendment and what is stated in the draft resolution. Nevertheless, we have worked on this draft to give it a certain balance. It may not be an agreed draft; but it is a draft which reflects, not the position of the sponsors—because the sponsors had, as members know, originally put forward a very different working paper—but the broad consensus of views of the majority of members. We have put this forward and yet we are asked to adopt an amendment which, in my view, frankly is not merely regrettable but unnecessary. Its adoption will add nothing whatsoever to our draft in terms of the framework. I should like the representative of the United Kingdom to consider what its rejection by this Council might imply.

The representative of the United States spoke of “rights”, “entitlements” and “expectations”. It is necessary to remember that both sides have rights, both sides have entitlements and both sides have expectations—and they have been waiting for decades for the fulfilment of their rights, for the recognition of their entitlements and their expectations. We think that in our draft we have provided for the legitimate rights and expectations of all the parties.

We shall, with very great regret, not be able to support the amendment proposed by the delegation of the United Kingdom, not because we are opposed to its substance, but because we consider that it is not relevant at this juncture.

MR. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The irritation and the tone of voice of the United Kingdom representative in his reaction to my observations on his amendment shows that my criticism was correct. No parliamentary witticism of the United Kingdom representative could conceal the real meaning and purpose of this amendment: to undermine the new and constructive decision of the Security Council. That is his aim and, therefore, no matter how much he is irritated, I cannot give a different assessment of his amendment.

And, again, much of what I wished to say has been said by the representative of Pakistan, but I wanted to stress that during the consultations the United Kingdom did not introduce any amendment, and everybody had the impression that silence was a sign of agreement. I therefore felt it was necessary to disclose the substance of his amendment. And, indeed, the substance of the amendment is that, instead of a recognition of the legitimate, inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, there is again an effort to reduce the Palestinian problem to one of refugees. That is the substance of the amendment. Every member of the Security Council has to face the question: Does he recognize the inalienable political rights of the Palestinian people or not?

Such is the conclusion that emerges from the discussion of this matter in the Security Council, and that is why it is unnecessary to try to conceal anything by former decisions and reject this political question of principle.

THE PRESIDENT: Since no other member wishes to explain his vote before the vote on it, I should like, in my capacity as representative of Tanzania,



to explain very briefly Tanzania's position on the United Kingdom amendment.

My delegation regrets that it will abstain in the vote on the amendment presented by the delegation of the United Kingdom for reasons which I believe should be obvious to all members of the Council. In the first place, the draft resolution sponsored by six delegations, including the Tanzania delegation, is the result of intensive negotiations and many compromises. The representative of Japan was absolutely right when he called it "a delicate compromise". As it is, it represents the balance of all considerations and legitimate rights of all the parties to the conflict, as well as the concerns of all the members of the Council. To accept the amendment proposed by the representative of the United Kingdom would certainly create unnecessary difficulties for many of those who have already been able to accept the draft as it is.

Furthermore, we believe that, while embodying the essential contents of resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), the draft resolution sponsored by six delegations is an improvement on those two previous resolutions, not only because it is much clearer, but also because it addresses itself seriously to the Palestinian question.

I should like also to add that the Tanzania delegation shares the preoccupations and the disappointments voiced by the representative of Pakistan, and to state that, by introducing his amendment at this eleventh hour, the representative of the United Kingdom has made our task much more difficult.

We particularly regret this since, as I said earlier and as was rightly pointed out by the Ambassador of Japan, the text before us is the product of a delicate compromise which was worked out after serious and protracted efforts.

For those reasons, the Tanzania delegation will not be able to vote for the United Kingdom amendment.

The Council will now proceed to vote on the United Kingdom amendment, contained in document S/11942, to the draft resolution submitted by Benin, Guyana, Pakistan, Panama, Romania and the United Republic of Tanzania, which is before the Security Council in document S/11940.

*A vote was taken by show of hands.*

*In favour:* France, Italy, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern

Ireland.

*Against:* China, Libyan Arab Republic.

*Abstaining:* Benin, Guyana, Japan, Pakistan, Panama, Romania, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America.

THE PRESIDENT: The result of the vote is as follows: 4 in favour, 2 against, and 9 abstentions. The amendment has not been adopted, having failed to obtain the required majority.

The Council will now proceed to the voting on the draft resolution contained in document S/11942 [*sic*]. I call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes at this stage.

MR. HUANG (China) (interpretation from Chinese): During the general debate on the Middle East question in the Security Council, the representatives of many countries expressed in their speeches profound condolences on the passing away of Premier Chou En-lai. We have already conveyed their deepest sentiments to the Chinese Government and people and to the bereaved family. Allow me, in the name of the Chinese delegation, to express once again our heartfelt thanks to them for the kind sympathy they have extended to the Chinese Government and people.

The Chinese Government and people have always firmly supported the Palestinian and other Arab peoples in their just struggle to regain their national rights and recover their lost territories, firmly condemned the Israeli Zionist aggression and firmly opposed and condemned the super-Powers for their contention and expansion in the Middle East. We have always maintained that the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people must be restored and that Israel must withdraw from all the occupied Arab territories. Basing ourselves on this position, we voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX). We are also in favour of the relevant content affirming the national rights of the Palestinian people in the draft resolution contained in document S/11940. We appreciate the efforts that have been made in this respect by the co-sponsors.

However, it must be pointed out that the reference to the relevant United Nations resolutions and international conferences on the Middle East contained in the draft resolution has an implication which may be interpreted as covering Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338

(1973) and the Geneva Conference based on the above two resolutions. Meanwhile, the draft resolution also says

...to guarantee... the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries; (*S/11940*)

In fact, in the present Middle East situation the prevailing task of urgency is the Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and the restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people. Before the achievement of this basic objective, the above provisions of the draft resolution may be used by Israeli Zionism to create pretexts for its policy of aggression and expansion and by the super-Powers to continue to maintain the situation of "no war, no peace" in the Middle East which was singlehandedly created by them.

In view of the foregoing, the Chinese delegation has decided not to participate in the voting on the draft resolution contained in document *S/11940*.

MR. RICHARD (United Kingdom): When I spoke in the Council on 15 January I pointed out that this debate offered a great opportunity to move the negotiations for a Middle East settlement forward, but that it also conferred upon us the responsibility not to imperil the very negotiations we were trying to help. I reminded the Council then that of the three main elements or requirements for a settlement—which have, I may add, been acknowledged by almost every member of the Council who has spoken in this debate—two formed the basic principles in Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which, together with resolution 338 (1973), had become established as a widely accepted foundation for a settlement.

I added, however, that my Government had recognized, like many other Governments, that these resolutions were deficient and that they did not take account of the third element—the essential part which Palestinian interests must play in any settlement.

I therefore suggested that the Council should recognize that third principle, the need to take account of the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to express their national identity. But I added that this should be done in a way which supplemented but did not supplant Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and I warned that my

Government would oppose any attempt to alter or detract from those resolutions.

The purpose of resolution 242 (1967) was to provide a framework in which negotiations leading to a settlement could take place. The new resolution recognizes that this Council is not a forum in which those negotiations should take place, and we must, I think, be careful in what we do here today to avoid putting the negotiators into a straitjacket and closing doors which might otherwise remain open. All of us here recognize as we have all had this experience here that in undertaking a negotiation there must be possibilities for movement within that negotiation. It will not help the negotiating process, in our view, to spell out in detail the various possibilities inherent in the terms of resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). As sponsors of resolution 242 (1967)—a resolution which, we believe, has a substantial and continuing contribution to make to the solution of the Middle East problem—we have always been careful not to express any interpretation of the wording of particular parts of that resolution.

My Government therefore has reservations about certain aspects of operative paragraphs 1 and 4 of the present resolution, which, we fear, could have a restricting effect. It was our hope that, by making it plain that the present resolution did not supersede resolution 242 (1967), we would have been able to overcome those doubts. Since the amendment which we moved this afternoon has not been accepted, my delegation will, to its regret, abstain on the draft resolution now before us.

In conclusion, I should like to make this plea. We believe that a great deal of progress has been made over the last few days in bringing positions together and in narrowing differences. What is needed now is surely a willingness to look forward to the future. The need for a just and lasting settlement in the Middle East, and especially a just settlement of the Palestinian problem remains urgent. The responsibility of the Security Council of the United Nations to assist and promote the negotiations towards a settlement remains just as important. The need for the parties—and this means all the parties—to re-examine their policies and attitudes and to look for some way of reconciling their differences in a spirit of compromise, without which no agreement can be reached, remains no less. My Government for its part remains determined to do whatever it can wherever

and whenever we may be asked to help this process and to help to bring about the just and lasting settlement in the Middle East which we all so earnestly desire.

THE PRESIDENT: I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution of Benin, Guyana, Pakistan, Panama, Romania and the United Republic of Tanzania which is before the Security Council in document S/11940.

*A vote was taken by show of hands.*

*In favour:* Benin, France, Guyana, Japan, Pakistan, Panama, Romania, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania

*Against:* United States of America

*Abstaining:* Italy, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

*China and Libyan Arab Republic did not participate in the voting.*

THE PRESIDENT: The result of the vote is as follows: 9 votes in favour, one against, and 3 abstentions. The draft resolution has not been adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.

I shall now call on the Secretary-General.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: The important debate which has occupied the Security Council for the past two weeks has highlighted both the main elements of the Middle East problem and the extreme difficulty of reconciling these elements. The debate has in particular emphasized the Palestinian dimension of this problem. At the same time, there has been a reaffirmation of the right of every State in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

I feel that it is my duty to express the general and growing anxiety in the international community at large at the very great difficulties which are being experienced in making progress towards a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East problem. It is generally recognized that stagnation and stalemate can only lead to further frustration, and that continued frustration will unavoidably lead to further violence. Such is the nature of the Middle East problem that there is a widespread awareness that the consequences of further conflicts in the Middle East will have very serious repercussions in a far broader sphere.

It is absolutely vital that efforts to find a way forward continue, no matter how great or insurmountable the obstacles to a peaceful settlement may now appear. I therefore appeal most earnestly to all of the parties concerned to persist in these efforts, and I shall remain in close contact with them to this end as well as with the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East.

The United Nations has been intimately involved in the Middle East question for more than a quarter of a century. Many of its Members have made great efforts during that time, both within the framework of the Organization and outside it, to assist in the search for a settlement of this immensely difficult and important problem. The stakes in the Middle East question are now perhaps higher than ever, and we shall soon be facing new deadlines which, in the absence of progress towards a settlement, can only bring on a new situation of crisis. Not only all of the parties involved but the world as a whole has a vital interest in a just and lasting settlement of this problem. I very much hope, therefore, that further constructive steps will quickly follow the debate which is now concluding.

THE PRESIDENT: I thank the Secretary-General for his statement. I shall now call on those representatives who have asked to speak after the vote.

MR. MOYNIHAN (United States of America): The United States has not lightly cast a negative vote against the resolution that was before us. We voted "no" only after long and conscientious consideration and with the realization that we must keep foremost in mind a greater goal beyond this Council chamber. I want to make clear our reasons for voting as we did, and the seriousness with which my Government first weighed the views expressed in this debate. As witness to our intent and purpose, the United States Department of State at this moment is releasing a statement that more completely sets out United States views on where this debate has left us in our search for a Middle East peace.

Briefly to state that position: we concluded that our responsibility to seek further progress towards an over-all peace settlement in the Middle East required us, even if we stood alone, to preserve the framework for negotiations established in Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). The provisions that were

before us were such that we considered the negotiating framework would have been altered in ways that would have been seriously harmful to the future of the peace-making process. We understand the reasons behind many of the ideas that have been presented here and we are not closing the door to the introduction into the negotiating process of considerations that have not yet been addressed. Rather, we wish to emphasize that it is better to go forward with the agreed basis that does exist, to utilize it to the best of our ability, and to see it evolve in a manner that will make it more useful, rather than running the risk of destroying it.

On 19 January, I made before this Council a short statement of the United States position on changes to the agreed framework for negotiation. I said then that changes imposed, whatever the intentions and with whatever justification but nevertheless imposed, would not work. That is a point that I would like to make again today. The United States negative vote on the draft resolution was not based on antipathy to the aspirations of Palestinians, but rather on the conviction that the passage of that draft resolution would not ameliorate their condition or be the most effective way of addressing the long neglected problem of their future in the context of an over-all settlement.

It is not a question of whether but of how to make progress to the goal we all profess.

On behalf of the United States, I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for your statesmanship and leadership, which have piloted us all through important and far-ranging deliberations. I wish to congratulate all members who have spoken here for the thoughtfulness and measured tones of their positions. Surely this approach is constructive and helpful to the parties that must soon proceed to negotiation of all the issues before them—to matters of procedure, the question of additional participation, and the matters of substance such as withdrawal from occupied territories, the right of all States in the area to live within secure and recognized borders, and reciprocal obligations of the parties to live in peace with one another.

When we first began our deliberations the United States made it clear that we wished to avoid confrontation and to produce positive results to aid in the search for peace. Many, we know, will be disappointed that we do not have a resolution to use and refer to, but for our part let me say that we

have none the less profited from the various views that have been expressed and we have increased our understanding of the enormous complexities before us all. Armed with the positive suggestions that have been made, fortified by the seriousness and concern of all who have participated, the United States pledges to you all and to the United Nations itself that we will persevere in the search for peace, that we will make use of the framework for negotiation that has been preserved, and that we will do our best. We need the co-operation of you all to make these efforts succeed. I hope you will join us and help us in this quest, and as it recommences, for the United States it is a matter of special import to know that we have the unfailing and determined efforts of the Secretary-General with us in this matter.

THE PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States for the generous remarks which he addressed to me personally.

MR. DE GUIRINGAUD (France) (interpretation from French): As I recalled in my explanation of vote a few moments ago on the United Kingdom amendment, as far as France is concerned the efforts of the Security Council in the course of the present debate should have been aimed at ensuring that all aspects of the question of the Middle East be taken into account in the search for a settlement. The text put before the Council by six of its members—to whom I wish to express our appreciation for the wise and responsible way in which they have carried out their task of conciliation—did meet the objectives that my delegation had proposed for this debate. It was thus that we voted in its favour, it being understood that, as far as we were concerned, this resolution had to complement resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), which set the principles for a settlement and point to the way in which it might be found. That was the reason why my delegation voted in favour of the United Kingdom amendment, which stressed this aspect of complementing the other resolutions. I regret the fact that that amendment was not adopted, but in our minds that amendment merely stated what was implicit in the six-Power draft, which in its last preambular paragraph does formally refer to the resolutions of the Council, without excluding any. It is because it is in this way that we read the text that, despite the rejection of the United Kingdom amendment, I have voted in favour of it. I

must deplore that this text, which is the result of lengthy consultation, also failed of adoption by the Council.

With regard to the text proposed by the six members of the Council, I should like to stress again that, as far as the question of the return of refugees contained in operative paragraph 1 (b) is concerned, we believe this to be a subsidiary aspect of the question, since the text already in paragraph 1 (a) has affirmed the right of the Palestinian people to an independent State in Palestine. Furthermore, in accordance with the terms of paragraph 2, the modalities have to be decided upon and taken into full account in all international efforts made within the framework of the United Nations. But the efforts of the Security Council, as I also said on 14 January, should be directed towards giving a new impetus to peace, and again we can only regret the rejection of this text, which we termed realistic and equitable, as proposed to us.

However, we do not believe that this has been a sterile or vain debate. In the many statements made in the Council the framework for a just and stable solution for the Middle East has become clearer. It calls for a reaffirmation of the facts as contained in resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), namely, the need to evacuate the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and to recognize the right to existence of all States of the region within recognized and secure boundaries and in full safety. It also implies a new affirmation which we consider to be essential, namely, the right of the Palestinian people to an independent State. Thus, even if it is not contained in a text that the members of the Security Council could unanimously support, all parties to the settlement should hereafter take this into account.

MR. SAITO (Japan): Mr. President, first of all, my delegation wishes to express its appreciation for the efforts made by you and by the non-aligned and other members in formulating the draft resolution on which we have just voted. I should like also to express the gratitude and appreciation of my delegation to the Secretary-General for his insistent and untiring efforts in the cause of peace in the Middle East. It is not an exaggeration to say that without such contributions the Council would not have had such a balanced and constructive proposal, which obtained the support of nine members of the Council.

My delegation has observed also that in this process the Council has been guided by good sense and a spirit of compromise. The reason for this is that all the delegations that have participated in Council meetings are greatly concerned about the situation in the Middle East.

My delegation voted for the draft resolution because we found that, as was clearly confirmed by the statement of the representative of Pakistan, who introduced the draft resolution, it was not intended to supplant Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), but to supplement them, and that it also upheld the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, rights which were not set forth in the two resolutions to which I have referred. Despite the Council's efforts, the draft resolution has failed of adoption. However, it is the judgement of my delegation that although no resolution has been adopted the fact that many members of the Security Council agreed on a formula aimed at solving the problem of the Middle East is in itself a point of departure for future discussions.

Faced with the grave situation in the area, my delegation appeals to the parties concerned to make every effort to seek the early achievement of a just and durable settlement of the Middle East problem, including the Palestinian question. For this purpose it is the view of my delegation that the Peace Conference should be reconvened in the very near future to work for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the area with the participation of all parties concerned.

THE PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for the kind remarks that he addressed to me as President.

MR. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Mr. President, first of all I should like to express my gratitude to you personally as President of the Security Council, and also to the members of the Security Council who prepared the draft resolution. I want to thank them for their strenuous efforts in trying to work out a concrete text so that the Security Council could adopt a decision which would contribute to speeding up the achievement of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

The delegation of the Soviet Union cannot fail to express its deepest regret that, because of the negative vote cast by one of the permanent members

of the Security Council, the United States of America, the draft resolution, on such an important question as the situation in the Middle East, which was supported by a majority, was not adopted by the Security Council.

It should be stressed first that the draft resolution to a considerable degree reflected the position which was expressed by the members of the Security Council and also by many States Members of the United Nations not members of the Council in the course of several days of discussion of the Middle East problem, including the question of Palestine. A particularly important aspect of this discussion was the general recognition, with a few exceptions, of the qualitatively new character of the Palestinian problem. A considerable majority of the members of the Council and the overwhelming majority of the Member States non-members of the Council recognized and stressed that the Palestinian question was an essential political problem in the settlement of the Middle East question. That just position found its reflection also in the draft resolution.

The majority of the members of the Council and the representatives of more than 20 Member States non-members of the Council very clearly and definitely stated that it is necessary to recognize and ensure the implementation of the inalienable national rights of the Arab people of Palestine. That was the main theme which ran through all the discussions in the Council on the question under consideration.

The second important aspect was that the overwhelming majority of the Member States, members and non-members of the Council—12 out of 15 members of the Council—spoke out in favour of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the occupied Arab territories. That just position found its reflection in the draft resolution which was killed by the United States veto. Thus the discussion in the Council of the problem of the Middle East has confirmed again that the majority of the members of the United Nations, members and non-members of the Security Council, believe that without an equitable solution of the Palestinian problem on the basis of respect for the inalienable national rights of the Arab people of Palestine and without the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the occupied Arab territories, genuine peace in the Middle East is impossible.

It is necessary to draw attention also to yet ano-

ther very important aspect of the discussion of the Middle East problem by the Council. A majority of the members of the Council who took part in the discussion spoke out with considerable conviction and stressed the need for the continuation of consistent efforts on the part of the world community and the United Nations to bring about a just and lasting peace in the Middle East so that the hotbed of threats of war in that region may be liquidated. This general view was also expressed by our Secretary-General in his statement before the Security Council.

In this connexion many of the participants in the discussion have also recognized that the Security Council cannot work out a peace treaty on a Middle East settlement and that the concrete working out of the individual elements and of the whole structure of the settlement should be carried out by the international forum which was set up for that purpose, namely, the Geneva Peace Conference.

The majority of the participants in the debate have recognized and stressed the need for the participation in the Conference on the settlement of the Middle East problem of all the parties directly concerned, including the participation on an equal footing of the Palestine Liberation Organization. In this context it is important to stress again that it is precisely the Geneva Peace Conference which provides already existing international machinery for holding negotiations aimed at a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and the forum where a just and equitable settlement of the Middle East crisis can and must be achieved.

All these positions which I have just indicated were supported not only by the majority of the States members of the Council, but also by the delegations of more than 20 States Members of the United Nations which took part in the discussion in the Council of the Middle East question, including the Palestinian problem.

In this connexion it should be pointed out that those positions are based on the views of the overwhelming majority of the Member States of the United Nations, which were expressed at the sessions of the General Assembly and which were incorporated in its resolutions.

What conclusion can be drawn from all this? The main political conclusion from the discussion of the Middle East problem in the Security Council is to be found in the fact that those who have prevented the adoption of a just decision by the Secu-

rity Council, a decision aimed at speeding up the achievement of peace in the Middle East with the equal participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the representative of the Palestinian people, have assumed a very heavy responsibility before the Security Council, the General Assembly and the whole of the world community.

Those who have undermined the adoption of the resolution have again demonstrated before the United Nations and before the eyes of the world their support of the expansionist and aggressive policies of the leaders of Israel, who, in violation of the principles of the United Nations on the non-acquisition of foreign territory by force, for many years now have been illegally occupying the Arab territories they have seized. In this context, it is impossible not to point also to the very important fact that, as a result of a long and thorough discussion of the Middle East problem in the Council, it has been clearly revealed before the eyes of the world that Israel and those who support it have become completely isolated internationally.

However, let them not triumph, those who have placed obstacles in the path of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and in the path of the implementation of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, those who hope by such methods to perpetuate the occupation of foreign territories seized by the aggressor.

The discussion in the Security Council of the Middle East problem has again confirmed the correctness of the line taken by the Soviet Union and the overwhelming majority of the States Members of the United Nations, with the aim of achieving a comprehensive political settlement of the problem of the Middle East. Furthermore, the need to satisfy the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including its right to create its own State, has been recognized and confirmed. It has been recognized and it has been very clearly stated that recognition of the legitimate and inalienable national rights of the Palestinians is one of the central issues in a Middle East settlement, without the solution of which the establishment of a stable peace in that region is not possible.

It is high time Israel and its protectors understood that all this cannot be simply cancelled out, either by a boycott of the Security Council by Israel or by a negative vote in the Security Council itself.

Israel, pursuing its aim of disguising its un-

justified position of non-participation in the discussion of the Middle East problem in the Security Council, refers to the non-recognition of Israel by the Palestine Liberation Organization. Such an approach should be rejected with determination. For it is necessary to consider this question in a different light and specifically to ask whether the Palestinian Arabs can adopt any other attitude towards Israel than the one they have adopted, when Israel and its protectors continue to ignore the inalienable national rights of the Palestinians and to deny their right to set up a national State and home of their own. Let Israel state officially that it recognizes the inalienable national rights of the Arab people of Palestine and that it agrees to the creation of its national State.

In conclusion, I must emphasize that the peoples of the Arab countries and the Arab people of Palestine and its natural friends and allies, represented by the socialist, non-aligned and all peace-loving States, will continue, as before, their ceaseless struggle to achieve a just and stable peace in the Middle East, the triumph of the principles of reason and justice and the recognition of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people; and this struggle will certainly be crowned with success.

THE PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for the kind words addressed to me.

MR. DATCU (Romania) (interpretation from French): Speaking on 16 January in the Security Council, the delegation of Romania expressed the hope that our present work would result in a resolution which would as soon as possible make available means whereby the conflict might be resolved through negotiations. At the moment, my delegation would like to express its deep regret over the fact that the draft resolution submitted by six members of the Council, including Romania, although supported by the majority failed of adoption because of the negative vote cast by the delegation of the United States. Our regret is all the greater since we know that it was a balanced and constructive resolution, prepared with a full awareness of our responsibility to peace and with deliberate care to safeguard the interests of all peoples and all States of the Middle East.

In fact, the sponsors of the draft resolution, and more specifically you, Mr. President, and our colleagues from Pakistan and Panama, Ambassadors

Akhund and Boyd, all very carefully took pains to consult all members of the Council and particularly all parties to the conflict present at the debate.

As far as the eleventh-hour amendment submitted by our colleague of the United Kingdom is concerned, my delegation had to abstain in the vote on it, not because we would challenge resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), but because the amendment was so worded that its adoption would disturb the balance that had been so painstakingly achieved in the six-Power draft after such careful and arduous negotiations.

We feel that the fact that the United Kingdom amendment was rejected does not mean that the Security Council has disavowed those resolutions. It merely means that the Security Council did not feel that it was appropriate to include the United Kingdom amendment in that draft resolution which you, Mr. President, and the representative of Japan had defined as "a delicate compromise".

I should like to add—and I wish to stress this—that my delegation nevertheless shares the views already expressed by other delegations that the Security Council has held a significant, revealing and useful debate. The Palestine Liberation Organization has been given an opportunity to express its views and has enriched our debate by its contribution. The participation of the PLO in this debate on an equal footing has been a most positive milestone in the efforts of the Security Council to solve the problems of this conflict. Other parties to the conflict—Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic and Jordan—have also put forward ideas and reasonable suggestions in order to foster the process of establishing peace in the Middle East. This debate has confirmed the opinion held generally here in the United Nations and everywhere throughout the world that the Palestine question is at the very heart of the Middle East conflict, that the Palestinian people is a major party to the conflict and that it is therefore necessary that the problem flowing from this be examined with the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization. It has also been most convincingly brought out that in any diplomatic effort to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East the national rights of the Palestinian people must be recognized and taken into account, namely, the right to self-determination including the right to constitute its own independent State. The necessity for all parties concerned to intensify their efforts so that negotiations lead-

ing to a political settlement of the problems of the Middle East can be renewed was also stressed.

This debate, which is now drawing to a close, underscores the need further to intensify the efforts within the United Nations and significantly to increase the support of this world Organization and of the Security Council in the search for a solution of the Middle East conflict. We believe that the responsibility of the Security Council regarding peace in that region has not ended. On the contrary, so long as a just and lasting peace has not been established, the Council must remain actively seized of the Middle East problem.

Similarly, we are convinced that now more than ever the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as the representative of our Organization and the element representing the continuity of our Organization's activities, should be encouraged to launch further efforts for peace in the Middle East. We believe that the parties to the conflict should take further advantage of the possibilities available through the good offices of the Secretary-General to start negotiations. My delegation would like to welcome the statement made here a few moments ago by the Secretary-General.

Although these meetings have not culminated in the adoption of a resolution—which was our ardent desire—we are nevertheless convinced that it is possible peacefully and by negotiations to solve the complex problem of the situation in the Middle East. The Romanian Government considers that, in order to achieve a political settlement in the Middle East, it is necessary that, in accordance with resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), Israel withdraw its troops from all the territories occupied during the 1967 war; that the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the right to constitute its own independent State, be recognized; and that a just and lasting peace be established that will ensure the existence, territorial integrity and the right to free and independent development of all States of the region, including the Palestinian State to be created and the State of Israel.

In conclusion, I should like to say that Romania intends to continue contributing in the future to the search for practical solutions aimed at fostering and intensifying the process of establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

MR. BOYD (Panama) (interpretation from



Spanish): For a just and lasting peace to be established in the Middle East, resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) must be strengthened. That will allow the Palestinian people to exercise its inalienable national rights, including that of establishing an independent State in Palestine within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations.

Many new crises could be avoided by the just and timely recognition of the national rights of the Palestinians to return to their own homeland and to establish an independent State in Palestine in accordance with the terms of the resolutions on this subject.

The Panamanian delegation has worked arduously during the last fortnight, with a sincere desire to see the debate on the Middle East problem including the Palestinian question culminate in a balanced resolution acceptable to the parties to the conflict and at the same time interpreted by world public opinion as a major constructive effort by this major body of the United Nations duly to channel the peace negotiations for that sorely beset region of the world. We believed that the draft resolution which we co-sponsored with the delegations of Benin, Guyana, Pakistan, Romania and the United Republic of Tanzania, which was rejected, offered mutual concessions and embodied the terms that would complement the basic resolutions on this subject, and that it could therefore be accepted by the parties concerned and the members of the Security Council. However, that was not the case.

We are concerned at having failed, because to maintain the *status quo* regarding the acute and fundamental problems of the Middle East is willingly or unwillingly to allow situations of force to prevail, which will inevitably lead to new warlike incidents.

The draft resolution co-sponsored by Panama suggested global solutions to the problem and was a most balanced document. The day on which the Palestinians establish an independent State in Palestine—one respecting the right of Israel and other States of the region to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries—will be the day when the peace which now seems so elusive will have a better chance of being brought about and strengthened.

In the statements which we made on 12 and 17 January, we gave the substantive reasons that led us as Latin Americans to call for the reconcilia-

tion for which we yearn between the Arab countries and Israel—important groupings of mankind with which Panama has very close and special ties of affection and friendship which we should like to see maintained.

The sole option now left to us at the end of this debate is to urge on all those that might contribute to a prompt renewal of negotiations at the so-called Geneva Peace Conference to do so and to see that those efforts be resumed as soon as possible, aware that the world will be able to appreciate whatever is done to ensure peace in the Middle East. They can, I know, count on the unflagging co-operation of the Secretary-General and the good will of members of the Security Council.

MR. RYDBECK (Sweden): In my statement on 14 January in the Council debate on the present agenda item I emphasized my Government's view that the basis for our deliberations must, first and foremost, be the two Security Council resolutions, 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). The principles embodied in these documents are still fully valid, and we must not do anything that may change or weaken those principles.

Without referring expressly to resolutions 242 (1967) or 338 (1973), the draft resolution which was put forward by the six members of the Council and on which we have just voted does, in my Government's view, contain the most important elements of these resolutions, in particular the reaffirmation by the Council of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. This passage thus again reaffirms the principle of the secure existence of Israel and all other States in the Middle East.

Another important feature of the draft is that it contains the necessary complement to the previous decisions by the Council, that is, the reference to the national rights of the Palestinians and their right to self-determination. The solution of this problem is a basic prerequisite for a just settlement of the conflict in the Middle East.

Notwithstanding the fact that the draft contains these important, positive elements, my delegation, to its great regret, found itself unable to vote for it. The reason for this is that the United Kingdom amendment, for which we voted, unfortunately failed of adoption. This failure of the Council to

include an explicit preference for resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) could, in the view of my Government, cast doubt as to the compatibility of the draft before us with the basic Security Council texts in question. The uncertainty thus created with regard to how the draft resolution should be interpreted forced my delegation to abstain.

In the Council's debate my delegation has emphasized that we consider it a matter of great importance that the Council should be able to arrive at decisions that could receive broad support. I regret that a broad support has not been possible to obtain. This is not due to any lack of efforts on your part, Mr. President, or on the part of the co-sponsors. My delegation expresses its warm thanks to you and to the co-sponsors for your patience and untiring efforts.

While it is thus regrettable that no resolution could be adopted, this does not mean, in our view, that this debate has not had its value. On the contrary, we consider this debate most constructive and useful.

As to the draft resolution, I wish to repeat that in our view it contains several essential elements which would form part of an over-all solution. I refer, in particular, to the paragraph dealing with the rights of the Palestinian people to exercise its self-determination. I want to reiterate that the Swedish Government gives its full support to this principle. We would express the hope that the Council will eventually be able to reach a decision endorsing this rightful aim and that that decision will command the broad support which is necessary to achieve meaningful results. Only in this way will it be possible to realize the aim that we are all urgently seeking, that is, the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Earlier in this debate my delegation emphatically stressed that the status quo does not give peace. Time does not work for peace. The peoples, the Governments must want and then work for such changes as will lead to agreements, and we appeal to all parties concerned actively to seek such agreements. The peoples in the area must finally have the opportunity to live without the constant threat of violence, terror and war. My delegation therefore wants to associate itself wholeheartedly with the appeal just made by the Secretary-General. We owe it to him to acknowledge gratefully once again the untiring efforts that he has devoted to the solution of the problems of the

Middle East over the years. We also owe to him our fullest support for his continued activities in this matter. We attach great importance, and indeed a great hope, to the role that the Secretary-General with his great experience and skill can play in the contribution towards the solution that we all fervently desire.

MR. VINCI (Italy): On 19 January, in the 1876th meeting of the Council, I had the opportunity to state the position of the Italian delegation on this highly important issue, namely, the Middle East problem including the Palestinian question.

I do not wish, however, in explaining the vote I have just cast on behalf of the Italian delegation, to refer myself simply to that statement. We would not be doing justice to all the participants in the debate. We could even appear as being ungrateful to the co-sponsors of the draft resolution, who have tried very hard in order to meet the views of the other members of the Council. On the contrary, we have listened very carefully to all the speakers, and we have examined with the greatest attention all the information and opinions provided during the debate and in the intensive consultations which have followed, practically until a little time ago. We certainly appreciate the many and significant improvements introduced in the original text, as will appear from what I shall say later in my statement.

And I can assure all the participants in the debate, as well as the six co-sponsors of the draft resolution, that in taking its final decision the Italian Government has done so after having duly and very earnestly considered all the elements I have just mentioned. I sincerely hope that from what I will say next everyone will be able to understand the reason why my delegation has been unable to support the present draft, much as we would have wished to do so fully, as I indicated in supporting and announcing our vote in favour of the amendment proposed by the representative of the United Kingdom.

Let me now recapitulate what we had in mind from the beginning of our deliberations and the opinion we hold on the texts which were put to the vote.

The main objective that Italy has consistently pursued is a just and lasting settlement in the Middle East. In this connexion, our position, as repeatedly stated, is that such a settlement

must be based on the following points: the withdrawal of Israel from all the territories occupied in June 1967; the recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian people, to whom a homeland cannot be further denied; and respect of the sovereignty, the political independence and the territorial integrity within secure and recognized boundaries of all the States in the area. Our stand is inspired by the principles stated by the Security Council itself, that is, in resolution 242 (1967) and subsequently recalled by resolution 338 (1973), which has established a framework for negotiations within which it has already been possible to achieve encouraging results.

In the draft that has been submitted to us, we do not fail to see a positive aspect to the extent that it tends to supplement the contents of the resolutions I have just mentioned with a dutiful acknowledgement of the political reality—and not only the human one—of the problem, a political reality we have long underlined, of the Palestinian people. This people rightly aspires, in our view, to the establishment of a national State. From this angle the draft is, therefore, to be commended for general consent, and for my delegation I would point out that we share its inspiration and its general scope.

However, this same text, which shows such an appreciable and commendable effort by the non-aligned members of the Council and other countries, still contains some formulations which raise a number of questions. We feel that some paragraphs are open to uncertain interpretations similar to those which have in the past made more difficult the peace-making process. In particular, from a technical and legal point of view, the importance of which can hardly be underestimated, we must take note once again of the omission of any specific reference to resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). What is also missing, in our view, is some clearer wording having the effect of giving new momentum to the negotiating process.

In conclusion, we believe that if there is a meaning all of us here and mainly the absent, should draw from this constructive and illuminating debate, which has gone on for two weeks and in depth, it can be construed as follows: a clear indication that what is needed is a quick resumption of the negotiating process and a growing acknowledgement that any attempt to deny to the Palestinian people the right to the expression of their national identity, since it would miss a main feature

of the negotiations, would be bound to obstruct the efforts towards peace, efforts which, on the contrary, we should like to see speeded up. Italy for its part is ready to contribute by all means to these efforts. In particular my country is prepared, together with our partners of the European community, to work out proposals for an adequate system of international guarantees, which appear to us to be the necessary complement of an overall peace settlement.

MR. PAQUI (Benin) (interpretation from French): In accepting the responsibility of participating as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, the Revolutionary Military Government of the People's Republic of Benin set as its target to do all in its power to contribute to the search for any solution that would lead to the strengthening of peace and international security and to make positive and constructive suggestions to help in the search for and the establishment of peace in the world. It was from that approach that the delegation of Benin worked, together with its other colleagues, and gave its support to all the compromise formulas, as far as they did not betray the fundamental national revolutionary options and mission.

The work we have undertaken since 12 January has given my delegation the chance to show its desire to co-operate, because, as the entire world knows, the Middle East is the region where more than ever before the peace of the world is at present threatened. Benin, when taking an active part in the preparation of the last version which was acceptable to all of us as the document we have just considered, worked with hope and confidence after hearing the views of all the parties, including those that are absent. Together with other colleagues, Benin has tried to reconcile the divergent views and hoped to make a modest contribution to the establishment of peace in that troubled and torn region of the world. While keeping the substance of the original text, which, as a majority of the Council recognized, admitted the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and independence within a State that should have borders defined in accordance with other existing States, the co-sponsors accepted all the suggested modifications and the majority of the constructive proposals made so that some of the errors of the past could be redressed and at the end of our work

the Security Council could pride itself on having at least broken the logjam and opened a freeway to all future efforts to establish in the Middle East a just and stable peace. But certain members of the Council preferred it to be otherwise, because by an irony they feel that this body in charge of maintaining international peace and security is not the one to draw the lines that should be followed in order to achieve peace in the Middle East. Now we have to break up without a decision of the Council, which is most regrettable. However, the delegation of Benin does not feel frustrated or discouraged, because we have the satisfaction of knowing that we have fulfilled our duty. Our conscience is clear because of the work we have done, and we leave it to history and the world community to judge our work.

It would be superfluous to stress that, despite the decision that was just adopted on a constructive text, the key to any solution to the crisis in the Middle East is the solution of the Palestinian problem, as the overwhelming majority of the members of the Security Council have stressed in their statements. Therefore, we should not hope to solve the problem of the Middle East by selecting deliberate aspects and overlooking and ignoring some of the essential components. My delegation is convinced that you do not have to be a genius to recognize that, even if by a miracle Israel were to withdraw from all the Arab territories occupied since the war of 1967, peace would thereupon be re-established in the region. It could not be so until the Palestinian problem was also solved, and it must always be considered a type of epiphenomenon. After nine years of stagnation, one would have to be wearing blinkers not to understand that there can be no true and lasting solution in the region until the Palestinian people has been granted its homeland and as long as it is still forced to lead a nomadic existence.

However, to reject the present draft resolution because it is contended that it would replace previous resolutions, particularly resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), would be to exaggerate, as the majority of the members of the Council have recognized. If it is true that those resolutions do constitute the basis for negotiations on the crisis of the Middle East, it is no less true that they contain certain flaws that the Security Council should correct if it wishes to help in the solution of the crisis of the Middle East. We know, for example,

that the weakness of resolution 242 (1967) lies *inter alia* in regarding the problem of Palestinians as a problem of refugees. The majority of the members of the Council have agreed that that problem is a highly political one.

That being the case, what would be more reasonable and what would be more just than to try to correct this weakness? That is what Benin and the other co-sponsors have been trying to bear in mind in the course of the negotiations, because justice and equity dictate that at least the land reserved for the Palestinians after the adoption of the famous resolution that led to the partition in 1947 should be restored to them. The text which was just supported by an overwhelming majority of the members of the Council and yet will not be a document of the Council because of the veto, by recognizing the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination as well as its right to constitute a State, only wanted to invite the Council once again to study the very act of the birth of the State of Israel in order to find a solution to the crisis and to force Israel to be content with what was granted it and to render unto the Palestinians that which was granted them.

Among the arguments advanced to block that draft resolution was the will to do nothing to alter the chances of the negotiator. The delegation of Benin considers that if we do not want to play the ostrich, if we want to negotiate in an objective manner, then we must tell each of the parties exactly what it must do and, particularly if it is a State that refuses to recognize a reality which is obvious to the rest of the world, that it is wrong in trying to overlook and ignore the basic element in the crisis, namely, the Palestinian question. Without being expert in political science, we can quite easily understand, after a calm and objective analysis, that the system of negotiation is blocked and that it will run the risk of being blocked as long as there is an unrealistic attitude adopted whereby the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and independence is not recognized.

Furthermore, contrary to what was stated in a widely distributed American periodical, the draft resolution co-sponsored by Benin was not a challenge to a giant. On the contrary, it was intended to help the giant and to help resolution 242 (1967) by introducing the necessary corrections that are called for in 1976. Therefore it was a realistic and

useful draft resolution. But alas, others did not judge likewise.

History will decide in future whether the co-sponsors or the giant were right. History will say whether or not the solution to the crisis of the Middle East has to pass by way of the specific attention which will be given to the solution of the Palestinian problem.

The delegation of Benin dares to hope that that truth will not be long in coming. The Palestinian people, fighting to have their rights recognized have waited, and I trust that they will be able to wait, because they have faith and confidence in their objectives, and nothing can stifle that trust and confidence. It is for that reason that my delegation believes that we must not await a new outbreak of war in the zone before we accept and understand this intangible fact, and we endorse the appeal made a few moments ago by the Secretary-General.

**MR. KIKHIA** (Libyan Arab Republic): The draft resolution presented by the Ambassador of Pakistan on behalf of the co-sponsors and contained in document S/11940, includes several very important positive points acceptable to my delegation. I refer in particular to the following points.

First, the recognition of the political status of the Palestinian people and of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the authentic representative of the people of Palestine.

Secondly, the recognition that the question of Palestine is the core and the origin of the conflict in the Middle East.

Thirdly, the condemnation of the Zionist aggression by deploring Israel's persistence in its occupation of the Arab territories.

Fourthly, the reaffirmation of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to establish an independent and sovereign State in Palestine.

My delegation would like to express on this occasion its gratitude and appreciation to you, Mr. President, and to our brothers the representatives of Benin, Guyana, Pakistan, Panama and Romania, for their sincere and indefatigable efforts in preparing this draft resolution after careful and delicate negotiations. However, the delegation of the Libyan Arab Republic did not participate in the vote on the draft resolution co-sponsored by our brothers, the representatives of Benin, Guyana, Pakistan,

Panama, Romania and the United Republic of Tanzania, because it employed the language of and was based in part on the principles of resolution 242 (1967). The position of my delegation concerning resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) has been reiterated many times in the General Assembly and in the Security Council. Those two resolutions have been bypassed, as I said earlier, by events and developments both inside and outside the United Nations. They are irrelevant as a framework for any just and lasting solution to the Middle East problem and to the Palestinian question. In fact, General Assembly resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX) reaffirming the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, along with resolution 3376 (XXX) proposing means designed to enable the Palestinian people to achieve their national rights and resolution 3379 (XXX) condemning zionism as a racist movement, reflect profound and important changes and developments in the attitude of the United Nations and in international public opinion. Logically those resolutions call for a review of the entire question and of the method of dealing with it.

I should also like to stress the fact that even this mild text prepared after long discussions and in a spirit of compromise failed to be adopted by the Council because of the negative vote of a permanent member of the Security Council. That means because of the veto of the protectors and allies of the Zionist aggressive entity.

These facts reaffirm my earlier statement made during this debate that the unjust and unlimited United States commitment to the Zionists constitutes the main obstacle to the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Finally, I should like to stress the fact that, in our opinion, by its vote on the British amendment, and by refusing specific reference to resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), the Security Council considers that those resolutions are no longer valid as a practical and realistic framework for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. In fact, the negative vote on the British amendment sealed the fate of resolution 242 (1967). It is a kind of *coup de grace* for these ill-fated ambiguous and irrelevant resolutions.

**THE PRESIDENT:** No other member of the Council wishes to speak, but before I call on those delegations which have been invited to participate in our discussion and which have expressed a wish

to address the Council, I should like, in my capacity as representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, to make a statement subsequent to the voting that has taken place in the Council.

It is indeed regrettable that the Security Council has not been able to adopt any resolution on the problem, for a unique opportunity has been lost thereby which could have been used at least to make a start in changing the dangerous trend of events in the Middle East. It is nevertheless the firm opinion of the Tanzania delegation that the meetings of the Security Council this month on the problem before it have been extremely fruitful in many ways.

In the course of the debate the Council has heard a fairly good number of statements, including especially that of the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In those statements, all of which were serious, one could not fail to note the overwhelming affirmation of certain pertinent Charter principles, in particular the inadmissibility of forcible territorial acquisitions and the recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, as well as the right of all States to exist in sovereignty and territorial integrity. But most significant, of course, was the affirmation by most speakers of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, for it was the first time for 30 years that the Security Council had focused its attention on this question. From resolution on resolution it is now overwhelmingly clear that the vast majority of the world community is of the view that no lasting solution can be arrived at in the Middle East unless and until the Palestinian question, the root cause of the whole problem, has been adequately settled.

The draft resolution which, regrettably, has not been adopted by the Council owing to a negative vote of a permanent member of the Security Council is, and will continue to be, an important and serious attempt at a meaningful search for a just, peaceful and lasting solution. We continue to believe that the adoption of that draft resolution would have created the necessary favourable and indeed indispensable conditions for promoting the momentum towards genuine and serious negotiations for peace and justice in the area.

The draft resolution submitted by four non-aligned members and two other non-permanent members of the Council was the result of long hours of negotiations and reflects all the basic con-

cerns on the question. It contains the elements in resolution 242 (1967) as well as those in resolution 338 (1973), and on those aspects it is definitely clearer and less equivocal than its predecessors. Above all, unlike resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), it tackles the very underlying cause of the problem: the question of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. If it had been adopted and followed by future efforts in the search for peace, it would certainly have ensured that the negotiations focused on the crucial and decisive issues. It is also our belief that those negotiations would have been rendered easier. We continue to hope, however, that in spite of the failure to adopt that draft the elements contained in it will not be lost from sight in future efforts.

We are confident that the Security Council will not give up, but will soon make another attempt at agreeing on a resolution of this kind. Needless to say, I have no doubt that in such future attempts the Security Council will continue to receive the outstanding and unreserved assistance of our distinguished Secretary-General, whose own contribution in the current consideration of the problem has been singularly important.

As President of the Council, I shall now call on those delegations which have been invited to participate in our discussions and which have expressed a wish to address the Council before it concludes its consideration of the item on its agenda.

I call on the representative of Egypt.

MR. ABDEL MEGUID (Egypt): At the outset of this long debate on the Middle East problem including the Palestinian question, in which the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has participated fully, there was hope that the Council's work would culminate in a resolution recognizing the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people. By recognizing those rights and calling for the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the Geneva Peace Conference, such a resolution would have added a necessary, indeed a vital element in the search for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem.

Many delegations, realizing the importance of the question being discussed by the Council, requested the right to express their views during the debate. This debate has proved to be of great value in many respects, and I am confident that the sig-

nificance of what was stated by the vast majority will not go unnoticed. The merit of the debate is that it focused on the new realities of the problem by stressing the necessity of recognizing the national rights of the Palestinian people. Moreover, it demonstrated very clearly that the recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian people is considered by the overwhelming majority of States to be of fundamental importance for any settlement in the Middle East to be just and lasting.

Speaker after speaker has stressed this recognition. The Palestinian people, like all other peoples in whose name the Charter of the United Nations was written, have rights that are of the utmost importance to all. To view the question of Palestinian people simply in humanitarian terms, as a mere refugee problem, has proved to be the single most costly mistake in all past efforts intended to achieve a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. History bears witness to that very fact.

Thus, it is with a deep sense of regret and puzzlement that we take note of the fact that the Security Council's draft resolution recognizing the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and supported by the majority of its members was rejected by the United States of America. In casting its veto, the United States will most certainly neither infringe upon the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people nor change the fact that the Palestinian question is the core of the Middle East problem. Such a negative vote will only cause delay and hinder the processes for arriving at a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

From the start of this debate, the Security Council had before it an important opportunity to add a further positive contribution to the various efforts aimed at achieving a just solution, by agreeing unanimously on a resolution to the effect that a permanent and just peace in the Middle East must be based on the achievement by the Palestinian people of their national rights. Had the Council been enabled to act, it would have been simply redressing the Middle East equation, not by detracting anything but, on the contrary, by adding a vital prerequisite for a just and lasting peace in the area.

The draft resolution just vetoed would have affirmed, *inter alia*, that the Palestinian people should be enabled to exercise their inalienable national rights of self-determination, including

their right to establish an independent State in Palestine in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and this because of the Council's conviction that the question of Palestine is the core of the conflict in the Middle East. That being so, it is only natural that the Palestine Liberation Organization should take part in all efforts that could lead to such a settlement, including the Geneva Peace Conference held under the auspices of the United Nations, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX) adopted on 10 November 1975.

Egypt's point of view in connexion with the Council's debate was and is very clear. In my statement to the Council on 13 January, I had occasion to state that:

... my Government, by participating in the debate, considers it not an alternative but rather a prerequisite to the Peace Conference. Therefore... Egypt calls for the reconvening of this Conference with the participation of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, on an equal footing with other participants in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX) in order to deal with the problem in all its different aspects, on the aforementioned basis. (*1871st meeting, p. 26*)

Even the United States of America, which saw fit to cast a negative vote today, has recently stopped referring to the Palestinian problem simply as a refugee problem. The logical sequence should have been that the rights of the Palestinian people are no less important than the rights of all the other peoples in the area and should be acknowledged and guaranteed. It would therefore have followed that they should also be given the opportunity to express their legitimate demands on an equal footing with the other peoples in the area.

The majority view that has clearly evolved during the debate is that the recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian people is of vital importance to any procedure devised to achieve a settlement. Security Council resolution 338 (1973) set out such a procedure whose success depends on how it can come to grips with the core of the problem it was created to solve.

The Security Council's inaction today with regard to the implementation of one of the main purposes of the United Nations Charter is most disturbing, for it is disturbing to contemplate a world so unbalanced and so immobilized.

Let us hope that the history of missed opportunities will not remain forever unheeded. Losing opportunity after opportunity will not gain time for Israel or for peace, for time is most obviously not in Israel's favour and Israel, in trying to play with time, is also playing with fire.

I believe that there is no need for me here to restate Egypt's position in detail, since I had the occasion to do so in my previous statement before the Council on 13 January 1976, contained in document S/PV.1871. However, in order to dispel any shadow of a doubt, I should like to reiterate the basic elements of our position: first, the right of the Palestinian people to an independent State of its own in accordance with its national right to self-determination; secondly, the total and complete withdrawal of Israel from all the Arab territories occupied since 5 June 1967; and, thirdly, the reconvening of the Peace Conference at Geneva in the near future with the participation of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization on an equal footing with the other participants in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX), in order to deal with the problem in all its aspects.

We share the anxiety expressed today in the statement of the Secretary-General, and I am sure that all of us around this table and elsewhere will undoubtedly take due account of all that has emerged from the discussions, each drawing his own conclusion as to the meaning and implications of the debate rather than its result.

Let us sincerely hope that such reassessment as may take place will not be counter-productive but, on the contrary, will be of a kind which will open the road to peace and stability in the area.

**THE PRESIDENT:** The next name on the list of speakers is that of the representative of Jordan, on whom I now call.

**MR. SHARAF (Jordan):** The result of the vote just taken bears little relation to what has happened in the last two weeks. The last two weeks have been a landmark in the development of the cause of justice in the Middle East. A new international awareness and a new understanding have emerged in the Security Council during these debates. A profound and irreversible change has taken place in the thinking of the international community regarding the rights of the Arab peoples, and particularly the Palestinian people, in the present conflict

in the Middle East.

In spite of the result of this vote, the basis for any prospective just settlement to the conflict has profoundly changed. The former obsolete assumptions of how to bring about peace in the Middle East have evaporated. Everyone realizes now that peace cannot be a state of static tranquillity rooted in Israeli military superiority and continued suppression of Arab rights. No one ignores any more the centrality of the issue of Palestinian rights in the continuing conflict. No one genuinely believes that equivocation on the necessity of Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories can continue in any serious search for peace in the Middle East. While all realize that in any just and realistic settlement of the conflict there has to be a balance between the rights and obligations of all the parties, no one—perhaps not even the United States—continues to conceive of it as the same mechanical and one-sided balance of November 1967. No one—perhaps not even the United States—can continue to believe that a viable search for peace can address itself only to Israel's claims and ignore Arab, and particularly Palestinian, rights.

The debate in the Security Council during the last two weeks has reflected a major and profound evolution in the thinking and positions of all continents and peoples on the issue of the Middle East. Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe—in spite of specific votes—have spoken strongly and positively in favour of justice for the Palestinians and their fellow Arabs. They have pronounced themselves strongly in favour of the principles of self-determination and the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force. In varying degrees and styles, they have condemned Israel's expansionism, chauvinism and intransigence.

They have supported the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people. They have categorically demanded the ending of Israeli occupation and aggrandizement. So, in spite of the United States veto, the Security Council has taken a decision, and it is a strong and positive decision.

As an Arab country which has absorbed for nearly three decades much of the shock of the Palestinian tragedy and Palestinian trials and tribulations, Jordan is gratified at this new success for the cause of justice in the Middle East. We extend our deep gratitude to all the States which have ex-



pressed their positive support for Arab rights and for the cause of justice. They have displayed a fundamental realization of the inseparable bonds unifying the struggle for justice, self-determination and freedom by all peoples in all continents.

Unfortunately, one major Power continues to display a lack of understanding and moral sensitivity far out of proportion to its global responsibility and influence. By casting a vote against a moderate and balanced draft resolution representing the irreducible minimum of recognition of the elements of right and justice in the Middle East question, the United States has destroyed a rare opportunity for opening the road to a revitalized peace process. The Arab parties were all here at the Security Council, advancing a reasonable case and expressing readiness for a just peace. It was not their fault that their adversary chose to avoid this forum of constructive peace process. The United States has made a historic mistake by missing this opportunity and by its insistence on maintaining the old and anachronistic framework for the establishment of peace which was drawn up in the wake of the Arab defeat of 1967.

There is no sanctity in that framework. Resolution 242 (1967) has no more and no less inherent value than other resolutions of the Security Council on the Middle East. Why should it, for example, have more value than nearly half a dozen resolutions on Jerusalem? In fact, resolution 242 (1967) has lost in value as time passed and no progress was made in the achievement of peace or a just settlement in the Middle East. The United States knows this very well as it has been closely associated with the agonizing process of attempting to implement resolution 242 (1967).

For nine years not one single step towards the implementation of resolution 242 (1967) has been made. The only steps, minor and partial, involving some movement resulted from the war of 1973 and not from the inherent, dynamic force of resolution 242 (1967). And it was again the long failure to break the stalemate that caused the war of 1973.

May I also recall that the war was again preceded by an Arab attempt in the summer of 1973 to bring the case of the failure to reach any results envisaged in resolution 242 (1967) to the attention of the Security Council only to be frustrated by a United States veto.

We have been told to preserve the so-called

agreed framework. What agreed framework? Who agrees to this presumed framework? All the Arab parties either believe or have now realized that the framework envisaged in 1967 is no longer adequate. Israel has not shown any respect for or enthusiasm about that framework during the last nine years. The United States, while technically not a party, cannot boast great achievements in the implementation of that framework. The so-called framework received during the last phase of the debate of the Security Council a peculiar form of support from the United Kingdom. A country that prides itself on its ability to accommodate with change and changing circumstances cannot justify such rigid attachment to an old and outdated formula. The balance assumed to have been the basis for resolution 242 (1967) was essentially preserved in the draft resolution just voted on. It only attempted to correct insufficiencies in resolution 242 (1967) and to take account of new realities. Therefore, the last minute proposal of the United Kingdom, injecting as it did an element of confusion and divisiveness, can hardly be construed as a constructive contribution.

We have been asked to preserve the process for peace. Which process? There is no process. There is a stalemate. This is why the Arab parties have come to the Security Council. Nevertheless, this debate by the Council has been fruitful and forward looking. A new framework for future peace in the Middle East has emerged. A new consensus is emerging in the world. Those who have not yet joined it will join it in the future. The Arabs have contributed to a new understanding of their case and cause. We are grateful to our friends and to all those who have supported the cause of peace and justice in the Middle East.

You, Mr. President, deserve a special salute and much credit for your role of leadership and your wisdom and untiring efforts in the conduct of this debate and in negotiations which helped develop a new framework of thinking and action for future peace in the Middle East.

THE PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Jordan for the very generous remarks he addressed to me personally.

I now call on the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.

MR. ALLAF (Syrian Arab Republic): The

vote just completed by the Security Council at the end of its two-week debate on the problem of the Middle East and the question of Palestine is an important landmark in the history of the handling by the United Nations of these two tragic situations.

In spite of last minute manoeuvres and in spite of the inability of the Council to adopt the draft resolution proposed by six of its members because of the abuse, once more, by the United States of America of its right of veto, that draft has gained the support of the democratic majority of the Council members. The draft resolution was the outcome of many days of lengthy and active consultations during which the sponsors exerted tireless efforts to accommodate the views of all parties in order to bring about a text that, short of entirely satisfying everyone, nevertheless constitutes a fair and valid basis for the realization of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Morally, the draft resolution has been adopted. Eleven countries out of 15 representing the entire family of nations in the Security Council have in fact, supported the draft resolution. The two non-participating members are no exception. They consider, in fact, that the draft resolution is too mild and they would have preferred a stronger affirmation of the rights of the Palestinian people and the Arab countries which are the victims of Israeli aggression. The tyrannous minority of one, who has obstructed the adoption of such a fair and balanced draft resolution, cannot change the course of history, for the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people have now become recognized by every nation of the world, except, of course, the aggressor itself and the one super-Power which has chosen to isolate itself in its blind support of it.

Yet what is there in this draft resolution that leads any country, let alone a super-Power and permanent member of the Security Council, to cast a vote against it or even to abstain? Does any of its provisions contradict the Charter of the United Nations or any principle of international law? The essential paragraph in the draft is paragraph 1, which is composed of four subparagraphs, forming as a whole the basic and balanced elements for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Subparagraph (a) recognizes to the Palestinian people the basic national rights recognized without

exception to every one of the 144 peoples constituting the United Nations, as well as to the few remaining nations which are still outside the international Organization either by their own choice or by pressure from the same tyrant minority. The right of every people to self-determination is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, in the first Article, and it is the backbone of the whole United Nations structure. To deny such a right amounts to a pure and simple rejection of the main principle on which all international relations are based. Unless we consider that the 3 million Palestinian human beings living inside and outside the occupied territories are mere phantoms, we have to recognize the existence of the Palestinian people. If there exists a Palestinian people, such a people is entitled, in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the most elementary principles of international law, to exercise its right to self-determination. The right of the Palestinian people to establish an independent State in its homeland, Palestine, stems directly from its inalienable right of self-determination and is as clearly stipulated at the end of subparagraph (a) in full conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. It is ironic that the opposition to the right of the Palestinian people to establish a State on its homeland comes exclusively from that Zionist entity which owes its very existence as a State, according to the United Nations, to the very resolution of the General Assembly which partitioned the territory of Palestine into two States, an Arab State and a Jewish State, plus the internationalized city of Jerusalem. Israel's denial of the right of the Palestinian people to establish an independent State in Palestine would amount to a legal suicide, because it would be denying General Assembly resolution 181 (II), of 29 November 1947, embodying the partition plan for Palestine and constituting in fact the United Nations birth certificate of the Zionist entity.

What is more abhorrent is Israel's affirmation that it would never allow the creation of a third State between its own and Jordan, for this is the first instance in memorable history when a State claimed for itself a right of extraterritorial sovereignty beyond its borders. We have heard, of course, of the concept of territorial waters but never of the concept of territorial territory by which a State can dictate beyond its legal borders

what should be or what should not be established. Obviously Israel cannot fool the world any more about the real designs behind such strange assertions, for it is becoming clearer than ever that what the Zionists are really after is pure and simple annexation of all or most of the occupied Arab territories. The creation of more Jewish settlements day after day, using various pretexts, on the Golan Heights and on the West Bank, as well as in other parts of the occupied Arab territories, is clear proof of Israel's policy of expansion.

Sub-paragraph (b) does not call for much argument in its support. The right of the Palestinian people to return to their homes and property and, if they choose not to do so, to receive adequate compensation has been recognized by the United Nations since the first days of the Palestinian tragedy, in General Assembly resolution 194 (III), of 11 May 1949. The same right has since been repeatedly confirmed year after year by the General Assembly, strangely enough, always under the sponsorship of none other than the United States delegation.

Sub-paragraph (c) is also very clear. It does not need explanation. It says in 13 words what could be equally convincingly said in 13 huge books, and that is that what was occupied by force must be completely returned. The occupation of Arab territories is a continued act of aggression according to the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law. The principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by the threat or use of force is indivisible, and all territories thus occupied must be completely returned. It is really distressing to see a very small minority of Security Council permanent members, who are supposed to be the first defenders of the provisions of the Charter and the rule of law, resort instead to intentional ambiguities and acrobatics in semantics in order to camouflage their blind support for the expansionist aggressor. Otherwise how can such great Powers as the United States or the United Kingdom explain their betrayal of the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations by failing to support a resolution which merely calls for the withdrawal of the aggressor from the territories it has occupied by force and by aggression, or how can they be opposed to recognition of the national rights of an uprooted people which has

been the victim of aggression and injustice for nearly three decades?

I do not think I need to go into details in regard to subparagraph (d), for this paragraph is supposed to meet the concern of those who insist on a so-called balance between the aggressor and the victim. Nevertheless, I cannot fail to refer to the term "secure and recognized boundaries" in that paragraph, which copies faithfully the language of the often quoted but never implemented resolution 242 (1967). Here, as well as there, one is faced with the same element of intentional ambiguity. What do we mean by secure and recognized boundaries? The concept of security cannot be related to any element of geographical or strategic position or situation, because the term "secure boundaries" would then be nothing more than a veiled invitation to expansion and annexation. Any such interpretation is definitely and wholly out of the question and is completely rejected by the Charter and by the principles of international law. Boundaries can be secure only if they are recognized. They can be recognized only if they are legal and not imposed by the force of aggression. The myth of geographically secure boundaries was completely shattered along with many others during the 1973 October war of liberation. Israel was at that time in full control of the Golan Heights in the north and of the Suez Canal in the south. Yet that strategic advantage did not prevent the Syrian and Egyptian armed forces from launching a successful attack against the aggressor and penetrating very deeply behind its lines.

In any event, the relevant reference in resolution 242 (1967), as well as in paragraph 1 (d) of the draft resolution which was vetoed today, speaks clearly of secure and recognized boundaries for all States in the area. But what might constitute secure boundaries for one State could at the same time constitute insecure boundaries for another. How then are we to decide which State's security has priority? The only security any State can have lies in its legality and in its respect for international law and for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In this age of ultra-modern weapons and sophisticated missiles it is difficult to see how any boundaries can be secure on the basis of territorial considerations.

It is really regrettable to see one of the two greatest super-Powers dedicating its influence

and its policy to the service of the aggressor. People have long ago begun to wonder who is really conducting the foreign policy of the United States of America. Is it President Ford or Mr. Rabin? Who decides about the action of the United States delegation? Is it Mr. Kissinger or Mr. Allon? This same question arises equally in relation to the question of who implements the policy of the United States in the United Nations. Is it Mr. Moynihan or Mr. Herzog? *The New York Times* of this morning gave a very timely answer to this last question. It said: "Mr. Rabin will be arriving in Washington at a time when Daniel Patrick Moynihan is serving as the Israeli voice in the the United Nations Security Council."

Why is such a great Power as the United States of America behaving in this manner? The bitter fact is that the United States of America is only isolating itself. With a very small number of States it isolated itself in the past in the General Assembly and it is now doing the same thing in the Security Council. The tyranny of this minority will not prevent the process of a just peace. A just and lasting peace is going to be realized and established. Every inch of the Arab occupied territory will be liberated and the heroic Palestinian people, sooner or later, will enjoy every single one of its national inalienable rights. The only loser will be the United States of America itself, which has proved once more that it is supporting the aggressor and that it lacks any quality of fairness, any quality which would make it a neutral and acceptable mediator in the Middle East crisis.

Where do we go from here? The United Nations is requested to take completely into its hands the efforts to establish a just and lasting peace in the region with the help of the overwhelming majority of Member States. We believe that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has special and particular responsibilities in this connexion and that he has a moral mandate from the world public to undertake everything possible in his high office and within his competence, as he promised in his statement today, to generate a movement towards a just and lasting peace.

We believe that the debate which has been going on in the Security Council for two weeks has been a very important Council activity. The Syrian Arab Republic, which requested this debate, is very happy and satisfied to see that all who have taken part in the debates, and even those who

have abstained in the voting on the draft resolution today, have reaffirmed the recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian people and the necessity of Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories. The debate has established the foundation for efforts to create a just and lasting peace in the region. The recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian people and the total withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories have become the two basic elements which should be taken into account in any future efforts towards the creation of such a lasting and just peace.

We express to the Secretary-General our warm thanks for his timely statement, in which he drew the attention of world public opinion and the international family to the danger of the situation in the region, and in which he requested that the process towards peace should not be stopped. We also very warmly thank the six countries which sponsored the draft resolution and which exerted great efforts in order to reach a very fair and balanced draft resolution. We equally thank all those great countries from East and West that have proved their devotion and attachment to the principles of justice and peace by voting in favour of that draft resolution.

Mr. President, the conduct of the current debate under your presidency was a great honour and a source of pride for all the countries of the third world. We extend to you our deep gratitude and our greatest thanks for the efforts you have exerted in spite of many manoeuvres and of the obstacles which certain countries have tried to put in the way of a fruitful debate.

I should like also to thank the representative of the United Kingdom. By insisting on presenting his draft amendment, he in fact gave an opportunity to the overwhelming majority of the members of the Council to reaffirm their total rejection of the two resolutions, resolution 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), as the sole basis for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region.

As a result of that draft amendment, which was soundly defeated, the validity and the moral value of the vetoed draft resolution have only been enhanced.

I shall conclude my statement by quoting once more from my first statement on 13 January, at the beginning of this debate, in which I reaffirmed:

Just and lasting peace can be realized only through a comprehensive settlement within the framework of the United Nations, taking into account all the elements and causes of the Middle East conflict—particularly the injustice, the grievances and the loss which have befallen the Palestinian people.

If the Arab nation is seeking peace based on justice, it is because peace without justice is capitulation. As long as any part of the Arab territories remains under occupation and as long as any of the rights of the Palestinian people are still violated, there can be no justice, and hence there can be no peace. (*1871st meeting, p. 52*)

THE PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic for the kind words he has addressed to me personally.

The next speaker is the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization, on whom I now call.

MR. KHADDOUMI [*sic*] (Palestine Liberation Organization): We welcomed the opportunity extended to us by the Council to share in its discussions. Our willingness to participate in the deliberations of the Council is both natural and imperative. The people of Palestine are the principal party to the conflict whose resolution this Council has been trying to effect. The Council's invitation to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to share its views with the Council signified its recognition that the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the people of Palestine, has an indispensable role to play in and contribution to make to a just solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It also signified the Council's recognition that previous international efforts undertaken without the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization have run their course, indicating that any just settlement needs both new terms of reference and our participation. We therefore came with hope and confidence.

Over the past few days, the Council has listened to several representatives as they expressed the views of their respective Governments on the problem of Palestine and the national rights of the people of Palestine, for so long deliberately denied by the Israelis and their supporters. From the outset, racist Zionism and its sponsors embarked anxiously upon the task of transforming Palestine, both geographically and demographically, into an exclusively Jewish State. They tried to erase its name from the map; the people of Palestine were forcibly driven into exile and dispersion; our national institutions were crushed; our religious

shrines were desecrated, and our ancestral heritage in our Palestinian homeland was disfigured and distorted.

Yet, despite this Zionist onslaught and the injustices inflicted on us, we succeeded in surmounting the problems of dispersion and, more important, we confronted the Zionist challenges both on the national and the international levels. The most recent evidence of the efficacy and legitimacy of our national rights and struggle has been demonstrated during the current debate of the Council. Although the views expressed during the deliberations of the Council were not all identical in definition and phraseology, the majority of them converged on the following basic concepts and conclusions: first, that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the representative of the people of Palestine; secondly, that the people of Palestine are entitled to national self-determination and independence in their Palestinian homeland; thirdly, that no peace and, hence, no just and durable solution of the Middle East crisis is feasible without the consent and participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization; and fourthly, that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) is inadequate, since it failed to deal with either the question of Palestine or the national rights of the Palestinian people to independence and sovereignty. Our early diagnosis of the failure of resolution 242 (1967) to constitute a basis for settlement was thus vindicated by the almost unanimous recognition of its inadequacy on the part of the Council.

However, the United States Government chose to be singled out as being against the will and consensus of the Security Council, as expressed by African, Asian, European and Latin American representatives.

The United States Government, which demonstrated this evening its prejudiced and unwavering support of Israel at the cost of impairing the effectiveness of the Council, can no longer claim that its step-by-step diplomacy will yield any productive results.

The United States Government, which professes to follow an even-handed policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, adamantly and defiantly believes the one-sided denial by resolution 242 (1967) of our national existence and national rights is the only framework for negotiating a settlement.

The United States Government, which poses

as the mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict, is so much concerned with stated needs and ambitions of one party that it totally and completely ignores the rights of the other party, even at the cost of endangering the process of peace for which we are fighting, in which we are genuinely interested and to which we are making a positive contribution.

The United States Government, which as early as 1947 voted in favour of a Palestinian Arab State, today shamelessly refuses to acknowledge the Palestinian right to independence and sovereignty and acts as the guardian of an expanded and expansionist Israel.

The United States Government, which recognized our "rights" in the Security Council in May 1948, insists in 1976 on thinking and behaving counterclockwise and reducing those "rights" to "interests", as though the struggle of peoples for freedom were regressive rather than progressive by nature, inspiration and outlook.

The United States Government, which was instrumental in the creation and maintenance of Zionist colonialism and aggression and which is equally responsible for the continuing wars, bloodshed, misery and turmoil, is determined, it seems, to perpetuate this perilous situation in our region.

The United States Government, which suffered heavy blows at the hands of the great peoples of Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia, should bring itself to understand that the will and the determination of peoples are always stronger than United States lethal and sophisticated weapons and the privileged position it abuses in the Security Council.

We believe that the Security Council's debate has served its purpose in the sense that it provided an historic opportunity for the Palestine Liberation Organization to spell out its views before this august body. Moreover, our experience has been enriched by the statements and messages of support from the representatives whose peoples share the feelings of the people of Palestine and whose Governments support the just struggle of the Palestine Liberation Organization. We are also confident that, through the deliberations of the Security Council, world public opinion has become more aware of our just struggle. We also cannot fail to note that increasing sectors of

American society are showing greater understanding of our rights and are expressing greater solidarity with our national liberation movement.

It is regrettable that the Council has been prevented by the tyranny of the veto from adopting a resolution affirming our national inalienable rights, comprising our repatriation, self-determination and independence in our Palestinian homeland. Our definition of our national rights, our irreducible minimum, comprises principles which are enshrined in the United Nations Charter and which have been specifically recognized and reaffirmed by the General Assembly. Veto or no veto, it goes without saying that our national rights in Palestine are inherent; they derive their validity neither from recognition by other Powers nor from resolutions. Moreover, our national rights are non-negotiable. Their implementation could not be negated by the veto cast in the Security Council by any Power. After all, we have come to the Security Council to persuade, not to bargain; to co-operate, not to capitulate; and to alert, not to subvert. Yes, I repeat: after all, we have come to the Security Council to persuade, not to bargain; to co-operate, not to capitulate; and to alert, not to subvert. At best, we believe that the Security Council and the General Assembly could bring moral pressure to bear on Israel; but, as is evident from Israel's attitude to the United Nations, to its Charter and to the relevant resolutions, a State that is predicated on an immoral basis cannot possibly be susceptible to moral considerations.

And now the British position, as expressed by the British representative, is a travesty of international behaviour and moral standards and codes. It was the British Government which committed the worst piece of treachery in the name of friendship when it promulgated the Balfour Declaration in 1917. It was the British Government which facilitated illegal Jewish immigration to Palestine at our expense. And it is now the British Government which remorselessly continues to probe the wounds it created when it betrayed its mandatory responsibility. It is high time we seriously considered this British position in the light of British interests in our Arab region. Needless to say, the only valid conclusion to be deduced from the defunct British amendment is that the Security Council refused to reaffirm resolu-

tions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).

Where do we go from here? As you are fully aware, the Palestine Liberation Organization is a liberation movement engaged in combating—militarily, politically, economically and culturally—the Zionist occupation of our homeland. We take pride in the fact that our just aspirations and our armed struggle brought so much international support and recognition for the national rights of the people of Palestine and for the Palestine Liberation Organization. Freed from the most sinister attempt to deflect our struggle, we will intensify our efforts to prevent the Israelis from consolidating their control over our occupied lands.

We shall go back with a firmer conviction that ours is a long and drawn-out struggle against the Zionist-imperialist alliance. We shall go back confident—as we have always been—that the Arab masses will further increase their moral and material support of our armed struggle. We shall go back with greater confidence in ourselves, our friends and our future.

However, I need not assure you that the successful consummation of the Palestinian struggle for national liberation is not entirely dependent on Security Council or General Assembly resolutions. This Council may have other opportunities to express a more affirmative and binding stand on this question. In this connexion the Palestine Liberation Organization will always be willing to contribute to the peace-making efforts of the Coun-

cil while simultaneously engaged in its armed struggle to liberate Palestine.

We are particularly grateful to the Secretary-General for his unfailing efforts for the promotion of a just and durable solution of the Middle East crisis. We are also indebted to you, Mr. President, for the wisdom and dedication you have demonstrated in the course of our deliberations.

I should also not fail to address my concluding words to those countries which have genuinely and sincerely supported our just cause and our national rights during the debate. On behalf of the Palestine Liberation Organization, I extend to them, through their representatives, our deep appreciation and I assure them that with their support and our armed struggle victory is inevitable, for this is the logic of history and the destiny of all freedom-fighters.

THE PRESIDENT: As there are no further speakers I take it that the Council has now concluded the current stage of its consideration of the item before it, entitled "The Middle East problem including the Palestinian question".

Before adjourning the meeting, I should like to announce that the Security Council will meet again tomorrow morning at 10.30 to resume its consideration of the item entitled "The situation in Namibia", which was last discussed in June 1975.

*The meeting rose at 10.30 p.m.*

## Statements by UN Officials

11

### **Statement by UN Secretary-General Waldheim calling for moves to end the crisis in Lebanon<sup>98</sup>**

New York, January 18, 1976

The deterioration of the situation in Lebanon and the continued violence, loss of life and massive destruction in that country are in themselves tragic developments. The obvious potential danger to international peace of this national tragedy is also a matter for the gravest concern to the world community. It is for this reason that I feel obliged to make a further appeal to the leaders and people of Lebanon.

I am fully aware of the complexity of the current state of affairs in that country. But I also know the distinguished record of Lebanon in world affairs, the quality, intelligence and tolerance of her people and the high hopes for the future which, until recently, were shared by all elements of the population. That heritage, those qualities and those hopes may soon be irreparably damaged or lost if the present strife continues. Not only is Lebanon's own place in the world threatened—her tragedy can all too easily lead to disastrous developments in the region as a whole.

However great the differences, however violent the emotions that now prevail, the clear alternatives for most of the people of Lebanon are either peace, reconciliation and the hope of a decent future, or continued strife and the virtual destruction of their country.

Once again, therefore, I appeal to all those involved in the present conflict, to the leaders of all sides and to all the people of Lebanon to put a stop to fratricidal strife, and to support all efforts now being made to restore peace and order.

<sup>98</sup> *UN Monthly Chronicle*, XIII, 2 (February 1976), p. 34.

12

### **Letter from Secretary-General Waldheim to the President of the Security Council regarding the situation in Lebanon<sup>99</sup>**

March 30, 1976

For some months I have been following with deep concern and anxiety the events in Lebanon. The deterioration of the situation there, the continued violence, loss of life and massive destruction are, as I have earlier pointed out, in themselves tragic developments with obvious potential dangers for international peace.

I am fully aware of the sensitivity of speaking to a delicate and complex situation of this kind. Fundamentally, the problem can only be resolved through accommodation, understanding and a reconciliation of differences among the Lebanese themselves, and of course, I am very mindful of the provisions of Article 2(7) of the Charter. At the same time, I believe it could not be denied that a further deterioration of the situation in Lebanon may carry implications extending well beyond the boundaries of that country. Not only are there some 300,000 Palestinians located in Lebanon but the future character of the Lebanese State is of special concern to its neighbours. In this regard, it is disturbing to note that there is an increased discussion of a partition of Lebanon, and the risks of outside involvement which this could entail. I feel obliged to state that I do not consider this would be an acceptable outcome; on the contrary, I believe that the international community has an interest in assuring the continued political independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

Of course, as indicated in my statement of 26 March, I have followed with appreciation the efforts by the Government of Syria to mediate the differences among various Lebanese factions. In addition, I have since noted with interest a suggestion of the Government of Egypt that the Lebanese problem be resolved in an Arab context through a mediation effort by a number of Arab States. Nevertheless, the unfortunate fact is that the fighting continues unabated. Thousands of lives have been lost and continue to be lost. At the very same time, an extensive displacement

<sup>99</sup> English text, *UN Monthly Chronicle*, XIII, 4 (April 1976), p. 28.



of the Lebanese civilian population and refugees impose an increasing responsibility on the world community. The economy of the country has come to a standstill. Our own efforts to mount a relief and rehabilitation programme to assist the people of Lebanon have come to a halt.

In my statement of 26 March, I issued an urgent appeal to all the factions and leaders concerned to accept an immediate and effective cease-fire. Unfortunately, that appeal has not been heeded, but I am convinced that a ceasefire has now become even more urgent. Given the magnitude of the tragedy and the implications it carries for endangering the wider peace of the area, and conscious of the efforts being made in the area to resolve the problem, I believe it is now incumbent on me to draw the attention of the Council to the gravity of the situation in Lebanon.

### 13

#### **Statement by the President of the Security Council expressing the Council's concern over Israeli settlements in the occupied territories<sup>100</sup>**

May 26, 1976

Following the request submitted by Egypt on 3 May 1976, the Security Council held seven meetings between 4 and 26 May to consider the situation in the occupied Arab territories. After consulting all the members, the President of the Security Council concludes that the majority of the members agreed on the following:

Grave anxiety was expressed over the present situation in the occupied Arab territories; concern was also expressed about the well-being of the population of these territories.

The Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War is applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967. The occupying Power was therefore called upon to comply strictly with the provisions of that Convention and to refrain from and rescind any measure that would violate them. In this regard, the measures taken by Israel in the occupied Arab territories that alter their demographic composition or geographical nature and

particularly the establishment of settlements were accordingly deplored. Such measures, which cannot prejudice the outcome of the search for the establishment of peace, constitute an obstacle to peace.

The Security Council should continue to follow the situation closely.

### 14

#### **Statement by the President of the Security Council expressing the Council's concern over the situation in the occupied territories and reaffirming that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to those territories<sup>101</sup>**

November 11, 1976

As a result of consultations over which I presided with all members of the Council, I am authorized as President to make the following statement on behalf of the Council.

Following the request submitted by Egypt on 20 October 1976, the Security Council held four meetings between 1 November and 11 November 1976 to consider the situation in the occupied Arab territories, with the participation of the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization. After consulting all the members, the President of the Council states that the Council has agreed on the following:

(1) To express its grave anxiety and concern over the present serious situation in the occupied Arab territories as a result of continued Israeli occupation;

(2) Reaffirmation of its call upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the territories and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities;

(3) Its reaffirmation that the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War is applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967. Therefore, the occupying Power is called upon once again to comply strictly with the provisions of that Convention and to refrain from any measure that violates them. In this regard the measures taken by Israel in the occupied Arab territories that alter their demographic composition or geographical nature and particularly the establishment of settlements are accordingly strongly deplored. Such measures which have no legal validity and cannot prejudice the outcome of the search for the establishment of peace constitute an obstacle to peace;

<sup>100</sup> Text as published in the *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIV, 1930 (June 21, 1976), p. 798.

<sup>101</sup> UN doc. S/12233 dated November 17, 1976. The statement was read at the Security Council's 1969th meeting.

(4) It considers once more that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon and the transfer of populations which tend to change the legal status of Jerusalem, are invalid and cannot change that status, and urgently calls upon Israel once more to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem. In this connexion the Council deplores the failure of Israel to show any regard for Security Council resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June

1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 and 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971 and General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967;

(5) Its recognition that any act of profanation of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites or any encouragement of, or connivance at, any such act may seriously endanger international peace and security.

The Council decides to keep the situation under constant attention with a view to meeting again should circumstances require.

## Draft Resolutions Vetoed in the Security Council

15

### **Draft resolution affirming the right of the Palestinian people to return and establish an independent state<sup>102</sup>**

January 23, 1976

A

*The Security Council,*

*Having considered* the item entitled “The Middle East problem including the Palestinian question”, in accordance with its resolution 381 (1975) of 30 November 1975,

*Having heard* the representatives of parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, representative of the Palestinian people,

*Convinced* that the question of Palestine is the core of the conflict in the Middle East,

*Expressing* its concern over the continuing deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, and deeply deploring Israel’s persistence in its occupation of Arab territories and its refusal to implement the relevant United Nations resolutions,

*Reaffirming* the principle of inadmissibility of acquisition of territories by the threat or use of force,

*Reaffirming further* the necessity of the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region based on full respect for the Charter of the United Nations as well as for its resolutions concerning the problem of the Middle East including the question of Palestine,

1. *Affirms* :

(a) That the Palestinian people should be enabled to exercise its inalienable national right of self-determination, including the right to establish an independent state in Palestine in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) The right of Palestinian refugees wishing to

<sup>102</sup> UN doc. S/11940. The draft, sponsored by Benin, Guyana, Pakistan, Panama, Rumania and Tanzania went to the vote on January 27 with the following result:

*In favour*: 9 (Benin, France, Guyana, Japan, Panama, Pakistan, Rumania, Tanzania, USSR)

*Against*: 1 (USA)

*Abstained*: 3 (Italy, Sweden, UK)

China and Libya did not participate in the voting. The draft failed due to the US veto. For the debate at the vote on this draft see doc. 10 above.

return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours to do so and the right of those choosing not to return to receive compensation for their property;

(c) That Israel should withdraw from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967;

(d) That appropriate arrangements should be established to guarantee, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;

2. *Decides* that the provisions contained in paragraph 1 should be taken fully into account in all international efforts and conferences organized within the framework of the United Nations for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take all the necessary steps as soon as possible for the implementation of the provisions of this resolution and to report to the Security Council on the progress achieved;

4. *Decides* to convene within a period of six months to consider the report by the Secretary-General regarding the implementation of this resolution, and in order to pursue its responsibilities regarding such implementation.

16

### **Draft resolution calling on Israel to desist from its policies affecting the status of the occupied territories and the rights of its inhabitants<sup>103</sup>**

March 24, 1976

*The Security Council,*

*Having considered* recent developments in the occupied Arab territories,

*Deeply concerned* at the serious situation which has arisen in these territories as a result of continued Israeli occupation,

<sup>103</sup> UN doc. S/12022. The draft, sponsored by Benin, Guyana, Pakistan, Panama and Tanzania, went to the vote on March 25 with 14 members in favour and one (USA) against. The draft failed due to the US veto. Both the PLO and Israel made statements during the debate.

*Deeply concerned further* at the measures taken by the Israeli authorities leading to the present grave situation, including measures aimed at changing the physical, cultural, demographic and religious character of the occupied territories and, in particular, the City of Jerusalem, the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories and other violations of the human rights of the inhabitants of those territories,

*Emphasizing* the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war,

*Recalling and reaffirming* the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council calling upon Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist from taking any further action which would alter the status of the City of Jerusalem and the character of the occupied Arab territories,

*Noting* that, notwithstanding the aforementioned resolutions, Israel persists in its policy aiming at changing the physical, cultural, demographic and religious character of the City of Jerusalem in particular,

*Reaffirming* the urgent need for establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

1. *Deplores* Israel's failure to put a stop to actions and policies tending to change the status of the City of Jerusalem and to rescind measures already taken to that effect;

2. *Calls* on Israel, pending the speedy termination of its occupation, to refrain from all measures against the Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories;

3. *Calls* on Israel to respect and uphold the inviolability of the Holy Places which are under its occupation and to desist from the expropriation of or encroachment upon Arab lands and property or the establishment of Israeli settlements thereon in the occupied Arab territories and to desist from all other actions and policies designed to change the legal status of the City of Jerusalem and to rescind measures already taken to that effect;

4. *Decides* to keep the situation under constant attention with a view to meeting again should circumstances so require.

### **Draft resolution reaffirming the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination<sup>104</sup>**

**June 29, 1976**

*The Security Council,*

*Having considered* the item entitled "The question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights", in accordance with the request contained in paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 3376 (XXX) of 10 November 1975,

*Having heard* the representatives of the parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, representative of the Palestinian people,

*Having considered* the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (document S/12090),<sup>105</sup> transmitted to the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 3376 (XXX),

*Deeply concerned* that no just solution to the problem of Palestine has been achieved, and that this problem therefore continues to aggravate the Arab-Israeli conflict, of which it is the core, and to endanger international peace and security,

*Recognizing* that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be established without the achievement, *inter alia*, of a just solution of the problem of Palestine on the basis of the recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (document S/12090);

2. *Affirms* the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

<sup>104</sup> UN doc. S/12119. The draft, sponsored by Guyana, Pakistan, Panama, and Tanzania, went to the vote on June 29 with the following result:

*In favour:* 10 (Benin, China, Guyana, Japan, Libya, Panama, Pakistan, Rumania, Tanzania, USSR)

*Against:* 1 (USA)

*Abstained:* 4 (France, Italy, Sweden, UK)

The draft failed due to the US veto. The PLO made statements during the debate, while Israel did not.

<sup>105</sup> Doc. 4 above.

# Resolutions and Decisions

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

18

## **General Assembly Resolution 31/15 concerning the administration and finances of UNRWA and reaffirming the Palestinians' right to return to their homes<sup>106</sup>**

November 23, 1976

A

*The General Assembly,*

Recalling its resolution 3419 (XXX) of 8 December 1975 and all previous resolutions referred to therein, including resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948,

Taking note of the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1975 to 30 June 1976,<sup>107</sup>

1. *Notes with deep regret* that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed by the Assembly in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952 for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern;

2. *Expresses its thanks* to the Commissioner-General and to the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for their continued dedicated and effective efforts under difficult circumstances to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees;

3. *Notes with regret* that the United Nations

<sup>106</sup> UN doc. A/RES/31/15. Adopted at the Assembly's 76th plenary meeting by the following votes:

Part A : 115 to none, with 2 abstentions

Part B : Adopted unanimously

Part C : Adopted unanimously

Part D : 118 to 2, with 2 abstentions

Part E : 118 to 2, with 3 abstentions

For voting details see Appendix F.

<sup>107</sup> Doc. 3 above.

Conciliation Commission for Palestine has been unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III)<sup>108</sup> and requests the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation of that paragraph and to report as appropriate, but no later than 1 October 1977;

4. *Directs attention* to the continuing seriousness of the financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, as outlined in the Commissioner-General's report;

5. *Notes with profound concern* that, despite the commendable and successful efforts of the Commissioner-General to collect additional contributions, this increased level of income to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East is still insufficient to cover essential budget requirements in the present year, and that, at presently foreseen levels of giving, deficits will recur each year;

6. *Calls upon* all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, particularly in the light of the budgetary deficit projected in the Commissioner-General's report; and therefore urges non-contributing Governments to contribute regularly and contributing Governments to consider increasing their regular contributions.

B

*The General Assembly,*

Recalling its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2341 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967, 2452 C (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, 2535 C (XXIV) of 10 December 1969, 2672 B (XXV) of 8 December 1970, 2792 B (XXVI) of 6 December 1971, 2963 B (XXVII) of 13 December 1972, 3089 A (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973, 3331 C (XXIX) of 17 December 1974 and 3419 A (XXX) of 8 December 1975,

Taking note of the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near

<sup>108</sup> See doc. 7 above.

East, covering the period from 1 July 1975 to 30 June 1976,

*Concerned* about the continued human suffering resulting from the June 1967 hostilities in the Middle East,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 2252 (ES-V), 2341 B (XXII), 2452 C (XXIII), 2535 C (XXIV), 2672 B (XXV), 2792 B (XXVI), 2963 B (XXVII), 3089 A (XXVIII), 3331 C (XXIX) and 3419 A (XXX);

2. *Endorses*, bearing in mind the objectives of those resolutions, the efforts of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to continue to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and in serious need of continued assistance as a result of the June 1967 hostilities;

3. *Strongly appeals* to all Governments and to organizations and individuals to contribute generously for the above purposes to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and to the other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations concerned.

## C

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 2656 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, 2728 (XXV) of 15 December 1970, 2791 (XXVI) of 6 December 1971, 2964 (XXVII) of 13 December 1972, 3090 (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973, 3330 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974 and 3419 D (XXX) of 8 December 1975,

*Having considered* the report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,

*Taking into account* the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1975 to 30 June 1976,

*Gravely concerned* at the alarming financial situation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, imminently endangering the essential minimum services being provided to the Palestine refugees,

*Emphasizing* the urgent need for extraordinary efforts in order to maintain, at least at their

present minimum level, the activities of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,

1. *Commends* the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for its work;

2. *Notes with appreciation* the report of the Working Group;

3. *Requests* the Working Group to continue its efforts, in co-operation with the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General, for the financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for a further period of one year;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the necessary services and assistance to the Working Group for the conduct of its work.

## D

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967,

*Recalling also* its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2452 A (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969, 2672 D (XXV) of 8 December 1970, 2792 E (XXVI) of 6 December 1971, 2963 C and D (XXVII) of 13 December 1972, 3089 C (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973, 3331 D (XXIX) of 17 December 1974 and 3419 C (XXX) of 8 December 1975,

*Having considered* the report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1975 to 30 June 1976, and the report of the Secretary-General of 4 October 1976,<sup>109</sup>

1. *Reaffirms* the right of the displaced inhabitants to return to their homes and camps in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967;

2. *Deplores* the continued refusal of the Israeli authorities to take steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants;

3. *Calls once more upon* Israel:

(a) To take immediate steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants;

(b) To desist from all measures that obstruct the return of the displaced inhabitants, including

<sup>109</sup> Doc. 6 above.

measures affecting the physical and demographic structure of the occupied territories;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General, after consulting with the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to report to the General Assembly by the opening of the thirty-second session on Israel's compliance with paragraph 3 of the present resolution.

## E

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967,

*Recalling also* its resolutions 2792 C (XXVI) of 6 December 1971, 2963 C (XXVII) of 13 December 1972, 3089 C (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973, 3331 D (XXIX) of 17 December 1974 and 3419 C (XXX) of 8 December 1975,

*Having considered* the report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1975 to 30 June 1976, and the report of the Secretary-General of 4 October 1976,

1. *Calls once more upon* Israel:

(a) To take effective steps immediately for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they were removed in the Gaza Strip and to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation;

(b) To desist from further removal of refugees and destruction of their shelters;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, after consulting with the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to report to the General Assembly by the opening of the thirty-second session on Israel's compliance with paragraph 1 of the present resolution.

## 19

### **General Assembly Resolution 31/20 accepting the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and commending it to the Security Council<sup>110</sup>**

**November 24, 1976**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 3376 (XXX) of 10 November 1975,

*Having considered* the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,<sup>111</sup>

*Deeply concerned* that no just solution to the problem of Palestine has been achieved and that this problem therefore continues to aggravate the Middle East conflict, of which it is the core, and to endanger international peace and security,

*Reaffirming* that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be established without the achievement, *inter alia*, of a just solution of the problem of Palestine on the basis of the attainment of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People for its efforts in performing the tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly;

2. *Takes note* of the report of the Committee and endorses the recommendations contained therein, as a basis for the solution of the question of Palestine;

3. *Decides* to circulate the report to all the competent bodies of the United Nations and urges them to take necessary action, as appropriate, in accordance with the Committee's programme of implementation;

4. *Urges* the Security Council to consider once again as soon as possible the recommendations contained in the report, taking fully into account the observations made thereon during the debate in the General Assembly at its thirty-first session,

<sup>110</sup> UN doc. A/RES/31/20. Adopted at the Assembly's 77th plenary meeting by 90 votes to 16, with 30 abstentions. For voting details see Appendix F.

<sup>111</sup> Doc. 4 above.

in order to take the necessary measures to implement the above-mentioned recommendations of the Committee so as to achieve early progress towards a solution of the problem of Palestine and the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

5. *Authorizes* the Committee to exert all efforts to promote the implementation of its recommendations and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session;

6. *Requests* the Committee to promote the greatest possible dissemination of information on its programme of implementation through non-governmental organizations and other appropriate means;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to give the widest possible publicity to the Committee's work and to provide the Committee with all the necessary facilities for the performance of its tasks, including summary records of its meetings;

8. *Decides* to include the item entitled "Question of Palestine" in the provisional agenda of its thirty-second session.

## 20

### **General Assembly Resolution 31/61 reaffirming its condemnation of Israel's occupation of Arab territories and its call for a cessation of all aid to Israel and a planned implementation of UN resolutions on the Middle East<sup>112</sup>**

**December 9, 1976**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 3414 (XXX) of 5 December 1975 and noting with concern that no progress has been achieved towards the implementation of that resolution, in particular its paragraph 4,

*Recalling* the debate held in the Security Council in January 1976<sup>113</sup> on the problem of the Middle East including the Palestinian question, in implementation of subparagraph (a) of Council resolution 381 (1975) of 30 November 1975,

*Deeply concerned* at the increasing deterioration of the situation in the Middle East due to continued Israeli occupation and Israel's refusal to imple-

ment United Nations resolutions,

*Reaffirming* the necessity of establishing a just and lasting peace in the region based on full respect for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as for the resolutions concerning the problem of the Middle East and the question of Palestine,

1. *Affirms* that the early resumption of the Peace Conference on the Middle East with the participation of all the parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 3375 (XXX) of 10 November 1975, is essential for the realization of a just and lasting settlement in the region;

2. *Condemns* Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law and repeated United Nations resolutions;

3. *Reaffirms* that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved without Israel's withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied since 1967 and the attainment by the Palestinian people of their inalienable rights, which are the basic prerequisites enabling all countries and peoples in the Middle East to live in peace;

4. *Condemns* all measures taken by Israel in the occupied territories to change the demographic and geographic character and institutional structure of these territories;

5. *Requests once again* all States to desist from supplying Israel with military and other forms of aid or any assistance which would enable it to consolidate its occupation or to exploit the natural resources of the occupied territories;

6. *Requests* the Security Council to take effective measures, within an appropriate time-table, for the implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Council and the General Assembly on the Middle East and Palestine;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to inform the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East of the present resolution and to submit a report on the follow-up of its implementation to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session.

<sup>112</sup> UN doc. A/RES/31/61. Adopted at the Assembly's 95th plenary meeting by 91 votes to 11, with 29 abstentions. For voting details see Appendix F.

<sup>113</sup> See doc. 10 above and docs. 38, 188 below.



**General Assembly Resolution 31/62 calling for a resumption of the Peace Conference on the Middle East before the end of March 1977<sup>114</sup>**

December 9, 1976

*The General Assembly,*

*Having discussed* the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East",

*Noting* the report of the Secretary-General on this item<sup>115</sup> and his initiative of 1 April 1976,

*Gravely concerned* at the lack of progress towards the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

*Convinced* that any relaxation in the search for a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem to achieve a just peace in the area constitutes a grave threat to the prospects of peace in the Middle East as well as a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General:

(a) To resume contacts with all the parties to the conflict and the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, in accordance with his initiative of 1 April 1976, in preparation for the early convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East;

(b) To submit a report to the Security Council on the results of his contacts and on the situation in the Middle East not later than 1 March 1977;

2. *Calls* for the early convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, under the auspices of the United Nations and the co-chairmanship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, not later than the end of March 1977;

3. *Requests* the Security Council to convene subsequent to the submission by the Secretary-General of the report referred to in paragraph 1 (b) above, in order to consider the situation in the area in the light of that report and to promote the process towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the area;

4. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to inform the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East of the present resolution.

**General Assembly Resolution 31/71 reaffirming its call for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East<sup>116</sup>**

December 10, 1976

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, in which it overwhelmingly commended the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

*Recalling also* its resolution 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, in which it recognized that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East enjoys wide support in the region,

*Mindful* of the prevailing political situation in the region and the potential danger emanating therefrom that would be further aggravated by the introduction of nuclear weapons in the area,

*Concerned* that the lack of any appreciable progress in the direction of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, in the present atmosphere in the region, will further complicate the situation,

*Convinced* that progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East will greatly enhance the cause of peace both in the region and in the world,

*Conscious* of the particular nature of the problems involved and the complexities inherent in the situation in the Middle East and the urgency of keeping the region free from involvement in a ruinous nuclear arms race,

1. *Expresses the need* for further action to generate momentum towards realization of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East;

2. *Urges* all parties directly concerned to adhere to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a means of promoting this objective;

3. *Reiterates* its recommendation that the States Members of the United Nations referred to in paragraph 2 above, pending the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone under an effective system of safeguards, should:

(a) Proclaim solemnly and immediately their

<sup>114</sup> UN doc. A/RES/31/62. Adopted at the Assembly's 95th plenary meeting by 122 votes to 2, with 8 abstentions. For voting details see Appendix F.

<sup>115</sup> Doc. 8 above.

<sup>116</sup> UN doc. A/RES/31/71. Adopted at the Assembly's 96th plenary meeting by 130 votes to none, with one abstention. For voting details see Appendix F.

intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons in their territory or the territory under their control by any third party;

(b) Refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from any other action that would facilitate the acquisition, testing or use of such weapons, or would be in any other way detrimental to the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region under an effective system of safeguards;

(c) Agree to place all their nuclear activities under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

4. *Reaffirms* the recommendations to the nuclear weapon States to refrain from any action contrary to the progress of the present resolution and the objective of establishing in the region of the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone under an effective system of safeguards and to extend their co-operation to the States of the region in their efforts to promote this objective;

5. *Invites* the Secretary-General to explore the possibilities of making progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the area of the Middle East;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-second session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

## 23

### **General Assembly Resolution 31/106 on the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories<sup>117</sup>**

December 16, 1976

#### A

*The General Assembly,*

*Guided* by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity,

*Bearing in mind* the rules of international law concerning occupation, in particular the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,

1. *Strongly deplores* the measures taken by Israel in the Arab territories occupied since 1967 that alter their demographic composition or geographical nature, and particularly the establishment of settlements;

2. *Declares* that such measures have no legal validity and cannot prejudice the outcome of the search for the establishment of peace, and considers that such measures constitute an obstacle to the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the area;

3. *Declares further* that all legislative and administrative measures taken by Israel, including the expropriation of land and properties thereon and the transfer of populations, which purport to change the legal status of Jerusalem are invalid and cannot change that status;

4. *Urgently calls once more* upon Israel to rescind all those measures and to desist forthwith from taking any further measures which tend to change the demographic composition, geographical nature or status of the occupied Arab territories or any part thereof, including Jerusalem.

#### B

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 3092 A (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973, 3240 B (XXIX) of 29 November 1974 and 3525 B (XXX) of 15 December 1975,

*Considering* that the promotion of respect for the obligations arising from the Charter of the United Nations and other instruments and rules of international law is among the basic purposes and principles of the United Nations,

*Bearing in mind* the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,

*Noting* that Israel and those Arab States whose territories have been occupied by Israel since June 1967 are parties to that Convention,

*Taking into account* that States parties to that

Part A : 129 to 3, with 4 abstentions

Part B : 134 to none, with 2 abstentions

Part C : 100 to 5, with 30 abstentions

Part D : 97 to 3, with 36 abstentions

For voting details see Appendix F.

<sup>117</sup> UN doc. A/RES/31/106. Adopted at the Assembly's 101st plenary meeting by the following votes:

Convention undertake, in accordance with article 1 thereof, not only to respect but also to ensure respect for the Convention in all circumstances,

1. *Reaffirms* that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;

2. *Deplores* the failure of Israel to acknowledge the applicability of that Convention to the territories it has occupied since 1967;

3. *Calls again upon* Israel to acknowledge and to comply with the provisions of that Convention in all the Arab territories it has occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;

4. *Urges once more* all States parties to that Convention to exert all efforts in order to ensure respect for and compliance with the provisions thereof in all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem.

## C

*The General Assembly,*

*Guided* by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the principles and provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

*Bearing in mind* the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, as well as of other relevant conventions and regulations,

*Recalling* its resolutions on the subject, as well as those adopted by the Security Council, the Commission on Human Rights and other United Nations bodies concerned and by specialized agencies,

*Having considered* the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories,<sup>118</sup> which contains, *inter alia*, public statements made by leaders of the Government of Israel,

1. *Commends* the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories for its efforts in performing the tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly;

2. *Deplores* the continued refusal by Israel to

allow the Special Committee access to the occupied territories;

3. *Calls again upon* Israel to allow the Special Committee access to the occupied territories;

4. *Deplores* the continued and persistent violation by Israel of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and other applicable international instruments;

5. *Condemns*, in particular, the following Israeli policies and practices:

(a) The annexation of parts of the occupied territories;

(b) The establishment of Israeli settlements therein and the transfer of an alien population thereto;

(c) The evacuation, deportation, expulsion, displacement and transfer of Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories, and the denial of their right to return;

(d) The confiscation and expropriation of Arab property in the occupied territories and all other transactions for the acquisition of land involving the Israeli authorities, institutions or nationals on the one hand, and the inhabitants or institutions of the occupied territories on the other;

(e) The destruction and demolition of Arab houses;

(f) Mass arrests, administrative detention and ill-treatment of the Arab population;

(g) The ill-treatment of persons under detention;

(h) The pillaging of archaeological and cultural property;

(i) The interference with religious freedoms and practices—particularly as manifested most recently in Al-Khalil—as well as family rights and customs;

(j) The illegal exploitation of natural wealth, resources and population of the occupied territories;

6. *Reaffirms* that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the occupied territories, or any part thereof, including Jerusalem, are null and void, and that Israel's policy of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in the occupied territories constitutes a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and of the relevant United Nations resolutions;

<sup>118</sup> Doc. 5 above.

7. *Demands* that Israel desist forthwith from the policies and practices referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6 above;

8. *Reiterates* its call upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any changes carried out by Israel in the occupied territories and to avoid actions, including those in the field of aid, which might be used by Israel in its pursuit of the policies of annexation and colonization or any of the other policies and practices referred to in the present resolution;

9. *Requests* the Special Committee, pending the early termination of the Israeli occupation, to continue to investigate Israeli policies and practices in the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, to consult, as appropriate, with the International Committee of the Red Cross in order to ensure the safeguarding of the welfare and human rights of the population of the occupied territories, and to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arises thereafter;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General:

(a) To render all necessary facilities to the Special Committee, including those required for its visits to the occupied territories, with a view to investigating Israeli policies and practices referred to in the present resolution;

(b) To continue to make available additional staff as may be necessary to assist the Special Committee in the performance of its tasks;

(c) To ensure the widest circulation of the reports of the Special Committee, and of information regarding its activities and findings, by all means available through the Office of Public Information of the Secretariat and, where necessary, to reprint those reports of the Special Committee which are no longer available;

(d) To report to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session on the tasks entrusted to him in the present paragraph;

11. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-second session the item entitled "Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories".

## D

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 3240 C (XXIX) of 29 November 1974 and 3525 C (XXX) of 15 Decem-

ber 1975,

*Having considered* the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, in particular section V thereof, entitled "Quneitra", and annex III thereto, a report submitted by a Swiss expert engaged by the Special Committee and entitled "Quneitra: a report on nature, extent and value of damage",

1. *Expresses its appreciation* of the thoroughness and impartiality with which the expert engaged by the Special Committee discharged the tasks entrusted to him;

2. *Condemns* the massive, deliberate destruction of Quneitra perpetrated during Israeli occupation and prior to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from that city in 1974;

3. *Recognizes* that the Syrian Arab Republic is entitled to full and adequate compensation, under international law and in equity, for the massive damages and deliberate destruction perpetrated in Quneitra while it was under Israeli occupation, and to all other legal remedies in accordance with applicable international law and practice;

4. *Takes note* of the statements made by the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic before the Special Political Committee, to the effect that his Government reserves all rights to full compensation in regard to all damages resulting from the Israeli deliberate destruction of Quneitra, including those not covered by the expert's above-mentioned report or not falling within the scope of his assignment;

5. *Requests* the Special Committee to complete its survey on all the aspects referred to in the previous paragraph and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Special Committee with all the facilities required for the completion of the tasks referred to in the previous paragraphs.

**General Assembly Resolution 31/110 calling on the Secretary-General to report on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories<sup>119</sup>**

December 16, 1976

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* the Vancouver Declaration on Human Settlements of 1976 and the recommendations for national action adopted by Habitat: United Nations Conference on Human Settlements, held at Vancouver from 31 May to 11 June 1976,

*Recalling also* resolution 3 of the recommendations of the Conference for international co-operation on living conditions of the Palestinians in occupied territories, and Economic and Social Council resolution 2026 (LXI) of 4 August 1976,<sup>120</sup>

*Recalling further* the recommendation adopted at the Regional Preparatory Conference for Asia and the Pacific, held at Teheran from 14 to 19 June 1976,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in collaboration with the relevant United Nations organs and specialized agencies, to prepare and submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session a report on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in preparing the above-mentioned report, to consult and co-operate with the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people;

3. *Urges* all States to co-operate with the Secretary-General in this matter.

<sup>119</sup> UN doc. A/RES/31/110. Adopted at the Assembly's 101st plenary meeting by 107 votes to 2, with 26 abstentions. For voting details see Appendix F.

<sup>120</sup> Doc. 29 below.

**General Assembly Resolution 31/186 reaffirming the right of the Arab states and peoples to permanent sovereignty over the natural resources of the territories occupied by Israel<sup>121</sup>**

December 21, 1976

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 3336 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974 entitled "Permanent sovereignty over national resources in the occupied Arab territories",

*Recalling further* its resolution 3516 (XXX) of 15 December 1975 on the same subject, in which it was noted that the report of the Secretary-General on the adverse economic effects on the Arab States and peoples resulting from repeated Israeli aggression and continued occupation of their territories was inadequate in that it did not incorporate the necessary substantive and comprehensive studies required in conformity with paragraph 5 of resolution 3336 (XXIX), the related statements made at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly on behalf of the co-sponsors and by the Secretary-General on the administrative and financial implications as well as the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions,

*Noting* that in its resolution 3516 (XXX) the Secretary-General was requested to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session his final comprehensive report, which should fulfil the above-mentioned requirements, taking into account the related statements on the administrative and financial implications submitted by the Secretary-General and approved by the General Assembly at its thirtieth session,

*Taking into account* the note by the Secretary-General of 1 November 1976,

*Bearing in mind* the pertinent provisions of its resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, containing the Declaration and the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, and 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974 on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,

1. *Reaffirms* the right of the Arab States and

<sup>121</sup> UN doc. A/RES/31/186. Adopted at the Assembly's 106th plenary meeting by 107 votes to 2, with 26 abstentions. For voting details see Appendix F.

peoples whose territories are under Israeli occupation to regain full and effective control over their natural and all other resources and economic activities, as well as the rights of those States, territories and peoples to the restitution and full compensation for the exploitation, loss and depletion of, and damage to, their natural and all other resources and economic activities;

2. *Takes note* of the regret expressed in the note by the Secretary-General that the submission of the report, as requested by the General Assembly in resolutions 3336 (XXIX) and 3516 (XXX) and the related statements will be postponed until the thirty-second session of the Assembly;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take immediately all the measures necessary to secure the submission to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session of his final substantive comprehensive report, which should fulfil all of the above-mentioned requirements;

4. *Requests* the heads of the relevant specialized agencies and United Nations organs, particularly the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the Economic Commission for Western Asia, to co-operate actively and adequately with the Secretary-General in the preparation of his final substantive comprehensive report.

## SECURITY COUNCIL<sup>122</sup>

### 26

#### **Security Council Resolution 390 (1976) extending the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force for six months<sup>123</sup>**

May 28, 1976

*The Security Council,*

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/12083 and Add. 1),

*Having noted* the efforts made to establish a durable and just peace in the Middle East area and the developments in the situation in the area,

*Expressing concern* over the prevailing state of tension in the area,

*Decides:*

(a) To call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973);

(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for another period of six months;

(c) To request the Secretary-General to submit at the end of this period a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973).

### 27

#### **Security Council Resolution 396 (1976) extending the mandate of UNEF for one year<sup>124</sup>**

October 22, 1976

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 338 (1973), 340 (1973), 341 (1973), 346 (1974), 362 (1974), 368 (1975), 371 (1975) and 378 (1975),

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force (S/12212),

*Having noted* the developments in the situation in the Middle East (S/12210),

*Recalling* the Secretary-General's view that any relaxation of the search for a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem could be dangerous and his hope that urgent efforts will be undertaken by all concerned to tackle the Middle East problem in all its aspects, with a view both to maintaining quiet in the region and to arriving at the comprehensive settlement called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973),

*Noting* that the Secretary-General recommends the extension of the mandate for one year,

1. *Decides*

(a) To call upon all the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973);

(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force for a period of one year, that is,

<sup>122</sup> In 1976 the membership of the Security Council was as follows: Benin, China, France, Guyana, Italy, Japan, Libya, Panama, Pakistan, Rumania, Sweden, Tanzania, USSR, UK and USA.

<sup>123</sup> UN doc. S/RES/390(1976). Adopted at the Council's 1923rd meeting by 13 votes to none; China and Libya did not participate in the voting.

<sup>124</sup> UN doc. S/RES/396(1976). Adopted at the Council's 1964th meeting by 13 votes to none; China and Libya did not participate in the voting.

until 24 October 1977;

(c) To request the Secretary-General to submit at the end of this period a report on the developments in the situation and the steps taken to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973);

2. *Expresses its confidence* that the Force will be maintained with maximum efficiency and economy.

28

**Security Council Resolution 398 (1976) extending the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force for six months<sup>125</sup>**

November 30, 1976

*The Security Council,*

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/12235),

*Having noted* the efforts made to establish a durable and just peace in the Middle East area and the urgent need to continue and intensify such efforts,

*Expressing concern* over the prevailing state of tension in the area,

*Decides:*

(a) To call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973);

(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for another period of six months, that is, until 31 May 1977;

(c) To request the Secretary-General to submit at the end of this period a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973).

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL  
COUNCIL

29

**Economic and Social Council Resolution 2026 (LXI) urging UN agencies to increase aid to improve the social and economic position of the Palestinian people<sup>126</sup>**

August 4, 1976

*The Economic and Social Council*

*Recalling* General Assembly resolutions 3210 (XXIX), 3236 (XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX), and Council resolution 1978 (LIX),

1. *Invites* the United Nations Development Programme, the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system to intensify, as a matter of urgency and in co-ordination with the Economic Commission for Western Asia, their efforts in identifying the social and economic needs of the Palestinian people;

2. *Requests* the above-mentioned agencies and organizations to consult and co-operate with the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, with a view to establishing and implementing concrete projects to ensure the improvement of the social and economic conditions of the Palestinian people;

3. *Urges* the heads of the organizations and agencies concerned to formulate and submit to their respective governing and/or legislative bodies proposals for ensuring the implementation of operative paragraphs 1 and 2;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Council at its sixty-third session on the steps taken to implement this resolution.

<sup>126</sup> *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Sixty-first session, Resolutions and Decisions, Supplement No. 1* (UN doc. E/5880), p. 27. Adopted at the Council's 2031st plenary meeting by the following votes:

*In favour:* 36

Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Iran, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Liberia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rumania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, USSR, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

*Against:* 1

United States.

*Abstained:* 11

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, West Germany.

<sup>125</sup> UN doc. S/RES/398(1976). Adopted at the Council's 1975th meeting by 12 votes to none; Benin, China and Libya did not participate in the voting.

COMMISSION ON HUMAN  
RIGHTS

30

**Commission on Human Rights Resolution  
2 (XXXII) deploring Israel's violation of  
human rights in the occupied territories<sup>127</sup>**

February 13, 1976

*The Commission on Human Rights,*

Guided by the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as the principles and provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949,

Recalling the pertinent United Nations resolutions on the situation in the occupied territories and the protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories,

Taking into account that the General Assembly has, in resolution 3376 (XXX), reaffirmed its resolution 3236 (XXIX), which confirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, and has expressed grave concern that no progress has been achieved towards:

(a) The exercise by the Palestinian people of their inalienable rights in Palestine, including the right to self-determination without external interference and the right to national independence and sovereignty,

(b) The exercise by Palestinians of their inalienable right to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted,

Taking into consideration that the General Assembly has adopted resolution 3314 (XXIX), which defines as an act of aggression the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof,

Recalling also resolution IX adopted by the International Labour Conference at its fifty-

ninth session, in 1974, which declares that any military occupation of territory constitutes in itself a permanent violation of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms and, in particular, of trade union and social rights,

Taking note of the reports of the United Nations and other international humanitarian organizations on the situation of the occupied Arab territories and their inhabitants, in particular the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (A/10272),

Greatly alarmed by the continuation of the violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms by Israel in the occupation of these territories and the measures aiming at annexation, as well as the continuing destruction of homes, expropriation of Arab properties and ill-treatment of prisoners,

Deploping Israel's continued persistence in establishing settlements in the occupied Arab territories, implementing massive programmes of immigration, continuing the deportation and transfer of the indigenous population and refusing their return,

Recalling the conclusion of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories that the Israeli occupying forces were responsible for the deliberate and total destruction of Quneitra and that this constituted a violation of article 53 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 and fell within the scope of article 147 of that Convention,

Seriously concerned that the population of the occupied Arab territories are hindered in the exercise of their inalienable rights to national education and cultural life,

1. Deplores once again Israel's continued grave violations, in the occupied Arab territories, of the basic norms of international law and of the relevant international conventions, in particular the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, which are considered by the Commission on Human Rights as war crimes and an affront to humanity, as well as its persistent defiance of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and its continued policy of violating the basic human rights of the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories;

<sup>127</sup> *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Sixtieth session, Supplement No. 3* (Un doc. E/5768), pp. 54–56. Adopted at the Commission's 1352nd meeting by 23 votes to one, with 8 abstentions.



2. *Reaffirms* that military occupation of territory constitutes a grave threat to international peace and security and is, in itself, a continuous violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

3. *Reaffirms further* the condemnation of Israel for the deliberate destruction and devastation of the town of Quneitra and considers these acts as a grave breach of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949;

4. *Calls upon* Israel to take immediate steps for the return of the Palestinians and the other displaced inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories to their homes;

5. *Calls upon* Israel to desist forthwith from establishing new settlements in the occupied Arab territories and to commence immediately with the removal of the existing settlements;

6. *Deplores* the measures taken by Israel to exploit the human, natural and all other resources and wealth of the occupied Arab territories and calls upon Israel immediately to rescind all such measures and to compensate and make full restitution for the exploitation and depletion of their human and natural resources;

7. *Declares* that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, the demographic structure and the status of occupied Arab territories are null and void, and considers these changes as an impediment to the achievement of a just and lasting peace;

8. *Reaffirms* its call upon Israel to ensure freedom of worship and accord the esteem, regard and protection due to the religious shrines and personalities in accordance with the established traditions in the region, particularly in Jerusalem, which have been fully respected by all authorities throughout the centuries;

9. *Declares* all measures taken by Israel with a view to changing the institutional structure and established religious practices in the sanctuary of Al-Ibrahimi mosque in the city of Al-Khalil null and void;

10. *Calls upon* all States not to recognize any such changes and measures carried out by Israel in the occupied Arab territories and invites them to do their utmost to ensure that Israel respects the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War;

11. *Censures* in the strongest terms all measures taken by Israel to change the status of Jerusalem;

12. *Condemns* in particular the following Israeli policies and practices;

(a) Measures aiming at annexation of parts of the occupied territories;

(b) The intensification of action aiming at the establishment of Israeli settlements therein and the transfer of an alien population thereto;

(c) The destruction and demolition of Arab houses;

(d) The confiscation and expropriation of Arab property in the occupied territories and all other transactions for the acquisition of land involving the Israeli authorities, institutions or nationals, on the one hand, and the inhabitants and institutions of the occupied territories, on the other;

(e) The evacuation, deportation, expulsion, displacement and transfer of Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories and the denial of their right to return;

(f) Mass arrests, administrative detention and ill-treatment of the Arab population;

(g) The pillaging of archaeological and cultural property;

(h) The interference with religious freedoms and practices, as well as family rights and customs;

(i) The hindrance of the exercise by the population of the occupied territories of their rights to national education and cultural life;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of all Governments, the competent United Nations organs, the specialized agencies and regional intergovernmental organizations and to give it the widest possible publicity and to report to the Commission on Human Rights at its next session;

14. *Decides* to place on the provisional agenda of its thirty-third session, as a matter of high priority, the item entitled "Question of the violation of human rights in the territories occupied as a result of hostilities in the Middle East".

UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL,  
SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL  
ORGANIZATION

31

**UNESCO General Conference Resolution 19C/  
15.1 condemning all violations of human  
rights and cultural freedom resulting from  
Israel's occupation of Arab territories<sup>128</sup>**

November 22, 1976

*The General Conference,*

Considering that, at its eighteenth session, after examining document 18C/16 entitled "Report by the Director-General on the Situation of the National Education and the Cultural Life of Peoples in the Occupied Arab Territories", the General Conference adopted resolution 13.1 which:

"1. Invites the Director-General to exercise full supervision of the operation of educational and cultural institutions in the occupied Arab territories, and to co-operate with the Arab States concerned and with the Palestine Liberation Organization with a view to providing the populations in the occupied Arab territories with every means of enjoying their rights to education and culture so as to preserve their national identity;

"2. Urgently appeals to Israel to refrain from any act that has the effect of hindering the populations of the occupied Arab territories in the exercise of their rights to national education and cultural life, and invites it to allow the Director-General of Unesco to carry out the task referred to in the foregoing paragraph;

"3. Invites the Director-General to report to the Executive Board on the implementation of this resolution";

Considering that, after studying a report of the Director-General, who had not been able to implement this resolution owing to the opposition of the Israeli authorities, the Executive Board adopted 99 EX/Decision 9.2 in which it:

"4. Reiterates to the Israeli occupation authorities the urgent appeal made by the eighteenth session of the General Conference and solemnly requests them to comply as a matter of urgency

with 18C/Resolution 13.1, in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Unesco Constitution;

"5. Invites the Director-General to pursue his efforts to ensure the effective implementation of this resolution and to intensify, for this purpose, all useful contacts both with the States involved and with the Palestine Liberation Organization;

"6. Decides to place the matter before the General Conference at its nineteenth session;

"7. Thanks the Director-General for his efforts and requests him to report on educational and cultural institutions in the occupied Arab territories to the General Conference at its nineteenth session";

Considering that the Director-General, in document 19C/73, expresses his regret that, despite his repeated requests, the necessary facilities were not granted for a mission to be sent to the area at a time which would have enabled him to submit an appropriate report to the General Conference,

Noting that, after a period of refusal, the Israeli authorities have just signified their agreement to admit the fact-finding mission proposed by the Director-General,

Noting with concern information received from various sources to the effect that the populations of the Arab territories occupied by Israel are not fully enjoying their inalienable rights to education and cultural life in accordance with their natural aspirations and their national identity,

Reaffirming that access to national education and culture is one of the fundamental human rights which are enshrined in the United Nations Charter and the Constitution of Unesco,

Recalling that the military occupation of territories by foreign troops represents a permanent threat to peace and human rights,

Condemning as contrary to human rights and fundamental freedoms all violations, resulting from Israeli occupation, of the rights of the populations living in all the occupied Arab territories to national education and cultural life, and particularly the policy of systematic cultural assimilation,

1. Invites the Director-General to implement as soon as possible his decision to send a fact-finding mission to the Arab territories occupied by Israel, whose terms of reference would be:

- (a) to collect on-the-spot information on:
  - (i) the general conditions under which the

<sup>128</sup> *Records of the General Conference, Nineteenth Session, Vol. I, Resolutions*, pp. 90-91. Adopted at the Conference's 28th plenary meeting.

right to education is ensured and instruction provided in the occupied Arab territories, with particular reference to curriculum content; the nature, origin and content of the textbooks used; the numbers, origins, situation and qualifications of teachers; the number and state of educational premises, together with the school enrollment trend;

(ii) conditions of cultural life and, in particular, cultural and artistic means of expression and self-fulfilment ensured for the populations of these territories; freedom in the matter of religious instruction and access to places of worship; freedom of access to external sources of culture and, in particular, to varied sources of information;

(iii) generally speaking, all factors permitting an assessment of the extent to which the populations of the occupied territories enjoy their natural right to an education and culture which accord with their national identity;

(b) to study and submit suggestions on activities that Unesco might undertake, in its fields of competence, to assist the populations concerned;

2. *Makes a final urgent appeal* to Israel finally to co-operate in normalizing this situation and in so doing cease to incur general disapproval for its intolerable defiance of the community of nations;

3. *Invites* the Director-General to follow and supervise very closely the operation of educational and cultural institutions in the occupied Arab territories, obtaining as much information as possible, particularly

(a) from the Palestine Liberation Organization,

(b) from the Arab States concerned,

(c) from the Israeli occupation authorities, with a view to guaranteeing the populations of the occupied Arab territories their rights to education and cultural life in such a way as to preserve their national identity;

4. *Again thanks* the Director-General for his efforts and requests him to keep the Executive Board informed of the results achieved.

## 32

**UNESCO Executive Board Decision 99 EX/9.2.2 regarding the report of the Director-General on educational and cultural institutions in the occupied Arab territories<sup>129</sup>**

May, 1976

*The Executive Board,*

1. *Having examined* the report of the Director-General on the implementation of 18C/Resolution 13.1 concerning educational and cultural institutions in the occupied Arab territories,

2. *Noting* the difficulties encountered by the Director-General in the effective implementation of this resolution due to the occupation authorities,

3. *Expressing* its deep concern at the fact that the populations of these territories, according to the information received, are prevented from freely exercising their inalienable right to education and culture, which is necessary to the preservation of their national identity,

4. *Reiterates* to the Israeli occupation authorities the urgent appeal made by the eighteenth session of the General Conference and solemnly *requests* them to comply as a matter of urgency with 18 C/Resolution 13.1, in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Unesco Constitution;

5. *Invites* the Director-General to pursue his efforts to ensure the effective implementation of this resolution and to intensify, for this purpose, all useful contacts both with the States involved and with the Palestine Liberation Organization;

6. *Decides* to place the matter before the General Conference at its nineteenth session;

7. *Thanks* the Director-General for his efforts and *requests* him to report on educational and cultural institutions in the occupied Arab territories to the General Conference at its nineteenth session.

<sup>129</sup> *Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the Executive Board, 99th Session, p. 67.*

WORLD HEALTH  
ORGANIZATION

## 33

**World Health Assembly Resolution WHA  
29.69 condemning Israel's practices in the  
occupied territories and requesting the com-  
mittee of experts to continue its investiga-  
tions**<sup>130</sup>

May 20, 1976

*The Twenty-ninth World Health Assembly,*

Recalling its resolution WHA28.35 on the health conditions of the refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East as well as the population of the occupied Arab territories;

## A

Having considered the Director-General's reports on the health assistance to refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East, documents A29/WP/1 and A29/33;

Mindful of the principle that the health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of a just peace and security;

Deeply concerned at the following Israeli practices such as:

(a) the eviction, deportation and expulsion of the Arab population;

(b) the displacement of the Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories;

(c) destruction and demolition of Arab houses and the confiscation and expropriation of Arab lands and properties;

(d) the continued establishment of Israeli settlements;

(e) mass arrests, administrative detention and ill-treatment of the Arab population;

Convinced that the above-mentioned practices gravely affect the physical and mental health of the Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories and further aggravate the health and living conditions of the Arabs under Israeli occupation;

1. *Calls upon* Israel to desist forthwith from such practices;

2. *Reiterates* its call upon Israel to immediately

implement the relevant World Health Assembly resolutions calling for the immediate return of the Palestinian people and displaced persons to their homes as well as the full implementation of the fourth Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war of August 1949;

3. *Requests* the Director-General to continue to allocate appropriate funds to be devoted to the improvement of the health conditions of the population of the occupied Arab territories;

4. *Further requests* the Director-General to ensure that the above-mentioned funds be spent under the direct supervision of WHO and through the provision of representatives in the occupied Arab territories.

## B

Bearing in mind resolution WHA26.56 which established the Special Committee of Experts to study the health conditions of the inhabitants of the occupied territories in the Middle East, and resolution WHA28.35 which condemns the refusal of Israel to cooperate with the Special Committee and calls upon its government to cooperate with it and particularly to facilitate its free movement in the occupied Arab territories;

Reaffirming resolution WHA24.33 and the relevant provisions of the Constitution of WHO concerning the failure of Members to meet their obligations to the Organization;

1. *Condemns* the refusal of Israel to receive the Special Committee as such and calls once again upon its government to ensure the free movement of the Special Committee to all parts of the occupied Arab territories;

2. *Requests* the Special Committee as such to visit the occupied Arab territories and to carry out its mandate under resolution WHA26.56 and in particular to achieve the following:

(a) to investigate the physical, mental and social conditions of the Arab population in all the occupied territories;

(b) to investigate the physical and mental conditions of the administrative detainees and prisoners;

(c) to contact directly the Arab population under Israeli occupation, their social representatives and their humanitarian societies in order to collect first-hand information on the health conditions of the said population, and to be informed about their health and requirements;

<sup>130</sup> *Handbook of Resolutions and Decisions of the World Health Assembly and Executive Board, Vol. II, 2nd edition (1973-1976)*, pp. 166-167.

3. *Requests* the Special Committee as such to remain in close consultation with the Arab states directly concerned and the PLO for the implementation of this resolution.

C

Having considered the Director-General's report

on health assistance to refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East, document A29/33,

*Appreciates* the efforts exerted by the Director-General for the implementation of resolution WHA 28.35 and requests him to continue his cooperation with the PLO concerning the rendering of all necessary assistance to the Palestinian population.



International





# **Decision of the government of Israel confirming the decision to boycott the UN Security Council debate on Palestine.<sup>1</sup>**

Jerusalem, January 4, 1976

1. The government reaffirms the urgent necessity for promoting efforts towards the achievement of a just and lasting peace between Arab countries and Israel.

2. The Israeli government is ready to start negotiations, without previous conditions with each of the neighbouring Arab countries, with the purpose of a peace treaty.

3. The Israeli government reaffirms that UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, as accepted by Israel, constitute the only basis for negotiations between the Arab countries and Israel on achieving peace in the area. Israel will oppose and not submit to any changes, direct or indirect, in those resolutions.

4. The government of Israel reaffirms that peace negotiations should be held between Israel and the Arab countries within defined terms. The government of Israel rejects any intention of depriving the parties of any responsibility in, or authority over the negotiations, by passing it over for the Security Council to decide upon.

5. The government of Israel calls for the promotion of peace efforts in the area and the convening of the Geneva conference, according to the UN Secretary-General's letter of invitation of December 18, 1973.

6. The government will act in accordance with the Knesset resolution of November 10, 1975, which states that "the organization called the PLO is a framework for organizations of killers whose declared aim is to destroy the state of Israel. Israel will not negotiate with the terrorist organizations in any forum and will not participate in the Geneva conference if a delegation representing those organizations is invited to it."<sup>2</sup>

7. The government decision of December 1, 1975,<sup>3</sup> following UN Security Council resolution 381 of November 30, 1975, is still effective. The decision states that the government will not participate in any action taken in accordance with

the mentioned Security Council resolution on the intended discussion of the Middle East problem, and the invitation of representatives of the terrorist organizations to this discussion. Following that government decision, the Israeli delegate will not join the Security Council discussion, set for January 12, 1976, if a PLO representative takes part.

8. The mutual agreements between the Israeli government and the US government, which were included in the memorandum of understanding between the two countries following the interim agreement with Egypt,<sup>4</sup> are intended to promote the possibility of peace. Security Council resolutions opposing these conclusions will prejudice to a great extent processes and possibilities of advancing towards peace.

The government of Israel expresses her confidence that the US government will abide by the mutual agreements in the Security Council and oppose any resolution which is not in accordance with these agreements.

## 35

# **Statement issued by the government of the USSR outlining its policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict<sup>5</sup>**

Moscow, January 9, 1976

The attention of all those concerned for the strengthening of international peace and security and the deepening of the relaxation of international tension has again been drawn recently to the question of a settlement of what is one of the most complex and dangerous conflicts, the conflict in the Middle East. This is because the development of events in and around the Middle East is still fraught with great dangers.

On the one hand, more favourable conditions are now being created for the achievement of an over-all political settlement in the Middle East. As was shown, in particular, by the recent discussions on this question in the United Nations General Assembly, there is a much better and wider understanding of the essence of the Middle Eastern conflict and the ways and means of settling it. Now an overwhelming majority of States

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Hebrew text, *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), January 5, 1976.

<sup>2</sup> Doc. 185 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>3</sup> Doc. 195 in *Ibid*.

<sup>4</sup> Doc. 150 in *Ibid*.

<sup>5</sup> Text as published in UN doc. A/31/43, Annex, dated January 12, 1976, incorporating the corrections in UN doc. A/31/43 Corr. 1, dated January 14, 1976.

believe that in order to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East it is necessary to solve three basic problems which are organically linked with each other.

Israeli troops must be withdrawn from all Arab territories they occupied in 1967; the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including its inalienable right to create its own State, must be ensured; the security of all Middle Eastern states and their right to independent existence and development must be guaranteed.

It is especially important that the recognition of the need to resolve the Palestine problem in the framework of a Middle East settlement is increasingly gaining ground. Such recognition was clearly reflected in the latest resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, which clearly stated that the Arab people of Palestine is one of the principal parties to a Middle East settlement, and the Palestine Liberation Organization is its legitimate representative. The participation of PLO in the consideration of all aspects of a settlement has now been confirmed by the practice not only of the General Assembly but also of the Security Council; both of these bodies have specially invited the Palestinians to participate in their work.

The proposal for resumption of the functioning of an international machinery which was created expressly for settling the Middle Eastern conflict, the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, is receiving broad support. The overwhelming majority of States firmly hold that all the parties directly concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, should participate in the Geneva Conference from the very start and on the basis of equal rights.

On the other hand, Israeli ruling circles continue stubbornly to oppose any real progress towards settlement. They do not want to return the occupied lands to their lawful owners, and they refuse to recognize the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine. The Israeli authorities are driving the Arab population from its native lands and ostentatiously creating their own settlements there. The territory of Lebanon has become the target of armed Israeli raids. Armed clashes inside that country are continuing, largely provoked from outside by the forces that are striving to maintain a tense situation in the Middle East.

Certain States that have long encouraged Israel's

aggressive policy are also continuing to sabotage the process of over-all political settlement in the Middle East. They continue striving to bypass the Geneva Peace Conference and are seeking separate arrangements that fail to deal with key problems of the settlement. They clearly hope to find weak links among the Arab countries, to disunite the Arab States and subject them to their own influence and control.

This is a risky and hopeless policy. It cannot lead to a settlement and the establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East. It can only result in a further aggravation of the situation and an increase in the danger of new military explosions in the region. It is high time for those who continue to follow this policy to understand that it only enhances the determination of the Arab countries and the Arab peoples to strengthen the unity of their ranks and their defences.

The situation in the Middle East is to be discussed in the United Nations Security Council shortly. If all the members of the Security Council, particularly the States which are permanent members of the Council, display political responsibility and a genuine interest in ending the dangerous situation in the Middle East and ensuring conditions for the peace and security of all States in the region, the Security Council will be able to make an important contribution to a positive development of events.

The Soviet Government believes that the Security Council must base its discussion of the situation in the Middle East on its well-known resolutions adopted after the 1967 war and the 1973 war respectively and also should fully take into account those decisions of the United Nations General Assembly which relate directly to this question.

The main result of the Security Council's discussion of the situation in the Middle East must be the creation of the necessary conditions for the resumption and effective work of the Geneva Conference.

With broad international support, the Arab countries are showing readiness to reach a Middle East settlement on a reasonable basis. This position should be evaluated on its merits. But the Arabs have a right to expect that the other side will also, at long last, display a sense of realism.

The present situation in the Middle East urgently demands the further intensification of

efforts by all those who truly want the peoples of that region to find peace and confidence in the morrow.

As to the Soviet Union, its policy on the question of a Middle East settlement is well known and will continue to be principled and constructive. Supporting the just cause of the Arab countries and peoples which are upholding their legitimate rights, the Soviet Union will do all in its power, in the Security Council and elsewhere, to promote the earliest attainment of an over-all political settlement in the Middle East.

### 36

#### **Letter from Foreign Minister Gromyko of the USSR to UN Secretary-General Waldheim informing him of action relevant to PLO participation in the efforts towards a Middle East peace<sup>6</sup>**

Moscow, January 9, 1976

I have studied your letter of 19 November 1975,<sup>6a</sup> in which you requested me to keep you informed of any action that may be taken in relation to the well-known General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX) inviting the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the work of the Geneva Conference on the Middle East as well as in all other efforts for peace in the Middle East. In this regard I wish to inform you of the following.

The Soviet Union consistently advocates the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. It is making persistent efforts aimed at solving the main, cardinal questions involved in the political settlement of the Middle East problem—the complete withdrawal of the Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 and the realization of the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including its right to create its own State. Only when these questions are solved will it be possible to establish a truly lasting peace in the Middle East and to

ensure stable conditions for a secure, independent existence and development of all the States of the region.

The Soviet Union believes that the only reliable way of reaching a fundamental settlement of the Middle East problem is through joint, collective efforts by all the parties directly concerned including, of course, the Arab people of Palestine represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The urgent need for the participation of the Arab Palestinian people in the achievement of a Middle East settlement was reflected in the relevant decisions of the General Assembly at the twenty-ninth session, in which it was pointed out that the Arab Palestinian people is a principal party in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the representative of the Arab people of Palestine. At the thirtieth session the General Assembly came out in favour of the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East which are held under the auspices of the United Nations, on an equal footing with other parties. The practice of the Security Council and the General Assembly, which specially invited PLO to participate in their work, also shows the importance and necessity of PLO participation in the consideration of all aspects of a Middle East settlement.

Guided by the goal of attaining a comprehensive political settlement of the Middle East conflict, the Soviet Union on 9 November 1975 proposed to the United States that the USSR and the United States as Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East should take a joint initiative aimed at the resumption of its work.<sup>7</sup> We stressed that all the parties directly concerned, including PLO as the representative of the Arab people of Palestine, should from the very beginning participate in the Conference on an equal footing.

In this connexion it should be noted that the various ideas which have been advanced concerning the convening of some kind of unofficial preliminary meeting without the participation of the PLO representatives is nothing but an attempt to avoid implementing the decisions of the United

<sup>6</sup> Text as published in UN doc. S/11931, Annex, dated January 13, 1976.

<sup>6a</sup> In pursuance of paragraph 3 of resolution 3375 (XXX), the Secretary-General, on 19 November 1975, sent identical letters to the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, informing them of that resolution and asking them to keep him informed of any action that might be taken in relation to it [orig. note].

<sup>7</sup> Doc. 183 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

Nations and to block the resumption of the work of the Geneva Conference. The Soviet Union continues to hold the firm view that the most appropriate forum for working out fundamental decisions on a Middle East settlement based on the relevant decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly is the international machinery specially created for this purpose—the Geneva Peace Conference. The Soviet Union resolutely advocates the speediest possible resumption of this Conference with the full and equal participation of the representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization. It will make every effort to ensure that the work of the Conference is successful and leads to the establishment of a lasting and just peace in the Middle East.

[Signed] A. GROMYKO  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

## 37

**Press conference statements by Secretary of State for External Affairs MacEachen of Canada reviewing his talks in Egypt<sup>8</sup>**

Cairo, January 12, 1976

*Q. Do you agree that the Palestinians should be involved in all the negotiations in respect of returning to their homeland, their destiny? You said [inaudible] at the airport. Why are we so hesitant that we accept the PLO organization as the official spokesman for the people's return?*

*A.* Well, it is true that I have stated last night and earlier that Canada believes that Palestinians ought to be involved in any discussion or negotiations related to their destiny. And that is still our policy. We have not pronounced as Canadians, as a Canadian Government, on who should represent the Palestinians. We have taken the view that that is a matter for the parties themselves to determine and not for Canada to pronounce upon. That has been our policy up to the present time.

*Q. Do we anticipate any change in that in the near future?*

*A.* As I said, my mind is open to views that

I will receive here and elsewhere in the course of my journey in the Middle East and, as a result, views that I may hear may influence Canadian policy. But I have not determined any particular aspect of that policy in advance that might be altered and I am not predicting that any particular aspect of our policy will be altered.

*Q. Sir, does the Canadian Government presently see the Palestinian problem as one of refugees or a political problem?*

*A.* Well, I believe that Canada sees the question of the Palestinians as a much broader question requiring political solutions, rather than as a refugee question. We have as you know been supporting the efforts of the United Nations for quite a number of years now to assist the refugees, but obviously the question is broader than that.

*Q. In the Arabic version of your statement, you refer to what is termed in Arabic the legitimate rights of the Palestinians but I find in English it says the interests, not the rights. Which do you mean?*

*A.* I'm certainly more familiar with the English version where I have used the expression "interest" and that is what I mean.

*Q. Would you use "rights"?*

*A.* I have used the expression "rights". I have not applied it to this particular question at all. I have not used the expression "legitimate rights", I've used the expression "legitimate interests".

## 38

**Statement by UN Ambassador Moynihan of the US made before the UN Security Council objecting to PLO participation in Security Council debates<sup>9</sup>**

New York, January 12, 1976

I would like, Mr. President, to thank you for the opportunity to state the view of the United States with respect to the motion which you, sir, have presented.

As will be recalled, Mr. President, on December 4, 1975, the last occasion on which the Council dealt with Middle East affairs, it was proposed to invite the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

<sup>8</sup> Excerpted from the transcript supplied, on request, by the Canadian embassy in Beirut.

<sup>9</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIV, 1912 (February 16, 1976), pp. 189-191.

to participate in that debate with "the same rights of participation as are conferred when a Member State is invited to participate under rule 37". The same proposal, Mr. President, has been made today.

The proposal of December 4, 1975, elicited strong objections from some members of the Council, including the United States. Our position today is unchanged from that of four weeks ago.

What is at issue today in significant measure is the integrity of the processes of the Security Council. We have already seen a startling decline in the confidence with which the processes of the General Assembly are viewed. Seeking to create precedents, while at the same time not adhering to the rules, can erode the Council's influence and authority as has occurred in the Assembly. It is in nobody's interest for this same process to take hold in the Security Council.

Rule 37 of our provisional rules states that:

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may be invited, as a result of a decision of the Security Council, to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council when the Security Council considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected or when a Member brings a matter to the attention of the Security Council in accordance with Article 35 (1) of the Charter.

Mr. President, it goes without saying that a member of the United Nations is a state. We do not have members, and the charter does not provide for members, which are not states. The Palestine Liberation Organization is not a state. It does not administer a defined territory. It does not have the attributes of a government of a state. It does not claim to be a state. This is the basic relevant fact we have here with respect to the proposal before us.

When we were faced with the similar proposal on December 4, it elicited, as I have said, the strongest protest from several members of the Council, including the United States. I described it as a "concerted attempt to disregard the rules of procedure and to accord to the Palestine Liberation Organization a role greater even than that which over the years the Council has granted to observer governments and a role greater by far than has in more recent times been granted to the spokesmen of legitimate national liberation movements invited here under rule 39."

I said then and I repeat that the United States is not prepared to agree and we do not believe this Council should agree to an ad hoc departure from the rules of procedure which ignores the needs of this institution. Unfortunately, despite our opposition and authoritative statements by other permanent members and elected members of the Council, rule and precedent were ignored on December 4 to extend the invitation as proposed.

I wish to emphasize at this point that I am not addressing the question of whether our proceedings are of interest to the Palestinian people. The U.S. view that the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people are an intrinsic part of the problem of lasting peace in the Middle East is well known and is unchanged. This is not the matter I am addressing. It is not my intention to deal with this matter today at all.

The specific issue before us, Mr. President, is our responsibility to the integrity of Security Council procedures and to the future effectiveness of this body. If we take liberties with those procedures and, under the influence of immediate political positions with respect to a given question before this Council, establish or reaffirm unwise precedents, this will come back to haunt us. I want to stress that a decision to invite the PLO to participate in our deliberations, not under existing Council rules, but as if it were a member state with the same rights as a member state of the United Nations would open a veritable Pandora's box of future difficulties.

Were that box to be opened, there are groups in all parts of the world that could seek to participate in our proceedings as if they were member states. No nation represented at this table, including my own, would necessarily be immune from the pernicious consequences.

Mr. President, I repeat: The Palestine Liberation Organization is not a state; it does not *claim* to be a state. For the most elemental of reasons, only member states can participate in our proceedings as member states—unless, of course, we change the rules, whereupon we shall look forward to welcoming the dissident factions and nationalities of half the world, for in point of fact, roughly half of the nations in the world face serious to extreme problems of internal cohesion, owing to internal ethnic conflict. This is true of more than half the present members of the Security Council.

Moreover, the PLO, which is not a state, much less a member state, suffers from an additional disability in seeking to participate in the work of this Council. It does not recognize the right to exist of the State of Israel, which is a member state, and whose right to exist is guaranteed by the charter which this Council is pledged to uphold.

Finally, the PLO, which is not a state, and which does not recognize the right to exist of Israel, which is a member state, further refuses to acknowledge the authority of this Council, which in Resolutions 242 and 338 has undertaken to uphold the rights of the states of the Middle East.

My government is not prepared to go along with an action which will undermine the negotiation process, which is the only process that can lead to peace. The representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization have repeatedly told the General Assembly of their hostility for systematic negotiations and their hostility for the work of this Council. They categorically rejected Security Council Resolution 242, which for years has served and continues to serve as the only agreed basis for serious negotiations.

Mr. President, the Security Council is the capstone of the United Nations. It can act and has done so with distinction in ways which have been essential to peace, especially in the Middle East. The preservation of its integrity and effectiveness deserves our care and attention.

The Council should not repeat its mistaken ad hoc decision of December 4. The United States asks that a vote be taken on your motion, Mr. President. The United States will vote against the motion.

### 39

#### **Executive order by President Ford of the United States establishing the United States Sinai Support Mission<sup>10</sup>**

Washington, January 13, 1976

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States of America, including the Joint Resolution of October

13, 1975<sup>11</sup> (Public Law 94-110, 89 Stat. 572, 22 U.S.C. 2441 note), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2151 *et seq.*), including but not limited to Sections 531, 621, 633, 901, and 903 thereof (22 U.S.C. 2346, 2381, 2393, 2441, 2443), and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. (a) In accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and notwithstanding the provisions of Part 1 of Executive Order No. 10973, as amended, there is hereby established the United States Sinai Support Mission, hereinafter referred to as the Mission.

(b) The Mission shall, in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, the Joint Resolution of October 13, 1975, and the provisions of this order, carry out the duties and responsibilities of the United States Government to implement the "United States Proposal for the Early Warning System in Sinai" in connection with the Basic Agreement between Egypt and Israel, signed on September 4, 1975, and the Annex to the Basic Agreement,<sup>12</sup> subject to broad policy guidance received through the Assistant to the President for national security affairs, and the continuous supervision and general direction of the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 622 (c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2382 (c)).

(c) It shall be the duty and responsibility of the Mission to ensure that the United States role in the Early Warning System enhances the prospect of compliance in good faith with the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement and thereby promotes the cause of peace.

(d) At the head of the Mission there shall be a Director, who shall be appointed by the President. The Director shall be a Special Representative of the President. There shall also be a Deputy Director, who shall be appointed by the President. The Deputy Director shall perform such duties as the Director may direct, and shall serve as the Director in the case of a vacancy in the office of the Director, or during the absence or disability of the Director.

(e) The Director and Deputy Director shall receive such compensation, as permitted by law, as the President may specify.

<sup>10</sup> Department of State Bulletin, LXXIV, 1913 (February 23, 1976), pp. 232-233.

<sup>11</sup> Doc. 169 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>12</sup> Doc. 148 in *ibid*.

SEC. 2. (a) The Director shall exercise immediate supervision and direction over the Mission.

(b) The Director may, to the extent permitted by law, employ such staff as may be necessary.

(c) The Director may, to the extent permitted by law and the provisions of this order, enter into such contracts as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order.

(d) The Director may procure the temporary or intermittent services of experts or consultants, in accordance with the provisions of Section 626 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2386), and section 3109 of title 5 of the United States Code.

(e) As requested by the Director, the agencies of the Executive branch shall, to the extent permitted by law and to the extent practicable, provide the Mission with such administrative services, information, advice, and facilities as may be necessary for the fulfillment of the Mission's functions under this order.

SEC. 3. (a) In accordance with the provisions of Section 633 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2393), it is hereby determined to be in furtherance of the purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, that the functions authorized by that act and required by this order, may be performed, subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this Section, by the Director without regard to the following specified provisions of law and limitations of authority:

(1) Section 3648 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (31 U.S.C. 529).

(2) Section 3710 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 8).

(3) Section 2 of Title III of the Act of March 3, 1933 (47 Stat. 1520, 41 U.S.C. 10a).

(4) Section 3735 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 13).

(5) Section 3679 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (31 U.S.C. 665, Section 3732 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (41 U.S.C. 11), and Section 9 of the Act of June 30, 1906 (34 Stat. 764, 31 U.S.C. 627), so as to permit the indemnification of contractors against unusually hazardous risks, as defined in Mission contracts, consistent, to the extent practicable, with regulations prescribed by the Department of Defense pursuant to the provisions of the Act of August 28, 1958, as amended (50 U.S.C. 1431 *et seq.*) and Executive

Order No. 10789 of November 14, 1958, as amended.

(6) Section 302 (a) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (41 U.S.C. 252 (a)), so as to permit the Sinai Support Mission to utilize the procurement regulations promulgated by the Department of Defense pursuant to Section 2202 of Title 10 of the United States Code.

(7) Section 304 (b) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (41 U.S.C. 254 (b)), so as to permit the payment of fees in excess of the prescribed fee limitations but nothing herein contained shall be construed to constitute authorization hereunder for the use of the cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of contracting.

(8) Section 305 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (41 U.S.C. 255).

(9) Section 901 (a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended (46 U.S.C. 1241 (a)).

(b) It is directed that each specific use of the waivers of statutes and limitations of authority authorized by this Section shall be made only when determined in writing by the Director that such use is specifically necessary and in furtherance of the purposes of this Order and in the interests of the United States.

SEC. 4. (a) There is hereby established the Sinai Interagency Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board, which shall be composed of the following:

(1) The Secretary of State or his representative.

(2) The Secretary of Defense or his representative.

(3) The Administrator, Agency for International Development, or his representative.

(4) The Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or his representative.

(5) The Director of Central Intelligence or his representative.

(6) The Director of the United States Sinai Support Mission or his representative.

(b) The Director of the United States Sinai Support Mission or his representative shall be Chairman of the Board.

(c) The President may from time to time designate others to serve on, or participate in the activities of, the Board. The Board may invite

representatives of other departments and agencies to participate in its activities.

(d) The Board shall meet at the call of the Chairman to assist, coordinate, and advise concerning the activities of the United States Sinai Support Mission.

SEC. 5. The Secretary of State shall, pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. 10973, as amended, including Part V thereof, and this order, provide from funds made available to the President the funds necessary for the activities of the United States Sinai Support Mission.

SEC. 6. All activities now being undertaken by the Secretary of State to implement the "United States Proposal for the Early Warning System in Sinai" shall be continued until such time as the Mission has become operational and the Director requests the transfer of those activities to the Mission. The Secretary of State may exercise any of the authority or responsibility vested in the Director, by this order, in order to continue the performance of activities related to the Early Warning System until transferred to the Director. All such activities undertaken by the Secretary of State shall be deemed to have been taken by the Director.

## 40

**Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger favouring a reconvened Geneva conference and opposing outside military intervention in Lebanon<sup>13</sup>**

Washington, January 14, 1976

*Q. Do you see any chance that in the U.N. Security Council debate that is now going on in the Middle East that anything constructive could come out, either for Israel or for the United States; and would you say that the polarization that seems to be occurring as a result of that debate between Israel and the Palestinians, the PLO, has hastened the need for a reconvening of the Geneva Conference?*

*A. Well, the United States supports the reconvening of the Geneva Conference, or of a preparatory conference to discuss the reconvening of the Geneva Conference.*

<sup>13</sup> Excerpted from the text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIV, 1910 (February 2, 1976), pp. 131-132.

I do not want to prejudge the outcome of a debate which is still going on, but from what we have seen, the resolutions that are at this moment being talked about seem not too promising.

On the other hand, the United States strongly supports progress toward peace in the Middle East and will make efforts, when this debate is concluded, to begin the negotiating process in whatever forum can be arranged.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you see the possibilities now of either Syrian or Israeli intervention in Lebanon?*

*A. Well, we have stated repeatedly that we support the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon and the right of the communities within Lebanon to lead their own lives. We would believe that any outside military intervention, from whatever quarter, would involve the gravest threat to peace and stability in the Middle East; and we have left the parties concerned in no doubt that the United States would oppose any military intervention from whatever quarter.*

## 41

**Press conference statements by Secretary of State for External Affairs MacEachen of Canada reviewing his visit to the Middle East and his talks in Israel<sup>14</sup>**

Jerusalem, January 20, 1976

*MacEachen:* Shall I begin or do you want to begin? Well, I'll begin by saying that I'm going to close my visit to the Middle East by this very valuable two days that I've spent in Israel where I've had discussions with the leaders of the government, not only on bilateral questions between Canada and Israel, but also on international questions. My purpose in coming to the Middle East was to first of all strengthen, where possible, relations between Canada and the countries of the Middle East. Secondly, to exchange views on international questions particularly on the Middle East itself. And finally, to establish a personal relationship with a number of leaders whom I had not met previously and with whom I had not had an opportunity of having discussions. I believe that I've accomplished these objectives

<sup>14</sup> Excerpted from the transcript supplied, on request, by the Canadian embassy in Beirut.



and I'm returning to Canada tomorrow morning, I hope with a broader understanding of the difficulties that exist in this part of the world and certainly with a renewed commitment on the part of Canada to assist in any way possible in this situation. As you know, we are not as a country direct parties to the Middle East dispute and that certainly determines our policy in a certain sense, but even though we are not direct parties to the dispute, we are involved because of our concern about peace and stability in this area and in the world as a whole, and of course—because we have been active peacekeepers in this part of the world at the present time, Canada has the largest single contingent in the peacekeeping force which we think is making a contribution to the stability of the area. I will try to answer questions if you care to ask any.

*Q. It was announced yesterday that a request has been presented to you, to the Canadian Government, to reveal a firmer stand or take a firmer stand vis-à-vis a cahoots that has taken place between Arab states and the Soviet Union, that intensifies tension in the Middle East. Has that really been presented to you and what is your reaction?*

A. Well I haven't had any discussions on that subject.

*Q. What do you feel Canada can do to achieve stability and tranquility in this area?*

A. I believe that directly we are making a contribution by our willingness to maintain at the present time about 1,100 men in the Middle East as part of the peace force, quite a long distance away from Canada, and we are willing to do that because we believe that it is a contribution. And that is a very direct involvement, a very direct involvement indeed. We don't foresee ourselves as a mediator in this dispute nor do we see where it is possible for Canada, or any other country for that matter, to dictate the terms of a settlement. We have always taken the view that a settlement in the Middle East must be reached by the parties involved and it can't be imposed from outside. We support, of course, the broad principles of the relevant United Nations resolutions, but apart from our involvement in peacekeeping and our general support for principles that ought to guide a search for peace, we do not. I have not found as a result of my visit, a more direct role for Canada because I had been asking myself and had been

asking other foreign ministers whom I've met in the course of the last year: Was there anything that a country like Canada or indeed countries like Canada could do? And I haven't found a direct role, I must say, as a result of my visit.

*Q. If I may, just one more question. On your arrival, I asked you about your impressions with regard to the atmosphere existing in the Arab states that you visited and other states in the Middle East. You said it was still early, to come to conclusions then, that you will at the end of your visit most likely. Have you any conclusions with regard to atmosphere?*

A. Well, on atmosphere: I must say that I found the leaders with whom I discussed these questions deeply concerned, but I didn't find an atmosphere of heightened tension at all in their attitudes. In so far as impressions are concerned, I certainly believe that the leaders with whom I spoke have a very genuine desire for peace. In fact, if I may give you impressions which I have released, messages which were transmitted to me in the Arab states were that they wanted peace at the present time. Certainly in Egypt, they had been badly damaged in their development by hostilities, they've expressed a genuine desire for peace along with other Arab leaders and also I've formed the conclusion that most of them, if not all, were ready to live in this part of the world with Israel as an independent, viable political state. And I also heard from people that there did exist, because of these two factors, an opportunity or that at the present time the momentum for peace ought not to be lost. I believe I'm leaving the Middle East with a deeper awareness of the difficulties of reaching a settlement.

*Q. Israel has said that she's not prepared to negotiate with the PLO, or to favor the creation of a third state between Israel and Jordan? Have you been persuaded to the Israeli view during your visit, sir? What is Canada's position on these two matters: PLO/Israel negotiations and a state being created ...? tape not clear*

A. Well, I'll tell you what I've been saying all along, certainly in all the Arab capitals where the question has been put to me and where Canada has been urged, for example, to extend what has been described as recognition to the PLO although in normal circumstances, a country extends political recognition to another state. We have, as a country, stated that the Palestinians ought to have a voice, or ought to be involved in discussions

affecting their future or their destiny. Indeed, it's apparent that unless the Palestinians are involved, that a lasting settlement would be unlikely. In so far as the PLO, we haven't said, as a country, that the PLO is the representative, the sole or the legitimate representative, of the Palestinian people. When that question has been brought forward at international fora, we've abstained on the grounds that it's a matter for the parties themselves to determine. On the question of a state, all we have said, certainly I've said at the United Nations, that we can contemplate the emergence of a Palestinian political entity. What form a Palestinian political entity would take if it does emerge—certainly it would be pretty presumptuous to determine, I think, for anyone at the present time. I have heard views on both sides on this question.

*Q. Could you comment on discussions between yourself and Israeli officials with regard to PLO entry to UN conferences like Habitat and so forth?*

*A.* I did explain that we had sought a postponement of the UN conference on crime which was to be held in Toronto last summer and which was subsequently held in Europe.<sup>15</sup> But we are also hosting the conference on human settlements to take place in Vancouver next spring. And we have determined as a government to go ahead with that conference, to hold it; we have signed an agreement with the United Nations, and I expressed my wish that Israel would adopt an understanding attitude towards our commitment. I was delighted to be informed that Israel had decided to participate in that conference and will send a delegation to that conference.

*Q. Mr. Minister, as a result of your talks both here and in the Arab countries, how do you envisage the UN's role, not only in the Middle East but in the international framework as a whole, particularly since it has been under such intensive attack, not only by Israelis but by many other Western countries as well? Do you think your trip has altered in any way your own approach to the UN, or could you explain how Canada now views the UN and its role both in the Middle East and in the international?*

*A.* There's no doubt about it that our attitude towards certain aspects of the UN has been conditioned, for example, by such decisions that

we have had to take, like the postponement of the crime conference, because we had taken the view that technical meetings of the United Nations had been damaged, and the United States damaged itself, because of the introduction of extraneous political considerations into technical discussions. We were particularly concerned at the end of the General Assembly in December, 1974, at what had happened. The Special Session in '75 did certainly indicate an improved atmosphere. And that atmosphere of course, was given another jolt, and a negative jolt in our minds, by the introduction of the resolution on Zionism. But, while these are undoubtedly troublesome incidents, we don't see, as a country, any substitute for the United Nations. We believe that apart from these troublesome, disturbing developments that there are very positive achievements and positive moves being supported by the United Nations in various fields, particularly in the social and the economic fields. Politically, on the United Nations, it has provided the framework through the resolutions 242 and 338 that all parties accept as a basis for a search for peace, and it seems to me at the present time that the only avenue that is open—apparent avenue—is the reconvening of the Geneva conference.

*Q. I realize there's a gap in the balance of payments in trade between Israel and Canada. In view of the existence of the Arab boycott on trade, is Canada going to take a stand? As a matter of fact, is it going to take legal steps similar to that of the United States with regard to the boycott?*

*A.* Well, of course, as the Foreign Minister pointed out and indeed complimented Canada for the position that had been taken by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on the question of discrimination. And it was a general statement with respect to discrimination in terms of the Arab boycott. You asked me whether we are proposing to take legislative action. We haven't reached that decision because the Arab boycott question is a matter that is still under consideration by the Government of Canada. It is before us and will be further considered by the Government.

*Q. Mr. Minister, this morning you viewed from a distance the Golan Heights. You also received a forceful explanation of the Israeli position regarding the need to keep that territory. I was wondering what impression*

<sup>15</sup> Doc. 131 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

*it made on you, in view of Canada's stand on return to the 1967 frontiers?*

A. Well you know, obviously the situation that I viewed, and we all viewed today, is bound to have an impression on your thinking and it obviously increased my understanding with respect to the anxiety of Israel with respect to the Golan Heights. That certainly is the case. We have already committed ourselves to the resolutions, the relevant resolutions—242, which of course stipulate or postulate the withdrawal from occupied territories, and that's still the framework that Canada supports. I think that that answers the question.

#### 42

### **Statement issued by the US Department of State explaining the US veto of a UN Security Council resolution regarding the rights of the Palestinians<sup>18</sup>**

**Washington, January 26, 1976**

At the conclusion of the Security Council's consideration of the Middle East problem, it is important to turn from the debates that have taken place in New York and look to the year ahead. In doing so we must ask ourselves, Where has this debate left us in our search for a Middle East peace? The United States has perhaps a particular responsibility to do this because, in being faithful to its concept of the search for peace, it has felt obliged to veto a resolution that others believed mapped out a preferable route. We did not do so lightly, nor in a spirit of negation. We believed that with this resolution the Council would have blocked the surer and the tested way to a settlement in favor of one that would not have worked. It is important that it be understood why we believed this to be the case and, more especially, how we see the process continuing within the framework that we have, with our vote, preserved.

There is surely no other problem of our time that has seen so much effort devoted to a solution and where the successes and the failures are so evident as guides for our future endeavors. There

has been no lack of resolutions, no lack of plans; but looking back over the years, we can discern those few developments that have gradually constructed a basis, a framework, for whatever progress has been made in all this time.

In 1967 the Security Council devised Resolution 242, which contained the fundamental principles that should be applied in order to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, including withdrawal from occupied territories; termination of all claims or states of belligerency; acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area; and respect for the right of every state to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. The comprehensiveness, fairness, and balance of Resolution 242 have won it acceptance by all the Middle East states directly involved in the conflict in addition to approval by the outside world. One of the great values of the resolution is its wide acceptance, despite the differences each side has over its meaning.

In 1973, the Security Council approved a resolution that complemented Resolution 242 by establishing a negotiating process between the parties as the means of implementing the principles set forth in the earlier resolution. This was, of course, Resolution 338, which also won wide acceptance and, with Resolution 242, formed a negotiating basis and framework that had been lacking since the early years of the Middle East problem.

The decision was then taken to provide a specific forum—a concrete context—for the negotiating process. The parties agreed to participate in a conference at Geneva under the cochairmanship of the United States and the Soviet Union. The nature of the conference reflected recognition of the fact that the negotiating process, if it was to have any chance of success, had to be based on the consent and voluntary participation of all the parties. The composition of the conference, accordingly, was itself a matter for agreement among all the parties.

Finally, as the parties confronted the substance of the problem, they decided to approach it in stages rather than all at once. The United States was pleased that, at the request of the parties, it could play a helpful role in this step-by-step negotiating process, keeping always in mind that

<sup>18</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIV, 1912 (February 16, 1976), pp. 194–196. The final session of the Security Council debate is doc. 10 above, and the vetoed draft is doc. 15 above.

each step was taken within the Geneva framework and with a view to insuring the ultimate success of the Geneva Conference. It was always recognized that moving directly to an overall approach was an alternative to which the parties could turn at any time, and there was no doubt that an overall settlement, whatever the approach, was the end goal of all concerned, including the United States.

And what was the result? For the first time in 25 or more years, genuine progress was made toward a resolution of the immensely deep and complex problems that constitute the Middle East question. Through the courage and statesmanship of the Governments of Egypt, Israel, and Syria—and working within this common framework—agreements were reached, concessions made in return for other concessions; land was returned on the basis of binding agreements.

Less tangible, but perhaps more important, was the progress in the attitudes of the countries of the Middle East. In the long history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is a new and relatively recent development that opinion in the Arab world has begun to think in terms of recognizing a sovereign Israel and that Israel has begun to see peace as a tangible goal rather than a distant hope. We are fully aware that only a start has been made, that many problems remain to be dealt with and resolved. It was the nature of the process that the easier issues would be dealt with first and the more difficult and complex left until later, when the momentum of the process itself would be working for us. The U.S. Government is committed to devote itself to the resolution of these remaining issues as it has to the issues that have already been resolved.

There would be no chance of further progress, however, if this negotiating framework, painfully erected over years of trial and error, were not left intact. Whatever its imperfections, however great the temptation to tamper with the resolutions and the Geneva formula that constitute it, if it were pulled apart now it could not be put back together and the clock would have been turned back to the years of futility in which no basis existed for negotiation to take place.

The negotiating framework is sufficiently flexible that it can provide the basis for negotiating fair and durable solutions to all the issues involved. The issues of withdrawal, of borders, of the termination of states or claims of belligerency, of

reciprocal obligations to peace, of the right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries—all these and more—must be carefully considered. Reciprocity is a fundamental concept in this process. All of the principles must be clothed with substance and given practical form. The nature of peace must be defined for all the peoples involved.

If there are limitations in the present framework, they result from the attitudes of the parties. What is needed is that all the parties go on from here to work out the substance of the solutions and that if any party feels there is a need to reconsider the framework in order to proceed further, that this emerge from negotiations among the parties in the Geneva context.

It is evident from the debate that led to the convening of the Security Council that there is concern on the part of some of the parties to the dispute, shared by members of the Council, regarding those aspects of the Middle East problem that relate particularly to the Palestinian people and their future. It is important that we work to develop a common understanding of this particularly complex issue. The Palestinian question was for many years considered primarily a refugee problem. It is widely accepted today that this is only one aspect of a larger question. The United States has repeatedly affirmed its recognition that there will be no permanent peace unless it includes arrangements that take into account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people. The United States is prepared to work with all the parties toward a solution of all the issues yet remaining, including the issue of the future of the Palestinian people. We have no preconceptions as to the nature of such a solution as it involves them, which can only be worked out as part of the negotiating process. But we recognize that a solution must take into account their aspirations within the framework of principles laid down in Resolutions 242 and 338.

This issue, as is the case with the other issues, can be successfully dealt with, however, only by maintaining the momentum of practical progress in the negotiating process. We look to this process to clarify issues and to help develop a reasonable and accepted definition of Palestinian interests, without which negotiation on this aspect of the overall problem cannot be successfully addressed. However, it is not realistic to expect one party

to the dispute to agree to the participation of another in the negotiations if the latter's policy is to seek the disappearance of the former as a state. As far as the United States is concerned, no negotiating framework is viable that calls the existence of the State of Israel into question.

We appreciate that, at this stage, the particular negotiating means that have been used so successfully to date present difficulties to one or another of the parties. We have therefore suggested an informal preparatory conference of the present Geneva parties looking toward a convening of the Geneva Conference, in which the parties can discuss questions relating to the agenda, procedures, and participants of the formal conference without prejudice to their positions on the conference itself.<sup>17</sup> What is important is to continue the process. The goals all want to achieve cannot be achieved without movement, but at the same time there is no shortcut. They require the cooperation of both sides at every stage.

We understand also that the process appears at times to be unduly slow. When one looks at the issues that lie ahead one is tempted, indeed, to question whether we shall ever deal with them all. But when one looks back over the years and sees how much more has been accomplished in the last two years than in the quarter of a century that came before, he is encouraged to hope that the process we are engaged in will in fact lead us where we all want to go. The years 1974 and 1975 were years of signal accomplishment. The United States is firmly and irrevocably committed to progress in the negotiation of a settlement. In keeping with this commitment, it will do all it can to press ahead this year to consolidate what has been achieved and lay the groundwork for rapid progress. We believe that we have an obligation to keep open and intact the negotiating framework and to assist in developing a common understanding of the problems that remain before us. We are confident that progress leading to an eventual solution of all the issues is possible, utilizing—and, in fact, only by utilizing—the present framework; and we are committed to assist in every way we can to facilitate such progress. We will be active in the months ahead, and our efforts will be seen to speak for themselves.

## 43

**Statement issued by the government of Israel welcoming the US veto of a UN Security Council draft resolution<sup>18</sup>**

Jerusalem, January 27, 1976

The resolution which was submitted to the Security Council was a negation of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, which created the framework for peace-making in the Middle East. The Security Council meeting was convened at the instance of the Syrians and PLO in pursuance to their aim to destroy the peace-making process in the Middle East. It was a furtherance of a policy developed at the General Assembly to eliminate the concept of negotiation in the Middle East conflict and to substitute an imposed settlement in place of a negotiated agreement. This was the purpose of convening the Security Council meeting. Israel was unwilling to be a party to this blatant and transparent attempt to destroy resolutions 242 and 338 and to supersede the Geneva Peace Conference by converting the Security Council into a forum for dictating a settlement.

Israel applauds the United States stand and sees in it an important contribution towards stability in the Middle East and the promotion of the process of negotiation and of peace-making efforts. It is to be deplored that states friendly to Israel—France, Japan, Panama and Rumania—saw fit to confirm a resolution which, in effect, attempts to eliminate Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and to destroy the existing peace mechanism in the Middle East. Israel has taken note of the fact that Great Britain, Sweden and Italy did not lend their support to this resolution which, had it been adopted, would have seriously prejudiced the only agreed framework for a settlement.

The recent developments in the Security Council only tend to vindicate the position taken by Israel, denying as they do all practical value to this sterile and dangerous debate.

It is sobering indeed to reflect that the Security Council had time to debate for two weeks this sterile resolution designed to block the road to peace in the Middle East, while it was unable to

<sup>17</sup> See doc. 196 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>18</sup> English text, *The Jerusalem Post*, January 28, 1976, p. 4. See also docs. 10, 15 and 42 above.

address itself to the horrifying tragedy in Lebanon.

Israel continues to maintain its position that the Security Council resolutions can in no way be a substitute for direct negotiations between the parties.

Israel reiterates its call to reconvene the Geneva Peace Conference, in accordance with the original letter of invitation, in order to examine possible solutions to the Middle East conflict.

#### 44

### **Speech by Prime Minister Rabin of Israel made before a joint session of the US Congress<sup>19</sup>**

Washington, January 28, 1976

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, distinguished Members of Congress: I come to you from Jerusalem with the greetings of my people in this, your Bicentennial Year.

Two days ago, I stood before Independence Hall to pay tribute in the name of Israel to the Fathers of the American Revolution. There, I saw the Biblical inscription on the Liberty Bell which is so familiar to me in its original Hebrew—*Ukratem dror ba'aretz l'chol yoshveha*—"Proclaim Liberty Throughout All the Land Unto All the Inhabitants Thereof." We, Israel, celebrate with you that great message America proclaimed 200 years ago.

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, I thank you all for the invitation that has brought me here today, and I appreciate your expressions of welcome.

Standing here in this great hall, I am aware that you are the heirs of a two-century-old tradition of free government by the people. Free people everywhere acknowledge their debt to your Declaration of Independence, which emphasizes the natural right of all peoples to establish governments of their own choosing.

Our declaration of independence, building on that right, adds to it the principle that the Jewish people shall preserve its integrity and restore its national existence in its own land, despite the holocaust of history.

The first principle reflects the essence of the American Revolution, the second the essence of the Zionist Revolution.

The war of 1776 and the war of 1948 were both battles of liberation. What made them into revolutions was the human vision that fired them. It was a vision not only to win freedom but also to construct new societies in freedom. In our case, it was the revolt of an ancient nation to put an end, once and for all, to homelessness, helplessness, and holocaust. It was the assertion of our right to self-determination, to return to Zion, to reclaim it of the desolation of 20 centuries, to gather in the oppressed of our scattered sons and daughters, and to build there a new society inspired by the values of the old.

This is the Zionist vision.

From the days when John Adams expressed his hope for the return of Jewish independence, from the days when Mark Twain first saw the land of Israel as "a land of ruin," to the present day, the United States has shown sympathy for this vision. Congress as the expression of America, has consistently acted to give that sympathy substance. For this, I extend to you the gratitude of the people of Israel.

Israel could well say of itself what Thomas Jefferson said of America:

... our ancestors... possessed a right, which nature has given to all men, of departing from the country in which chance, not choice has placed them, of going in quest of new habitations and of there establishing new societies....

When these words were spoken, America was in the midst of its nationbuilding through immigration. It was to continue for another 150 years. We are a century into ours. Our Statue of Liberty is a refugee immigrant barge.

For both of our new societies, immigration became pioneering. Israel's contemporary folk heroes, like yours, are those who mastered wastelands and went out to build communities in empty places.

In a society of pioneering, democracy springs from the frontier itself. Our common heritage—founded upon the Biblical ethic—gave the democratic experience its unique expression. It proclaimed the dignity and worth of every individual. Though different in form, our respective institutions share this common objective.

There are all too few nations in the world that uphold these democratic forms and objectives. We are a rather small family. We did not expect to be so a generation ago.

<sup>19</sup> Text as published in *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIV, 1913 (February 23, 1976), pp. 228–231.

A generation ago, the world was engulfed in a great war. In the contest between nations, it was perhaps the greatest of battles between the forces of good against the forces of evil. When it was over, a conscious effort was made to extend the principles of international justice and decency to all peoples, large and small. Its concrete expression was the Charter of the United Nations.

At the generation's end, the United Nations finds itself in crisis. The words of its charter have been abused and devalued. Israel has learned that it can expect no justice from the United Nations in its present form. Its moral resources have been eroded by extortion and appeasement which again intrude upon the international scene. None of us in the free world have fared well in this climate.

The present combination of circumstances has placed my own people in the front line. But I believe that the consequences extend to the whole democratic family and, ultimately, to the peace and welfare of mankind. Given the acute political, economic, and social stresses of our times, never has the interdependence of our democratic community been greater.

Benjamin Franklin might well have been speaking of us when he said: We must all hang together or we will all hang separately.

I say this as a representative of a small democracy to the representatives of the biggest and strongest of us all. President Ford's leadership is making a crucial contribution to the peace of the world and to the cause of peace in the Middle East. His efforts hold out the hope for a more secure and stable world and a better place for people to live in.

There is no freedom, nor shall there be peace in this world, without a United States strong and confident in its purpose. World peace rests upon your fortitude. Upon it rests the hope that honest dialogue can move forward with societies having other systems of rule. We welcome any form of international dialogue to reduce the suspicions and tensions between nations. For in the end, our common cause as democracies is a struggle for mankind and not against any portion of it.

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, from this rostrum I declare that, however difficult the road, however hard the challenge, and however complex the process, Israel will strive with all its being to contribute to the peace of the world by pressing

ahead with its effort for peace with the Arab countries. This is the driving goal of all our policies.

We know of your concern and national interest in the stability of our area, and I wish to say to you that we seek to be sensitive to them. I believe that certain steps we have pursued have also contributed to that interest. We see the expression of that interest—through the advancement of the human and economic welfare of the peoples of our region—as a positive development and as a hope for progress toward peace itself.

We express our confidence that such developing ties need not be, and must not be, at the cost of Israel's vital interest of liberty and security. And if, in the pursuit of our shared goals, differences do arise from time to time, then let us recall Jefferson's wisdom that "every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle."

The principle of which I speak is the resolution of a conflict that has lasted too long. Let me share with you my thinking on what has, thus far, stood in the way of a solution to it.

If I were to be asked to state in a word what is the heart and the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, I would say this: It is the refusal of the Arab countries to reconcile themselves to the right of existence of one small viable sovereign Jewish state in the land of our people's birth; by Jewish state I mean an independent, democratic society, secular in the equality of all its citizens, Jew and non-Jew alike, before the law and founded upon historic Jewish values.

By stating this, I am saying that the question of territory, the matter of boundaries, the issue of maps, were not and are not the true obstacles to peace.

Twenty-nine years ago, in 1947, we accepted a very truncated partitioned territory upon which to rebuild our Jewish statehood. It was not because of its shape or size that the Arab leaders rejected that United Nations partition plan. They went to war against us because they rejected our very right to freedom as an independent people.

Against great odds and with much sacrifice, we won our war of independence. The stakes were incredibly high. Defeat would have meant national holocaust and the eclipse of the Jewish people in history.

And just as every war reaps its inevitable tragic crop of refugees, so did the Arab war against Israel produce two refugee problems of almost

equal size—an Arab one, and a Jewish one from Arab countries.

After our war of independence, in 1949 we signed armistice agreements with our neighbors. We believed, naively, that these would soon lead to a negotiated peace. They did not. We were ready to settle for the fragile armistice lines as peace boundaries. But as a matter of principle, the Arabs would not negotiate the end of the conflict because they refused to reconcile themselves to a Jewish independent state.

So, in 1956, another war was imposed upon us. Again we won it. At its end, we agreed to evacuate the Sinai Peninsula. Did Israel's withdrawal from all the territories occupied in the war lead to peace? It did not even lead to a negotiation.

So, in 1967, Arab armies again massed along those fragile frontiers that had invited past aggression. Again we won a victory in a war we did not seek.

Then came 1973. Again we were attacked—this time a surprise attack. But this time we were not exposed to those weak armistice lines which our neighbors had recognized only as targets of invasion. Israel now had defensive depth.

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, until 1967, Israel did not hold an inch of the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, or the Golan Heights. Israel held not an acre of what is considered disputed territory. And yet we enjoyed no peace. Year after year Israel called for—pleaded for—a negotiated peace with the Arab governments. Their answer was a blank refusal and more war.

The reason was not a conflict over territorial claims. The reason was, and remains, the fact that a free Jewish state sits on territory at all.

It is in this context that the Palestinian issue must be appraised. That issue is not the obstacle to peace, as some would suggest. Certainly it has to be solved in the context of the final peace. But to assert that this is the key to peace, the formula for peace, or the breakthrough to peace is to misread the realities. It is to put the legendary cart before the horse.

The Palestinian issue began with, and is a product of, the overall Arab posture on the legitimacy of a Jewish State of Israel. Only when that posture changes will the Palestinian issue be constructively and finally tackled.

The clock of history cannot be put back. It

was not Israel that prevented the establishment of a Palestinian state in 1947, as the partition plan had proposed. What did prevent it was the Arab declaration of war on the plan itself because it called for the creation of a Jewish state.

For 19 years no Arab government saw fit to establish a Palestinian state, even though the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were under Arab control. Neither was there a Palestinian demand to do so. In January 1964, the organization that calls itself the PLO was established by the Arab heads of state. Yet, even then, statehood in those territories, then held by Jordan and Egypt, was never the objective. We know what the objective is. It is written large into the Palestinian covenant, which is their binding constitution. Every paragraph of its spits out the venom calling for Israel's destruction.

These are the truths that lie at the heart and the core of the Arab-Israel conflict. And since, to date, the Arab version of peace does not depart from these truths, no honest being can blame us for refusing to cooperate in our own national suicide.

Peace will come when the Arab leaders finally cross the Rubicon from aggressive confrontation to harmonious reconciliation. Then, there is no problem between us that cannot be solved in negotiation. That includes, too, the Palestinian issue, within the geographic and political context of peace with Jordan. When I say Jordan, I do not discount Palestinian representation in the peace delegation of that country. And when I say geography, I do not discount a negotiation concerning the future final peace boundaries of the territories involved.

For the genuine peace we seek, Israel is ready to give up much and to compromise much on territory. In a negotiation whose sincere shared goal is final reconciliation, we shall go more than halfway to assure its success.

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, a short time ago, from this very rostrum, President Sadat wisely declared: "there is no substitute for direct person-to-person contacts that go deep into the heart of all the problems which invoke our common concern and capture our imagination."<sup>20</sup> I wish that he would direct those words to me as well as to you, the Congress of the United States. I would

<sup>20</sup> Doc. 322 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.



then know that the work of true peacemaking has finally begun.

I today declare: I am ready to meet with any Arab head of government, at any time and at any place, for the purpose of peace talks.

I do not know when peace will finally come. But of this I am certain: It will be our future strength that will largely determine the resources of peace in our region. Weakness is no prescription for negotiation. If it be perceived that Israel is not weak, so shall our neighbors perceive the wisdom of mutual compromise, reconciliation, and peace.

What, therefore, does Israel propose as the next step in the effort for peace? Israel proposes the reconvening of the Geneva Peace Conference in accordance with the letter of invitation from the U.N. Secretary General to the parties to the conference.

The basis for the conference has to be founded on two fundamental principles—on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as they were accepted by Israel and by the other parties and powers concerned. The second principle is that the parties to the conflict must be the parties to the peacemaking process. The negotiations for peace must be conducted between ourselves—the Government of Israel and the neighboring Arab governments.

There are some who tell us that—here and there—a change toward realism is perhaps slowly evolving. I pray there is some truth to this.

Israel is determined to encourage whatever symptoms there may be to move that process along. This is why we entered into the interim agreement with Egypt. We did so to encourage the trend toward greater realism. Our aim in the agreement is to promote conditions of stability and trust which, we hope, will produce, in time, a climate for genuine peace negotiations.

In the light of what I said and under the given conditions of regional tension, the pursuit of this policy calls for taking risks. It has required our making tangible concessions for concessions far less tangible. We have done so because we believe it is necessary to take measured risks not only in case of war but also for the sake of peace.

Thus, in a very few weeks' time, the defense forces of Israel will carry out a withdrawal in Sinai. We have already handed to Egypt proper the oilfields on the Gulf of Suez and the coastal

link to them. With that, Israel has given up its single oil resource. We have agreed to these measures not in return for peace, not even in return for an end to the state of war. We did what we did in the hope that it will move us some steps closer to peace.

Congress, I know, is familiar with these measures. They are major elements of the recent Israel-Egypt agreement, negotiated through the good offices of the United States. May I say that the limited American civilian technical presence—requested by both parties—and which Congress authorized in the context of this agreement is a contribution toward the cause of peace. That presence has no function or responsibility in case of war. And I wish to add with emphasis that if a condition of hostilities does arise, I will be the first to call for its removal. This is a matter of fundamental doctrine for Israel. We alone are responsible for our own defense. This is how it has been; this is how it must be. I believe it to be the essence of our political relationship.

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, throughout the years, we have found here, in Congress, a wisdom and deep understanding of our nation-building and defense needs and the economic burdens arising from them. But as a people, we turn to ourselves before we turn to others.

The Government of Israel is engaged in a tough program of economic measures.

Last year we reduced private consumption by almost 5 percent, and we will reduce it by another 5 percent this year. We have put on ourselves a heavy burden of taxation. This year the government will collect in taxes some 70 percent of all our national income. I am told this is almost twice as much as it is in America.

I mention these as only a few of the many examples within a comprehensive economic policy inducing more austerity and higher production. We shall continue this policy—difficult though it be—for this is what we require of ourselves to do.

Peace, not war, is our tradition. We see no glory in battle. I was once a soldier, not by choice but by necessity. I know the horrors of war, the waste, and the agony. I know what peace can bring to all the peoples of our region through open boundaries, projection of economic cooperation, the conquest of disease, and the free flow of ideas, people, and products.

Even now, before peace, we declare our readiness to promote its climate by unilaterally opening our ports for the free passage of goods to and from our immediate neighbors.

We open our hospitals to our neighboring sick. We declare open our institutions of research for all the countries in the Middle East wishing to share knowledge in the fields of agriculture and water development.

We, the people of our region, are destined to live together for all time, for never again shall there be a Middle East without a State of Israel.

The going has not been easy, and the challenge ahead will not be easy. But we are an old people, and there is no sacrifice too great to protect the freedom we have won and the new society we have created. I believe Americans, above all, can understand this truth.

Three hundred years ago, celebrating their first years of survival after much suffering, your Pilgrim Fathers wrote these lines:

"We have made a clearing in the wilderness; and another year will see a broader clearing, a better garnering. We have made a good beginning in a hostile world."

So do we, the first generation of free Israel, descendants of 2,000 years of unhappy wandering, declare we have made a good beginning in a rather hostile world.

America has helped us greatly. In loyalty to its Founding Fathers, this Republic of the United States has given tangible meaning to human values in the charting of its policies. By virtue of this, Israel pays you tribute as you enter into the third century of independence.

Permit me to express that tribute to the Congress through the words of an American Jew, a soldier in the Revolutionary War. Jonas Phillips, in 1787, wrote this prayer:

"May the almighty God of our fathers Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, imbue this noble assembly with wisdom... and may they have the satisfaction to see that their present toil and labor for the welfare of the United States be approved throughout all the world and particularly by the United States of America."

This is the sincere sentiment of friendship Israel brings you this day.

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**Press interview statement by Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan pointing to the Palestine problem as the central element of the Middle East conflict<sup>21</sup>**

**Lahore, January 29, 1976**

*Q. Excellency, peaceful negotiations are one of the pillars of foreign policy. Do you think that such negotiations would bring about a just settlement to the Middle East conflict?*

*A. The Middle East conflict?*

*Q. Yes.*

*A. You have asked me a question which I can answer, but which I prefer not to.*

*Q. In view of your experience at the United Nations, don't you think that the use of veto has killed the resolutions which if allowed to be passed, would have brought peace and stability to many countries, specially the developing countries? What in your opinion could be done to stop such action?*

*A. I don't advocate that the power of veto in the Security Council should be withdrawn because with that the Security Council would collapse and if the Council were to collapse, the General Assembly would also break down. This would mean the end of the United Nations.*

*I therefore, understand the necessity of the right of veto in the hands of the Super Powers. At the same time, it is important that the veto should be used in the cause of peace and in its promotion. I can give you one example when the veto was used to promote peace and justice. That was when the People's Republic of China refused to admit Bangladesh to the membership of the United Nations until the 90,000 prisoners of war were returned to Pakistan and the territory occupied by aggression had been vacated. The Chinese veto in the Security Council helped to bring about the return of 90,000 prisoners of war. This was a big contribution to peace.*

*This shows that the veto can be used for good peaceful purposes. But in the context in which you have put the question, I believe that the use*

<sup>21</sup> Interview conducted for the *Egyptian Gazette* (Cairo) and published in *Dawn* (Karachi), February 19, 1976; excerpted from the English text, *Pakistan Horizon* (Karachi), XXLX, 1 (1st quarter, 1976), pp. 159-161.

of the veto in the present debate on Palestine will not contribute to a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian dispute.

I believe that the veto in this connection was a negative use of power. What was there which needed to be vetoed? Resolution 242 talked about refugees. Now in 1967, you could call the Palestinians poor people and show sympathy. But today in 1976, the position of the PLO is entirely different from what it was in 1967. The Rabat Conference was the turning point. At Rabat, when Jordan agreed to recognize the PLO and the rights of the PLO, what happened to the so-called realism of the States that claim a pragmatic approach to problems? Is it not a reality that PLO exists, is it not unanimously accepted by all Arab States? Is it not a reality that Jordan has conceded the West Bank as Palestinian?

The whole of the Arab World is involved in the Palestinian problem. The whole of the Muslim World is involved in it, indeed the whole of the Third World. More and more States are supporting the Palestinian cause. Most of them are extending support out of conviction. Others are doing so out of expediency. Some West European countries changed their policy towards the Palestinian cause after the oil price went up. Incidentally, we don't appreciate that kind of attitude. When we starve they say, alright, they are starving but why should they have a repressive Government? But when they had to pay 20 cents more for a gallon of petrol, they changed their fundamental policy. However, that is a separate question. To return to the issue, more and more of the world is recognizing the rights of the Palestinian people. No nation, therefore, should adopt a diplomatic stance which will promote its own isolation. Nations work hard to break their isolation, not to promote it. From that point of view, I do not understand why this veto was applied.

The question is: What is the heart of Arab-Israel problem? The heart of Arab-Israel problem is not Egypt, it's not Algeria, it's not Sudan, it's not Pakistan. The heart of Arab-Israel problem is Palestine—the rights of the Palestinians.

What are the rights of the Palestinians? They include the right to their homeland, the State of Palestine. It would not be a new State; it would not mean the creation of a new country. The State of Palestine was recognized even in 1947. The British plan called for the division of Palestine.

Now the point is this: The territory of the Palestine State falls in part occupied by Israel and in part of Jordan; Jordan has recognized the right of the Palestinian people and thus the principle has been conceded by one of the two countries which are affected. The rights of the Palestinian people to a State is an established fact and it is now only for the other power to similarly accept a reality.

#### 46

### **Resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe regretting the UN General Assembly's resolution on Zionism and calling for moves towards a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict<sup>22</sup>**

Strasbourg, January 30, 1976

The Assembly,

1. Recalling its Resolutions 490 (1971) and 594 (1975), on the situation in the Middle East;

2. Welcoming the Sinai agreement, reached in September 1975 between Egypt and Israel,<sup>23</sup> as a further step toward a jointly agreed peaceful solution in the Middle East;

3. Alarmed by the threats to a peaceful negotiated settlement in the Middle East arising from the increase in hostilities between national and religious communities in Lebanon, and condemning all acts of military hostility or terrorist action against members of the various national and religious communities, as well as against all civilian populations of the region in general;

4. Deeply shocked by the shameful resolution equating Zionism with racism, adopted by the United Nations on 10 November 1975, and expressing its solidarity with the Jewish people who, more than any other people, have suffered from racism, a doctrine which is in utter conflict with the aims and the ethics of the Council of Europe,

5. Appeals to the parties involved in the Middle East conflict to abstain from all political propaganda directed towards attaching derogatory labels to one side or the other, and to resume joint efforts to reach a peaceful solution, in par-

<sup>22</sup> Resolution 616 (1976) adopted at the 25th sitting of the 27th ordinary session; text supplied, on request, by the Council of Europe.

<sup>23</sup> Doc. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

ticular by means of direct negotiations, bearing in mind that any lasting negotiated settlement must recognise the State of Israel and its right to live at peace within secure and recognised frontiers, and must offer a political solution to the situation of the Palestinian people, ensuring their representative participation in a settlement valid for the entire region;

6. Invites the governments of the member states of the Council of Europe:

a. to do everything in their power to promote a new climate of reconciliation between the various conflicting communities in Lebanon;

b. to implement Resolution (54) 16 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, with a view to consulting and harmonising their policy in the United Nations, in order to prevent any sectarian abuse of the second decade for action to combat racism, which will open in 1976 at the conference in Accra.

#### 47

### **Television interview statements by Prime Minister Rabin of Israel discussing US policy towards Israel and denying the centrality of the Palestine question<sup>24</sup>**

New York, late January, 1976

*Monroe: Our guest today on "Meet the Press" is the Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin.*

*Mr. Rabin, on an 11-day visit to this country, addressed a Joint Session of Congress on Wednesday. He was Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army during the Six Day War of 1967 and for five years served as Israeli Ambassador to the United States.*

*We will have the first questions now from Barbara Walters of NBC News.*

*Walters: Mr. Prime Minister, it has been reported now, after your talks here, that the United States will try to have a Geneva Conference on the Middle East, to have it reconvened without the direct participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Given the strong Arab and Syrian support for the PLO, one wonders realistically how this can be accomplished. Can you tell us how you and President Ford think it will be?*

A. I prefer to present the Israeli position rather than to represent the American position, because I believe it will be more advisable to turn to an American official about an American position.

I think that what we should try now—after succeeding in the achievement of the interim agreement between Egypt and Israel and through that reduction of tension, creating, I believe, conditions that will help the cause of peace—[is] to reconvene the Geneva Conference on the basis that was agreed in '73, that it will be convened, in accordance to the procedures that were set by the two co-chairmen, the United States and the Soviet Union, in the letter that was sent to the Secretary General, and really go into the meaningful negotiations about putting an end to the conflict and negotiating peace. I hope the American position will be the same.

*Walters: Mr. Prime Minister, you have repeatedly said in your speeches that a militarily strong Israel is necessary to maintain the peace. The Pentagon and the CIA have reported after their military analysis that Israel is more than strong enough to deter any Arab aggression. Were you able to convince Congress and President Ford, those who are responsible for deciding military aid to Israel, that you are right and that the CIA and the Pentagon are wrong?*

A. First, I would like to thank the CIA and the Pentagon for complimenting Israel for its military strength, but I believe that we need more than compliments. We need hardware.

What is the real problem? The influx of arms by the Soviet Union, especially to Syria, to Iraq, to Libya, and just to give you an idea, since the Yom Kippur War at the end of '73, I would say that for each tank that we got from the United States, the Soviet Union sent something between four to five tanks to four Arab countries. Therefore, if the Soviets will reduce the arms influx, we can reduce our needs. But, to be more specific to your question, I believe that the calculations that were presented by the CIA and the Pentagon were not based on the issues they should be based on. For example, they excluded the Jordanian Army from any calculation whatsoever—

*Walters: But, Mr. Prime Minister, could you just tell me if you were able to convince the President of this point of view in your days of talks, or does he still feel that the military analysis of this country is right?*

A. I can say in a simple way that after my

<sup>24</sup> Interview conducted by Barbara Walters, Rowland Evans, Richard Holbrooke and Richard Hunt and broadcast on NBC's "Meet the Press" on February 1, 1976; transcript supplied, on request, by NBC.

talk with the President and the Secretary of State, I have come up with satisfaction as to what has been added during my visit in terms of items that will be shipped to Israel.

*Evans: Mr. Prime Minister, U.S. taxpayers are going to be charged by the U.S. Congress about \$2.5 billion this year to keep Israel in the posture that, of course, you wish to keep her, the strongest nation in the Middle East. That amounts to about \$833 for every man, woman and child in Israel. Do you think that with unemployment in this country running close to eight per cent, with some of our great cities like New York on the edge of bankruptcy, that there could be a backlash by the American taxpayer over this kind of spending?*

A. I can explain the needs of Israel and the need for a strong Israel to maintain the course of stability in the area and the search for peace.

I don't believe and I don't pretend that I can answer it from the American point of view.

Allow me just to remind you that I think if we look back we will see that whenever the United States supported Israel on the one hand and offered, on the other hand, open course for peace, for increased stability, this combination of the two-pronged policy by the United States brought her certain political achievements that have served the American interest.

I believe that this policy has brought about the interim agreement with Egypt, the change in the Egyptian attitude towards the United States, and through that, to secure vital American interests. Therefore, I think the policy of the United States that puts first and foremost the efforts to bring about peace, but realizing that without a strong Israel this cannot be achieved and cannot even turn some of the attitudes of the Arab countries to be more favorable to the United States, I think that this policy has to continue to be pursued.

*Evans: Let me turn that military aid question around a little bit, Mr. Prime Minister.*

*By what rule of international law does Israel claim the right to use U.S. military aid in the form of aircraft to bomb refugee and terrorist bases in Lebanon that are said to be bases used by the PLO and the Fatah against Israel?*

A. I believe by the rule of self-defense. We attack bases of terrorists that they declare publicly and that carry out all kinds of atrocities against Israel, and therefore I think that the act of self-defense is respected all over the world.

May I ask you a question? In Lebanon, in the last ten months, ten thousand people got killed, twenty thousand were wounded, the Christian community was forced to accept conditions that were dictated under the influence of Syria by the terrorists—the Palestinian terrorists—and I have never heard you saying any word about it.

*Evans: Could I answer that by asking you, sir, whether you feel the presence of a half million Palestinians who used to live in what is now Israel, as refugees, in Lebanon, caused or were part of the cause of the unfortunate problems in Lebanon?*

A. I don't believe that it is a related problem, but if you would like to answer me, the answer is simple. While in Lebanon, practically, there was coexistence between the Christian community and the Moslem community. Only because of outside forces there is an effort to bring about Islamization of Lebanon.

In 1947, when the partition plan of former Palestine to a Jewish state and an Arab state was proposed, we accepted it. The other side rejected, went to war against the plan, against the very existence of the Jewish state, and now they claim that they have suffered from the war that they initiated. Had they accepted the partition plan, there would have been a Jewish state and a Palestinian state, and no one Palestinian would have been in the status of a refugee. Therefore, please turn your question about what has been developed as a result of the war that they initiated to those that were responsible for that.

*Holbrooke: In answer to Barbara Walters' second question, Mr. Prime Minister, you said that the United States apparently, on your last visit, has increased its support to Israel. Specifically, did you get the administration and President Ford to agree to restore in one form or another the \$500 million that they had cut from next year's budget?*

A. When we discussed with the administration our problems, we first focused on the political issue. Then we dealt with the practical needs of Israel in terms of hardware to maintain the balance of power in view of the increased military strengths of the other side. And the financial problem comes after we decide about the question of the hardware.

I believe that at present the main focus was the political issue and the hardware. We have got time to discuss the financial problem.

*Holbrooke: Are you saying that it did not come up in all your talks with the President and the Secretary of State?*

A. This issue was raised up. I don't consider it to be at the present the crucial issue. Allow me to remind you that the fiscal year bill of foreign aid for '76 has not yet been approved by the Congress. I tend to believe it will be appropriated in the proper way, and then in accordance with the process of the legislation of the fiscal year of '77, we will bring up all our problems.

We need more than was put before the Congress by the bill for fiscal year '77.

*Holbrooke: So you would like more. Do you expect to get it?*

A. I am optimistic.

*Holbrooke: There are reports in the newspapers that a compromise has already been reached. Are you willing to confirm that?*

A. I am not aware of it.

*Hunt: Changes are being made in the political structure of Lebanon, Mr. Prime Minister, which greatly increase the power and influence of the Syrians and Palestinians in that country. Do you regard these changes as a threat to Israel?*

A. I prefer to look at it from a different point of view. I believe that for us, and I think also and might be mainly to the outside world, it should serve as a certain lesson and a warning.

Lebanon was the only country amongst 17 Arab countries that Islam was not, by their constitution, the official religion. It was the only Arab minority which does not have Islam as their religion that managed to sustain themselves within a framework of a statehood and political state, and the effort to force the Islamization of Lebanon, to prevent that even one Arab country exists as a secular state in which Christians and Moslems would be able to live together, serves as a warning to us. To what extent a minority which is not Arabic and is totally different in the religion, can afford not to have independence, statehood, and the strength to defend it against the militancy of the Arab-Muslimic countries.

I would say even more than that. The fact that all the moralists in the world keep silent when a massacre takes place—as I said, ten thousand people got killed—over 80 per cent of them are civilians; women, children. No one raised the issue in the Security Council, and the

body of the United Nations that is supposed to maintain peace, deals for two weeks with all the nonsense that the so-called PLO brings there and no one raises that a massacre goes on in an Arabic state against a Muslim community that are Arabs. Of course, we have to draw also some lessons from that.

*Hunt: In a strategic sense, sir, are you not concerned about the presence of a possibly far more hostile presence on your northern frontier?*

A. It is too early to pass any judgment on what will be the final development in Lebanon. I believe that at the present the Syrians will be satisfied with the first step of the Islamization of Lebanon, and I don't believe—and I hope that it would not dare to make it more hostile in its attitude towards Israel, but no doubt it is going to change the situation of Lebanon, not in the immediate future, but it might be in the longer term, in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, not in favor of Israel.

*Monroe: Mr. Prime Minister, you have talked about the possibility of Israel talking directly with the Palestine Liberation Organization as if that might be suicidal. Isn't that a harsh overstatement? It is true that the PLO has not officially recognized Israel's right to exist, but neither has Israel recognized the right of the Palestinians to a national existence. Why not have both sides sit down and talk about it? What harm could that do?*

A. First, allow me to remind you that the PLO basic philosophy and concept is that: first, Judaism is religion and religion only. Second, the Jews are not entitled to any right of self-determination; and, three, the Jews have no right to have a country of their own.

The declared goal of the PLO is the destruction of Israel, the expulsion of two million Jews back to the countries where they came from and to build on the ruins of Israel their country. I don't believe that any reasonable person will expect Israel to cooperate in its self-destruction.

When it comes to us, we have said that even though the Palestinian issue is not the crux of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the real issue that has maintained the Arab-Israeli conflict is the reluctance of the Arab leaders to reconcile that there is a Jewish state at all. But we know that without the solution of the Palestinian issue there will be no real peace.

Therefore, we offer to negotiate with Jordan and if Jordan will include within its own nation a delegation, the representatives of the leaders of the people who live on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, that their fate and their future will be decided in this discussion, we will have nothing against it.

*Monroe: How is that workable, Mr. Prime Minister? Isn't it clear that the Palestinians and the Arab countries both look upon the PLO as the voice of the Palestinians, not the government of Jordan?*

A. If this is true, why of 670,000 people who live on the West Bank, who have got Jordanian citizenship, none of them has decided to give it up? All of them adhere to their Jordanian citizenship.

According to the Geneva Convention, we are there on a temporary basis, and we have to tolerate the Jordanian law—and respect the [fact] that the people there are Jordanian citizens and they want to remain so.

*Walters: Mr. Prime Minister, we have heard these arguments now back and forth for a year, and I'd like to get back to my very first question which was, how do you expect to have a Geneva Conference reconvened without the PLO? Or, to be more specific; you and the United States have said that you are going to coordinate your diplomatic strategy. I asked you about President Ford and you said you had to have the Americans answer. But can you give us any sign, any hope, any direction; can you realistically be specific about one new action that is going to break the stalemate, the same conversation back and forth that we have heard for a year. Has anything happened this week, or are things basically the way they were before you came to this country?*

A. I believe that there are basically two options, how to move towards peace. One is to reconvene the Geneva Conference along the basis that I have described. Again, allow me to remind you that two years ago everybody agreed to that. Allow me also to remind you that at least one key Arab country has made it public that this country is ready to go to the Geneva Conference and to discuss the participation of the so-called PLO once the conference will be convened. This is one option. We are all for it.

Second, there might be another option, that, through quiet diplomacy, we will inquire to what extent there is a readiness on the part of the Arab countries and, without going into details, to set forward a more meaningful political

goal for the negotiations, the kind that was set for the interim agreement, either peace or something which is closer to a real peace that will put an end to the war.

Therefore, I believe these two options are open. I don't believe that there is a need to include the so-called PLO in the process of the peacemaking at the present because the meaning of their inclusion, on the part of Israel, is to accept the legitimacy [of their] target, our destruction.

*Monroe: We have less than a minute.*

*Evans: Mr. Prime Minister, you said a minute ago the PLO and Palestine issue is not the crux of the matter, and yet a high American official, Mr. Saunders of the State Department, stated American policy as follows: "The Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the heart of the conflict."*<sup>25</sup>

*How do you bring Israel's point of view in concert with the United States in view of that statement?*

*Monroe: There's just about twenty seconds, Mr. Prime Minister.*

A. I don't accept the concept of Mr. Saunders, and I tend to believe there are people who know better than him, in the administration, what is the heart of the problem.

*Monroe: You don't think he speaks for Mr. Kissinger?*

A. I don't have any evidence of that.

*Monroe: I am sorry to interrupt, but our time is up. Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister, for being with us today on "Meet the Press."*

48

**Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger discussing the US attitude to the Geneva conference and denying reports of State Department involvement in anti-boycott amendments<sup>26</sup>**

**San Francisco, February 3, 1976**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the late Rabin visit to Washington, what's your concept of the future of peace-making efforts in the Middle East? Would it be Geneva or quiet diplomacy—or what's your concept?*

<sup>25</sup> See doc. 186 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>26</sup> Excerpted from the text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIV, 1913 (February 23, 1976), pp. 216–217, 218.

A. I do not know what our capacities for quiet diplomacy are at this particular moment. I am going to see Prime Minister Rabin again tonight in Los Angeles, and we will have a sort of a wrap-up session.

What forum will be chosen depends of course on what is possible. The United States is prepared to go to Geneva. The United States is also prepared to encourage other steps that the parties could agree upon.

After further talks with the Prime Minister and after his return to Israel for an opportunity to talk to his colleagues, we will then approach other countries. And only out of that can we be sure of what process is going to develop.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, has the United States any view on the reported conflict between Mr. Rabin and Peres regarding the military needs of Israel?*

A. I am not aware of any conflict between Prime Minister Rabin and Defense Minister Peres. I must say we are so busy in our own internal problems that we cannot get involved in those of Israel.

*Q. The State Department reportedly proposed the filing of an antitrust suit against Bechtel Corporation in relation to the Arab boycott. The State Department also has proposed amendments that will change the language of the export-most-favored act which makes the boycott against Israel against the law. Why does the State Department propose these antiboycott amendments?*

A. This is not exactly correct. It is in the nature of things that when other agencies in the government undertake steps which they think may have a foreign policy implication they will ask our views.

In the case of the Bechtel case, the Attorney General asked the view of the State Department as to what the foreign policy implications would be. We made clear, both publicly and in our opinion to the Attorney General, that we did not claim any right to interfere with the judicial process, or that our opinion should affect the judicial process. But being asked what our view was—I think anybody can tell you that the impact on Saudi Arabia and Saudi-U.S. relations will not be all that favorable.

Having stated our opinion, the Attorney General then proceeded—as was his duty—with applying

the law as he sees it.

With respect to boycott, I do not know exactly what specific provisions you are talking about. We have supported—strongly supported—the Presidential statement which sets down the basic guidelines on the boycott. On some specific measures we have the view that they would have a serious impact on our relations with the countries concerned and might interfere and complicate the process of a moderate evolution toward peace in the Middle East.

But, again, the State Department has the responsibility to express the foreign policy implications. Others that have other responsibilities can then weigh those in relation to other priorities.

#### 49

#### **Final declaration of the meeting on Islamic-Christian dialogue (excerpts)<sup>27</sup>**

**Tripoli, February 6, 1976**

18. Lebanon, a country dear to the hearts of both Muslims and Christians, has been exposed to a sedition in which thousands of innocent people were victims. Certain people of ill-intention, inside and outside Lebanon, have tried to describe the struggle as a sectarian one between Muslims and Christians. This slander does not only insult the Muslims and Christians in Lebanon, but it aims at exploding all genuine and earnest endeavors for “rapprochement” between the Muslim and the Christian worlds. The Two Parties, therefore, denounce the sedition which rose in Lebanon and refute stamping it as a sectarian struggle, and condemn all attempts of such evaluation or distort the sublime, magnanimous co-existence prevailing among the religious families in Lebanon.

<sup>27</sup> Excerpted from the English text as published in *The Link* (New York), IX, 1 (Spring 1976), p. 5. The meeting was attended by Roman Catholic scholars appointed by the Vatican and representatives from various Islamic countries. The head of the Vatican delegation, Cardinal Pignedoli, later disavowed the statement in paragraph 20 equating Zionism and racism, saying that it had been passed due to a “technical accident” (*International Herald Tribune* (Paris), February 9, 1976, p. 5.).



20. The Two Parties look upon the revealed religion with respect, and accordingly they distinguish between Judaism and Zionism, the latter being a racial aggressive movement, foreign to Palestine and the entire Eastern region.

21. Abiding by Truth and Justice and being fully concerned with Peace and believing in the right of people for self-determination, the Two Parties reaffirm the national rights of the Palestinian people and their right to return to their homeland, and to affirm the Arabism of the city of Jerusalem, and the rejection of Judaization, partition and internationalization projects, and denounce any violation of all sacred shrines. The Two Sides request the setting free of all the detainees in occupied Palestine, above all the Muslim 'Ulema and the Christian clergy, they also demand the liberation of all occupied territories and call for the formation of a permanent commission to investigate the alteration of sacred Muslim and Christian sites and reveal all these to the world's public opinion.

. . . . .

## 50

### **Letter from Foreign Minister Gromyko of the USSR to UN Secretary-General Waldheim outlining the USSR's attitude to Middle East peace moves<sup>28</sup>**

**Moscow, February 12, 1976**

Your message to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East in connexion with the results of the consideration of the Middle East problem in the Security Council has been carefully considered. Your initiative is duly appreciated in Moscow and we share your concern at the persisting tension in the area of the Middle East, which represents a danger to the cause of peace. It is quite evident that Israel's continuing occupation of the Arab territories and its disregard of the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine remain fraught with the threat of new military explosion, the consequences of which may seriously affect the whole international situation. Such a course would be in the interests only of those who would like to use the lack of a settlement of the Middle East crisis and the absence

of a lasting peace in the area for their own narrow purposes.

The fact that Israel and those who support it continue their efforts to keep the whole problem of the Middle East settlement deadlocked cannot but cause concern. The results of the recent consideration of this question in the United Nations Security Council testify to this. That organ was unable to reach a decision because of the position of one of the permanent members of the Security Council,<sup>29</sup> although the overwhelming majority of its members definitely spoke out in favour of specific measures to achieve a comprehensive political settlement of the Middle East problem.

In the course of the consideration of the situation in the Middle East in the General Assembly as well as in the Security Council, the Members of the United Nations, with very few exceptions, clearly expressed their opinion that genuine peace in the Middle East is impossible unless Israeli troops are withdrawn from all the Arab territories occupied by Israel in 1967 and unless the inalienable national rights of the Arab people of Palestine are safeguarded and the right of all States of the region to independent existence and development is guaranteed.

The development of the situation around the problem of a Middle East settlement has clearly demonstrated that there is no other reliable way to achieve agreement on all the questions involved in a Middle East settlement except through the resumption of the work of the Geneva Conference—the international forum specially created for that purpose. That conference should, of course, be well prepared and all the parties directly concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization as well as the USSR and the United States, as the Co-Chairmen of the Conference, should participate in its work.

Without the participation of the Palestinians, the Geneva Conference would be not a forum for business-like negotiations but a camouflage aimed at creating a semblance of negotiations. I believe you will agree that such a turn of events would do nothing but harm since lack of progress would lead to a further aggravation of the situation in the Middle East and around it.

The Soviet Union considers that those Governments which impede the convening of the Geneva

<sup>28</sup> UN doc. A/31/53, Annex, dated February 17, 1976. For the US response see doc. 53 below.

<sup>29</sup> See docs. 10, 15 and 42 above.

Conference, take upon themselves the responsibility for the consequences of such a policy.

The United Nations, with its high international prestige, can and should make an important statement on the questions relating to the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. You may rest assured that the Soviet Union, for its part, will continue to do everything in its power to achieve this goal. Such is the position of principle of the USSR to which it will firmly adhere.

[ SIGNED ] A. GROMKYO  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
of the USSR

## 51

**Press statements by Israel Defence Minister Peres expressing optimism at the implementation of the Egypt-Israel disengagement agreement<sup>30</sup>**

Northern Sinai, February 19, 1976

*Peres*: I believe the conclusion and the execution of the agreement between Egypt and Israel which will be completed in a matter of another day is the single most important step leading to the pacification of the area. I think this is the most significant effort taken by both sides with the good offices of the United States [unclear] to change a fatalistic tendency to go to war and to repeat war, and try to embark upon a peaceful and diplomatic road which may eventually enable the conflicting parties to solve the problems existing between the two of them, namely Egypt and Israel. I believe that both Egypt and Israel don't have any room for complaints. The execution of the agreement was very true to its intentions and undertakings, and while I don't know which side gained more—basically Israel was the giver and Egypt was the getter—but I do believe that peace gained a great deal, and by peace gaining, both sides gained as well.

*Announcer*: Peres was asked: What now?

A. I am very hopeful that in due course we

shall make a further step toward peace. I don't know if it will be in '76 or '77, but judging by the experience, that I do believe that both parties gained, there is certainly more room for more progress towards the very same goal. For example, to agree to put an end to the state of war.

*Announcer*: Does Peres believe that Egypt has changed its attitude toward Israel or is he concerned lest once it gets this territory back it once again adopt a warlike stance?

A. Well I wonder if really Egypt changed her attitude toward Israel. I think Egypt changed, if at all, her attitude toward war. After four wars, Egypt came to learn that it is a very painful process, a very costly one, which affected terribly her economy, her society, in a way her independence, and while I can't say definitely that Egypt abandoned completely the belligerency as a means of relationship, I can see the additive, namely her readiness to try the alternative road, is the thing that encourages us. I believe that it will be fair on my side to add that from all the indications we have, the tendency of Egypt to return to her own affairs, to develop her own economy, is still gaining ground. And while it will be safer to be more sceptical than I am, I think fairness goes to call things as they are in reality.

. . . . .

## 52

**Declaration issued by the Second Brussels Conference on Soviet Jewry<sup>31</sup>**

Brussels, February 19, 1976

We, delegates assembled at this Second Brussels Conference on Soviet Jewry, representing Jewish communities in every continent, declare to our brethren in the Soviet Union:

We are with you in your struggle. We share your faith. We honor your courage. You are not alone!

Together we work towards the same future, identify with the same experiences, respond to the same memories. The Jewish destiny that unites us is one and inseparable, our common tradition indestructible.

We salute those from every sector of society, every race and religion—in government, parlia-

<sup>30</sup> Statements made to reporters while inspecting the last stage of Israeli withdrawal. Broadcast by Israel radio in English at 18.00 gmt; monitored and transcribed by the Institute for Palestine Studies. The agreement is doc. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>31</sup> *Israel Digest* (Jerusalem), XIX, 6 (March 12, 1976), p. 2.

ment, science, law, education, the arts, labor, commerce and industry—who have joined with us in the cause of the Jews of the USSR.

We call on all men and women of conscience, and all governments cherishing humanitarian ideals, to speak out on behalf of Jews of the USSR. We have the right and duty to say to them, a generation after the Holocaust, that they dare not remain silent in face of the renewed threats confronting the Jewish people. History has taught that these threats imperil human rights everywhere.

We abhor and condemn anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, whether under the guise of prejudice towards the Jewish religion or false accusations against Israel and Zionism.

We state that the equation of Zionism and racism by the Government of the Soviet Union and other regimes is a calumny against Israel and against Jews everywhere. Those who exploit this mockery of truth give aid and comfort to the enemies of liberty, peace, justice and human brotherhood.

We declare that Jewish people, deriving immeasurable strength and spirit from the State of Israel, shall resist and overcome those who seek to thwart its rightful aspirations.

We have listened to the messages of our brethren in the Soviet Union, declaring their determination to emigrate to Israel and follow the 100,000 Jews from the Soviet Union who have succeeded in reaching the Jewish state.

We proclaim our faith and pride in their fortitude, which adds new depth to the Jewish spirit.

We have heard the statements and commitments of delegations of Jewish communities from throughout the world. All affirm that the Jewish people has never stood more united in solidarity with the Jews of the USSR and with Israel, where so many of them seek their freedom and fulfillment as Jews.

Now, therefore:

At the close of this Second Brussels Conference, we call upon the Soviet Union:

To respect its own Constitution and laws, to fulfil its obligations as set forth in international declarations and agreements in the field of human rights and fundamental freedom, and to implement the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

To recognize and respect the right of Jews in

the USSR to be united with their brethren in Eretz Israel, the historic Jewish homeland.

To remove all obstacles in the way of those who wish to leave and to desist from all harassment and intimidation.

To free forthwith the Prisoners of Zion—the Prisoners of Conscience incarcerated for their struggle to return to Zion.

To recognize and respect the freedom of our brethren within the Soviet Union to profess and practice their religion and to enjoy and develop their cultural heritage and language.

To end the campaign of anti-Semitism and acts of discrimination against Jews.

To allow Jews in the Soviet Union to establish and maintain ties with the rest of the Jewish people.

On this historic occasion, we remember the ancient oath of our people:

For the sake of Zion, I will not remain silent and for the sake of Jerusalem I will not hold my peace.

As heirs of that tradition, we, representatives of the Jewish people, solemnly declare that for the sake of our brethren in the Soviet Union, we shall not remain silent nor shall we hold our peace.

### 53

#### **Message from US Secretary of State Kissinger to UN Secretary-General Waldheim outlining the US attitude to Middle East peace moves<sup>32</sup>**

**Washington, February 20, 1976**

Dear Mr. Secretary-General:

I have your letter of 27 January, sent to me in my capacity as Co-Chairman of the Peace Conference on the Middle East. As you know, I always appreciate having your views on the situation in the area.

You can be sure that I share your sense of the urgency of pursuing the goal of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. Our just concluded discussions with the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Rabin, have been helpful in our consideration of further diplomatic activity, and we expect to

<sup>32</sup> UN doc. A/31/54, Annex, dated February 23, 1976. For the Soviet reply see doc. 50 above.

be consulting with all the parties in the weeks ahead.

The United States does not believe that stagnation is acceptable or inevitable. We are determined to continue our efforts towards meaningful negotiations.

We believe, however, that there would be no chance of further progress if the negotiating framework, painfully erected over a period of years, were disrupted. This framework, erected fundamentally around resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), is sufficiently flexible, as we have previously noted, that it can provide the basis for working out fair and durable solutions to all of the issues involved, including the issues of withdrawal from occupied territories, of the termination of states or claims of belligerency, of reciprocal obligations to peace, and of the right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. As you are aware, the United States has also repeatedly affirmed its recognition that there will be no permanent peace unless it includes arrangements that take into account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people.

We recognize the need for a degree of flexibility on the particular procedures through which the momentum of practical progress in the negotiating process may be maintained. We have agreed that a resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference after careful preparation would serve the goal of achieving such progress. As a practical way of proceeding, we have proposed a Preparatory Conference of those who have participated so far in negotiations looking towards a settlement within the Geneva Conference framework.<sup>33</sup> The United States is also prepared to consider holding bilateral consultations with the USSR in advance of such a Preparatory Conference.

I will keep in close touch with you as our efforts proceed.

With warm regards,  
HENRY A. KISSINGER

**Decision of the government of Israel to let the US explore the possibility of achieving an "end of state of war"**<sup>34</sup>

Jerusalem, February 22, 1976

The Government takes note of the Prime Minister's statement that in reply to the U.S. Government's questions, and in the context of the Government's existing decisions, he intends to explain Israel's stand as follows:

1. With a view to reaching peace negotiations between Israel and her neighbours, the Government of Israel reiterates its proposal to convene the Geneva Conference, on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and on the basis of the original letter of invitation. Before the Conference meets, the Government will determine the Israeli delegation's instructions.

2. Further to the Israel Government's readiness to conduct peace negotiations with the neighbouring countries, and in the context of previous decisions, it is ready to examine the possibility of negotiations—through the good offices of the U.S.—also with regard to an agreement concerning an end to the state of war, in its political and legal meaning as accepted under international law. It is essential that the meaning of "end of state of war" be agreed between Israel and the U.S. It is therefore proposed that the clarification and agreement on this matter with the U.S. Government take place as soon as possible.

3. An operational decision about opening negotiations with each one of the neighbouring states about an agreement to end the state of war will be taken separately at the appropriate time.

4. Should the possibility arise of opening negotiations in accordance with the conditions laid down above, the Government will determine the detailed conditions which Israel will demand, and the commitments which it would be willing to assume in the agreement with the country with which it is to negotiate the "end to the state of war."

<sup>33</sup> See doc. 196 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>34</sup> English text, *The Jerusalem Post*, March 1, 1976, pp. 1–2.

55

**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Syria of a delegation of the Congress Party of India (excerpts)<sup>35</sup>**

**Damascus, February 23, 1976**

At the invitation of the National Command of the Arab Socialist Baath party, a delegation representing the Indian National Congress Party headed by its president, D.K. Barooah, visited Syria on February 17–23, 1976.

The two delegations reviewed with great interest the tense, ever explosive situation in the Arab area resulting from the imperialist and Zionist conspiracies. The two delegations expressed their anxiety over the continuation of the illegal occupation of the Arab territories and the neglect of the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people. They stressed their firm and principled stand in this matter. They also reaffirmed that a just and lasting peace in the area can only be achieved through the immediate and complete withdrawal of the Zionist forces from all occupied Arab territories and the regaining of the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people, including their right to self-determination in their own homeland.

The two delegations expressed their conviction that the recognition gained by the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people constitutes a main factor in the solution of the Middle East issue.

They expressed their satisfaction about the great victory recently achieved by the Arab cause in the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations, both of which adopted resolutions condemning racist Zionism, and asserting the established rights of the Palestinian Arab people. The two sides condemned the United States' veto of the resolution presented by the non-aligned states concerning the Palestine cause.<sup>36</sup>

The two delegations also condemned the Zionist terrorist practices, the policy of racial discrimination and the violation of the Charter of Human

<sup>35</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), February 24, 1976.

<sup>36</sup> See docs. 10, 15 and 42 above.

Rights through aggressive practices against the Arab citizens of the occupied Arab territories, and demanded the full implementation of the relevant United Nations and Security Council Resolutions.

56

**Statement by US Assistant Secretary of State Atherton outlining US defence relations with Saudi Arabia, made before a Congressional subcommittee<sup>37</sup>**

**Washington, February 23, 1976**

I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear before you to respond to any questions you may have about the sales of defense articles and services to Saudi Arabia for which letters of offer are now before the Congress. First I would like to explain briefly why the Administration considers these proposals to be in the national interest.

Saudi Arabia carries considerable weight, as you know, both politically in the Middle East and on a world scale in the financial and energy areas. We proceed from the premise that it is in our interest to maintain good—and by that I mean mutually beneficial—relations with Saudi Arabia.

Our ties to the Saudis are broadly based and cover many areas of common interest, including that of national security and self-defense. As should always be the case if our relationships with other countries are to be soundly based, U.S.-Saudi relations are a two-way street, and I think it is important to look at what is valuable in that relationship for Saudi Arabia and what is valuable to the United States.

The Saudis see a number of advantages in their relations with us, probably most significantly on the political level. Profoundly anti-Communist and vigorously opposed to the expansion of destabilizing influences in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia looks to the United States as a nation of world stature with which it shares common principles in that regard.

Saudi Arabia has supported our peace efforts in the Middle East, recognizing as we do that

<sup>37</sup> Made before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations; *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIV, 1917 (March 22, 1976), pp. 377–381.

failure to achieve a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict carries with it a high risk that there will be a new war and that that in turn will greatly enhance opportunities for Soviet and radical influence in the region.

The United States has long been a significant factor in the development of Saudi economic strength, through the activities of U.S. companies in both the oil sector and elsewhere. Thus the Saudis look to us for a major input to their ambitious development plans. They are accustomed to and prefer American technology, American products, and American management. They like what they see, and by and large they hope we will assume a major role in their \$142 billion five-year development plan announced last year.

I would emphasize that this aspect of our relations is more than simply economic or commercial; it is based on mutual respect and confidence built up over many years. That kind of respect and confidence can be a more precious commodity than the most persuasive economic factors.

Similarly, in the financial field, a long history of mutual confidence has led the Saudis to look to us for both advice and adequate and profitable capital markets for their surplus oil revenues.

What, then, are the advantages for the United States in our relationship with Saudi Arabia?

As I indicated above, there are similarities in our view of the world strategic equation. We, too, seek to limit the expansion of Soviet and radical influence in the Middle East, because it presents a threat to the stability and security of that region, where vital U.S. interests are at stake.

Like the Saudis, we see the trend toward moderation on the part of a number of Arab governments, over the past two years in particular, as a most significant factor in the progress we have made thus far toward peace. Saudi Arabia has been a strong supporter of that trend, both politically and economically. Like us, they do not want to see a regression to the polarization and disunity among the Arabs which existed in the past and which create an atmosphere in which militancy flourishes and progress toward peace is frustrated.

In all of these important respects we see Saudi policy as paralleling our own. Indeed, in both the political and the economic fields the Saudis have been able to make a contribution to modera-

tion—and thus to progress toward peace—which has been supportive of our policies. In dealing with those issues on which differences exist between Saudi Arabia and the United States—and we do deal with them frankly and constructively—it is important that we both keep in mind the importance of preserving the larger framework of interests and objectives we share.

Saudi oil policy has been basically advantageous to the United States, despite the oil price increases which Saudi Arabia has gone along with and which we continue to feel are unjustified. Saudi Arabia has acted as a strong moderating force within OPEC against even greater increases and has maintained production levels which are well beyond its economic needs. With oil availabilities declining in the Western Hemisphere, Saudi Arabia can be expected to become an increasingly important source for our own oil imports.

In the economic and financial fields, the advantages for us of close U.S.-Saudi relations are self-evident: multibillion-dollar trade and business opportunities for American companies, both here and in Saudi Arabia, and very large amounts of capital for growing U.S. needs.

Beyond these mutually beneficial political and economic ties, an integral part of U.S.-Saudi relations has been a military supply and training relationship which goes back over a quarter of a century. It began shortly after the Second World War, which had highlighted in dramatic fashion Saudi Arabia's strategic and economic importance to the United States, to Western Europe, and to Japan.

Although our ties to Saudi Arabia had begun in the thirties, we began after the war to develop a more broadly based relationship. That relationship included a military aspect almost from the beginning, because our strategic interests led us to request and receive base facilities at Dhahran, while Saudi interests led them to request and receive advisory and training assistance from us for their military forces. It is important to remember that this security relationship thus predated the advent of the Arab-Israeli conflict and was founded on reasons totally unrelated to that conflict.

Saudi Arabia's military forces at that time were composed largely of traditional desert warriors employing age-old cavalry and ground tactics—forces which were very effective in certain situations

but which were little suited to any sort of modern defense needs. That situation persisted through the fifties and even into the sixties; to some extent, it is still true today.

Thus, for many years our military supply and training programs in Saudi Arabia were relatively low level and concentrated on improving the effectiveness of the traditional small-scale Saudi military units. Virtually no modern weapons were involved.

In 1965, primarily as a result of hostility between Saudi Arabia and Egypt over the civil war in Yemen, the Saudis turned to us for modern air defense equipment, and we provided a limited amount of such weaponry. In more recent years, the Saudis began an ambitious program to modernize other existing arms of their military structure and have used European as well as American equipment for such modernization. Finally, in 1974, at their request, the U.S. Department of Defense carried out a survey of Saudi defense needs over the next 10 years.

That survey, among other things, was intended to bring some order and priority into their military planning, and it has succeeded in so doing. But I would emphasize that we are still talking about relatively small and limited forces, forces which are not nearly the size of those of other states in the area: Syria, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, and Israel.

Among the letters of offer now before the Congress, those for military equipment and related services are fully in line with the recommendations of that 1974 survey. Saudi Arabia has a small number of conventional infantry brigades, of 5,000 men each. The letters of offer for tanks, APC's [armored personnel carriers], Dragon missiles, and Vulcan guns are in response to a Saudi request that we assist them to mechanize two of those brigades along the lines on which U.S. units are organized and with similar equipment. At the time that recommendation was made in the 1974 survey, we considered it a reasonable step in the direction of modernization for a force which was, as I have said, quite small and without modern equipment.

Thus, when the Saudis requested this materiel and training in mid-1975, we agreed in principle. If these sales are carried through, the Saudis will have, in the late seventies, two brigades with a small integral tank force in each, with APC-type vehicles for mobility, and with integral

antitank and antiaircraft capability. Deliveries for the bulk of major equipment will begin in 1977 for APC's and 1978 for tanks.

The Maverick missiles proposed for sale to Saudi Arabia are to be used on the F-5 aircraft which we have sold them. The Maverick is consistent with our survey recommendations; while it is a very modern weapon, its principal advantage is its accuracy, rather than the firepower which it represents.

Finally, the two Corps of Engineers cases are similar to those which the corps has managed in Saudi Arabia for some years now. The great bulk of the money forecast to be spent for those cases is not for work to be performed by the corps itself, but for disbursement to contractors and sub-contractors. Under a bilateral agreement concluded in 1965, the corps manages construction projects, sets specifications, supervises design work, reviews contractor bids, supervises contract performance, and disburses moneys to contractors on satisfactory completion of work. Corps personnel are not involved in the actual construction, and of course all costs are paid by the Saudi Government. Finally, it is important to note that these projects do not involve the purchase or transfer of any weaponry.

One corps case is for the construction of two cargo-handling facilities. Port congestion in Saudi Arabia is a major bottleneck to Saudi development. At Saudi request, the corps proposes to construct two facilities—one on the Red Sea near Jidda and one on the Persian Gulf—to facilitate the import of construction materials. Eventually, these ports are likely to revert to civilian uses, for which they are also suited, and they will thus contribute to the overall economic development of the country.

The second corps case is for naval facilities. As some members of the committee know, we undertook in 1972 a program to build a small modern coastal force for the Saudi Navy. At present, that navy is almost nonexistent, with a few patrol boats stationed at Dhahran. This program calls for the construction of a naval headquarters at Riyadh and naval facilities at Jidda, on the Red Sea, and at Jubail, on the Persian Gulf. These onshore and offshore facilities—ship docking and repair facilities; breakwaters; housing, training, maintenance, and administrative buildings; desalinization plants; schools; messhalls;

and so on—will be comparatively expensive, especially at Jubail, which is presently little more than an area of desert coastline. This amendment to the previously approved FMS [foreign military sales] case for construction will cover onshore facilities, primarily at Jidda and Jubail.

Mr. Chairman, we have previously outlined before this subcommittee the general criteria which we apply to arms sale decisions in the gulf area. Certain criteria were particularly pertinent to our decision to go ahead with the letters of offer now before the committee, and I would like to touch briefly on them:

*The Balance of Forces:* We have looked carefully at the relative balance of forces in Saudi Arabia and its neighbors and conclude that these sales would not significantly affect that balance. In fact, to the extent that strengthening Saudi ground forces in a limited way enhances the Saudi security role with respect to its smaller neighbors in the Arabian Peninsula, the impact would be positive. As far as other neighboring states are concerned, it is important to bear in mind that we are talking here about mechanizing Saudi *brigades*. Israel, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan each measure their ground forces in corps or armies or, at least, divisions.

*Legitimacy of Defense Requirements:* The basic Saudi motivation in wishing to modernize its limited defense forces is simple: with territory approximately as large as the United States east of the Mississippi, with resources valued at about \$1.5 trillion at current prices, and with limited military capability, Saudi leaders clearly realize that they have much to protect and little to protect it with. They are strongly opposed to and deeply concerned about possible future intrusion of radical influences, already present to the north and south of them in the gulf and the peninsula. They see that they have an important security role to play, along with Iran, in preventing such further intrusion. And I believe they realize that they cannot play a significant regional security role without some credible military force behind their policy. In these terms, we see their present requests as reasonable and rational, albeit limited and relatively small, and well within their capability to absorb and employ effectively.

*Transferability:* We are aware of concerns held by some on this account. There is of course no ultimate guarantee that military equipment we

sell to one state will not be transferred to another. But there are serious constraints. First, there are the legal and political restraints inherent in our FMS procedures. There is nothing in our experience thus far to suggest that the Saudis intend to do anything other than respect our FMS agreements on this score. On the contrary, they have in fact chosen non-U.S. suppliers for military equipment which they have purchased for other Arab countries. Beyond this, however, there are serious technical limitations to effective transfer. I say "effective," because we must distinguish between transfer of hardware as such and transfer of capability. To transfer hardware, one needs only move it from one place to another. But the transfer of capability—the only meaningful kind of transfer—implies the ability to transfer the hardware *and* the necessary supporting services, training or trained manpower, sources of supply for spares and ammunition, and so forth. In these vital areas the equipment we are proposing to sell would need U.S. support for some time to come; it would be extremely difficult to transfer it in ways not authorized by us and to have it effectively employed.

Mr. Chairman, to the extent that there may be an inclination to see proposals of the kind under consideration today purely in terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict, I suggest that this would be an incomplete perspective. To understand Saudi Arabia's interest in modernizing its armed forces and our interest in assisting it to do so, I believe three broader points must be stressed:

—First, Saudi Arabia's vast terrain, its resources, and the fact that its armed forces today are small and are not equipped as a modern force.

—Second, the fact that Saudi Arabia looks to its military relationship with the United States as an integral part of a broader relationship, which has important benefits for the United States with respect to our peacemaking efforts in the Middle East, energy, finance, and trade.

—Third, the fact that refusal on our part to provide the Saudis with these reasonable amounts of advice and equipment would be seen as a conscious and witting step away from our present close relationship, and such a refusal would, moreover, be essentially irrelevant to the question of whether or not they acquire equipment of this kind. With rare exceptions, everything we sell Saudi Arabia in the military field is available



from other suppliers, and of course they have the money to pay for it. Thus, the question is not "Should Saudi Arabia have this equipment and these services?" but "Saudi Arabia is in a position to acquire these types of equipment and services; should they come from the United States or from another nation?"

Mr. Chairman, to summarize, the proposed sales we are discussing today are part and parcel of our overall relationship with Saudi Arabia. We believe that they are reasonable in the Saudi context and that they will not significantly affect the balance of forces in the region. They will, moreover, contribute to the larger purposes which are served by our good relations with the Saudis.

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**Report of CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev delivered to the 25th Congress of the CPSU (excerpt)<sup>38</sup>**

**Moscow, February 24, 1976**

. . . . .

A few words about our relations with the Arab countries. Good mutual understanding has arisen between us and Syria in the past five years. We act in concert on many international problems, first and foremost that of the Middle East. The Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation we have concluded with Iraq, on which our relations are based, is an important development. Our co-operation with Algeria and South Yemen is expanding and growing deeper. Significant steps have been taken to build up Soviet-Libyan ties. The friendly contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization have grown stronger.

Of late, certain forces are making persistent attempts to undermine Soviet-Egyptian relations. As concerns the USSR, we remain faithful to the fundamental line of strengthening them. This is reflected in the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between the USSR and Egypt, which we regard as a long-term basis for relations conforming with the interests not only of our two countries, but also the entire Arab world.

All these years, the Soviet Union has consistently supported the Arab peoples' struggle to eliminate the consequences of the Israeli aggression. Our country helped—and effectively, as the October 1973 war showed—to build up the military potential of the countries opposing the aggressor, that is, Egypt, Syria and Iraq. We supported the Arab political struggle in and out of the United Nations.

There is no war in the Middle East at present. But neither is there peace, let alone tranquility. And who would venture to guarantee that hostilities do not erupt anew. This danger will persist as long as Israeli armies remain in the occupied territories. It will persist as long as the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians driven from their land are deprived of their legitimate rights and live in appalling conditions, and as long as the Arab people of Palestine are denied the possibility to create their national state. For Middle East peace to be lasting, the security of all the states of the region, their right to independent existence and development must also be guaranteed. Is it not clear how serious a responsibility is assumed by those who, in pursuance of egoistic aims, are making a Mid-East settlement the object of political manoeuvre and use separate partial agreements to delay, or even entirely place in question, genuine solutions?

As concerns the Soviet Union, its position is constructive and based on principle. As the co-chairman of the Geneva Conference, the USSR is prepared to co-operate in all efforts to reach an effective settlement of the conflict. We are prepared to participate in international guarantees of the security and inviolability of the frontiers of all Middle East countries either in the UN framework or on some other basis. Incidentally, it is our opinion that Britain and France, too, could participate in such guarantees along with the USSR and the USA. This would only benefit matters.

We are for creating conditions to facilitate the development of our relations with all Middle East countries. We have no prejudices against any of them. Finally, we are also prepared to participate in searching for the solution of such a problem as ending the arms race in this region. But it stands to reason that this must be tied in closely with a general settlement in the Middle East. To tackle the problem before such a settle-

<sup>38</sup> Excerpted from the English text, *Moscow News*, supplement to no. 9 (February 28, 1976), pp. 3–4.

ment is reached would place the aggressor on a par with his victim.

## 58

**Radio interview statement by Minister without Portfolio Galili of Israel considering the meaning of "an end to the state of war"**<sup>39</sup>

February 25, 1976

In August 1974, my colleague Foreign Minister Yigal Allon delivered to US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, preliminary explanations concerning the elements that should be implied in the phrase "end to the state of war". It is clear that this phrase means to put an end to war and change the status quo; and not a ceasefire, a disengagement, or a truce, but an end to the state of war, not an end to war but also to the state of war.

It should also imply the prevention of an economic war and that all parties who sign such a treaty should decline from participating in an alliance whose aim is aggression against any one of the states which signed the treaty. In addition all parties should stop information attacks and inflammatory propaganda, as well as political and diplomatic hostilities on the international level.

It is almost certain that we need to be precise and include other clauses in the treaty. This would anyway represent a real practical and official change. For this is the stage that precedes an overall peace.

## 59

**Decision of the government of Israel approving a development plan for Galilee**<sup>40</sup>

Jerusalem, February 29, 1976

In the course of the decisions on the development of Galilee, for the welfare of its Jewish and Arab inhabitants, and in accordance with the approved populating plans of the Ministry of

Housing, the government decides to recognize the statement of the minister of finance on the concentration of lands, including the necessary expropriations which are needed for the realization of the plan.

The work will be done within the framework of the law. Landowners will be paid proper compensation in accordance to the law. Similarly, the possibility of suggesting land exchange for those who want it will be examined as much as possible.

## 60

**Memorandum by Northern District (Galilee) Commissioner Koenig of Israel suggesting changes in policy towards the Arabs in Israel—"The Koenig Report"**<sup>41</sup>

March 1, 1976

GENERAL:

1. Until a very short while ago it was accepted by those dealing with this part of Israel's population that it had fully come to terms with the establishment of the State of Israel and that most of this [Arab] population had a high degree of identification with the state and had been drawn into its various frameworks. This, at least, was expressed by those who handle them, and by those close to the social centers of Arab residents and citizens of the state.

2. Recently, certain phenomena have occurred which have challenged these assumptions and which have seriously questioned the loyalty of a large part of them to the state and to its very existence.

Even though doubts about the ideas and ways of dealing with the Israeli Arabs have been expressed over the years for reasons that will be mentioned below, these were opposed to the accepted conception of the Arabists and rejected outright. It appears to us that it can no longer be disputed that there is room to discuss these "preconceptions" which have, until recently, served as guiding principles.

3. With the establishment of the state, the

<sup>39</sup> Made to Shalom Kital and broadcast on Israel radio in Hebrew, translated from the Arabic translation, *Rasd Idhaat Israil* (Beirut), No. 1001 (February 26, 1976), pp. 512-513.

<sup>40</sup> Translated from the Hebrew text, *Davar* (Tel Aviv), March 1, 1976, p. 2.

<sup>41</sup> Reportedly submitted to the Prime Minister; published in Hebrew in *Al Hamishmar* (Tel Aviv), September 7, 1976. English translation, *SWASIA* III, 41 (October 15, 1976), pp. 1-8; reprinted in *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), VI, 2 (Autumn 1976), pp. 190-200.

remnants of the Arab population in the country were left without a leadership. A minority was created which had to adapt itself to the reality of a Jewish state waging a war against its neighboring countries and proving its strength against them.

The military government, under whose aegis this population was placed, established the rule of "notables" and thus entered into the framework of Arab society which was built on family clans. The abolition of the military government caused the undermining of the authority of the "notables" and those whom they represented. The undermining of the individual's dependence on the establishment—the military government—enabled the younger generation to feel the power that had come into its hands in a democratic society, and this also because of the passage of Arab society from an agricultural society to an industrial one with all the social implications of this.

Moreover, the "revolt" of the younger generation frequently forced the older generation to join the camp of the rebels and exposed the state as a target for their struggle, since the tools to insure their dependence on Jewish society had not been prepared. Moreover, we encouraged the letting off of steam by attempts to bring the rebels to our side by various "means."

In the fifties, the Arab society was dependent from an economic point of view on the Jewish economy which had, in the course of time, been opened to the Arabs as a result of Jewish manual laborers having left it. This situation has created an affluent economic stratum, on which to a large extent, the economy of the country and its well-being are dependent.

4. With the abolition of the military government the country put the affairs of the Arab population into the hands of those who spoke Arabic and who pulled out the violent elements and made them leaders while founding their status on their ability to obtain benefits for themselves and their families. This they did while ignoring the social problems in the Arab sector on the one hand, and lacking a long-term plan for the creation of an identity of a loyal Arab citizen on the other.

Those dealing with the Arab sector at all levels, political, military, police and civilian—their test was to familiarize themselves with the Arab mentality. Their thinking and practical ability

was not always greater than that of the people with whom they were dealing, and dealing with their interests instead of maintaining their independent thinking and analytical abilities is a phenomenon that causes concern on the one hand, as opposed to the attempt to deal with this from the point of view of objective thought that insures the long-term Jewish national interests on the other hand.

5. In the northern district are concentrated most Israeli Arabs, whose sincerity and involvement among the Jewish population manifestly and prominently put into focus the problems that have already been created and the expectations in the near and distant future. One of the most worrying phenomena is the loss of patience of the average Jew toward the Arab citizen, and in certain cases a hostility can be felt, and any provocation might cause an uncontrollable explosion on both sides whose results might have negative consequences in Israel and especially abroad.

(See the decision of the student organization in Haifa not to perform guard duty because of the possibility given to Arab students to pay a guard fee.)

This catalyst containing powerful emotional residues among the Jewish population upsets the demographic balance in these areas, and this can be felt by and is a source of fear to each individual.

In the framework of this memorandum we will point to certain critical issues establishing the background, and, in conclusion, recommendations to solve the problems.

The problems to be discussed are:

- a) The demographic problem and the manifestations of Arab nationalism.
- b) The Arab leadership and its implications.
- c) Economy and employment.
- d) Education.
- e) Implementing the law.

#### A. THE DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEM AND THE MANIFESTATIONS OF ARAB NATIONALISM

1. The natural increase of the Arab population in Israel is 5.9 percent annually against a natural increase of 1.5 percent annually among the Jewish population.

This problem is particularly acute in the northern district where there is a large Arab population. In mid-1975 the Arab population of the northern

district was 250,000 while the Jewish population was 289,000. A regional examination shows that in western Galilee the Arab population constitutes 67 percent of the total; in the region of Yizre'el the Arab population constitutes 48 percent of the total population. In 1974 only 759 Jews were added to the population of the northern district while the Arab population increased by 9,035.

According to this rate of increase, by 1978 Arabs will constitute over 51 percent of the total population of that district.

The nationalists feel—as I do in regard to the Arab population—that the Arabs' increase in the Galilee will endanger our control of that area and will create possibilities for military forces from the north to infiltrate into that area in proportion to the acceleration of the nationalistic process among Israeli Arabs and their willingness to help.

2. The Israeli Arab population has received a nationalistic momentum since the six-day war. The policy of free contact with the West Bank and the open bridges has renewed the contact between the Arabs of Judaea and Samaria and the Palestinians east of the Jordan River, and this has created the basis for a show of determination and slogans for a nationalist struggle in Israel. This process, which was inevitable, gained momentum after the Yom Kippur war and was further strengthened after the international political events which were manifested in the recognition of the PLO as the standard bearer of the struggle in regard to the Palestinian problem.

Recently there has been mention of the UN resolution about Israel's borders in 1947 according to which significant parts of this piece of land are not to be included in the State of Israel.

The Israeli Arab is no longer passive and has gone over to nationalistic manifestations—only verbal at this stage—which have seen light in a number of events, the most striking of which were:

a) Events during the prime minister's visit to Nazareth a year ago.

b) The shouting of slogans of solidarity with the PLO during student demonstrations and on other occasions.

c) The position of Arab students in the universities on the issue of guard duty.

d) The nationalistic manifestations in the voting in the Nazareth municipal elections on December 9, 1975.

e) The devious and unexpected callup of the inhabitants of Nazareth to help the municipality pay off pressing debts, which at that stage eased Rakah's burden on running the town.

f) A protest rally in Sakhin on February 14, 1975 in which the head of Ramra's local council announced that Israel should fear the Israeli Arabs more than it does the Arabs beyond its borders.

g) Decisions made at a convention in Nazareth on Saturday, March 6, 1976:

1) Declaration of a day's strike by the whole Arab population in Israel called "the Day of the Land strike."

2) A call to the Arab population not to cling to passive protests alone but to "protest by way of struggle until the bitter end..."

3) A hunger strike in front of the UN buildings, following the example of the protest on behalf of Russian Zionists.

4) "The government is residing in a glass house and we will be the first to hurl a stone and smash it."

5) A statement by local council head Mi'ilya (Mas'ad Kasim), who is considered a "positive" man, and who is a former MK from a list linked to the Alignment: "... What moral right has the government to carry out expropriations in this region which, according to the 1947 UN resolution concerning the partition of Eretz Yisra'el is not included in Eretz Yisra'el?"

This is a relatively new phenomenon and reflects the wish of a clear majority of these people to demonstrate against the establishment and the Israeli authorities even within the confines of a "pocket"—a very serious development in view of their past behavior.

The era of international victories by the Palestinians and the achievements of the nationalists in Israel point to a process of open confrontation with the Arab problem in Israel, a process which will grow as long as Rakah carries the resistance to the establishment exclusively. (It must be remembered that "Israel" is not Rakah's major concern and this is not accidental.)

### 3. Forecast

a) The increase of the Arab population (from 150,000 in 1948 to over 430,000 in 1975) gives the Arab nationalists a feeling of power and a hope that time is working for them. This is especially true in an area like northern Israel where the

physical Arab presence in contiguous areas represents a checking obstacle.

b) The usurping by Rakah of "quasi-governmental" institutions, such as the local councils, creates a legitimate basis for a political nationalistic activity, both overt and clandestine, adopting methods that were in use by the Jewish community in the "prestate era," as well as worldwide communist methods. Actually, at this time there already exists a number of local councils completely controlled by Rakah, and in our view, due to premeditated decisions. They are at this time not yet being exploited for the above-mentioned aims, but this is only due to a lack of sufficient executive cadres and the lack of necessary organizational facilities. In fact, the number of students in Eastern Europe from northern villages aided by Rakah stipends is gradually increasing in our view, for the purpose of creating such cadres.

c) There is ground for serious apprehensions that within the next decade an Arab political and demographic takeover of the Acre and Nazareth areas will occur.

d) It must be taken into account that at one of the stages of the hostile political activities a demand of some kind will be raised to hold a referendum in northern Israel where the Arab population is in the majority.

This activity will be guided from outside, but its perpetrators are likely to be nationalistic leftists from among the local populace.

e) At some state a planned provocation by Rakah and/or by nationalists is possible in order to induce an outbreak of disturbances by uncontrolled Jewish elements—a situation likely to have the issue of Israeli Arabs raised at international forums, and concurrently, to maneuver the moderate Israeli Arab elements into a situation which forces them to identify themselves with extreme steps within Israel and outside it.

f) There are indications of an organized activity in the purchase of real estate by Arabs in the north. This activity is prominent in Upper Nazareth and in Acre, and is also causing concern in the Yisra'el Valley.

#### 4. Suggestions

a) Expand and deepen Jewish settlement in areas where the contiguity of the Arab population is prominent, and where they number considerably more than the Jewish population; examine the possibility of diluting existing Arab population

concentrations.

Special attention must be paid to border areas in the country's northwest and to the Nazareth region. The approach and exigency of performance have to deviate from the routine that has been adopted so far. Concurrently, the state law has to be enforced so as to limit "breaking of new ground" by Arab settlements in various areas of the country.

b) At the same time, a strong and solid Jewish leadership should be fostered in Upper Nazareth and in Acre capable of facing the expected crucial developments.

c) Introduce a policy of reward and punishment (within the framework of the law) for leaders and settlements that express hostility in any way toward the state and Zionism.

d) To deny Rakah its "priority" in carrying out a national struggle and representing Israeli Arabs and to provide a valve for communities still sitting on the "fence," a sister Labor Party should be established in which the stress will be on ideas of equality, humanism and language, social struggle and on raising the banner of peace in the region. The establishment has to prepare itself to maintain covert presence and control in that party.

e) Invest every possible effort in bringing all Zionist parties toward a national consensus regarding the issue of Israel's Arabs in order to disentangle them from their internal political squabbles.

#### B. THE ARAB LEADERSHIP AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

1. The Jewish democratic and open society, which swallowed the Arab population remaining in the country after the establishment of the state, failed to absorb it as far as its way of thinking, its manners and its vulnerability are concerned. The Jews appointed to take care of this population, and whose aim had been to make them loyal to the Jewish society in its state, failed to do so. On the contrary, there are clear indications that everything was done to maintain that population's singularity and isolation on the one hand, and to receive selective attention and preferred favoritism on the other hand.

At the same time, however, time and again they made proclamations about equality, integration and so forth... though the actions were contradictory. This policy did not take into consideration the superficial and Levantinistic Arab char-

acter whose imagination tends to exceed rationality.

The extreme and keen manifestation of this double standard and contradictory policy of the "enthronement" of public representatives and leaders. Up to this very day there is not a single elected major Arab public figure above the local level.

The Arab society in Israel is in the throes of the transition from an agricultural and institutionalized society of long standing into an industrial society, a transition involving the breakup of family, religious and social frameworks, to which the dimension of national strife has been added.

This strife is serious and confronts every individual with decisions that are often crucial. The transitory society is in these stages in need of leaders who can provide personal examples and who are capable of giving appropriate answers to sincere nationalists, leading them toward a reasonable personal and public solution.

However, as has been mentioned in the preamble, this had not been the test for receiving the title of "leader." The bully, the bigmouth and not always the honest, have become the representatives and standard-bearers of Israeli Arabs.

2. The second generation which has grown up in Israeli society and which is trying to adapt, and not just superficially, to Israeli customs, has not been able to produce the proper leaders. Signs of this could be seen 10 years ago. Those responsible for these issues had to create leaders who were acceptable to this generation and, at the same time, loyal to the state. In our opinion, both if this omission was a result of no other choice or if it was premediated, the results of it might be disastrous. One of the main catalysts of today's decline is the disgust with this leadership (see the Nazareth municipal elections).

#### 3. *Forecast:*

a) The struggle between those who hold the various positions and the rebellious generation will get worse with the former falling back on the governmental, Histadrut and party establishment.

b) The result will be that the struggle for control will become a struggle against the establishment and the state with the majority consistently going over to the side of the rebels.

c) The elements hostile to the country will take full advantage of this social crisis. They will adopt this as their struggle and the echoes will

be taken advantage of in various forums in this country and abroad as a social and national struggle.

d) We believe that if the decline continues at the present rate, Rakah might win 10 seats in the coming Knesset elections.

#### 4. *Suggestions:*

a) We would act courageously and replace all the people who deal with the Arab sector on behalf of government institutions, the police and the parties, including policymakers.

b) We should disassociate ourselves from the present Arab "leadership" which does not represent the Arab population and stress the establishment's nonsolidarity with them.

c) Those who will be given the job of performing this mission should start immediately to create new figures of high intellectual standard, figures who are equitable and charismatic. They should be helped to establish an Arab party as mentioned above.

d) Special team should be appointed to examine the personal habits of Rakah leaders and other negative people and this information should be made available to the electorate.

e) Steps should be taken against all negative personalities at all levels and in all institutions.

### C. ECONOMY AND EMPLOYMENT

1. The development and economic improvement of the country's population over the years of its existence did not reach the Arab population. Moreover, this lack of improvement is strongly felt among this population because it was the poor who remained within the borders after the fighting of 1948-1949.

This great gap between supply and demand for labor in all spheres of the market and especially in building, mechanics and general manual labor, and the dependence on this labor that has been created in many spheres of the economy have given a feeling of power to Israeli Arabs which has been taken advantage of by interested hostile elements.

2. The manual aid that is customary among members of a family and the lack of awareness about creative investment on a large scale have left very large sums of cash in the hands of the Arab population. This capital is hidden from the various tax authorities. It should be stressed that while the Arab population in Israel constitutes 14

percent of the total, and there is no "uprooting" of labor as a result of 3 years of army service among that population, it pays only 1.5 percent of the taxes. In this way its economic future is decisively insured. Also, the age composition (half of the population is young and working) is of great significance: it means a high income for all families. To this should be added state grants (national insurance to families with more than two children, which is 95 percent of the Arab families in Israel).

3. A significant issue in the northern district, because of the large concentration of Arabs there, is that projects which are being established with huge investments with the aim of increasing the Jewish population are employing Arab workers on a scale of 25 to 50 percent.

This social and economic security that relieves the individual and the family of economic worries and day-to-day pressures, grants them, consciously and subconsciously, leisure for "social-nationalist" thought which is taken advantage of by hostile elements for various forms of incitement, a sense of power and the possibility of public protest.

#### 4. *Forecast:*

a) The concentration of mainly black capital in undesirable hands, estimated to be several hundred of millions of pounds, in addition to the economic damage that might be caused by this, could serve as a basis for donations which, in the future, might be put at the disposal of hostile elements (the collection of payments by the Nazareth municipality has already been mentioned).

b) The increase of Arab workers in factories might accelerate the friction between Jews and Arabs and develop into uncontrolled incidents. Moreover, there is a possibility of Rakah taking over the worker committees.

c) By having significant control over various spheres of the economy there is the possibility of striking or of noncooperation and thus causing serious damage to the economy and to the state, and especially political damage by emphasizing their strength as factor in the country's economy.

d) Increasing difficulties in absorbing Jewish workers, especially in the north where we have a special interest in increasing the Jewish population.

#### 5. *Suggestions:*

a) Appropriate arrangements have to be made

with the management of a concern bearing the "approved investment" label in crucial areas (as noted above). The number of Arab employees should not exceed 20 percent.

b) The tax authorities must adopt immediate steps to intensify tax collection, performing it with firmness and without deviations.

c) Reach a settlement with central marketing factors of various consumer goods that would neutralize and encumber Arab agents, particularly in the northern areas, in order to avoid dependence of the Jewish population on those agents, especially in times of emergency.

d) The government must find a way to neutralize the payment of "big family" grants to the Arab population, either by linking them to the economic situation or by taking this responsibility from the national insurance system and transferring it to the Jewish Agency or to the Zionist organization, so that the grant is paid to Jews only.

e) Endeavor to have central institutions pay more attention in giving preferential treatment to Jewish groups or individuals rather than to Arabs.

#### D. EDUCATION

1. The most important and crucial change in the conceptual and behavioral structure of the Arab population is a result of the broadened and expanding educational system available to that population.

The improved economic situation and the social security of the individual and of the family have encouraged a large number of pupils to attend high school and institutions of higher learning. This process aided in the introduction of graded tuition fees—66 percent in high schools. Financial aid and the policy of scholarships to university students established the fact that a populace with education, and be it ever so superficial and provincial, provides the "jet sets" for every nationalistic movement, particularly in the given circumstances of the Israeli Arabs, and this is indeed the situation, namely, the incidents at the universities. People in charge of that sector should have foreseen such contingencies, and it is imperative that from now on the coordination of the various frameworks as well as the activities adopted toward the population of all kinds of graduates be meticulously planned.

2. The establishment of preferential criteria (low grades) for the acceptance of Arab pupils into

various colleges and into the department to which they used to be directed (humanities, political and social sciences), as well as the absence of care and the inability to provide full employment to graduates, created a large population of frustrated "intelligentsia" forced by a profound mental need to seek relief. Expressions of this are directed against the Israeli establishment of the state.

The scope of the problem is particularly serious when we take into consideration that the number of graduates is more than 5,700 and that today about 2,500 students are in high schools.

### 3. *Forecast:*

a) Because of the objective difficulty of recognizing the professional inferiority, the feeling of frustration will increase gradually, and the total number will become bigger at an ever-increasing rate.

b) By virtue of its Levantine character and due to social dynamics, this society will move from introversion to external manifestations and a possible move into organized violence is not to be ruled out. The first blossoms already exist.

c) The raising of the banner of the social and nationalistic struggle and overt identification with the PLO and even more extremist organizations.

d) Reasonable prospects for the success of a number of leaders by virtue of their being sons of the local progressive society out of which they grew. No doubt some of them will be endowed with leadership qualities.

e) One shouldn't ignore the difficulties that will be caused to the government when handling them in crucial times, because of their personal standards.

### 4. *Suggestions:*

a) The reception criteria for Arab university students should be the same as for Jewish students and this must also apply to the granting of scholarships.

A meticulous implementation of these rules will produce a natural selection and will considerably reduce the number of Arab students. Accordingly, the number of low standard graduates will also decrease, a fact that will facilitate their absorption in work after their studies. [sentence as published].

b) Encourage the channeling of students into technical professions, to physical and natural sciences. These studies leave less time for dabbling in nationalism and the dropout rate is higher.

c) Make trips abroad for studies easier, while making the return and employment more difficult—this policy is apt to encourage their emigration.

d) Adopt tough measures at all levels against various agitators among college and university students.

e) Prepare absorption possibilities in advance for the better part of the graduates, according to their qualifications. This policy can be implemented thanks to the time available (a number of years) in which the authorities may plan their steps.

## E. LAW ENFORCEMENT

1. Implementation of the law and its enforcement by the authorities expresses the public interest of society in preference to individual interest. In the subject in question, the diligent maintenance of internal security with everything that this implies is of paramount importance to the nation and to Jews at large.

Law enforcement in a country with a developing society like that of Israel is a problem to be solved with flexibility, care and much wisdom. At the same time, however, the administrative and executive authority in the Arab sector must be aware of the existence of the law and its enforcement, so as to avoid erosion.

We have already mentioned some ways in which this population was treated and the double standards that were characteristic in those procedures. There exists an awareness among the Arab population, based on facts, that the law in this state can be circumvented by good connections with the proper people. In addition to the general public damage these procedures are causing, Israeli Arabs see in this the first signs of weakness in the administration which, following further pressures, will make possible additional concessions (examples for this abound).

2. It is difficult to get a reasonable explanation for the low percentage of taxes collected from the Arab population, in comparison to what is collected from the Jewish population. Nonenforcement of the law is likely to cause grievous harm to the internal security in extensive areas in the north and center of the country.

One has to remember and to learn from the experience of other states with national minority populations that exaggerated and uncontrolled



liberalism does not achieve the intended end, but rather the opposite. And this rule applies particularly to the specific Arab minority in Israel (as has been elaborated upon above).

### 3. *Forecast:*

a) In a law-abiding society overt disobedience of law generates a dynamics of its transgressions, a situation later necessitating many efforts to remedy it.

b) The possibility must be considered that in the future many Jews may support, for various reasons and motives, a population violating the law, and denounce the administration as "suppressor" if it attempts to enforce the law.

c) One cannot ignore the percent of the Arab population—14 percent—in which the violation of the law may assume a "revolutionary" quality.

d) Hostile elements inside the country and abroad are apt to exploit the implementation of laws, whose enforcement the authorities avoided for a long time, claiming they represent national suppression, and so forth.

### 4. *Suggestions:*

a) Make clear to everyone dealing with the Arab sector that violation of the law must not be ignored, and that its literal implementation should be carried out firmly.

b) Adopt legal steps against civil servants and institutions not fulfilling their duty in the enforcement of what the law prescribes.

c) Introduce law suits and put into effect a number of court sentences, particularly in the sphere of income tax and illegal building, which will deter the population from any thought about an escape from the hands of the law.

d) Increase the presence of various police and security forces in the Arab streets to deter extremist circles and those who are "sitting on the fence" and are likely to be drawn into uprisings and demonstrations.

## ANNEX<sup>42</sup>

1. Following my previous memorandum and in the light of the March 30 developments and incidents [Day of the Land Strike], it is desirable to analyze and assess these incidents and to draw up forecasts for possible new developments in the near future, and a number of suggestions to

be implemented soon.

The full success of the strike in the Arab sector is a fact that ought to be carefully studied and accepted as a starting point for every discussion of the subject.

There are several factors which contributed to the success of the strike and to its scope which deserve to be studied:

a) There is no way to examine the percentage or the number of Arabs who did not come to work in places outside their residences, but in villages and in the two cities in which the Arab population is concentrated, the strike was complete and total.

b) Control by the strike organizers over all kinds of educational institutions in the Arab sector including church schools insured that the strike was complete.

c) The persuasion campaign about the necessity of the strike was begun by "official" factors, local council chairmen and public figures who are usually described as moderate and cooperative with the Israeli establishment. It must be assumed that these circles went into action after having lived under the impression that high-ranking elements were backing them and that an "interference" by the Arab populace would persuade the government to withdraw the expropriation. In this activity they competed with each other in extremist expressions, assuming that the achievement would be attributed to the loudest.

d) At a very late stage, realizing their mistake, the official Arab leadership—that is, the local council chairmen and others—found they could no longer retreat. The erosion they had caused was sweeping them along too. The Jewish stopgap attempts did not prevent the strike and caused estrangement and a rift between the Arab population and its elected representatives although the strike and the incidents accompanying it did occur.

e) The strike organizers conducted a tough, threatening campaign, using violence against strikebreakers which proved effective. Pledges by the administration that every strikebreaker would be protected lacked credibility and the population did not take them seriously.

2. Despite the fact that the strike and all the preparations and events that accompanied it was planned and executed by Rakah, the party decided not to be very conspicuous in this matter in order

<sup>42</sup> Written sometime after the "Day of the Land" disturbances on March 30, 1976.

to assumé, in practice, the leadership of all the nationalities and to be the vanguard of all Arab nationalist activity among Israel's Arabs in the future.

It is necessary to pay attention to this process and to study its motives and components:

a) The PLO movement, that is the national liberation movement for the Palestinian Arabs, does not call for achieving social aims. With the exception of a small and secondary section—George Habash's group—there is not a single group that seriously deals with such matters or propagates them.

b) Sending people who do not belong to any party into an open and violent confrontation with the security forces, causing maximum casualties among the people in an attempt to create feelings of hatred and vengeance among them and tension on the part of the government toward the hostile population.

c) A classic move that is usually the vogue with the liberation movements in Asia and Africa is the linking of the national and the social struggles in a way that helps to mobilize the masses for the sake of the struggle and to obtain sympathetic world public opinion. It is clear that some countries and powers that have a certain orientation find themselves involved, if only for propaganda purposes, in every struggle that is carried out under these slogans.

In view of what has been said before, it is necessary to treat very seriously the aforementioned moves and the phenomena that are liable to stem from the creation of such an identification in world opinion and among the Arab population. Moreover, it is my belief that Rakah has used these moves mainly under the guise of nationalism.

3. There have been a number of impressive achievements for Arab nationalism led by Rakah as the result of the strike day [Day of the Land], both the disturbances that took place prior to the strike day and those that took place on the day of the strike:

a) For the first time since the establishment of the State of Israel, a situation has been created where the Arab population has identified itself openly and cognizantly—contrary to the government's request—with an Arab extremist-nationalist demand and have displayed a psychological readiness for actions to achieve it. Moreover, most parts of the Arab population justified and

still justify those who rioted and attacked the defense forces, and they talk openly about their identification with them.

b) A large number of local authorities and their leaders were used as the means and tools to develop and lead the struggle. Those local council heads who, as a result of pressures, did not join the extremists in the last phase did not declare their objection to the strike, but requested its postponement in order to use it as a threat to apply pressure against the government in a bid to make it surrender to their demands.

c) The nationalists and Rakah succeeded in agitating and embroiling the masses in a violent struggle with the defense forces—a confrontation that has left its deep and serious marks for a long time to come.

The fact that despite the sentiments that gripped the masses the organizers succeeded in extricating their men from the violent struggle and insuring their physical safety, and saved them from being arrested after the riots, proves the precision of the planning of the operations.

d) The open and violent acts with all the sorry results that they brought upon the population have infused them with pride and strengthened their backs. They are proud of their courage to confront the official forces of the state. It should not be forgotten that such a feeling in a population like that of the Israeli Arabs, and in the atmosphere in which they live, holds many possibilities for professional agitators whose aim would be to restore "the straight back of the humiliated Arab," to the Israeli Arabs.

e) The political power of Arab nationalism that is used by Rakah for its own future political struggle becomes evident.

f) The strike and the violent actions that accompanied it pushed aside that part of the official Arab establishment (the elected) and the heads of the local councils who did not participate in the strike or had proposed postponing it to a marginal position. The strike took place contrary to the Shefar'am meeting. In this way, the active part of the Arab population, especially the young, were left for Rakah and its nationalist agitators.

It is perhaps worth asking here whether it was politically wise, in the long run, to apply pressure on the heads of the local councils in the Shefar'am meeting for them to act as they did. The subject should be discussed and suitable conclusions should

be reached. The absolute unity of the Arab population that was attained on the "Day of the Land" and the deep rift created between the Arab and Jewish sectors was a historic achievement for the organizers. This rift had and will have in the future grave expressions in the Arab and Jewish populations alike. Needless to say, it will be well exploited by a hostile factor.

g) A significant impression was felt in plants and services as a result of the strike by proving the dependence of the smooth operation of the economy on Arab hands. Parallel to that, dependency of the Jewish-run economy on them has been proven to the Arab population. Even this is exploited, and will be in the future, for the sake of feeding the "Arab back-straightening" which the Arabs of Israel must exploit.

#### 4. *Forecast:*

a) The conditions created on "Day of the Land" and afterwards provide Rakah and the nationalists with many opportunities to incite disturbances in the country and to create communal tension and anxiety. It appears that we may witness here a recurrence of the same tactics and slogans used to inflame the masses and turn them loose on the streets whenever the leading elements decided to so do.

b) The campaign of intimidation will be intensified to the point of threatening Arabs who cooperate with the government or committing violence against them in order to quell any resistance and silence moderate voices.

c) Following the repercussions in the Arab streets in the wake of the recent clashes, the masses will be called into the streets for a specific purpose: to clash with the security forces and to increase as much as possible the number of Arab citizens injured so as to arouse ambitions of revenge within the Arab population against the security forces and to create reaction in the world about the tension in Israel and the suppressing of the Arab population by the Israeli occupying power.

d) Such clashes would increase the Israeli Arabs' identification with the injured and the means would be created to penetrate into those circles which are still hesitant about joining the struggle.

Such action would, generally speaking, cause the atmosphere to become more extreme and to deteriorate further. The theory adopted by those circles is that the present situation is bad for the

Israeli Arabs and that only in a situation of general disruption in the state would they have an opportunity for change: in the long run—perhaps in the foreseeable future—this would cause Israel to disintegrate from within and would bring about the Palestinization of the state.

e) It is quite probable that the PLO or some of its components would analyze [as published—possibly lead] these extreme acts, although the operations in the field would be carried out by Rakah—while its functionaries remain behind the scenes but pull the strings. Most of the burden of absorbing such activity will be placed on the Arab nationalists from the population in Israel, and mainly from among the intelligentsia who yearn for action in order to prove their "Arabness" and their willingness to struggle against Israeli rule.

f) The rift that the recent events have created between the Jewish and Arab populations would be completely exploited and all efforts would be made to widen and deepen it. It must be taken into consideration that in order to achieve that end, provocations of all kinds would be carried out, including strikes, demonstrations, violent actions and even acts of sabotage (in cooperation with Arab terrorists). I think that in the next large-scale clashes there will be greater use of firearms in order to create critical visual effects of this rift.

g) There is also a probability that a nationalist organization oriented toward the West would be created in order to attract sympathy to their struggle from states and circles abroad which are anti-leftist.

h) The penetration and takeovers of local councils will increase in order to exploit them for propaganda, cover, financing and to create an impression of broad representation. This measure proved very effective on "Day of the Land" in carrying out those aims.

5. In view of the speedy deterioration and the forecast which I have outlined in my previous memorandum and in the present one, I would like to suggest:

a) To immediately create a brain trust which would submit three plans of action to the decision-making elements:

- 1) For the short run.
- 2) For the medium run.
- 3) For the long run.

b) An interministerial coordinating committee should be set up immediately at the ministry director level, headed by a minister who would be appointed for that purpose by the cabinet and assisted by the prime minister's Arab affairs adviser.

c) In view of the fact that the Interior Ministry is the official practical and central link with the official and elected institutions of the Arab population, it is hereby suggested that the coordinating committee of ministry directors should be headed by the director general of the Interior Ministry.

## 61

**Communiqué issued by the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Israel (Rakah) condemning the Israeli government's expropriation plans for Galilee<sup>43</sup>**

Tel Aviv, March 1, 1976

The Political Bureau of the Israeli Communist Party takes a negative view of, and is deeply concerned about, the decision taken by the Rabin government at its meeting of February 29, 1976,<sup>44</sup> which calls for the expropriation of 20,000 dunums in the Galilee to meet the needs of what is being termed "settlement in Galilee" and which the newspaper *Davar* on March 1, 1976, affirmed to be the "Judaization" of Galilee and called a shameful and racist scheme.

We expected the Rabin government to have second thoughts about its racist scheme when faced with the storm of protest from the Arab inhabitants and from wide democratic sectors in the country and when faced with a world public opinion that is more aware of what is happening in Israel. The government's decision to continue with this scheme and to expropriate the rest of Arab lands 28 years after the establishment of the state is a hazardous undertaking threatening future relations between the two peoples. The explanation provided by the government that the recent land expropriations affect Jews and Arabs equally and are carried out in the interests of both peoples is a blatant attempt to deceive the public at home and abroad.

The Arabs want development more than any-

thing else. They do not oppose genuine development if it is in their interest and in the interest of the majority. But official policy has shown that in recent years land expropriation has had no relation whatever to genuine development. The government does not hide the fact that the recent decision to expropriate land in Galilee is part of a larger scheme to expropriate thousands of dunums in Negev, in the Kafr Qasim triangle, the lands in Maaliya village in Upper Galilee and of Arab Sawaid village in closed area no. 9. It is well known that there are ministers and other personalities who are immediately aware of the deplorable results this adventurous policy might have and express their opposition to it. We call again for rescinding the expropriation orders in Galilee and throughout the country.

For the sake of future relations between the two peoples and for the sake of Israel's future in the family of nations in the region and the world, we call upon all people of conscience and all supporters of peaceful relations among nations to oppose this policy that is full of danger.

## 62

**Press conference statements by US Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld discussing the implications of supplying military equipment to Egypt<sup>45</sup>**

Washington, March 4, 1976

. . . . .

*Q. Are there any follow-up sales contemplated to the Egyptian sale of six transport planes, how can we justify to our Israeli allies this kind of a sale?*

*A.* My understanding is that the Administration has had discussions with Egypt; that they have begun a consultation process with the Congress; that specifically there have been discussions with respect to some C-130's; that the final decisions have to wait the conclusion of consultations with the Congress; that it is accurate to say the Government of Egypt has indicated an inclination on their part to move away from a Soviet system of supply and purchase, and towards a U.S. relationship of some sort. How that rela-

<sup>43</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ittihad* (Haifa), March 2, 1976, p. 1.

<sup>44</sup> Doc. 59 above.

<sup>45</sup> Excerpted from the transcript supplied, on request, by the US Department of Defence.

tionship would evolve, of course, depends very much on individual elements that might be proposed and decisions to be made in the Executive Branch, and subsequently consultations with the Congress. And, I can't chart it out as to where it will go.

*Q. What else were they thinking of besides transport planes?*

*A.* I don't have any announcements to make. You asked what else, specifically, besides the C-130's, and I don't have any announcements to make.

*Q. But there are other things besides the C-130's that the U.S. Administration is now considering?*

*A.* Of course, State has the lead on this, and my statement to the effect that the Government of Egypt has indicated an inclination on their part to shift from a Soviet to a U.S. relationship, would suggest that this is not the only item. I'm not in a position to announce other specific items.

*Q. But generally, Mr. Secretary, generally can we discuss the types of weapons? It's been said in the past this C-130 request is not a new one. It's been acknowledged before. Have the Egyptians asked you for what are called lethal military equipment? The distinction is not mine. It's been drawn by the State Department in the past between lethal and non-lethal—C-130s as against warplanes; tanks and that sort of thing. Do the Egyptians have a shopping list which includes weaponry?*

*A.* I've been a little reluctant to grab this and try to wrestle it to the ground. I think that the answer, of course, is that I would not be surprised to find a rifle or two on the list. And if you consider a rifle lethal, I guess that depends on who's handling it.

. . . . .

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I want to follow-up on that rifle answer of yours. While it may have been facetious, it could have some important implications. I seem to remember, about a hundred years ago when I was in the Army, that a 155, and howitzers and all that, was classified—we were taught to classify it as rifles. Are you saying that there'll be possibly heavier equipment than just C-130 planes that could be on the list?*

*A.* I'm really not trying to be circuitous about this. It is a subject that, under the law, the Department of Defense's role is a secondary one. The process of negotiating or discussing, or considering

within the Executive Branch, and then consulting with the Congress, is a long torturous one. I don't know what will be coming with certainty beyond a C-130. I simply said, and I will repeat it roughly maybe a little more precisely, that given a general feeling on the part of the Government of Egypt, that it would be to their advantage and in their interest to adjust downward their relationship in these areas with the Soviet Union, and to develop a relationship with the United States, I would be surprised if it were limited simply to C-130s. I would not be surprised, I said, to see a rifle or other things that would logically, become a part of such a relationship. What judgments would be made by the Executive Branch, how the Congress would react would depend on the negotiations with the Congress on this subject. And I don't know what would eventuate. Now, I did not mean by a rifle, anything other than a rifle.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, given your position that the healthy relationship would be improved here between the United States and Egypt, would you say the Israelis would be ill-advised to oppose this supply relationship that's now being discussed with Congress?*

*A.* Gee, I don't know that it's fair for Rumsfeld to advise the Israelis as to what they'd be well-advised or ill-advised to do—

*Q. I just asked you to tell us what you think.*

*A.* My sense is that it is in Egypt's interest and the United States' interest, and in the interest of the Middle East in the broadest sense that the kind of adjustment in relationships between Egypt and the Soviet Union, and Egypt and the United States, in fact take place. What that would translate into in terms of specific weaponry, however, is what you're walking towards and that I can't answer because I think those have to be dealt with on a specific case by case basis.

*Q. You seem to be implying that we could draw the Egyptians away from a relationship with the Soviet Union if we were to open a military relationship with them.*

*A.* No, I was simply saying that it strikes me that it's in the interests of those people I described, to have their relationship to be one of an improved one with us, and a considerably altered one with the Soviet Union.

*Q. Well, given the fact that it's already altered with the Soviet Union, and they're having a terrible time getting anything from the Soviet Union, is it your opinion that the Middle East would be a safer place if Egypt does get another source of arms, if it has not another source than the United States?*

*A. First of all, it would be inaccurate to say that any nation in the world has no other source of arms other than the United States.*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, would you have any specific objections to selling anything lethal to the Egyptians? Or what level would you see cutoffs? Would it be rifles, tanks, guns, F-4s,—what?*

*A. To the extent that I'll have views on that as events move along, if they do move along, I'll give those views through the National Security process, and the President will make his judgments, and the Congress would be consulted. But I'm not going to sit here, having not been involved in the discussions with the Egyptians, having not been involved with the discussions with the Congress, and say this is exactly and precisely where I would go.*

*Q. Has your department, in some way, not been involved in the discussions with the Egyptians on what they might want in the way of hardware?*

*A. We have been involved in exactly the way that it's a law, and the bureaucratic arrangements have been established. And, so—*

*Q. Would you have some idea as an institution, the Defense Department has some idea what the Egyptians have in mind? I realize you play a secondary role in this whole process, but maybe it's not all that secondary. You have an input on advice, of what kinds of weapons a country might get; the relationship to the—the situation and the U.S. Forces and so I think it's not quite as secondary as you picture it.*

*A. It is exactly what I said, it is secondary. And what I would have is, that at that point where requests were made, at that point where there was an opportunity in an orderly way to supply departmental view with respect to the variety of considerations, that is to say our production capacity, our own needs, the needs of other countries, the question of the balance or security situation in the region involving the country, and the three or four other criteria that one logically looks at. Those kind of things would then come into play. We are not at that stage in the process,*

and so notwithstanding your difficulty with the response, the fact is, we are not at that stage in the process.

63

### **Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger defending the sale of six C-130 transport aircraft to Egypt<sup>46</sup>**

Atlanta, March 6, 1976

*Q. My second question is: Ambassador Dinitz of Israel asked the State Department last night to register Israel's formal objections to the Ford Administration's plan to sell six C-130's to Egypt. What is going to be your reply to Israel?*

*A. Well, first of all, what Ambassador Dinitz indicated was Israel's objection to a military supply relationship to Egypt, not to any specific individual sale. Of course, the decision of what to sell to other countries has to be a decision that is taken in the American national interest, in light of all the considerations of our relationship to the Arab world—the relationship of Egypt, the previous relationship of Egypt to the Soviet Union—and other matters.*

The United States has made a decision with respect to only one matter; namely, the sale of six C-130's to Egypt. It has made no decision with respect to the sale of any other item. And we will proceed with that sale of the C-130's and submit this in a formal request to the Congress within the next few weeks.

With respect to other sales of other items, this is a matter that we will take up if we decide to do it later on. But it is not a decision that has now been made.

*Q. Under Secretary Sisco was quoted as saying this was the beginning of a military relationship between the United States and Egypt. Is that correct? Is that your position?*

*A. Well, I outrank Under Secretary Sisco. [Laughter.]*

I think where the confusion arose was as follows.

<sup>46</sup> Made at a meeting of the Sigma Delta Chi professional journalists society; excerpted from the transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIV, 1918 (March 29, 1976), pp. 391–392.

When we discussed with the Congress the question of the sale of the six C-130's, in order to give the Congress as frank and honest a feel for what we had in mind we explained to them the kind of military supply that might be considered in the future, if it ever became necessary or desirable from the American point of view—so that rather than answer in a piecemeal fashion the question that would inevitably arise for what else we had in mind, we told them two things: One, we had nothing specific in mind right now; second, we gave some idea of the sort of categories that further down the road might be considered as a means of reassuring them that we were not entering a massive relationship at this moment. And if you look at this briefing, you will see that this was the thrust of it.

But I repeat: The policy of the United States now is to sell six C-130's. This does not imply any other decisions. And if any other decisions are made, there will be a formal discussion with the Congress on the subject.

#### 64

### **Press interview statement by President Giscard d'Estaing of France discussing the principles behind France's policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict<sup>47</sup>**

Paris, March 12, 1976

*Q. France's stand concerning the Palestine question has taken a particularly positive character, as manifested, among other things, in your recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the opening of a PLO office in Paris. Would you therefore, Mr. President, talk to us about your opinion concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict and the reasons that led your Government to take a stand different from all other countries of the European Economic Community?*

*A.* The stand we have adopted vis-à-vis the Palestine question and the rights of the Palestinian Arab people is based on two considerations: realism and justice.

On the realistic level, if we consider what the Palestinians have gone through during the past twenty years, we find that they were at first treated as refugees and that any stand towards them was based on formulating a way of dealing with them from this perspective. Realism, however, has led to the discussion of this issue from a different perspective; it has become clear that the Palestinians' will and actions indicate complete rejection on their part of their status as refugees, even if it were in their interest to accept that status. They proved that their ambitions were those of people seeking to organize themselves and enjoy all conditions of existence and the exercise of power, like all other peoples.

Realism, therefore, is taking these ambitions into consideration. The other consideration is justice; for whenever a certain people exists, when they are aware of their existence and when the desire to live a shared life is born in them, they should have the right to enjoy what all other peoples of the world enjoy, that is they should have what I call a national homeland. Such ambitions have been common to all peoples throughout the history of humanity. Since the Palestinian people are now recognized by the international community, it is clear that they have the right to enjoy, like every other people, including ourselves, a national homeland. Two trends, therefore, have dictated France's stand on the Palestine cause and justify all our stands taken on different occasions, especially our decision to permit the Palestine Liberation Organization to establish an office in Paris.

You asked me to explain in general France's stand on the Middle East conflict. Our stand is based first of all on the crux of the issue, and second on the procedure. Concerning the crux of the cause, we have several times stated the principles that we think would lead to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. These principles have gradually been recognized as including the elements that will lead to a just and honourable solution. As you know, and as I have often repeated, we support the idea of an overall settlement. I do not believe that a just and lasting peace could be attained by partial settlements. Such partial settlements could, of course, be useful under certain circumstances when they might help in avoiding confrontation or in opening the way towards thinking about realizing an overall solution in

<sup>47</sup> Interview conducted by the Syrian press corps accompanying visiting President Asad of Syria; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), March 14, 1976, p. 2.

stages, but these partial settlements do not in themselves contain the final elements of the solution. For this reason, the question includes both what is the essence and what is procedural. I am therefore convinced that the present difficulties facing the achievements of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East are differences on procedure and not on the core of the issue. I have noticed, throughout my talks with highest level officials in the Middle East and in the world that there is an international consensus on the core of the problem, and especially as regards the principles we have declared. The present differences relate more to the means of reaching overall recognition and accepting it than to the core of the solution.

Concerning procedure, our stand is as follows:

We believe that choosing the necessary measures is mainly the duty of the concerned countries themselves. These countries have to propose and assess the most effective procedures for a solution. When procedures are discussed, we naturally find ourselves committed to take supportive stands, like the one we took at the UN Security Council. We can, however, make two contributions as far as procedures are concerned: First, we can gradually work towards achieving an international consensus regarding an overall and final settlement; that is what we are now doing together with our friends and partners in the European Community. Second, we can prepare to participate in formulating the significance of the necessary guarantees for the conformity of this overall settlement. I believe we can contribute, together with our partners in the European Community, in defining, formulating and implementing these guarantees. This is my answer to your question which is very important for your country and for world peace.

# **Statement by UN delegates of 41 Islamic states condemning Israel's policy in Jerusalem<sup>48</sup>**

**New York, March 12, 1976**

The members of the Islamic Conference at the United Nations met to consider the grave situation in Jerusalem resulting from the recent Israeli violations of Security Council resolutions concerning the status of Jerusalem and the profanation and desecration of Al-Aqsa Mosque—252 (1968), 267 (1969), 271 (1969) and 298 (1971)—and General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V), and express their deep concern about the present situation in Jerusalem and in particular the ruling of the Magistrate Court, to the effect that Jews have the right to pray in Al-Aqsa Mosque. The members of the Islamic Conference cannot but view this ruling in the context of the systematic and persistent policy of the Israeli occupation authorities to change the status of Jerusalem and gradually obliterate the Moslem and Christian heritage in the Holy City.

This deliberate policy aims at radically changing the religious, cultural, demographic and political status of occupied Jerusalem and undermining the spiritual values of the Holy City and its universal sacred character. The attitude of Israel in this matter is reflected in the statement made by the Chief Rabbi of Israel, as published in the Israeli daily *Ma'ariv* on 22 July 1969, in which "he appealed to all Jews in Israel and elsewhere to observe as usual the Jewish traditions of mourning in remembrance of the destroyed Temple of Solomon. The Chief Rabbi drew the attention of world Jewry to the fact that Israeli occupation of the Old City of Jerusalem did not return to the Jews their Temple. They had no alternative but to continue spending that sorrowful day in fasting and prayer until the Temple was reconstructed in the courtyard of Al-Haram Al-Sharif."

The Israeli policy of Judaization of the Holy City is being implemented *inter alia* by the following:

1. Expropriation of Arab land in Jerusalem and setting up of new Jewish quarters on this land

<sup>48</sup> Transmitted to UN Secretary-General Waldheim by Saudi Arabia, UN doc. A/31/63, Annex, dated March 15, 1976.



culminating in the recent project of building 30,000 housing units in and around Jerusalem by 1980 with 3,000 units to be completed by the end of this year;

2. Attempted alienation of the indigenous Arab population from their history, civilization and culture by the Israelization of educational programmes and curricula;

3. Exploitation of the economy of occupied Jerusalem and its absorption within the Israeli economy;

4. Measures designed to compel the Arab population of Jerusalem to leave their homes and property;

5. Suppression of Islamic and Christian heritage and institutions.

The members of the Islamic Conference take note with appreciation of the efforts made by Dr. Waldheim, Secretary-General of the United Nations, in the present case as a result of the representations made to him by the Islamic Group.

They request the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General to keep under urgent attention the situation in Jerusalem and in the rest of the occupied territories which might be further aggravated. They reaffirm that immediate steps must be taken in order to stop such violations and defiance of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on Jerusalem and to rescind measures already taken by the occupation authorities in violation of these resolutions.

## 66

### **Statement issued by the USSR news agency Tass reacting to Egypt's decision to abrogate the friendship treaty with the USSR<sup>49</sup>**

Moscow, March 15, 1976

The President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Anwar Sadat, made a speech in the People's Assembly of Egypt on March 14<sup>50</sup> in which he described the development of Soviet-Egyptian relations in recent years in a distorted light. On his proposal, a decision was taken to terminate the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between

the USSR and the Arab Republic of Egypt signed in 1971.

This action by the President of Egypt is a new manifestation of the unfriendly policy with regard to the Soviet Union which he has been pursuing in practice for a long time. This puts a juridical seal on a situation in which, as a result of this policy, the operation of the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between the USSR and the Arab Republic of Egypt has been, in fact, paralysed.

Tass is authorised to state that the responsibility for the consequences of the Egyptian leadership's policy as a whole with regard to the Soviet Union in recent years, and for the abrogation of the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between the USSR and the Arab Republic of Egypt, rests entirely on the Egyptian side.

The Soviet Union has pursued and will continue to pursue in the future a principled and consistent policy aimed at developing friendly relations with the Arab Republic of Egypt and with the Egyptian people.

## 67

### **Statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger analyzing the situation in Lebanon and praising Egypt's role in the current Middle East situation<sup>51</sup>**

Dallas, March 22, 1976

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, what are the possibilities of a shooting war in the Middle East?*

*A. The situation in the Middle East is extremely complicated.*

You have the tensions between the Israelis and their neighbors that have plotted for over generations. You have internal tensions in many countries, such as Lebanon, which can spark a conflagration without any particular plan by any country. And therefore the problem in the Middle East is extremely difficult.

On the other hand, in the last two years more progress has been made toward peace in the Middle East than in the entire postwar period. So if we can create the penalties for irresponsible conduct that I tried to describe in my speech, and if we can continue the efforts to promote negotia-

<sup>49</sup> English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5826 (March 16, 1976), p. 113.

<sup>50</sup> Doc. 215 below.

<sup>51</sup> Statements made in response to questions after a dinner speech; excerpted from the transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIV, 1920 (April 12, 1976), pp. 465-468.

tions among the parties that we have done in the last two years, I think that considerable progress can be made toward peace and a shooting war can be avoided.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, now that Egypt's turn to the West is complete and they have renounced the Soviet Union, what in your opinion are the Soviet Union long-range goals now in regard to the Middle East?*

*A.* The Soviet Union has had a historic interest in maintaining a position of influence in the Middle East, and it will no doubt continue to maintain that interest. The problem is what it can do concretely to bring it about.

As far as the United States is concerned, our principal objective in the Middle East is not to play big-power politics with the hopes of the people in the Middle East but to help them find their way toward a peaceful solution.

If the Soviet Union has any ideas of how to bring about a peaceful solution, we will be glad to hear it. But basically the decision of Egypt gives us a great opportunity and imposes on us a heavy responsibility, because we have to demonstrate that those men who relied on us are also going to see some possibility for having their aspirations fulfilled.

But on the whole, I would consider it a very positive development.

*Q. Coming back to Lebanon, what is President Asad up to in the current conflict in Lebanon? He seems to be counteracting the PLO there.*

*A.* The basic conflict in Lebanon has arisen because the balance between the Christian community and the Moslem community has been upset by the large influx of Palestinians that have created, in effect, their own organization and that probably has the most effective—"probably"—it certainly has the most effective—army that operates today in Lebanon.

As a result, the political structure in Lebanon, which was weighted slightly in favor of the Christians, maybe by a margin of 55 to 45, is being altered to at least equality for the Moslems and perhaps a reversal of the balance—a condition which the Christian community in Lebanon finds very difficult to accept.

Now, Syria has actually attempted to play a moderating role in Lebanon. It has attempted to prevent the pendulum from swinging so far

over to the Moslem side that the Christians, in despair, will secede or that an open and prolonged civil war would break out.

This has led to the paradox that some of the Syrian efforts have been to curtail the PLO power.

On the other hand, after the Lebanese army has disintegrated under the impact of upheaval, there is no effective force there to bring up to enforce whatever has been achieved in the negotiations. So we face a very complex situation in which the danger of an Israeli attack becomes very great if the Syrians move their own forces in and where, however, there are no other courses clearly visible.

We are telling all parties that the United States is interested in the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon and in the coexistence there of the two communities. And we are in touch with all of the parties in order to urge restraint and to act, if we can, as a mediator. But it is an enormously complicated situation.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what meaning do you place on a recent uprising in Ramallah, and do you think that President Sadat has the power to unify the Arabs and bring about peaceful coexistence with the Israelis?*

*A.* Well, there is a great turmoil in the Arab world, and there it has the prospects for negotiation development. All of the groups that will be subject to negotiation have a temptation to demonstrate their power or their influence, and events on the West Bank are a reflection of tendencies in the Arab world.

One of the reasons why the United States believes, and has repeatedly asserted, that stagnation in the Middle East is in nobody's interest—not of the Arabs, and not of Israel, because the longer these forces are contained, the bigger will be the inevitable explosion—and these events underline the importance of making progress toward a settlement in the Middle East.

Now bringing about the unity of the Arabs is a task which, up to now, has eluded many states.

President Sadat has taken a very statesmanlike approach. He has been the first Arab leader to move toward peace with Israel; he has been willing to take steps on his own.

And therefore, if the peace prospects continue and the other Arab states see that it is the only way to achieve some of their aspirations, I think his moral influence in the Arab world will survive.

He is now under very great attack for the very

courageous decisions he took last year, but I believe that he will be vindicated by events, and it will be seen that it was an inevitable step to promote further progress toward peace in the Middle East.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what would be the impact on Middle East negotiations as the result of major oil reserves in the Sinai and Gulf of Suez by Israel—peace, war, or favorable negotiations?*

A. Well, it depends, of course, where these oil reserves are located. I pray that they are not on the dividing line between Israel and Egypt. [Laughter.]

So, anything that contributes to the Egyptian balance-of-payments problem—or to the solution of the Egyptian balance-of-payments problem is helpful.

Israeli oil explorations in the Gulf of Sinai raised for the Arabs the problem that they do not recognize the Israeli right to operate in the Gulf of Sinai, nor has Israel raised that as part of a peace settlement. They would want to control the shoreline that is basically the Gulf of Sinai. So, by the definition of both sides, this would be a temporary phenomenon.

I think, on the whole, these oil explorations will not affect the prospects of negotiations one way or the other.

## 68

### **Speech by US Permanent UN Representative Scranton expressing disapproval of Israel's policy in the occupied territories, made before the UN Security Council<sup>52</sup>**

New York, March 23, 1976

First of all, may I say to you, Mr. President, that I am very grateful personally for your kind comments at the opening of this hearing and likewise for your extraordinarily calm and measured leadership in this which, of all the questions that face us, is among the most passionate.

Likewise, I am equally grateful to all represen-

tatives who have been kind enough to give me the kind of welcome that is very warming to the heart. I hope that I can live up to some of the very kind things that have been said.

On purpose I have been here personally for each and every representative who has spoken and I plan to be here, if I possibly can, for all the other speakers on this very difficult problem—with one exception. To him I have already personally apologized and should like to do so publicly.

Yesterday, in the middle of the comments of the representative of Egypt, I had to get up and leave because I was scheduled to be at a small luncheon for the Ambassador from Japan, whom we are very sorry to have leave our Council. But I did read what he had to say, and I was here for his reply this morning.

Now I too would like to indulge, for just a couple of minutes, in some personal comments from notes, very well aware that it is impossible for a barbarian in the aegis of the gentleman from Saudi Arabia, with his inimitable wit and remarkable eloquence and, most important of all and truly and seriously, his very extraordinary knowledge of history. But nevertheless I shall try, because I want to make it meaningful and personal. Just a few comments about what has happened here so far in these deliberations.

First of all, I still am quite concerned and openly say so at the decision that was taken concerning procedure, not—and I want this thoroughly understood—because the United States Government or, as far as I can make out, any other Government here, did not want the Palestine Liberation Organization to be heard. Quite the contrary: we did, and we welcome the hearing. But I am concerned personally because I think that unless a major international body of deliberation abides by rules it writes for itself we can in the future regret it, and I can see on the horizon the number of times that could be forthcoming when, forgetting rules and simply doing what the majority wants—whatever the majority may be, could come back to haunt that majority at some future time. I think it is very important for us to have rules of procedure and to abide by them.

Secondly, with regard to this event, which is purported to have initiated the recent difficulties in the West Bank and Jerusalem, there were many references made by other speakers about media reports, some of them based on hear-say, what

<sup>52</sup> UN doc. S/PV. 1896, pp. 28–40.

other persons had said. This is natural and understandable, but it does lead us away from what is extremely important, and that is the facts—important in any kind of deliberation but particularly in a deliberation which has to do with such a very emotional part of the world, more so, I suspect, than anywhere in the world, because of its long and enduring varied cultures, the remarkable differences and yet extraordinary religions, and the other emotions that are there in such depth.

Events have taken place over the last several years which have deeply hurt us all: terrorist raids and equally senseless retaliations and reprisals. These and other events have meant human killing, and a good deal of it, and last, but by no means least, very intense and very wide-spread human suffering. It seems to me that it is our responsibility in this international body not to add fuel to those fires as they individually or collectively arise, but to do everything we can to lessen tensions, to deal with facts, and to help in every way possible to bring peace there and everywhere else in the world.

As several of you have said, and said correctly in my judgement, the big issue here is not each of the events to which I have referred, as deplorable as they may be. The big issue is the question of the occupied territories and the people that are there vis-à-vis Israel's right to be and to be secure—to which, as everyone knows, we Americans are strongly and deeply dedicated.

Yesterday, when I left this body, I went to that small luncheon and sat next to a very lovely woman, and we were discussing this very major issue, and she said to me, rather yearningly, "Can it ever be resolved?" That is clearly the major question here, and the one to which we should be devoting all our efforts. My answer to her was something quite simple and simple to say, very difficult to do. For the world it must be.

And one last personal comment to you all. I really would greatly appreciate it, over the next few weeks and months that I am here, if any one of you and all of you would be kind enough to talk with me in the corridors or at the social functions or anywhere else so that I can get as deep and penetrating an understanding as possible of what each of you and your Governments is thinking and wanting about this, the most critical problem, I think, that besets this world.

And now for some written comments.

Mr. President, at the outset it is especially noteworthy, I think, that Israel has joined in our deliberations, and my Government warmly welcomes Israel's decision to do so. For the events that have brought us together today are a corollary and a consequence of the tragic dispute that has occupied this Council with such regularity over the years. As such, they raise two categories of issues that we must have in mind if we are to deal with them constructively.

First is the question of bringing to an early end the situation that gives rise to these disturbances and to other forms of violence in the Middle East. So long as the situation persists, we can expect continuing tension and occasional violence, however much we might and must regret it. It is not necessary for me to belabour this point. Surely it is evident to all of us.

The occupation of territories in the 1967 war has always been seen by the world community to be an abnormal state of affairs that would be brought to an end as part of a peace settlement. Resolution 242 (1967), adopted by this Council shortly after the end of the 1967 war that led to the occupation, established the basic bargain that would constitute a settlement. This bargain was withdrawal of Israeli forces in return for termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, the territorial integrity and the political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.

My Government has committed itself to do all it can to bring about this settlement—in the words of resolution 338 (1973), to implement Council resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts and to further negotiations between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East, which is what we are here for. We are engaged at this moment in an effort to regain momentum, as all members of the Council know, in the negotiating process that has brought some unusual progress and that must bring more.

The second focus of our consideration must be the conduct of the occupation itself. Together with the request for this meeting, the letter of complaint circulated by the Permanent Representatives of the Libyan Arab Republic and of Pakistan identifies three issues: the administration of the

holy sites; the situation in Jerusalem, and Israeli actions in regard to the civilian population of the occupied territories, and the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories.

The position of the United States on these issues is clear and of long standing. I propose to review the United States position today once more to point out that there are proper principles and procedures under international law and practice which, when applied and maintained, will contribute to civil order and will, over the longer run, facilitate a just and lasting peace.

First, there is the matter of the holy sites and practice of religion in the occupied areas. The deep religious attachment of Moslems, Jews and Christians to the Holy Places of Jerusalem has added a uniquely volatile element to the tensions that inhere in an occupation situation. The area known to Moslems as the Haram El Sharif and to Jews as Temple Mount is of particular sensitivity. Israel's punctilious administration of the holy places in Jerusalem has, in our judgement, greatly minimized the tensions. To my Government the standard to be followed in administering the holy sites is contained in article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. All parties to the Arab-Israel conflict are signatories of the Convention. Article 27 of the Convention prescribes, *inter alia* that:

Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs.

With regard to the immediate problem before us—a ruling by a lower Israeli court which would have the effect of altering the status of the Haram—it is our view that Israel's responsibilities under article 27 to preserve religious practices as they were at the time the occupation began cannot be changed by the ruling of an Israeli court. We are deeply gratified that the Supreme Court of Israel has upheld the Israeli Government's position.

The status of the Holy Places is, of course, only one facet, however important—and it is very important—of the problem of the status of Jerusalem itself. The United States position on the status of Jerusalem has been stated here on numerous occasions since the Arab portion of that city was occupied by Israel in 1967. Ambassador Yost said in 1969:

The part of Jerusalem that came under the control of Jerusalem in the June war, like other areas occupied by Israel, is occupied territory and hence subject to the provisions of international law governing the rights and obligations of an occupying Power.

Ambassador Goldberg said in 1968, to this Council:

The United States does not accept or recognize unilateral actions by any States in the area as altering the status of Jerusalem.

I emphasize, as did Mr. Goldberg, that, as far as the United States is concerned, such unilateral measures, including expropriation of land or other administrative action taken by the Government of Israel, cannot be considered other than interim and provisional and cannot affect the present international status nor prejudice the final and permanent status of Jerusalem. The United States position could not be clearer. Since 1967 we have restated here, in other forums and to the Government of Israel that the future of Jerusalem will be determined only through the instruments and processes of negotiation, agreement and accommodation. Unilateral attempts to predetermine that future have no standing.

Next I turn to the question of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. Again, my Government believes that international law sets the appropriate standards. An occupier must maintain the occupied areas as intact and unaltered as possible, without interfering with the customary life of the area, and any changes must be necessitated by the immediate needs of the occupation and be consistent with international law. The Fourth Geneva Convention speaks directly to the issue of population transfer in article 49:

The occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.

Clearly, then, substantial resettlement of the Israeli civilian population in occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, is illegal under the Convention and cannot be considered to have prejudged the outcome of future negotiations between the parties on the location of the borders of States of the Middle East. Indeed, the presence of these settlements is seen by my Government as an obstacle to the success of the negotiations for a just and final peace between Israel and its neighbours. The real issues of peace and stability

in the Middle East are very difficult indeed; and unilateral acts, such as civilian population transfers, have been taken which serve to inflame emotions on both sides.

I welcome the opportunity this meeting of the Council has provided to review the issues involved in the administration of the holy sites, the status of Jerusalem and, in addition, the question of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. Now, as for prospective action by this Council, my Government will apply three tests. First, do the facts and judgements on which the draft resolution is based correspond to the actual situation? Secondly, will the Council's action in practice advance the proper administration of the areas involved? Thirdly and most important of all, will the Council's action help or hinder the peaceful settlement process, the framework for which was established by Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973)?

## 69

**Statements by Defence Minister Peres of Israel to the Knesset declaring that there will be no change in Israeli policy towards the Arab population<sup>58</sup>**

Jerusalem, March 24, 1976

There might be differences of opinion on what should be done in Judea and Samaria, but it is agreed that what we are doing there is a far-reaching attempt on behalf of the Israeli government to build a new pattern of relations with the Arabs... that we might have economic co-operation, freedom of movement, freedom of speech, and the establishment of human relations. We must be careful, that whatever has been achieved in the territories since 1967, little as it might be, shall not be destroyed.

I do not want the Arabs of Israel to consider themselves as the Arabs of Judea and Samaria. They are citizens of this state.

<sup>58</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text, *Knesset Records*, Eighth Knesset, third session, March 24, 1976, pp. 2258-2261.

Finally, the riots which took place are not the first nor the most serious. I think that we have dealt with this crisis with the utmost responsibility and sensitivity, due to our intention not to cause any bloodshed or to endanger the relations which have been established since 1967 with such great labour and understanding.

## 70

**Memorandum from US President Ford to US Secretary of State Kissinger finding that the cash sale to Egypt of C-130 transport aircraft "will promote world peace"<sup>54</sup>**

Washington, March 25, 1976

Subject:

*Eligibility of Egypt for Cash Purchases of C-130 Aircraft and United States Military Schools under the Foreign Military Sales Act, as Amended*

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by Section 3 (a) (1) of the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended, I hereby find that the cash sale to Egypt of C-130 aircraft and training of Egyptian personnel, will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace.

You are requested, on my behalf, to report this finding to the Congress.

This finding, which further amends Presidential Determination No. 73-10 of January 2, 1973 (38 F.R. 7211) as amended by Presidential Determinations No. 73-12 of April 26, 1973 (38 F.R. 12799), No. 74-9 of December 13, 1973 (39 F.R. 3537), and No. 75-2 of October 29, 1974 (39 F.R. 39863), shall be published in the *Federal Register*.

[signed] GERALD R. FORD

<sup>54</sup> Presidential determination no. 76-11; from a photocopy of the original memorandum.

## 71

**Statement by US Permanent UN Representative Scranton announcing his intention to veto a UN Security Council draft resolution condemning Israel's policy in the occupied territories<sup>55</sup>**

New York, March 25, 1976

I want once more to recognize and appreciate the comments that three or four of the representatives made this morning in giving me a warm welcome to this Council, and I am indeed grateful for their very kind remarks. This reminds me, incidentally, that their comments were in some contrast to the welcome I had outside the Council today. I dare say I have now written a new record for representatives to this Council, one I think nobody else can match, by having a demonstration requesting my ouster hardly before I have sat down.

Secondly, I should like to say to the representative of Pakistan how much I appreciate the comments he made to me in a very quiet and deliberate way a few moments ago, quoting some of the comments I made on behalf of my Government on Tuesday.<sup>55a</sup> I shall try to respond and explain our veto in the same quiet and deliberate way, briefly.

The representative of Pakistan has quoted to the Council the three tests I laid out in that intervention on Tuesday, and I shall not repeat them. But they are the tests that have been carefully measured by my Government, and when I say "carefully" I mean just that. We have carefully measured the draft resolution that is now before members against these criteria and have concluded that it fails to meet them, especially because it reflects or implies judgement which on balance does not correspond to the actual situation in the area. Parts of the draft resolution, for example, are based on the judgement that Israel is persisting in a policy aimed at changing the religious character of the city of Jerusalem. We believe, my Government and I, that this conclusion is incorrect. Quite to the contrary: we think that Israel's administration of the Holy Places in Jerusalem has literally and actively minimized tensions.

Thirdly, and I think this extremely important, the Council will remember that one of the tests was whether the Council's action would help or hinder the peaceful settlement process. On Tuesday I said that my Government has committed itself to do all it can to bring about a settlement. We take a back seat to no nation in this regard. We are, as I said then, engaged at this moment in an effort to regain momentum in the negotiating process that has brought some unusual progress, and I think it is fair to say that there has been more progress in this effort than in anything that has been undertaken since the 1967 war, although we are as aware as everyone else that there must be more.

It is our belief and our strong feeling that this draft would not help in that peaceful settlement process. And because, therefore, the draft fails, in our judgement, to meet the tests which we brought to the Council, and which I brought to the Council's attention on Tuesday, in the vote that is forthcoming the United States will vote "no".

## 72

**Press interview statements by Chancellor Schmidt of West Germany outlining his attitude to the Middle East conflict and the participation of the PLO in its solution<sup>56</sup>**

Bonn, March 26, 1976

*Q. Past experience suggests that in the future Arab-German relations will also be determined by the Federal Republic's policy towards the unsolved Palestine problem, and by its willingness to contribute to a solution to this problem. Following this argument, the question can be raised: What is the Federal Republic's position towards the solution of the Middle East conflict, and is your government ready to participate more actively than hitherto towards a just solution to this problem?*

*A. The Federal Government's basic principle is to support with all means the maintenance of world peace and to support a solution to conflicts which endanger such peace. This holds true for our position towards the Middle East conflict*

<sup>55</sup> Made before the Security Council; UN doc. S/PV. 1899, pp. 62-65. The draft resolution is doc. 16 above.

<sup>55a</sup> Doc. 68 above.

<sup>56</sup> Interview conducted for *al-Ahram* (Cairo), March 26, 1976. Excerpted and translated from the German text, *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung* (Bonn), no. 35, (March 27, 1976), pp. 325-328.

and our efforts to contribute to a solution. Our position is very clear.

We support all Security Council resolutions. Together with our EEC partners we stated in the declaration of November 6, 1973,<sup>57</sup> the principles upon which a peaceful regulation should be based:

—The inadmissibility of conquering territory by force.

—The necessity that Israel end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the 1967 conflict.

—Respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of each state in the region and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized borders.

—The recognition of the fact that in order to bring about a just and lasting peace, the legitimate rights of the Palestinians must be taken into consideration.

The Federal Government continues to stand by these principles.

Parallel to these common European efforts the Federal Government will continue as hitherto in its efforts to bring about a just and lasting peace in its bilateral talks with the Arab States and Israel.

*Q. Mr. Chancellor, not too long ago you spoke in an interview with an Israeli newspaper of the right of the Palestinian people to its own identity. Foreign Minister Genscher spoke on the occasion of the recent visit of the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister to Bonn of the fact that the Palestinian people must be granted the right to establish its own national authority on the territory evacuated by Israel. Is there any difference between these two statements, or do both lead to the simple conclusion of the creation of a Palestinian state?*

A. These are not different statements. Already the 1973 EEC declaration states that the legitimate rights of the Palestinians must be taken into consideration. The Federal Government understands thereby the right of the Palestinian people to express its own national identity.

During the 29th UN General Assembly the Federal Republic supported the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people, including the right to decide for itself whether or not it wants to establish its national authority over the

territory evacuated by Israel within the framework of a peaceful solution or whether it would choose another option. It certainly should not be our business to decide this.

It is, however, important to note that, as the Federal Republic and the nine European states have repeatedly stated, the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people shall not jeopardize Israel's right to exist, with secure and recognized borders. Both rights are of equal importance.

*Q. A year ago, in an interview with Le Figaro of Paris you made a Euro-Arab dialogue including the PLO dependent on the recognition of Israel by the PLO and the latter's renunciation of force. The Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and the Minister of State in the Foreign Office, Hans-Jürgen Wischniewski, have recently spoken in favour of equating the recognition of Israel by the Palestinians, i.e. the PLO, with the recognition of the right to self-determination for the Palestinian people by Israel. As you know, in the meantime the question of the PLO's recognition by third countries has become prominent. Would you, Mr. Chancellor, reformulate your earlier declaration with regard to a possible recognition of the PLO in the light of these recent remarks made by your cabinet members?*

A. In my opinion a solution to the Middle East conflict can only be achieved under the conditions that I already have mentioned.

I fully understand the psychological and political difficulties which stand in the way of a possible recognition of Israel by the PLO as well as a recognition of the PLO by Israel. But I do not see any other alternative if one wants peace. Once this problem is solved then the recognition of the PLO by third countries is no longer a problem.

A very important precondition for a solution to the conflict is naturally the realization that force and terror cannot bring about a political solution, either in the Middle East or in other parts of the world. This fact all countries and peoples must accept.

<sup>57</sup> Doc. 184 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.



73

**Press statement issued by the US Department of State clarifying the US attitude to events in Lebanon<sup>58</sup>**

Washington, March 29, 1976

The situation in Lebanon has become more acute during the past week, and we want to make clear the U.S. position concerning developments there.

We believe that a resolution of the Lebanese crisis can only come with agreement among the Lebanese on a basic political solution that gives adequate opportunity and security to all groups and communities in the country. The political compromise worked out with constructive Syrian assistance in connection with the January 22 cease-fire appears to us to provide a fair basis for such a solution.

It appears to us, moreover, that a cease-fire and an orderly and constitutional resolution of the Presidential question are necessary if progress is to be made on the more fundamental issues.

We believe that military intervention by any outside party contains great dangers and must be avoided.

The United States is prepared to help all the parties toward a political solution on the basis of these principles.

74

**Press interview statements by Chairman Pajetta of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Communist Party of Italy discussing the Arab-Israeli conflict<sup>59</sup>**

Tel Aviv, March, 1976

*Q. As you probably know, the criticism expressed by the Italian Communist Party in regard to the UN resolution identifying Zionism with racism has received favorable comment in Israel, not only in political circles but from public opinion as well. Can you explain the motivations of your criticism on the political level, and, possibly, on an historical level?*

A. The very fact that the Italian Communists

<sup>58</sup> Read to correspondents by Robert L. Funseth, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIV, 1921 (April 19, 1976), p. 507.

<sup>59</sup> Interview conducted by Livia Rokach, *New Outlook* (Tel Aviv), XIX, 2, (February-March 1976), pp. 44-47.

have been asked to express an opinion on Zionism, considering its history and its ideological implications, suffices to explain why we have deemed it an error that the UN should take a vote on this matter. An international organization composed of states (that is, based on the recognition of the coexistence, and, in a way, of the collaboration, between countries which differ in their political and social structures) ought not to consider issues that do not concern relations between states but instead, relate essentially to internal policies or questions of a political character. The question of racism in general, and the condemnation of South Africa, are specifically different, because they relate directly to the policy of "decolonization," i.e. to a practice of a "colonial" type, which cannot be considered merely in the context of that country's internal affairs. Thus it seems to us that if the UN wishes to deal with the problem of the restitution of the lands forcibly occupied by Israel, if it wishes, moreover, to propound in new terms, as compared with 1948, the question of the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine, it cannot ignore the issue of the state of Israel's right to existence, and, therefore, its right to have its own internal policies which, however they may be judged by other governments or political parties, should be exempt from outside intervention.

This is why, while we have confirmed our own negative judgement of Zionism, including our opinion on its significance in the life and policies of the state of Israel, we have likewise considered the question irrelevant to the UN and we have approved of the negative vote by the representative of the Italian government.

We do believe, however, that the political leaders of Israel and its public opinion ought to meditate on the fact that Israeli policy has led to a situation whereby the majority of the states represented in the United Nations voted in favor of the resolution, and thirty other countries, which did not want to accept the resolution, have, in any case, also refused to vote against it.

*Q. We must assume that your criticism of the UN resolution has given rise to some kind of a reaction, let's say to a reaction of surprise, at least, on the Arab side, and especially among the Palestinians. What explanation did you give to them and how was your explanation accepted by them?*

A. Having obtained such a large consent and

such a high rate of abstention from so many countries, the Palestinians have certainly had their reasons to remain more than perplexed by our declared position. We told them that, due to its rationality, our attitude constitutes ultimate proof of our comprehension of their cause, because it means that when we do support them we are not being biased. We have also underlined that we consider it vital to maintain contacts with other Italian democratic forces, whose sympathy for the Palestinian cause is constantly growing, but who are also firmly convinced that no space whatsoever should be allowed for any form of antisemitism to exist and who consider it legitimate and necessary to support the existence of an Israeli state and the rights of the Israelis. I do not believe that our explanations have led to an identity of views between us and the PLO. It is certain, however, that the Palestinians have understood our intention. Our relations with them, too, must be viewed in the framework of the doctrine of "unity based on diversity" which we consider an essential factor of our conception of internationalism.

*Q. How do you, as a political leader who is profoundly familiar with both the problems of the Middle East and those of the policy of the USSR, evaluate the apparent contradiction between the support given by the USSR and the socialist countries to the UN resolution and the repeated Soviet statements that Moscow firmly supports the existence and the security of the state of Israel?*

*A. I think that the Soviet Union and the socialist countries wished to underline in this way their support of the Arab cause and at the same time their deploring of extremist behavior which they consider to be responsible for the policy of aggression and for the reluctance to advance toward a solution. But this is distinct from the principle whereby the existence and the security of the state of Israel as such must be assured; a principle in regard to which their position remains unchanged.*

*Q. The Israelis affirm that such a semantic distinction is hardly possible inasmuch as the state of Israel is a constant expression of Zionism.*

*A. I disagree that the state of Israel must be considered as a "constant expression" of Zionism, even though no one can, or wishes, to deny the close relationship between the origins and basic conceptions of the state, and that which in the past had been the utopia—and today is the ideology*

*and the practice—of Zionism. But the state of Israel is the product of an historical process and as such it constitutes an immutable reality. The theocratic elements which in our opinion characterize some of its aspects today derive at their roots from the wars which Israel has suffered or had been made to suffer over a long period of painful birth pangs. It is not difficult to visualize a different development that might occur under international conditions of peace and collaboration among neighbors, in which certain states of mind, psychological complexes and political attitudes caused by antisemitism may well disappear. Should humanity, as I firmly believe it will, liberate itself everywhere, forever and totally from the malediction of antisemitism, many features of Zionism, too, might appear anachronistic.*

*Q. In his recent book *Ou va Israel?*, Dr. Nahum Goldmann sustains the thesis that, as compared to its original cultural and political goals, Zionism has been betrayed by the Israeli ruling circles. Many others consider the policy of the latter even suicidal and dangerous to the future existence of Israel itself. What is your opinion?*

*A. I myself have pointed out more than once that the extremism and other aspects of the policy of the Israeli government, have damaged first and foremost the Jews and Judaism itself. I believe, however, that this argument cannot constitute an object of propaganda from the outside. What the democratic forces in Italy, first and foremost the Communists, can do, is to recall to everyone's mind, including both Jews and Arabs, the ever-reactionary character of antisemitism; and to guarantee, in this manner, for those who live in Israel or who defend its cause, that deploring the policy of aggression must be accompanied by a policy of peace and by the recognition of the equality of all peoples' rights.*

*Q. A surprising feature of the Israeli situation today is undoubtedly that of the extreme weakness, not quite, but almost, the absence of a left-wing movement as a leading force in the internal struggle for a peaceful solution. And yet, in the past, there did exist, even within the framework of Zionism, a left-wing trend which called for coexistence between Arabs and Jews and even supported the idea of a bi-national state. Do you consider that this regressive development is due to internal causes only or also, perhaps, to some excessively dogmatic attitudes, or errors of analysis and judgement,*

*that may have weakened those left-wing movements in the Middle East who were working for coexistence, by exposing them to the chauvinistic blackmail of right-wing propaganda?*

A. It follows from all that has been said above that extremism on the part of the Arabs (even when the existing balance of power clearly demonstrated its rhetorical character) certainly served the cause of the conservative and extremist elements in Israel much more than it did that of the Arabs themselves.

As far as the international workers movement is concerned, I believe that it was correct for it to consider Zionism as a conservative trend, a tendency to escape from reality and from the difficulties of class struggle and democratic unity in those countries in which political and social backwardness caused suffering to the Jews but not to the Jews alone. Beyond that, however, the fact that the democratic, and even the socialist, revolutions have not in themselves been sufficient to extirpate the roots of the evil plant of anti-semitism, demonstrates how long and painful some historical processes may be. This conclusion should keep us aware that certain problems of the kind do exist, that they must be adequately solved and that they ought not to be forgotten, let alone hidden away.

*Q. What are, in your opinion, the best concrete means to break the present deadlock in the Middle East: direct negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians? Geneva? Guarantees of the big powers? European guarantees? All or some of these means? Does the Italian Communist Party contemplate the promotion of additional clarifications between the parties?*

A. I believe that it is necessary to guarantee a long period of peace and a gradual development of international collaboration. To say that it is obligatory to start off from the Geneva Conference and to negotiate, means to indicate an initial phase of what may become a new historical era during which the conclusion of an effective and lasting solution should be achieved. International guarantees may certainly play an important role, on condition, however, that they be accompanied by a process of effective lowering tension throughout the Middle East area. Our party, in my opinion, cannot pretend to promote mediations and clarifications; but I also do believe that what we ourselves have done in order to elaborate and define a just position of our own, signifying a

recognition of every legitimate right, should be considered as the fulfilment of a duty on our part, and, therefore, as a contribution to the common action of the forces of progress. Some concrete results of this common action still constitute the goals of a long-range perspective.

On the other hand, it is indispensable for us to be aware of the limitations that all external intervention must have. We must remember, for example, how much damage was caused to the progressive and Communist movements, particularly in certain countries, by the lack of understanding toward the progressive value of the Arab revolution which did exist even though some religious, and even xenophobic, elements were also mixed up in it. Equally, we should remember how Communists and peace-vanguard movements have had a difficult life in Israel not only under the pressure of Zionist chauvinism, but also, at times, due to Jewish "national" preoccupations. We ought not to forget all this because in a situation in which national sentiments have been time and again exasperated or wounded, in which paternalism or brutal imperialist intervention have played an important part, factors such as the caution, and also the patience, of whoever is familiar with the rhythm of historical processes, must be taken into account. International solidarity, like international condemnation, in regard to some aspect or to some policy or other, are valuable above all when the internal forces of progress and peace can demonstrate that they have profound national roots and that they truly consider themselves indispensable to their own people and are strongly supported by them.

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### **Press interview statements by Black Panther leader Cohen of Israel on the situation of the Sephardic Jews in Israel<sup>60</sup>**

**April, 1976**

*Cohen:* I left the party at about the same time the Black Panthers appeared. My being in Parliament and being a Sephardi Jew made contact very natural. I was in touch with the Panthers from the beginning but I didn't join at first: I wanted to see them crystallize into a political

<sup>60</sup> *Merip Reports* (Washington D.C.), no. 49, (July 1976), pp. 19-22.

party with their own political thought—I didn't think the existent political groups should take them over. Then, in late 1972, the Panthers held a convention in Jerusalem and decided to join with my group (the Israeli Democrats) and take part in the elections. We worked out a political program and created the Israeli Democrats-Black Panthers Movement; now it's called the Black Panther Party.

*Q. What have the Panthers been doing since 1971 in terms of actions and programs?*

*A.* It started in 1971 as a protest movement. Usually a political organization grows out of a meeting of people with an idea or ideological set; they work out a plan, an ideological platform, and then they try to sell this to the masses, to mobilize the masses around their ideas. The Black Panthers were exactly the opposite. First there was a huge explosion of popular discontent, a grass roots explosion. There was no political platform, no organizational structure, but there were demonstrations of 10,000 to 15,000 people, fighting with the police, who wanted to change something, who were mobilized against the conditions in which they were living, their housing, wages, education.

It took two years for the movement to crystallize into a political organization, to set up an organizational structure, to develop a political program. The wave of mass demonstrations in 1971 was followed by a year of low profile organizational work in 1972. 1973 saw another outburst of direct action: mass demonstrations, the occupation of houses which were standing empty waiting for Jews to come from Russia, strikes, the occupation of schools in slum areas to force them to remain open in the afternoons. We also decided to participate in the Histadrut elections in September, 1973. These elections are run along party lines, just like elections to the Knesset. We started absolutely from scratch; no money, no budget, no organized party; we were a group which constituted itself just to take part in the elections. We received 1.7% of the vote, which was very little in absolute terms but was considered the greatest upset of the elections. The fact that the Panthers could achieve representation made many people who had been cautious join us.

Elections to the Knesset were scheduled for the following month, and political observers thought that we might get as many as five Knesset members.

But the elections were postponed because of the October War: afterwards, the main issues were no longer social or economic conditions, but the war and peace issue. The Panthers at the time were focused almost exclusively on the social and economic problems, but people were thinking about foreign affairs, about security. Our appeal as a party became secondary. When the elections were held, we got 18,000 votes, a few hundred less than we needed for representation. If we had been a regular parliamentary organization, that would probably have been the end of it. But because our movement was born in the streets, in response to still existing economic problems, the party did not disappear. For example, 10 days after the 1973 Knesset elections, on January 10, 1974, the minister of finance announced that the prices of public transport, as well as bread, milk and other staples were going up by 40%. Other political forces did not react, but the Black Panthers staged a demonstration the same day: we occupied a bus station in Tel Aviv, and within minutes we had about 25,000 people solidly with us. The police intervened with tear gas and violence. The next day we held another "illegal" demonstration where there was street fighting with the police, many were arrested and wounded.

It isn't well known outside Israel, but we are always active. You can't pick up a daily newspaper in Israel without hearing about something we did. Just recently, the *Jerusalem Post* reported that one of our groups confiscated milk products and distributed them in slum areas in Jerusalem as a protest against the rise in prices and the cuts in government subsidies. This kind of thing goes on day-in and day-out.

*Q. What is the situation of the "Oriental" Jewish community in Israel today and how is it related to the structure of the Israeli state in general?*

*A.* When we talk of the economic and social structure of the state of Israel, we must remember that the mainstream in Zionism was a socialist trend, a socialism that arose in eastern Europe and Russia about the same time as other major communist movements. The Zionists thought they would have their socialist revolution in a Jewish state; they set up the structure which would later become the state of Israel. Armed with this ideology, they were bent on creating a working class of Jews, and they themselves were to be this

working class. They set up kibbutzim, work battalions—they tried to displace Arab workers from Jewish farms. After the state was set up, however, this socialist movement, still calling itself socialist, became an exploitative capitalist system. The kibbutz itself today is still a collective, but it's a millionaire's collective. It exploits labor, it owns industries; it uses national funds to build industry and uses cheap labor, mostly Oriental Jews who don't share in the profits of these industries.

When the state was set up in 1948, the Zionist structure became the structure of the state of Israel, and the Oriental Jews became the working class: logically those in power economically, politically, militarily would like to see others work for them. When the Zionists created a state structure and expanded, they didn't look for people to run the state, but for people to work in the factories and fields. This was *the* big break between Zionist ideology and Zionist reality. Zionist ideology says that we are one people—the Jewish people—and it doesn't matter where you come from, you are all equal. For a while, it even tried to work out this kind of equality with kibbutzim, collectives, and the co-operative movement. But suddenly, it was not equal: there were two kinds of people, those who work and those who get rich. And those who work and make other people rich were almost exclusively from the Arabic-speaking communities.

It's not only a class question. This Oriental community was not only proletarianized, but they were also ethnically suppressed. They are discriminated against as well as exploited. Today the Oriental Jews who make up 52% of the population hold less than 10% of the seats in Parliament, 9% of the top jobs in government and the economy; while 68% of the elementary school pupils are Oriental Jews, only 11% of the university students are. 85% of the juvenile delinquents are Sephardic Jews. The average standard of living for this community is about 3/5 of that of the Ashkenazis, and the gap is steadily widening. All this took place in the space of one generation. Young people now growing up hear their parents saying that it used to be different, in the Arab countries they were often highly educated professionals. When they came to Israel at the same time as someone else from Poland or Roumania, they were both newcomers to the country, but

because the person from Europe had relatives in the Ashkenazi establishment, he worked his way up. There are now many millionaires in Israel, but there are few who are Sephardis. The big capital is Ashkenazi.

All this is creating a class consciousness which is coupled with an ethnic consciousness. If we talk in universally accepted terms, we are a colonized majority, but we're *not* in a colony, it's our land. We are equal partners in the Zionist venture, yet we have symptoms of a colonized society.

*Q. What effect has the importation of Arab labor from the occupied territories had on the Oriental community?*

A. People often realize that this cheap labor has been brought to Israel and is being exploited to force them to reduce their own demands. This is not just a theory, it happens: when a Jewish construction worker asks for a raise, he is told that he can be replaced by an Arab who will work harder and for less.

*Q. The Oriental community, has, in the past, exhibited a tendency towards political conservatism. How does this affect your work?*

A. One of the most militant demonstrations against the price hikes in January 1974 took place in the Hatikva quarter, the "Harlem of Tel Aviv;" it's a neighborhood of about 50,000 people, over 90% Oriental Jews. It has always been a stronghold of the right, the *Likud*. During this demonstration, however, a few hundred people left the main demonstration and attacked the headquarters of the *Likud*, saying: "Begin, why aren't you fighting for us, for our welfare?" This is quite characteristic of a slow but gradual shift from the right towards our position, the position of the Black Panthers. I think 90% of our members come to us from the *Likud*, from the *Herut* which is really the right wing. Our appeal to them is that they are politically out of place in the *Likud*: they can't belong to a party which represents the exploiters, the big capital which gains by these price hikes. Their place is with us, we are the only political group fighting for their rights, fighting for housing, jobs, education. When people leave the *Likud*, they are not only leaving because it is exploiting them, they also understand the tie-in between exploitation and war, between

upper class interests and more expenses for armaments. They accept our basic position that we, the Jews from Oriental countries with such a deep understanding of Arab culture, can and should be a bridge for peace with the Arab world.

*Q. When the Black Panthers were founded, as you said earlier there wasn't very much in the way of structure or a political platform. Has that changed?*

*A.* Yes, we are now structured as a party. In our national convention last September, we elected a national central committee of 51 members, which in turn elects the national secretariat of nine members, the official leadership of the party.

At that convention, we also adopted additions to our basic political program: primarily, a much clearer stand on the Palestinian nation. At that time, to say that there was a Palestinian people was a very radical position in Israel. In September, 1975, we progressed still further. Our program today says that without solving the Palestinian problem there can be no peace in the Middle East. We do not accept the PLO program for a democratic secular state—personally, I don't think it's a workable idea. We are for the establishment of a Palestinian state beside the state of Israel on the condition that the borders are open and peaceful. Jerusalem should be united with each state having its capital in one part. I think this shows a good deal of political maturity.

There was a time when people would ask why we bother to speak about these issues; they thought we should confine ourselves to the social problems of the community. Today, the idea is why *shouldn't* we have a voice. Why should the Ashkenazis monopolize the Palestinian issue. More and more people also realize that the megalomania of the Israeli establishment is crazy, and that it's costing them the possibility of a peaceful life and social justice.

*Q. Has the development of a political platform led to splits or divisions within the party?*

*A.* Some people have left the party, but very few. On the other hand, such a party in Israel, an active militant Sephardi organization, is a threat to the established parties' hold on the Sephardi masses. The major party, and the government, are doing everything in their power to create divisions within the Black Panther movement. For example, on the eve of the Knesset

elections in 1973, Eddie Malka posed as the head of the "real" Panthers in Israel, calling his group the "Blue and White Panthers." They had huge sums of money and were spending like mad on ads and other propaganda. We didn't have a tenth of the money he had. He got 5,000 votes, not enough to get elected to the Knesset but enough to spoil things for us. We knew exactly where the money was coming from but we didn't have any proof. Then about a year ago, in the annual balance sheet of the Industrial Development Bank (which belongs to the government of Israel and is run by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce) there was an entry of 870,000 Israeli pounds in "bad debts written off" to Eddie Malka. They obviously gave him a loan for the election: a loan of \$10,000 which is a tremendous amount in Israel. He spent about 400,000 Israeli pounds on newspaper advertising while we spent less than 200 pounds. He has now disappeared, but occasionally another person will surface as the "real" Panther.

The establishment feels that they have to contain this party though all possible means: it's just not some votes going somewhere else in the establishment or within the established conception of politics. It is breaking up the very basis of the Israeli establishment.

*Q. How do you see the future of the Black Panther movement and the Oriental community in Israel?*

*A.* A neat answer would be that there is no way out but a classical revolution which would destroy the existing class structure and set up a socialist society. The Black Panthers have a socialist outlook. The question is if Israel can have a socialist revolution and survive. It would be easy to say that a socialist revolution is a socialist revolution and that it has nothing to do with nationalist concepts; and that if we set up a socialist state in Israel, there would also be socialist states in Palestine, Egypt etc. Unfortunately, I don't think this is possible. Nationalism in the Middle East today is at a very virulent stage, whether in Israel, Palestine, or the other Arab countries. Let's make it clear: suppose there is a revolution in Israel and the workers take over: there would be a civil war which would present the Arab regimes with an excellent chance to destroy Israel. Today, in Black Panther thinking, we know that our position could lead to just such a development,

but there is a limit beyond which we are not willing to go. We are not willing to use terrorism or armed force because it could set up this process which would end in the destruction of the state of Israel; we don't want the state to be destroyed, we want to change it. Jews in Israel today have no physical alternative except to leave the country (and many are indeed leaving). We, however, do not want to leave, we want to stay and change the country; we want to make it possible by changing Israel to have peace and a socialist revolution throughout the Middle East as a whole.

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**Press interview statements by Arab Affairs Advisor Toledano of Israel regarding the Day of the Land strike and the expropriation of Arab lands<sup>61</sup>**

April 2, 1976

*Q. Don't you think that the timing for land expropriation in Galilee was wrong?*<sup>62</sup>

A. It would certainly have been better, from the point of view of our relations with the Arabs, if the expropriation had not taken place. Since this is quite unavoidable—and I was convinced of that in my numerous visits to the sites—then the question of timing is not important at all. I would imagine that this ought to be done as early as possible, and that any postponement will aggravate the problem since rumors about the expropriations have been running in Galilee for over a year now.

*Q. What kind of interrelation is there between the unrest in the West Bank and what happened this week in Galilee?*

A. The events in the West Bank had an effect on what happened in Galilee and the atmosphere created there. The echoes of the unrest in the West Bank crossed the green line. This is only one of the elements which comprises all the problems. It is a fact that the Israeli Arabs did not strike or demonstrate over the Temple Mount which is as dear to their hearts as it is to every Moslem. They chose to demonstrate about the

land problem which is something that concerns them and the state.

*Q. Why were the riots concentrated mainly in the villages of Arraba, Deir Hanna and Sakhnin?*

A. These villages have been affected by the closure of area 9 which is the training ground of the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces]. This area, which was closed until 1967, was reopened for agriculture and cultivation but then closed again about 3 months ago. The whole area extends over 30 thousand dunums and the villagers used to cultivate only a small part of it. It is quite clear to me that this matter had a tangible effect on the disturbances but it was not the main reason.

*Q. Will you please answer me frankly. Was the Land Day strike a victory for Rakah?*

A. Yes—in a certain sense. Rakah was able to mar the relations between Jews and Arabs and to inflame the spirits of young Arabs in the villages. But Rakah could not bring the strike to a climax, and it became, unfortunately, something second rate in light of the demonstrations in the Galilee and the Triangle. It is true that Rakah's prestige soared up to a certain degree in the short run, but in the long run I believe it lost on two levels: one, it suffered an open rift with most of the council heads who opposed the strike; and two, the Arab populace in Israel will sober up and will arrive at the right conclusion, namely, that Rakah might lead them into a difficult situation since here matters are quite different than in the [occupied] territories.

*Q. To what extent is it possible to say that the Israeli Arabs of the post-Yom Kippur war are different from the Israeli Arabs prior to the war?*

A. The Yom Kippur war only precipitated a certain process but by no means created it. As I already said, we anticipated what was going to happen back in 1971, and therefore there is no reason to say that a new kind of Arab has appeared.

*Q. What personal conclusions are you going to draw from what happened in the Arab sector in the recent week?*

A. Why should I draw any conclusions? A man

<sup>61</sup> Interview published in *Yediot Aharonot* (Tel Aviv), April 2, 1976; partial English translation as published by *Merip Reports* (Washington D.C.), no. 47, (May 1976), p. 4.

<sup>62</sup> See doc. 59 above.

has to draw his conclusions if he did not anticipate things, or did and had not warned and warned again, or if despite his warnings nobody listened to him. None of this three elements exist in my case. I anticipated these events a long time before they actually happened and I forewarned the government and the responsible factor both in persona and in writing about that. My recommendations have been accepted primarily in slowing down the process of deterioration which we clearly saw was unavoidable. If the 6-day war and the Yom Kippur war had not taken place and the Palestinian issue had not crept up we would have reached that deterioration a few years later.

It is quite evident to me that there is no power in the world that can totally uproot the national identity of any given minority. I think we have done a fine job of forestalling this. As far as personal conclusions are concerned, the foreign minister should be asked why does he not resign after all these recurring failures at the United Nations, and ask the defense minister the same in light of what is going on in the West Bank.

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**Statement by US Secretary of State Kissinger recommending the sale to Egypt of six C-130 transport aircraft, made before a Congressional subcommittee<sup>63</sup>**

Washington, April 2, 1976

The President has asked me to convey to you his strong support for the government-to-government cash sale of six C-130 transport aircraft to Egypt and for the training of Egyptians in the U.S. service schools. In the Presidential Determination forwarded to Congress on March 25, the President stated that this sale and such training will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace.<sup>64</sup> I want to address this morning the question of why we firmly believe this to be the case.

We have felt from the beginning of our discussion with Egypt about the C-130 sale that, modest as it is, it represents a policy decision that should

be the subject of full consultation between the executive and the Legislature. This is particularly true in light of the history of restrictive legislation relating to our relationship with Egypt, legislation that was enacted in a very different era of U.S.-Egyptian relations.

I would like to begin by putting this sale and the training in the context of the policy we have been following in the Middle East since 1973—with congressional support—to help bring about a settlement of the intractable and complex Arab-Israeli dispute, to support and insure the survival and security of Israel, and to improve our relations with the Arab states of the region. It has been vital to this endeavor to gain and hold the confidence of the Arab states most involved, as well as to keep the confidence of Israel.

The Arab states—with some of whom we had had little or no relationship for seven years—had to develop confidence that we took their concerns seriously and were prepared to treat their legitimate needs fairly and with sympathy. We were asking the Arab leaders, in their own interests, to break with the past and follow us in the difficult steps that could lead to a negotiated peace. Their confidence in us and in our capacity to respond to their needs and interests was and is essential if we are to maintain progress toward a settlement.

Egypt, under President Sadat, has taken the lead on the Arab side in cooperating with our endeavors to help the region break out of the cycle of recurring war. Egypt has also moved to reorient its policy, after more than 20 years, away from the Soviet Union and toward the United States. These positive developments in Egyptian policy provide both opportunities and challenges. The opportunities, I think, are clear, both in terms of our bilateral relationship and in terms of our search for peace. The challenges are equally real.

The Arab world as a whole is aware of what President Sadat has staked in signing the Sinai II agreement with Israel,<sup>65</sup> in abrogating the friendship treaty with the Soviet Union,<sup>66</sup> and in taking his economy off a war basis and rebuilding the cities along the Suez Canal. Other Arab states are skeptical that he can derive sufficient benefit from this new policy to make it advantageous for Egypt.

<sup>63</sup> Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIV, 1921 (April 19, 1976), pp. 505–507.

<sup>64</sup> Doc. 70 above.

<sup>65</sup> Doc. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>66</sup> See. doc. 216 below.



Let me say a word about what I mean by "advantageous for Egypt." For the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli dispute, there are voices in the Arab world—Egypt among them—that say they are prepared to make peace with Israel. Given our fundamental commitment to Israel's right to exist, this step was necessary before there could be common ground for cooperation between the United States and the Arab world in the search for a political solution to the problems that have brought four Arab-Israeli wars in 25 years.

Egypt seeks a peace that will meet its legitimate concerns for sovereignty over Arab territory and justice for the Palestinians without bringing into question Israel's right to exist in peace and security. Egypt under President Sadat's leadership has sought to throw off the shackles of the past. We must seek to do the same in our relations with Egypt.

We must, in other words, by the responsiveness of our policy, help give Sadat a positive answer to make it possible for him to continue on the course he has chosen and encourage the other Arab states to follow his example. For this reason, and to build a durable bilateral relationship, we have broadened our ties with Egypt extensively in the past two years, primarily in the economic field. The Administration has requested \$750 million to finance an economic assistance program with Egypt this year. The Public Law 480 program adds about another \$190 million.

A U.S.-Egyptian joint commission has been established, and its activities have added a further dimension to our relationship. There are biannual joint working group meetings in medicine and health; education and culture; agriculture, science, and economics. These meetings, and the joint projects developed by them, have resulted in a broadening of our relationship with Egypt. Our doctors talk with theirs about problems of concern to us both. In other fields, American specialists are working closely with their Egyptian counterparts. There are over 100 projects currently underway in Egypt under the aegis of the joint commission. These projects are being funded by U.S.-owned Egyptian pounds which have been generated by the Public Law 480 program.

In the private sector, a joint U.S.-Egyptian business council has been formed and is headed by Thomas Murphy, chairman of the board of

General Motors Corporation. This council has helped Egyptian Government officials to understand better how a modern market economy works today and in what way government bureaucracies can facilitate private investment and thereby accelerate economic development.

While the economic side of our relationship will remain the most important, President Sadat considers that some evidence of American willingness to help meet his national security needs through the sale of some military equipment would be very important to him. The supply of military equipment from the Soviet Union had largely dried up during the course of 1975; and the abrogation of the Egyptian-Soviet treaty, as well as the cancellation of Soviet access to Alexandria shipyard facilities, can only be expected to cut Egypt off even more completely from that source.

To meet President Sadat's needs for an American gesture of this sort, we have decided to sell the six C-130's to Egypt and to provide some training for Egyptian military personnel in American service schools. This is an individual step and sets no precedent for the future. There is no further commitment on our part.

What we are intending to do is clearly of much greater political than military importance. If we fail now to follow through—if Congress should reject the sale—it would have very serious consequences not only in Egypt but throughout the Arab world. The capacity of the United States to respond to governments that adopt policies we favor would be called into further question by countries who have long been skeptical on this score.

## 78

**Letter from US President Ford to Speaker Albert of the US House of Representatives stressing his opposition to transitional security assistance funds higher than those requested<sup>67</sup>**

Washington, April 6, 1976

Dear Mr. Speaker:

In my letter of March 29, 1976 to the House and Senate Conferees, I stated my strong objec-

<sup>67</sup> From a photocopy of the original letter.

tions to the Senate action adding nearly \$800 million in program terms to the budget for Foreign Military Sales credits and Security Supporting Assistance for the Transition Quarter for Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Syria, since in my view these funds are not needed to meet the essential needs of the recipients. This position was only taken after the most careful review and analysis.

As you know, this Administration is firmly committed to the security of the State of Israel, and also to providing constructive economic assistance to Egypt, Jordan and Syria. However, the FY 76 and FY 77 budget levels were designed to meet these purposes on an austere basis without any funding in the Transition Quarter.

It is natural that the recipient governments would like to receive financial support at a higher level than provided in the Administration's request. I am aware also that it has been argued that the United States should fund through security assistance any budget deficit which governments might incur as the result in part of acquiring military equipment from the United States. However, it should be obvious that any such proposals are completely infeasible, since the United States is in no position to control every aspect of another government's budget spending. Security Assistance is intended to provide military and economic funding to ease the pressure on friendly governments in meeting their legitimate security needs. It never has been nor should be intended to meet every budgetary deficit or foreign exchange shortfall which another government may incur and no such commitment has been made.

Specifically in the case of Israel, my FY 76 and FY 77 budget requests provide sufficient levels of assistance to meet that nation's needs. Our most careful analysis indicates that the levels provided in the FY 76 and 77 requests for FMS are adequate to enable Israel to maintain its security. Our previous estimates of this need have been carefully rechecked and reaffirmed.

At a time when our own country's budget pressures are very great, when our nation faces many other urgent and pressing program needs and our own deficits for FY 76 and the Transition Quarter are already too large, I cannot justify more funds than have been included in my budget request.

Therefore, if I am presented with a final appropriation bill that includes additional funds for

the Transition Quarter, I will be forced to exercise my veto—an alternative which could seriously disrupt our efforts to assist our friends and allies in maintaining their security and development growth efforts. I naturally hope that the House will not make necessary such a course of action, but will instead reach the only responsible conclusion.

Sincerely,  
[Signed] GERALD R. FORD

79

### **Speech by Pope Paul VI made at a reception for President Sadat of Egypt<sup>68</sup>**

Vatican City, April 8, 1976

Mr. President,

It gives us great pleasure to offer you our hearty greetings today. Your visit has even more significance for us since it is the first time that an Egyptian president has visited the Vatican.

We welcome you as a great president of a great nation that has enriched the whole world with its culture over thousands of years.

It also gives us pleasure to recall the Christian contributions to Egypt's history, and the Egyptian contributions to the history of the Church, especially in Africa.

In modern Egypt today, Christians, especially Catholics, wish to cooperate with their Muslim co-citizens in their country's progress. We are in this context glad to stress and encourage Catholic activities, especially in the realms of education and social services. We know that these activities are being generously carried out and supported by incentives devoid of any selfishness and dedicated to the public interest.

On this occasion we express our hope that the growing progress in your country will continue, and that the Islamic-Christian dialogue will continue in a spirit of fraternity; and may the Lord's greatest blessings be upon the Egyptian Arab Republic.

Your Excellency is aware that we are extremely concerned with the future of this and following generations. In all sincerity we request the continuation of efforts for a just and peaceful settle-

<sup>68</sup> Translated from the Arabic translation, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), April 9, 1976.

ment of the Arab-Israeli conflict including, necessarily, a just solution of the problem of the Palestinian people about whose dignity and rights we have often expressed our human and friendly concern. The question of Jerusalem and the holy places should also be solved within the framework of respect for the millions of believers of the three monotheistic religions.

We reiterate our expression of anxiety and concern as regards Lebanon where the conflict is assuming disastrous dimensions.

We also reaffirm our pleasure at your visit and express our confidence that the Egyptian people, under your leadership, will offer a unique contribution to the building of a world pervaded by equality, a world of fraternity, peace and justice, or what we are wont to call the "civilization of love."

For the sake of achieving these objectives, we ask God to bestow His blessings on Your Excellency and on the beloved Egyptian people.

## 80

### **Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Italy of President Sadat of Egypt (excerpts)<sup>69</sup>**

Rome, April 8, 1976

Concerning developments in the situation in the Middle East, the two sides asserted the importance of creating a new impetus for the peace efforts to which the Egyptian government has resolutely contributed, and that developing peace efforts should aim at reaching an overall peaceful settlement within the framework of the Geneva conference.

The two sides asserted the urgent necessity of achieving a just and lasting peace on the basis of Israel's withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967, the right of all the countries of the region to live in peace, the respect of rights of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, and the recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian people who seek to establish their own independent state.

The two sides take into consideration that this settlement should be accompanied by an effective system of international guarantees regarding which Italy and her European partners are determined to offer definite ideas and formulae.

## 81

### **Letter from US State Department official McCloskey to Sen. Humphrey (Dem.) detailing the limits of proposed training of Egyptian military personnel by the US<sup>70</sup>**

Washington, April 8, 1976

HON. HUBERT H. HUMPHREY,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance and Economic Policy, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During Secretary Kissinger's appearance before your Subcommittee on April 2 concerning the sale of six C-130 aircraft to Egypt,<sup>71</sup> Senator Percy asked if the sale is approved whether U.S. military personnel would be sent to Egypt to train Egyptians on the C-130s and whether this would involve a U.S. military delegation going to Egypt. The Secretary promised to provide that information to the Subcommittee and I am hereby providing a response.

The concept for training of Egyptian pilots and air crews, ground crews, and maintenance personnel has not yet been determined since there has been no detailed discussion with Egyptian officials. Although it might be more efficient to conduct all training in the United States, training could be conducted in either location by either Air Force or contractor personnel or by a combination of Air Force and contractor personnel. These details will be determined subsequent to receipt of additional information from the Egyptians and after a thorough review of the alternatives. In any event, it is not envisioned that significant numbers of USAF personnel will be required to conduct or supervise training in Egypt.

I would also like to take this opportunity to clarify an apparent misunderstanding in some of Senator Case's comments during the hearing.

<sup>69</sup> Excerpted and translated from the partial Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), April 9, 1976. The visit took place April 5-8, 1976.

<sup>70</sup> Text inserted by senator Case (Rep.) in *Congressional Record* (daily), April 12, 1976, p. S5470.

<sup>71</sup> See doc. 77 above.

The only training covered by the Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer transmitted to the Committee is the training needed to operate and maintain the C-130 aircraft; this training is estimated to cost about \$2.9 million, though that figure could vary depending on where the training is done.

Any other training authorized by the Presidential Determination of March 25 would be paid for separately by the Government of Egypt. The policy of this Administration is that such training is expected to be quite limited and will be conducted at service schools where many other foreign officers including other Arab officers are already enrolled. This training will cost a mere fraction of the \$25 million mentioned by Senator Case. This type of training does not involve the divulgence of classified information concerning U.S. combat tactics and strategy nor would it include training in the use of sophisticated military equipment. We would envisage giving such training to about 20 Egyptian officers this year.

I hope this information is useful to the Committee. Please let me know if I can be of further assistance.

Sincerely yours,  
ROBERT H. McCLOSKEY,  
*Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.*

## 82

**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Yugoslavia of President Sadat of Egypt (excerpts)<sup>72</sup>**

Brioni, April 10, 1976

At the invitation of the President of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Anwar el Sadat and his wife paid a working and friendly visit to Yugoslavia from 8 to 10 April, 1976.

They expect significant and concrete action of the fifth conference of the non-aligned countries and the undertaking of energetic measures directed towards support for the Arab countries in their

demands for a just and lasting peace, including the fulfillment of the rights of the Palestinian people and the settlement of other crises.

## 83

**Press statement issued after a visit to the USSR of a delegation of the Palestine National Front in the Occupied Territories<sup>73</sup>**

Moscow, April 12, 1976

From April 5-12, a delegation of the Palestine National Front led by PLO Executive Committee member and member of the Front leadership Abd al-Jawad Salih visited the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee.

The delegation held discussions and meetings with the Soviet Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the Soviet Veterans Committee, the Soviet Women's Committee as well as other groups. The delegation examined the many-sided activities of these Soviet social institutions, which aim at implementing the programme set forth and approved at the Party's twenty-fifth Congress for international peace and cooperation and the freedom and independence of peoples of the world.

During the talks held with the Solidarity Committee, the Palestine National Front delegation spoke of the heroic struggle of the masses in occupied Palestine against the annexationist policy of the Israeli occupying authorities as well as the activities of the Front in organizing resistance in the occupied territories and its activities which aim at rallying the masses around the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian masses.

Representatives of Soviet social organizations condemned severely all injustice and oppression being practised by Israel occupation authorities in the occupied territories. They further condemned the terror campaigns, mass arrests, acts of sacrilege and expropriation of Arab land carried out by the occupation authorities. They expressed their firm solidarity with the struggle of the Palestinian people led by the PLO to protect

<sup>72</sup> Excerpted from the English text, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXVII, 625 (April 20, 1976), p. 17.

<sup>73</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Filastin al-Thawra* (Beirut), April 25, 1976, p. 7.

national rights, determine Palestinian destiny and create a national and independent state.

The Palestinian delegation praised highly the principled stand of the Soviet Union in support of the struggle of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples against Israeli aggression and imperialist and reactionary plots. This stand aims at establishing a just and permanent peace in the Middle East. It is a policy that was fully set forth at the twenty-fifth Congress of the Communist Party.

The National Front delegation condemned the policy of surrender practised by certain Arab reactionary circles in collusion with imperialist forces that conspire against the national rights and sovereignty of the Arab people, including the Palestinians, by concluding bilateral and partial agreements with the Israeli aggressor. The delegation also pointed to certain actions being taken to undermine Arab-Soviet friendship by these reactionary circles which are seen to be in conflict with basic Arab interests, including the interests of the Arab people of Palestine.

The delegation placed a wreath on the tomb of the unknown soldier and visited the Lenin Museum inside the Kremlin as well as the city of Leningrad.

#### 84

### **Press conference statements by Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa reviewing his visit to Israel<sup>74</sup>**

Jerusalem, April 12, 1976

I want to thank my colleague the Prime Minister of Israel for inviting me and receiving me and my colleague Dr. Muller, here and the other members of my party. It was a most unforgettable visit from the personal point of view. But apart from the personal point of view, I am pleased that it was possible to have had fruitful, constructive and informative discussions with my colleague, your esteemed Prime Minister and the other Ministers of his Cabinet. Allow me to read the following statement:

"We, that is the Prime Minister of Israel and myself on behalf of our Governments, have decided to establish a Ministerial Joint Committee comprising of Ministers of South Africa and Israel. The Committee will meet at least once a year

and will make an overall review of the economic relations between the two countries and will discuss ways and means to expand the economic cooperation and trade between the two countries, such as:

- (a) encouragement of investments
- (b) development of trade
- (c) scientific and industrial cooperation

(d) joint utilization of South African raw material and Israeli manpower in joint projects. A steering group will be established in order to regulate the exchange of information and ideas."

That is all from my part, ladies and gentlemen.

*Q. Mr. Prime Minister, there have been reports of a negotiation or discussions concerning a military supply relationship. My question is whether or not the two countries are establishing or have established or look forward to any form of military supply relationship?*

A. Don't hold me responsible for any such reports and the reply is no.

*Q. Mr. Prime Minister, it was reported in the South African press that Israel and South Africa are negotiating for a supply of approximately one million tons of South African coal per year to be exported to Israel round about 1979.*

A. I have no comments. But naturally, it is a question of trade and if it can be done I have no objection to it whatsoever.

*Q. Mr. Prime Minister, could you specify what projects are more or less feasible for Israel and South Africa?*

A. No. I don't think that I am called upon at this stage to go into details at all.

*Q. Sir, South Africa is a country in which different populations live together.*

A. Yes we are a multi-national country.

*Q. The same is true of Israel and I presume here you have heard of their attempts to solve these problems in Israeli territories. Have you been discussing these kinds of problems?*

A. No, gentlemen. I am not and I have never posed as an authority in solving the problems of other countries. I have my work cut out to solve my own.

*Q. Mr. Prime Minister, there has been much talk of coincidence of interest between Israel and South Africa. I wonder if we could have your view on just where the*

<sup>74</sup> Transcript supplied, on request, by the South African embassy in Washington D.C.

*two countries coincide in their respective interest on the international scene.*

A. No. I think if one takes an objective look at the two countries there are differences, in some instances vast differences, but then on the other hand there are parallels and similarities in many, many instances, from the climatic conditions upwards.

*Q. Mr. Prime Minister, did you invite Prime Minister Rabin to visit South Africa?*

A. That, gentlemen, as I understand protocol, is not a matter that I will discuss at this stage at this press conference.

*Q. Mr Prime Minister, would you say that the appearance of Cuban troops armed with Soviet weapons and without an American objection to this, has changed the entire picture of Africa?*

A. It has brought in a totally different dimension in the affairs of Africa and more particularly southern Africa for that matter.

*Q. Sir, do you see any possibility of joint efforts or joint strategy concerted by South Africa and Israel in an attempt to reach out to the black African countries?*

A. It has not been discussed at all but we want to normalise our relations with African countries and we have succeeded in doing that to a great extent. As time goes on relations will become better. It stands to reason that any country including Israel will look upon Africa in the same light. What we need in this world, is to normalise relations between countries, to soft-pedal that which divides and to concentrate on that which we have in common. What the world needs today, I think, is to come to its senses, to agree to differ on many, many things. Because disagreement as far as policy outlook is concerned must never be a bar to cooperation as between states. The policy of my country is to try its level best to normalise relations with all non- and anti-communist countries.

*Q. I also asked whether you saw a possibility that Israel and South Africa might concert a political policy with regard to black African states.*

A. We will certainly discuss African situations as we will discuss other world situations which affect us both. It is perfectly normal when heads of Government meet.

## **First report of the US Sinai Support Mission<sup>75</sup>**

**April 13, 1976**

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On October 13, 1975, you signed the Joint Resolution of the Congress which authorized implementation of the United States Proposal for a U.S. early warning system in the Sinai, manned by up to 200 American civilians.<sup>76</sup> The attendant duties and responsibilities were, at your direction, entrusted to the United States Sinai Support Mission.<sup>77</sup> I am submitting herewith an account of the Mission's activities to April 13, 1976 for inclusion in the six-month report to the Congress required by Section 4 of the Joint Resolution. In addition, illustrative material and copies of documents are provided to contribute to an understanding of accomplishments to date.

This initial six-month period has been a time of intense and productive activity for the Sinai Support Mission, its overseas arm, the Sinai Field Mission, and the private contractors who have been installing the early warning system under our direction and supervision. With the full cooperation of the Governments of Egypt and Israel and the United Nations authorities in the area, we were able to achieve operational surveillance capability on February 22, 1976 simultaneously with the final movements of the Israeli armies and the assumption by the United Nations Emergency Force of responsibility for the Buffer Zone in accordance with the Basic Agreement of September 4, 1975 between Egypt and Israel and the Annex to the Basic Agreement.<sup>78</sup>

Since then, we have been engaged in improving our initial capability and continuing the construction of life-support facilities for the men and women who will comprise the Sinai Field Mission. Although the Joint Resolution agreed to the assignment of 200 Americans with the Field Mission, we have kept in mind Congressional interest in reducing this number. I am pleased to report that the total number of United States Government and contractor staff of the Sinai Field Mission will be 174 once the construction period has

<sup>75</sup> Department of State Bulletin, LXXIV, 1926 (May 24, 1976), pp. 648-649.

<sup>76</sup> Doc. 169 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>77</sup> See doc. 39 above.

<sup>78</sup> Doc. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

ended. Other Congressional concerns raised during the Fall, 1975, hearings or expressed in the Joint Resolution have also been addressed: every member of the Sinai Field Mission is an American civilian who volunteered to work in the early warning system; no member was previously employed by a foreign intelligence gathering agency of the United States Government and none is operating under the control of the Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense. The health and welfare of each American in the Sinai were given priority consideration in the formulation of our plans. Security precautions have been integrated into the Field Mission's physical structures and daily procedures. Finally, with specific reference to Section 1 of the Joint Resolution, emergency evacuation plans have been prepared for the rapid removal of Sinai Field Mission personnel in the circumstances specified, or in such other circumstances as you may decide.

From its inception, the Sinai Support Mission has been mindful of the need to act with dispatch in order to fulfill its responsibility "to ensure that the United States' role in the early warning system enhances the prospect of compliance in good faith with the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement and thereby promotes the cause of peace." The work schedule that was developed as a consequence is divided into three successive and distinct periods:

1. An unusually compressed procurement/contracting period began with the formation of the Mission in November, 1975, and ended on January 16, 1976 with the award of a competitive contract to install, operate and maintain the early warning system under Mission management to E-Systems, Inc. of Dallas, Texas, an electronic systems and equipment manufacturer. Close to fifty American firms participated at various stages of the procurement process; without their full cooperation, it would not have been possible to maintain the accelerated schedule we required.

2. It was highly desirable that the date on which the early warning system entrusted to the United States was to become operational coincide with the completion of the final troop redeployments in the Sinai and the establishment of the UN Buffer Zone. By making do with rudimentary shelters and concentrating on the installation of the sensor fields and related hardware and communications links, and on the procedures to be

followed in monitoring the Egyptian and Israeli surveillance stations, the men in the field successfully completed the first phase of contract implementation three days in advance of the February 22 deadline. Since then the sensor fields and watch stations have been working at full effectiveness and no untoward incidents have occurred.

3. The post-February 22 construction schedule is directed to improving the living and working conditions in the Field Mission's temporary structures and preparing the permanent facilities required for its ongoing operations. This period will end on July 1 of this year. By then, all Field Mission personnel and operations will have been installed in their permanent quarters.

The components and capabilities of the early warning system are also described in some detail in the report in order that the Congress may be assured that the American role in the Sinai is fully responsive to the provisions of the United States Proposal and the requirements of the Joint Resolution. I hope that other readers who may be less familiar with the role that you have assigned to us will find the documentation of value.

Sincerely yours,

C. WILLIAM KONTOS

*Director*

## 86

### **Speech by Prime Minister Hua Kuo-feng of China expressing solidarity with the Arab cause<sup>79</sup>**

**Peking, April 21, 1976**

Your Excellency Deputy President Husni Mubarak and Mrs. Mubarak, Honourable Egyptian guests, friends and comrades.

It is a great pleasure for us to attend the banquet being given tonight by H.E. Deputy President Mubarak. The enthusiastic remarks just made by H.E. the deputy president express very faithfully the deep sentiments of friendship entertained by the Egyptian people towards the people of China. On behalf of the government and people of China, I express my sincere gratitude for this, at a time when the Egyptian people and other Arab peoples

<sup>79</sup> Made at a dinner hosted by visiting Deputy President Mubarak of Egypt after the signature of a protocol on arms supplies between China and Egypt; translated from the Arabic translation, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), April 22, 1976, p. 13.

are scoring continuous victories in the face of aggression and domination. The people of China joyfully welcome the visit of Deputy President Mubarak at the head of a high-level Egyptian delegation and extend also a warm welcome to his comrades-in-arms and his companions who have travelled from afar.

Chairman Mao has met the deputy president and a pleasant and friendly conversation took place. During the past few days, the two sides have exchanged opinions on a wide range of topics concerning the present situation in the Middle East and international issues of common concern. Sincere and friendly talks were also held regarding development and strengthening of friendly relations and cooperation, mutual aid between China and Egypt as well as a number of other issues. The results achieved were fully successful. By his visit, the deputy president has made an important contribution to the cause of greater friendship and comradeship in struggle between the two peoples as well as the development of relations of friendship and cooperation. It is our view that continued development of friendship and cooperation between the two countries serves not merely the basic interests of the two peoples but also the interests of the common struggle of third world countries against imperialism and domination. We in the third world countries are still being subjected in varying degrees to exploitation, oppression, injustice and outside interference by imperialism, big power domination, Zionism and racism.

We face a common enemy without there being any basic conflict in our interests. We must, by the nature of things, exchange sympathy and support and must cooperate closely in our common struggle.

The just struggle led by the Egyptian and other Arab peoples including the Palestinian people, against aggression and domination has met with a wide measure of sympathy and support throughout the world. In turn, that struggle has furnished great support and encouragement to the struggles of the revolutionary peoples of the world. We are confident that the Egyptian and other Arab peoples, including the people of Palestine, so long as they rely on their own power, strengthen their unity and continue to struggle in a long-term sense, will assuredly achieve even greater victories in their struggle against imperialism, hegemony and Israeli Zionism, supported in this by the third

world and by revolutionary peoples everywhere.

The deputy president and the rest of the honourable Egyptian guests have visited some sites in our capital. Tomorrow, they leave Peking for South China to continue their visit. We wish our honoured guests a happy journey and ask them to convey the regards and best wishes of Chairman Mao to President Anwar Sadat.

Let us now drink a toast to the prosperity and wellbeing of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the happiness of its people, the new phase in friendship between the peoples of Egypt and China, to their friendship and cooperation, to the victory of the Egyptian and other Arab peoples including the people of Palestine in their struggle against aggression and hegemony, to the health of President Anwar Sadat, his vice president, Husni Mubarak, and Mrs. Mubarak, the health of the rest of our honoured Egyptian guests, to the health of H.E. Ambassador Salah Abd and of friends and comrades.

## 87

### **Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger discussing the situation in Lebanon<sup>80</sup>**

**London, April 23, 1976**

*Secretary Kissinger:* Ambassador Brown and I have had a very good, very helpful talk.

As you know, Ambassador Brown was sent to Lebanon four weeks ago, taking leave from his position as president of the Middle East Institute, and left with something like 24 hours' notice. At that time, the situation in Lebanon was chaotic, and the danger of outside intervention was very great. In the interval, partly as a result of his extraordinary efforts, we can now talk about the beginning of a restoration of constitutional government in Lebanon.

We discussed such things as the creation of a security force and the danger of the situation in Lebanon escalating into a Middle East crisis has been reduced.

We've repeatedly pointed out that it remains a delicate process and that it could easily be upset by irresponsible actions of individuals, actions of

<sup>80</sup> Made following a meeting with the US envoy to Lebanon Dean Brown, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIV, 1925 (May 17, 1976), pp. 627-628.



outside powers. And the U.S. view is that all of the factions, all of the interested outside powers should continue to exhibit the constructive attitude that has brought matters to this point.

Ambassador Brown is going to return to the United States to report to the President. He will then return to Lebanon for a few days, and then he will have completed his mission with great distinction and as a great service to peace in the area—a great service to the foreign policy of the United States.

*Q. What do you mean by the "creation of a security force"?*

A. Well, as you know, the security force in the country—the military forces and the police—disintegrated under the impact of the civil war, and when a new President is elected and the government is reconstituted, one of the obvious problems it will face is how to create a force that is responsive to the government and that can interpose itself between the various factions. And there are some ideas on this subject that are now being explored and with which Ambassador Brown has also been helpful.

*Q. Will there be Lebanese forces or outside forces?*

A. We are talking about Lebanese forces drawn perhaps from some of the factions or separately recruited. We don't want to go into any of the details, but we are specifically talking about Lebanese security forces to deal with Lebanese problems.

*Q. Will there be indigenous Palestinians in that security force?*

A. The composition of the security forces is one of the subjects that is under negotiation right now; and I don't think it is for us to speculate as to the elements, but obviously a security force to be effective must be acceptable to all of the parties that feel threatened.

*Q. What kind of time frame are you talking about?*

A. We, of course, do not control the time frame. Again I must stress the situation is tenuous and delicate, and it has been brought to this point through the constructive attitude of all of the parties. On the assumption that that continues, we would think that the election of a new President could be completed within a two-week period and that the beginning of a return to more

normal processes should start immediately after that.

*Q. Has the danger of massive outside intervention been reduced?*

A. It is my impression from Ambassador Brown's report that the danger of outside intervention has been reduced. But, of course, if the situation in Lebanon should blow up again, the danger could return.

*Q. Are the Syrian troops still in there?*

A. I don't think there has been any significant change in troop deployment since I answered questions at a press conference yesterday.

*Q. Would the United States play any role—perhaps as a guarantor in case security forces were to be established?*

A. Our basic position has been to avoid intervention by outside powers or to give outside powers the right of intervention, and therefore we would believe that the best solution would be one in which the Lebanese factions agree among themselves as to the creation of the security force.

*Q. What are the prospects for Syrians removing their troops from Lebanon?*

A. Well, this is a question that will have to be negotiated between the Lebanese and the Syrians, but it is our impression that they are there as part of the immediate situation and not a permanent feature of the Lebanese scene.

*Q. What is the U.S. role in the creation of the security force? Is Ambassador Brown trying to get factions to agree on the compositions or—*

A. Well, I think it is fair to say that Ambassador Brown has been one of the very few people who has been in touch with all of the factions—and I say very few, probably the only person in Lebanon—and therefore he has been in a position to carry the views of the various parties to the others. My judgment is that he's played a very useful, in fact, almost decisive role in this diplomatic process.

And we will do as we indicated when we sent Ambassador Brown—he will be ready to do what the parties ask him to do and to help them to move toward common objectives. And when he leaves—in about two weeks—Ambassador Meloy will replace him to perform again whatever functions—

*Q. Ambassador Brown, did you have any direct or indirect contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization in your negotiations?*

*Ambassador Brown:* I did not.

## 88

**Press interview statements by Mayor Kollek of Jerusalem reviewing the place of the Arabs in Jerusalem<sup>81</sup>**

Jerusalem, late April, 1976

*Q. The recent West Bank elections seemed to many observers to be a victory for "immoderate" Arab leaders. What's your reaction?*

*A.* We have to deal with Arabs who exist, not with some image that we create for ourselves that makes us comfortable. We now have a group of [West Bank] Arab leaders who represent the real feelings of the population and who will deal with such problems as we let them deal with. Elections never lead to results that are altogether ideal. We have to realize that fact.

*Q. You have frequently quarreled with the Israeli Government on its policies regarding Jerusalem—*

*A.* Wait a minute... I have no fundamental quarrel with policy. Basically the Israeli Government supports a liberal policy in Jerusalem of equality for everybody, and of trying to avoid tension. But I sometimes disagree about the execution of that policy.

*Q. In what ways?*

*A.* I try to put myself in the shoes of Jerusalem's Arabs, who must regard themselves as being occupied. If you are occupied, you are suspicious of the occupier. And these suspicions must be eliminated as much as possible by establishing a kind of recognized permanency of rights and conditions.

*Q. What does "recognized permanency" mean?*

*A.* For example—something like the status quo regarding the Christian holy places. That was set out in 1852 in a concordat between the various

Christian denominations and czarist Russia, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the British Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia. All these empires and kingdoms have disappeared, but that status quo remains. It gives the Christians a feeling of continuity and stability. The Muslims simply haven't got that.

*Q. But aren't the Muslim holy places—Al-Aksa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock on the Temple Mount—protected?*

*A.* They certainly are protected. The Muslims control those places; the status quo that existed before is maintained absolutely. But it doesn't change the psychological situation and the suspicions of the Arabs. For example, not long ago a Jerusalem magistrate ruled that Jews are entitled to pray on the Temple Mount in the Old City. It's sacred to us, but the Muslim mosques are there and the Muslim religious institutions control the area. The government has appealed the decision, and the police still do not allow Jews to pray on the Mount.

*Q. So what's the problem?*

*A.* You saw the problem. There were riots. Because of the Arabs' background and associations, they are all certain that the magistrate—particularly since she is young and a woman—got instructions from the government. They cannot imagine how independent our judicial system is; and because of our background and associations Jews don't understand this. Jews didn't see it as a match held to a powder keg.

*Q. Can you envisage any situation—say for the sake of a peace treaty with the Arabs—in which Jerusalem would again become a divided city?*

*A.* It would be a tragedy and I hope it never happens. Jerusalem is 4,000 years old and except for two decades, it has never been divided. When you deal with Jerusalem you have to look at the long-range sweep of history and not just at the immediate problems.

*Q. What about expanding the rights of Arabs in Jerusalem?*

*A.* We must give Jerusalem—because of its special character—a different legal framework

<sup>81</sup> Interview conducted by Michael Elkins, *Newsweek* (New York—international edition), May 3, 1976, p. 56.

from that of Tel Aviv or Haifa. For example, in time for the next election, we should establish a ward system, so that the Arabs—even if only a few go to elections—are not entirely outvoted and so there will be Muslim and Christian representatives on the United City Council.

*Q. Can you envision a time when through free elections there might be an Arab majority on the city council or an Arab mayor?*

A. I don't see it in the foreseeable future because there's an almost two-thirds majority of Jews in the city; but I can certainly see an Arab vice mayor or head of an Arab borough, an Arab vice mayor in charge of municipal engineering, or something like that.

89

### **Press interview statements by Defence Minister Peres of Israel outlining Israel's attitude to the war in Lebanon<sup>82</sup>**

**Late April, 1976**

I think we should be very careful not to change the Christian-Muslim conflict into an Arab-Jewish one. We are not a party to that conflict and we do not have any intention of interfering, unless there is a direct and real threat to Israel's security.

As far as we are concerned, the dilemma is not simple. We should not, for example, interfere in such a way as to help Arafat. We also do not want to interfere in such a way as to unite all the Arab factors against Israel and change the conflict in Lebanon into an Israeli-Arab conflict. Political courses, like military moves, should consider, in the immediate term, the situation as it is and any current changes: One time you warn, another time you do something else, but all in accordance with the development of the battle as a whole. I think that we have enough strength to permit us to be moderate, and we have enough strength and moderation to obtain what is necessary: respect of power on one hand, and respect of moderation on the other. This thing has brought us tactical-political results as well as tactical-military ones.

<sup>82</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text, *Bemahane*, (Tel Aviv), April 28, 1976.

90

### **Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Iraq of Prime Minister Goma of the Congo (excerpts)<sup>83</sup>**

**Baghdad, April 26, 1976**

At the invitation of the government of the Republic of Iraq, Mr. Louis Silva Goma, member of the Revolutionary Command Council and Prime Minister of the People's Republic of the Congo, paid a friendly visit to the Republic of Iraq from April 20–23, 1976.

The two sides strongly condemned Zionist aggression against the Arab people. They reaffirmed their support for the struggle being waged by the Palestinian people to recover their firm and legitimate rights.

The two sides announced that the return of peace to the Middle East hinges upon the complete liberation of all occupied territories. The two sides further affirmed their support for UN General Assembly Resolution 3379 which considered Zionism as a form of racism.

91

### **Statement issued by the government of the USSR calling for serious efforts to achieve a Middle East settlement<sup>84</sup>**

**Moscow, April 28, 1976**

The Soviet government finds it necessary to draw the attention of the governments of all states of the world again to the situation in the Middle East and to the events taking place there. It is prompted to this by anxiety caused by the lengthy absence of a settlement of the Middle East conflict, by the Soviet Union's awareness of its international responsibility as a permanent member of the United Nation's Security Council and by the desire to contribute to a further relaxation of international tension and strengthening of universal peace.

<sup>83</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thaura* (Baghdad), April 27, 1976.

<sup>84</sup> English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5832 (May 4, 1976), pp. 170–171.

1. For many years now Israel's armed forces have been occupying vast territories of independent Arab states. A policy of racial discrimination and oppression is being conducted against the Arab population in these territories. The native inhabitants of the occupied territories are being driven from their homes and their dwellings are being razed to clear the ground for the establishment of settlements for citizens of an alien state—Israel. Those who resist the cruel occupation policy are subjected to arrests, deportation and other repressions. Step by step, the captured territories are being included into the state of Israel. All this creates an atmosphere of a long drawn-out and dangerous crisis in the Middle East.

Israel's ruling circles are obstructing the implementation of the inalienable right of the Arab people of Palestine to create their own state. The three million Palestinian Arabs, having the same right to this as any other people in the Middle East and as any other people in the world, continue to remain in the position of an exiled people. And all this despite the fact that their right to create their own state on the territory of Palestine was confirmed by the United Nations and that the Palestine Liberation Organisation is widely recognised as the legitimate representative of this people and has the support of the masses of the people in the Israeli-occupied territories.

Israel's armaments are being further built up on a huge scale. The United States is sending various modern arms there, including rockets capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. Reports that Israel is creating or has already created its own nuclear weapons are alarming in this respect. It is not difficult to see what a potential danger to peace this poses.

While last year's separate deals concerning some small sections of Israeli-occupied territories did create the illusion in some quarters of a calming down in the Middle East, everybody now sees that these deals, which side-stepped the fundamental questions of a Middle East settlement, not only failed to defuse the situation but have even further aggravated it. Nothing demonstrates this so convincingly as the tragic and bloody events in the Lebanon and around it. These events confirmed once again that if resolute efforts are not taken towards achieving an all-embracing political settlement in the Middle East, the situation there can worsen still further and every new day brings

fresh evidence of this.

2. While the Middle East conflict remains unsettled the situation is fraught with the danger of a new military explosion. This situation itself means that the aggressor continues to reap the fruits of his criminal policy with impunity, while the lawful interests and rights of the victims of the aggression are being further flouted. It is clear that there can be no stability and no tranquility in the Middle East on such a basis. The absence of a settlement of the conflict has already resulted in military clashes between Israel and the Arab states four times within a comparatively short period of time. It would be naive to proceed from the assumption that it could not happen for a fifth time. Meanwhile the possible consequences of a new war in the Middle East, including the consequences for the international situation as a whole, are obvious to all.

There are even more grounds for alarm because some states are seeking to put off further and further a solution to the main problems of a Middle East settlement and are using completely artificial arguments to justify this. First they say it is necessary to wait for the presidential elections in the United States to take place, then they say that conditions for a Middle East settlement are not ripe at all.

The real aims of those who would like to put off endlessly and indefinitely a solution of the problem of a Middle East settlement should be clear to any objectively minded person. The maintenance of the present situation in the Middle East is in full accord with their long-term plans for establishing their control over the Middle East area and over its tremendous oil resources and important strategic positions.

It is precisely for this reason that those who pursue aims that have nothing in common with the genuine interests of the peoples of the Middle East would like to weaken the Arab states to the maximum, push them off the road of progressive social development and set them against each other and compel them to act in disunity.

Who does not know that until recently the arsenal of imperialist policy in the Middle East included one main weapon—Israel's ruling circles which are pursuing a policy of territorial expansion at the expense of the Arabs. Now, however, the aggressors and their patrons hope in their policy to rely on some Arab states also, but one can be

confident that in the final count the peoples of the Arab East will frustrate this plan which is hostile to the cause for which the Arabs are struggling, the cause of their independence and freedom.

Obvious attempts are being made to strike a blow at the forces of the Palestine resistance movement and to draw Arabs into a fratricidal war. This is the real meaning of the events in Lebanon. This is demonstrated even more clearly by such provocative actions as the concentration of Israeli troops on Lebanon's southern borders and the sending of U.S. naval ships to the coast of Lebanon, although they have no business there.

Such is imperialism's policy in the Middle East, a policy of encouraging and supporting aggression, of weakening the positions of the national progressive forces and undermining their unity and, on this basis, establishing its domination in that area.

3. The Soviet Union is promoting a fundamentally different policy with regard to questions related to the Middle East. It proceeds from the premise that the peoples of that area should be complete masters of their destiny and should be given an opportunity to live in conditions of independence, freedom and peace. This is why the Soviet Union comes out firmly for a radical political settlement of the Middle East conflict and believes that this is attainable. The discussion in recent years of the Middle East situation and the relevant decisions of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly laid down the basis on which such a settlement can and must be achieved. This basis consists of three organically interconnected elements:

Firstly, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories occupied as a result of Israel's aggression in 1967;

Secondly, satisfaction of the legitimate national demands of the Arab people of Palestine, including their inalienable right to establish their own state;

Thirdly, international guarantees for the security and inviolability of the frontiers of all Middle East states and their right to independent existence and development.

These basic and interconnected problems of a Middle East settlement take due account of the legitimate rights of all the sides directly concerned and create a just and realistic basis for settlement.

This basis is just for the Arab states, the victims

of Israel's aggression—it provides for giving them back the territories belonging to them and restoring their sovereignty over these territories, and removes the danger of a new aggression.

The peoples of the Arab countries would have an opportunity to concentrate their energies and resources on solving the problems of economic and social development and eliminating the backwardness they inherited from colonialism. The Arab states would also be able to play a more important role in international affairs.

This basis for a settlement is just for the Palestinian Arab people, because it takes into account their right to establish their own independent state. The Arab people of Palestine would leave the refugee camps, gain freedom from oppression by the invaders and build their own state in their homeland.

This basis for a political settlement is also just for Israel, because it ensures for it peace and security within recognised frontiers. Its young people would no longer be sacrificed on the altar of war. The Israeli working people, the entire people of the state of Israel, would be able to live with confidence in the future. The state of Israel would have an opportunity to normalise its position among the states of the world.

A comprehensive and radical political settlement in the Middle East will bring peace and a chance of prosperity to all the peoples of the area. It will create a firm foundation of peace for the future, particularly considering the fact that within the framework of such a settlement it will be possible to find a solution to the problem of stopping the arms race in the Middle East, which is advocated by the Soviet Union.

Only circles which cannot abandon the dangerous policy of brinkmanship in the Middle East can object to this basis for a political settlement.

4. Not only is there a just and realistic basis for a settlement of the Middle East conflict. International machinery also exists for working out appropriate accords. This is the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East.

No one denies that given the desire of the states concerned, the Geneva Peace Conference could lead to agreement on all aspects of settlement. Nor is this denied by the United States. What is more, several years ago identity of views on this matter was made the basis of the agree-

ment on holding the Geneva Conference. What is lacking now?

The desire is lacking. This and this alone accounts for the fact that changing moods, determined by transient considerations, have been the dominant attitudes to the Geneva Conference in recent years. This refers, first of all, to the position of the USA and Israel with regard to the role of this conference.

The problem, therefore, is not that the Geneva Peace Conference is not suitable machinery for a settlement of the conflict, but that some are unwilling to put this machinery into operation. This clearly is the real position if the entire question of the Geneva Conference and its role is cleared of dishonesty.

The Soviet Union comes out for the resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference with the participation of all the sides directly concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organisation as a representative of the Arab People of Palestine.

True, this calls for certain preparatory work. The Soviet government understands this. It believes that the work of the conference could be arranged in two stages, in the initial stage, it would solve all the organisational questions that may arise, including the procedure for considering the concrete aspects of settlement, the possibility of establishing appropriate working bodies, etc.

This stage would obviously not be a long one, and after this phase the conference could take up its basic task, that of finding solutions concerning the substance of the settlement problems. It goes without saying that representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organisation should take part in the work of both stages of the conference.

The Soviet Union is prepared to appoint its representatives for attending the preparatory and the basic phases of the Geneva Conference without delay. The Soviet government would like to hope that all the other sides concerned will adopt a similar position. If, however, some governments continue to obstruct the resumption of the Geneva Conference they will naturally assume a serious responsibility for the consequences of this policy.

5. Setting out its considerations on the need for more active efforts towards a settlement of the Middle East conflict, the Soviet government considers it necessary to stress that the Soviet Union does not seek any advantages for itself

in the Middle East. Neither in the Middle East nor in any other area of the world does it demand military bases or any rights to develop local natural resources or an opportunity for it to influence the internal development of the states concerned. The Soviet Union, loyal to the ideal of solidarity with the peoples fighting for freedom and social progress, unswervingly supports and intends to continue its firm support for the just position of the Arab states and the Arab peoples.

Peace and tranquillity in the Middle East are the goal of Soviet policy in the area. The Soviet Union is also interested in creating conditions for the development of relations with all states in the Middle East.

Nor has it any prejudices against any of these states, including Israel, if the latter drops its policy of aggression and takes the path of peace and good-neighbourly relations with the Arabs.

Elimination of the dangerous source of tension that remains in the Middle East is one of the top-priority tasks in efforts to strengthen international peace and security. It is the duty of all states to contribute to the solution of this task. The Soviet government urges the governments of all states of the world to discharge this duty and to promote efforts to achieve a just and lasting political settlement in the Middle East.

## 92

### **Final communiqué issued by the twentieth meeting of Commonwealth heads of government (excerpt)<sup>85</sup>**

**Kingston, May 6, 1976**

Commonwealth Heads of Government met in Kingston from 29 April to 6 May. All Commonwealth countries were represented, twenty-eight by their Presidents or Prime Ministers. The Prime Minister of Jamaica was in the Chair.

#### MIDDLE EAST

Heads of Government expressed concern at the renewed danger of conflict in the Middle East. They re-emphasized the need for the establishment of a durable peace in the area as a matter of urgency and urged all parties to renew their

<sup>85</sup> Excerpted from the English text, *Survey of Current Affairs* (London), V, 5 (May, 1976), pp. 184-185.

efforts to achieve this objective. To this end Heads of Government affirmed their support for the relevant UN resolutions on the Middle East and their belief that to ensure success it was necessary that the authentic and legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people participate in the forthcoming peace negotiations in Geneva.

## 93

**Decision of the government of Israel regarding the future of the illegal Qaddum settlement<sup>86</sup>**

Jerusalem, May 9, 1976

The government will work for the increase of settlements on both sides of the green line, in accordance with decisions which the government will take, following the basic principles of its policy as approved by the Knesset.

The government will prohibit attempts to locate or settle without its approval and decision, which is contrary to the law and to Israel's policy of defence and peace.

The procedure of decision making on the subject of settlements will be continued with the approval of the government through the ministerial committee for settlement and the ministerial committee for Jerusalem affairs.

No settlement will be established in Qaddum. The nucleus at Qaddum will be moved, on a date in the near future to be set by the government, to a permanent place for settlement, which will be suggested within the framework of the approved plan of the government. Until then, no steps shall be taken in Qaddum which might change the place into a permanent settlement.

## 94

**Statement issued by the government of Bulgaria outlining its attitude to the Arab-Israeli conflict<sup>87</sup>**

Sofia, May 11, 1976

The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, having considered with particular attention the statement of the Soviet Government dated 28 April 1976 (A/31/84-S/12063),<sup>88</sup> highly appraises its new initiative for a political settlement of the conflict in the Middle East which is dangerous for world peace. In expressing its full agreement with the analysis and assessment of the situation in this region, contained in the statement, the Bulgarian Government supports unreservedly the proposals, formulated therein, for the solution of the Middle East crisis.

The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is deeply convinced that a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict can be achieved only by solving the three problems, linked organically with each other, viz:

—withdrawal of the Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied as a result of the aggression of Israel in 1967;

—fulfilling the legitimate national demands of the Arab people of Palestine to create a State of their own;

—international guarantees for the security and inviolability of frontiers of all States in the Middle East, for their right to independent existence and development.

The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria has always maintained the stand that a successful solution to these fundamental problems could be reached at the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East with the participation of all parties directly interested, including the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Faithful to its peace-loving foreign policy of principle the People's Republic of Bulgaria will continue to render full support to the struggle of the Arab peoples for the elimination of the consequences of the Israeli aggression and to give its contribution to the achievement of a just and lasting political settlement of the conflict in the Middle East.

<sup>86</sup> Translated from the Hebrew text, *Davar* (Tel Aviv), May 10, 1976, p. 1.

<sup>87</sup> Published in UN doc. A/31/93, Annex, dated May 19, 1976.

<sup>88</sup> Doc. 91 above.

## 95

**Press interview statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger announcing the improbability of a 1976 Geneva conference<sup>89</sup>**

Washington, May 11, 1976

*Q. Let's turn to the Middle East for a moment. Do you regard the latest Soviet proposal for a two-stage Geneva Conference, including the possibility of the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] working in the preparation of that conference, as containing any new elements?*

*A. We haven't found any new elements yet. Of course, as you know, we proposed a two-stage approach, and if the first could be conducted without the PLO without any prejudice to what happens later, then I think we would be very close to the Soviet position. But the first stage could include those countries that were invited to the first Geneva Conference and then let those countries that were, after all, the originators of the conference, decide where we go from here. Then I think we would be prepared to meet.*

*Q. Would the PLO be able to participate as a member of one of those delegations?*

*A. Well, that has never been raised yet. Our position is that the PLO must recognize Israel.*

*Q. Do you see a chance for a Geneva Conference this year?*

*A. It doesn't look too promising now.*

*Q. What are the major challenges you see in the remaining six or eight months of this Administration?*

*A. The major challenges remain the challenges that we have had all along—to build a structure of peace; to strengthen our relationships with our allies; and to build a structure of peace with our adversaries and to strengthen our relationships with our allies and to build a new set of relations with the new nations. Within that, then, we have to avoid an outbreak of war in the Middle East. We have to do what can be done to make progress on these other issues. Those*

goals are permanent and are not affected by the election year.

*Q. You don't see any specific objectives in the Middle East or in relationship with the Soviet Union, in the Third World, that you would like to accomplish before you leave office?*

*A. How do you know when I leave office? [Laughter.] Our foreign policy is not geared to the satisfaction of my own ego.*

## 96

**Press interview statements by Foreign Minister Allon of Israel defending Israel's policy of settlements in the West Bank<sup>90</sup>**

Mid-May, 1976

*Q. Has the Kadum decision<sup>91</sup>—or non-decision—made your job harder?*

*A. First, I don't believe that the comfort of foreign ministers should be the guiding line of a foreign policy. And when I spoke about the necessity to move the Kadum group, I didn't use a single argument concerning foreign policy. Settlements, according to my philosophy, have to be confined to strategic necessities... [for the] territorial defense of a country that lacks strategic depth. One should also take into consideration the interests of the Arab side. Therefore the concept that I have recommended ever since 1967 is to locate new settlements only in strategic areas, and not in heavily Arab-populated areas. This leaves options for territorial compromise.*

*Q. That, of course, is the so-called Allon Plan—which has never been officially accepted by the Israeli Government.*

*A. The Cabinet has discussed it many times, but no vote has taken place. But I am very glad that this plan helped to form a sort of unofficial concept that guided us in our decisions not only where to settle but also where to refrain from settling.*

*Q. Why has the government never officially adopted the Allon Plan?*

<sup>89</sup> Excerpted from the text of the interview conducted by John P. Wallach for Hearst newspapers, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIV, 1928 (June 7, 1976), pp. 729, 730.

<sup>90</sup> Interview conducted by Milan J. Kubic; partial text, *Newsweek* (New York—international edition), May 24, 1976, p. 52.

<sup>91</sup> See doc. 93 above.



A. One reason was that once you confine yourself to a definite plan and make it public, what remains for negotiations?... [Another] reason was probably domestic: the Cabinet was divided and a decision [shortly after the Six Day War] might have created a coalition crisis.

*Q. To what extent is Israeli public opinion a factor in your plan?*

A. [It's not designed] to satisfy public opinion. On the contrary, my settlements policy annoys the hawks, who think I give up too much, and annoys the doves, who think that I try to keep too much.

*Q. Do the 64 Israeli settlements in the occupied territories stand on land that won't be returned to the Arabs?*

A. I am sure that it's possible to reach a compromise that will provide a just solution to the political problem of the Palestinian Arab community on the West Bank, and also give Israel "secure and recognized" borders within the context of peace.

*Q. That doesn't seem to be the position of the West Bank Arabs.*

A. Look, if we are to accept the Arab view, it means we have to give up the existence of our state. And nobody says that one party should dictate the terms of the settlement to the other party. Every possible border is negotiable—I'm not saying acceptable, but negotiable.

*Q. But Prime Minister Rabin has said no settlement in the occupied lands has been created to be closed down.*

A. Nobody is settling in order to be removed, and announces it beforehand. Where have you seen this sort of negotiation? That one party should say exactly what will be its ultimate terms and the other party has a complete authority to say what it doesn't accept? We did not invite the Six Day War nor the Yom Kippur War. If the Arabs lost, why does the rest of the world say, 'Oh yes, but Israel will have to give back everything.' What is needed is defensible boundaries, and this can be achieved without annexing populated areas to Israel.

*Q. Then why set up these expensive settlements now, and risk giving up some of them later?*

A. We are not trading; we are fighting for our survival. We would like to be able to defend ourselves and not be at the mercy of any foreign

country. And thank God, we have never asked for any American military intervention. We only ask for the tools. A defensible Israel is a great asset, without which we would have had a Vietnam situation here years ago.

*Q. You stress the defense value of settlements, and yet during the Yom Kippur war the Golan Heights settlements hindered the army, which had to use its trucks to evacuate civilians.*

A. A settlement that is not fortified and not equipped with sophisticated weapons can become a liability. But the same settlement, well-armed, with well-trained settlers, can be very effective in checking the enemy advance. And, as a former general, I would like to [point out that] modern weaponry makes it possible to overrun territory much more quickly than ever before—and it is still the physical occupation of territory by foot soldiers that decides the outcome of the war. Just think of Vietnam.

*Q. When you proposed the Allon Plan nine years ago, you obviously believed that it would be acceptable to the Arabs. Do you still think so?*

A. It's hard to say. How can you expect an Arab leader to compromise when the rest of the world tells him not to?

*Q. Is the U.S. Government among the sinners, too?*

A. Yes. I think the Rogers Plan in its time inflicted disaster on the Middle East because once it was made public you could not expect any Arab to give up more than what the Rogers proposal said. I think the greatest responsibility for Middle East peace rests on the shoulders of the rest of the world rather than on the Arabs and the Israelis. Because the other governments are all talkative and they are all trying to gain a few petrodollars. Instead of insisting on negotiations between the Arabs and Israel, everybody gives you advice on what to give up.

## 97

**Resolution of the 7th Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers denouncing Zionism as racism and deploring Israel's policy in the occupied territories<sup>92</sup>**

**Istanbul, mid-May, 1976**

The Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers held its Seventh Ordinary Session in Istanbul, Republic of Turkey, Jumada I 13-16, 1396 AH (May 12-15, 1976).

*Referring* to the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,

*Noting further* the fact that United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3151 (XXVIII) of December 14, 1973, condemned the perfidious alliance between racism in Southern Africa and Zionism,

*Noting* that the racist regime in power in occupied Palestine and the true racist regimes in power in Zimbabwe and South Africa are derived from a common colonialist background and constitute a uniformity, having the same racist structure, and are organically tied in their policy aimed at degrading human dignity and its sacred character,

*Taking into account* the policy of repression, terror, injustice, discrimination, murder, detention, exile, deportation, usurpation of the rights, liberties, property and land followed by Israel against the Arabs in the occupied territories,

*Referring* to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379 (XXX) of October 10, 1975, which considers Zionism as a form of racism and racial discrimination,

1. *Denounces* Zionism as a colonialist, expansionist, racist, imperialist doctrine that constitutes a direct danger threatening peace and international security;

2. *Denounces* Israel for the imprisonment, detention and deportation of Arab citizens, who struggle to regain the occupied territories, and for the inhuman treatment inflicted on them and calls for their immediate release;

3. *Charges* the General Secretary with preparation of a document on Zionism, its principles, plans, crimes and its close relations with racism,

<sup>92</sup> Translated from the French text as transmitted to the UN by Turkey, UN doc. A/31/237, Annex I, dated October 4, 1976, pp. 1-3.

in the working languages of the Conference;

4. *Calls upon* all states to elaborate programmes designed for the struggle against Zionism at the national, regional and international levels;

5. *Decides* that to eliminate Zionism it is necessary that all states give moral, political, and material assistance to the Palestine Liberation Organization for the establishment of Palestinian rights and support for their efforts destined to liberate Palestine;

6. *Greets* Arab and Muslim parties that have accepted the return of Jewish victims of Zionists who led them in error and the Conference invites Jews who have emigrated to Palestine under the influence of false allegations to return to their original homes in this region in the hope of saving them from racist Zionism, condemned by international conferences and the United Nations General Assembly.

## 98

**Resolution of the 7th Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers regarding the Islamic holy places in occupied territory<sup>93</sup>**

**Istanbul, mid-May, 1976**

The Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers held its Seventh Ordinary Session in Istanbul, Republic of Turkey, Jumada I 13-16, 1396 AH (May 12-15, 1976).

*Noting* that the measures undertaken by the Israeli occupation authorities consist in changing the character, creed and incontestable religious rights in the Holy Mosque of al-Aqsa in the city of Jerusalem and the Ibrahimi Mosque in the city of Hebron,

*Considering* that these measures constitute a serious violation of the religious rights of Muslims, the rights of man, of confessional freedom, the rules of international law and of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilians in time of war,

*Considering also* that these violations constitute an attack on inalienable religious rights on the holy places and religious monuments and represent a provocation to the sensitivities of all Muslims,

*Further considering* that these violations which

<sup>93</sup> Translated from the French text as transmitted to the UN by Turkey, UN doc. A/31/237, Annex I, dated October 4, 1976, pp. 19-20.

have already given rise to important popular uprisings on civil and religious levels, constitute a new threat to peace and security in the region,

1. *Affirms* the strong attachment of Muslims to the Holy City of Jerusalem and the determination of their governments to assume their responsibility and work for its liberation and the restoration of Arab sovereignty over the city, and their resolve that Jerusalem will not become the object of any bargaining or concessions;

2. *Declares* that all measures undertaken by the Israeli occupation authorities with the aim of changing the essential character, creed, and inalienable religious rights in the al-Aqsa Holy Mosque in the city of Jerusalem and the Ibrahimi Mosque in the city of Hebron, are null, void and illegal;

3. *Considers* that these measures constitute an aggression against the inalienable rights, heritage, holy places and religious monuments of the Islamic nation and a provocation to the sensitivities of all Muslims;

4. *Decides* to adopt the necessary measures in the framework of a common plan with the aim of repulsing this aggression and compelling Israel to annul the above-mentioned measures that constitute a flagrant violation of the charter of the United Nations and the rights of man and an aggression against the rights of the Palestinian people and all Muslims throughout the world;

5. *Calls upon* the General Secretary to see that resolutions adopted on this subject are applied and to submit to the next conference a report on what has been achieved in this regard.

## 99

### **Resolution of the 7th Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers regarding the Palestine question<sup>94</sup>**

**Istanbul, mid-May, 1976**

The Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers held its Seventh Ordinary Session in Istanbul, Republic of Turkey, Jumada I 13–16, 1396 AH (May 12–15, 1976).

*Guided* by the principles and provisions of the Charter of the Islamic Conference and that of

the UN,

*Inspired* by the resolutions of the conference of Heads of State and Governments of Islamic States and the resolutions adopted by the Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers on the Palestine problem,

*Considering* that the support and consolidation given to the Palestinian people struggling under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization to recover their occupied territories and their inalienable national rights constitutes a responsibility and a duty that necessitates Islamic solidarity that should be formulated by practical and effective methods,

*Reaffirming* the legitimacy of the Palestinian people's struggle for the liberation of its territory and the recovery of its full national rights,

*Having examined* the developments of the Palestine problem and the perilous situation arising from support for the Israeli occupation of Arab territories, from the violation of the rights of the Palestinian people and from the rejection of pertinent UN resolutions, in particular resolution 3239 (XXIX) of the General Assembly adopted on November 25, 1975,

*Taking into account* the discussions that took place in the conference on the subject of the violation of the UN Charter by Israel, its refusal to apply the resolutions of the international organization, its violation of the principles of international law and the rights of man and its continual aggression against the rights of the Palestinian people and their homeland,

1. *Reaffirms* its total and effective solidarity with the Palestinian people in its legitimate struggle to recover its inalienable national rights in Palestine including:

- its right to return to its homeland and recover its property,
- its right to self-determination without any foreign interference,
- the exercise of its sovereignty over its land,
- the establishment of its own independent national authority,

#### 2. *Decides*

a) to work in all areas in order to embody in a concrete form the recognition and respect of the rights of the Palestinian people. The Member States will undertake all necessary measures with the aim of reaching this objective;

b) to coordinate the activities of the Islamic Conference and the Palestine Liberation Organiza-

<sup>94</sup> Translated from the French text as transmitted to the UN by Turkey, UN doc. A/31/237, Annex I, dated October 4, 1976, pp. 26–28.

tion in all various bilateral and international domains with the aim of permitting the Palestinian people to liberate its homeland and recover its rights,

3. *Requests* that all countries in the world support the Palestinian people with all their means in its legitimate struggle, directed against Zionist and racist colonialism for the recovery of its inalienable national rights. It affirms that the restitution of these full rights constitutes a *sine qua non* for the establishment of an equitable and permanent peace in the Middle East,

4. *Invites* the UN to work towards the application of resolution 3239 (XXIX) of the General Assembly adopted on November 25, 1974, concerning the rights of the Palestinian people and to take the necessary measures indicated in the Charter to put this resolution into effect,

5. *Reaffirms* the attachment of Muslims to the city of Jerusalem, the firm determination of their governments to liberate the Holy City and to establish there Arab sovereignty and the categorical objection by these governments that Jerusalem be the object of blackmail or concessions. It has decided to assure financial assistance capable of consolidating the Islamic presence in the Holy City,

6. *Condemns* Israeli violation of human rights in the territories occupied in 1948 and 1967, its refusal to apply the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the protection of civilians in time of war, its policy of Judaizing the very nature and cultural heritage of the occupied territories and considers that similar policies and measures are crimes of war and a defiance of all humanity,

7. *Considers* that all measures adopted by Israel in the territories occupied in 1948 and 1967 to change their demographic, geographical, social, cultural and economic aspects including measures aimed at annexing parts of the occupied territories, and in particular the annexation and Judaization of the Holy City of Jerusalem are null and void and can in no way be recognized,

8. *Affirms* that the financing of UNRWA is an international responsibility and condemns all attempts to avoid this responsibility, in order that all Palestinian refugees may be able to regain their homes,

9. *Condemns* all states that furnish moral, economic, or military assistance to Israel and asks them to refrain from doing so,

10. *Invites* once again the Member States to work within the UN and other international forums in order to expel Israel from the international organization,

11. *Reaffirms* that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and of its legitimate struggle and announces that it accepts the opening of PLO offices in the capitals of Member States. All facilities and immunities will be accorded to these offices so as to permit them to accomplish their mission in the service of the Palestine cause and the just struggle of its people. It asks that Member States that have not yet authorized the opening of a PLO office in their capitals hasten to do so in execution of the resolutions adopted by previous Islamic Conferences,

12. *Requests* that Member States follow up the resolutions of the Islamic Summits and the previous conferences of Foreign Ministers as quickly as possible, notably concerning the necessity of severing any form of relation with the racist Zionist entity,

13. *Requests* the General Secretary to follow up the implementation of these resolutions and to submit a report on this subject to the next Islamic Conference.

## 100

### **Resolution of the 7th Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers expressing support for the resistance of the Arabs under Israeli occupation<sup>95</sup>**

**Istanbul, mid-May, 1976**

The Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers held its Seventh Ordinary Session in Istanbul, Republic of Turkey, Jumada I 13-16, 1396 AH (May 12-15, 1976).

*Inspired* by the objectives and principles of the Charter of the Conference of Islamic States aimed at consolidating Islamic solidarity among Member States and furnishing the necessary funds for the realization of this objective,

*Recalling* the resolution of the second Islamic

<sup>95</sup> Translated from the French text as transmitted to the UN by Turkey, UN doc. A/31/237, Annex I, dated October 4, 1976, pp. 30-31.

summit of February 24, 1974, stipulating the creation of the Islamic Solidarity Fund,

*Considering* the struggle led by the Arab people in the occupied territories to safeguard the heritage and the Islamic, Arab and human character of the holy places in the occupied Palestinian territories, notably the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem and the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron, as being a sacred struggle for the liberation from the yoke of colonialism and Zionist occupation and for the defence of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people,

1. Greets the struggle being waged by the Palestinian Arab people in the territories occupied since 1948 and 1967, assuring them of solidarity and support with a view to liberating the occupied territories and recovering their inalienable national rights and safeguarding Islamic, Arab and human heritage, and the holy places of Islam and inalienable religious rights;

2. *Decides* to donate the largest part of the Islamic Solidarity Funds to support the struggle of the Arab people in the territories occupied since 1948 and 1967 until the achievement of the objectives outlined in this resolution;

3. *Calls upon* Member States to increase immediately their contributions to the Islamic Solidarity Fund for the attainment of the above objectives;

4. *Calls upon* the General Secretary and the committee to control the implementation of this resolution and to present a report at the next conference.

## 101

### **Resolution of the 7th Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers regarding the Middle East situation<sup>96</sup>**

**Istanbul, mid-May, 1976**

The Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers held its Seventh Ordinary Session in Istanbul, Republic of Turkey, Jumada I, 13–16, 1396 AH (May 12–15, 1976).

*Guided* by the principles and provisions of the Charter of the Islamic Conference and that of the UN,

*Inspired* by the resolutions of the Conference of the Kings and Heads of State and Government of Islamic countries, held at Lahore February 22–24, 1974,<sup>97</sup> confirming the resolutions of the six conferences of Islamic Foreign Ministers,

*Denouncing* all attempts to maintain a state of aggression and occupation in the Middle East, a state that constitutes a serious threat to possibilities of establishing an equitable and permanent peace in the region and consequently international peace and security,

*Denouncing* also the attempts to impose a *fait accompli* and a policy of expansion, exploitation, domination, repression and terrorism that are at the heart of Zionist policy in the Middle East,

*Condemning* all measures undertaken by Israel in the occupied territories aimed at changing their demographic and geographical character, the installation of kibbutzim, the undermining of their historical character, and in particular, measures and plans of a racist nature,

*Affirming* that the establishment of a permanent and just peace in the Middle East depends on Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories and the exercise by the Palestinian people of their legitimate national rights, notably the right to return, to self-determination, and the establishment of their own independent entity in Palestine,

1. *Affirms* the promise of the Islamic States to support Arab rights and offers their political, material and military support to the Arab states and the PLO in their legitimate struggle for the recovery of all their occupied territories,

2. *Affirms* that the Palestine problem is the essence of the Middle East conflict and that a just and durable peace in the Middle East must be based on:

a) the withdrawal of Israel from all occupied territories;

b) the restoration of the legitimate and inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and the exercise of its rights, notably its right to return, to self-determination and the right to establish its own independent entity in Palestine,

3. *Incites* the countries and peoples of the world to adopt a decisive attitude in face of Israeli intransigence and the attempts by Israel to follow a policy of aggression, expansion and the continual

<sup>96</sup> Translated from the French text as transmitted to the UN by Turkey, UN doc. A/31/237, Annex I, dated October 4, 1976, pp. 34–38.

<sup>97</sup> Docs. 65–67 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

refusal to execute the resolutions of the United Nations and the deliberate impeding of efforts undertaken for the establishment of a just and durable peace, declaring that these attempts constitute a serious threat to the process of establishing a just and permanent peace in the Middle East and place in danger international peace and security,

4. *Calls upon* the peoples of the world to ensure complete support for the Arab countries and peoples exposed to Israeli aggression in their struggle to put an immediate end to this aggression,

5. *Calls upon* all countries to cease furnishing Israel with any form of assistance capable of prolonging the illegal Israeli occupation of the occupied Arab territories, considering that this assistance only consolidates Israel as an advanced base of colonialism and racism in the heart of the Third World and reaffirms the occupation and aggression,

6. *Condemns* the connivance between Israel and South Africa rendered obvious by the visit of the Israeli Prime Minister to South Africa.<sup>98</sup> This complicity confirms the similarities that exist between the two states as regards the policy of expansion and racism that they follow and the cooperation between them in all domains with the aim of threatening the security and independence of the African and Arab states,

7. *Condemns* Israel for continuing the policies and measures that they apply in the occupied territories, notably the annexation of certain areas of these territories, the creation of Israeli colonies, the settling of foreign inhabitants in these zones, the destruction of houses, the confiscation of property, evacuation, deportation, expulsion, dispersal, exile, the transfer of Arab inhabitants, the denial of their right to return, their wide-scale arrest, the ill-treatment and torture to which they are subject, the devastation of archaeological sites and cultural monuments, the violation of liberties, religious rites and practices, the rights and customs of the family and the illegal exploitation of natural wealth and resources and of the population of the occupied territories,

8. *Declares* that this policy and these Israeli measures constitute a serious violation of the United Nations Charter, notably the principles of sov-

ereignty and territorial integrity, the provisions and principles of international law of the Fourth Geneva Convention on the protection of civil rights in time of war as well as an obstacle to the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

9. *Reaffirms* that all measures adopted by Israel to change the political, demographic, geographic, economic, cultural and religious characteristics and the civilization of the occupied territories or a part of these territories are null and void, demands that Israel annul and cease all these policies and measures and asks all countries of the world to avoid any action that could be exploited by Israel as aid in the implementation of their policy,

10. *Declares* that Israel is responsible for all measures of change, exploitation, destruction and confiscation of Arab lands that they undertake in the occupied territories,

11. *Affirms* the necessity of severing all diplomatic, consular, economic, cultural, artistic, sporting, touristic, and transport relations with the Zionist entity, on all official and non-official levels. This measure constitutes a collective obligation on the part of all Member States of the Islamic Conference,

12. *Reaffirms* paragraph 7 of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the Sixth Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers held in Jidda on July 15, 1975.<sup>99</sup>

## 102

### **Final communiqué of the first session of the General Committee of the Euro-Arab Dialogue (excerpt)<sup>100</sup>**

Luxembourg, May 20, 1976

1. The General Committee of the Euro-Arab Dialogue held its first session in Luxembourg from 18–20 May 1976. The meeting was opened by his Excellency Mr Gaston Thorn, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Luxembourg and President-in-Office of the European Communities. He addressed the Committee.

2. In recognition of the importance of this Euro-Arab meeting His Royal Highness the Grand

<sup>98</sup> Thus in the original. In fact, such a visit did not take place; the resolution is referring to South African Prime Minister Vorster's visit to Israel April 9–12, 1976; see doc. 84 above.

<sup>99</sup> See doc. 126 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>100</sup> Excerpted from the English text supplied, on request, by the EEC.

Duke of Luxembourg granted an audience to the co-chairmen of the two delegations and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States and received the members of both delegations.

3. This meeting, which was the first to be held at ambassadorial level, underlined the political dimension of the Euro-Arab Dialogue. It afforded an opportunity for both sides to consider the general policy and state of the Dialogue.

4. During the meeting both sides put forward their views on all aspects of the Euro-Arab Dialogue including political issues, and studied carefully the views put forward by the other side. They expressed their willingness to continue the dialogue in the future and determined some of the specific terms of their cooperation.

5. Both sides recalled the various ties which link Europe to the Arab World by virtue of geographical proximity and the interchange between both civilizations. They agreed that these ties, as well as common interests and closer relationship between the two regions, should lead to a greater understanding between the parties to the Dialogue.

6. They emphasised that security in Europe is linked to the security in the Mediterranean area and that of the Arab region. Both sides expressed their great concern about the dangerous situation prevailing in the Middle East and its threat to international peace and security.

7. Both sides declared their firm commitment to peace, security and justice, in accordance with the purpose and principles of the United Nations Charter. They will pursue the dialogue in this spirit.

8. Both sides explained their views on the question of Palestine and on the Middle East crisis. They noted with great interest the statements made by each side, and recognized that a solution to the question of Palestine based on the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people is a crucial factor in the achievement of a just and lasting peace.

9. The European side recalled the four points of their Declaration of 6 November 1973<sup>101</sup> and their statement during the last session of the General Assembly.<sup>102</sup> They also reaffirmed that in their view the principles enshrined in these texts remain the foundation on which a just and lasting peace should be sought. They expressed the firm hope

that early progress could be made towards this objective and affirmed their determination to do all in their power to contribute to its achievement.

10. The Arab side shares the European view that force and fait accompli are not elements upon which stable international relations can be based. They affirmed that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East requires the fulfilment of the following elements:

a) Withdrawal by Israel from the occupied territories

b) Recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian people

c) Participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, in all international peace efforts.

11. The General Committee established the organizational framework for the Dialogue so as to provide an institutionalized structure for the relations between the European Communities and the Arab World.

12. Both sides expressed their expectation that a Euro-Arab Dialogue meeting on the level of Foreign Ministers be held at an appropriate date. They agreed to consider practical steps for the preparation of this meeting.

### 103

#### **Speech by AFL-CIO President Meany of the US stressing the support of the US labour movement for Israel<sup>103</sup>**

**Washington, May 20, 1976**

I think that this award tonight is outstanding in the long list of humanitarian awards under the names of William Green and Philip Murray. I don't think any recipient deserves the honor more than our honored guest tonight.

She has served her country during the most trying years of its existence in many capacities, most notably as Prime Minister in 1973 when a sneak attack plunged the Middle East into war.

She has shown tremendous courage and tremendous fortitude in defending the sacred rights of the people of Israel to live as free men and women. For many, many years she had exemplified

<sup>101</sup> Doc. 184 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

<sup>102</sup> Doc. 177 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>103</sup> Made at a ceremony held to award Golda Meir the AFL-CIO's Philip Murray-William Green Humanitarian Award; text as inserted by Senator Williams (Dem.), *Congressional Record* (daily), June 3, 1976, pp. S 8444-8445.

the spirit of Israel—the determination of a people to live in freedom and democracy even when surrounded by neighbors who are openly committed to a policy that would result in the extermination of Israel as a nation.

So, I am happy to be here tonight to play a small part in extending a welcome to Golda Meir once again to our country. I am happy to play a part in presenting her with this honor, the Murray-Green award, awarded every year at the recommendation of the Community Services Committee of the AFL-CIO.

It is significant that her visit comes at a time when politicians and profit-hungry businessmen are trying to pressure the State of Israel into some kind of a position that could destroy the freedom of her people. We have critics of Israel now raising their voices in this country saying that Israel is too rigid in its attitude towards its Arab neighbors; that it is not flexible enough.

Well, when they say that, remember this: that Israel's neighbors have practically taken an oath in blood to bring about the destruction of Israel as a nation. The first requisite for peace in the Middle East is a commitment to the sovereignty of Israel—not by the United States, not by the Soviet Union and not by the United States and the Soviet Union in combination. That sovereignty must be guaranteed by Israel's neighbors. And when that happens, Israel, I am sure, can then afford to be a little less rigid and a little more reasonable. Then we would have a real foundation for peace in the Middle East.

I think we have to keep in mind that America, whether it accepts the challenge or not, is looked upon by people all over this world as the foremost champion of human freedom, the foremost champion of democracy. And this means, if we accept this challenge, we want freedom not only for ourselves but we want freedom for people everywhere, especially for those who are willing to stand up and fight for their freedom.

And as a nation, we cannot afford for our own selfish interest, if you please, to let Israel go down the drain. America must continue to provide whatever material aid that we can give this nation in order for it to continue to exist in a part of the world where freedom and democracy are practically unknown, and not to be tied down by concessions that would jeopardize the very existence of these people.

So, let our politicians and statesmen who become experts after short congressional junkets to many parts of the world, let them look back at the history of recent years. Let them look back to ten years ago when Mr. Nasser, Abdel Nasser of Egypt, united, at least so he said, all the Arab nations on a policy that was designed to destroy Israel or as they said, "Push them into the sea."

Let us remember that it was Nasser who ordered the UN troops out of the buffer zone and, then, when he got them out, he attacked Israel in 1967.

Let those who want to do something to bring peace in the Middle East, let them put the pressure on the Arabs. And all the Arabs have to do is to simply recognize the right of the Israelis to live—the right of these people to work out their own destiny in democracy and freedom.

The American trade union movement has always had a keen sense of what freedom means. I can recall back in 1933, in the month of April, (I was a very young man), I attended a meeting with William Green, David Dubinsky, Matthew Woll, Johnny Vladeck and a number of people in New York who were interested in what was going on 6,000 miles away in Hitler's Germany. And that night two organizations were formed—in April of 1933—the Anti-Nazi Nonsectarian League to boycott the products of Nazi Germany and the so-called German Labor Chest to help the labor trade union victims of Hitler who were in the concentration camps or who had to flee the country.

Now, the significant thing about this is that this happened in April in 1933. Hitler came to power on January 30, 1933, so a bare two months later the American trade union movement was aware of the threat to our way of life—the threat to freedom all over the world—that was coming at that time from Hitler's Germany. And I can say to you, without any fear of contradiction, that there were very, very few people, very, very few organized groups in America at that time that saw the German situation as the trade union movement saw it.

So, labor understands the simple facts of life as far as the Israel-Arab conflict is concerned. We are committed to a preservation of freedom in that part of the world, as we are in any other part of the world. And we intend to give our continuing all-out support to the people of Israel and use whatever influence we have in this country



to see that our country does its share, does play its part in preserving freedom and democracy in the Middle East.

It is in that spirit that I again welcome Golda Meir to an AFL-CIO gathering and say to her, "Come what may, we will be there when the chips are down."

## 104

### **Statement by UN Ambassador Scranton of the US expressing disapproval of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories<sup>104</sup>**

New York, May 26, 1976

First may I say that the statement which I am about to make clearly indicates I believe that the United States of America is not unrelentingly supporting "Zionist aggression," nor is it making its position because of internal matters within the United States but, rather, because it believes thoroughly that in any matter that comes before this Council it is important that we have a balanced answer, particularly as this Council is instructed through the charter of our great organization first and foremost to be thinking of peace.

Mr. President, my delegation has disassociated itself from the statement you have read out which represents the view of the majority of the Council's members. As you know from views that my government has expressed on past occasions in this chamber and elsewhere, there is much in the statement of the majority view with which we could agree.

We agree, for example, that the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War is applicable to the territories occupied by Israel since 1967. We believe in the importance of following its prescriptions. In fact, we made our position on this question clear during the March deliberations in this Council. From the unanimous agreement, therefore, of this Council that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to the occupied territories, it follows that all of its provisions apply. We also agree that Israel should scrupulously comply with all the provisions of that convention. Our position about the Israeli settlements in the oc-

cupied territories is similarly well known.

We are concerned, however, that the statement of the majority view lacks balance, and it is the element of balance which should be the hallmark of the deliberations of a body charged, as this one is, with maintaining the peace.

While the summary statement does contain references to certain provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention describing the obligations of an occupying power, there is no corresponding reference in the statement to those provisions of the convention which explicitly recognize that the occupying power has the duty to maintain law and order and the right to protect its forces. We object, furthermore, to the fact that the statement is unrelieved by any recognition of the many areas in which Israeli administration of the occupied territories has been responsible and just, as in its administration of the holy places in Jerusalem and in its substantial efforts to permit the population to choose their own elected representatives to local government.

In particular, we believe the statement's sweeping injunction to Israel to rescind measures is out of place in this context and at this time.

Having said this, however, and having disassociated ourselves from the view of the majority, we would be remiss if we did not call the attention of the Government of Israel to the fact that there are aspects of its policies in the occupied territories, in particular that involving the establishment of settlements, that are increasingly a matter of concern and distress to its friends throughout the world and are not helpful to the process of peace. Israel has ample reason, with the experience of recent years, to feel that this Council too seldom approaches the Middle East problem with objectivity. It would be mistaken, however, to dismiss as products of blind partisanship all the points contained in the statement read out in this chamber today.

<sup>104</sup> Made before the Security Council; *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIV, 1930 (June 21, 1976), pp. 797-798.

## 105

**Letter from UN Permanent Representative de Guiringaud of France to UN Secretary-General Waldheim clarifying aspects of France's offer to send security forces to Lebanon<sup>105</sup>**

New York, May 27, 1976

The letter addressed to you by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria on 25 May, which was circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council (A/31/95-S/12084),<sup>106</sup> contains a number of untrue allegations about French policy towards Lebanon which my Government must strongly refute.

The policy of France towards Lebanon is motivated by a single concern, namely to preserve the unity, integrity and sovereignty of this friendly State. The French authorities have repeatedly stated that it was incumbent upon the Lebanese themselves to find, without any external interference, the political solution which alone can bring to an end the present divisive tragedy.

If the political process begun by the election of a new President of the Lebanese Republic is to go forward, however, it may be necessary to establish machinery to consolidate the cease-fire. Should it be deemed helpful by the President of the Lebanese Republic and the parties concerned with the civil war, that is to say the various Lebanese parties and the interested Arab countries, France would be prepared to make its contribution to such machinery. It is to this "preparedness" that the President of the French Republic and the French authorities have referred on various occasions.

France's offer was officially announced by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs in the National Assembly on 6 May<sup>107</sup> in the following terms:

The major problem which the new authorities must tackle remains that of security. France, as has already been stated, would not shirk its duty if all the leaders and all the parties to the Lebanese conflict were to ask it to participate in the establishment on the spot of security arrangements whose purpose would be to assure, once the fighting had stopped, an independent new start for Lebanese political life in the mood of fundamental unity

which must reunite all those who, in their diversity, make up that country.

Far from constituting an external intervention in the affairs of Lebanon, this offer—which would be made good only if there was a request from the constituted authorities of that country and a consensus of all the parties concerned with the conflict—is based on the conviction that it is essential to enable the Lebanese to determine the basis of their reconciliation.

The French initiative showed France's willingness to make, if this is desired, a temporary and limited, but specific, contribution to the process of restoring peace.

Given this context, it was particularly inappropriate to suggest that there was an alleged threat of military intervention by France in Lebanon.

International morality cannot be expected to remain indifferent and passive to a tragedy which has already claimed tens of thousands of victims and which is claiming hundreds more with each passing day, particularly as the people involved are esteemed by the entire international community and live in an extremely sensitive area. It is especially out of place to refer to imperialism when speaking of the independent offer which my country made in full respect for Lebanese and Arab sovereignty. I should like to reaffirm this respect in this letter and also to testify to the sincere emotion which the ordeal of a friendly country has aroused in the French people.

On the instructions of my Government, I request you to have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 28 of the preliminary list of items to be included in the provisional agenda of the thirty-first regular session of the General Assembly, and as a document of the Security Council.

<sup>105</sup> UN doc. A/31/96.

<sup>106</sup> Doc. 253 below.

<sup>107</sup> The offer was repeated by President Giscard d'Estaing in Washington on May 20, 1976.

## 106

**Statement issued by the Soviet Society for Friendship and Cultural Cooperation with the Arab Countries condemning "imperialist interference" in Lebanon's civil war (excerpts)<sup>108</sup>**

Moscow, May 28, 1976

Soviet public opinion calls upon all progressive forces in the Arab countries and in the whole world to take a stand against imperialist interference in Lebanon's affairs. It is inspired by its sincere sympathy with the people of Lebanon and all the Arab peoples. Active efforts should be exerted to stop the bloodshed, settle the situation and attain peace all over the Lebanese territories.

## 107

**Statement by Prime Minister Kosygin of the USSR expressing support for progressive Arab forces in the struggle against Zionism<sup>109</sup>**

Baghdad, May 31, 1976

The Twenty-fifth Conference of the Soviet Communist Party has highly appreciated Soviet-Iraqi relations on the basis of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the two countries.<sup>110</sup> Comrade Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee announced in his report to the above-mentioned conference: "We stand by the side of the forces of progress, democracy and national independence in the developing countries and everywhere, and we are attached to them as friends and comrades in struggle."

This is the principle of our policy and ideology from which we do not deviate and in light of this,

we offer continuous support for the Arab people in their struggle to eradicate the traces of Israeli aggression.

The Israeli occupation of the Arab territories and its deprivation of the Palestinian Arab people of their legitimate national rights are in complete harmony with the long-term imperialist plans that aim at controlling this part of the world and its vast oil wells and important strategic locations. This is ultimately the core of the whole issue. The realization of these plans is, however, hindered and prevented by the new balance of power in the Middle East and the emerging strength of its countries which are going along on the road to national independence and progress. Imperialism and its allies are therefore sparing no efforts to overthrow the progressive Arab regimes. To this effect, they try to play one against the other and to prevent the coalition of the nationalist forces of the Arab world and to undermine the ties of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Arab countries.

The imperialist conspiracies also became obvious through the incidents in Lebanon. The conspiracy against the country aimed at diverting Arab attention away from the struggle against Israeli aggression, at destroying the Palestine resistance movement and at dealing a blow to the nationalist and progressive forces of Lebanon. Lebanon should be protected against any imperialist intervention in its internal affairs, because such affairs are the exclusive right of the Lebanese people themselves and such a legitimate right should be respected by everybody.

We deeply believe that in spite of the schemes of hostile forces, and in spite of certain failures, the just cause of the Arab peoples will inevitably succeed. The Arabs, just like all other peoples of the world, will ultimately become masters of their own destinies and will be given the chance to live in conditions of independence, freedom and peace. We are convinced that the true road leading to such conditions passes by way of an overall political settlement of the Middle East conflict.

The Soviet Union, of course, supports this settlement, that must be truly just and lasting. For this purpose, it is a prerequisite that all territories occupied by Israel in 1967 should be liberated, that the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people should be realized, including their right of establishing their own national independent state, and

<sup>108</sup> Translated from the partial Arabic text issued by Tass in Beirut on May 28, 1976.

<sup>109</sup> Made in a speech on Iraqi television broadcast June 3, 1976; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text published by the Novosti press agency in Beirut on June 4.

<sup>110</sup> Doc. 72 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

that the independent existence and development of all the countries of the area be guaranteed.

We lead the struggle towards achieving this settlement which will yield peace and the possibility of welfare for the people of the Middle East. The Soviet proposal for the resumption of the Geneva peace conference, which is the particular political tool for a Middle East settlement, was met by a wide range of international support. All parties directly concerned in the conflict including the Palestine Liberation Organization, should participate in this conference from its beginning and on a basis of equality.

The success of the struggle for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East will be achieved as quickly as the Arab countries become more active in unifying their ranks. Of course, the Arab countries in order to confront the imperialist pressure and the Israeli threats and provocations, reinforce their defence abilities; while the Soviet Union, as is clear to everybody, contributes a great deal in this context.

## 108

### **Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Iraq of Prime Minister Kosygin of the USSR (excerpts)<sup>111</sup>**

Baghdad, June 1, 1976

At the invitation of the Command of the Arab Socialist Baath Party and the Iraqi government, Comrade Alexei N. Kosygin, member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR and Prime Minister, paid an official and friendly visit to the Iraqi Republic in the period May 29-June 1, 1976.

Comrade Kosygin and his delegation received a warm and friendly welcome, an expression of the deep sentiments of friendship borne by the Iraqi people for the peoples and leaders of the Soviet Union. Comrade Ahmad Hasan Bakr, General Secretary of the Regional Command of the Arab Baath Socialist Party and President of the Iraqi Republic, received Comrade Kosygin

and held cordial talks with him.

Comrade Saddam Hussein, Assistant General Secretary of the Regional Command of the Arab Socialist Baath Party and Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council in Iraq, also held talks with Comrade Alexei Kosygin.

The two sides reviewed at length, during their talks and meetings which were held in an atmosphere of frankness, cordiality and mutual understanding, the current situation and future growth of Iraqi-Soviet cooperation. A constructive exchange of views took place regarding the development of party and state. The two sides expressed their firm resolve to develop and strengthen the ties of amity between Iraq and the Soviet Union, using all the means necessary and in a manner that serves the interests of the two countries and peoples.

The two countries noted with satisfaction that the political policy outlined in the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation concluded between the two countries in 1972 is being successfully implemented. The Treaty represents a firm base for friendly relations and Soviet-Iraqi cooperation. The treaty is built upon equitable foundations and is an important factor in the struggle against imperialism, neo-imperialism and Zionism and for social progress and total peace. Due to their common efforts relations between Iraq and the Soviet Union are steadily developing and intensifying.

The two sides noted that contacts between the Arab Baath Socialist Party in Iraq and the Soviet Communist Party have grown more intimate in recent years. These contacts play a major role in developing successful Iraqi-Soviet relations in the various fields. They affirmed their resolve and readiness to deepen and expand cooperation between the two parties at all levels.

The two sides noted the accomplishment brought about by fruitful cooperation between the two friendly states in the various economic, commercial, cultural, scientific and technological fields. They declared that they would continue to make efforts leading to the expansion of this cooperation.

In reviewing the current situation in the Arab regions, the two sides agreed that the position is still serious and explosive, the result of the aggressive, expansionist and colonialist policy of the

<sup>111</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), June 2, 1976.

Zionist entity and of the forces supporting it. These forces are intensifying efforts to divide the Arab states and get them to confront each other. The two sides are convinced that there can be no just peace in the region before the liberation of all occupied Arab territories, the removal of all traces of aggression, and the full restoration of the firm and legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their definite right to self-determination. In this regard, the two sides announce their firm support for the Palestine resistance movement in struggling to achieve these objectives.

The two sides believe that the fusion of Arab countries on the basis of the fight against imperialism and increased cooperation with their friends, foremost among whom are the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, is an important prerequisite in the struggle against imperialism and Zionist aggression. They declare their resolve to continue to strengthen the traditional ties of friendship between the Soviet Union and the socialist countries and the Arab national liberation movement, in order to guard against any attempts to harm these relations.

The two sides further expressed their deep concern regarding the serious situation in Lebanon and the continuing attempts of imperialism and reaction to interfere in Lebanon's internal affairs for the sake of destroying the unity of the progressive forces and attacking the Palestine resistance movement. Iraq and the Soviet Union shall continue to help stop the bloodshed in Lebanon as soon as possible in order to protect its unity, independence and sovereignty and that the forces opposing aggression may come out of the crisis more unified and powerful than before. The two sides assert that a positive settlement of the Lebanese crisis must be accomplished by the Lebanese people themselves.

The two sides noted with satisfaction the political successes recently won by the Palestine resistance movement, by winning wider international recognition of the just struggle of the Arab people of Palestine, and of the role being played by peace-loving states and friends of the Arabs foremost among whom are the socialist countries. They affirm their resolve to support the Palestine resistance movement and to consider it an inseparable part of the Arab and world liberation movement.

**Speech by Prime Minister Kosygin of the USSR made at a dinner in his honour (excerpt)<sup>112</sup>**

**Damascus, June 1, 1976**

We share the grief and anger of the Arab peoples over the fact that part of their native lands is still under the yoke of occupationists, that many hundreds of thousands of Palestinians are deprived of the possibility of returning to their native places. But condemnation of the Israeli aggressors and their supporters, who are frustrating the implementation of the well-known United Nations resolutions and who are blocking the way to a just peace in the Middle East, is growing in the world.

Israel and those who are backing her should not entertain illusions that they will be able to impose their will on the Arab countries by force. The futility of such schemes was convincingly proved during the October war of 1973. I should like to pay tribute to the staunchness of the Syrian armed forces, to the courage of the Syrian people and their cohesion behind the leadership of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party, headed by President Hafez al-Assad, behind the Progressive National Front.

Supporting the Arabs' cause in the face of Israeli aggression, the Soviet Union will continue to give the necessary assistance to friendly Syria in strengthening her defence potential.

The Soviet Union shares our Syrian friends' negative attitude to separate deals, such as the latest Israeli-Egyptian agreement on the disengagement of armed forces in Sinai.<sup>113</sup>

While creating the illusion that some headway is being made, such deals actually lead away from a genuine settlement, leaving aside the solution of the key questions underlying the Middle East conflict. They certainly serve the Israeli rulers' expansionist ambitions, since they are designed to maintain the occupation of the Arab territories that have been seized.

This is only one aspect of the matter.

Separate deals are also aimed at splitting the

<sup>112</sup> Partial English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5836 (June 8, 1976), pp. 205-206.

<sup>113</sup> Doc. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

ranks of the Arab countries which are resisting Israeli aggression, and at drawing some of them away from the front of struggle for the cause of all the Arabs. The aim is to create conditions enabling the aggressor to exert pressure on Arab countries, one by one, and thereby facilitate the attainment of what has not been achieved by military means.

With the same aim in view, imperialist forces are provoking the bloody events in Lebanon, drawing Arabs into a fratricidal war against Arabs, attempting to drive the wedge of controversies between them and to undermine the Palestine resistance movement. The Soviet Union considers imperialist interference in Lebanon's affairs to be inadmissible in any form whatsoever. We are on the side of the Lebanese forces that are fighting for national unity and the preservation of the integrity of the Lebanese Republic, for an end to the bloodshed and a settlement of the present crisis through peaceful means, in accordance with the vital interests of the Lebanese people.

The Soviet Union consistently comes out in favour of a radical settlement of the Middle East conflict. The experience of recent years in seeking such a settlement and the resolutions passed by the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly, have revealed a real basis on which this can be achieved. That basis includes three interrelated demands which are in the interests of all the sides immediately involved in the conflict.

The first demand is for the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967. The second is for the satisfaction of the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including the right to create a state of their own. The third is for ensuring the independent existence and development of all the Middle East states.

The entire course of events in the Middle East shows that nothing can replace an all-embracing settlement on such a basis. To delay a settlement means to show contempt for the fate of the countries and peoples of this area, for the fate of universal peace.

That is why the Soviet Union comes out in favour of the speediest resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference, which was specially created in order to work out the terms of a lasting peace in the Middle East, with the participation of all the sides immediately concerned. Representatives of

the Palestine Arab people must take part in this conference with the same rights as the others, for a just settlement of the Palestine problem is one of the key elements of a firm and all-round settlement. As a co-chairman of the Geneva Conference, the Soviet Union is prepared to co-operate in all the efforts aimed at establishing a just peace in the Middle East.

Our visit to Syria serves to reaffirm the unchanging desire of our two countries to continue to strengthen our friendly cooperation.

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**Statement made by Foreign Minister Minić of Yugoslavia on Israeli aggressiveness and the necessity of supporting the Palestine revolution<sup>114</sup>**

Algiers, June 2, 1976

I should like to dwell briefly only on the most dangerous crises. Particularly worrying is the fact that, due to Israel's aggressive policy and the support it receives from the outside, all efforts are blocked for finding a just and lasting solution to the Middle East crisis which remains the most dangerous in the world, and that the right to self-determination and independence of the Palestinian people, suffering from occupation and terror, is being denied in practice. We must, therefore, continue to lend our full support to the struggle of the Palestinian people, under the leadership of the PLO. We attach great importance to the initiative of non-aligned countries members of the Security Council at the January session of the Security Council, coordinated with the Arab countries directly concerned, in the form of a resolution containing generally accepted principles for the settlement of the crisis, i.e. the withdrawal of Israel from all the territories occupied in 1967, the realization of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to

<sup>114</sup> Made in a speech at a meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries; excerpted from the English text, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXVII, 629 (June 20, 1976), pp. 12-13.

a state of their own, whereby necessary conditions would be created for the independence and security of all peoples and states in that area. Unfortunately, this resolution was not adopted because it was vetoed by the United States. We believe that conditions have been created for non-aligned countries to present themselves, through the Fifth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, as a direct factor in solving this issue, since they can offer both a just and a realistic platform that could rally the largest number of countries. Any further delay of effective concerted action by non-aligned countries would only benefit those forces which do not want the crisis resolved.

# 111

## **Communiqué issued by the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries (excerpts)<sup>115</sup>**

Algiers, June 2, 1976

1. The Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries met in Algiers from 30 May to 2 June 1976.

7. The Bureau expresses its concern at the areas of conflict and tension maintained by the Zionist and imperialist policy of aggression in the Middle East, and at the persistence of colonialism and racism in Africa and imperialist manoeuvres in Asia and Latin America.

8. The Bureau reviewed the serious situation prevailing in Palestine and in the occupied Arab territories, particularly the popular uprising against the Israeli occupation.

The Bureau welcomes the participation of the PLO as the authentic representative of the Palestinian people in the last Security Council discussions devoted to the Middle East situation and the Palestinian question.

It expresses its satisfaction at the decision taken by the last UN General Assembly to create a "Committee for exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people" and underlines the importance it attaches to that Committee's report.

It condemns the expansionist, annexationist and colonialist policy pursued by Israel, which is exemplified in particular by the continued establishment of settlements in the occupied Arab territories.

The Bureau condemns the methods of repression of the Israeli authorities in occupied Palestine and expresses its support for the Palestinian patriots courageously fighting to regain their inalienable national rights.

The Bureau condemns the measures taken by Israel to alter the status and the religious, social, ethnic and economic character of the occupied territories, more specifically of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and considers that such measures are null and void and do not constitute a legal precedent.

The Bureau considers that Israel, by its continuous aggression against the Palestinian people and the Arab countries of the region, and by its systematic refusal to respect the decisions of the United Nations, is violating the fundamental principles of the Charter. Accordingly, recalling the declaration of the Lima Council of Foreign Ministers and the resolutions on the questions of the Middle East and Palestine, the Bureau considers that the United Nations should take effective steps, including those provided for by Article VII of the Charter, to ensure respect by Israel for the decisions taken by the United Nations.

The Bureau reaffirms that the Palestinian question is the core of the Middle East problem and that there can be no just and durable peace in this region except on the basis of the following two principles:

A. Withdrawal by Israel from all Arab territories occupied since 1967.

B. Restoration of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and the exercise by that people of its rights, and primarily of its right to return to its homeland, its right to self-determination and the establishment of an independent State in Palestine.

The Bureau reiterates that the struggle of the Arab people against the Israeli occupation of Palestine and the occupied territories is an integral part of the struggle of peoples for their right to

<sup>115</sup> Excerpted from the English text, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXVII, 629 (June 20, 1976), pp. 15-16. Members of the Bureau are Algeria, Cuba, Guyana, India, Kuwait, Liberia, Mali, Malaysia, Nepal, Peru, Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tanzania, Yugoslavia, and Zaire. The delegation of Zaire expressed reservations in regard to article 8.

self-determination and against colonialism, occupation and racism.

9. The Bureau, deeply concerned over the present situation in Lebanon, urgently appeals to all the conflicting Lebanese parties to cease their fratricidal situation in Lebanon, urgently appeals to all the unity, territorial integrity and independence of Non-Aligned Lebanon.

The Bureau considers that responsibility for solution of the Lebanese crisis rests with the Lebanese themselves.

## 112

### **Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Syria of Prime Minister Kosygin of the USSR (excerpts)<sup>116</sup>**

**Damascus, June 3, 1976**

At the invitation of the Command of the Arab Baath Party and of the government of the Syrian Arab Republic, A.N. Kosygin, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Prime Minister, paid an official and friendly visit to the Syrian Arab Republic in the period April 1-4, 1976.

Wherever they went, Comrade A.N. Kosygin and his companions met with a warm welcome which conforms with the mutual sentiments of friendship between the Arab people of Syria and the people of the USSR.

Comrade A.N. Kosygin on this occasion met Comrade Hafiz Asad, General Secretary of the Arab Socialist Baath Party and President of the Syrian Arab Republic, several times. Talks were also held between Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin and Syrian Prime Minister Mahmud Ayyubi. During these meetings and talks, conducted in an atmosphere of mutual cordiality and understanding, a wide exchange of opinions concerning Syrian-Soviet relations and major current international affairs took place.

The two sides affirmed the importance of the joint communiqué issued in Moscow on April 13,

1974, by Comrades Hafiz Asad and L. Brezhnev,<sup>117</sup> which set down the broad framework of friendly relations between the two countries, growth in cooperation and strengthening of friendly relations on firm foundations of equality, mutual respect, independence, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. They asserted their resolve to adhere to this policy in the future.

The two sides exchanged views regarding major international issues. They concentrated their attention upon the situation in the Middle East and its recent developments. They expressed their grave concern for the explosive situation in the region, the result of continued Israeli aggression upon the Arab nation with the help of world imperialism and Zionism.

They expressed their two countries' long condemnation of Israel's acts of aggression and expansion and of Israeli refusal to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories and to recognize the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people. The two sides further condemned acts of oppression and racial discrimination practiced by Israel against the Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories as well as the building of settlements therein.

The two sides reaffirmed their countries' unwavering attitude that just and permanent peace in the Middle East can only come about by total Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 and the restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people, including their inalienable right to self-determination and the establishment of their independent national entity. They also affirmed their countries' policy of rejecting all partial and individual solutions that are separate from a comprehensive solution. Recent events and the tension now prevalent in the region confirm that such partial solutions merely divert a comprehensive solution from its proper path by ignoring basic issues, and this leads to continued occupation of Arab territories.

The two sides noted that the continuing attempts by Israel and imperialist forces to divide Arab ranks and bring Arabs into confrontation, weaken the common struggle against Israeli aggression. They also noted that this anti-Arab policy is

<sup>116</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), June 4, 1976.

<sup>117</sup> Doc. 96 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.



supported by certain leaders in certain Arab countries.

They declare their determination to continue their cooperation to achieve a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. They believe that the Geneva conference is the right forum to arrive at this settlement on the basis of the implementation of UN resolutions and with the participation of the PLO, the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, in the conference and on a footing of equality with the other participants who attended at the beginning.

The two sides expressed their deep concern regarding the continuing crisis in Lebanon, the result of imperialist and Zionist schemes. They expressed their resolve to continue to work in order to stop the bloodshed and restore peace and security to Lebanon and to guarantee its territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty.

In reviewing current international issues, the two sides noted with satisfaction the efforts made by forces of socialism and national liberation in the world to deepen international détente as well as the increased entrenchment of the principles of peaceful coexistence among countries with diverse social structures. They affirmed their countries' and peoples' determination to join all peace-loving states and nations in continuing efforts to challenge the forces of imperialism and Zionism and to foil their schemes by taking positive measures to buttress world peace and security. They expressed their conviction that world imperialism and Zionism are intensifying efforts to increase tension in international affairs, to stop the march of détente and obstruct the efforts made to wipe out points of tension in the world.

### 113

#### **Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger discussing the situation in Lebanon<sup>118</sup>**

**New York, June 5, 1976**

*Secretary Kissinger:* I wanted to express my appreciation to the Secretary General. We had

a very good talk. I complimented him on his mission to Damascus, and we exchanged ideas on the Middle East, Cyprus, southern Africa, the problems of development in the light of the recent UNCTAD Conference, and a number of odds and ends involving the United Nations and the United States. I think it was an extremely useful talk, and of course, we greatly appreciate the role that the Secretary General plays in so many international problems of our time. We'll be glad to answer a few questions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been a lot of charges recently that you were personally responsible for the increased bloodshed in Lebanon. I refer specifically to the recent column by Nick Von Hoffman and similar charges made by Lebanese leaders [inaudible] Jumblatt, and Le Monde also recently made similar statements. This would seem supported by statements made by Dean Brown following his previous trip to the Middle East, to the effect that he was very unhappy that while he was there the White House intervened to prevent the Syrians from intervening. Now, I wonder if these charges are in any way true, and if so, are they aimed at you personally trying to sabotage President Ford's peace initiatives? He stated recently that he is opposed to your step-by-step diplomacy.*

*A.* It is a very eloquent statement. I am not aware that President Ford has ever indicated that he is opposed to any of the policies that he and I are jointly carrying out, so that statement—the last statement is total nonsense. President Ford and I are working in complete unity, and the policy we are pursuing in the Middle East has been pursued up to now on a step-by-step basis and will be pursued in the future by whatever methods are most likely to produce peace in the Middle East.

With respect to the situation in Lebanon, the United States, as the party that has had access to more of the factions and other countries involved than almost anyone else, has unceasingly used its efforts in order to bring about an end of the conflict and a moderation of violence where the conflict couldn't be ended.

The quotation you ascribed to Ambassador Brown is totally incorrect. I have checked it with him.

The United States has attempted to maintain the sovereignty and integrity of Lebanon. It has supported every U.N. and other efforts, and it has

<sup>118</sup> Made after a visit to UN Headquarters; excerpted from the transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXIV, 1931 (June 28, 1976), pp. 813–815.

exerted all its efforts to bring an end to the conflict and to save human lives; and when the record becomes known, I think it will be understood that we've played a credible and important role.

*Q. Can you tell us whether you and Mr. Waldheim have discussed a new initiative which you might make together to start again the diplomatic process in the Middle East?*

*A.* There have been press reports that a specific new initiative is started, which are incorrect. There are ongoing talks on which we exchanged ideas. Of course the Secretary General, having been in the Middle East more recently than I, could give me some of his firsthand impressions, but there is no specific new initiative. There are the proposals and ideas which we have been discussing since February and March, and we exchanged ideas with respect to those.

*Q. The Syrian intervention—what is this government's point of view about that?*

*A.* The United States has consistently warned against foreign intervention as involving a significant risk of escalation. We have supported the program—the political program—that Syria also supported at the end of January and that had led to an understanding among the parties. We still believe that with adaptations for what has happened in the interval this would be a reasonable basis to come to a solution. But we believe that outside countries should show the greatest restraint because of the explosiveness of the situation.

*Q. Would you say that the United States supports the political efforts by Syria to solve the Lebanese situation? Are you saying also that the United States views with significant alarm the latest military moves into that country?*

*A.* We were not consulted about the latest military move, and we have—our basic position has been to oppose outside intervention. At the same time, it is an extremely delicate situation in which we are still trying to bring all of the factions together and in which we are encouraging restraint by all of the parties—and we continue to call for restraint by all of the parties.

*Q. How active is that opposition?*

*A.* Well, I don't know what the definition of "active opposition" is. We have stated clearly our view, and as you have heard in the eloquent opening question, we are being criticized both for oppos-

ing and supporting the Syrian intervention. Our position is that all parties should exercise great restraint and that we are trying to act as an honest broker between the parties, but of course we cannot by ourselves create the framework of good will. We can contribute our maximum effort, which is what we are doing now.

*Q. What do you predict will happen if Syria follows through with this military intervention?*

*A.* Well, we hope that, as we understand the parties, the various factions in Lebanon are beginning to talk to each other. We can only urge the most rapid political solution, because once there's an established government in Lebanon it can call for the withdrawal of outside forces, and then the situation can be returned to one where the central government exercises authority and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon is preserved and the two communities can, hopefully, live side by side.

## 114

### Statement on Middle East policy issued by US presidential candidate Carter (excerpts)<sup>119</sup>

New York, June 6, 1976

...When I announced my candidacy for Presidency... I said that the time for American intervention in all the problems of the world is past. But I also said that we cannot retreat into isolationism. I pointed out that America must fulfill its commitments, and maintain its strength, if world peace is to be preserved.

I stressed, too, that the integrity of Israel must be preserved.

...in a foreign policy speech in Chicago, I said that balance of power politics should be replaced by a new effort to join with other nations to build a just and stable world order, and that it is unfortunate that our nation's foreign policy is being made and executed by just one man, the Secretary of State. I expressed my view that in a Democracy a nation's foreign policy should be openly arrived at, and

<sup>119</sup> Released by the New York Citizens Committee for Jimmy Carter; partial text, *Middle East Review* (New York), IX, 3 (Spring 1977), p. 70-73. Reprinted by permission of *Middle East Review*, published by the American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East.

should reflect, the essential decency and generosity and honesty of the American people.

I want to speak today about how I think these principles apply to the situation in the Middle East.

This region has experienced a resurgence of the tension and conflict which have been its lot for decades and, indeed, for centuries. Since 1948, four wars have been fought. Countless diplomatic initiatives have been launched. Yet peace seems no closer today than it was in 1948, and the possibility of the Middle East touching off a global war is still with us.

Even without war, terrorism runs rampant, and the burden of arms bleeds the budget of every nation in the area.

Obviously, all men of good will can agree, it is time—it is far past time—for permanent peace in the Middle East, a peace based on genuine reconciliation and respect between all the concerned nations.

And in this quest for peace, the American People, as well as the people of Israel and the Arab states, look to the United States government to help lead the way.

We have a unique opportunity to contribute to the solution of this conflict if we can maintain the trust of all sides. Our constant and unwavering goal must be the survival of Israel as a Jewish state and the achievement of a just and lasting settlement. As long as there is no such settlement, there will be no peace. There will only be periods of uneasy truce, punctuated by border raids and terrorism while each side builds up forces for another conflict.

A real peace must be based on the absolute assurance of Israel's survival and security. As President, I would never yield on that point. The survival of Israel is not a political issue. It is a moral imperative. That is my deeply held belief, and it is one that is shared by the vast majority of the American people.

Rarely in history have two nations been so closely bound together. We are both democratic nations. We both cherish freedom of the press, freedom of expression, and freedom of religion. We are both nations of immigrants. We share cultural and artistic values. We are friends and we are allies. Ours was the first nation to recognize the Israeli Government, as a nation, and we must remain the first nation to which Israel can turn in time of need.

Just as we must be clear about our commitment to the preservation and well-being of Israel, we

must also be clear about our commitment to meaningful, productive Arab-Israeli negotiations.

Only face to face communication can build the trust and nurture the accommodations that will be needed. By insisting on these kind of talks, by demonstrating the seriousness of our commitment to real peace, we can use our influence to prepare all sides for the best way out of this tragic conflict.

I favor early movement toward discussion of the outline of an eventual overall settlement. Limited settlements, as we have seen in the past, leave unresolved the underlying threat to Israel. A general settlement is needed, one which will end the conflict between Israel and its neighbors once and for all.

The guide to a general settlement is to be found in United Nations Resolution 242, which has been accepted by Israel and its neighboring governments. It sets forth two main principles.

One of these is, and I quote, "Termination of all claims on states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force."

This is the heart of the matter. Peace in the Middle East depends more than anything else on a basic change in attitudes. To be specific, on Arab recognition of the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish state.

This change must be reflected in tangible and concrete actions by the Arab countries, including:

- Recognition of Israel;
- Diplomatic relations with Israel;
- A peace treaty with Israel;
- Open frontiers by Israel's neighbors;
- An end to embargo and official hostile propaganda against Israel.

In justifying these steps to their own peoples, Arab leaders will have to acknowledge that the Arab-Israeli war is over once and for all—that this is not just another armed truce. Without this basic change no peace is possible.

The other principle of U.N. Resolution 242 calls for, and again I quote, "Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." This language leaves the door open for changes in the pre-1967 lines by mutual agreement.

Final borders between Israel and its neighbors should be determined in direct negotiations be-

tween the parties. They should not be imposed from outside.

A general settlement will take time to negotiate, and even more time to implement. Its execution would probably come in stages. This would permit both sides to test the durability of the settlement, and it would give either side an opportunity to halt the process if it found that its interests were being violated.

We are dealing with a deep and bitter legacy of hatred and distrust, which can only be dissipated over time. This makes it all the more important now to lift the sights of all concerned by focusing on our long term goal.

While we work toward peace, we must acknowledge the lessons of past wars. Progress toward peace requires that Israel remain strong enough that it can neither be overrun militarily nor isolated in the international community.

Israel has never sought American soldiers. It asks us only for the tools to assure its own defense. We should continue to supply them in the full amounts necessary, so Israel can pursue peace from a position of strength and confidence.

We should continue to aid Israel's economy, which has been strained to the utmost by the burdens of defense.

We must also continue to maintain our strong military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and a capacity to reinforce that presence powerfully if need be, in order to deter outside intervention in any local conflict.

None of this need prevent our maintaining good relations with the Arab states. Avoiding conflict and achieving a settlement is in their interest as well as Israel's.

In assisting both sides' efforts to achieve such a settlement, we not only fulfill our commitment to Israel, we strengthen the strong links of friendship that have developed between us and the Arab countries over many years. The process of peace will be best served if these relations deepen, not at the expense of Israel but in the interest of all the countries involved. I do not believe it serves the cause of peace if we arm any country beyond its legitimate needs for defense. Local arms races, besides being costly, increase the chances of war.

I said two months ago that I do not favor supplying offensive weapons to Egypt, and I still hold to that view. We should help Egypt obtain housing and jobs and health care for its people, not

such offensive weapons as tanks and attack planes and missiles. Investing in Egypt's economic development is an investment in peace.

We have already developed close ties of investment and economic aid with many Arab countries. This shows that economic interdependence can also be a foundation of peace. The Arab peoples are no less tired of war than Israel, no less weary of its burdens and waste, no less mournful of their dead. Some Arab states have set goals for economic development and education which are worthy of great respect, as well as our aid and participation. But their dreams, like the dreams of Israel, will come true only if there is a lasting peace in the Middle East.

Unless there is peace, the Arab nations will inevitably become radicalized, more militant, and more susceptible to Soviet re-entry, both political and military. If that happens, Israel will be confronted with an even graver threat.

Peace in the Middle East involves difficult, highly emotional issues. In face to face negotiations, if all parties will act in fairness and good will, the questions of boundary lines and the status of the Palestinians can be resolved.

There is a humanitarian core to the complexity of the Palestinian problem. Too many human beings, denied a sense of hope for the future, are living in makeshift, crowded camps where demagogues and terrorists can feed on their despair. They have rights which must be recognized in any settlement, and the government of Israel has made it clear that it is sensitive to that fact.

But those terrorists who wage war and deny the very concept of Israeli nationhood, only undermine their own people's best interest. We must make it clear to the world that there can be no reward for terrorism.

I must speak too of the Soviet Union. We want no clash with the Soviets, but we could not accept the intervention of its combat forces into any Arab-Israeli conflict. Our naval and air presence in the Eastern Mediterranean should make this clear. Mutual non-intervention by the Super-Powers serves these powers' interests and all the states of the area.

By the same token, I do not believe that the road to peace can be found by U.S.-Soviet imposition of a settlement. It would, however, be desirable to obtain Soviet agreement and support for any settlement, since we do not want to give Soviet

leaders any reason or excuse to subvert that settlement. We seek the support of the Soviet government in the search for peace, but we will continue that search with or without her support.

We all want to see a Middle East, dedicated to human progress rather than sterile hate...

We must work toward these goals through international organizations, as well as negotiations. This is a difficult time for Israel in the international arena, primarily because of the importance of oil to the world's developing nations. I deplore the actions taken recently in the United Nations. I reject utterly the charge that Zionism is a form of racism. Indeed, Zionism has been in part a response to racism against the Jewish people. The concept of a State of Israel was born out of centuries of persecution of human beings because they practice a different religion...

For years, the vision of Israel has embodied the dream that there could be at least one place on this earth where racism could never exist. Now that dream has come true. As a country founded upon religious freedom and dedicated to brotherhood, America has a special responsibility, not only to oppose this baseless charge wherever it appears, but to keep that dream alive.

Finally, I want to say that there have been far too many secret undertakings, covert assurances, contradictory promises, and diplomatic sleights of hand. Maneuvers of this type are bound to produce—as they have produced—both failure in negotiation and suspicion among its participants.

American policy toward the Middle East—and toward every other part of the world—should be shaped *with* the knowledge of the Congress, *from* the outset, on a bipartisan basis. It would emerge from broad, well-informed public debate. Indeed, this is a necessity. In every foreign venture that has failed—whether it was Vietnam, Cambodia, Chile, Angola or in the excesses of the CIA, our government operated secretly, and forged ahead without consulting the American people. It did things that were contrary to our basic character.

Public understanding and support today are as vital to successful foreign policies as they are to any domestic program. No one can make our foreign policy for us as well as we can make it ourselves. It should be based not just on military might or economic power or political pressure, but

also on truth, justice, equality, and a true representation of the moral character and compassion of our people. A policy of that kind will reflect the best in all of us. And it can succeed.

Peace in the Middle East is not an impossible dream. It can be a concrete objective. And it is one to which the next President should direct his efforts from the day that he takes office. As a matter of the highest priority and greatest urgency...

## 115

### **Press interview statement by Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran expressing support for legitimate Palestinian rights<sup>120</sup>**

**Teheran, early June, 1976**

*Q. What is the Iranian government's policy as regards the PLO? And what is your Majesty's attitude to the Middle East problem? And what are your views on the present incidents in Lebanon?*

A. There can be no peace in the Middle East without the full withdrawal by Israel from the Arab territories she occupied in 1967 and her recognition of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people. We stress the need for the PLO to participate in efforts aimed at achieving peace in the Middle East. Iran has always supported these principles at the United Nations and at the Islamic conferences and emphatically approved them. As for the problem of Jerusalem, our view is that we can never permit sacred Islamic territory to remain in the hands of non-Muslims, and this view is shared by our Christian brothers, who cannot allow their holy places to remain in the hands of the Zionists.

As for Lebanon, I am really baffled. What is happening there is extraordinary and quite incomprehensible. Lebanon changes ten times a day. Of course, we are against the present bloodshed in Lebanon and regard what is happening there with the greatest concern.

<sup>120</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the interview conducted by Sami Hashim, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), June 10, 1976.

## 116

**Statement issued by the USSR news agency Tass regarding the situation in Lebanon and its impact on the Palestine resistance movement<sup>121</sup>****Moscow, June 9, 1976**

In recent days the developments in Lebanon have been assuming a tragic character. The fratricidal war in which Arabs are fighting Arabs is becoming increasingly bloody. The number of civilian victims, women, old people and children, is growing.

What is taking place in Lebanon is ceasing to be an internal Lebanese matter. This is to be seen by, among other things, the French statement on the possibility of sending a contingent of French troops to Lebanon. The U.S. Navy is still plying close to the shores of Lebanon.

The Soviet Union has already issued warnings that the situation in Lebanon and the Middle East as a whole may become even more complicated if attempted foreign interference in the affairs of Lebanon is not stopped.

The Syrian Arab Republic, on its side, has time and again issued statements saying that the mission of the troops it introduced into Lebanon is to help stop the bloodshed. Nevertheless, notice should be called to the fact that bloodshed continues in Lebanon today and that blood is flowing in ever greater streams.

At this moment, when the Lebanese events threaten to grow into a bigger international conflict, the Soviet Union urges all states to abstain from any action that goes against the principles of respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, so that these generally recognised international principles should be fully implemented in relation to Lebanon also.

The first thing to be done in Lebanon in order to achieve this is to stop the bloodshed. It is necessary that all sides involved in the Lebanese events, in one way or another, should immediately hold their fire.

As for the powers who refer to an interest in the situation in Lebanon and threaten direct military interference in its affairs, the Soviet Union is forced in this connection to declare that the

Middle East is much closer to the Soviet Union than to those who are issuing these threats and, in any case, the Soviet Union is not less interested in how the situation in Lebanon and around it develops and continues to develop. Nobody should lose sight of this.

Leading circles in the Soviet Union consider it necessary to draw attention to yet another aspect of the Lebanese developments. As is known, there are hundreds of thousands of Palestinians on Lebanese territory who have now found refuge in this country and are carrying on a courageous struggle in the ranks of the Palestine resistance movement for their legitimate national rights and for the common Arab interests in the cause of eliminating the aftermath of the Israeli aggression. What is happening to them now? They have also been drawn into the bloody fratricidal war.

The Soviet Union expects that at this juncture due responsibility will be displayed both by the sides directly involved in Lebanon and by all the other states that are aware of the danger of further worsening of the situation in the Middle East.

## 117

**Resolution adopted at Mapam's Seventh National Congress laying the premises for the basis of a programme for a comprehensive Israeli-Arab peace agreement (excerpt)<sup>122</sup>****Tel Aviv, June 11, 1976**

Mapam's Seventh National Congress calls upon the Government of Israel to formulate a program for an inclusive Israeli-Arab peace agreement. This program, which Israel will bring to Geneva or to any other agreed-upon forum, will constitute Israel's suggestions for a solution of the problems in dispute. Such a program would reinforce our position by clarifying our aims to the Arab countries, and would win friendship and support for our struggle for peace and security all over the world. The following premises should be the basis for this program:

a) The peaceful relations between Israel and its neighbors will be founded on recognition of

<sup>121</sup> English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5837 (June 15, 1976), p. 223.

<sup>122</sup> Partial English text, *Mapam Bulletin*, (Tel Aviv), no. 36, (June, 1976), pp. 3-5.

the independence and sovereignty of the State of Israel; the cessation of hostile propaganda and the economic boycott; on economic, scientific and cultural cooperation; and the development of tourism—with the aim of attaining normal relations, including diplomatic relations. The peace program will be implemented within a definite period of time and in pre-determined stages.

b) Israel will strive for an inclusive peace agreement with all of its neighbors. It will therefore be prepared to conduct negotiations, with no preliminary conditions, with all the Arab countries together or with each of them separately.

c) Israel will also be prepared to negotiate the termination of the state of war, as well as interim or partial agreements as a stage towards lasting peace. Those negotiations will be conducted by Israel on the basis of its inclusive program.

d) The State of Israel does not seek annexations but rather guarantees for its security. It will come to the negotiations on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, declaring its readiness to evacuate the territories it occupies in Sinai, the West Bank and the Golan Heights, and to make far-reaching withdrawals, with necessary border modifications obligated by security needs, to secure, recognized and agreed-upon borders. Before peace is achieved, no facts will be established which are not obligated by security needs and which would be obstacles to agreement by political means.

Palestine on both sides of the Jordan river is the mutual homeland of the Jewish people returning to its country and of the Palestinian people living in it. Therefore, in its negotiations with Jordan, Israel will favor a political solution based on the existence of two independent and sovereign states: Israel on the one hand, and an Arab state—Jordanian-Palestinian—on the other. The self-determination of the Palestinian Arab people will find its expression in this neighboring state. Israel will respect the democratic decisions of the Palestinians and Jordanians in everything concerning self-determination, sovereignty and independence of both these groups, beyond Israel's borders, on condition that the relations with Israel be based on peace agreements and good neighborliness.

Israel will be prepared to negotiate with any Palestinian group which recognizes its (Israel's) right to existence and sovereignty, and rejects

and avoids acts of terror or sabotage (on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242). The agreement between Israel and its neighbor to the east will be based on a peace treaty and on economic and cultural cooperation. Combined efforts will be made by both states to mobilize means from international sources for the development of irrigation projects, agriculture, industry and housing. Upon the determination of the border modifications necessary for its security, Israel will withdraw to the agreed-upon borders and the West Bank will be returned and demilitarized according to a time-table determined by the agreement. Armed forces will not cross the Jordan river and the demilitarization will be guaranteed by agreed-upon security arrangements.

Peace agreements between Israel and its neighbors and the consequent termination of hostilities will liberate tremendous human and economic resources capable of advancing the peoples of the region towards economic and political independence. It will free them from the intervention of foreign powers and enable them to achieve a higher standard of living and work towards the eradication of poverty, disease and illiteracy, the effective utilization of natural resources, large-scale development programs and the use of know-how for the mutual benefit of all the people of the region.

## 118

### **Speech made to the Knesset by Prime Minister Rabin of Israel reviewing Israel's foreign policy (excerpts)<sup>123</sup>**

Jerusalem, June 15, 1976

Peace cannot be achieved by a unilateral effort, but the Israeli Government regards it as a task of paramount importance—from the Israeli, Jewish, regional and international points of view—to do, on its part, all that can be done in order to advance towards peace. Peace has been, and still is, the central objective of Israeli policy. To this end, we have organized our political policy on the basis of two courses. The first—and preferable—course is a sharp transition from war to peace within defensible borders with each of the

<sup>123</sup> Partial English text, *Israel Digest* (Jerusalem), XIX, 14 (July 2, 1976), pp. 4–6.

Arab states. The second course is graduated progress towards peace, from the disengagement agreements,<sup>124</sup> via the interim settlement with Egypt,<sup>125</sup> and readiness for negotiations on ending the state of war, with each of our neighbors.

We are convinced that, by virtue of Israel's initiatives and positions, we have achieved:

- 1) A considerable strengthening of our security,
- 2) A period of relaxation and absence of fighting,
- 3) A political situation in the area calculated to strengthen the prospect of progress towards peace,
- 4) Strengthening of the political understanding with the United States and increased American security and economic aid to Israel.

When I stated in the Knesset that the interim agreement with Egypt was a very promising event, I was referring not only to the benefit that Israel would reap, but also to the gain that would accrue to Egypt. According to the information in our possession, Egypt is indeed developing broad rehabilitation works, including the reopening of the Suez Canal, the rebuilding of the Canal Zone cities, and the settlement of a million people in them.

I am well aware that Egyptian spokesmen at the UN and other forums are playing their part in hostile propaganda against Israel. I have no intention of claiming that the political course taken by Egypt is guaranteed to be continuous all along the road to peace. I do not say that we can be assured of realism in Egypt's approach to an agreement on ending the state of war or to a peace agreement. Regrettably, we must also take into account the possibility of dangerous recidivism.

In any event, Egypt's signing of the interim agreement with Israel was a meaningful step, from which a number of political developments have branched out in the Middle East and beyond.

The Israeli government has chosen—insofar as the matter depended on it—the course of readiness for progress on either of the two paths, namely: a sharp transition to peace, or through the further stage of agreement on ending the state of war.

The terrible events in Lebanon, with their cruelty, killing and havoc, with the disintegration of the country, with their vicissitudes and surprises—must shock and grieve everyone in Is-

rael who wishes our northern neighbor to be at peace. In these events, each of us sees, first of all, the human aspect of the Lebanese tragedy, and we follow with grave concern the fate of men, women, and children who are being killed daily without even knowing why.

That this bloodshed can occur is terrible testimony to the character of our world. But because of conflicts of international interests the deterioration continues unchecked—and we can learn a cruel lesson when we see how far the enflaming of antagonisms and passions can go in the Arab world.

As we follow these events, we can see what a trouble-making and provocative factor the terrorist organizations and their leaders constitute in Lebanon's internal policy, in destroying the fabric of inter-communal life, enflaming antagonism and quarrels, and kindling the fires of war.

Changes and vicissitudes in our region are not a rare phenomenon. Only yesterday, Syria was an active factor in the isolation of the Jordanian kingdom and in aid to the terrorist organizations, the Jordanian king's sworn enemies. But not much time elapsed before Syria embarked on an effort to unite with Jordan in a military and political alliance for the revival of the eastern front. Jordan is strengthening its ties with Syria, in the meantime, cautiously, and is keeping to a certain limit lest it comprise its independence. Will it know how far to go?

We are following what is happening on our eastern border. We have no cause to change our policy towards our neighbor to the east. We are not bound by the Rabat resolutions,<sup>126</sup> nor do we accept at face value Jordanian diplomatic declarations accepting the authority of the Rabat resolutions. We regard Jordan as a partner to negotiations on peace and on ending the state of war, just as we respect the maintenance of the link between the inhabitants of Judea and Samaria and their brethren in Jordan. We regard with favor the aid Jordan proffers to the municipal authorities in Judea and Samaria. We shall continue to judge Jordan by its actual moves, and to regard a Jordanian-Palestinian state in which expression will be given to the Palestinian identity, as one of the components of the solution to the conflict in our region.

<sup>124</sup> Docs. 50 and 115 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

<sup>125</sup> Doc. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>126</sup> Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.



In this connection, let me recall a passage in my statement in the Knesset on December 2, 1975: "Any peaceful solution in our region has to take into account the Palestinian issue, but no solution will be reached before non-acquiescence in Israel's existence is abandoned."

Syria and Israel have again extended the validity of the UNDOF mandate. We welcome this step in itself. It should be stressed once again that Israel wanted the UN force's mandate to be extended, but objected to this being made dependent on any attendant conditions whatsoever. We informed the UN Secretary-General and others of this position. We did so in good time, before Syria could have been given any undertakings that might have led to complications. I note with satisfaction that Syria extended the mandate on the basis of the existing agreement without any conditions.

Syria still refuses to make any meaningful move in the direction of progress towards peace. She is still obdurate in making an ultimative demand for total Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of an Arafatist state—and not even in exchange for peace. Nor has she expressed any readiness to take part in negotiations for an agreement to end the state of war. This obduracy still constitutes the obstacle on the road to peace.

Israel will continue on the international arena to defend the justice of her rights and policy, in a constant effort to explain her cause, without acquiescing in the political isolation that others are trying to force on her. Despite all censures, we shall gird ourselves to continue on our way, guided by our own sovereign considerations and confident of the justice of our cause.

We have strengthened our covenant with the Jewish people. In the face of the campaign of incitement and denunciation against Zionism, the Jerusalem Conference of Jewish Solidarity<sup>127</sup> was held, giving expression to Diaspora Jewry's solidarity with Israel and its role in the realization of Zionism.

I note with satisfaction that during the past two years, relations between the United States and Israel have become closer.

Both our governments have a common approach to the need to examine the possibility of negotiations for an agreement on ending the state

of war, which is intended to be more far-reaching than the previous interim settlements.

The United States continues to extend military aid to Israel to increase the Israel Defense Forces' strength on an unprecedented scale. She is also helping Israel cope with the heavy security burden, and financial aid has been significantly extended.

Relations between the United States and Israel remain firm. Friendship and cooperation between the United States and Israel are in accord with the aims and the role of the United States in promoting peace in the region and in the world. I believe that not only Israel, but the United States too, reaps benefits from the network of relations between the two countries. And it will never be superfluous to emphasize once again the gratitude of the people of Israel, the Knesset and the Israeli government to the United States for its support of Israel.

Engrossed in an ever-increasing effort to retain its positions and status in the Middle East, the Soviet Union is attempting to consolidate its alliance with the most extremist elements in the Arab world, acquiescing in their policies and demands. The signs of this activity are discernible in the area—in Syria, in Iraq, in Libya and in support of the terrorist organizations.

The Soviet Union, it is true, repeatedly stresses its position regarding the State of Israel's right to exist, but it persists in helping the terrorist organizations in the international arena, and makes every effort to consolidate an Arab rejection front against any concrete progress towards peace.

For the sake of peace we shall not rest.

It is a paramount Jewish and Israeli precept to work for the promotion of peace while being ready and prepared to repulse any aggressor. We shall not despair of peace though it be delayed—but neither shall we sit idly by. We shall do everything in our power to advance the realization of the Zionist vision.

<sup>127</sup> See doc. 201 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

## 119

**Proposed US Democratic Party platform  
(excerpt)<sup>128</sup>**

Mid-June, 1976

We shall continue to seek a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The cornerstone of our policy is a firm commitment to the independence and security of the State of Israel. This special relationship does not prejudice improved relations with other nations in the region. Real peace in the Middle East will permit Israel and her Arab neighbors to turn their energies to internal development, and will eliminate the threat of world conflict spreading from tensions there.

The Middle East conflict is complex, and a realistic, pragmatic approach is essential. Our policy must be based on firm adherence to these fundamental principles of Middle East policy:

We will continue our consistent support of Israel, including sufficient military and economic assistance to maintain Israel's deterrent strength in the region, and the maintenance of U.S. military forces in the Mediterranean adequate to deter military intervention by the Soviet Union.

We steadfastly oppose any move to isolate Israel in the international arena or suspend it from the United Nations or its constituent organizations.

We will avoid efforts to impose on the region an externally devised formula for settlement, and will provide support for initiatives toward settlement, based on direct face-to-face negotiation between the parties and normalization of relations and a full peace within secure and defensible boundaries.

We vigorously support the free passage of shipping in the Middle East—especially in the Suez Canal.

We recognize that the solution to the problems of Arab and Jewish refugees must be among the factors taken into account in the course of continued progress toward peace. Such problems cannot be solved, however, by recognition of terrorist groups which refuse to acknowledge their adversary's right to exist, or groups which have no legitimate claim to represent the people for whom

they purport to be speaking.

We support initiation of government enforcement action to insure that stated U.S. policy—in opposition to boycotts against friendly countries—is fully and vigorously implemented.

We recognize and support the established status of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, with free access to all its holy places provided to all faiths. As a symbol of this stand, the U.S. Embassy should be moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

## 120

**Speech by President Podgorny of the USSR  
made at a dinner in honour of visiting King  
Hussein of Jordan (excerpt)<sup>129</sup>**

Moscow, June 18, 1976

The Soviet Union calls for an immediate and comprehensive political settlement in the Middle East.

There still remain centres of tension in the world, which are fraught with the danger of new flare-ups of serious military conflicts.

The Middle East, with its explosive problems, bred chiefly by many years of interference by imperialism in the affairs of that region, has been such an area for more than a quarter of a century. The Israeli aggressors and their patrons stubbornly avoid taking effective measures to achieve an all-embracing settlement of the Middle East crisis and are striving to push the Arab countries on to the road of separate deals.

Meanwhile it is absolutely clear that partial agreements on a separate basis will not lead to favourable moves in a Middle East settlement. Such half-measures only create illusions and are geared to lead the Arab peoples away from the struggle for their real interests and for the triumph of justice in the long-suffering Arab land.

Only a total withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all the occupied Arab territories, the fulfilment of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arabs, including their right to establish their own state, and guarantees for the independent and

<sup>128</sup> Excerpted from the text as inserted by Sen. Humphrey (Dem.), *Congressional Record* (daily), July 2, 1976, p. S 11587.

<sup>129</sup> Partial English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5838 (June 22, 1976), p. 236.

peaceful development of all states in the area can lead to the normalisation of the situation in the Middle East.

We continue to consider that in the present conditions the Geneva Peace Conference is the most appropriate international machinery to achieve this goal. And naturally all the sides immediately interested, including representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, which has been recognised by the United Nations and the Arab summit conference as the legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine, must take part in the work of the Conference from the outset on an equal footing. A solution of the Middle East settlement is impossible behind the backs of the Palestinians and disregarding their interests.

The Soviet Union is loyal to its high-principled and peaceful foreign policy and will continue as hitherto to give the necessary support to the struggle of the Arab peoples to remove the consequences of Israeli aggression and to contribute to the achievement of a just and lasting political settlement in the Middle East.

A lasting peace in the Middle East can be ensured only if the settlement encompasses all sides involved in the conflict and all questions bred by the conflict. For the sake of such a settlement, it is important to prevent hostile forces from fomenting feuds between Arab countries and making them quarrel with their sincere friends—the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, who have consistently supported the just cause of the Arab peoples in times of the greatest hardship.

The dangerous development of events in Lebanon is very damaging to Arab unity. Those events were sparked off by internal reaction and the interference of imperialism in the domestic affairs of that country and they give the forces of peace cause for sincere concern. The Soviet Union calls strongly for the ending of the fratricidal war in Lebanon and for the preservation of the integrity, sovereignty and independence of that country.

The Lebanese people must be given the opportunity to seek ways of solving the acute problems that have emerged on their soil. The interests of peace and security in the Middle East require that the forces confronting Israeli aggression should come out of the Lebanese crisis, not weakened and separated, but united and stronger.

121

**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to France of President Asad of Syria (excerpts)<sup>130</sup>**

Paris, June 19, 1976

In response to the invitation of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, President of the French Republic, and his wife, President Asad of the Syrian Arab Republic and his wife paid an official visit to France June 17–19, 1976.

Talks between the two presidents were held in a friendly atmosphere. They both expressed satisfaction with the progress in bilateral relations and the common desire to further strengthen cooperation between them. An exchange of views took place concerning major international issues and all other issues of mutual interest.

1. In the field of international affairs, a field where a lengthy exchange of views took place, the two presidents emphasized their respective governments' resolve to adhere to the principles of national independence, respect for the sovereignty of other states and international cooperation.

They examined, in the first place, the situation in the Middle East which occupied their special attention because of the region's importance for international peace and for the ties that link Mediterranean to European continental security.

The two presidents emphasized the need to arrive at a comprehensive, just and permanent settlement of the conflict and the need to quickly find an effective solution in order to achieve these objectives.

President Hafiz Asad expressed his satisfaction with the permission granted by the French government to the PLO to set up an information and communications office in Paris.

The two presidents reviewed the situation in Lebanon. They emphasized the concern displayed by both Syria and France for that country's affairs. Both countries have traditional fraternal and friendly relations with Lebanon. They reaffirmed their resolve to maintain the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon.

In this spirit, the two presidents affirmed the

<sup>130</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), June 20, 1976.

need to put an end to the fratricidal war that has rent this country for a long time. President Hafiz Asad explained that the entry of Syrian troops had no other aim than to prepare for the return of law and order to Lebanon and to create the conditions necessary for the resumption of political compromises. Once these objectives are attained, Syrian troops will withdraw.

The French president took note of this and expressed great appreciation for such intentions. He in turn reasserted the French offer to facilitate the holding of a round-table conference of the various groups constituting the people of Lebanon, the aim being to establish the foundations for a political settlement and a national reconciliation. President Hafiz Asad expressed his great appreciation for France's readiness to move in this direction.

The two presidents reviewed the positive growth in the relations between the Arab countries and the European family of nations. They expressed their satisfaction at the increased concern being given to the Euro-Arab dialogue and the common recognition of the importance of multilateral relations between the two regions. They were also satisfied with the meeting of the general committee of the Euro-Arab dialogue in Luxembourg,<sup>131</sup> where positive talks were held and included political, economic and social issues. Thus, the hopes that are pinned upon the Euro-Arab dialogue appear to be more realistic. In this regard, the president of the Syrian Arab Republic expressed his great appreciation for France's constructive and effective role in bringing about such a dialogue which aims at bringing the Arab world closer to Europe, both of whom are striving in their own fashion to create a firmer unity.

The two presidents expressed their satisfaction for the agreements concluded or about to be concluded between the EEC and the Arab countries which aim at increasing cooperation and understanding between the two groups.

**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Iran of President Sadat of Egypt (excerpts)<sup>132</sup>**

**Teheran, June 21, 1976**

At the invitation of H.M. the Shahanshah of Iran Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and H.M. the Shahbanu, President M. Anwar Sadat of the Arab Republic of Egypt and Mrs. Sadat paid an official visit to Iran June 15-21, 1976,<sup>1</sup> corresponding to 16 to 22 Jumada II, 1396 AH.

The two leaders discussed at great length the situation in the Middle East and recent developments. They affirmed the need for speedy action towards a just settlement of the Middle East conflict on the basis of the total withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories occupied since 1967 and the restoration of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people.

The two leaders supported all policies that seek to restore the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people. They condemned all policies that seek to arrest all movement and to obstruct progress towards a just and permanent peace. In this context, they called for the speedy resumption of the Geneva conference, to include all the parties concerned as well as the PLO on a footing of equality with the rest of the participants and in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 3375.

The two sides condemned Israel's policy and the measures being adopted in the occupied Arab territories, which have as their aim the transformation of the demographic and geographical character of these territories. The two leaders regard these measures as a serious violation of the Geneva conventions and a grave threat to peace in the Middle East. The two sides further condemned the Israeli measures taken in Jerusalem and Israel's flouting of Christian and Muslim religious sanctuaries. They call upon all countries in the world to strongly oppose these Israeli policies and measures.

The two sides expressed their concern for the unfortunate situation in Lebanon. They affirmed

<sup>131</sup> See doc. 102 above.

<sup>132</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), June 22, 1976.

that the ending of all forms of irresponsible foreign interference is a prerequisite for achieving a practical solution to the Lebanese problem and establishing peace and security in the country and the region as a whole. In this regard, the two sides expressed the hope that the common effort undertaken by the Arab League and accepted by the Lebanese government would achieve stability in Lebanon in the future. The two leaders emphasized that the preservation of peace and security in the Middle East, an essential element in international peace and security, requires the speedy establishment of a nuclear free zone in the Middle East, in accordance with the joint Iranian-Egyptian initiative which was met with international approval.

## 123

**Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger denying direct contacts with the PLO and commenting on prospects for a Geneva meeting.<sup>133</sup>**

Washington, June 22, 1976

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel that we are any closer to a settlement of the Lebanese crisis today than we were three days ago?*

A. I don't see what has changed in the last three days that would make a settlement of the Lebanese crisis easier. The problem remains substantially what it has been all along. The differences between the warring factions in Lebanon have proved extremely complicated to reconcile. Secondly, even when there is a central government there is the problem of how to supply it with a security force that would enable it to make its writ run in all of Lebanon.

We strongly support any initiative that brings the conflicting groups together; we favor a negotiation among these factions and among the various groups; and we strongly support a united Lebanon whose independence and sovereignty is respected and in which the various communities can live in security.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could you supply something which may be a footnote—or may be more than a footnote—to the Lebanese evacuation? Did the U.S. Government directly contact the PLO or any agency of the PLO to, first, arrange for the evacuation and, second, to thank them for their support and cooperation during it?*

A. The United States at no time has been in direct contact with the PLO during the evacuation. The United States, of necessity, had to deal through various intermediaries with the PLO. That is to say, other countries that have relations with the PLO contacted the PLO about the physical arrangements in an area that was controlled by Palestinians. It wasn't only the PLO, there were other Palestinian groups that controlled the area from which the evacuation took place.

There has been, to the best of my knowledge, no direct contact between the United States and the PLO on the subject, before or subsequently, at any time during the Lebanese [inaudible]. All communications have been through intermediaries. And in all cases, except for a general expression of thanks to all people who helped, there were no messages at all. We left it to the intermediaries to arrange what needed to be arranged.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, regarding Lebanon, can you tell us if there is any promise in either the French proposal for a roundtable or for the French proposal for a French force in Lebanon?*

A. With respect to the idea of a roundtable in Paris, the United States does not want to commit itself to any one particular formula. We would certainly think that a roundtable in a place that appears neutral to most of the participants would be an obvious solution. And if all of the parties were to agree to come to Paris, we would think that was a reasonable venue, and we would support it.

We have not put forward any particular locale, but we would not only have no objection to Paris, we would think it has something to commend it.

With respect to the French force, as I understand the French proposal, it is that if all the parties ask for French participation, as well as the states most concerned, like Syria and Egypt, and if there are conditions of cease-fire, then France would be prepared to send forces to help assure the cease-fire for a limited period of time.

<sup>133</sup> Excerpted from the transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXV, 1934 (July 19, 1976), pp. 90, 92, 94–95.

If all of these conditions are met, the United States would believe that a French force, especially under the conditions which now exist, might play a useful role. It is not, however, for us to say whether a French force should go to Lebanon. It depends, as President Giscard himself has pointed out, on the wishes of the Arab parties concerned and on a prior achievement of a cease-fire. If all of those conditions are met, the United States would certainly not object to such a force.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, back to the Middle East for a moment, please. There is a report—I have not seen the report fully—out of Israel that you have told Ambassador Dinitz that, for the transitional quarter, Israel will have to get along with \$200 million instead of the \$500 million voted by Congress. Now I realize that reports get garbled, and as I say, I have not seen the report, so could you clarify this? Has there been such a decision made by the Administration to cut Israel's aid during the transitional quarter, and if so, why?*

A. First of all, it is incorrect to characterize this as cutting Israel's aid. The problem has been how much should be added to aid for Israel during the transitional quarter. The President has been attempting to work out a compromise with interested Members of the Congress on the amount of aid for Israel, between the sum of \$500 million that has been requested by Israel as an addition to the sums that have already been appropriated and what he feels is possible and will still meet his budgetary ceiling. To the best of my information, this sum is still under negotiation, and therefore any particular figure would be incorrect.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you refer to intermediaries between the United States and the PLO. May I ask if Egypt played a part in this capacity? May I ask you about the prospect for a Geneva meeting?*

A. First of all, "intermediary" between the United States and the PLO is perhaps too sweeping a word. The United States had the practical problem of evacuating citizens from areas that were controlled by Palestinians, and therefore it was necessary to make certain technical arrangements with the Palestinians. In this respect the Government of Egypt played an extremely helpful role, for which we are very grateful, and we dealt with it by stating our requirements to the

Government of Egypt, which then dealt with whatever group they felt was necessary to achieve it.

But they did not pass any messages from us to any other group. It was done by the Government of Egypt on its own authority. There were other Arab governments such as the Government of Saudi Arabia and of Tunisia that were extremely helpful in arranging the evacuation, and we have thanked them. The President has sent messages to all of them.

With respect to the resumption of the Geneva Conference, the United States has expressed its view that an extended stagnation of conditions in the Middle East would be dangerous to the peace of the area. We therefore support a peace process which in our view now should proceed on all fronts, either in stages or toward the final settlement, whichever the parties agree to.

We are prepared for a resumption of the Geneva Conference. We are prepared to do it in any other forum that indicates progress. We at one point proposed the preparatory conference in order to examine what could be done, but we are open-minded in this matter. The major objective is to make realistic progress, and we are in touch with all of the parties in order to achieve it.

## 124

### **Statement by UK Under-Secretary for Trade Meacher made in a House of Commons debate on the Arab boycott<sup>134</sup>**

London, June 24, 1976

My hon. Friend the Member for Basildon (Mr. Moonman) has, as always, presented his case very lucidly and very forcibly. I am very glad to have the opportunity to discuss this issue tonight because there can be no doubt that there is a very great deal of feeling in this country about it. In some quarters I think that it has generated some misunderstandings, which I hope to have the chance, briefly, to clear up.

As has been repeatedly stated by Ministers, in the House and elsewhere, Her Majesty's Govern-

<sup>134</sup> Excerpted from the text supplied, on request, by the British embassy in Beirut.

ment are opposed to and deplore all trade boycotts other than those that are sanctioned by international support and international authority. We wish to see our commercial relations expanding in all markets, but we recognise that exporters have to deal with a situation in which certain countries require certain special formalities and documentation.

It would not be for the Government to direct or instruct firms to supply specific markets or to prevent exporters from providing whatever documents or declarations are required in respect of goods shipped to a particular country. To direct firms not to comply with requirements which are often part of the import regulations of the importer's government could clearly bring to an end our export trade with those countries. This could be dangerous for this country's future economic policies, and it would be damaging to employment at home. We cannot ignore these realities.

Thus I think that it must be for exporters to decide how they deal with the situation which they currently face in doing business with the Middle East. If choices have to be made, firms must decide their policy in the light of their own commercial interests.

Similar principles must govern any consideration of this question by the EEC, of which my hon. Friend made mention, as this would require the agreement of all the member States. It is relevant here that the EEC has signed or is in the process of negotiating a network of commercial agreements with many Mediterranean States, including both Israel and her Arab neighbours. The principle underlying these agreements is one of improving the flow of trade. The boycott is clearly inconsistent with this. While I do not rule out discussing the problem with our trading partners, the first priority must be a peaceful solution to the fundamental political problem.

As far as I am aware, Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome, to which my hon. Friend explicitly referred, concerns restrictive agreements between undertakings and decisions by associations of undertakings which may affect trade between member States. It has no application to steps taken by individual firms as a result of external pressures. Article 85 concerns abuse of market powers by undertakings in as far as they affect trade between member States. Again, it has no application to steps taken as a result of external pressures.

No facts have been brought to our attention to show that any relevant articles of the Treaty of Rome have been breached in this country. Of course, if an individual firm has reason to believe that there has been an infringement of Article 85 or 86 and can claim a legitimate interest, it is open to that firm to request that the suspected infringement be investigated by the Commission of the EEC.

My hon. Friend also referred to American legislation on the boycott. Her Majesty's Government see little purpose in adding to the already heavy burden of documentation placed on our exporters by requiring them to report their dealings with the boycott authorities. After all, the United States' legislation does not appear to prevent American exporters from providing declarations required by Arab importers. It is merely the reporting of their dealings with the boycott authorities that is required. Again, we judge that it is best to leave it to the commercial judgment of our own traders.

Apart from these broad principles, however, there are considerable misunderstandings in some quarters over this issue. For example, it is not always understood that Iran, for example, has nothing to do with the boycott. It is not always understood that merely exporting non-military goods to Israel is in general compatible with a flourishing trade with Arab countries.

In that context I emphasise that officials at the Department of Trade are available to discuss with individual firms any problems that they encounter and to offer them their knowledge and experience. It is perhaps surprising that we often discover that firms have been about to act on the basis of a misunderstanding of the boycott.

I can place before the House a copy of a note for exporters which the Department has prepared and which has been circulated to member chambers by the Associated British Chambers of Commerce. In addition, the publication on Israel in the "Hints to Businessmen" series reminds readers to consult the Department if they have any doubts about the boycott.

My hon. Friend drew attention to the trade prospects with Israel and suggested that Government encouragement or inducement was necessary to ensure that it was fully exploited. Neither he nor other hon. Members need fear that British companies are unaware of the opportunities for exports to Israel. Last year, when Israel's total

imports fell, our exports to that country increased to £237 million and we regained our position as Israel's second largest supplier after the United States. This year we have supported a mission to Israel of the London Chamber of Commerce and today has been British Day at the International Consumer Goods Fair in Tel Aviv where we have an official British pavilion.

There have been regular contacts between British and Israeli Trade and other Ministers. But for the current suspension of the normal arrangements for pairing, the Under-Secretary of State responsible for civil aviation and shipping would tonight have hosted a reception at our pavilion at the Tel Aviv Fair. We are in the final stages of setting up a United Kingdom-Israel joint committee to examine further ways of promoting exports in both directions. Neither the Government nor British exporters can be accused of neglecting this important market.

## 125

**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Yugoslavia of President Assad of Syria (excerpts)<sup>135</sup>**

Belgrade, June 26, 1976

At the invitation of the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, the President of the Syrian Arab Republic Hafez al Assad, accompanied by his wife, paid an official and friendly visit to S.F.R. Yugoslavia on June 25 and 26, 1976.

Reviewing the situation in the Middle East, the two Presidents expressed their profound concern over the absence of concrete steps toward a solution of the Middle East crisis, the refusal of Israel to behave in accord with the United Nations resolutions or to recognize the national rights of the Palestinian people, and the continuing Israeli practices of reprisals, persecution, violation of human rights, and establishment of new settlements in occupied territories.

The two Presidents expressed the view that the

Middle East crisis has entered into a most critical and dangerous phase and that it is indispensable to take urgent steps to arrive at a thorough, just, and lasting settlement on the basis of complete Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories occupied since 1967 and the solution of the Palestinian problem in accord with recognition of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to form an independent Palestinian state.

The two Presidents consider that this goal calls for urgent cooperation, coordination, and joint action based on the solidarity of the Arab countries and the PLO in direct confrontation with Israel, so as to ensure the implementation of the resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the Security Council relating to the establishment of the basic national rights of the Palestinian people.

The two Presidents devoted particular attention to the developments in Lebanon. They consider it urgent to halt the conflict and bloodshed in that country. Any prolongation of the conflict increases the danger of the crisis spreading and represents a threat to the security of the entire region.

President Assad informed President Tito of the steps and measures Syria has taken to halt the Lebanese crisis and to create the conditions for the inauguration of political dialogue. He further acquainted him with the decisions of the Arab League regarding the formation of Arab peace forces in Lebanon, including Syrian forces, to halt the fighting and establish peace and security in the country.

President Assad asserted that Syria had no goal other than ensuring the independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

President Tito acquainted President Assad with the Yugoslav view of the Lebanese developments. He particularly stressed that the solution of the Lebanese crisis was primarily the affair of the Lebanese people. In this connection he called attention to the historical responsibility of the Arab countries and the international community to assist in the shaping of a solution that would ensure the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of non-aligned Lebanon, in accord with the interests of the Lebanese people and the need to secure the rights of the Palestinians.

The two Presidents asserted their full support for the peace mission of the Arab League in creating the conditions necessary for political settlement of the Lebanese crisis.

<sup>135</sup> Excerpted from the English text, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade) XXVII, 630-631 (July 5-20, 1976), p. 28.



The two Presidents believe that the developments in the Middle East generally and in Lebanon particularly place a great responsibility on the Arab countries requiring them to close their ranks and increase the solidarity of the Arab countries, the most essential factor for the rapid solution of the crisis in Lebanon and the Middle East generally.

## 126

**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of King Hussein of Jordan (excerpts)<sup>136</sup>**

Moscow, June 28, 1976

King Hussein ibn Talal of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan paid an official visit to the Soviet Union from June 17 to 28, 1976, at the invitation of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Soviet government.

During the talks, stress was laid on the dangerous situation in the Middle East.

The two sides consider that the tension in the Middle East area, which is jeopardising peace and international security, is the result of Israel's continued aggression against the Arab countries and peoples and her refusal to recognise the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

The two sides are unanimous in considering that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East can be achieved only with the complete withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967, with the satisfaction of the national demands made by the Arab people of Palestine and the ensuring of their right to self-determination.

Both sides feel that a just and lasting peace can be established in the Middle East as a result of an all-embracing settlement and not by separate and partial measures. It was pointed out, specifically, that such a settlement was possible only with the participation of all the sides immediately interested, including the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the legitimate representative of the

Arab people of Palestine.

The two sides are deeply concerned over the tragic events in Lebanon and call for a speedy end to the bloodshed and for the ensuring of Lebanon's integrity, independence and sovereignty.

## 127

**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Rumania of President Asad of Syria (excerpts)<sup>137</sup>**

Bucharest, June 28, 1976

At the invitation of President Nicolae Ceausescu, General Secretary of the Rumanian Communist Party and President of the Socialist Republic of Rumania, and Mrs. Ceausescu, President Hafiz Asad, General Secretary of the Baath Socialist Party and President of the Arab Republic of Syria, and Mrs. Asad paid an official and friendly visit to the Socialist Republic of Rumania in the period June 26-28, 1976.

Upon examining major international issues, the two sides paid special attention to the situation in the Middle East. The two presidents expressed their grave concern for the tense and conflict-creating situation in the Middle East which constitutes a serious threat to peace not only in that region but in the whole world.

They affirmed the necessity of intensifying efforts to arrive at a political solution of problems in the Middle East and to achieve real progress on the road to a just and permanent peace in accordance with UN resolutions. The urgent necessity for this peace was stressed in previous joint communiqués issued in 1974 and 1975.

The two presidents pointed out that the continued Israeli occupation of Arab lands since the aggression of 1967 and Israeli refusal to recognize the national rights of the Palestinian people have been and still are a permanent source of tension and military confrontation.

A just and permanent peace in the Middle East in accordance with relevant UN resolutions will be achieved when Israel withdraws from all Arab

<sup>136</sup> Excerpted from the English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5841 (July 13, 1976), p. 259.

<sup>137</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), June 29, 1976.

territories occupied since 1967 and it recognizes the national rights of the Palestinian people, including their firm right to establish an independent state.

The two presidents agreed that it is necessary to strengthen the role of the UN General Assembly and Security Council in order to facilitate solutions and the implementation of UN resolutions relating to the Middle East.

In this context, and reviewing recent Security Council debates, the two presidents condemned the oppressive measures adopted by the Israeli authorities against Palestinian inhabitants of the occupied territories, as well as the establishment of colonies and other measures that affect the geographic, demographic and cultural nature of these territories.

They expressed their support for the reconvening of the Geneva conference with participation of all parties concerned, including the PLO, which is the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, on a footing of equality with the other participants in the conference.

President Hafiz Asad expressed his deep gratitude for the fruitful efforts being made by President Ceausescu to bring about a just and permanent peace in the Middle East. The President of the Syrian Arab Republic pointed to the fact that the Rumanian president had from the beginning grasped the complexity and gravity of the situation, adopting a firm stand against the occupation of Arab lands by force in 1967 and for justice to be done to the Arab people of Palestine.

President Ceausescu expressed special gratitude for the fruitful efforts being made by President Asad to bring about a speedy settlement to the Middle East crisis and to establish a just and permanent peace in accordance with UN resolutions relating to withdrawal from occupied Arab territory and recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

The two presidents expressed their concern regarding the dangerous situation in Lebanon, 14 months after the start of civil war. Hence they call for an end to the fighting as soon as possible and for a solution to the conflict through dialogue, not armed confrontation. They affirmed the need to intensify efforts and thus enable the political and social forces in Lebanon to find a proper solution which would ensure the country's territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty as well as its in-

dependent economic, social and democratic development. This solution would enable the Lebanese people to solve its own problems, achieve national reconciliation and preserve fraternal relations with the Palestinian resistance, based on respect for agreements concluded between the Lebanese state and the PLO.

The two presidents further expressed their hope that the initiative undertaken by the Arab League with Syrian aid would help to bring about a restoration of peace in Lebanon in an effective manner. Such a solution to Lebanon's problems should also ensure that no outside interference takes place in Lebanese internal affairs and should conform with Lebanon's own vital interests as well as the interests of peace and security throughout the Middle East and the world.

## 128

### **Statement by UN Representative Sherer of the US explaining the US veto of a Security Council draft resolution regarding Palestinian rights<sup>138</sup>**

**New York, June 29, 1976**

I take this opportunity to thank once again all those in this Council who have so generously expressed their sympathy to the United States on the death of the American Ambassador to Lebanon, his Economic Counselor, and their driver. This terrible act brings to reality, as often our words do not, the seriousness, the explosiveness, the tragedy, of the whole situation in the Middle East.

The subject that is before us today, the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,<sup>139</sup> is an effort to come to grips with one aspect—a very central aspect—of the Middle East conflict.

My government does not doubt that the effort has been well intentioned and that members of the committee have worked hard and seriously to develop recommendations that will promote a Middle East settlement. But I must say in all candor, as my delegation has said before, that the

<sup>138</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXV, 1935 (July 26, 1976), p. 143-144. The draft resolution is doc. 17 above.

<sup>139</sup> Doc. 4 above.

basic approach that has been followed strikes us as misguided.

The Middle East conflict is probably the most complex dispute in the international scene. Is it realistic to assume such a problem can be resolved by committees, no matter how well meaning? Or is it not the duty of the United Nations to encourage the parties to resume negotiations on the serious issues that confront them?

Peace will come about through a negotiated comprehensive settlement taking into account all the issues involved in the Arab-Israeli dispute. The framework for this settlement exists in Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. In the numerous meetings of this Council since the beginning of the year touching various aspects of the Middle East situation, the United States has made clear its position on the principles that must underlie a Middle East settlement, on the Palestinian question as a whole, and on the situation in the territories occupied by Israel.

Our position is also clear on the report that has occasioned our meeting. We voted against General Assembly Resolution 3376 of November 10, 1975, which created the Committee of 20, just as we voted against General Assembly Resolution 3236, which it seeks to implement.

Our reason is not lack of concern for the Palestinian people. We have consistently made clear our concerns on this score and our conviction that there must be a solution to the Palestinian issue if there is to be a lasting settlement. We are convinced that resolutions and committee reports are not the most effective way of dealing with the question of the political future of the Palestinians. The United States will do its utmost to bring about the early resumption of serious negotiations looking toward a settlement of all the issues, and we believe that it is through such negotiations that we must seek a solution to the issue of the Palestinians.

Mr. President, I should like to explain my government's position on the draft resolution that is before the Council. There are, in our view, two fundamental flaws to this resolution.

First, the text is totally devoid of balance, stressing the rights and interests of one party to the Middle East dispute and ignoring the rights and interests of other parties.

Second, the draft "affirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, in-

cluding the right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine..." The political interests of the Palestinians and their role in a final Middle East settlement constitute, in my government's view, a matter that must be negotiated between the parties before it can be defined in resolutions of this Council.

For these reasons, Mr. President, my delegation intends to vote "No" on the resolution before us.

In closing I would like to second the appeal made by my British colleague for special contributions to UNRWA, to enable it to continue its humanitarian work touching the daily lives of Palestinians in need. We are heartened by the news of the generous contribution of Saudi Arabia and the intentions of the Governments of Japan and the United Kingdom. President Ford has submitted a request to Congress for substantial additional money to add to the U.S. contribution to UNRWA for 1976. We believe this is an appropriate way to deal with immediate Palestinian needs as we resolve to make a better future for the Palestinian people and the Middle East as a whole.

## 129

### **Declaration adopted by the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Europe (excerpts)<sup>140</sup>**

**East Berlin, June 30, 1976**

A conference of 29 Communist and Workers' Parties of Europe took place in Berlin, the capital of the German Democratic Republic, on June 29 and 30, 1976.

The participants in the Conference stand for:  
The elimination of the hotbeds of war through negotiation and the strict fulfilment of agreements reached, especially for a just overall settlement of

<sup>140</sup> Excerpted from the English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5840 (July 6, 1976), pp. 250, 255. The Communist Parties of the following countries took part: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (Democratic Republic), Germany (Federal Republic), Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, San Marino, Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, West Berlin and Yugoslavia.

the Middle East conflict guaranteeing the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territory occupied since 1967 and the national independence, security and territorial integrity of all states in this area and ensuring the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to their own national state; they are opposed to any outside interference in the affairs of the peoples in the Middle East.

## 130

**Resolution of the OAU Council of Ministers on the Middle East and occupied Arab territories<sup>141</sup>**

**Port-Louis, early July, 1976**

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity meeting in its Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session at Port Louis, Mauritius, from 24 June to 3 July 1976,

*Having considered* the report of the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU on the Middle East problem document CM/736 (XXVII),

*Having heard* the statement delivered during the session by the representatives of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the PLO and other delegations,

*Recalling* the resolutions adopted by previous sessions of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government and the Council of Ministers on the Palestinian problem and in particular AHG/Res. 76 (XII) and CM/Res. 459 (XXVI),

1. *Endorses* the report of the Secretary-General as contained in document CM/736 (XXVII);

2. *Further endorses* Resolution CM/459 (XXVI) by which the Council reaffirmed its total and effective support for Egypt, Arab front line States and the Palestinian people.

## 131

**Resolution of the OAU Council of Ministers on the question of Palestine<sup>142</sup>**

**Port-Louis, early July, 1976**

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity meeting in its Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session at Port Louis, Mauritius, from 24 June to 3 July 1976,

*Having considered* the report of the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU on the Palestinian question,

*Having heard* the statement of the Representative of the Palestinian Liberation Organization,

*Recalling* the declaration on Palestine, all other relevant resolutions and in particular resolutions CM/Res. 425 (XXV) and CM/Res. 460 (XXVI),

1. *Endorses* the report of the Administrative Secretary-General as contained in document CM/737 (XXVII);

2. *Further endorses* Resolution CM/Res. 460 (XXVI) by which the Council of Ministers reaffirmed its full and effective support to the Palestinian people;

3. *Requests* the PLO and the OAU Liberation Committee to co-ordinate their action through the OAU and the Arab League.

## 132

**Speech by US Secretary of State Kissinger at a luncheon in honour of visiting Deputy Prime Minister Prince Abdallah of Saudi Arabia<sup>143</sup>**

**Washington, July 8, 1976**

Your Royal Highness: It is always a great privilege for me to welcome friends from Saudi Arabia to the United States.

His Royal Highness pointed out to me that I have visited Saudi Arabia 13 times in the last three years; I pointed out to him that on my first visit I detected a certain suspiciousness on the part of my host, but I'm glad to say that we have devel-

<sup>141</sup> Text as published in UN doc. A/31/196, Annex, dated September 2, 1976, p. 13.

<sup>142</sup> Text as published in UN doc. A/31/196, Annex, dated September 2, 1976, p. 14.

<sup>143</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXV, 1936 (August 2, 1976), pp. 172-173.

oped a relationship now of mutual confidence and of personal friendship.

Of course, I always feel a little apologetic when I welcome people from Saudi Arabia here, because I recognize that as far as hospitality is concerned, the United States is an underdeveloped country.

Your Royal Highness is visiting the United States at a very important period in the relationship between the Arab countries and the United States and in the history of the Middle East. We are all conscious of the tragedy that is taking place in Lebanon, and we are also aware of the necessity of making progress toward peace in the Middle East. The two events are closely related because, in all candor, peace in the Middle East cannot progress without unity among the Arab nations. Contrary to what our critics are saying, the United States favors unity among the Arab nations.

We think that the Kingdom, and His Majesty in particular, has taken wise initiatives in bringing together the Prime Ministers of Syria and Egypt<sup>144</sup> and in using the good offices of Saudi Arabia to arrange negotiations among all of the parties in Lebanon.

Whatever assistance the United States can give these efforts, we will be eager to do. We believe that the time has come in Lebanon for all of the parties to recognize that a continuation of the conflict only leads to a needless loss of life and only encourages outside forces—that are neither interested in the independence of Lebanon nor in progress toward peace in the Middle East—to exploit the situation. I believe, and I have the impression that our friends in Saudi Arabia also believe, that it is time to have a roundtable conference in which all of the parties discuss arrangements in which the various communities can live together, the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon are safeguarded, and outside influences are gradually withdrawn.

As far as the Middle East as a whole is concerned, the United States has stated repeatedly that we believe important steps have been taken toward peace in the Middle East. But very major steps remain to be taken; and those steps, in our view, and I believe in the view of all of the parties now, have to be taken on all fronts, so that progress toward peace can be uniform for all of the

principal parties concerned. This is the attitude with which the United States is approaching the problem, and again, I want to emphasize that the cooperation between the Arab states has to be an important component of this effort.

As far as our bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia are concerned, Saudi Arabia has been our oldest friend in the Arab world. We have had an uninterrupted relationship of trust and confidence, and in the world as it is today, it is important that countries know that friends of the United States know of our interest in their sovereignty, in their prosperity, and in their independence; and that it is known that the United States stands behind its friends.

A few years ago, a group at the National War College sent a plaque—in brass, since only the Saudis can afford gold—with a piece of a plank on which the first meeting took place between President Roosevelt and the King of Saudi Arabia. A few weeks ago, the wheel of that ship was presented by Ambassador [William J.] Porter to the Government of Saudi Arabia. It symbolizes the fact that, while it may have taken 170 years of our history for our leaders to meet the leaders of Saudi Arabia, in the last 30 years these contacts have been frequent and important in the negotiations that I have had the privilege of conducting in the Middle East.

The advice of His Majesty King Faisal, of His Majesty King Khalid, and of the Crown Prince, Prince Fahd, has been of enormous importance. And anyone who knows how Saudi diplomacy operates—discreetly and unostentatiously—also knows that our Saudi friends always do more than they say, and I would like to stress that this close relationship we are dedicated to maintaining and to strengthening.

It is a great privilege, Your Royal Highness, to welcome you to the Department of State and to the United States, and I would like all of our guests to drink a toast: To His Royal Highness and to the growing friendship between our two peoples.

<sup>144</sup> See doc. 267 and 268 below.

## 133

**Communiqué issued by the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee expressing anxiety over the impact of current events on the Palestine resistance and the National Movement of Lebanon**<sup>145</sup>

Moscow, July 9, 1976

Current events in Lebanon are causing grave concern in Soviet circles. For over a year armed clashes, provoked by internal reaction backed by foreign imperialist circles, have been taking place. The national patriotic forces, the units of the Palestine resistance in Lebanon and the peaceful citizens of Beirut and other cities have become the target of the continuous blows of the reactionaries. Despite the fact that the Lebanese national forces and the Palestine resistance are ready to sit at the negotiating table in order to reach a settlement to the crisis with the participation of all parties concerned, the Lebanese reactionaries persist in their course of military escalation.

Progressive public opinion in the Arab countries rightly views the Lebanese conflict as a contemptible new conspiracy woven by imperialism and the Israeli ruling circles, aimed against a just settlement to the Middle East conflict and at splitting the Arab peoples in their struggle to liberate the Israeli-occupied Arab territories. The involvement of Syrian military units in this conflict has further aggravated the situation in Lebanon.

Events in Lebanon have lately taken on a more dramatic and bloody aspect. Thousands of innocent people have been killed or wounded after the savage artillery bombardment by the Christian rightist forces against the Palestinian refugee camps of Jisr al-Basha and Tal al-Zaatar and other areas. These crimes arouse the anger of all peace-loving democratic circles.

The Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, in the name of Soviet public opinion, calls for the immediate implementation of a cease-fire and for a halt to the bloodshed. Soviet public opinion believes that the Lebanese conflict can and should be solved, free from foreign interference, by the Lebanese themselves with the participation of all parties concerned on the basis of guaranteeing

the independence, sovereignty and unity of Lebanon. Only in this way can the Arab confrontation states extricate themselves from the conflict in Lebanon without further weakening themselves and scattering their forces, and thus emerge more united in order to continue their legitimate struggle for the liberation of the Arab territories and for the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the region.

Soviet citizens call on all peace-loving forces to support the Palestine resistance movement and the Lebanese progressive forces and announce their solidarity with the forces of freedom, peace and progress in the Middle East.

## 134

**Joint declaration issued after a meeting of the Communist Parties of Israel (Rakah) and Jordan (excerpt)**<sup>146</sup>

Late July, 1976

Negotiations were held between a delegation of the Communist Party of Jordan, led by First Secretary Fuad Nassar, and a delegation of the Communist Party of Israel led by General Secretary Meir Vilner. They examined the Middle East crisis and ways of solving it in the interests of all nations, peace and security in the region and in the world.

Both sides were pleased to note that the views of both Communist Parties coincided on all problems that were reviewed.

## I

Both Parties believe that Israel's nine year occupation of Arab territory, its non-recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian Arabs and the conspiracies with U.S. imperialism in the region make the situation in the Middle East explosive. It is in the vital interests of the peoples to prevent the outbreak of a new war and to see a just and lasting peace established.

The Israeli authorities continue their reprisals on the occupied Arab territory, crudely violating

<sup>145</sup> Translated from the Arabic text distributed by Tass News Agency (Beirut), July 10, 1976.

<sup>146</sup> Excerpted from the English text as published in *World Marxist Review Information Bulletin* (Toronto), XIV, 15-16 (July 31, 1976), pp. 31-34.

the Geneva Declaration and the people's rights.

In the occupied regions the Israeli rulers employ a policy of "creeping expansionism" by settling their colonists, expropriating lands, expelling Palestinians, carrying out arrests, torturing prisoners in jails, making bloody attacks on demonstrations protesting against the occupation and causing many casualties, particularly among women and children. The Israeli occupation authorities are abusing the population's national and religious feelings.

The brutal acts of suppression, however, could not extinguish the flame of struggle in the hearts of the Palestinian Arabs and their brothers on occupied territory. On the contrary, the flame has grown, popular resistance against the occupation has increased, and the mass demonstrations and strikes have gained in scope, reflecting the striving of the Palestinian Arab for a free life.

The internationalist policy of the Israeli Communist Party, its heroic struggle against Israeli occupation, against the reprisals on occupied Arab territory, its support of the national rights of the Palestinian Arabs are highly assessed by the Jordanian Communist Party. The stand of the CP Israel serves peace and the genuine interests of the Israeli people.

The Israeli Communist Party is deeply satisfied with the just and heroic struggle waged by the Jordanian CP together with all patriotic forces against the Israeli occupation, for the rights of the Palestinian Arabs, for a just and lasting peace. It expresses its solidarity with this struggle. The position of the Jordanian CP serves peace and the national emancipation of the Arab people of Palestine and the other Arab peoples.

## II

The problem of the Palestinian Arabs is at the core of the Israeli-Arab conflict. Without a just solution of this problem there can neither be a settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict nor an end to the Middle East crisis.

Both Communist Parties, the Jordanian and the Israeli, declare that today opportunities exist for a just and realistic settlement of the Middle East crisis by fulfilling the Security Council and UN General Assembly resolutions, which foresee:

—full withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied in 1967;

—respect for the rights of the Palestinian Arabs,

including their right to self-determination and the creation of an independent state on the West Bank to include the Arab sector of Jerusalem and the Gaza sector; allowing Palestinian refugees to return in accordance with UN resolutions;

—respect for the right of all states in the region to an independent existence in peace and security.

Both Parties believe that such a just and realistic peace program would inscribe a new page in the life of the region and free the people from the horrors of war and the burden of the tremendous military expenditures that are destroying the economy and lowering the people's living standards.

Both Parties believe that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole representative of the Palestinian Arabs. Such is the will of the Palestinian Arabs wherever they live, particularly on occupied territory. This was confirmed by the April 1976 municipal elections on the West Bank.

At the top-level conference in Rabat all the Arab states recognized the PLO as the sole lawful representative of Palestinian Arabs. This organization has been recognized by the UN General Assembly and the Security Council. Refusal by the United States and Israel to reckon with this universal decision is the main obstacle to a just peace.

Both Parties hold in high esteem the principled Leninist policy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, a policy of supporting the peoples' struggle for national and social emancipation, for peace and security in the Middle East and the whole world. The Soviet Union's authority is aiding the efforts to stop the Israeli occupation, restore the rights of the Palestinian Arabs and establish a just and lasting peace.

The development of events in the region proved that partial and separate steps and settlements as employed by the United States and those circles cooperating with it have not only not mitigated the Middle East crisis, but have complicated and worsened it.

The two Parties agree that in order to prevent a new war and settle the main problem connected with the Middle East crisis, it is necessary to immediately resume the work of the Geneva Conference with equal participation of all interested organizations, including the PLO.

## III

Both Parties brand with shame the conspiracies between U.S. imperialism, Israeli circles and reactionaries in Lebanon and other Arab countries. These conspiracies are aimed against the Lebanese and Palestinian people and have led to the tragic civil war in Lebanon.

Both Parties agree that the people's interests demand an immediate stop to the civil war in Lebanon and a political settlement by the Lebanese themselves without any foreign interference. They denounce the threat by imperialism and the Israeli authorities to interfere in Lebanon's internal affairs.

Any settlement in Lebanon must guarantee its independence and territorial integrity, the right of the Lebanese people to democratic development. It should strengthen the solidarity between the patriotic forces in Lebanon and the Palestinian Arabs.

. . . . .

## 135

**Interview statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger stressing the importance of a solution to the Lebanese problem before general Middle East peace negotiations and elaborating on the possibility of another oil embargo<sup>147</sup>**

**Portland, July 22, 1976**

. . . . .

*Mr. Sterling: Shifting to the Middle East, sir, what effect does the war in Lebanon have on your step-by-step diplomacy in the Middle East?*

A. First, let me explain with respect to our diplomacy. We were faced in 1973 with a situation in which there was an oil embargo. We had no diplomatic relations with any of the key Arab countries. The whole industrialized world was in increasing difficulties because of the impact of the Middle East war. The Soviet Union was backing the Arab countries and was the principal influence in several of the Arab countries.

Under those conditions, our immediate objective had to be to prevent the impact of this crisis from escalating further. We also thought that for nations who had made no progress toward peace for a generation, it was important above all to get to learn to deal with each other.

Under those conditions, the step-by-step approach was the most effective method to make progress, because it enabled us to reduce problems to manageable proportions—insofar as anything is manageable in the Middle East—and enabled the countries to take those steps on which they could agree.

We were also convinced that somewhere along the line the step-by-step approach would merge into an overall approach and that an attempt would be made to bring about a permanent peace on the basis of negotiations between the Arab countries and Israel. And we are approaching that point in any event.

Now, the impact of Lebanon on this process has been that for the time being the energies of almost all of the participants in a potential negotiation in the Middle East, and particularly of the Arab participants, is focused on their disagreements with respect to the evolution of Lebanon. And the Lebanese civil war has taken on these tragic dimensions because each of the factions—each of the Arab factions—is backed to a greater or lesser extent by some of the Arab countries.

So I would have to say that until the problem of Lebanon is resolved, it will be very difficult to get enough attention to [make] serious progress on the Middle East. And a degree of unity among the Arab countries as to their political objectives is essential to make significant progress toward peace.

*Mr. Sterling: As a followup, then, by your lights, what would be the happiest possible resolution of the Lebanese situation?*

A. I think, however, that as the Lebanese situation develops and as it evolves, the experience of the various Arab countries with the crisis may bring about consolidations that would be quite favorable to peace.

Now, what the United States has always believed is that the outcome in Lebanon should be one in which the territorial integrity of Lebanon is preserved, in which the two communities—the

<sup>147</sup> Excerpted from the text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXV, 1938 (August 16, 1976), pp. 235–237, 240, 244.



Christian and the Moslem communities—can exist side by side without either of them attempting to impose its will on the other. And this will require some new constitutional arrangements from those that prevailed previously. And if the Lebanese parties are left to settle their disputes—and I believe that some formula can be found and will be found, in which these objectives can be achieved.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, my question is as follows: What are the chances of a second Arab oil embargo? And what should the U.S. response be to a possible second Arab oil embargo, if one should occur?*

A. Well, the possibilities—our relations with the Arab world have improved to a point where an oil embargo is not likely to be undertaken lightly. If there should be another Arab-Israeli conflict, I suppose that there will be several Arab states that will be tempted to do this.

Since 1973 we and the other industrialized nations have formed an agency, the so-called International Energy Agency, whose purpose it is to make it easier for the industrialized nations to withstand the impact of an oil embargo. We have built up our oil stocks so that most countries now have six to nine months of reserves. We've agreed to share available supplies; and we've brought about a situation where a selective embargo is no longer possible, because of the mutual support that the industrialized nations will give to each other. So an embargo would be a much more complicated matter.

And without going into details, it's not a matter which the oil-exporting countries should take lightly, because in the future the United States and its industrial allies would also—would look to their own economic means of resistance.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how can a rise in the price of oil by the oil-producing countries be prevented by other means than trading in armaments?*

A. Well, I don't think that the trade in armaments is a device to prevent a rise in oil prices. I think it results from the rise in oil prices that has already occurred, because it gives the oil-producing countries enormously large resources with which to purchase either industrial goods or armaments—if that's what they choose. So the basic

problem is not that we are trying to prevent a rise in oil prices by selling armaments.

The fact is that having already achieved such tremendous surpluses as a result of the oil prices that have occurred since 1973, the oil-producing countries can enter the international market and buy armaments. And if they don't get them from us, they get them from other countries. And it isn't in our interest.

Our purpose in selling arms, when we do, is not to prevent a rise in prices but in order to prevent other countries from gaining the position of influence that often comes with the sale of arms.

### 136

#### **Press conference statement by US Secretary of State Kissinger reiterating that contact between the US and the PLO in Lebanon was solely for evacuation purposes<sup>148</sup>**

Teheran, August 7, 1976

*Q. Mr. Secretary, putting Iran-American relations aside for a while, I would like to hear your comments on the latest developments in the Middle East and in particular the Lebanese situation. With reference to the cooperation between the U.S. Embassy and the Palestinians, would this have any implication on forward developments in that region?*

A. The contact between the United States Embassy and the Palestinians in Beirut resulted from the de facto control of west Beirut by the Palestinians. It was confined to the security of American personnel in Beirut and the evacuation of Americans from Lebanon. It had no other significance. And it had no implication for the evolution of the Middle East negotiations.

The situation in Lebanon is a tragedy for the people of Lebanon. The United States is deeply interested in the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon and hopes that the parties concerned can negotiate a solution that will rapidly restore these conditions.

With respect to peace in the Middle East, the

<sup>148</sup> Excerpted from the text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXV, 1941 (September 6, 1976), p. 314.

United States has repeatedly said that we do not believe that a long period of stagnation is in the interest of anybody. The United States will support efforts to begin a negotiating process again as soon as the parties concerned are ready to do so and the [inaudible] of their efforts which Lebanon represents is at an end. But we believe that a lasting and just peace in the Middle East must be high on the agenda of all people who are concerned with peace in the world.

## 137

**Proposed political platform of the US Republican Party (excerpt)<sup>149</sup>**

**Kansas City, mid-August, 1976**

The preservation of peace and stability in the Middle East is a paramount concern. The efforts of two Republican Administrations, summoning diplomatic and political skills, have been directed toward reduction of tensions and toward avoiding flashpoints which could serve as an excuse for yet another round of conflict between Israel and the Arab countries.

Our commitment to Israel is fundamental and enduring. We have honored and will continue to honor that commitment in every way—politically, economically and by providing the military aid that Israel requires to remain strong enough to deter any potential aggression. Forty percent of all United States aid that Israel has received since its creation in 1948 has come in the last two fiscal years, as a result of Republican initiatives. Our policy must remain one of decisive support for the security and integrity of Israel.

An equally important component of our commitment to Israel lies in continuing our efforts to secure a just and durable peace for all nations in that complex region. Our efforts have succeeded, for the first time since the creation of the state of Israel, in moving toward a negotiated peace settlement which would serve the interests and the security of all nations in the Middle East. Peace in the Middle East now requires face-to-face, direct negotiations between the states

involved with the recognition of safe, secure and defensible borders for Israel.

At the same time Republican Administrations have succeeded in re-establishing communication with the Arab countries, and have made extensive progress in our diplomatic and commercial relations with the more moderate Arab nations.

As a consequence of the Middle East conflict of 1973, the petroleum-producing states imposed an embargo on the export of oil to most of the advanced industrial countries. We have succeeded in creating numerous cooperative mechanisms to protect ourselves, working in concert with our allies, against any future embargoes. The United States will view any attempt to reimpose an embargo as an essentially hostile act. We will oppose discriminatory practices, including boycotts of any type.

Because we have such fundamental interests in the Middle East, it will be our policy to continue our efforts to maintain the balance of power in the Mediterranean region. Our adversaries must recognize that we will not permit a weakening of our defenses or any attempt to disturb valued Alliance relationships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

We shall continue to support peace initiatives in the civil war in Lebanon; United States envoys engaged in precisely such an initiative were murdered, and we express our sorrow for their untimely deaths and for all other dedicated government employees who have been slain elsewhere while in service to their country. In Lebanon, we stand ready to provide food, medical and other humanitarian assistance.

## 138

**Press statement issued after a meeting between representatives of the Communist Party of Lebanon and the CPSU (excerpts)<sup>150</sup>**

**Moscow, August 17, 1976**

At the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, a meeting was held which included Andrei Kirilenko, member of the Politbureau and secretary of the Central Committee, Boris Ponomarev, candidate member of the Polit-

<sup>149</sup> As adopted by the Party's Committee on Resolutions; text of Middle East section, *Near East Report* (Washington), XX, 33 (August 18, 1976), p. 140.

<sup>150</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nida* (Beirut), August 18, 1976.

bureau and secretary of the Central Committee, and a delegation from the Lebanese Communist Party made up of comrades Nicola Shawi, General Secretary of the Central Committee and Nadim Abd al-Samad, member of the Politbureau and secretary of the Central Committee.

During the meeting, the two sides exchanged information about party activities and views concerning current issues related to the situation in the Middle East. This has increased in complexity recently due to the events in Lebanon.

The representatives of the Lebanese Communist Party spoke of developments in Lebanon and of the struggle of the communists and other progressive forces in the country to stop the bloodshed and achieve a political settlement of the crisis. Representatives of the Lebanese Communist Party attach a great deal of importance in this regard to the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanese territory.

The two sides noted that the bloody events in Lebanon are the result of sabotage by imperialism and domestic reaction, the direct result also of the crisis in the Middle East remaining without solution and the continuing Israeli aggression against the Arab peoples. Reactionary and imperialist circles have sought, by exploding and deepening the Lebanese crisis, to direct the Arab peoples from their struggle to liberate the occupied Arab territories, and to ensure the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; to fragment the forces of freedom and progress in the Arab world and to strike at the Palestine resistance movement.

The two sides firmly condemned the Israeli acts of piracy that seek to blockade the Lebanese coast. During the meeting, it was emphasized that confronting the schemes of imperialism and reaction must be accomplished by achieving a settlement which enables the anti-imperialist forces in this conflict not to emerge divided and weakened but united around common goals of the struggle against Israeli aggression and for the sake of the freedom and social progress of the Arab peoples.

During the meeting, the two sides emphasized the importance of channelling all the efforts of anti-imperialist forces towards foiling the schemes of imperialism and reaction in Lebanon. They expressed their conviction that the Lebanese

crisis can and must be solved by the Lebanese themselves without the interference of foreign powers and on a democratic and peaceful basis which would ensure the independence, sovereignty and unity of Lebanon.

### 139

#### **Statement by President Tito of Yugoslavia on the Middle East conflict<sup>151</sup>**

**Colombo, August 19, 1976**

The Middle East is the most dangerous hotbed of crisis today. Israel, supported by some big powers, is the main cause of such a situation, because it will not renounce its aggressive policy of annexation and occupation of Arab territories. Moreover, it is even intensifying terror against the Palestinian population. Grave responsibility is borne also by those who, by rendering Israel military and economic assistance, make it possible for that country to behave in this way. The non-aligned countries have proposed the bases on which it is possible to resolve this crisis in a just manner. This, of course, presupposes Israel's withdrawal from all the territories occupied in 1967, and the realization of the national rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to a state of their own. Otherwise, there can be no durable peace and security for the peoples and states in that region. Any attempt "to resolve" this crisis at the expense of the Palestinian people must be prevented. Any attempt at pushing aside and breaking up the Palestinian Liberation Organization as its legitimate representative will only further aggravate the Middle East crisis. If Israel persists in its expansionist policy, the United Nations should take effective sanctions in keeping with contained [*sic*] in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

It is also indispensable to resolve the Lebanese crisis as soon as possible. The unity, sovereignty

<sup>151</sup> Made in a speech to the General Assembly of the Fifth Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries; excerpted from the English text, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXVII, 634 (September 5, 1976), pp. 13-14.

and territorial integrity of non-aligned Lebanon must be ensured, and the interests of the Palestinians, protected. I deem it indispensable for the Arab countries to transcend their mutual differences as soon as possible and not to allow any external factors to kindle these differences and use them to serve their own goals.

## 140

**Resolution adopted by the Fifth Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries on the report of the UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People<sup>152</sup>**

Colombo, August 19, 1976

The Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries:

Having considered the Report of the "United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People", established in accordance with United Nations resolutions 3376 (XXX)—document S/12090,<sup>153</sup>

1. *Affirms* the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the right of return and the right to national independence and the establishment of its independent, sovereign State in Palestine, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

2. *Endorses* the Report of the Committee;

3. *Requests* the representatives of the Non-Aligned countries in the United Nations to support the Report in the Thirty First Session of the General Assembly;

4. *Appeals to* the General Assembly to endorse the Report and urges the competent bodies of the United Nations to take immediate action in accordance with the programme of implementation recommended by the Committee;

5. *Requests* the Co-ordinating Bureau to take the necessary steps for the implementation of the present Resolution.

## 141

**Resolution adopted by the Fifth Conference of Heads of State and Governments of Non-Aligned Countries on the question of Palestine<sup>154</sup>**

Colombo, August 19, 1976

The Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned countries meeting in Colombo, Sri Lanka, from 16 to 19 August 1967:

*Recalling* the previous resolutions of the Non-Aligned Conferences on the question of Palestine, and the explosive situation resulting from Israel's persistence in usurping Palestine and its continuous denial of the national rights of the Palestinian people recognized by the world community as represented by the United Nations, which constitute a threat to the security and territorial integrity of the Non-Aligned countries and to international peace and security,

*Reaffirming* the legitimacy of the Palestinian people's struggle against colonialism, Zionism and racism by all possible means, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations, with a view to recovering their inalienable national rights, a struggle which is considered an integral part of the international liberation movement,

*Reiterating further* that the Palestine issue is the essence of the conflict with Zionism,

*Asserting* that Israel's persistence in occupying Palestine and its continuous denial of the Palestinian people's inalienable national rights, as well as its rejection of the United Nations' relevant resolutions, in particular United Nations General Assembly resolution 3236 adopted in its Twenty-Ninth Session, is inadmissible and constitutes a flagrant violation of the principles of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights as well as a serious threat to world peace,

*Considering* that Israel's refusal to co-operate with the Committee of Twenty set up by the United Nations General Assembly resolution 3376 (XXX) to ensure that the Palestinian people exercise their inalienable national rights as provided for by United Nations General Assembly resolution 3236 confirms Israel's persistence in its flagrant defiance of the will of the inter-

<sup>152</sup> English text, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXVII, 634, (September 5, 1976), p. 51.

<sup>153</sup> Doc. 4 above.

<sup>154</sup> English text, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXVII, 634 (September 5, 1976), pp. 50-51.

national community and its refusal to abide by United Nations resolutions,

*Considering* that Israel's continued membership in the United Nations is in contradiction with its Charter and encourages Israel to ignore its resolutions and to act in collusion with the various aggressive, racist and expansionist regimes,

*Reaffirming* the United Nations General Assembly resolution 3379 dated 10 November 1975, which views Zionism as a form of racism and racial discrimination,

*Condemning* Israel's racist, expansionist, terrorist policy and its attempts to Judaize Arab territories, particularly in the cities of Jerusalem and Hebron, and the sacred shrines therein,

*Reaffirming* that the racist rule in occupied Palestine, in Zimbabwe, Namibia and Azania (South Africa) proceeds from the same imperialist source and is organically linked to that policy which aims at the repression of man's freedom and is an affront to his dignity,

*Considering* that maintaining political, economic, technical and other relations with Israel helps it to continue its usurpation of Palestine, to persist in ignoring international will as well as United Nations resolutions, and encourages it to pursue its expansionist racist policy which is essentially founded on aggression,

*Expressing* its conviction that the military, economic, political and moral support that Israel receives from some States and particularly the United States of America, encourages it to persist in its aggressive policy and its usurpation of Palestine,

*Recalling* the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, and stressing the fact that it should be applied by the Zionist Israeli occupation authorities,

*Deploring* the non-implementation of the resolution adopted by the Fourth Summit Conference of the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned countries held in Algiers which, in its operative paragraph 8, calls on the Member States that still maintained relations with Israel to sever them at diplomatic, economic, military and cultural levels, as well as in the fields of sea and air communication, in accordance with Chapter Seven of the United Nations Charter,

*Decides:*

1. To *reaffirm* its total and effective support to

the Palestinian people in their legitimate struggle to recover their inalienable national rights in Palestine, which comprise:

(a) their right to return to their homeland and to recover their property as guaranteed by United Nations resolutions,

(b) their right to self-determination without any outside interference, in keeping with the principles of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,

(c) their right to freely exercise their sovereignty over their territory,

(d) to establish their national independent Palestinian authority as an expression of their own will and a confirmation of their national identity;

2. To *strive* in all fields, at the widest international level, for the recognition and respect of the national rights of the Palestinian people, the Non-Aligned countries undertake to carry out all necessary measures to realize that objective,

3. To *call upon* all the Non-Aligned countries to pledge support for the Palestinian people by all possible means in their continued struggle against the Zionist racist occupation of Palestine until they fully recover their inalienable national rights, and to reaffirm that the recovery of these rights is a prerequisite to the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

4. To *intensify* co-ordination between the Non-Aligned Movement and the Palestine Liberation Organization, as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, at both bilateral and international levels, to ensure the liberation of Palestine, and that its people exercise their national rights, and to view the question of Palestine as one of the leading issues of Non-Alignment,

5. To *call upon* all Non-Aligned countries to adhere to all the resolutions adopted by the Summit and Ministerial Conferences of Non-Aligned countries on the question of Palestine, and to implement them as soon as possible, particularly as regards severing political, economic, cultural and technical relations with racist and Zionist Israel,

6. To *call upon* all Member States that have not yet taken the necessary measures to accept the representation of the Palestine Liberation Organization in their capitals to do so forthwith as a step on the path towards developing bilateral relations between Non-Aligned countries and the Palestine Liberation Organization,

7. To *condemn* Israel for its constant refusal to apply United Nations resolutions and specifically those of the General Assembly's Twenty-Ninth and Thirtieth Sessions concerning the question of Palestine, especially resolution 3236, which implies an explicit recognition of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people by the international community,

8. To *condemn* Israel's violation of human rights in occupied Palestine and its refusal to apply the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in particular the Fourth Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, and its policy of Judaizing the natural and cultural features in occupied Palestine,

9. To *condemn* all countries that afford political, military or economic or human assistance to Israel and request them to put an immediate end to it,

10. To *consider* the measures taken by Israel in the Arab territories to alter the demographic, geographical, social, cultural and economic features, including steps to Judaize the cities of Jerusalem, Nazareth and the region of Galilee, as null and void, and which therefore should under no circumstances be recognized as to their substance and effects,

11. To *invite* the United Nations General Assembly to initiate practical measures to put an end to the non-compliance with its resolutions, with a view to safeguarding that international organization and ensuring its continued existence, and in order to avert any threat to international peace and security,

12. To *call on* the Non-Aligned countries to take all necessary measures to increase pressure on Israel in the United Nations and its specialized agencies, including the possibility of depriving it of its membership, if necessary,

13. To *urge* all Non-Aligned countries to implement operative paragraph 12 by mandating their Foreign Ministers to fully co-ordinate their action with the Palestine Liberation Organization during the examination of the question of Palestine at the Thirty-First Session of the United Nations General Assembly,

14. To *put* the question of Palestine on the Agenda of the forthcoming Sixth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned countries.

### **Resolution adopted by the Fifth Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries on the Middle East<sup>155</sup>**

**Colombo, August 19, 1976**

The Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned countries meeting in Colombo, Sri Lanka from 16–19 August 1976,

*In keeping with* the principles and objectives of non-alignment and the principles and objectives of the United Nations,

*Reaffirming* the indissoluble bonds of the Non-Aligned countries and their commitment to the objectives of their common struggle for peace, justice and progress,

*Convinced* of the role of non-alignment in directing the evolution of the world, away from the path of polarization and free of the evils of aggression, racism, neocolonialism and all attempts at domination and exploitation,

*Recalling* the Declaration of the Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned countries meeting in Algiers in 1973<sup>156</sup> and the resolutions of the Summit and Ministerial Conferences of the Non-Aligned countries on the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories in June 1975, the last being resolution 8 adopted by the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Lima (Peru) in August 1975,<sup>157</sup>

*Deeply concerned* with the increasing deterioration of the situation in the Middle East following Israel's expansionist policy of aggression and its refusal to implement the resolutions of the United Nations,

*Denouncing* all attempts to maintain a state of "no war no peace" in the Middle East which is a serious threat to any possibility of establishing a just and lasting peace in the area thereby endangering world peace, security and stability,

*Denouncing* all attempts to force a *fait accompli* and all the policies of aggression, exploitation, domination, repression and terrorism on which the Zionist policy is founded,

*Condemning* all measures taken by Israel in the occupied Arab territories to change the demo-

<sup>155</sup> English text, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXVII, 634 (September 5, 1976), pp. 49–50.

<sup>156</sup> Doc. 120 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

<sup>157</sup> See docs. 143 and 144 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

graphic and geographical aspects of those territories, to establish colonies of settlements thereon and to despoil their cultural aspects, in particular those measures and plans of a racist nature,

*Reaffirms* that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be attained without Israel's withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since 1967 and the Palestinian people's exercise of all their legitimate rights, particularly the right to return to their homeland and to recover their properties in accordance with the resolution of the United Nations as well as their right to self-determination and their right to set up their independent State,

1. *Reaffirms* the Non-Aligned countries' pledge to support the right of the Arab people and to give material and moral assistance to the front line countries and to the Palestinian people in their just struggle to recover all their occupied territories and national rights,

2. *Sets up* a Committee (composed of Non-Aligned countries) to find practical means of assisting the Arab countries and peoples under the yoke of Israeli occupation,

3. *Reaffirms* that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East must be based on the following:

(a) the total and unconditional withdrawal of Israel from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967,

(b) the Palestinian people's recovery of their national rights and the exercise of these rights, particularly that of establishing their independent state,

4. *Reaffirms* international resolutions stipulating that the only proper means of satisfying the basic demands mentioned in operative paragraph (3) calls for the use of all effective means to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

5. *Calls upon* the Non-Aligned countries and peoples to adopt a firm stand against Israel's obstinacy and its endeavours to maintain the state of "no war no peace" and notes that these attempts constitute a threat to the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and a grave danger to world peace, security and stability,

6. *Calls upon* all States and peoples to give their full support to the Arab countries facing Israeli aggression, in their struggle to put an immediate end to this aggression,

7. *Denounces* the countries which are providing Israel with assistance, weapons and means of

slaughter and destruction and considers that the real objective behind overflowing Israel with such massive quantities of arms is to consolidate it as a colonialist and racist basis in Africa, Asia and the Third World in general,

8. *Calls upon* all States to stop all the military, human and material assistance which encourage Israel to pursue its occupation of the Arab territories, and declares that continued support to Israel from these States would force the Non-Aligned countries into adopting a new stand in respect of them,

9. *Condemns* the collusion between Israel and South Africa confirmed by the assimilarity of their policies of aggression and racism as well as their collaboration in all fields with a view to threatening African and Arab security and independence,

10. *Reaffirms* that the Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War applies to the situation prevailing in the occupied Arab territories and calls upon the parties to the Convention to implement it by forcing Israel to put it into effect and stop all Acts that are a violation to the Convention,

11. *Condemns* the expansionist policy of Israel and its measures aiming at the annexation of territories by force, the alteration of their geographical, demographic and economic features and the destruction of their cultural aspects; declares that all these measures are null and void; and demands that Israel put an end to them forthwith,

12. *Condemns* Israel for persisting in its policy of forcing a *fait accompli* and for establishing colonies of settlements on Palestinian and all occupied Arab territories which is inconsistent with the principles of International Law, particularly that of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by force and which constitutes an obstacle to a just settlement of the Middle East question,

13. *Condemns* Israel's measures to exploit and despoil the natural resources of the occupied Arab territories, and calls upon all States to refrain forthwith from assisting Israel in its exploitation of Arab resources,

14. *Holds* Israel responsible for all its measures designed to alter, exploit and despoil the occupied Arab territories,

15. *Calls upon* the non-aligned countries which have not yet severed diplomatic, economic and other relations with Israel to do so in view of Israel's

continued refusal to comply with the resolutions of the United Nations and its persistence in pursuing its settlers and expansionist policy of aggression as well as its defiance of world public opinion,

16. *Calls upon* Non-Aligned countries to take up all effective measures at the widest possible international scale in the United Nations and its Agencies as well as in the various international Organizations and Conferences with a view to increasing pressures on Israel, including the possibility of depriving it from its membership to these bodies should the need arise.

### 143

#### **Resolution adopted by the Fifth Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries on permanent sovereignty over national resources in the occupied Arab territories<sup>158</sup>**

Colombo, August 19, 1976

*The Fifth Non-Aligned Summit Conference:*

*Recalling* resolution 6 of the Fourth Non-Aligned Summit Conference, Algiers, 1973, entitled "Economic Effects of the Israeli Aggression against Arab States",<sup>159</sup>

*Recalling also* the General Assembly resolution 3336 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974, entitled "Permanent sovereignty over national resources in the occupied Arab territories", in paragraph 5 of which the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant specialized agencies and United Nations organs, including the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, to prepare a report on the adverse economic effects on the Arab States and peoples resulting from repeated Israeli aggression and continued occupation of their territories,

*Recalling further* General Assembly resolution 3516 (XXX) of 15 December 1975 which requested the Heads of the relevant specialized agencies and United Nations organs, particularly the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the Economic Commission for Western Asia, to co-operate actively and ad-

equately with the Secretary-General in the preparation of a final and comprehensive report on this subject,

*Confirms that* the Secretary-General of the United Nations in pursuance of the above-mentioned resolutions submits to the Thirty-first Regular Session of the General Assembly the final and comprehensive report referred to in resolution 3516 (XXX);

*Recommends that* Member States should take joint action in the United Nations in order to ensure that the Arab States and peoples, particularly the Palestine peoples, be fully compensated for the adverse economic effects of the repeated Israeli aggression and continued occupation and exploitation of Arab population and territories.

### 144

#### **Political declaration of the Fifth Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries (excerpts)<sup>160</sup>**

Colombo, August 19, 1976

The Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries was held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, from 16-19 August, 1976.

The following countries participated as Members in the Conference:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentine Republic, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon (United Republic of), Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Egypt (Arab Republic of), Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Palestine Liberation Organisation, Panama, Peru, Qatar, Republic of Maldives, Rwanda, Demo-

<sup>158</sup> English text, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXVII, 634 (September 5, 1976), pp. 60-61.

<sup>159</sup> Doc. 118 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

<sup>160</sup> Excerpted from the English text, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXVII, 634 (September 5, 1976), pp. 18-19, 25.



cratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Upper Volta, Socialist Republic of Viet-Nam, Yemen Arab Republic, Yemen People's Democratic Republic, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

The Conference granted special status to Belize including the right to address the Summit.

The following countries and organizations attended the Conference as Observers:

Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela;

African National Congress, Pan African 1st Congress of Azania, Socialist Party of Puerto Rico, United Nations, Organization of African Unity, Arab League, Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation, African National Council of Zimbabwe, Djibouti Liberation Movement, South West Africa People's Organization, Somali Coast Liberation Front, The Secretary-General, Islamic Conference.

The following countries attended the Conference as Guests:

Austria, Finland, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland.

## VIII. SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

70. The Middle East situation continues to pose a grave threat to international peace and security. About nine years following its 1967 aggression, Israel continues to occupy Arab territories and violate the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people. The Israeli aggressors persist in their policy of expansion, annexation, mass expulsion and repression of the Arab population, in violation of the United Nations Charter and resolutions, and the principles of humanitarian and international law, particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention. Moreover, Israel continues to establish settlements in the occupied Arab territories and take measures aiming at the alteration of the political, demographic and cultural features, and religious character of Jerusalem and other occupied Arab territories.

71. Dependent on the United States political, economic and military support, Israel persists in its dilatory tactics and efforts to prolong its oc-

cupation in a bid to obstruct the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region.

72. In view of the above, the Conference deemed it necessary that all Non-Aligned countries play an effective role and make positive contribution to the maintenance of world peace by exerting sustained and stronger pressure and adopting a clear stand in order to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

73. The international community is fully convinced that a just and lasting peace can only be established through an over-all settlement based on Israel's total withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and the Palestinian people's recovery and exercise of their inalienable national rights. Such an over-all settlement can only be reached through the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people on the basis of General Assembly Resolution 3375 (XXX).

74. The Conference called upon all countries:

(a) To give all-out support and military, moral and material assistance to the Arab States and the Palestinian people under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, in the struggle to end the Israeli aggression.

(b) To desist forthwith from any action which could contribute to Israel's financial, military or human potential or give moral support to its policy.

(c) Not to recognize any alterations made by Israel in the geographic, democratic, economic, cultural or historical characteristics of the occupied territories, and hold it responsible for the exploitation of these territories' wealth and resources.

(d) To stress the Non-Aligned countries' support for the preservation of the national, religious and spiritual values of Jerusalem and regard all annexation measures taken by Israel as null and void.

(e) To condemn the racist and hostile collusion between South Africa and Israel which aims at creating a racist and expansionist axis to wage war against peoples and deprive them of their national rights.

75. The Conference expressed deep satisfaction at the United Nations resolutions which stress the importance of the establishment of a just and lasting peace in consonance with the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter.

76. The Conference, gravely concerned over the stagnation of efforts to establish a just peace, is confident that Non-Aligned countries will bring stronger pressure to bear in order to create the impetus necessary for overcoming the obstacles which Israel attempts to force on the international community.

#### IX. QUESTION OF PALESTINE

77. The Palestine and Middle East situation continues to pose a grave threat to international peace and security.

78. Israel's continued usurpation of Palestine, its flagrant denial of the national rights of the Palestinian people as recognized by the United Nations, its persistence in its hostile, expansionist and racist policy and its repressive practices against the Palestinian people in the occupied territories constitute a defiance of the international community and a violation of the Principles of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.

79. The Conference believed that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East can only be established through the solution of the Palestine question, the root cause of the conflict in the region, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions which recognized the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people.

80. The Conference after considering the Report of the United Nations Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People<sup>161</sup> established in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 3376 (XXX) endorsed the Report and requests the respective representatives of the Non-Aligned countries at the United Nations to support the Report in the 31st Session of the United Nations General Assembly and urges the competent bodies of the United Nations to take immediate action in accordance with the programme of implementation recommended by the Committee.

81. Israel's refusal to co-operate with the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestine People set up by the Thirtieth Session of the United Nations General Assembly in accordance with United Nations Resolution 3236 (XXIX) is a new indication of Israel's persistent defiance of the will of the international community and attempts to prevent the Pal-

estinian People from exercising their inalienable national rights. This only serves to escalate the conflict and tension in the Middle East and creates an explosive situation which poses a grave threat to international peace and security.

82. In view of the obstacle laid by the United States to block any condemnation of or sanctions against Israel by using the veto in the Security Council against relevant draft resolutions, the Conference urged the need to take the most adequate measures in order to strengthen their pressure on Israel in the United Nations and specialized agencies, including the possibility of eventually depriving it of its membership in these institutions.

83. The Conference noted with deep satisfaction the United Nations resolutions which invite the Palestine Liberation Organisation, as the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate in all international efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East which are held under United Nations auspices, on an equal footing with other parties, on the basis of Resolution 3236 (XXIX).

84. The Conference also noted with satisfaction the United Nations resolution which condemns Zionism as a form of racism and racial discrimination.

#### 145

#### **Communiqué issued by the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee denouncing attacks against the Palestine resistance movement and Lebanese National Movement<sup>162</sup>**

**Moscow, August 26, 1976**

The armed factions of Lebanese reaction have in the recent past carried out a new escalation of military operations against the Palestinian Resistance Movement and the Lebanese Nationalist forces.

And in circumstances of the extended siege imposed on the Palestinian and Lebanese nationalists, the right-wing force, with large-scale support by aggressive NATO circles have launched an intensive and large-scale attack on Palestinian and Lebanese nationalist positions and committed

<sup>161</sup> Doc. 4 above.

<sup>162</sup> English text distributed by Tass and published in *Wafa* (Beirut), August 27, 1976, pp. 3-4.

bloody new atrocities in the regions that they have seized.

The savage violence of the reactionaries against thousands of Palestinian and Lebanese nationalists and against Muslim inhabitants in Nabaa, Tal al-Zaatar and other regions, has incited strong anger and denunciation by the Soviet people, and has caused pain to all those who care for the principles of peace and the freedom of peoples.

The situation was further worsened by the actions of Israel, which closely resembles piracy, along the Lebanese coast: actions which resulted in halting the arrival of foodstuffs and medicines sent by international democratic and nationalist organizations to help the inhabitants of Lebanon.

All this confirms the danger of the conspiracy aimed to destroy the positions of the Palestinian Resistance Movement and the Lebanese nationalist forces; and it shows the existence of long-term conspiracies by international and local reaction in the Middle East.

The Soviets strongly denounce the cowardly intervention of Israel and the imperialist forces supporting it in the affairs of Lebanon, considering it a new act of aggression by Tel Aviv against the Arab peoples.

Soviet public opinion considers unacceptable and even contradictory with the principles of humanity and international right, the acts committed by reaction against the Palestinian Resistance Movement and its militant vanguard, the PLO, the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, which is recognized on a wide scale by the international community and the UN Organization.

It is well known that the Soviet Union is fully confident that the Lebanese conflict can and must be settled in a democratic and peaceful manner by the Lebanese themselves in order to secure the unity of Lebanese soil, its independence and sovereignty.

The Soviets support the stand of the PLO and the Lebanese Nationalist forces working to settle the Lebanese crisis without external intervention. They share with world public opinion its view that for the solution of the Lebanese crisis, it is important that Syrian forces be withdrawn from Lebanon.

It is natural that a settlement of the situation in Lebanon will greatly facilitate Syria's cooperation with its natural allies against imperi-

alism, i.e. with the Palestinian Resistance Movement and the Lebanese Nationalist forces. This will undoubtedly help in restoring and consolidating the front of Arab forces struggling against Israeli aggression and imperialist expansionist plots and ambitions, and in order to guarantee a just peace in the Middle East.

The Soviet Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity calls upon international democratic and national organizations to work to support the Palestinian Arab people and the Lebanese nationalists in their struggle to foil the imperialist conspiracy in Lebanon and to stop the bloodshed immediately, and settle the Lebanese crisis politically in the interest of the people of this country and all the peoples of the Middle East.

#### 146

### **Report of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the US House of Representatives on the Arab boycott—summary, conclusions and recommendations<sup>163</sup>**

**Washington, September, 1976**

#### SUMMARY

The boycott of Israel by the Arab countries raises basic and often conflicting legal, economic and political issues for the United States. It has brought into question the applicability of a variety of U.S. laws especially antitrust and civil rights laws, laws affecting the banking industry, and securities laws affecting corporate behavior and disclosure. It has also raised the question of whether there is need for new law.

The Arab boycott is an aspect of the Arab-Israeli conflict in which U.S. foreign policy interests are involved. The boycott has had a significant impact within the United States and raises fundamental issues concerning our commitment as a people to principles of free trade and freedom from religious discrimination.

Although the Arab economic boycott against Israel and its supporters has formally been in existence for 25 years, its impact throughout the world began to increase dramatically in late 1974 following the fourfold petroleum price increase

<sup>163</sup> *The Arab Boycott and American Business. Report by the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Congress, 2nd session, 1976, pp. vii-xiii.*

brought on by the Arab oil embargo. Accordingly, an investigation into the domestic effects of the boycott was commenced in March of 1975 by the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce upon the request of Rep. James H. Scheuer, a subcommittee member.

In July 1975, the subcommittee sought from the Department of Commerce copies of "boycott reports" filed with the Department over the past 5 years. Pursuant to the Export Administration Act, (50 U.S.C. 2403 (b)), U.S. exporters receiving requests to participate in foreign imposed restrictive trade practices or boycotts are required to report to the Commerce Department the facts surrounding those requests.

When the then Secretary of Commerce, Rogers C.B. Morton, refused to voluntarily provide the reports, the subcommittee, on July 28, 1975, issued a subpoena duces tecum. On September 22, 1975, pursuant to the subpoena, Secretary Morton appeared before the subcommittee to explain his refusal to furnish the documents.

Secretary Morton testified that section 7(c)<sup>164</sup> of the Export Administration Act prohibited him from disclosing the reports to Congress. Subcommittee Chairman John E. Moss noted that the statute does not refer to Congress and that statutes should not be interpreted to preclude Congress from obtaining documents needed to carry out oversight duties under article I of the Constitution unless they do so expressly, not as the Secretary argued, by implication. Secretary Morton again refused to comply.

The subcommittee examined the issues raised by the Secretary and found them legally unportable. On November 11, 1975, it approved a resolution by a vote of 10 to 5 finding the Secretary in contempt of Congress and referring the matter to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce for appropriate action.

On December 8, 1975, 1 day before the contempt matter was to be brought before the full

committee, the Secretary agreed to provide the subpoenaed documents. The subcommittee received them in executive session pursuant to rule XI (k) (7) of the Rules of the House of Representatives.<sup>165</sup>

Examination of the reports furnished by Secretary Morton was necessary in evaluating the impact of the boycott on domestic commerce because the reports provided the only comprehensive data base on restrictive trade practices imposed by foreign concerns on American business. The antiboycott provisions of the Export Administration Act are the only Federal law dealing directly with these practices. As part of this review, subcommittee staff examined at least 30,000 subpoenaed report documents.

The pattern of Commerce Department activities studied by the subcommittee indicates that the Department, at best, did a bare minimum to carry out the mandate of the foreign boycott provisions of the Export Administration Act. By actions such as distributing to U.S. businesses "trade opportunities" containing boycott clauses, the Commerce Department actually furthered the boycott by implicitly condoning activity declared against national policy by Congress 11 years ago. Administration of the act's boycott-reporting provisions was so poor that the executive and Congress have been effectively deprived of data necessary to determine the scope and impact of, and adequately deal with boycott practices.

The subcommittee found that the reporting practices and policies of the Commerce Department often served to obscure the scope and the impact of the Arab boycott. The subcommittee also found that the impact on U.S. business has been substantially greater than Congress had been led to believe by the Commerce Department. Thus, while boycott activities thrived, the Department generally looked the other way, except when pressed to act by Congress and by public opinion.

#### CONCLUSIONS

The Subcommittee finds:

(1) The practices and policies of the Department of Commerce have served to thwart full

<sup>164</sup> 50 USC App. 2406 (c).

Section 7 (c) of the Act states:

"No department, agency or official exercising any functions under this Act shall publish or disclose information obtained hereunder which is deemed confidential or with reference to which a request for confidential treatment is made by the person furnishing such information, unless the head of the department or agency determines that the withholding thereof is contrary to the national interest." [orig. note]

<sup>165</sup> Rule XI(k) (7) provides "No evidence or testimony taken in executive session may be released in public session without the consent of the Committee." [orig. note]

implementation of the antiboycott provisions of the Export Administration Act. The Department has taken action reluctantly and only after Congress urged it to act more decisively.

(2) Through a variety of practices, the Commerce Department actually served to encourage boycott practices, implicitly by condoning activity declared against national policy or simply by looking the other way while these practices grew. For example:

—The Commerce Department circulated to U.S. businesses trade opportunities with boycott clauses (invitations to bid or do business.) Commerce ended this practice in the fourth quarter of 1975 after it was criticized at a Subcommittee hearing.

—For 10 years, the Commerce Department failed to require companies to answer the question concerning what action the company took in response to the boycott request. Accordingly, most companies chose not to answer that question which is crucial to determining the impact of the boycott practices. After Subcommittee criticism, the Department issued a new regulation to require an answer.

(3) Based on the boycott reports filed with the Department, the Subcommittee concludes that at least \$4.5 billion worth of U.S. sales and proposed sales to Arab countries in 1974 and 1975 were subject to boycott requests.

The most common boycott requests by Arab countries were for certificates by U.S. exporters that the goods shipped were manufactured in the United States and "not of Israeli origin"; that the ship transporting the goods was not blacklisted by Arabs and would not stop at an Israeli port en route to Arab countries.

U.S. businesses were also requested to a lesser extent—about 15 percent of all tabulated reports—to certify that they were not blacklisted by Arab countries. Only a few reports were found suggesting that U.S. firms had engaged in a concerted refusal to deal with blacklisted companies. There were 15 reports filed with the Department of Commerce in 1974 and 1975 which contained clauses of a religious or ethnic nature. These included requests by Arab importers that U.S. exporters certify that there are no persons employed in senior management who are of the Jewish faith, Zionists, or persons who have purchased Israeli bonds, contributed to the United Jewish Appeal,

or members of organizations supporting Israel.

(4) The Subcommittee estimates that exporters complied with at least 90 percent of all "boycott requests"—contained in boycott-affected sales documents—reported to the Department during the last 2 years.<sup>166</sup> It was necessary to estimate compliance because prior to October 1, 1975, firms were not required to report what action they had taken in response to boycott related requests. However, the practices complied with do not indicate, according to the reports, that most companies actually boycotted Israel or altered their corporate practices in response to the boycott of Israel. Some reporting companies, for example, make a distinction between passive compliance, particularly the act of providing factually accurate information such as the certificates of origin, and active compliance: aiding, furthering, or participating in the boycott of Israel by refusing to trade with Israel or with firms "blacklisted" by the Arab League. The exporters' boycott reports do not indicate if they stopped doing business with Israel or blacklisted firms, or if so, whether the action was because of the boycott—the fear of losing Arab business.

(5) The reporting forms and regulations used by the Department were insufficient to obtain complete, accurate information about the exact nature of restrictive trade practices being imposed on U.S. business by foreign concerns. Instructions for completing the reporting were sketchy at best and made it difficult for the exporters to accurately complete the forms. For example, 10.7 percent of all reporting firms listed the country initiating the boycott as the country also being boycotted. Second, the space available for firms to detail the types of boycott requests received was so limited—two typewritten lines—that most companies were forced to either quote only one of several boycott clauses, attach the entire document containing the clauses to the reporting form, or simply describe the clauses generically—such as, "... typical boycott of Israel terms."

(6) The data reported quarterly and in special reports to Congress was generally meaningless and almost always inaccurate. The Commerce

<sup>166</sup> This percentage is based on the dollar value in boycott affected sales documents cited in Export Administration Act reports filed with the Commerce Department in the fourth quarter of 1975, when firms were required to answer the question about the firms' response to the boycott request. [orig. note]

Department, for example, tabulated the impact of the boycott in terms of "transactions" and not dollars. A "transaction" could be one box of nails or a shipload of wheat.

The Commerce Department totaled up the dollar values of reported boycott-affected transactions on only one occasion: a special report to Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., which was later used by the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee. The Department hurriedly gathered the data from Export Administration Act reports. The crude analysis understated the dollar value of boycott-affected transactions. Their auditing method produced substantial distortions.

For 1974, for example, the Department's special report stated that there were \$9,948,578 worth of "reported boycott-affected transactions." But when the Subcommittee added up the dollar value of boycott-affected transactions from the same reports filed in 1974 with the Department, it found the actual total is \$19,995,719. The Subcommittee discovered that adding the values according to the date in which the boycott requests were reported as received by the exporters resulted in a total of \$145,355,113. The value of transactions subject to boycott requests reported as having been received in 1975 rose dramatically to \$4,402,333,887, the Subcommittee found.

The boycott clauses cited by the Commerce Department in its reports to Congress included several duplications and excluded clauses related to backlisting of firms and religious discrimination. Furthermore, when the clauses in the report and the boycott documents attached to the report were compared with the coding marks of Commerce Department clerks purportedly stating the types of clauses contained in the reports, it was found that at least half of the coding was in error, usually because it omitted clauses contained in the report.

(7) Information specialists for the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, evaluated for the Subcommittee the reporting form designed by the Commerce Department for exporters to use to report the receipt of foreign imposed boycotts. The CRS analysts summarized some of the deficiencies they found as follows:

"The form was designed to fulfill the minimum requirements of the law. The form was not designed to facilitate data collection or retrieval.

The tabulation procedure was not considered as a necessary part of the approval of the form. No provision was made for easy convertability into machine readable format. The reporting requirement was progressively relaxed through changes in the regulation to accommodate the needs of firms required to file the form."

(8) Drafts of the Commerce Department reporting forms were submitted to industry lobbyists representing the Machinery and Allied Products Institute and the World Trade Department Automobile Manufacturers Association, Inc. prior to being issued to the public. Files at the Office of Management and Budget on the history of the reporting form show no input from persons outside of Government except for lobbyists for these groups. The suggestions of these lobbyists —purportedly to reduce paperwork—were adopted by the Department. However, the Department's final reporting regulations reduced the value and quantity of data, without necessarily reducing the burden on those who must file the reports.

(9) Commerce Department reporting regulations contained numerous loopholes that allowed domestic business concerns to evade the reporting mandate of the act, including the following examples:

Despite the fact that the Export Administration Act requires the President or his designate to "require all domestic concerns" to report the facts surrounding the receipt of a request to participate in a foreign imposed restrictive trade practice or boycotts, the Commerce Department regulations for 11 years required only exporters to file the reports. It was not until December 1975, that the Department changed its regulations to also require reports from what are called service organizations: banks, freight forwarders, and insurance companies.

Commerce Department reporting regulations called for "U.S. exporters" to file the reports. Therefore, some American based multinational corporations were able to take the view with at least the tacit approval of Commerce Department officials, that a U.S. parent company is not expected to report a boycott request when the request is received by one of the company's foreign subsidiaries without the actual knowledge of the parent company; that they could establish trading companies as subsidiaries in foreign countries to facilitate trading with Arab countries and

thus avoid the reporting requirement of the Commerce Department regulations.

Commerce Department regulations, ostensibly to avoid paperwork for reporting firms, allow for reporting only the first document received as part of a given transaction. This may have enabled firms to have reported boycott requests related to trade opportunities without reporting that it later resulted in a sale.

(10) Federal antitrust, securities, and civil rights laws are useful tools to combat some domestic aspects of the Arab boycott. A more vigorous Commerce Department program for obtaining and analyzing data from businesses on boycott activities could considerably enhance the enforcement of antitrust, securities, and civil rights laws by providing the Federal Government and the investing public with more complete information about Arab boycott practices and the responses of American firms to those tactics. Moreover, amendments to the Export Administration Act to allow public access to boycott data and to define impermissible boycott related activities are needed.

(11) The United States has a competitive advantage over other industrial nations in its export of agricultural products and a large variety of manufactured goods. Accordingly, a shift in spending Arab petrodollars with other countries as the result of stronger antiboycott measures by the United States is less likely. However, there still remains a need for increased diplomatic activity in order to minimize any impact of foreign-imposed restrictive trade practices on domestic commerce.

(12) For over 10 years, the Commerce Department has opposed the enactment of measures against foreign-imposed boycotts. Since Congress added antiboycott provisions to the Export Administration Act in 1965, the Commerce Department has consistently opposed amendments to the act to strengthen it. The subcommittee finds that vigorous congressional oversight by those committees having jurisdiction over the Export Administration Act is necessary to insure adequate enforcement of boycott related laws.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

The Subcommittee recommends:

(1) The Export Administration Act should be

amended to prohibit all agreements to refrain from doing business (a) with a foreign country friendly to the United States, or (b) with a company or supplier boycotted by a foreign concern, thereby furthering a foreign-imposed boycott or restrictive trade practice.

The Act should contain criminal penalties sufficient to provide a strong deterrent to these practices. The Commerce Department should be required to report all probable violations of this prohibition to the Justice Department.

(2) The Export Administration Act should be amended to prohibit U.S. businesses from providing information directly or indirectly to any foreign concern about race, creed, national origin, sex, religion or political beliefs of any citizen, including contributions to or association with philanthropic organizations such as the United Jewish Appeal, when the person furnishing the information knows or should know that the information is for the purpose of discriminating against or boycotting any person or concern.<sup>167</sup>

(3) The Export Administration Act should be amended to prohibit persons from providing information directly or indirectly to any foreign concern as to whether that firm or any of its subsidiaries or subcontractors is "blacklisted" or boycotted by any foreign concern.

(4) The Export Administration Act should be amended to allow domestic businesses to provide importers or agents for importers only affirmative factual information relating to the origin of goods manufactured or produced, the name of the manufacturer, the name of the insurer of the goods, the name of the vessel transporting the goods and the owner or charterer of the vessel. This information could be provided on business documents in the following fashion:

The products are of U.S. origin.

The producer or manufacturer of the product is -----.

The name of the vessel is-----and it is owned or chartered by -----.

(5) The Commerce Department should im-

<sup>167</sup> Pursuant to the Export Administration Act, and at the direction of President Ford, the Commerce Department issued a regulation in December of 1975 prohibiting any action "that would have the effect of discriminating against U.S. citizens or firms on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."—Section 369.2 of the Export Administration Regulations. 15 CFR 369.2. [orig. note]

mediately begin to improve the quality of its information collection, assimilation, and retrieval system. Toward that end, the Department should improve the quality of its reporting form and make the instructions easier for businesses to follow.

(6) The Export Administration Act should be amended to provide for public access to filed reports, except for the name of the foreign buyer, description of the commodities shipped and their cost so as to adequately protect proprietary information. Public disclosure would aid compliance with the reporting requirements of the act and help prevent U.S. business from being used as a tool of the economic warfare of foreign nations, consistent with the policy set forth in the Export Administration Act.

(7) The President should increase the level of diplomatic efforts in order to minimize the impact of foreign-imposed restrictive trade practices on American commerce. These efforts could include forming alliances with other industrialized nations for the purpose of establishing basic international business ethics and standards.

(8) Given the Commerce Department's poor record in carrying out the statutory policy against foreign-imposed boycotts, the subcommittee recommends increased congressional oversight of the Commerce Department by committees having jurisdiction over the Export Administration Act.

#### 147

#### **Press conference statement by US Secretary of State Kissinger supporting the integrity and unity of Lebanon<sup>168</sup>**

Washington, September 11, 1976

*Q. Mr. Secretary, during the period that you will be in Africa, Lebanon faces an important date in the transition of power from President Franjyiah to President Sarkis—President-elect Sarkis. And at the same time, there are reports that Syria is making intensive efforts to produce some sort of negotiated solution that will allow Sarkis to take power in normal conditions.*

*What are your expectations for Lebanon in the next two weeks, and what is your view of the Syrian efforts?*

<sup>168</sup> Excerpted from the text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXV, 1945 (October 4, 1976), p. 414.

*Is the United States in favor of them?*

A. I had an opportunity yesterday to talk to two Foreign Service officers who just returned from the Christian part of Lebanon and who have had an opportunity to talk to President Sarkis. Also, I will be taking with me on this trip, an expert on the Middle East, so that I can be in close touch with developments in Lebanon.

We favor a negotiated solution on the basis of the formula that was worked out in Damascus earlier this year,<sup>169</sup> and we have generally supported the political efforts based on that formula.

Whether the advent of a new President would lead to a rapid solution is not yet clear.

We support the independence and territorial integrity and unity of Lebanon. We will use our influence in this direction. We have invited President Sarkis to send a representative to the United States for further talks soon after his installation, and we will use our influence in the direction of the unity and integrity of Lebanon.

#### 148

#### **Press statement issued following a meeting between Foreign Minister Fischer of East Germany and PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi<sup>170</sup>**

East Berlin, September 21, 1976

Today Oskar Fischer, Foreign Minister of the GDR, received Mr. Faruq Qaddumi, member of the PLO Executive Committee and head of its Political Department. A friendly talk resulted.

The exchange of views centered upon issues related to developments in the Middle East and preparations for the holding of the thirty-first session of the UN General Assembly. Oskar Fischer pointed to the great importance of the debate on Palestine once more to be held in the General Assembly. He affirmed that the GDR will support the Palestinian people and the PLO, its legitimate representative, in the coming session. Fischer added that the GDR is strongly opposed to Israel's policy of aggression and vigorously condemns the methods of the Israeli occupiers

<sup>169</sup> See doc. 204 below.

<sup>170</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), September 22, 1976, p. 5.



which they practice in the occupied Arab territories and which violate the rights of man. Fischer supported the continued cooperation between the GDR and the PLO. Qaddumi thanked the government and people of the GDR for their consistent support of the Palestinian people and its revolution.

149

**Press statement issued following a meeting between President Ceausescu of Rumania and PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi<sup>171</sup>**

**Bucharest, September 23, 1976**

This evening, Comrade Ceausescu, General-Secretary of the Rumanian Communist Party and President of the Socialist Republic of Rumania, received Mr. Faruq Qaddumi, member of the Executive Committee of the PLO and head of its Political Department who is currently in our country on a private visit at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Communist Party. The meeting was attended by Comrade Andre Estefan, alternate member of the Politbureau and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. On this occasion, brother Abu Lutf handed a message to Comrade Ceausescu from Mr. Arafat, Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee. This message expresses the spirit of brotherhood and friendship and his best wishes to the Rumanian people. Comrade Ceausescu thanked his brother guest and asked him to convey his own sincere regards to Yasir Arafat and his best wishes for the success of the Palestinian people in actualizing their destiny and creating their own truly independent state. During the meeting, the question of representation and of strengthening relations between the Rumanian Communist Party and the PLO and between the Rumanian and Palestinian peoples was discussed. The two sides exchanged views regarding the entrenchment of peace and cooperation in the world.

On the occasion of the assumption of the office of Presidency of Lebanon by Elias Sarkis, both sides hoped that military operations would cease,

and quiet order and stability would return to Lebanon. They further hoped that normal activity may be resumed in Lebanon and emphasized the importance of guaranteeing Lebanon's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity in line with the wishes of the Lebanese people and with the establishment of peace in the Middle East and the world.

150

**Statement issued by the US Department of State welcoming the installation of President Sarkis as President of Lebanon<sup>172</sup>**

**Washington, September 23, 1976**

The United States is convinced that the occasion of the installation of a new President of Lebanon offers an opportunity which must not be lost to bring an end to the fighting and to begin rebuilding national institutions. It will be essential for all parties in Lebanon to support and strengthen the authority of Lebanon's new President elected by legitimate processes so that all Lebanese may promptly begin their return to productive life.

The violence and destruction in Lebanon have gone on far too long. The costs in human suffering have been far too high. It is clear that no one can gain from continued fighting: countless more men, women, and children will lose lives, property, and hope for the future. It is a time for magnanimity, restraint, and compromise.

The United States believes that a solution can be found that will preserve the country's independence, territorial integrity, and national unity. Solutions based on the partition of Lebanon are invitations to further strife and instability. The states so created would not be viable and would invite external intervention.

We continue to believe that the principles for a political accommodation among the Lebanese parties enunciated last January and February provide a basis for institutions that will meet the needs of the Lebanese people and nation. We hope that President Sarkis will be able to bring his countrymen to the roundtable talks he has proposed as soon as possible so that the process of reconciliation and rebuilding can begin.

<sup>171</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), September 25, 1976, p. 4.

<sup>172</sup> Read by Director Brown of the Office of Press Relations; *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXV, 1946 (October 11, 1976), pp. 459-460.

The major objective in negotiating a solution will be to preserve a united country, led by a central government which will assure security and opportunity for all individuals and communities in the country. The principles proposed in January and February were designed to give practical political expression to the concept that there should be a partnership of equals in a reunited Lebanon. In our view, this calls for political, economic, and social adjustments that all Lebanese will perceive as fair and equitable. It presupposes that the government will have at its disposal security forces loyal to it which can restore confidence in the authority and ability of the government to maintain domestic order. And it will require that the Palestinians in Lebanon live in peace with their Lebanese hosts and neighbors without challenging the authority of a central Lebanese administration.

The governments of the area and the Arab League are in a position, each in its own way, to make constructive contributions to a political solution of the conflict. Continuation of the fighting cannot serve their interests. Peace in the Middle East and international stability will be in jeopardy as long as the fighting continues. An end to the fighting in turn would create conditions more conducive to a resumption of the search for a negotiated settlement of the broader Middle East question which would take into account the concerns of the states of the area for their security and territorial integrity, as well as the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people.

We are prepared to help to bring an end to the fighting in Lebanon and to achieve a political solution. The interests of the United States lie in alleviation of human suffering, in the restoration of unity and stability based on justice in Lebanon, and in the reduction of tension and the establishment of peace among the nations of the Middle East. We will be prepared to support or undertake any diplomatic initiative requested by the parties.

We will continue our humanitarian programs, which already amount to more than \$10 million in hospital and other medical equipment and supplies and foodstuffs distributed as fairly as possible on both sides of the lines. We will do this and more as necessary. We are considering ways of shipping substantial quantities of wheat under Public Law 480.

We will also play our part, after a settlement is

achieved, in helping President Sarkis and his government rebuild Lebanese institutions and the Lebanese economy. We have invited him to send a personal envoy to Washington as soon as he considers it appropriate in order to discuss specific ways in which we can be helpful. We have sought from the Congress an appropriation of \$20 million to begin the process.

This is a time of opportunity and hope for a suffering people in an area already too long devastated by war. The United States shares the conviction that this opportunity must not be lost.

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### **Statement by US Assistant Secretary of State Atherton favouring arms sales to Saudi Arabia<sup>173</sup>**

**Washington, September 27, 1976**

I appreciate very much the opportunity to appear before this committee to discuss an issue of key importance to broad U.S. interests—our military supply relationship with Saudi Arabia, which in turn is an integral part of the overall relationship between our two countries.

An aspect of this longstanding relationship is under question—the Administration's proposal to sell 650 Maverick missiles. This issue is of gravest concern to the Administration. We are deeply concerned that singling out Saudi Arabia by disapproving this sale could do serious damage to our national interests and those of our allies in the industrial nations.

This committee is aware that our excellent relations with Saudi Arabia represent years of mutual efforts to develop trust.

This committee is aware of the major expansion in that relationship in recent years. Our arms supply relationship is but one aspect of broad ties which have served U.S. interests remarkably well, but it is an important aspect and integral to the pursuit of our broader interests.

This committee is well aware of the importance of Saudi Arabia to our search for peace in the Middle East, to our concern for the security of the Persian Gulf, and to the world's economic

<sup>173</sup> Made to the House Committee on International Relations; *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXV, 1947 (October 18, 1976), pp. 475-478.

health.

Against this background I would stress a few central points:

—Over many years, as the United States has sought peace in the explosive Middle East, Saudi Arabia has remained a steadfast friend and a force for moderation. Its political and financial support for the Arab nations that are committed to a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a critical component of our efforts to achieve a Middle East peace.

—This year we expect to export over \$3 billion in American goods and services to Saudi Arabia, providing thousands of jobs for Americans. Only a fraction of these exports will represent military items.

—Saudi Arabia has been a stalwart partner in our objective of resisting the expansion of Soviet influence and radical movements in the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf.

—Saudi Arabia is playing a key role in seeking to bring the tragedy and travail in Lebanon to an end.

—Saudi Arabia has been supportive of our position on a number of important issues in various international fora. At the recent nonaligned conference in Colombo, for example, it entered reservations on resolutions hostile to our positions on Korea and Puerto Rico.

—Saudi Arabia is a major and constructive force in the world economy, in finance, in economic development, and, most significantly, in energy. It is Saudi Arabia which has prevented further increases in crude oil prices this year. The world looks to Saudi Arabia to restrain efforts by other OPEC countries to increase prices sharply in the years to come. The growing share of our energy imports that comes from Saudi oil is a well known fact.

In this context our concern for Saudi security insures that Saudi Arabia will feel confident enough in its relationship with us to continue to be helpful to our national objectives in the Middle East and throughout the world.

Clearly Saudi Arabia pursues the policies it does because it considers those policies in its own national interest, not because they are in the U.S. interest. It has been a fundamental tenet of Saudi policy for over 30 years that a close relationship with the United States is in the Saudi national interest because of our position of leadership in

the non-Communist world and because of the benefits Saudi Arabia derives from that relationship in the economic and technological development of its society. In many spheres the policies of the Saudi Government and its close ties with the United States are under attack by radical states and movements in the area. It has withstood those attacks because of its confidence in the constancy of the relationship between us.

This is what is at stake in the issue we are considering today. When I say that disapproval of this sale could do serious damage to our national interests, I do not mean this one act would destroy our relationship overnight. The Saudis and we have an interest in preserving that relationship. What I do mean is that the assumptions on which that relationship is based would be called into question in Saudi minds. An erosion of confidence, already shaken by what Saudi Arabia sees as a pattern of attacks in this country on the U.S.-Saudi relationship, would be set in motion, whose consequences we would come to regret over time.

Secretary Kissinger has asked me to emphasize on his behalf what we risk if we treat a proven friend in this way, singling it out for disapproval from among all the nations to which we supply defense articles and striking at the spirit of mutual confidence on which that friendship is based.

What we risk is nothing less than undermining moderation and stability in the Middle East and jeopardizing our own economic well-being. The issue today transcends the narrow question of whether or not we sell Maverick missiles to Saudi Arabia, and how many we sell. It goes to the heart of a relationship that has served well our interests and the interests of peace in the Middle East.

Mr. Chairman, I would like now to turn to the specific question which lies before us—the letter of offer for 650 Maverick missiles for Saudi Arabia. Various questions and reservations have been raised about this sale. I would like to try briefly to address these.

First, why do we consider it important to supply military equipment to Saudi Arabia?

For over a quarter of a century our military supply relationship has been one of the foundation stones of an overall relationship which has fostered Saudi confidence in this country and Saudi receptivity toward our international goals. Our long cooperation in this field has been a major factor

inducing the Saudis to value consultation on a wide variety of other subjects including, as I noted previously, support for our Middle East peace-making efforts and efforts to hold down oil prices.

Secondly, why should this particular weapon—the Maverick—be sold to Saudi Arabia?

These missiles, like all other arms we have sold to Saudi Arabia, are intended to defend the Kingdom against external aggression and, with specific reference to the Maverick, against ground attacks by hostile armored units. Saudi Arabia, with 2 trillion dollars' worth of oil reserves to protect, is as large as the United States east of the Mississippi and has long borders to defend; and much of the terrain is highly suited to armor operations.

An important fact to keep in mind is the small size of the Saudi Army. While Israel, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan measure their ground forces in corps or armies or at least divisions, Saudi Arabia can muster only brigades. It thus becomes apparent why the Saudis need to support such small and dispersed defensive forces through the use of a weapon like the Maverick.

Thirdly, some question has been raised about the appropriateness of the precise number of these missiles in this letter of offer.

Our proposal to sell the Maverick rests on professional American military judgments related to a carefully devised program for modernizing the Saudi Armed Forces. The original proposal was to sell 1,500 of these weapons, in addition to the 1,000 already supplied. We have reduced that figure to the present 650 not because we thought the original figure was arrived at through faulty analysis, but because of the strong feelings among some members of Congress about the sale of a larger number at this time. The original figure of 1,500 Mavericks requested by Saudi Arabia itself represented a reduction, at U.S. Air Force prompting, of an earlier Saudi request. We held advance informal consultations with the Congress on this and other sales and made a bona fide effort to take congressional concerns into account by reducing the numbers of both Sidewinder and Maverick missiles agreed upon in negotiations with Saudi Arabia. This decision itself was not without some costs to our relationship, but those costs will be magnified many times if the sale is rejected in its totality.

Finally, concerns have been expressed that these missiles may become a threat to Israel,

either because Saudi Arabia might use them itself in an attack on Israel or because Saudi Arabia might transfer some of these missiles to a third country.

Obviously, there is never a 100 percent guarantee of what may or may not happen in the future. Even should these concerns prove justified by later events, however, a sale of 650 Mavericks will not have any appreciable impact on the balance of power in the Arab-Israeli context. A fundamental principle of American Middle East policy is the preservation of the security and survival of Israel. It would be unthinkable on the face of it that we should, by this or any other sale of military goods and services to Saudi Arabia or any other country, undermine that basic policy of support for Israel's security and survival.

But the main point I want to stress here is the following. Both experience and logic strongly suggest that the concern that the sale of these missiles will pose a threat to Israel is an unjustified concern. In the Arab-Israeli dispute, there is no doubt about where Saudi sympathies lie politically. But Saudi Arabia has never been a combatant in any Arab-Israeli war. Its armed forces are small in number, and their primary mission is to defend the vast territory and resources of the Kingdom. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia knows that were it to use for aggressive purposes the weapons we sell it, it would jeopardize the entire relationship with the United States which it so highly values. And most important of all, the entire thrust of Saudi policy is directed toward a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, toward avoiding further Arab-Israeli wars, not toward promoting them.

Secondly, let me address the concern about unauthorized arms transfers to third parties. Over many years Saudi Arabia has never made an unauthorized transfer of U.S. equipment. Saudi Arabia values its military supply relationship with us. We believe they would not wish to jeopardize this relationship—and very directly, their own security—by such irresponsible acts as the transfer of weapons in violation of their agreements with us. In the specific case of the Maverick, moreover, there are additional technical considerations which make transfer extremely unlikely. Mavericks cannot be used on aircraft other than those which have been specifically designed to handle them, and in the Arab Middle East only the Saudis have

such aircraft.

Mr. Chairman, in recent months there has been much publicity about the flow of arms to the Persian Gulf. The Administration is convinced that U.S. policy in this regard is sound and supportive of peace and security in this area. But however much honest men may differ on this complex question, there is no doubt that refusal to sell this one item—the Maverick—to Saudi Arabia can only be regarded by the Saudi Government as a discriminatory act.

I have sought to be candid with the committee about the repercussions upon our relationship with Saudi Arabia and on our national interests that we believe could flow from a decision to deny this request. We must ask ourselves whether we wish—whether, indeed, it is justified in any way—to give a signal to an old friend which would seem to repudiate the trust and confidence it has long placed in the United States as the main supporter of its national security.

Today our relations with Saudi Arabia rest on hard-won mutual confidence. Our relationship has been reflected in cooperation, not confrontation. But in prudence we must not take Saudi good will for granted. The Administration is deeply concerned that blocking the Maverick sale will do serious damage to a relationship which over the years has produced major dividends for the United States and could have over time the most serious political and economic repercussions for our own national interests.

## 152

### **Statement issued by the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee warning of the dangers to the Palestine resistance of the events in Lebanon<sup>174</sup>**

**Moscow, September 30, 1976**

The attention of the Soviet public has once again been drawn to the alarming situation in Lebanon.

Only a few days ago the development of events in that country seemed to give some grounds for hoping for a speedy end to the fratricidal bloodshed. Elias Sarkis, who assumed the post of

Lebanon's President, is a statesman legitimately elected by the Lebanese Parliament. The new President's first statements expressed his desire to work for a cease-fire, to find a way towards a political settlement of the country's internal problems, towards strengthening its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and towards normalising the status of the Palestinians on Lebanese soil.

A major step towards the restoration of peace was the declaration by Yasser Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, of a unilateral cease-fire by Palestinian detachments on every sector of combat operations in Lebanon, aimed at creating favourable conditions for the implementation of President Elias Sarkis's peace initiative.

The PLO leadership thereby demonstrated once again a sense of high responsibility and an interest in the speediest possible elimination of the conflict. Readiness to co-operate with the new President in the interests of ending the bloodshed and a peaceful solution to internal Lebanese problems was expressed by the national patriotic forces of Lebanon. Important political contacts were established, various political forces in the country began intensive consultations. Battles began to diminish in intensity in a number of sectors.

Today, however, everything is once again under threat.

Encouraged from outside by imperialist circles and leaning on Israel's direct support, the right-wing forces in Lebanon replied to the constructive steps of the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the national patriotic forces regarding a cease-fire with a new military onslaught. Gun and mortar shells are again bursting in the streets of Beirut, the flames of war have engulfed the whole country and peaceful Lebanese citizens, including women, children and old people, are dying.

No one can any longer have any doubts that this is a broad conspiracy of imperialism and Arab reaction against the Palestine resistance movement, which showed itself to be an active and staunch fighter against imperialist machinations and the Israeli aggression. This conspiracy is aimed also against the national patriotic forces of Lebanon.

The provocative actions of the right-wing Lebanese forces serve those who seek further seizure of Arab lands and the establishment of neo-colo-

<sup>174</sup> English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5852 (October 5, 1976), p. 352.

nialist control over the entire Middle East region. It is not by accident that the recent period has seen almost daily encroachments on the frontier areas of south Lebanon by Israeli military units, which is a gross violation of the Lebanese people's sovereign rights, including their right to territorial integrity and non-interference in their internal life. Encouraged by certain powers, Israeli pirates are committing outrages off the shores of Lebanon.

The fact that Syrian forces, which have been on Lebanese territory since last June, are taking part in the present military operations against the Palestine resistance movement and the national patriotic forces of Lebanon causes special concern to world public opinion, concern shared by the Soviet people. Meanwhile, it is absolutely clear that what is taking place in Lebanon today is inflicting damage not only on the Lebanese people, but on the entire struggle of the Arab peoples and states against the Israeli aggression and for a just political settlement in the Middle East.

Grave danger looms over the Palestine resistance movement, over the national patriotic forces of Lebanon and over the entire Lebanese people. No one can remain indifferent to this without renouncing the basic principles of democracy, humanitarianism and progress.

The Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee appeals to international and national democratic organisations in all countries resolutely to demand protection for the legitimate rights and interests of the Arab people of Palestine and the Lebanese patriots, to raise their voices against foreign interference in Lebanese affairs and to come out firmly for an immediate end to the bloodshed and for the resolution of all questions existing between the sides concerned by political means.

### 153

#### **Statement by US Secretary of State Kissinger favouring the early resumption of a Geneva conference<sup>175</sup>**

New York, September 30, 1976

The United Nations, since its birth, has been

involved in the chronic conflict in the Middle East. Each successive war has brought greater perils: an increased danger of great-power confrontation and more severe global economic dislocations.

At the request of the parties, the United States has been actively engaged in the search for peace in the Middle East. Since the 1973 war, statesmanship on all sides has produced unprecedented steps toward a resolution of this bitter conflict. There have been three agreements that lessen the danger of war, and mutual commitments have been made to pursue the negotiating process with urgency until a final peace is achieved. As a result we are closer to the goal of peace than at any time in a generation.

The role of the United Nations has been crucial. The Geneva Conference met in 1973 under its aegis, and the implementation of subsequent agreements has been negotiated in its working groups. Security Council resolutions form the only agreed framework for negotiations. The U.N. Emergency Force, Disengagement Observer Force, and Truce Supervision Organization are even now helping maintain peace on the truce lines. I want to compliment the Secretary General and his colleagues in New York, Geneva, and on the ground in the Middle East for their vigorous support of the peace process at critical moments.

The United States remains committed to help the parties reach a settlement. The step-by-step negotiations of the past three years have now brought us to a point where comprehensive solutions seem possible. The decision before us now is how the next phase of negotiations should be launched.

The United States is prepared to participate in an early resumption of the work of the Geneva Conference. We think a preparatory conference might be useful for a discussion of the structure of future negotiations, but we are open to other suggestions. Whatever steps are taken must be carefully prepared so that once the process begins the nations concerned will advance steadily toward agreement.

The groundwork that has been laid represents a historic opportunity. The United States will do all it can to assure that by the time this Assembly meets next year it will be possible to report significant further progress toward a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

<sup>175</sup> Made in a speech before the 31st United Nations General Assembly; excerpted from the text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXV, 1948 (October 25, 1976), pp. 501-502.

Since the General Assembly last met, overwhelming tragedy has befallen the people of Lebanon. The United States strongly supports the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of that troubled country. We oppose partition. We hope that Lebanese affairs will soon be returned to the hands of the people of Lebanon. All members of the United Nations, and all the conflicting parties in Lebanon, have an obligation to support the efforts of the new President of Lebanon to restore peace and to turn energies to rebuilding the nation. And the agencies of the U.N. system can play an important role in the reconstruction effort.

## 154

### **Proposal by the USSR concerning a Middle East settlement and the Geneva peace conference<sup>176</sup>**

**Moscow, October 1, 1976**

Among the complex international problems requiring a solution in the interests of the preservation and strengthening of peace, the problem of a Middle East settlement is particularly acute. The red-hot tension in the Middle East is not abating. The situation in this region is extremely precarious and unstable. At any moment there may be a new military outburst there.

The peoples of the Middle East countries are living in a state of uncertainty, under a permanent threat to their security. They are being prevented from devoting their efforts to peaceful construction and the improvement of living conditions. Attempts are being made to keep the Arab people of Palestine in the position of an exiled people.

The entire course of events in the Middle East in recent years demonstrates one fact: there cannot and will not be peace in this region until the causes which gave rise to the Middle East conflict have been removed: the occupation of the Arab territories by Israel, the denial of their inalienable rights to the Palestine Arab people and the continuing state of war. It is impossible to hope that it will be sufficient to eliminate any one particular

individual hotbed of armed conflict in order to restore peace in the Middle East.

The tragic events in Lebanon provide a very clear confirmation of all this. The Lebanese crisis could not have arisen if a comprehensive political settlement had been achieved in the Middle East. There is another undeniable fact: if there had been such a settlement, or if serious efforts had been made to achieve one, it would have been easier to find a solution to the problems rending this small Middle Eastern country.

Only those who are trying for their own narrow ends to preserve the existing situation in the Middle East can oppose a broad political settlement or work against its achievement.

It is the conviction of the Soviet Union that the situation in the Middle East requires urgent measures capable of achieving a change from war to peace there.

The Soviet Union has already proposed a resumption for this purpose of the work of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East. This is precisely the forum which has been recognized as being politically acceptable by all the interested parties.

Concerned about the dangerous course of events in the Middle East, the Soviet Union now again appeals to all the parties directly involved in the Middle East conflict and to all the participants in the Geneva Peace Conference to resume the work of the Conference. The Soviet Union, for its part, would be prepared to take part in the work of the Conference in October-November 1976.

The experience of international negotiations and conferences has shown that an important factor in their success is the precise definition of the range of issues to be discussed by the parties. When these issues are spelt out and placed before the participants in the negotiations the prospects for achieving the necessary understanding also become clearer.

In an attempt to expedite the achievement of a Middle East settlement and for this purpose to promote the resumption of the work of the Geneva Peace Conference, the Soviet Union submits for the consideration of the participants the following proposal for the agenda of the Conference:

1. Withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967.
2. Realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestine Arab people, including their right to

<sup>176</sup> Text as submitted to the UN on October 7, 1976, in UN doc. A/31/257, Annex; the proposal was presented to the governments of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria and the US and to the PLO.

self-determination and the establishment of their own State.

3. Preservation of the right to an independent existence and to security of all the States directly participating in the conflict: the Arab States bordering on Israel, on the one hand, and the State of Israel, on the other, and the granting to them of appropriate international guarantees.

4. Cessation of the state of war between the Arab States concerned and Israel.

In the opinion of the Soviet Union, this proposed agenda covers all the key aspects of a settlement. It takes into account the legitimate rights and interests of all the parties directly involved in the conflict—the Arab States, the Palestine Arab people and the State of Israel.

With regard to the organization of the work of the Geneva Peace Conference, the Soviet Union has already expressed the view that it should be conducted in two phases. The Palestine Liberation Organization should naturally participate in the work of the Conference from the very beginning and with equal status.

In the first, preparatory phase, final agreement could be reached on the agenda of the Conference and the procedure for considering the specific aspects of a settlement could be determined. In the second, fundamental phase, efforts would be concentrated on arriving at an understanding on the substance. The Conference should conclude with the adoption of a final instrument (or instruments) in the nature of a treaty.

The Soviet Union is convinced that a real possibility exists of eliminating the underlying causes of the Middle East conflict and agreeing on a comprehensive settlement. To this end, it is prepared to press on with the work, together with all the other participants in the Geneva Peace Conference.

**Press interview statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger denying US arms shipments to Lebanon and defending US arms sales abroad<sup>177</sup>**

Hilton Head, October 2, 1976

*Mr. Stroud: Mr. Secretary, what reason do you have now to believe that the reconvening of the Geneva Conference on the Middle East would be productive? And isn't there the danger now that the critics who said that the step-by-step process would deal away some of your trump cards too early may be proven right?*

A. You always have to compare the—of course you have to remember that it is unlikely, despite my well-known objectivity, that I will agree with my critics. [Laughter.]

But you always have to compare the alternatives that were in fact available. In 1973 the United States had no diplomatic relations with any of the key Arab countries. The Soviet Union was acting as the lawyer of the Arab countries. Israeli armies were confronting the Arabs along dividing lines that were extremely unstable.

To attempt a comprehensive solution under those circumstances involved—if an oil embargo was still in force, to attempt a comprehensive solution under those circumstances involved a high risk of an explosion. And a step-by-step approach enabled the parties to get used to the process of negotiation, to gain confidence that progress could be made.

It was always envisaged that the step-by-step approach would sooner or later lead to a more comprehensive approach. It was never conceived as an alternative to a comprehensive solution, but as a step toward a comprehensive solution.

I think now the conditions are approaching where comprehensive solutions can result. Whether it has to be one grand solution, or whether a series of stages within a larger framework, that will have to be seen as the negotiations begin.

I do not believe that we have given away any key bargaining chips that will be needed later. On the contrary, I think we created conditions from which comprehensive solutions can now be

<sup>177</sup> Excerpted from the text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXV, 1949 (November 1, 1976), pp. 544–547, 549–550.



attempted without the risk of an explosion and without the risk of an alienation of some of the major countries involved.

*Mr. Stroud: What is the leverage from this point on?*

A. Well, what was the leverage in 1973? In 1973 we were all subject to an oil embargo. We had no diplomatic relations with any of the key countries. And it is an illusion to believe that we had a leverage in 1973 that we have lost in 1976.

The leverage that we have now is that we are the only country that is in friendly relations with all of the chief actors in this process. We are the only country without whose help progress simply is not possible. And that leverage is the chief contribution we can make to the process.

The basic leverage as to the Israelis and the Arabs is about what it was in 1973; that is to say, the Israelis have territory which the Arabs want, and the Arabs have legitimacy which the Israelis want. Now, how to balance off the tangible return of territories, which has to be part of the settlement, against the Arab commitment to peace, which is certainly more revocable than is the giving up of territories, that has been the essence of the negotiation all along. And the Israelis have not given up so much territory that this problem has changed.

This is the essential issue in the negotiation. What has improved is the readiness of the Arab countries to accept the existence of Israel. What has improved also is the greater confidence Israel has acquired in the process of negotiation. What has fundamentally changed is the diplomatic position of the United States in the Middle East, which is a dramatic reversal of what it was in 1973. And this is why the conditions now, either for a Geneva Conference or some other diplomatic process, seemed to us better now than they have been at any period since the end of the war.

*Mr. Barnard: While we are on the Middle East—enormous supplies of arms seem to have poured into Lebanon and complicated the problem there. Can you tell us whether the United States or Israel has given either overt or covert support to any faction there, particularly the Christians? And if not, where do you think all those arms have been coming from?*

A. The United States has not given any arms to any of the factions. We have no official knowledge of what Israel may have done. But the majority of arms, the overwhelming majority of arms in Lebanon, come from the Soviet Union

one way or the other, either through Libya or through Syria.

The chief conflict is between the Syrians and the Palestinians, both of which are armed by the Soviet Union and come directly from Soviet sources.

*Mr. Greenberg: Mr. Secretary, there would seem to be at least one part of the Middle East where American policy would seem to have been very ineffectual, and that would be in Lebanon, where we seem to have adopted a policy of just waiting for the blood to settle. I wonder if that doesn't raise the larger question of morality in foreign policy. A recent poll by the State Department indicates that Americans feel—to quote one of its findings—that Washington simply has not appeared to be animated in the last decade or so by the same root sense of right and wrong as the American people. How would you respond to that kind of feeling?*

A. First of all, let me make clear what the poll is.

The State Department—we have started in the last year, in order to find out what the public is concerned about, to hold a series of town meetings around the country in which we have invited concerned citizens to state their criticism. And we are sending senior officials to sessions which are entirely devoted to the public expressing their concerns. Our officials then write reports to me about what they consider to be these concerns, and we distribute these reports, also, to the newspapers in the towns where the town meetings were held. So this is not a very secret operation. Now, somebody leaked one of these reports in Washington that had already been distributed to the hometown newspapers of the people concerned.

I just want to make clear all of these reports are going to be critical, because the town meetings are organized to elicit concerns and not elicit approvals.

Now, let me get to your question of morality last and deal with Lebanon first.

Whatever our moral convictions may be, we cannot carry them to the point where the United States must settle every conflict in every part of the world in order to be cured.

We have in Lebanon passions that have been built up over centuries. We have armies that have been built up over decades.

For the United States to attempt to impose peace by our own forces would make us the policeman of the world. We have attempted to do our best to prevent outside intervention. We have

sent a special envoy there. We have lost an Ambassador, who was murdered there on a peace mission.

We have stopped short of military intervention, because that would require a massive degree of an American commitment that we do not feel is warranted in these circumstances. But we also believe that the evolution in Lebanon, painful as it is, could lead to a situation in which the overall peace process can be resumed under conditions where all of the parties have learned how tenuous and fragile the situation is.

This does not mean that we would not want to have the war ended as quickly as possible. And we have offered repeatedly our good offices. The only thing we have refrained from doing is to send in American military forces.

*Mr. Greenberg: Mr. Secretary, earlier you quoted President Eisenhower approvingly. Would you consider his intervention in Lebanon to have been a failure?*

A. No, I think that President Eisenhower, under the conditions that then existed, with the forces that were then at work in Lebanon, conducted an operation that was a marginal success. A similar [inaudible] the United States today would require many divisions, would involve us in all the inter-Arab disputes that you now see in Lebanon, and could not be justified to the American people by American purposes that we could explain afterward.

After all, what is the conflict of Lebanon? You have the Christian community and the Moslem community that have coexisted side by side for many decades, but not always. You have within the Moslem community, the splits between the radical factions and the moderate factions. And you have the presence of the Palestinians, who constitute almost a state within a state. All of this overlaid by Arab rivalries in which the Libyans and the Iraqis back the radicals and the Syrians have backed the moderate Arabs and have co-operated with the Christians.

For the United States to inject American military power into such a situation, under present circumstances, would lead us into a morass.

I think there are certain situations which, tragic as they are, we cannot overcome with military power. And that is the only thing that we have not done in Lebanon.

*Mr. Greenberg: There is one area of the foreign policy in which you might have a special knowledge or interest, and that is the arms sales abroad. The Democratic candidate for President has not been alone in deploring the size of American arms shipments abroad, on the theory that they will actually ignite wars and we will be drawn into them. Do you see any of that sort of danger in the amount of armaments this country is shipping to various nations abroad?*

A. One has to analyze where the arms are going before one can judge whether they will ignite wars and, secondly, whether the United States will be drawn into those wars if they are ignited.

Many of the figures that are being used are vastly inflated. I see references, for example, to \$7.5 billion of arms to Saudi Arabia. Of that \$7.5 billion, the overwhelming part of it is going for construction by the Corps of Engineers, and it is not going for weapons. And it is technically in the military budget, but it is to build cantonments for the Saudi Army and has nothing to do, as such, with the arms race.

Another percentage goes to Iran. Now Iran has pursued a policy that has been very parallel to ours in the Middle East. It has not joined the embargo. It has declared that it wouldn't join the embargo. It has sold oil even to Israel during this period.

Countries that threaten it are countries like the Soviet Union and countries armed by the Soviet Union, such as Iraq. And therefore I cannot foresee—nor has Iran ever transferred arms to another country. So it is difficult to foresee any war that Iran would start that would draw us in. And to the extent that Iran is capable of protecting itself, we are less likely to be drawn in than we would be if it were defenseless.

On the other hand, I do agree that we should look at the question of arms sales more systematically, and we have created, now, a new group to make sure that the question you put is being dealt with in a responsible manner.

It is my judgment that the arms sales have contributed much more to stability than to the opposite. But we are not pushing arms sales. We are responding to needs that countries feel—and most of which they would be in a position to get anyway from other sources.

*Mr. Greenberg: But, Mr. Secretary, those figures on Saudi Arabia include something like 600–700 Sidewinder missiles. Now what possible defense justification could there be for a country like Saudi Arabia to have that many missiles, except perhaps to defend its interests against Iran, which we have also supplied with—*

*A. Much more to defend its interests against some neighbors it has that are armed by the Soviet Union. And of the Sidewinders, a large—a significant percentage is going to have to be used for training purposes. So that what will be left is a minimum defensive package. And if you look at the countries surrounding Saudi Arabia, you would not pick Iran as the most likely one to attack it.*

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**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Pakistan of King Khalid of Saudi Arabia (excerpt)<sup>178</sup>**

Islamabad, October 15, 1976

The two leaders affirmed that it was not possible to arrive at a just and permanent settlement of the Middle East problem except on the basis of total Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and the restoration of the full rights of the Palestinian people to its homeland, in accordance with the Lahore Declaration issued by the Second Islamic Summit.<sup>179</sup> The Pakistani president reaffirmed the unchanging determination of the government and people of Pakistan to continue their total support of just Arab causes. The two leaders expressed their grave concern for the painful conflict presently raging in Lebanon, which has caused the needless shedding of innocent Arab blood. They called upon the parties to this conflict to stop at once this shedding of fraternal blood which has caused grievous harm to the just Arab cause. They expressed their commitment to Lebanon's unity and territorial integrity. They also expressed their feelings of revulsion for the continuing desecration

<sup>178</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Riyad* (Riyad), October 16, 1976. The visit took place October 10–15, 1976.

<sup>179</sup> Doc. 67 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

of holy sites in occupied Arab territories. They asserted that Israel's lack of respect for religious sanctities has fully exposed its aggressive intentions which violate civilized norms. They also drew attention to the explosive situation in the occupied territories brought about by Israel as a consequence of the continued violation of the principles of human rights and of Israel's insistence upon its attempt to Judaize and change the landmarks of the city of Jerusalem. The two leaders called upon the international community to take immediate steps to put pressure on Israel and to prevent it from implementing these measures that aim at the dispossession of the Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories through discrimination and economic and social repression.

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**Statement issued by the USSR Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee expressing concern over events in Lebanon<sup>180</sup>**

Moscow, October 18, 1976

The new dangerous turn of events in Lebanon has given the world public cause for grave concern which is fully shared by the Soviet people.

A new broad offensive has been launched by the right-wing Christian and Syrian troops against the Palestine resistance movement and the Lebanese national patriotic forces. Fighting is going on practically throughout the country. More people are dying—Lebanese, Palestinians and Syrians—and more blood is being shed.

This situation is being exploited by the ruling circles of Israel, whose armed forces have also stepped up armed provocations against the Palestinian and Lebanese patriots. Israeli forces are thrusting into the territory of Lebanon and are intensifying their blockade of the Lebanese coast.

The new offensive has caused a breakdown of the political talks between representatives of Syria, Lebanon and the Palestine Liberation Organization in the city of Chtaura, at which a real step was reported to have been made towards achieving a cease-fire and normalising the situation in Lebanon. The beginnings of progress towards agree-

<sup>180</sup> English text, *Soviet News* (London), 5855 (October 26, 1976), p. 375.

ment on these matters have been brought to naught by this new offensive.

The Soviet people wonder why Syria now comes out against its natural allies in the anti-imperialist struggle—the Palestine resistance movement and the national patriotic forces of Lebanon. It is well known that the Palestine resistance movement has grown stronger in recent years and has become an active and staunch fighter against Israel's aggression and the machinations of imperialism in the Middle East. Now, in Lebanon, blows are being struck at this movement, one of the front-ranking sections of the national liberation struggle, a movement whose anti-imperialist positions have long come under fire from imperialism and Zionism. And this is being done with the direct participation of Syrian forces.

In this way an old scheme of the forces hostile to the Arabs is being carried out by the hands of the Arabs themselves. What it comes to is, in practice, the diversion of the struggle of the Arab peoples to eliminate the consequences of Israel's aggression and a serious blow to the Arab national liberation movement as a whole.

What is taking place in Lebanon cannot but affect the basic interests of all Arab states and all Arabs. These interests demand that the Lebanese people and the Arab people of Palestine should have a just peace and the Lebanese people should have the opportunity to decide their problems themselves on the basis of the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of their country.

The Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, like all Soviet people, expresses great concern over the threat to the independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon, which is being torn apart by current events, and again expresses its firm support for the Palestine resistance movement and the Lebanese national patriotic forces at this hour of trial for them. The Soviet public resolutely comes out for an immediate end to military and all other actions against the Lebanese patriots and the Palestinians and in favour of a political settlement which would ensure the national interests of the Lebanese and the Palestinian peoples and co-operation and unity among the Arab states in the struggle against Israel's aggression and the imperialist machinations in the Middle East.

**Statement by US Secretary of State Kissinger defending the step-by-step approach towards a Middle East settlement<sup>181</sup>**

New York, October 19, 1976

The task of foreign policy is to find that balance between competing ends and between ends and means. The problems of timing, method, and feasibility impose themselves on any conscientious policy decision. There are certain experiments that cannot be tried, not because the goals are undesirable, but because the consequences of failure would be so severe that not even the most elevated goals justify the risk.

The Middle East provides a vivid example. No people yearn for comprehensive peace more than the people of Israel, whose existence has not been recognized by any of its neighbours throughout its history. There are those who argue that in the aftermath of the 1973 war the entire complex of Arab-Israeli issues—borders, peace obligations, refugees—should have been approached simultaneously at one conference. But the proponents of this course ignore the fact that at the time it would probably have proved disastrous; the United States had no diplomatic relations with several of the key Arab countries; the Soviet Union was in effect the lawyer for the Arab cause; an oil embargo was still in effect; and hostility between the Arab states and Israel remained at the flashpoint. Under such conditions the chances for success of a comprehensive approach were slight and the penalties for failure were far-reaching: a continuation of the oil embargo, a prolonged freeze in US relations with the Arab world, the corresponding growth of Soviet influence, strains with our allies in Europe and Japan, the increased isolation of Israel, and the likelihood, therefore, of a resumption of the Middle East war in even more difficult circumstances.

We chose to proceed step-by-step on those issues where room for agreement seemed to exist. We sought to establish a new relationship with the Arab world, to reduce the Soviet capacity for exploiting tensions, and to build a new sense of

<sup>181</sup> Made in a speech to the Synagogue Council of America, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXV, 1951 (November 15, 1976), pp. 601–602.

confidence in the parties directly involved so that overall solutions would some day be possible. We approached peace in stages but with the intention of ultimately merging individual steps into a comprehensive solution.

In the brief space of 18 months three agreements were reached, two between Egypt and Israel and one between Syria and Israel. As a result, the possibilities of achieving a genuine peace are greater today than they have ever been.

Deep suspicions remain, but the first important steps have been taken. The beginnings of mutual trust—never before in evidence—are emerging. Some Arab states for the first time are openly speaking of peace and ending a generation of conflict. The capacity of outside countries to exacerbate tensions has been reduced. The step-by-step approach has thus brought us to a point where comprehensive approaches are the logical next step. The decision before us now is not whether, but how, the next phase of negotiations should be launched. And we will engage in it, together with our Israeli friends, with new hope and confidence.

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### **Press conference statements by US President Ford regarding action on the Arab boycott and arms supplies to Israel<sup>182</sup>**

Washington, October 20, 1976

*Q. Mr. President, in the past week two top men in your Administration—F.B.I. Chief Clarence Kelley and Gen. George Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have come under pressure for their comments involving the press and aid to Israel. I want to know, since you haven't made any comment on this, what is your opinion of this incident. And, if you are elected, would you keep these two men in these responsible jobs?*

*A. I'm glad that the counsel of the White House through the Attorney General did stop what I understood was to be a speech by Clarence Kelley. From what I know about the speech, I think it would have been ill-advised and would not reflect the views of President Ford in his relationship with the press.*

Now General Brown had an interview six or eight months ago; it was released at a time when I'm certainly certain that General Brown didn't anticipate it would be released, and it was released in part, not in whole. And General Brown, after consulting with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, did appear before the press—both of them—and explained the entire context of the interview. And the total interview led any reasonable person to a different interpretation than the excerpts that were taken from it and were released to the press.

Now I happen to believe General Brown, and I've reviewed the whole text of that interview myself. Some of those statements were impudent (imprudent) and were ill-advised and I certainly don't believe that General Brown in that position ought to make those kind of comments in several instances. But I also don't believe it was fair in the prospective or released text that certain excerpts should be taken, and several of them taken out of context. Now General Brown was just recommended by me and he was confirmed by the Senate for a two-year term as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I would expect him to stay. He has a superb military record—35 years of devoted service in wartime and I think he's been a fine Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But he made one or two ill-advised statements and I hope and trust that he won't do it again.

*Q. But you would keep both him and Mr. Kelley in their jobs?*

*A. Yes, because I think Clarence Kelley has taken a very serious situation in the F.B.I., I think he's straightened it out and I think he's a person that all of us can have trust in as far as the job as the Director of the F.B.I.*

*Q. Mr. President, Mr. Carter yesterday said that if he was elected he would end the Arab oil boycott, and I wonder if you consider this a legitimate—*

*A. You mean the Arab oil embargo?*

*Q. The Arab boycott of Israel, I misspoke. I wonder if you consider this a legitimate objective and if you would like to do the same thing.*

*A. The Ford Administration is the only Administration since 1952 when the Arab boycott went into effect that's done anything in the Executive Branch of government. Now Mr. Carter says that he would end it—a very short sentence.*

*I resent the inference of that. The Arab boycott*

<sup>182</sup> Partial transcript, *The New York Times*, October 21, 1976, p. 10.

was initiated in 1952. In effect he's saying that President Eisenhower didn't do anything; that President Kennedy didn't do anything about it; that President Johnson didn't do anything about it; President Nixon didn't do anything about it, and he infers I haven't—of course he's inaccurate there. But I resent that he's challenging those other four Presidents—Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon—because I know they opposed the Arab boycott just as much as I do and just as much as Mr. Carter does.

I wonder how anybody can be so naive as to in one sentence that he's going to do something that four other outstanding individuals didn't do, even though they opposed the same thing. And I think it's ridiculous for him to make that kind of an allegation.

*Q. Mr. President, a moment ago, when talking about the Arab boycott, you were accusing Mr. Carter of inferring that previous Presidents had done nothing about it. But you prefaced that with a statement that the Ford Administration is the only one that's done anything about it since 1952. Aren't you and Mr. Carter making the same accusation?*

*A.* I've done it. He says he's going to end it. I think the affirmative action that I've taken—and it's been proven, I think, helpful because of what's transpired since, I think it was Oct. 7 when the actual order was issued that would force companies who had participated to have their names revealed. I think this will be a big deterrent. I hope it will. I'm against that Arab boycott. But I repeat, I'm the first President that has taken any affirmative action and I think the way that Mr. Carter stated it was a reflection on previous Presidents who I know felt as strongly as he does that an Arab boycott is contrary to philosophy that we as Americans have.

*Q. If you are saying that previous Presidents did nothing about it aren't you in effect making the same accusation?*

*A.* No, I said he said they had not done anything about it.

*Q. But you said the Ford Administration is the only one that's done anything.*

*A.* Anything that's required that companies put their name on the line that they participated or had received information; that is correct.

*Q. Mr. President, during your last debate with Jimmy Carter Mr. Carter stated that if there was another Arab oil boycott and he was President of the United States he would break that boycott by countering it with a boycott of our own. Mr. President, do you think this is a realistic possibility? Could the United States break down an Arab oil boycott or embargo by penalizing them by refusing to sell materials to them? And secondly, even if it is realistic, would it be in the best interests of the United States?*

*A.* My answer would be that I would not tolerate an Arab oil embargo. But I add very quickly, in the current atmosphere, because of the leadership of the Ford Administration you aren't going to have an Arab oil embargo.

In 1973 we had the Yom Kippur war. That was settled. We had the Sinai I agreement followed by the Sinai II agreement. This Administration, in the Sinai II agreement, was able to expand the peace effort in the Middle East, because the Arab nations on the one hand and Israel on the other trust the Ford Administration.

You won't find among Arab nations today the same attitude that prevailed at the time of the Yom Kippur war. And you won't find the possibilities of another Middle East war today that you had in 1973. So the probabilities of an Arab oil embargo are virtually nil because of the leadership of this Administration.

Now furthermore, I do not agree with the proposed recommendations of Mr. Carter if there was one. He says he would cut off food, he would cut off trade, he would cut off military arms. I think we can avoid any Arab oil embargo and not have to resort to cutting off food that American farmers have produced and sell abroad in order to help our economy here at home.

*Q. Mr. President, Barry Goldwater has said that he agrees with General Brown in the sense that Israel is a military burden on the United States and that we may deplete our own armory to supply Israel and that we may give Israel too many arms, too much arms. Is Israel a burden in your opinion, and will we deplete our own arms in giving Israel arms?*

*A.* That's a very good question and I would like to expand a bit in my response, if I might. The United States is dedicated to the security and survival of Israel. The 3 million Israelis, they're a democratic state in an area where democracy doesn't flourish. We have many, many good, firm, fine ties with the people and with the Government

of Israel, and want that to be understood very clearly.

Now you have to look at the broad picture when you look at the United States and Israeli military circumstances. At the time of the Yom Kippur war, the United States came immediately to the aid of Israel with substantial military hardware and military equipment. We drew down from our reserves in Western Europe, in the NATO forces, U.S. hardware, that was sent to Israel. Now that was not an irreparable situation in NATO because in the interim, from 1973, we have virtually made up that drawdown. But for a period of time one could say that the immediate needs of Israel in a crisis were a burden to the United States.

On the other hand, since I've been President, Aug. 9, 1974, to the present time, in order to make Israel strong militarily, the Ford Administration has either granted or sold about \$2.5 billion worth of military equipment to the state of Israel. And the net result is today Israel is stronger militarily than it was prior to the Yom Kippur war because of the support of the Ford Administration. So today Israel is not a burden militarily to the United States because of the forthright action of the Ford Administration.

So you have to take the comments that have been made in the proper context. Israel is a strong ally who doesn't want U.S. troops to be participants in any future military engagement there because Israel is strong and the Ford Administration has contributed significantly to making them strong.

But in the 1973 Yom Kippur war some emergency actions had to be taken. Now we've overcome it; Israel's strong, they're a good ally, and we're dedicated to their security and survival.

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### **Statement by General Secretary Brezhnev of the CPSU analysing the Middle East situation<sup>183</sup>**

**Moscow, October 25, 1976**

Comrades, the 25th Congress set the task of

concentrating the efforts of the peace-loving states on abolishing the remaining centres of war and, first of all, of achieving a just and lasting settlement in the Middle East. This task has recently acquired a special, it can be said, burning topicality. The point is that the situation in that area has again deteriorated, in the light of the bloody events in Lebanon.

If we look at the root of those events, we see that they mark a new attempt by world imperialism—that is, by the United States and other NATO powers—to deal a blow at the forces of anti-imperialist revolution in the Middle East and to maintain and strengthen their positions there. Imperialism has now taken to the road of provoking internecine conflict between Arab and Arab. The possibilities for this lie in the increased class stratification inside the Arab countries and in the growth of sociopolitical differences among them.

In Lebanon the forces of internal reaction, armed and encouraged by the western powers and supported by Israel and Saudi Arabia, have launched an offensive against the local national patriotic forces. But in the first place, their blow is directed against the detachments of the Palestine resistance movement, that is against an anti-imperialist detachment of the Arab world. Syria has, unfortunately, found itself drawn into the orbit of military actions.

From the very outset, the Soviet Union came out for ending the fratricidal war in Lebanon, for the protection of that country's progressive forces and the Palestinian patriots from being destroyed, for the preservation of the state unity of the Lebanon and for frustrating the reactionary plan aimed at splitting that country.

At the same time we hold the view that it is very important to settle in a spirit of mutual good will the relations between the Palestinian and Lebanese patriots, on the one hand, and neighbouring Syria, on the other. This is necessary if the unity of the anti-imperialist forces in the Arab east is to be restored.

As is well known, a conference of heads of state of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Kuwait and Lebanon and also Yasser Arafat, chairman of the executive committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, was held recently. An agreement on a ceasefire, on creating inter-Arab security forces and on normalising the situation in the Lebanon was achieved.

Judging by everything, this agreement, at least

<sup>183</sup> Made in a speech at a plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee; excerpted from the English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5856 (November 2, 1976), p. 384.

in what concerns the cease-fire, is being largely observed. We shall see how matters develop further.

Our attitude to the very fact of an agreement to end the war in the Lebanon is, of course, a positive one. We would like to hope that the process of normalising the situation there will continue on a healthy basis, without detriment to the Lebanese patriotic forces and to the Palestine resistance movement.

It seems that a considerable period of time will still be needed for full normalisation of the situation in that area. As for the USSR, we will continue to do everything we can for the success of a peace settlement in the Lebanon.

Comrades, we see clearly that the unsettled situation in the Middle East in general is the real basis of the events in Lebanon. The Soviet Union recently came out with a new initiative aimed at the resumption of the Geneva conference on the Middle East with the participation of all sides concerned, including also the Palestine resistance movement. We proposed a concrete agenda for that conference. It encompasses all the problems the solution of which would really bring about the establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East.

We thereby keep consistently to our policy towards the conflict in the Middle East. Our policy is a principled, class, Marxist-Leninist one, the only kind of policy that our country can pursue.

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### **Press conference statement by US Secretary of State Kissinger considering the ceasefire in Lebanon<sup>184</sup>**

**Hartford, Connecticut, October 27, 1976**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Arab leaders have announced agreement on what they call a peace plan for Lebanon after a two-day conference in Cairo.<sup>185</sup> Can this be a true step forward for peace in the Middle East, and especially for Lebanon, with Syria insisting on maintaining most*

*of its 20-or-so thousand troops as about two-thirds of a peace force there?*

A. There have been of course, I believe, 60 ceasefires in Lebanon. And therefore to predict that any one agreement is going to mark the end of the conflict is hazardous. It's interesting that we had a report from Beirut yesterday that for the first time in months there was a traffic jam, which meant that the population felt secure enough to go out into the streets.

I believe that the Riyad accord, as ratified by the Cairo summit, might well mark the beginning of a peaceful solution for Lebanon. The composition of the Arab force has not yet been agreed upon, but one would assume that it would have a preponderance of Syrians, since they are the largest number of troops that are there now.

The problem that now awaits solution is the relation between the Christian and the Moslem communities in Lebanon.

The United States has always supported the independence and unity of Lebanon, but it also favours the ability of each community to lead its own life according to its own traditions. And this remains to be worked out.

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### **Press interview statements by Socialist Party leader Mitterand of France criticizing aspects of the French government's Middle East policy<sup>186</sup>**

**Tel Aviv, late October, 1976**

*Q. How does the Socialist Party judge the attitude of the French government towards the Arab-Israeli conflict?*

A. I think the French government is wrong more in its psychological attitudes, its position and in certain unilateral decisions, rather than in its political principles.

As I understand it, its position is seriously lacking in sensitivity and flexibility. For example, when one speaks of an arms embargo and sends

<sup>184</sup> Excerpted from the transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXV, 1952 (November 22, 1976), p. 646.

<sup>185</sup> Docs. 313 and 314 below.

<sup>186</sup> Interview conducted by André Scemama; excerpted and translated from the French text, *Le Monde* (Paris), October 30, 1976, p. 10.



Mirages to Libya, it is a situation which can only offend Israel. I thoroughly understand that France has a policy of *rapprochement* with the Arab countries, because, as socialists, we would do the same, but it is more the method of government diplomacy with which we disagree.

I believe that through a whole series of considerations, by a sense of justice with regard to the third world countries, by its attitude towards the immigrants among us, France can show that she will never follow an anti-Arab policy. The problem of Israel is a limited one, there is a historical contradiction, there is even the existence of two historical necessities that France, I stress, cannot separate.

*Q. Did your Israeli interlocutors ask you for your "good offices" in rapprochement with the Arabs?*

A. No, we did not come here for that. But we would be able, in a given situation, to render service as we have already done.

*Q. Doesn't the fact that Israel only envisions negotiations with Arab states and not with the Palestinians present itself as a major obstacle?*

A. It is true that Israel intends to ignore not the Palestinians but the PLO, and as that means, for the time being, by-passing the PLO there is a temporary impasse.

*Q. [In response to a question about his visit to the Machpela Cave (Mosque of Abraham) in Hebron:]*

A. It was very moving to visit a place whose history one reads about in Genesis, and what is extraordinary is that, although 5,000 years old, it has become the cause of a kind of religious war and of debates in Parliament to ascertain whether or not it is an Israeli sanctuary. I find that marvellous.

*Q. And the future of Jerusalem?*

A. I do not think that one can assume that Jerusalem will not continue to be the capital of Israel. I think it is possible to find a solution so that the Arab population can feel at home in certain sanctuaries and sectors of the city.

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# Article by Israel Foreign Minister Allon reiterating his plans for peace (excerpts)<sup>187</sup>

October, 1976

## II

The polarized asymmetry between the size and intentions of the Arab states and those of Israel, and the extreme contrast in the anticipated fate of each side in the event of military defeat, obliges Israel to maintain constantly that measure of strength enabling it to defend itself in every regional conflict and against any regional combination of strength confronting it, without the help of any foreign army. To our deep regret, this is the first imperative facing us, the imperative to survive. And I would venture to say every other state in our place would behave exactly as we do.

There are, of course, many elements constituting the essential strength that Israel must maintain, ranging from its social, scientific and economic standards, as well as its idealistic motivation, to the quality and quantity of its armaments. A discussion of all of these elements is not within the compass of this article; my concern here is with one of them—but one essential to them all and without which Israel might well lack the strength to defend itself. I am referring to the territorial element; to what can be defined as defensible borders that Israel must establish in any settlement, as an essential part of any effective mutual security arrangements and without any desire for territorial expansion per se.

The most cursory glance at a map is sufficient to ascertain how little the armistic lines of 1949—lines which were never in the first place recognized as final—could be considered defensible borders. And even the most superficial fingering of the pages of history should be enough to demonstrate how attractive these lines have been to the Arab states as an encouragement to try their strength again against us. The truth of the matter is that Resolution 242 of the United Nations Security Council has already recognized, in its original English text, the need to provide Israel with secure and recognized boundaries—in other

<sup>187</sup> *Foreign Affairs* (New York), October, 1976; excerpted from the reprint in *The Jerusalem Post*, September 24, 1976, pp. 6-7.

words, that changes must be introduced in the old lines of the armistice agreements.

It is no coincidence that this resolution does not speak about Israel's withdrawal from *all* the territories that came under its control in the war that was forced upon Israel in June 1967, nor even from *the* territories. In the original text (which was the outcome of long and exhaustive negotiation), Resolution 242 speaks only of withdrawal from territories. That the meaning was clear was demonstrated by the statement of the United States at the time, made by its U.N. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg on November 15, 1967, in the Security Council discussions that preceded the passage of Resolution 242. He stated:

"Historically, there never have been secure or recognized boundaries in the area. Neither the Armistice Lines of 1949, nor the Cease-Fire Lines of 1967, have answered that description."

As is known, Israel expressed more than once its willingness to withdraw from the cease-fire lines of 1967, within the framework of a peace agreement. On the other hand, it is clear—even according to the Security Council decision—that Israel is not obliged to withdraw to the armistice lines of 1949 that preceded the 1967 war, but to revised lines. The question is what borders will provide Israel with that essential minimum of security? And without such security it is difficult to expect to pacify the area and provide a lasting solution to the conflict within it.

If the sole consideration were the purely strategic-military one, then possibly the most convenient security borders would have been those Israel maintained following the Six-Day War, or perhaps those which it maintains today. There is even a basis for the claim that the 1973 Yom Kippur War—began as a surprise attack in concert by the armies of Egypt and Syria—proves that these lines were ideally the best. Had the Yom Kippur War commenced on the 1949 armistice lines, for example, there can be little doubt that the price Israel would have had to pay in repelling the aggressors would have been unimaginably higher than that paid so painfully in October 1973. But we are not merely talking about purely military-strategic matters, to the extent that they ever exist in isolation. Nor are we discussing the maximum security that borderlines can provide Israel. As stated, our preoccupation is only with the essential minimum.

One does not have to be a military expert to easily identify the critical defects of the armistice lines that existed until June 4, 1967. A considerable part of these lines is without any topographical security value; and, of no less importance, the lines fail to provide Israel with the essential minimum of strategic depth. The gravest problem is on the eastern boundary, where the entire width of the coastal plain varies between 10 and 15 miles, where the main centers of Israel's population, including Tel Aviv and its suburbs, are situated, and where the situation of Jerusalem is especially perilous. Within these lines a single successful first strike by the Arab armies would be sufficient to dissect Israel at more than one point, to sever its essential living arteries, and to confront it with dangers that no other state would be prepared to face. The purpose of defensible borders is thus to correct this weakness, to provide Israel with the requisite minimal strategic depth, as well as lines which have topographical strategic significance.

Of course I do not wish to overlook the fact that there are some who would claim that in an era of modern technological development such factors are valueless. In a nutshell, their claim is that the appearance of ground-to-ground missiles, supersonic fighter-bombers, and other sophisticated instruments of modern warfare has canceled out the importance of strategic depth and topographical barriers. Personally, I do not know of a single state which is willing and ready to give up a convenient border line for this reason. At any rate, this argument is certainly invalid regarding Israel, and within the context of the Middle East conflict, where the opposite is true. Precisely because of dramatic developments in conventional weaponry the significance of territorial barriers and strategic depth has increased.

With all the heavy damage that warheads and bombs can inflict, they alone cannot be decisive in war, as long as the other side is resolved to fight back. Recent military history demonstrates this only too clearly. The German air "blitz" did not knock England out of World War II, nor did the heavy allied air bombardments bring Germany to its knees. This happened only when the last bunker in Berlin fell. Even massive American air bombardments did not defeat North Vietnam which, in the final analysis, proved to be the victor in the war. At least as far as conventional wars

are concerned, the following basic truth remains: without an attack by ground forces that physically overrun the country involved, no war can be decisive. This is all the more so in the Middle East where the Arab side is no less vulnerable to rocket and aerial bombardment than Israel, a factor that can greatly minimize the use of this kind of weaponry, and will leave to the ground forces the role of really deciding the issue.

### III

Fortunately, the geostrategic conditions that have existed in the Middle East over the past nine years permit a solution based upon a fair political compromise. This could provide Israel with the minimal defensible borders that are indispensable without impairing, to any meaningful extent, the basic interests of the other side, including those of the Palestinian community. As with every other compromise, so, too, is this one likely to be painful in the short term to both sides. But this compromise will, in the long run, grant advantages that both sides do not currently possess nor, without it, ever would in the future.

According to the compromise formula I personally advocate, Israel—within the context of a peace settlement—would give up the large majority of the areas which fell into its hands in the 1967 war. Israel would do so not because of any lack of historical affinity between the Jewish people and many of these areas. With regard to Judea and Samaria, for example, historical Jewish affinity is as great as that for the coastal plain or Galilee. Nonetheless, in order to attain a no less historically exalted goal, namely that of peace, such a deliberate territorial compromise can be made.

For its part, the Arab side would have to concede its claim to those strategic security zones which, together with a number of effective arrangements to be discussed below, will provide Israel with that vital element so lacking in the pre-1967 war lines: a defense posture which would enable the small standing army units of Israel's defense force to hold back the invading Arab armies until most of the country's reserve citizens army could be mobilized. These security zones would thus guarantee enough time to organize

and launch the counteroffensive needed to defeat any such aggression.

The armistice lines of 1949 extend along the foothills of the Judean and Samarian mountains and along the Mediterranean coastal plain—that is, flat territory without any topographical barriers. This leaves central Israel with a narrow area that comprises the Achilles heel of the lines prior to June 4, 1967. It serves as a constant temptation to a hostile army in possession of hilly Judea and Samaria to attempt to inflict a fatal blow against Israel by severing it in two in one fell swoop. Moreover, this weakness would permit such an army not only to strike at Israel's densest population and industrial centers, but also in effect to paralyze almost all of Israel's airspace with surface-to-air missiles with which the Arab armies are so abundantly equipped.

According to the 1949 lines, Jerusalem was pierced through its heart—the university and the principal hospital on Mount Scopus were cut off, while access from the coastal plain to Jerusalem was restricted to a narrow corridor, threatened on both sides by a pincer attack.

In the northeastern sector, the 1949 line left Syria on the dominating Golan Heights, controlling the Huleh Valley and the Galilee Basin at their foothills, and including the sources of the Jordan River and the Sea of Galilee from which Israel draws a vital part of its water supply. Moreover, after 1949 Syria not only repeatedly shelled the Israeli villages located at the Golan foothills but also attempted to divert the sources of the Jordan and thereby deprive Israel of a vital source of water. Even more important, the Golan Heights served in past wars as the most convenient base for the Syrian army to make swift and major attacks upon Galilee, ultimately aimed at the conquest of the entire northern part of our country.

According to the 1949 armistice agreements, signed by Israel in the naive belief that they would lead swiftly to peace, Egypt was given control of the Gaza Strip. This was a dangerous and needless anomaly. Bordering the unpopulated Sinai desert and without any affinity to Egypt proper, this zone came to serve as a base for large-scale terrorist raids launched at southern Israel. Should the strip be returned to Egyptian control it might easily resume its destructive function. Even worse, it might serve Egypt as a bridgehead for

an offensive northward and eastward toward the very heart of Israel, following the historic invasion route from south to north. Another serious defect in the armistice agreements was that it left Israel's southern port entrance at Elath on a tiny strip of shoreline only six miles long from its border with Egypt to that of Jordan. Moreover, Israel's maritime route to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean passes through the Straits of Tiran at Sharm-el-Sheikh, and the Egyptian blockade there against Israeli ships and cargoes constituted a *casus belli* in both 1956 and 1967.

A reasonable compromise solution can be found for all these weaknesses in the current geostrategic and demographic situation existing in the Middle East. Without going into details or drawing precise maps, an activity that must await direct negotiations between the parties themselves, in my opinion the solution in principle ought to be along the following general lines.

Both to preserve its Jewish character and to contribute toward a solution of the Palestinian issue, Israel should not annex an additional and significant Arab population. Therefore the strategic depth and topographical barriers in the central sector, so totally absent in the lines preceding the 1967 war, cannot be based on moving these lines eastward in a schematic manner, even though this would be logical from a purely strategic point of view. Rather, apart from some minor tactical border alterations along the western section of "the green line," this same goal can be achieved through absolute Israeli control over the strategic zone to the east of the dense Arab population, concentrated as it is on the crest of the hills and westward. I am referring to the arid zone that lies between the Jordan River to the east, and the eastern chain of the Samaritan and Judean mountains to the west—from Mt. Gilboa in the north through the Judean desert, until it joins the Negev desert. The area of this desert zone is only about 700 square miles and it is almost devoid of population. Thus this type of solution would leave almost all of the Palestinian Arab population of the West Bank under Arab rule.

Cutting through this zone, which continues from north to south, it would be possible to delineate a corridor from west to east under Arab sovereignty. This would permit uninterrupted communication along the Jericho-Ramallah axis, be-

tween the Arab populated areas of the West and East banks of the river. In this manner the only realistic solution becomes possible—one that also helps resolve the problem of Palestinian identity that could then find its expression in a single Jordanian-Palestinian state. (After all, the population of both banks, East and West, are Palestinian Arabs. The fact is that the great majority of Palestinians carry Jordanian passports while almost all of Jordan's inhabitants are Palestinians.)

Jerusalem, Israel's capital, which was never the capital of any Arab or Muslim state, but was always the capital and center of the Jewish people, cannot return to the absurd situation of being partitioned. The Holy City and adjacent areas essential for its protection and communications must remain a single, undivided unit under Israel's sovereignty. Because of its universal status, however, in that it is holy to three great religions, as well as the mixed nature of its inhabitants, a solution for the religious interests connected with it can be found, a *religious* and not a political solution. For example, special status could be granted to the representatives of the various faiths in the places holy to them, just as it might be possible to base the municipal structure of the city upon subdistricts that take ethnic and religious criteria into account.

While the strategic zone in the central sector is crucial to Israel's security, so, too, is a zone on the Golan Heights. As past experience has demonstrated, a border not encompassing the Golan Heights would again invite the easy shelling of the villages below in the Huleh Valley, the Galilee Basin and eastern Galilee. More important than the danger of renewed Syrian shelling and sniping at Israeli villages and fishermen below, which is basically a *tactical* question, is that Israel needs an effective defense line on the Golan Heights for two cardinal *strategic* reasons: first, to preclude any new Syrian attempts to deny Israel its essential water resources and, second, to prevent a massive Syrian attack on the whole of Galilee, either independently or in coordination with other Arab armies on Israel's other frontiers.

In my view the city of Gaza and its environs, which is heavily populated by Palestinian Arabs, could comprise a part of the Jordanian-Palestinian unit which would arise to the east of Israel, and serve as that state's Mediterranean port. In this case, it would be necessary to place at the

disposal of traffic between Gaza and the Jordanian-Palestinian state the use of a land route (as distinct from a land corridor) similar to that, for example, connecting the United States with Alaska. But Israel must continue to control fully the strategic desert zone from the southern part of the Gaza strip to the dunes on the eastern approaches of the town of El Arish, which itself would be returned to Egypt. This strategic zone, almost empty of population, would block the historic invasion route along the sea coast which many conquerors have taken over the generations to invade the land of Israel, and further north.

A number of border adjustments will also be essential to ensure security sensitive areas of the 1949 Armistice line between Israel and Egypt. These must be made in such a manner as to permit full Israeli control in a number of sectors of crucial importance to its defense and which lack any value for the security of Egypt. I am referring to such areas as those surrounding Abu Aweigila, Kusseima and Kuntilla, which comprise the principal strategic crossroads on the main routes from the desert to Beersheba, and to the Elath shore line which is the gateway to Israel's maritime routes to the Indian Ocean and the Far East.

An especially sensitive point is that of the area of Sharm-el-Sheikh at the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula. Although, from this vantage point, there is no danger of a massive surprise attack on Israel proper, a very concrete threat to Israeli freedom of navigation does exist. It should be repeated that Egypt has twice imposed blockades against Israeli ships and cargoes seeking passage through the Straits of Tiran. And, in both instances, Israel was compelled to break this blockade mounted from Sharm-el-Sheikh by capturing the place. In one way or another, unquestionable Israeli control over this corner of the Sinai—and over a land route reaching it—is not only critical to Israeli defense, but also serves to neutralize a focal point that is liable to set the area on fire once again. Moreover, because of the threat of blockade to Israeli-bound traffic through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean, full Israeli control over Sharm-el-Sheikh might serve as a countervailing deterrent against such blockade attempts.

To sum up, there were numerous bitterly

deficient points in the pre-1967 lines, and these proposals encompass minimal corrections to them required for an overall peace settlement. The necessity for these corrections is all the more apparent when it is realized that Israel not only faces the military strength of its contiguous neighbours, but may also have to face the combined strength of many other Arab countries. This has already happened to no small extent in the 1973 war, when contingents from Iraq, Libya, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan and other Arab countries participated in the fighting, together with the armies of Egypt and Syria. Thus, in a very practical sense, solid defense lines are indispensable to Israel in order to withstand the attacks of the entire Arab world. In addition, these may well be supported by contingents of so-called volunteers who can be sent from certain countries from outside the area that are hostile to Israel.

Let me stress again that defensible borders are vital to Israel not out of any desire to annex territories per se, not out of a desire for territorial expansion, and not out of any historical and ideological motivation. Israel can compromise on territory but it cannot afford to do so on security. The entire rationale of defensible borders is strategic. This is also the only rationale for the selective settlement policy that Israel is pursuing, as an integral part of its unique defense system, in those strategic zones so vital to its security.

Of course, when the peace for which we strive is achieved, the borders will not divide the two peoples but be freely open to them. In short, good fences make good neighbors.

#### IV

As I have pointed out, border adjustments essential for Israel's security, and hence for the long-term stability of the entire area, must also be linked with mutually effective security arrangements designed to prevent surprise attacks by one side on the other, or at least to reduce to a minimum the danger of such attacks. In the geostrategic circumstances of the Middle East, to reduce the possibility of surprise offensives is, in fact, to reduce the danger of all offensives. I am referring to such arrangements as the delineation of both totally and partially de-

militarized zones under joint Arab-Israeli control, with or without the participation of a credible international factor; or such arrangements as the delineation of parallel early-warning systems like those functioning in the Sinai according to the terms of the 1975 Interim Agreement between Israel and Egypt.

I will not enter here into the technical details of such arrangements, their nature, placement and scope. Not that they are unimportant or nonessential; on the contrary, without them, Israel could not permit itself to make the far-reaching territorial compromises which, in my opinion, it should be prepared to make within the context of peace agreements with its neighbors. Let me give one example, albeit, the most important, in order to illustrate this point. According to the principles I have already outlined, if Israel were to forfeit the densely populated heartland of Judea and Samaria, it would not be able to forego—under any circumstances—the effective demilitarization of these areas. Apart from civilian police to guarantee internal order, these areas would have to be devoid of offensive forces and heavy arms. In the same way as any other country, Israel would be unable to abandon areas so close to its heartland if they were liable once again to become staging areas for full-scale, limited or guerilla attacks upon its most vital areas.

In short, Israel cannot permit itself to withdraw from a large part of the West Bank unless the area from which it withdraws is shorn of all aggressive potential. For this purpose, absolute Israeli control, as proposed above, of a strategic security zone along the Jordan Basin will not be adequate. Effective demilitarization of the areas from which the Israel Defense Forces withdraw will also be essential. Here as elsewhere, the two elements are interwoven: without a security zone, Israel cannot be satisfied with demilitarization alone; without effective demilitarization, Israel cannot be satisfied with just the security zone.

It should be clear from what I have said, that Israel does not hold most of the territories that fell into its hands in the war, which was imposed on it in 1967, as an end in itself. Despite the paucity of its territory compared with the vast areas of the Arab countries, and despite the historical, strategic and economic importance of these areas, Israel would be prepared to concede

all that is not absolutely essential to its security within the context of an overall peace settlement. It is holding most of these territories now only as a means to achieve its foremost goal—peace with all its neighbors.

## 164

**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Iraq of Prime Minister Manescu of Rumania (excerpts)<sup>188</sup>**

Baghdad, November 10, 1976

1. At the invitation of Mr. Saddam Hussein, deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council of the Iraqi republic, Mr. Manea Manescu, of the Socialist Republic of Rumania paid an official visit to Iraq in the period from 6-11 November, 1976.

12. The two sides reviewed their respective countries' viewpoints regarding the current situation in the Middle East. In this regard, they both expressed their concern about the gravity of the situation which is primarily the result of depriving the Arab people of Palestine of their national rights and the continued military occupation of Arab territories. Both sides declare once again their view that a just and permanent peace in the region is impossible to attain unless there is an immediate withdrawal of all occupying forces from all occupied Arab territories and unless the Arab people of Palestine recover their determined national rights, including their right of self-determination.

13. (a) In this regard, both sides affirmed their steadfast support for the just struggle of the Palestine liberation movement. They noted with satisfaction the success of the PLO in achieving a wide measure of international recognition.

(b) Both sides expressed their deep concern as regards the situation in Lebanon. They favour a settlement of the conflict to take place among the various political and social forces in Lebanon since they are the parties directly concerned. This would lead to an end to the bloodshed

<sup>188</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), November 11, 1976.

and to the preservation of the sovereignty and independence of the country and its territorial unity without any foreign interference in its domestic affairs.

## 165

### **Speech by UN Representative Sherer of the US expressing support for the UN Security Council consensus statement on Israeli policy in the occupied territories<sup>189</sup>**

New York, November 11, 1976

Mr. President, the United States has joined the other members of the Security Council in the consensus statement which you have read because we believe this statement affirms several important principles in regard to the occupied territories.

First is the principle that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to the present situation in the occupied territories. Under this convention and under international law the occupying power has rights as well as responsibilities. Secondly, we have supported and continue to support the principle that persons displaced in the 1967 war should be permitted to return to their places of habitation at the time of that war. Finally, we welcome the concern in this statement for the sanctity of the holy places, which we consider to be a particularly sensitive and important matter.

While my government has associated itself with the results of this debate, I must in candor observe that the criticism of Israel which dominated these proceedings has been largely one-sided and excessive. This was particularly true as regards the question of access to the holy sites, specifically the burial site of the Patriarch Abraham.

We agree with the other members of the Security Council that the Fourth Geneva Convention, specifically article 27, provides the standard for measuring Israeli conduct in this matter. We are also fully aware that in recent weeks there have occurred deplorable acts of desecra-

tion and violence in and around this site which is holy to Moslems, Jews, and Christians alike.

However, it is only fair and proper to point out that the Israeli Government has condemned and opposed these activities and has, most recently, brought charges in a military court against a rather prominent Israeli citizen for his role in them.

The question of access to and worship within this site is a particularly complex and difficult matter, but we believe that the occupying authorities have acted in good faith to protect and preserve the religious rights set forth in the Fourth Geneva Convention.

The Council's statement of consensus speaks of the danger to peace of any act of profanation of the holy places. This we take to mean any act by the population, the local authorities, or the occupying power.

In closing, I would like to observe that in this debate we have been dealing with the symptoms of the problem rather than with the problem itself. The conditions we have been discussing will be satisfactorily resolved only in the context of the negotiation of a just and lasting peace in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, with respect to which we stand by all our previous positions.

There is good reason that conditions in the Middle East have improved to the point that renewed efforts toward such a settlement will be possible. The recent meetings of Arab leaders in Riyadh and Cairo promise to contribute to an end to the fighting in Lebanon and to the preservation of its independence, territorial integrity, and national unity, to which we attach the highest importance. More broadly, the statesmanship displayed by the governments principally involved promises to establish the constructive atmosphere and the conditions necessary if there is to be progress toward resolving the problems which continue to beset the Middle East.

<sup>189</sup> Made in the Security Council. *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXV, 1954 (December 6, 1976), pp. 692-693. The consensus statement is doc. 14 above.

## 166

**Letter from US Secretary of State Kissinger to US Senator Javits (Dem.) asserting that US support for the Security Council consensus does not represent a change in US policy towards Israel** <sup>189a</sup>

Washington, November 16, 1976

Dear Senator Javits:

I have received your letter of November 15 concerning the United States' action in associating itself with the consensus statement in the recent Security Council meeting on the Israeli occupied territories. I welcome the opportunity to discuss our reasons for adopting this position.

I want to make clear at the outset, in response to your specific question, that this action of the United States does not represent in any way a change in US policy towards Israel, its security, or its relations to its neighbours and the United States. Our commitment to the security of Israel remains a fundamental element in American foreign policy. Our friendship towards Israel tested over the years remains fundamental.

Our decision in the Security Council was a reflection of the policy we have followed for years towards Israel's rights and responsibilities in the occupied territories.

It is important to regard our action in New York against the background of our handling of Middle East issues in the Security Council over the past year and to take into account as well the problems that we know lie before us. We were facing a situation in New York in which, after having vetoed or blocked at least six Security Council actions critical of Israel in the last year alone, we now had a proposed statement that eliminated the very elements that had led us to oppose earlier actions, specifically a Council statement in May.<sup>190</sup> The statement, moreover, drew on language we had ourselves used with respect to Israeli policies in the occupied territories. It is hard to see how we could have failed to associate ourselves with a statement incorporating language we had ourselves used and deleting clauses to which we had previously objected.

At the same time, looking ahead, we recognized

that we would be facing a series of Middle East issues in the UN in the weeks ahead, in the first instance the renewal of the UNDOF Mandate at the end of November. Our capacity to be effective in opposing measures that are clearly objectionable requires us to maintain the credibility of our position by not opposing measures that are basically consistent with our policy. We had not chosen to have this Security Council meeting but had nonetheless to respond to the situation with which it confronted us.

The consensus statement as it was finally put forward in the Council reflected long and publicly stated United States policy on the occupied territories. This policy was most recently enunciated by Ambassador Scranton in the Security Council on May 26 of this year,<sup>191</sup> but it had been the subject of other public statements going back several years. The US Permanent Representative stated in the Council (in 1969) that "the occupier must maintain the occupied area as intact and unaltered as possible without interfering with the customary life of the area, and any change must be necessitated by immediate needs of the occupation... My government regrets and deplores this pattern of activity and it has so informed the government of Israel on numerous occasions since June 1967." In the following year, on March 20, 1970, the US Representative to the UN Commission on Human Rights, stated in the debate on the Question of Human Rights in the Territories Occupied as a Result of Hostilities in the Middle East: "Article 46 of this [Geneva] Convention prohibits the occupying power from transferring parts of its civilian population into the territories it occupies. It also prohibits individual or mass transfers or deportations of people from occupied areas.... With respect to transfer of civilians into those areas, my government has stated time and time again that it has strong reservations about these or any other steps which might prejudice an ultimate political settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute." Essentially the same point was made by the spokesman of the Department of State on June 9 of the following year.

During the consultation in New York that led to the consensus statement, we reviewed with Israeli representatives our position on the pro-

<sup>189a</sup> Department of State Bulletin, LXXV, 1954 (December 6, 1976), pp. 693-695. The consensus statement is doc. 14 above.

<sup>190</sup> Doc. 13 above.

<sup>191</sup> Doc. 104 above.



posed statement and informed them of the efforts we were making to soften the language. We made clear to them that we would not be able to act inconsistently with our past positions should we succeed in these efforts. We had no reason to expect the intensity of the present Israeli reaction.

I would like to emphasize that our position on the question of Israeli conduct in the occupied territories has had also positive elements. We believe, in particular, that Israel has carried out its obligations to safeguard the holy places in an exemplary manner, and we have made this point firmly in discussing the question of the occupied territories. In his statement in the Security Council following the reading of the consensus statement on November 11, US Ambassador Sherer stated, "We believe that the occupying authorities have acted in good faith to protect and preserve the religious rights set forth in the Fourth Geneva Convention." He also made a point that we felt needed to be stressed when he said, "Under this [Geneva] Convention and under international law, the occupying power has rights as well as responsibilities."<sup>192</sup>

In situations where we have felt United Nations resolutions to be unjustly critical of Israel, or where they have contained language that we considered harmful to goals that we and Israel share in the Middle East, we have not hesitated to oppose them even if this required, as it frequently has done, standing alone. We voted against numerous General Assembly Middle East resolutions that we considered unbalanced, and in the United Nations specialized agencies we have led the opposition against efforts to limit Israel's full participation. We have also consistently defended Israel's interests against unjust criticism in the Security Council and have insisted on balance in the Council's actions. I am attaching a brief summary of the occasions during this past year when we have blocked what we considered to be unacceptable Council measures.

I want to emphasize in conclusion that our policy toward Israel has not changed and that a measured consistency on our part in responding to such a situation as that which faced us this month in the Security Council is important not only in the context of the Council itself but also

in respect to our broader responsibilities in the Middle East, in particular our efforts to help achieve a Middle East peace settlement. If we are to continue to play the important role that we have played in this respect in recent years, we must above all maintain the conviction among the parties involved that we stand by statements we have made over the years. Just as Israel has been able to count on it, so must the other parties. Israel has always understood that our policy in support of a peace settlement requires us also to take the views of other parties to the peace process into account. As is evident from views we have reiterated throughout the period since 1967, had we been presented with this consensus statement at any time, we would have supported it. We all want to see peace in the Middle East, and we all recognize that only through peace will we finally resolve the issues such as those that have led to this recent meeting of the Security Council.

*Attachment: Summary*

## TEXT OF SUMMARY

*Summary of Occasions During Past Year when the United States Has Blocked Unacceptable Security Council Measures*

On December 8, 1975 the US vetoed a resolution "strongly condemning the Government of Israel for its premeditated air attacks against Lebanon..."<sup>193</sup>

On January 26, 1976, the US vetoed a resolution affirming "that the Palestinian people should be enabled to exercise its inalienable national rights of self-determination including the right to establish an independent state in Palestine..."<sup>194</sup>

On March 25, 1976, the US vetoed a resolution on the occupied territories, which *inter alia*, expressed deep concern "at measures taken by the Israeli authorities... aimed at changing the physical, cultural, demographic and religious character of the occupied territories..."<sup>195</sup>

On May 26, 1976, the US refused to join a Security Council consensus statement on the occupied territories because it called upon Israel "to rescind" any measure that would violate the Fourth Geneva Convention.<sup>196</sup> (This phrase, among others, was deleted from last week's

<sup>193</sup> Doc. 205 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>194</sup> See docs. 10, 15 and 42 above.

<sup>195</sup> See docs. 16, 68 and 71 above.

<sup>196</sup> See doc. 13 above.

<sup>192</sup> Doc. 165 above.

consensus statement because of US insistence.)

On June 29, 1976, the US vetoed a resolution affirming "the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine...."<sup>197</sup>

On July 14, 1976, the US prevented the adoption of a resolution, following the Entebbe raid, that condemned Israel's "flagrant violation of Uganda's sovereignty and territorial integrity" by introducing a counter-resolution with the UK which condemned hijacking.

## 167

### **Statement by Foreign Minister Söder of Sweden explaining Sweden's policy on the Middle East and the Palestine question<sup>198</sup>**

**Stockholm, November 18, 1976**

In a question in Stockholm Mr. Sven Andersson has asked whether I in Parliament would expand my previous public remarks to the effect that the change of government will not entail any change in the attitude of Sweden towards the Middle East question. The questioner further asks whether I consider it conducive to the credibility of Swedish foreign policy that prominent members of the government publicly express divergent views on a question as crucial and as internationally noticed as that of the Middle East.

In addition, Mr. Hellstrom has asked the Minister of Labour whether he thinks the PLO should have the right to participate in the UN Security Council's debate on the Middle East. The question has been passed to me to answer.

I intend to answer the questions of Mr. Andersson and Mr. Hellstrom together. First I shall outline the general attitude of the government to the Middle East question. This subject came up in my speech before the UN General Assembly a month or so ago. On that occasion I first said how we were following the tragic civil war in Lebanon with sympathy. It is a catastrophe for the population of that country. It constitutes

a further reminder that the whole Middle East conflict must be brought to a speedy solution. I said that the Swedish government considers that a solution should be based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. Israel and all other states in the area have the right of existence and sovereignty within secure and recognized borders. The principle that conquest of territories by force is inadmissible must be respected. Beyond that, it must be obvious that the legitimate national interests of the Palestinian Arabs should be taken into account. This includes the right to form their own state to live peacefully beside Israel. Finally, I pointed to the necessity of speedily establishing contacts which can lead to an agreed solution. If this does not happen the risk will increase of new violent clashes which will entail new suffering for the affected peoples.

In the UN Security Council the government has also had to take a stand on the question of the PLO. The attitude of the government is that the PLO as representative of the Palestinian Arabs should be given the right to participate in the considerations of the UN Security Council regarding Middle East questions. This attitude of the government was last expressed in the Security Council on November 1. Already in the explanation of vote in connection with the voting on the procedural question the government parties also found it appropriate to outline and clarify their attitude to acts of terror and parts of the PLO programme. This attitude is shown by an overwhelming majority of the Parliament and of the Swedish people.

In the Security Council the government has also had to adopt a position on Israel's policy in the areas occupied in 1967.

A statement on behalf of all the members of the Council, including Sweden, expressed concern over the situation in the occupied Arab territories.<sup>199</sup> Israeli measures which alter the demographic patterns and the geographic conditions there, and above all the establishment of settlements in occupied territory, was deeply rejected by the Security Council which considered that these measures were an obstacle to peace. The Council further pointed out that the legal status of Jerusalem could not be altered and stressed the importance of protecting the holy places.

<sup>197</sup> See docs. 17 and 128 above.

<sup>198</sup> Made in an answer to a parliamentary question; translated from the Swedish text supplied, on request, by the Swedish embassy in Beirut.

<sup>199</sup> Doc. 14 above.

I have wished to present this review of the development of the question so as to show, among other things, that the new government is following on the Middle East question lines which have applied for a long time and which were presented by the questioner when he was foreign minister.

The statements I have made and the measures adopted on the part of the government in this question express the collective judgement of the government. This fact is not affected when a spokesman of one of the ruling parties finds it necessary as party spokesman to make a statement in the light of the views offered by his party.

After the explanations I gave earlier to the public and the answer I have given today, I regard it as impossible for anyone at home or abroad to harbour any misunderstanding regarding the contents of the government's policy on the Middle East question. Our desire is to contribute to a peace in the Middle East which will give justice to both Israeli and Palestinian.

### 168

#### **Statement by Prime Minister Rabin of Israel inviting President Sadat of Egypt to talk peace to him rather than to the press<sup>200</sup>**

Jerusalem, November 21, 1976

The year 1977 may well prove to be a year of new diplomatic testing and initiative. Israel is ready. Our agenda is flexible.

If our neighbors wish 1977 to be the year of Geneva—we are very willing to join in a renewal of the Geneva Conference for negotiation with them on an overall peace. If they seek some other framework for genuine peace talks—Israel is not fussy. We are open to all reasonable suggestions.

Likewise, if, for reasons of their own, our neighbors prefer to negotiate something less than peace—we are ready for that, too. We are willing to hold talks with them on ending the state of war, as a further crucial step towards peace.

These options have been clearly proposed by this Government, and we await the Arab response. It is up to them to decide. No one can

decide for them. No one can serve as a substitute for their responsibility to negotiate with us. And no formula devised outside the region can take the place of the formula which must be devised inside the region. On the contrary, outside initiatives of this kind could prove fatal to the peace process itself.

Here, in Jerusalem, we have begun to hear all kinds of noises from Arab capitals. They come particularly from Cairo. We are listening to them very carefully. We note that the word "peace" is being mentioned quite a lot. This, in itself, is interesting. What is not encouraging is that the word is never addressed to us.

President Sadat is saying very nice things about peace to all kinds of visitors to Cairo—to American Senators, to Congressmen and to foreign journalists. However, he has not said a word to us. So let me say a word to Sadat:

If you are serious about this word "peace," let us negotiate. You have explained your willingness to make peace in talks with American Senators, Congressmen and other visitors. You have talked about peace with CBS, NBC and ABC. But these are not the parties to the peace. Peace in the Middle East can be negotiated only among us who live in the Middle East.

I therefore say to Sadat:

I have heard what you have had to say to others. Now, what do you have to say to me? If you want to talk at Geneva, Israel is ready.

If you and your colleagues have any other proposal where to meet about an overall peace, let me know about it.

If you prefer testing our ideas about an end to the state of war—please, let me hear from you.

I say again: If you really want progress towards peace, then let us—your country and mine—negotiate peace.

<sup>200</sup> Made in a speech to the Knesset; partial English text issued by the Israeli embassy in Washington.

**Press interview statements by Israel Prime Minister Rabin commenting on the prospects for a Middle East settlement<sup>201</sup>**

Late November, 1976

*Q. What is happening in Lebanon now that has caused the current crisis atmosphere?*

A. Over two divisions of the Syrian army, disguised as an inter-Arab force, are taking over most parts of Lebanon, except the south. Politically the question is whether the Syrians will limit their activities to helping the President [Elias Sarkis] restore Lebanon as a political entity and independent country. Or will the Syrians try to annex Lebanon to create the beginning of a greater Syria? Militarily the present deployment of the Syrian army puts it in a much weaker position against Israel than if it were concentrated where it used to be around Damascus and the Golan Heights. But this is really only a temporary situation. Israel cannot tolerate a return to the dangerous situation of a year and a half ago, when terrorists used southern Lebanon as a base for their attacks against Israel. We want a neutral zone in southern Lebanon—not a buffer zone—in which no forces exist except Lebanese forces—not U.N. forces—that keep the security and tranquillity.

*Q. If there is no immediate threat from the Syrians in Lebanon, then why has Israel issued such tough warnings?*

A. I believe it is better to make clear positions beforehand in order to prevent any misunderstanding. You have to bear in mind that we don't talk directly to the Syrians or to the Lebanese. We have to make clear that we cannot tolerate any change that threatens the basic security interests of the state of Israel, either through Syrian movement to the south or the return of the terrorists. [But] we don't mean to threaten anyone. We are not asking for the change of one millimeter of the line between Israel and Lebanon.

*Q. What is a reasonable timetable for Middle East peace initiatives?*

A. Any time is the proper time for negotiations. I am ready to meet every one of the Arab leaders, separately or together, to negotiate either an overall peace or limited agreements. I believe the preferable objective of a limited agreement would be the end of the state of war. I don't want to go into details of what [that] would mean, because if I did, you would say, quite rightly, that I am putting preconditions. Realistically I know that without an initiative by the United States Government, no such framework for negotiations can be achieved. I assume therefore that in 1977, when the new Administration enters office, initiatives will be taken by the United States to bring the parties together, because the responsibility for effective peacemaking lies mainly on the shoulders of the parties to the conflict.

*Q. How do you feel about Kissinger's departure?*

A. Regardless of some disagreements in the past with Dr. Kissinger, I personally had a very good relationship with the Secretary when I served as Ambassador to the United States and later on as Premier. I believe the United States will continue in the new Administration to try to achieve the basic goals that Kissinger tried to achieve—that is, deterring war in the Middle East, doing whatever possible to achieve peace and continuing to support the state of Israel in the political, financial and military-aid fields.

*Q. What about your relationship with Egypt?*

A. I wish I could say I have a good relationship. Unfortunately, there are no political relationships whatsoever, because Egypt refuses to have them. Once there were an agreement between us, Egypt and Israel could play a major role in changing the destiny of this area. Egypt [is] the biggest Arab country and it is also the leading Arab country. Israel represents the country which is most advanced and progressive in technology and social concepts. The combination of the efforts of these two countries could again bring the Middle East to what it once was—the cradle of Western civilization.

*Q. Why should a Geneva conference not include the Palestinians?*

A. The Geneva peace conference should be for the countries directly involved, namely Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon on the one hand,

<sup>201</sup> Interview conducted by Donald Neff and David Hallevy: partial text, *Time* (New York—international edition), December 6, 1976, p. 21. Reprinted by permission of *Time*, the weekly newsmagazine; copyright Time Inc. 1976.

Israel on the other. The so-called P.L.O., which is the representative of the terrorist organizations, is not a partner for negotiations for the simple reason that the basis of its policy and philosophy is nonacceptance of Israel, of its right to exist. On the other hand, I accept that there could be representatives of the people who live in the West Bank attached to the Jordanian delegation to a peace conference or as a part of the Jordanian delegation.

## 170

**Press interview statements by former General Peled of Israel discussing Palestinian attitudes on a settlement<sup>202</sup>**

Late November, 1976

*Q. What was the basis on which you and the Palestinians met?*

*A.* They initiated the meetings, and to my surprise they immediately accepted as a basis the manifesto of our council, which affirms the sovereign right of the Jewish people to immigrate to and live in the state of Israel and which rejects any Palestinian territorial claims on Israel in its pre-Six Day War boundaries. We have had very little argument.

*Q. There has been speculation that the Palestine National Council will shortly accept U.N. Resolution 242, thereby recognizing the state of Israel. Do you think that will happen?*

*A.* I believe that there will be a very sincere attempt on the part of the Palestinian doves to pass a resolution that will legitimize the concept of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. The extremists of the [Palestinian] "rejection front" have practically disappeared as a result of the Lebanese conflict, which revealed that they were all generals without troops. The doves, who are the most important element in the Palestinian group Al Fatah, this time will be dominant. But I don't think we can expect them to ratify 242, because it speaks of the refugees as a humanitarian problem while the whole thrust of the

Palestinian effort over the past years has been to define the refugees as a political issue. But the Palestinians understand very well that if they want to negotiate at all with Israel they have to accept the two key principles of 242, which are the recognition of the state of Israel and an agreement to stop hostilities, to end the shooting. And the Palestinians do want to go to Geneva.

*Q. How would you view the formation of a Palestinian government-in-exile?*

*A.* I think this would be a very positive development, because a government cannot easily indulge in all kinds of terror and hijackings, which make an underground movement a free-for-all. And there are some people in the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization who are interested in an official status. But there are others who feel that the restrictions that it would impose on the movement are unacceptable.

*Q. The Palestinian National Covenant contains fifteen clauses that demand or imply the destruction of Israel. Are the Palestinians ready to scrap it?*

*A.* I don't know what they will do with it in their next council. I don't expect them to abrogate it. But of course it is clear that Israel will never sign a treaty with the PLO unless it renounces the covenant. It is so totally obnoxious that we cannot accept it even as a nonbinding dream for the future. But the first step should be mutual recognition by the two parties so they can participate in the Geneva talks. Only the second phase, the signing of a peace treaty, would be conditional on the abrogation of the covenant.

*Q. What will be the Israeli reaction to these Palestinian changes?*

*A.* There has been some movement, but very slow, and not in the government's position. I don't think our government realizes how little encouragement is necessary to enable the Palestinian doves to bring about a revolution in their own camp. For instance, if Israel would merely intimate, in an inconspicuous manner, that the resolution which I described would enable the Palestinians to participate in Geneva, that would make the whole difference between its adoption or rejection. The Palestinians look at us very carefully, and they read every little sign.

<sup>202</sup> Interview conducted by Milan J. Kubic; *Newsweek* (New York—international edition), December 6, 1976, p. 60. Matityahu Peled is a member of the Israel Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace, four members of which had recently held a series of meeting with certain Palestinians.

*Q. But are not the overwhelming majority of Israelis opposed to any Palestinian entity on their flank?*

*A.* This has never been put squarely to a test by vote. Moreover, it all depends on what sort of Palestinian state would emerge out of Geneva. Of course, if it had a blank check to become a staging area for huge Arab armies, Israel is doomed. But I would expect the Palestinian state to be demilitarized, at least de facto, with no air force or significant anti-aircraft capability. Moreover, the Palestinian state would consist of Gaza and the West Bank, and the daily communications between the two halves would depend on Israel. The security border of Israel would be the Jordan River, because we would insist that no Arab army be allowed ever to cross it.

*Q. Would this be acceptable to the Palestinians?*

*A.* I believe so. I don't think they have any illusions about our position.

*Q. What about the argument that a Palestinian state would be economically weak and politically unstable and would soon become a Soviet satellite?*

*A.* The Palestinians will need a lot of economic aid from oil-rich Arabs, from the U.S. and from Western Europe, and none of these countries are fond of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the argument reminds me of what the British used to say to us in the '40s, when we were fighting for our own state. We do get a lot of foreign aid, so what?

*Q. What would you do about the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, and about Jerusalem?*

*A.* The settlements were an ill-advised adventure and a sheer waste, and we should get rid of them. In Jerusalem, the main issue is the holy places. They should be permanently open to all religions and have a special status. The city, as a municipal unit, should remain unified. We could have an Israeli and an Arab submunicipality whose responsibility would be to run the separate fire departments and licensing agencies. But in terms of sovereignty, the city should be divided between West Jerusalem in Israel and East Jerusalem of the Palestinians, who would probably put their own capital there. It would be something new, but we've done new things before.

171

**Statement by Secretary of State for External Affairs Jamieson of Canada outlining Canada's policy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict<sup>203</sup>**

**Toronto, December 3, 1976**

The second area, of course, where we are deeply concerned, for historical and many other reasons, is the Middle East. I do not think it any secret that matters in the Middle East, except for the tragedy of Lebanon, have been somewhat quiet in recent months for the very simple reason that all of the parties concerned realized that, until there was a resolution of the domestic election in the United States, it was highly unlikely that there would be strong initiatives from that quarter. Now the United States elections have been held. Fortunately, the situation in Lebanon is stabilized—for how long, of course, we do not know, but it is stabilized and there is some ground for confidence. Therefore it is my view that negotiations with regard to a permanent settlement in the Middle East should begin at the earliest possible moment, that the situation that exists at present is one that (though, as I said, it is quiet now) could erupt once again into a very serious danger, not only to the peace of the area but to the peace of the world.

Now I am not particularly concerned whether the talks are held in Geneva or somewhere else, but it is my intention to call upon all of the parties—in my official role—to resume those talks as quickly as possible, and to commit Canada's best efforts to getting them going in a climate that is best designed to bring about a permanent solution. None of us is so naive as to think that that solution will come easily. But it will not come at all unless there are a commitment and a willingness by all the parties to get together in a realistic fashion and face the complexities of bringing about a permanent peace.

So far as Canada is concerned, our position, with regard to the State of Israel is clear, unequivocal. We subscribe to the United Nations resolutions that ensure Israel the right to survival

<sup>203</sup> Made in a speech to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs; excerpted from the text, *Statements and Speeches* (Ottawa), no. 76/32, pp. 5–7.

behind safe and secure boundaries, and there is no intention, no thought, of changing that position. Furthermore, we believe that a settlement in the Middle East must not only ensure the letter of that United Nations resolution but the spirit of it as well. And, of course, we're equally determined, as I think every reasonable person is, to see that the Palestinians, the Palestinian people, are also relieved of the terrible crushing burden so many of them have had to suffer for so many years. On humanitarian grounds alone this is surely an essential element in any Middle East solution that must be found. And, once again, it is not enough, it seems to me, to argue that it is complicated and complex and that we had best get along with a little patchwork here and little patchwork there—that there are those hundreds of thousands of people who have rights, which again have been recognized by the world community, and that we must see that as an essential part of the equation and of the solution.

In the interim, of course, Canada has been one of the major contributors to the United Nations' organization for refugees in the Middle East, and only two or three weeks ago I was able to give to the Secretary-General of that organization an additional amount of \$300,000 for this year for that purpose. But all of these are what I have called patchwork solutions. I have no doubt that, as members of the United Nations, and particularly of the Security Council, in this coming year, we in Canada, as with South Africa but perhaps with more visibility, will have to make some very difficult decisions relating to the Middle East. And I have no doubt either that there will be many who will say, as has already been said, that, by joining the Security Council, in some way or the other Canada's policy towards the Middle East is going to change in some direction, there is going to be some perceptible shift. Let me reassure you on that point. Our policy will continue to be as I have outlined it and, as you who are students—at least of international affairs—will know, we have declared it to be for many, many years. But I am also resigned to the very distinct possibility that, on this or that particular issue, there are bound to be those in Canada who will disagree with the position taken by Canada. I can only tell you that, during my period as Secretary of State for External Affairs, no such decisions, no such votes, no dec-

larations, will be made or taken by us without the most careful analysis and scrutiny of resolutions or actions to ensure that they are consistent with the basic principles that I outlined a few moments ago.

There is much, much more that I could say about the Middle East, but once again time constraints make it impossible. But, if Canada, as has happened on two previous occasions, can be in the Security Council and can use its influence to move towards the resolution of the problems of the Middle East, then this will be one of the most satisfying things, I think, not only for those of us who have the active responsibility at a given moment but also for all Canadians, who have had such an intense interest in that area for so many reasons for so many years.

## 172

### **Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Yugoslavia of PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat (excerpts)<sup>204</sup>**

**Belgrade, December 5, 1976**

At the invitation of the President of the Republic, Josip Broz Tito and the President of the Federal Executive Council, Dzemal Bijedic, the President of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Yassir Arafat, made an official and friendly visit to Yugoslavia from December 3 to 5, this year.

The President of the SFRY, Josip Broz Tito, received President Yassir Arafat who briefed him on the development of the situation in the Middle East and in Lebanon and also on the activities of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the light of the recent decisions of the Arab countries taken at their top-level meetings in Riad and Cairo. On that occasion, President Yassir Arafat conveyed to President Tito the gratitude of the Palestine Liberation Organization for the support and assistance Yugoslavia extended to the Palestinian people and their just struggle for achieving their legitimate national rights.

<sup>204</sup> Excerpted from the English text, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXVII, 641 (December 20, 1976), p. 20.

The talks, which evolved in an atmosphere of friendship, sincerity and full understanding, reflected an identity of views or a high degree of agreement on all the questions discussed.

The Yugoslav side paid full tribute to the PLO and President Yassir Arafat personally for their exceptional efforts in the quest for a solution to the Lebanese crisis and for consolidating inter-Arab relations, and for thus making a significant contribution to a resolution of the Middle East crisis and the Palestinian issue.

While reviewing events in the Middle East, both sides assessed that there could be no settlement of the Middle East crisis or a durable and just peace in the region without a solution of the Palestinian question based on recognition of the legitimate national interests of the Palestinian people including their right to establish an independent and sovereign Palestinian state on their national territory.

The two sides positively appraised the results of the Arab countries' summit meetings in Riad and Cairo, the decisions of which had contributed to settling conditions in the Lebanon and cleared the way for efforts to find a solution to the Lebanese crisis and to consolidate relations between the Arab countries, those directly involved in the confrontation with Israel, in the first place. They particularly appreciate the fact that the PLO was recognized on this occasion, too, as the sole and legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine.

The two sides expressed deep concern because of foreign interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon aimed at preventing a settlement of conditions in that country, and emphatically denounced the aggressive behaviour and threats of Israel which jeopardized the independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon and which could lead to an expansion of the conflict in the area.

The talks between the two delegations afforded an opportunity for a closer and more complete analysis of the directions in which Yugoslavia and the other non-aligned countries could act in support of the just struggle of the Palestinian people.

Guided by a deep understanding of the just aspirations of the Palestinian people for achieving freedom and independence, socialist and non-aligned Yugoslavia will continue to extend full

support and assistance to the liberation struggle of the Palestinian people and the Palestine Liberation Organization, as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

173

**Draft resolution presented to the UN General Assembly by Israel calling for a reconvening of the Geneva peace conference on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338<sup>205</sup>**

**New York, December 6, 1976**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* that all Member States, in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations, have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter and to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered,

*Reaffirming* the urgent necessity of establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East,

*Calls* on Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic to reconvene without delay at the Peace Conference on the Middle East under the co-chairmanship of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in order to resume negotiations without prior conditions on the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East as called for in Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973.

<sup>205</sup> UN doc. A/31/L.24. An amendment offered by India, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia (UN doc. A/31/L.25) would have included Palestinian representation. Israel withdrew its draft on December 9.



174

**Radio interview statements by Foreign Minister Allon of Israel explaining Israel's reasons for submitting its draft resolution in the UN General Assembly<sup>206</sup>**

December 7, 1976

*Q. ... What is going to happen to the proposal now?*

*A.* We are waiting to see when the proposal is due for a vote. If it becomes clear that the pro-Arab countries which introduced amendments in order to distort the content and the trend of our proposal intend to bring the amendment to a vote, we shall make use of the rules of procedure which will enable us to withdraw our proposal in order to preclude a majority for a distorted proposal.

*Q. Why did we decide to table the proposal? For many years we have been boycotting the UN, we've been explaining that the UN is not a forum which is capable of adopting objective resolutions. Suddenly, we have changed that practice.*

*A.* This is not a theological [as heard] issue, it is a diplomatic issue. We are not boycotting the UN, we are sitting in it. When the UN or any of its organizations adopt a positive resolution, we definitely accept it. However, since most of its resolutions are negative, we reject them, do not recognize them and don't accord them any importance. There is, however, no rule which says that by our presence in the UN and in its organizations and by our appearances in its forums we are boycotting it, as it were, and if we put forward a draft resolution—even if only for the sake of an important act of an information campaign—we're cancelling that boycott. We didn't strengthen the UN's moral authority by presenting our proposal, but we accomplished a first-rate publicity objective.

*Q. Some say that we have accomplished a publicity objective at the expense of sacrificing our political strategy, which says that the UN is not a serious forum.*

*A.* Nobody determined a strategy implying a ban on Israel's putting forward proposals, and every situation must be judged on its merits.

In the situation that has developed in the world now, after the elections in the United States, after the war in Lebanon has more or less ended, after possibilities of political initiatives are beginning to emerge on the horizon, and in the face of the Arab propaganda offensive—which isn't ineffective—we've placed before the world an unambiguous situation: Israel proposes to go to Geneva on the basis of the relevant resolutions and the appropriate clause in the UN Charter. This has made a great impact in the UN corridors. It has made a great impression on the world media and has also been well received by the Israeli media. According to our UN Ambassador Hayyim Herzog, the initiative has won remarkable acclaim and many have come to congratulate him, including the US Ambassador at the UN.

*Q. So this is where we touch upon the United States. We've been hearing rumours of a different kind—mind you, I said rumours—but is reported that Kissinger is angry.*

*A.* If he's angry, I'm sorry about that, but this is unlikely to change my opinion. The degree of importance of this move is such that it did not necessitate consultation at the level of foreign ministers...

*Q. Then it can be concluded from your words that Dr Kissinger feels some irritation nevertheless?*

*A.* I don't know whether it is irritation or an expression of dissatisfaction. I do know one thing, though: if our proposal were not distorted by pro-Arab amendments, the Americans would vote in its favour.

*Q. And the anger now is, I understand, due to rules of protocol, or execution, or lack of preliminary consultations?*

*A.* We are good friends.

. . . . .

<sup>206</sup> Broadcast on Israel radio in Hebrew; partial English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5385/A/2-3; reprinted by permission. The draft resolution is doc. 173 above.

175

**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Rumania of Executive Committee Chairman Arafat of the PLO (excerpts)<sup>207</sup>**

**Bucharest, December 7, 1976**

At the invitation of Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, General Secretary of the Rumanian Communist Party and President of the Socialist Republic of Rumania, Comrade Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, paid a friendly visit to Rumania December 5-7, 1976. During the visit, Comrade Ceausescu met with Comrade Yasir Arafat and held talks with him.

During the talks, which were held in an atmosphere of warm cordiality and total mutual understanding, President Ceausescu and Chairman Arafat exchanged information on topics of mutual concern to the Socialist Republic of Rumania and the PLO. They discussed the prospects for future relations between them and exchanged views regarding certain international problems, especially those related to the Middle East situation.

The ties of friendship, cooperation and solidarity between Rumania and the PLO have been firmly established and based upon the resolve of both sides continually to strengthen and expand these ties in accordance with the interests of the Rumanian and Palestinian peoples, for the sake of peace and justice in the Middle East and the world as a whole and in order to affirm the right of all peoples to determine their own destiny freely and independently.

The two sides emphasized the importance of a permanent dialogue on all levels between Rumania and the PLO, especially in talks and the exchange of viewpoints at the highest levels.

In this regard, Comrade Ceausescu warmly welcomed the current visit to Rumania by Comrade Arafat, which provided a new opportunity to develop relations between Rumania and the PLO and to discuss ways and means to achieve a just peace in place of conflict in the Middle

East, as well as to secure the implementation of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people.

Chairman Arafat expressed his great appreciation for the achievements of the Rumanian people, Republic and General Secretary, as well as Rumania's economic, social and cultural progress. He further noted with appreciation Rumania's and Comrade Ceausescu's contributions to the furtherance of peace and justice in the world. He also expressed high esteem for the firm policy of the Rumanian Communist Party and the Socialist Republic of Rumania as well as Comrade Ceausescu's visible and active support for the struggle of the Palestinian people, which springs from deep understanding of the just cause of Palestine and concern to secure a just and permanent peace in the Middle East.

The Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO further expressed the heartfelt thanks of the Palestinian people and of the PLO to the Rumanian people and the Rumanian Communist Party and to President Ceausescu in particular for the sentiments of solidarity and for political and diplomatic support, both moral and material, that all have offered to the Palestinian people. This support is manifested, among other things, by the education of a number of students in the economic, social and cultural fields necessary for the Palestinian people.

In turn, Comrade Ceausescu, General Secretary of the Rumanian Communist Party and President of the Socialist Republic of Rumania, praised the efforts of Comrade Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, to strengthen Arab solidarity, settle the situation in Lebanon and to struggle to achieve the national rights of the Palestinian people.

The General Secretary of the Rumanian Communist Party and the Chairman of the PLO evaluated the results of the Riyadh and Cairo summits which opened the way to a stabilization of the situation in Lebanon. The General Secretary emphasized his support for the Palestine resistance movement represented by the PLO, the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The two sides expressed their satisfaction with the ending of the fighting in Lebanon and their hope that this would lead to a settlement among the Lebanese themselves which would ensure a solution of their problems

<sup>207</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), December 7, 1976, supplement.

without any outside interference. The two sides consider that the independent, united, sovereign and democratic state of Lebanon would serve the true interests of the Lebanese people and all other Arab states as well as the cause of peace and security in the world.

Having considered present developments in the Middle East, the two sides pointed to the imminent threat to peace represented by continued Israeli occupation of Arab lands and the deprivation of the Palestinian people of the right to practise their national rights.

The two sides emphasized on this occasion their policy regarding the achievement of a just and permanent peace in the Middle East, which must have as its basis immediate Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and effecting a just solution to the problem of Palestine by allowing the Palestinian people to practise their inalienable national rights, including their right to return to their homes and property and their right to establish their free and independent state in accordance with their just aspirations and with the principles and charter of the United Nations and UN resolutions.

The two sides pointed to the active role that the UN must play to achieve a just and permanent peace in the Middle East and to settle the problem of ensuring the achievement of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to establish their independent sovereign state. They also welcomed the activities of the UN special committee of twenty that is concerned with the exercise by the Palestinian people of their inalienable rights.<sup>208</sup>

Comrades Ceausescu and Arafat emphasized the importance of consolidating the political and diplomatic activity of all peace loving countries and all revolutionary, democratic, progressive and anti-imperialist forces with the object of taking speedy measures on the path towards establishing a just and permanent peace in the Middle East.

The General Secretary and the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO agreed to keep in touch and to hold consultations regarding developments of the situation in the Middle East and to continue to work for a just settlement of the problem of the Palestinian

people.

The Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO expressed his deep gratitude to Comrade Ceausescu for his invitation to visit Rumania once again and for the heartfelt welcome extended to him which testifies to the sentiments of friendship, esteem and mutual respect between the Rumanian Communist Party and the PLO and between the Rumanian and Palestinian people.

## 176

### **Statement by Jews who had emigrated from the USSR denouncing the Zionist campaign to bring Jews from the USSR to Israel<sup>209</sup>**

**Rome, early December, 1976**

Zionism means deception, grief and misfortune for the Jewish people. This is what we, a group of Jews, former Soviet citizens, who fled from Israel and now find ourselves in Italy, believe.

We left the Soviet Union for Israel several years ago. It seemed to us that each had good reasons for going to that country. Some wanted to reunite with relatives. Others hoped to find high pay and an easy life in Israel. And a third section thought that this was, so they imagined, the real native land of all Jews. But the true and the main cause was the influence of Zionist propaganda, the "Voice of Israel" radio broadcasts, letters from long-forgotten or even non-existent relatives, written on Zionists' instructions, lavish promises and high-flown talk of a certain "world brotherhood" of Jews.

We left our friends and favourite jobs where we were respected and numerous relatives in the USSR. What did we find in the "Promised Land" which we longed to go to? It was in Israel that we grasped the meaning of democracy, its true meaning. There we found ourselves looked upon as people of the lowest sort. Even those who managed to get a job had a hard time. Do you know what it means to work for an owner-capitalist who can sack you at any moment and who controls your destiny as he likes? You don't, do you?

We regarded with distrust what we were

<sup>208</sup> See doc. 4 above.

<sup>209</sup> Text as published in *Soviet News* (London), no. 5862 (December 14, 1976), p. 439. The statement was given to the Soviet embassy in Italy, the Soviet mission to the UN and to the UN Commission on Human Rights.

told about this in the USSR. Everything in Israel proved alien: an alien system, an alien language, unfriendly and even hostile relations between people, animosity on the part of the indigenous population, and the Zionists' policy of dividing people into castes on a racial and religious basis. Zionists take our children away to the army and send them to fight for alien interests against peoples to whom we do not and did not feel any hostility, and with whom we want to live in peace.

There are of course, people in Israel who are very well-off. All kinds of rogues and swindlers can find a place there. They easily find friends in a society where everything is decided first of all by money. An honest man can do nothing in that country.

Israeli officials make a profit out of us and pocket a great deal of money. In many countries of the world, mainly in the USA, there are very, very wealthy Jews. Since they are wealthy they can have their people in the State Department and in Congress and can dictate their terms to anyone.

They raise money among all Jews and send it to Israel through the Jewish "Makbita" communities, but none of them is going to live in Israel. The money which Israel gets for assistance to the new arrivals of "Alimm" from the USSR is largely embezzled by Israeli officials.

We curse the moment when the wicked thought of leaving our native land, where we were born free and where we left our homes, friends and relatives, our language and culture, came into our heads. We cannot forgive ourselves for that, since it is impossible to return to the Soviet Union because of our folly. When we left our native land we knew that we were not going on a tourist trip. Many tens of thousands of Soviet Jews have already left Israel and gone to other countries. But what awaits them there?

Many dream of leaving Israel. But, seeing that, the government has taken a number of measures to make it difficult to leave the country. We have been in Rome for more than a year now and are trying to go to other countries. But Israel has cut off all the ways in order to prevent world public opinion from learning the real state of affairs. They want to suppress us economically because we are Soviet Jews.

To return to Israel is, to us, tantamount to

suicide. It is not our country and not our people. It is a place where there are no spiritual values for us. It is a world where cultural life and many other things do not correspond to these high standards which we got accustomed to and which are within everyone's reach in the USSR.

It is bitter to think that it is only in a capitalist country that we came to realise in a genuine way what a great boon it is to have free medical aid, the guaranteed right to work and education and confidence in the future. We realised how terrible it was when one had no such confidence and when one did not know how to support one's children and was ready to accept any job.

We could not stand life in Israel; but we found ourselves in a trap. It is easy to get to Israel, but difficult to get out. The Soviet Union strictly observes the provision of the Helsinki Act and allows persons of Jewish nationality to go to Israel. The state of things is different in the West. We got out of Israel with great difficulty and came to Rome. But things here proved no better. There are no jobs for us. We have worn out our clothes and our children do not go to school. Some people, who failed to make savings, are starving. Everybody has turned away from us. We hoped to leave Rome for the USA or Canada, but we are not allowed in there either. We are told in Zionist organisations and the Embassies of western countries: "You can either return to Israel or you can die of starvation. Your fate is of no concern to us."

We have staged demonstrations and hunger strikes and written letters and applications to various organisations—all in vain. We have seen for ourselves once again that the Zionists only needed us as cannon fodder for Israel, as a cheap labour force and as pawns in their dirty political machinations. They batten on us—for each immigrant from the socialist countries Israel gets money from the USA, money which Zionists unscrupulously embezzle. They make capital out of our grief and suffering.

Much is said and written in the West with reference to the handful of Zionist provocateurs who are temporarily denied departure from the USSR for security reasons and about the imaginary persecution of the Jewish population in the USSR. "Fighters for freedom" like them, upon arriving in the West, are not ashamed to admit that they received and continue to receive not

inconsiderable recompense from Zionist organisations for their inciting and anti-state activities in the USSR. Many of those who, like us, have found themselves in a tragic position, largely owe this to such provocateurs. We deny as false and invented the western propaganda statements about the persecution of Jews and about anti-semitism in the USSR.

We call on all Jews in the USSR to heed our voice and not fall for Zionist propaganda.

All that we have experienced in the West is beyond description. It should be firmly stated that Zionism brings not joy and happiness, but only separation, grief, tears and sorrow.

## 177

### **Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of President Qadhafi of Libya (excerpts)<sup>210</sup>**

**Moscow, December 9, 1976**

Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council of the Libyan Arab Republic, paid an official visit of friendship to the Soviet Union from December 6 to 9, 1976, at the invitation of the CPSU central committee and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The sides condemned the continued Israeli-Zionist aggression against the Arab people and reaffirmed that it seriously jeopardises world security and peace.

The situation in the Middle East was discussed. The sides expressed their firm belief that a genuine peace in the area can be achieved only after the release of all the captured Arab territories and after guarantees are given for the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their right to self-determination and the establishment of a national state. They reaffirmed their support for the struggle waged by the Palestinian Arabs and the Palestine Liberation Organisation and described the struggle of the Arab people of Palestine as an integral part of the Arab national liberation movement.

The sides expressed their conviction that events which have taken place in Lebanon are a link

in the chain of continued aggression and imperialist intriguing against the Arab peoples, aimed at establishing domination in the Middle East and imposing a partial settlement so as to take full control of the region.

Reaffirming that the Lebanese crisis can be resolved only by the Lebanese themselves, without foreign interference, the sides expressed complete support for the progressive Lebanese forces in their struggle to maintain the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Lebanon and to oppose the imperialist plot to split Lebanon and deal a blow at the progressive forces and the Palestine resistance movement.

The Soviet Union and Libya are convinced that the consolidation of Arab unity on an anti-imperialist and progressive basis represents a major guarantee of success in the Arab liberation struggle against imperialism, colonialism and aggression and they call for stronger and broader contacts between the Arab peoples and the Soviet Union and other states of the socialist community. They declare their firm determination to repel all attempts to inflict damage on Arab-Soviet friendship and consider it to be their duty to help in strengthening and expanding it.

The Soviet side declared its unshakable determination to continue to render all-round support to the Arab peoples who are fighting to strengthen their national independence and to make economic and social progress.

## 178

### **Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger assessing the Middle East situation at the conclusion of his term of office<sup>211</sup>**

**Brussels, December 10, 1976**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you think your policy regarding the Middle East, or let us say American policy regarding the Middle East, will continue after you and with the new Administration. Can you give us a general assessment about the situation as you see it?*

<sup>210</sup> Excerpted from the English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5862 (December 14, 1976), p. 435.

<sup>211</sup> Excerpted from the transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXCVI, 1958 (January 3, 1977), pp. 2-3.

A. Well, I am sure you know that I am not the spokesman that has been chosen for the new Administration, so I would not want to make pronouncements about their policies. Mr. Vance is an old friend of mine.

I believe that the foreign policy of the United States can never be based on the personal preferences of individuals and to the extent possible we attempted to analyze the basic realities and the basic interests and purposes of the United States. In that sense, if our conclusions were substantially correct, I would believe that a new Administration would follow a similar course. There might be differences in tactics, differences in personalities.

I believe the main commitment toward a just peace in the Middle East is dictated by American interests and by world interests and finally by the best interests of the parties concerned, and I am convinced that the United States will continue to play a major role in the search for peace in the Middle East.

*Q. What is your assessment?*

A. My assessment, which I have been making for months, both before and after our election, is that the objective conditions that make for peace in the Middle East are better than they have been in perhaps decades.

I believe that all of the parties have come to a realization that there is no military solution to their conflict and that some negotiated peace must be sought. An endless conflict will have profound consequences for the peoples involved and profound global consequences, and therefore I believe that the parties are now more ready and the conditions are now more ripe for a significant effort toward peace than has been the case in a long time.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, should the PLO be represented at those negotiations?*

A. The United States has stated repeatedly its attitude toward the PLO, which is that until the PLO accepts the existence of the State of Israel and the resolutions on which the present negotiations are being conducted—that the United States cannot address this sort of a question.

*Q. Is there any prospect of that acceptance?*

A. That is for the PLO to answer.

*Q. But I take it that you say unless they do they will not be at Geneva, so far as the United States is concerned?*

A. Until January 20, anyway. [Laughter.]

## 179

### **Communiqué issued after a meeting of the North Atlantic Council (excerpts)<sup>212</sup>**

**Brussels, December 10, 1976**

The North Atlantic Council met in ministerial session in Brussels on 9 and 10 December. Ministers recognised the indispensable role of a strong Alliance in ensuring the security of member countries, and in providing the foundation for their efforts to establish a more constructive and stable relationship with the Warsaw Pact countries. They expressed their determination to maintain and enhance the cohesion and strength of the Alliance.

8. Ministers reviewed developments in the Mediterranean area since their last meeting. They welcomed the end of hostilities in the Lebanon and expressed the hope that there would be continued progress towards stability and reconstruction in that country. They considered, nonetheless, that the continuing instability in the Middle East still gave cause for serious concern and could have dangerous consequences. They underlined the urgency of continuing efforts designed to achieve an overall settlement resulting in a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

## 180

### **Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Iraq of Prime Minister Todorov of Bulgaria (excerpt)<sup>213</sup>**

**Baghdad, December 11, 1976**

At the invitation of Mr. Saddam Hussein, deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Command

<sup>212</sup> Excerpted from the English text, *Survey of Current Affairs* (London), VII, 1 (January, 1977), pp. 17, 19.

<sup>213</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), December 12, 1976.

Council of the Republic of Iraq, Mr. Stanko Todorov, Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, paid an official and friendly visit to the Republic of Iraq in the period from December 7-11, 1976.

During their talks, the two sides agreed that the situation in the region is still highly explosive, the result of the aggressive and expansionist policy pursued by the Zionist entity and the forces supporting it. These forces are actively seeking to fragment the Arab states and set them at odds one against the other. The policy of these forces is aimed at consolidating the Zionist regime, which is regarded as a pillar of imperialism in the Middle East. It further aims to encourage Zionist expansionism at the expense of the Arab states and to whittle away the achievements of the progressive regimes in the Arab world and of the Arab liberation movement. The two sides condemned the terror practised by ruling Zionist circles against the people of Palestine in the occupied Arab territories. They express their solidarity with the heroic struggle waged by the people of Palestine.

The Iraqi Republic and the People's Republic of Bulgaria are convinced that a just and permanent peace cannot be achieved unless one essential condition is fulfilled, namely the liberation of all Arab territories, the removal of all traces of aggression and the restoration of all the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their national right to self-determination.

In this regard, the two sides expressed their admiration for the just and heroic struggle of the Arab people of Palestine. They declare that they shall continue to offer their full support to the Palestine liberation movement, which is an inseparable part of the Arab and world national liberation movement.

The two sides noted with satisfaction the political achievements of the Palestine liberation movement represented in the international field by the PLO. They further noted the role played in this regard by peace loving forces and by friends of the Arab people, foremost among whom are the socialist countries.

The two sides declare that the events in Lebanon are caused by imperialist aggression against the Arab people. The aim is to liquidate the Palestine national liberation movement as a military and political power and to strike at the

progressive and national forces in Lebanon and further to create tension among the various groups constituting the Arab liberation movement.

The two sides insist strongly upon the necessity of a restoration of normality to Lebanon, leaving the Lebanese to settle their internal affairs peacefully and democratically, without foreign interference and taking into consideration protection of the Palestine resistance movement and its legitimate rights and interests.

The two sides affirmed that cohesion among Arab states based upon enmity to imperialism and stronger cooperation with sincere friends, above all the socialist countries especially the Soviet Union, is one of the most important elements for success in the struggle against Zionist aggression.

. . . . .

## 181

### **Resolutions adopted by the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of Israel (Rakah) (excerpts)<sup>214</sup>**

**Haifa, December 19, 1976**

. . . . .

4. An end to occupation and oppression! Freedom and independence for the Palestinian Arab people!

The 18th Congress of the Israeli Communist Party condemns the repressive measures taken by the Israeli authorities in the occupied Arab territories in violation of international agreements and UN resolutions. We demand that an end be put to bloody and ugly attacks on the citizen masses, on men and women, young men and young women, who demonstrate against occupation and repression. We demand an end to savage torture in prisons and the release of Palestinian nationalists from jail. We express our strong opposition to land expropriation and colonialist settlement.

We express our fraternal solidarity with our Palestinian Communist comrades who stand in the front rank of the just struggle against occupation and for the sake of creating an in-

<sup>214</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ittihad* (Haifa), December 21, 1976, p. 2.

dependent Palestine state alongside the state of Israel and of a just and permanent peace. We express our solidarity with all victims of repression in the occupied territories and with the masses of the Arab Palestinian people struggling against the yoke of occupation and for freedom, independence and peace.

The 18th Congress of the Israeli Communist Party demands an end to occupation and a withdrawal to the borders of June 4, 1967, making them the peace frontiers.

We, the Israeli communists believe that by following this path, the path of struggle to achieve justice for all peoples, we are serving the true interests of the people of Israel and the cause of peace and security for both peoples. The security and freedom of Israel are linked with the security and freedom of the Arab Palestinian people.

The 18th Congress, motivated by its concern for a just and permanent peace for all peoples, proclaims: Let the occupation end! Let colonialist settlement stop! An end to repression in the occupied territories! Freedom and independence for the Palestinian Arab people! A just and permanent peace in the Middle East!

. . . . .

8. Appeal by the 18th Congress of the Israeli Communist Party: Lovers of peace, unite! Let us unite in the struggle against occupation and for the peace, equal rights and defense of workers' interests! The 18th Congress proclaims: Come quickly and let us create a working unity among all peaceful and pragmatic forces in Israel, irrespective of party commitment or ideological view, in order to prevent the catastrophe of a new war so that our people may reach the safety of the shore of a just and permanent peace.

Once more, the danger of war is imminent. But there also exists a real possibility of peace. Now more than any other time responsibility for the destiny of our people and youth requires that we strengthen the ranks of the peaceful and pragmatic political forces in Israel in one broad front. In division lies weakness, in unity strength.

We communists say the following to the people of Israel: The alternative to a peace based upon respect for the rights of all peoples and states in our region is a new war, perhaps even bloodier than its predecessors. Peace is not a trap, as claimed

by advocates of occupation and annexation. Peace is Israel's lifeboat.

Let us struggle together against the government's attempts to sabotage peaceful initiatives. Let us call for the speedy reconvening of the Geneva peace conference with the participation of all parties to the conflict, including the PLO as the recognized representative of the Palestinian Arab people, so that we can reach a peace that opens a new chapter in the life of the region's peoples. Our Israeli Communist Party addressed the following appeal to all peace-loving and democratic forces in Israel, both Jews and Arabs: Let us work to create a peaceful and democratic front for the ninth Knesset elections in 1977. In spite of the bitter experience of the 1973 October war, the Rabin-Peres government continues in its policy of perpetuating the occupation of Arab territories and of denying the rights of the Palestinian Arab people by relying on advanced American weaponry. This policy will lead to a lowering in the standard of living of the workers and masses as well as increased repression of Arab citizens and members of eastern groups.

Let us close our ranks to repel the attack of the extreme right and fascist forces in order to change official policy, to protect democratic freedom and workers' rights, to ensure equality of rights for Arab inhabitants and to end sectarian discrimination.

The forces of peace can constitute a considerable power and an effective alternative if they unite. The peace forces in Israel are not isolated in this battle. Major forces in the world are working to extinguish the fires of war in the Middle East threatening the peace of the world, and to establish a just and permanent peace.

The Soviet Union which pursues an unchanging peaceful policy, is undertaking a series of initiatives aimed at preventing a fifth war between Israel and the Arab countries and at the establishment of peace in our region, in the interest of all peoples and states. The Soviet Union has declared more than once that it is ready to join international guarantees to conclude a peace in Geneva. The normalization of relations between Israel and the Soviet Union is in Israel's interests and the road to such normalization lies through the adoption of a policy of peace.

We Israeli communists declare our solidarity



with the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people against occupation and for peace. We call upon all people of conscience in Israel, appealing to them to rally around the following demands: an end to occupation; an end to savage repression, murder of demonstrators, acts of torture, eviction and destruction of houses; an end to administrative detention and the release of all political prisoners; an end to expropriation and settlement in the occupied territories.

Our Israeli Communist Party, which unites in its ranks both Jewish and Arab comrades on the basis of a single programme which respects the rights of both peoples, is convinced that the struggle of Arab citizens in Israel for equality in civic and national rights is an important factor in the struggle to defend democracy and to achieve a happy future for both peoples.

We call upon all lovers of peace, democracy and equality to escalate the struggle against national discrimination and oppression. Let land expropriation from the Arab inhabitants cease! Let the racist Koenig<sup>215</sup> be expelled! Let a committee be formed to investigate the events that took place on the "Day of the Land".

The 18th Congress outlines the road to be followed to repair the Israeli economy, to combat poverty and to effectively solve the burning social issues of the day—this is the road of peace and social progress. Let the armaments race stop! Let more funds from the budget be allocated to health, education, housing and social services.

Our Congress calls for unity in the struggle of those working against the policy of the extreme right, which increases poverty and sectarian oppression among workers and increases the wealth of the big capitalists. From this Congress, we send our warm greetings of solidarity to all those who struggle in defense of their wages and their rights and of a decent life for themselves and their families and who work against dismissal from jobs, anti-labour laws, forced detention regulations, inflation and the heavy taxes shouldered by the working population. We call for firmer unity in the struggle of workers in production and services against the new "package deals", less social security and against attempts to decrease cost of living allowances and children's allowances. We condemn the demagogic and extreme right

Likud coalition as well as other rightist groups, whose representatives in the Knesset vote for a greater military budget, higher prices and more taxation and support anti-labour legislation. In the Histadrut, however, these same representatives act as if they are defending the workers. We call upon the Histadrut leaders to support the just demands of the workers.

We, the Israeli communists, derive great encouragement in our actions from the wide measure of support received for our policies and activities from the international communist and workers movements. This support was expressed by the fact that many fraternal delegations from all over the world have taken part in our 18th Congress.

We are convinced that our 18th Congress is an exceedingly important event and not only for our party, for it makes clear the path to be followed towards another Israel where workers can live a good life, a life of joy and creativity, where the young can look with confidence to the future, where equality and fraternity will characterize Jewish-Arab relations. It is our party which shows the way to peace and to good neighbourly relations with the Arab peoples. Peace is necessary! Peace is possible! The creation of a broad front is a vital necessity if the peace forces in Israel are to win. Lovers of peace, unite!

## 182

### **Statement by Minister Without Portfolio Galili of Israel insisting on the continuation of existing settlement policy in the occupied territories<sup>216</sup>**

**December 22, 1976**

It is important to mention that settlement efforts of Israel's government on both sides of the green line will continue in full force, in accordance with its policy and its political security and settlement considerations. Such efforts apply to the lands in which we have already settled, to those in which we will settle, as well as to those lands which we do not intend to settle. The

<sup>216</sup> Made in response to questions in the Knesset and partially broadcast on Israel radio in Hebrew; translated from the Arabic translation, *Rasid Idhaat Israil* (Beirut), no. 1105 (December 23, 1976), pp. 160-161.

<sup>215</sup> See doc. 60 above.

change in the composition of the government is not accompanied by a change in its policy and settlement intentions as mentioned in the government's guidelines announced in June 1974.

Concerning the questions put forth today, I want to answer by expressing my personal opinion on certain issues: First, as regards my friend, Knesset member David Koren, I do not think there is a chance of adopting a recommendation for a compromise solution which violates the Knesset's and government's decision, as is the case in the Qaddum issue. Anyhow, I do not

think that such a recommendation is expected, certainly not by me; and I do not know whether such a recommendation was expected by other ministers.

As regards the Afra case, and I should note that Afra was established as a work camp—there is a suggestion, delivered to the Ministerial Committee for Settlement Affairs, to transform Afra into a settlement. When the discussion of this subject is concluded, its results will certainly be announced to the Knesset members.

# Arab World



**Speech by Director Abu Sharar of PLO Unified Information discussing the conditions necessary for the continued activity of the Palestine revolution (excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

Sidon, January 1, 1976

. . . . .

Brothers, in order for this revolution to continue, strong in the support of its masses, Palestinian in aspect and Arab at heart, we are concerned at all times with achieving the following aim:

We are concerned with building a strong and effective structure for ourselves. This is an essential condition if the revolution is to remain strong and free from all tutelage or subjection. This is why last year we were able to increase the number of fighters inside Fatah and inside the Palestine revolution to a substantial degree. Their number increased by several thousand compared to what they were in 1974. At the same time, we were able to improve their combat experience, training and political education to the point where the Palestinian fighter is now a real fighter with political and popular potential. He handles his rifle but at the same time knows full well, humanly and politically, why he is shooting. In addition, we were concerned with developing cells inside the occupied land because our revolution is basically directed towards the liberation of the Palestinian land and the destruction of Zionist institutions erected upon it. The aim is to effect the desired collapse of the Zionist structure and the creation of our democratic state in its place.

. . . . .

On the level of political struggle, we firmly believe and have stated ever since we began that military activity without a clear political line is mere adventurism. A gun in the hands of a non-politicized combatant may at any moment turn into a gun in the hands of a highwayman. We therefore attach great importance to political activity. In our revolution, we do not have regula-

tions to which we expect our members and cadres to adhere literally. Commitment comes through persuasion. Political activity is what leads to the right persuasion.

On the level of political activity inside the occupied lands, we were able in 1974 to bring about a great popular uprising which began the day brother Abu Ammar delivered his historic speech at the United Nations<sup>2</sup> and thereafter continued for ten days. That same year and the year following, i.e. in 1975, we were able to score a big victory by way of the massive popular uprising which swept all the occupied lands and reached its climax in Nablus where our masses clashed with more than one hundred Israeli armoured cars. This uprising was not accidental but the result of steady political activity inside the occupied lands. In 1975, our masses voiced their opinion of the Zionist entity by supporting the list of the Communist Party (Rakah) for the elections to the Nazareth municipality. That list fought the battle using PLO slogans and won a decisive victory which all observers agreed could not have been possible were it not for the Palestine revolution and for Palestinian political victories at the United Nations and at various other international forums.

In 1976, we shall further escalate our political activity inside the occupied lands in order to frustrate the plot aimed at creating alternative leaderships and to foil the attempt made to establish self-government schemes. These latter are feverishly advocated by the Zionists, the imperialists and their local lackeys with the object of creating an artificial entity on the West Bank and Gaza, claiming to represent the Palestinian people but in fact totally subordinate to imperialism, Zionism and their local agents. We shall intensify our support for the Palestine National Front in the occupied territory. Fatah is a joint and basic leader of this front because of its size, efficacy and weight both inside and outside the occupied land.

Brothers, at another level there is yet another condition to be met if we are to persevere in our revolutionary Palestinian course and if the revolution is to remain active and effective rather than a mere slogan. This condition is the lifting of official Arab guardianship. When we started out

<sup>1</sup> Made at a public celebration on the occasion of the 11th anniversary of the Palestine revolution; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), January 2, 1976, 3rd bulletin, pp. 1-15

<sup>2</sup> Doc. 9 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

in 1965, we did not ask permission from any Arab regime. In fact we acted against the desires of the Arab regimes. When the first Palestinian bullet was fired, it was fired in the name of God, country and of the Palestinian people, not for the sake of any regime or leader. This is why we maintain that one of the most notable achievements of the Palestine revolution is that, throughout eleven years of pain, hope and victory and despite all plots and pressures, we have managed to preserve the greatest possible degree of independence for our revolutionary Palestinian will. The year 1976 will also witness further and more obvious Palestinian activity aimed at placing things in their proper perspective. Let me give you an example. We have condemned and still condemn terrorist acts of hijacking and attacks on civilians and have repeatedly declared that we have no connection with such operations. Those who carried out such attacks would fly from one capital to another and imperialist mass media would constantly highlight the fact that Palestinians were responsible. In 1976, we shall not allow any terrorists, whether they act in groups or as agents of intelligence services or as states, to hide behind a Palestinian identity in order to carry out terrorist operations. We shall demand that all cards be placed on the table. Our cause was not made to be trampled upon in this fashion. Whoever wants to practice terror may do so under his own banner, not that of the Palestine revolution.

As we enter upon our twelfth year, we affirm that we shall devote a great deal of attention to our political and diplomatic battles. Military victory, unsupported by diplomatic and political triumphs, remains temporary and is bound to fade away without a trace. Correct military action accompanied by correct diplomatic and political moves leads to genuine victories and to the achievement of our goal of total victory. In 1974, the PLO scored a big victory when it was accepted at the UN as an observer by the vote of 105 states in the world community. The same year, Palestinian unanimity was achieved regarding our interim political programme at the Palestine National Council's twelfth session.<sup>3</sup> The same

year also witnessed the affirmation of the rights of the Palestinian militants at the Rabat summit as the sole and legitimate representative of the people of Palestine.<sup>4</sup> In 1975 we scored major political triumphs, the most notable of which was the challenge offered by Syria and Palestine to the Sinai surrender agreement.<sup>5</sup> That agreement was the natural result of the surrender of the Egyptian regime to US and Zionist blackmail. That year also, we achieved an important strategic victory when the UN General Assembly condemned Zionism as a racist movement in addition to adopting a number of other notable resolutions. That year also, we frustrated the conspiracy to liquidate us in Lebanon, led and executed by the fascist and isolationist forces inside Lebanon. The year 1976 comes upon us now, placing before us the new challenge of protecting our political and diplomatic achievements and of developing them so as to resist all pressures aimed at pushing us to the wall of surrender and bargaining.

## 184

**Press interview statements by Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria reviewing Syria's aims in the Lebanese conflict<sup>6</sup>**

**Kuwait, early January, 1976**

*Q. As regards Lebanon, is there any possibility of your resuming your mediation?*

A. Certainly we are greatly preoccupied with the Lebanese situation. It is a very delicate situation for us here in Syria and as regards the presence of the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon. Our action in Lebanon is based on helping the Lebanese parties to meet to solve the crisis. We are concerned for Lebanon and we want her to be secure and stable. We have made contacts with all parties and they have appreciated our efforts. The Lebanese problem is extremely complicated and requires great patience and per-

<sup>4</sup> Doc. 308 in *ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> Doc. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975.*

<sup>6</sup> *Al-Rai al-Amm* (Kuwait), January 7, 1976; partial English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), V, 3-4 (Spring-Summer 1976), p. 268.

<sup>3</sup> Doc. 246 in *ibid.*

severance. Within this framework we have maintained contact with all parties with a view to reaching agreement on a solution that suits them all. However, we have made it absolutely clear that we shall not permit the partition of Lebanon and that any attempt at partition will involve our immediate intervention. Lebanon was part of Syria and we shall take her back if there is any attempt at partition.

I must make it clear that this does not apply only to the four cazas and the coast, but to Mount Lebanon as well. Lebanon must remain a single country or return to Syria.

We have said this to those who dream of the partition of Lebanon, although we are extremely anxious that Lebanon should remain a single and independent country. We hope that the Lebanese will tire of killing each other and return to their senses and their state. I believe that they certainly will do so eventually, and that Lebanon will once more be at peace again, as it was in the past.

*Q. But Israel has threatened to intervene if Syria intervenes, and this encourages the advocates of partition.*

*A.* We have said that we shall not intervene as long as partition does not take place. But we shall not give way to Israeli threats if it is clear that the partitionists are going to take action. Moreover, all-out Israeli intervention would not be a light matter because such an intervention would mean all-out war in the area. This would entail the collapse of many of the equilibriums which the Americans want to maintain. The first victim of Israeli intervention might well be the Sinai agreement and this America does not want.

In fact we are interested in two things: preventing partition and reuniting Lebanon in the interest of its survival.

We assume that our brother Arabs realize this, and that if Syria is occupying herself with the matter it is to ensure the survival of Lebanon as a free and united state. Therefore arabization of the problem would be a case of too many cooks spoiling the broth and would only lead to the dissipation of the efforts being made to achieve the desired solution, which will be in the interests of all Lebanese.

185

**Press interview statements by UN Permanent Representative Sharaf of Jordan discussing the importance of the forthcoming UN Security Council debate on the Middle East and Palestine questions<sup>7</sup>**

**Amman, January 6, 1976**

*Q. What is the importance of the coming UN Security Council debate for the Middle East problem and Palestine?*

*A.* Its importance stems from the fact that it is the first general debate in the Security Council devoted to the Middle East problem, including the Palestine problem, since the year 1973. At that time, the Security Council met to receive the latest of Dr. Jarring's reports regarding his efforts to establish peace and end Israeli occupation.<sup>8</sup> Dr. Jarring was the special representative of the UN Secretary-General. Because of the US veto, the Security Council did not then come to any conclusion.<sup>9</sup> This resulted in an outbreak of war in October, 1973.

The forthcoming debate on the twelfth day of next month is scheduled to review the general situation in the Middle East, to break the vicious circle in the current conflict and to seek to arrive at a just and permanent settlement based upon ending Israeli occupation and the implementation of a just solution of the national rights of the Palestinian people. Accordingly, the debate is important because it will lay down the outlines of future political developments, the path which the region will follow and the schedule for a comprehensive settlement. Otherwise, there is the path leading to conflict in the region. We hope the Arabs will formulate a unified and firm policy and will succeed in getting the Security Council to adopt a schedule of action and of timing as regards the ending of occupation and the restoration of the fixed rights of the Arab people of Palestine as well as the establishment of a just and permanent peace.

*Q. What is your view of the Arab position in the coming debate?*

*A.* As I stated earlier, Arab demands are clear

<sup>7</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Rai* (Amman), January 7, 1976.

<sup>8</sup> Doc. 8 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

<sup>9</sup> See doc. 109 in *ibid*.

in their outline. They may be summarized under two headings constituting the basis for any peace in the region:

1. To affirm the principle of total Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories in accordance with a time schedule and under the supervision of the Security Council.

2. To begin to restore legitimate Palestinian rights, including the right to return for those evicted from their homeland.

This also necessitates the preparation of a detailed schedule implemented under Security Council supervision. It is upon these two foundations that a permanent peace with its guarantees can be established as well as all international efforts for peace in all forums and by every means. Thus, the Arab position must be unified and backed by various Arab political, economic and other resources. It must also be a flexible position, designed to win support throughout the world for the legitimate Arab rights. Jordan has striven and will continue to strive to unify the Arab position and to achieve total Arab accord during this debate and afterwards, i.e. during the coming political phase.

*Q. What, in your view, will be the international position if Israel carries out its threat to boycott the Security Council meetings?*

A. Israel has announced that it will not attend and will boycott the Security Council meetings.<sup>10</sup> This stand is a clear proof that Israel is facing a severe international crisis. Israel knows that its extremist and obstinate stand enjoys no genuine international support. Even its traditional allies feel that a reasonable settlement is a burden upon the policies of these states that are allies of Israel and that the price they pay is exorbitant. But Israel cannot keep the occupied territories and the world does not accept that it should retain possession of these lands indefinitely, in whole or in part.

The second point is the Palestinian factor. The world community as a whole is now convinced that there can be no settlement in the Middle East and no peace in the region if the Palestine question is not solved in a manner that brings justice to the Palestinian people and the right of self-determination in their homeland.

Therefore Israel avoids confronting the inter-

national community in the Security Council because it knows that its negative policy can no longer be supported even by traditional allies. At present, the international scene is not favourable to Israel and its policies in the region. Even in Europe and the USA there are strong currents that criticize Israel's extremist policy.

On the other hand, the Arab side has gained a great deal from its recent policies, characterized as they are by clarity of demands and moderation of objectives. It is important for us Arabs to maintain a unified position, a positive attitude and cool nerves and to marshal all our political and economic resources behind these specific and clear demands. The dialogue between the Arabs and the various strata of societies friendly to us must also be continued so as to win supporters, entrench our positions and apply pressure to the intractable enemy.

*Q. What, in your estimate, will the US policy be regarding the Middle East problem during the Council debates?*

A. It is difficult to predict the US position. The US officially declares that they support a settlement on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and that they support the political and diplomatic efforts made to implement these two resolutions. US officials have repeatedly stated their opposition to any changes made in this context but it is clear that any just settlement to be followed by a just peace requires the existence of the two principal factors I have cited above, i.e. total and complete Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967 and respect for UN resolutions relevant to the firm national rights of the Palestinian people. Accordingly, the Arab side must work to clarify these two principal factors on which is based any just settlement or peace in the region. If the US desires peace in the Middle East and wishes its own relations with the Arab world to grow in a natural and proper manner, wisdom requires that it respond to these just Arab demands. If, on the other hand, groups supporting Israel's extremist policies succeed in winning over US policy makers and the US moves to a negative stand and does not respond to right and logic in the Middle East and as regards the Palestine question, then it is not unlikely that the US will veto any resolution considered to be against the wishes of Israel.

<sup>10</sup> Doc. 34 above.



In this case, the argument used will be that such a resolution, i.e. the one proposed by the Arabs goes formally beyond the context of 242 and 338. But it would be difficult to predict what the US position will be, although it is important for us Arabs to adhere to our principles and to proceed with our political struggle regardless of the policy of others.

*Q. Will the Security Council debates conflict with the Geneva peace conference?*

A. The Security Council was the authority which set up the Geneva conference and it is the right of this higher authority to review the bases and the means, i.e. the objectives and the means to arrive at them. The Security Council is entitled to review the bases of the Geneva conference and it is also entitled to formulate any sort of action plan or use any part of its apparatus. Therefore, the Security Council debates do not contradict, in principle, the existence of the Geneva peace conference.

It is important, however, for the Security Council to outline the path to be followed in future and to lay down the foundations for any talks or efforts made for a just settlement irrespective of their shape or form because the present period is one of stagnation. There are no effective efforts being made at present to break this vicious circle and begin to implement UN resolutions dealing with Israeli withdrawal, Palestinian rights and permanent peace.

Thereafter, that is after the Security Council has outlined the road to be followed in order to revive international efforts to implement UN resolutions and create a just settlement, the path to a just solution can pass through Geneva or through any other practical avenue.

## 186

### **Communiqué of the Central Council of the Palestine Rejection Front issued after its tenth ordinary session<sup>11</sup>**

**Early January, 1976**

The Central Council of the Palestine Rejection Front concluded its tenth ordinary session in which

all events and political developments in the area were reviewed (the progress of the capitulationist settlement on all levels, Palestinian, Arab, international, and the bloody events in Lebanon). The Central Council succeeded in defining the following conceptions:

#### *A. Regarding progress of the capitulationist settlement*

1. Much has been achieved in preparing the climate and preparing the Palestinian side, represented by the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, to be a party to the conspiracy for a capitulationist settlement.

2. The presentation of the question before the Security Council, and calling on the PLO to participate in the discussions, is nothing but a devious ploy to extricate the Syrian regime from its critical position with the masses for extending the mandate of the UN Emergency Forces in the Golan.

3. It seems likely that the participants in the conspiracy for a capitulationist settlement have agreed to have the Security Council be an effective substitute for the Geneva conference, thereby making New York the alternative site to Geneva for the meeting of all participants in the settlement. This will facilitate the problem of participation by the leadership of the PLO in the discussions and avoid the sensitivities that will be aroused if it were to attend the Geneva conference.

4. The Security Council will review the question on January 12, 1976, on the same principles formulated by the Council for the Geneva conference, that is, on the basis of resolutions 242 and 338, resolutions which have been rejected by the Palestinian people as represented by the National Council during all its sessions that followed the ratification of Security Council resolution 242 on November 22, 1967. The PLO leadership's attendance at these talks on the basis of these resolutions is considered a challenge to the popular will and a deviation from the resolutions of the Palestine National Council.

5. The Palestine Rejection Front therefore warns the leadership of the PLO against being dragged into the game of Syrian containment, and calls upon them to declare their withdrawal from the settlement conspiracy and their refusal to attend the Security Council meeting on January 12, 1976 which is no less dangerous than attending the Geneva conference; it also calls upon them not to use the positive international victories,

<sup>11</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), January 10, 1976, p. 6.

achieved by the Palestine revolution through continual struggle, as a cover for participation in the settlement conspiracy presenting such a step as a victory over the Zionist entity.

#### B. *The Lebanese crisis*

1. The fascist right represented by the isolationist forces and the state institutions, supported by imperialism, Zionism and Arab reactionary forces, is still responsible for escalating military operations and fanning the explosive situation in order to extricate by blackmail further concessions at the expense of the Lebanese national movement, so as to suppress it and cut down to size the Palestine resistance movement.

2. There exists a temporary discrepancy in the balance of forces between the fascist right and the liberal right in their internal conflict, in favour of the liberal right represented by Rashid Karami, supported and financed by certain factions and international forces, both Arab and local.

3. It is the duty of the Lebanese national movement and the Lebanese masses to continue the struggle against the fascist right, while simultaneously preventing the implementation of the liberal rightist plan which aims at weakening the national movement, watering down its programme and splitting its unity in struggle.

4. The Central Council reaffirms that the Palestine resistance movement is not a substitute for the Lebanese national movement, but that they stand together in the same trench to defend the Lebanese popular movement and the Palestine resistance movement and the latter's right to freedom of action and in order to avoid giving the fascist right and isolationist forces the opportunity to sever the Lebanese national movement from the Palestine resistance movement and facilitate the execution of their conspiratorial plots.

The Central Council concurrently indicts any attempt, regardless by what faction, of either the Lebanese national movement or the resistance movement, which willingly or unwillingly contributes in facilitating the objectives of the fascist right.

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#### **Statement issued by the Alumni Association of the Islamic Maqasid Society of Lebanon defining its hopes for Lebanon (excerpts)<sup>12</sup>**

**Beirut, January 11, 1976**

. . . . .

The Lebanon we want is an Arab, democratic and open one, a Lebanon with a single homeland and a single and unified people, a Lebanon with a single state, an organized and orderly Lebanon, some of whose outlines were set forth in the first cabinet statement presented after independence and belied by politicians and officials thereafter. The Arab character of Lebanon was affirmed in the very first cabinet statement after independence where it states that "Lebanon is a country with an Arab face," as well as in the words of the leaders of independence and of popular representatives.

. . . . .

An example of the distortion of national ideas is provided by the deliberate confusion made between Arabism and Islam which is used as a pretext to reject Arabism, it being understood that Arabism is a national attribute far removed from religious connotations. The basis of Arabism is the Arabic language and not Islam. Arabism had been the only guarantee and the principal motive of those Muslims and Christians who fought against Islamic Ottoman rule and Turkification. It has been a quality which distinguished Arab from Islamic and non-Islamic states, both near and far, like Turkey, Iran and India.

In addition to the fact that Arabism is a national attribute, it has been and remains today one of Lebanon's chief economic sources of wealth. Thanks to it, Lebanon found in the Arab world a labour market for its sons as well as a market for its industrial and agricultural products.

. . . . .

A national regime is the alternative. It alone can guarantee the remedying of the complaints of some who feel afraid, cheated and uneasy. Such a regime will succeed in removing minority

<sup>12</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), January 12, 1976.

sentiments and complexes, replacing them with sentiments of patriotism that act as a catalyst.

The definition of a homeland precludes a partial attitude to problems and demands a full comprehensive viewpoint. If Lebanese sovereignty is now in an unenviable position, it follows that everything in Lebanon is in a pathetic state, especially the corrupt political leadership. For this leadership has betrayed its trust, reneging on its vow to build up the country, the state and their institutions, including the army.

The question of sovereignty has in fact been used as a pretext, following the Sinai agreement,<sup>13</sup> to attain goals that are very far removed from the strengthening of sovereignty and adherence to it. The question of sovereignty has been raised at a time when the efforts of the entire world are being directed towards finding a solution to the Palestine problem and resistance, and at a time also when there has been much talk of the creation of a Palestinian state prior to the departure of Palestinians thereto.

We shall not be so deluded as to believe that what happened was for the sake of saving Lebanon's sovereignty from Palestinian excesses. No matter how great the concern may be for sovereignty nor how deep loyalty to it is, it cannot reach the point of risking all moral values, all the winning cards, indeed of risking sovereignty and Lebanon itself, were it not for the existence of a scheme planned and executed by a limited number of these leaders who were devoid of all national sentiment.

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**Speech by PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi in the debate on the Palestine problem in the UN Security Council (excerpts)<sup>14</sup>**

**New York, January 12, 1976**

May I be permitted, Mr. President, to express to you and to the representatives of friendly Member States in this Council our appreciation for the efforts you have exerted to enable the people of Palestine to exercise its legal right to speak for itself. Our people's case, the question of Palestine, is the essence, the core of the crisis with which this Council has been concerned and of which it is endeavouring to reach a just settlement. The Council's decision to invite the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the discussions of the Council, combined with the totality of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly over the past two years, testifies to the profound and widespread international understanding of the Palestine question. They reflect the concern of the majority of the States of the world with rendering justice to the Palestinian people and with responding affirmatively to their national rights. It is for the attainment of these national rights that the Palestinian people have resorted to armed struggle.

However, I should note the deliberate absence of Israel from this discussion. Why is Israel not present? What is its pretext for boycotting this Council's session? Israel is absent simply because the representatives of the people of Palestine are invited to take part in these deliberations. This is symbolic of who is anxious to participate in the process of peace-making and who is deliberately eager to frustrate the will of this Council.

Moreover, the Council's decision constitutes a basic and imperative step along the path of confronting the facts as the Council prepares itself to issue a just decision, the decisive resolution for which our people has long waited. Our people has been waiting for such a just decision for over 28 years, during which our people suffered anguish, deprivation, exile and oppression. This Council's

<sup>13</sup> Doc. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>14</sup> Excerpted from the English text, UN doc. S/PV. 1870, pp. 72-76, 91-97.

decision, in our view, is a courageous international recognition of the fact that whoever wishes to search for a serious resolution of the Middle East conflict will have to begin with its root cause and heart, which is the question of Palestine. Had there not been the question of Palestine, all the wars our region has suffered, in 1948, in 1956, in 1967 and in 1973 would never have been; there would never have been the constant tensions which threaten further wars. In short, had there not been a question of Palestine there would not have been what is mistakenly termed the "Middle East crisis".

Although the invitation of this Council comes after very long and painful years, it is better late than never. For without addressing the essence of the "crisis" with which the Council is dealing, it would be useless to attempt to find its solution, and consequently there would be no peace in the Middle East or, perhaps, in the world. The Council's invitation to the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the deliberations of the Council is right and just, but it is also based on the serious search for peace in our region, where peace is most threatened.

The question of Palestine, its background, details and causes, is no longer a strange and unfamiliar question to the United Nations. Although the sinister design against the land and people of Palestine was formally initiated in 1917 with the issuance of the Balfour Declaration, the tragedy of Palestinian dispersion commenced right here, in the United Nations, in the aftermath of the unjust and infamous recommendation to partition Palestine in 1947. Since then—that was over 28 years ago—our case has been in suspension; it has been awaiting someone who would deal with it justly and fairly, someone who would possess the moral and human courage to realize justice and to translate it into reality.

If we wished to summarize this tragedy in a single short sentence, we would say that it is a tragedy epitomized by two types of resolutions: unjust resolutions, which found States to support, sustain and implement them and to extend their purview; and resolutions which tried, sometimes partially, to relieve oppression and injustice, which remained ink on scraps of paper and have never been implemented.

Thus we resumed our revolution. We took up arms and had recourse to force in defence of our very existence, of our right to live in our land, and of our independence and sovereignty. While we carry out our armed struggle, we continue to hope to attain our goals through political options.

Accordingly, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, moved politically in the aftermath of the October 1973 war to rectify the mistaken view of the identity of the conflict in our region. We requested the inclusion of the question of Palestine as an independent item on the agenda of the twenty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly. Our request was supported by the overwhelming majority of Member States, which were dissatisfied with the continuing deliberate disregard of the question of Palestine and the fate of its people. The question was debated in the presence of the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization Executive Committee, Mr. Yasser Arafat, who spoke in the name of the people of Palestine, explained our cause in all its dimensions and intricacies, and shared with you his vision of the Palestine of tomorrow.

The international community then recognized the following facts:

First, that the question of Palestine is the central issue in the Middle East conflict;

Secondly, that peace in the Middle East is contingent upon the realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, beginning with their right to return, to self-determination and to sovereignty on their national soil;

Thirdly, that the 1967 war was not in reality a conflict over regional frontiers between the Arab States and Israel: it was one of the inevitable results of the continued Israeli usurpation of Palestinian land and violation of Palestinian rights;

Fourthly, that resolutions of the Arab Summit Conference in Rabat<sup>15</sup> and General Assembly resolution 3237 (XXIX) decisively confirmed the Palestine Liberation Organization as the representative of the Palestinian people.

The resolutions of the General Assembly at its thirtieth session—resolutions 3376 (XXX) and 3375 (XXX)—have increased our hope of reaching a just solution through the United Nations. We trust that the Security Council will not make us

<sup>15</sup> Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

lose that hope, especially since this august Council today has an historic opportunity to right a wrong and to relieve the oppression of our patient and steadfast people.

The Zionists established their racist entity in our Palestinian homeland, relying on a racist ideology already condemned by the General Assembly at its thirtieth session. The Zionists have used all methods of conquest and oppression to usurp the homeland of others. They have also relied on external Powers, some of which have supported them in order to protect their own imperialist interests in the Arab region and in order to retard the development and unity of the Arab countries.

The Zionists have never yet been able to base their claim on any law or internationally recognized charter. We, the people of Palestine, as you have noted from our narration of our cause, are struggling for just goals endorsed by the United Nations and anchored in international legitimacy. We struggle to attain freedom and peace, not to seize what does not belong to us. What we aspire to is consonant with the principles of international law and the United Nations Charter.

Therefore we wish to emphasize here the resolve of our people to continue their struggle, military and political, until they attain the fulfilment of their national responsibility to restore and return to their national soil and to exercise their self-determination and to establish their independent State. We have legitimate national rights—not “interests”, as some like to put it. The difference between interests and national rights is obvious, and our belief in peace is no less than our belief in right and justice. Were it not for the disregard of our rights, none of these wars and tragedies would have occurred in the Middle East.

We want peace for us and for the Jews in Palestine; we wish to stress, with the utmost sense of responsibility, that the Security Council can assume a basic and effective role if it applies the United Nations Charter and compels the aggressors to put an end to their aggressions.

The time has come for the Security Council to adopt a resolution which recognizes the objective facts in the region, beginning with the Palestine question and the necessity of finding a just solution to it so that our people may exercise their inalienable rights in their homeland.

The time has come for the adoption of a resolu-

tion which would rectify the error and which would rely on practical, correct and effective means for its implementation. Such a resolution would contribute to the relaxation of tension and to the realization of peace.

It is of concern to us to declare before this Council that the Palestine Liberation Organization, the legitimate representative of the people of Palestine, rejects the false allegations propagated by Zionist and imperialist circles regarding its intention, or the intention of our people, concerning the fate of the Jews in Palestine. Our struggle is not against the Jews. No, it is not against the Jews in Palestine, but against the Zionist movement, its racist doctrines, its expansionist practices and its aggressive intentions, which have led, in fact, to the exile and homelessness of our people.

We have also declared our categorical rejection of any alternative homeland. Our people have one homeland, which is Palestine, and we struggle for its restoration and the exercise of our historic and inalienable rights over its sacred soil.

The General Assembly in its last two sessions has offered us some hope with its positive resolutions. And here we are today, looking confidently to this august Council for the realization of this hope, especially since the Security Council, according to Article 36 of the United Nations Charter, has the power to implement its resolutions.

Those of our people who have lived in exile since 1948, and those who live under occupation, expect this Council to adopt a resolution which would end this tragedy and offer them a brighter future and a path to return to their homeland.

The Palestine Liberation Organization, on behalf of the people of Palestine, offered, and continues to offer, a solution to the question of Palestine. Its democratic solution assures all Arabs and Jews of Palestine a peaceful and dignified life therein; its solution is predicated upon the unqualified acceptance of the principle of human equality.

The Palestine Liberation Organization, in its transitional programme<sup>18</sup> which preceded the General Assembly's resolution 3236 (XXIX), envisages an independent Palestinian State in Palestine. Israel today, in yet another of its more notorious attempts to frustrate the will of the international community and to subvert the intent

<sup>18</sup> Doc. 246 in *ibid.*

of that resolution, is proceeding shamelessly with "elections" under military occupation. Our people, in exile and under occupation, have made it abundantly clear that our immediate aim is the establishment of an independent sovereign State on our national soil.

Members of this Council are fully aware that the majority of Member States have recognized our national rights and our right to independence. The United States Government, which has been the principal political, diplomatic, economic and military sponsor and sustainer of the continuing aggression and expansion of Israel, is isolated by its obdurate equivocation on these facts. This undoubtedly accounts for the abysmal failure of the United States Government to contribute to a just solution of the conflict in the Middle East. For how can a solution be found to a conflict which is derivative? How can we resolve a conflict when we ignore its heart and we deny the legitimacy of the principal party to that conflict in all international efforts concerned with peace?

We wish to emphasize that a just and lasting peace will not prevail in the Middle East unless and until the historic, inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people are fully realized and Palestine resumes its historic role as a bridge between the Arab States west and east of Suez and between Africa and Asia.

We await a decisive, effective resolution and meaningful measures from this Council, in accordance with Article 36 of the Charter, which would consolidate, strengthen and implement General Assembly resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3376 (XXX). The Palestine Liberation Organization is prepared to participate in and contribute to all international efforts based upon General Assembly resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3376 (XXX), in order to bring peace with justice to all.

Meanwhile, our people will continue its just struggle by all legitimate means to attain its legitimate goals. When these are attained—hopefully with this Council's affirmative resolution—a just and lasting peace will prevail in the Middle East.

**Communiqué issued by the Maronite leaders of Lebanon outlining their attitude to the crisis<sup>17</sup>**

**Beirut, January 13, 1976**

1. The Maronite denomination in Lebanon regards the current conflict as one between the Lebanese, especially the Christians, and the Palestinians, whether Christian or Muslim, who have broken the agreements in force in a dishonourable manner and allied themselves with leftist movements, hiding behind the Muslims. It is regrettable that this conflict should have led to a sectarian conflict in which displacement, killing on the basis of identity and destruction are practiced.

The real position of the Maronites must be recognized. It is a position against all Palestinian excesses and is not intended to be against the Palestine cause, a cause in the service of which they have expended and continue to expend every endeavour, believing in its justice.

2. The Maronite denomination will not hesitate to offer all necessary sacrifices to preserve the Lebanese formula in the framework of national sovereignty and the security of Lebanese soil and the need to protect the integrity of all Lebanese people. The Maronites, while rejecting every compromise of these principles and anything that may prejudice a part of them, reiterates its affirmation that this Lebanese formula is a unique cultural experiment, which it would be wrong to eradicate by ignorance, irresponsibility and fanaticism.

3. The Maronite denomination, which prides itself on its contributions to Arab renaissance, is more aware than others of its obligations and role in the Arab world.

4. In the difficult circumstances through which Lebanon is passing the Maronite denomination cannot but express its sincere feelings towards

<sup>17</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), January 14, 1976. The meeting which adopted the communiqué was attended by President Sulayman Franjeh, Bishop Nasrallah Sfeir (representing the Maronite patriarch), Abbott Sharbil Qassis (Chairman of the Standing Conference of the Order of Maronite Monks), Pierre Gemayyel (leader of the Phalangist party), Shakir Abu Sulayman (President of the Maronite League), Fuad Shimali (President of the "Organization"). Former president Camille Chamoun (leader of the National Liberal Party) was absent but subsequently signified his agreement with the statement.

its emigrant sons and acknowledge what they have contributed to the mother country for more than a century in moral and financial support that have reinforced its potential and helped it perform its role in the service of Lebanon and the Arab causes.

5. The Maronite denomination hopes that these bloody events will constitute a lesson to all Lebanese and that they will overcome them and continue their efforts towards reconstructing this sacred country in an atmosphere of openness, loyalty and love.

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### **Declaration issued by a meeting of Muslim religious and political leaders in Lebanon<sup>18</sup>**

**Aramoun, January 16, 1976**

Following the recent and grave developments and the bloody incidents resulting from a deliberate military escalation supported by elements of the Lebanese army which led to a tightening of the siege, both of military supplies and foodstuffs, around Tall al-Zaatar camp; in view of the attack on Dbayye camp and the resultant deaths and eviction of innocent people, and since this may lead to a worsening of the situation—as has happened in the Damour region—and to repercussions on the national and Arab levels;

The Muslim leaders, who managed on Friday to attend a meeting in the house of the Mufti of Lebanon, Shaykh Hasan Khalid, in Aramoun, studied the deteriorating state of affairs in the country in the light of the above facts and it was their opinion that the only way to decrease the terrible tension in the country at present would be to lift the sieges of Tall al-Zaatar, Damour and all other regions and to evacuate the Dbayye camp of the aggressors in order that the fighting may stop and the armed men withdraw with a view to attaining a possible political solution.

Prime Minister Karami informed the army commander by telephone of this solution so that he could relay it to the people concerned and in order that matters might be settled accordingly. Despite their positive and frank position, the group holding this meeting were soon surprised to learn by telephone from the army commander, who

spoke to Prime Minister Karami, that he had ordered the airforce to intervene. Prime Minister Karami asked him not to do so because this would only complicate matters, especially since those who were meeting had arrived at practicable solutions to the problem. Despite this, however, military aircraft attacked the area in Aramoun quite near the Mufti's house where the meeting was being held. The prime minister who is also defence minister, was obliged to contact the army commander once more asking him to order an immediate halt to the aircraft attack. However, the attacks continued and several areas in Aramoun and elsewhere were shelled heavily for a long time.

The Muslim leaders meeting today, in view of the grave developments referred to above and bound by their great and historic responsibilities towards country and citizens, announce the following:

1. The fact that the army disobeyed the orders of the prime minister and defence minister to refrain from using the airforce and to prevent the army from interfering in the present conflict is to be viewed as a serious act of rebellion by the army against the responsible political authorities and a matter that cannot be ignored, calling for the most severe condemnation. Rapid action must be taken to put a decisive and final end to it so that the army does not fall victim to what those at the meeting have continuously warned against, namely, the evil of partition and fragmentation.

2. Those attending the meeting call upon those responsible for the army with all its units and who care for army solidarity as well as for the unity, security and independence of their homeland, to do all in their power to foil the scheme aimed at corrupting the army—something which occurred today as well as previously, for it is a scheme whose end is to embroil the army in side battles in order to fragment and paralyze it.

3. Those attending the meeting will endeavour to take all the steps necessary to prevent aggression against the country and citizens and to protect the Palestinian resistance, affirming that all their Arab brethren will stand by those forces that believe in their rights, the justice of their cause and the unity of this country and people.

4. They call upon their sons and brothers to be more vigilant. They declare that they shall continue to deal with the situation according to policies that will preserve Lebanon's unity. They

<sup>18</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), January 17, 1976.

express their appreciation for the efforts being made by sister states, especially Syria. They warn everyone, however, of the continued existence of evil intentions at all levels having as their aim the undermining of Lebanon's Arab character and its unity as well as its fragmentation. This requires that all Lebanese and Arabs be armed with the greatest degree of vigilance prior to taking conscious and responsible measures.

Those meeting today find themselves facing the greatest responsibilities.

Signed: Shaykh Hasan Khalid, Mufti of the Lebanese Republic; Imam Musa Sadr, Head of the Higher Muslim Shiite Council, Mr. Rashid Karami, Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Messrs. Saib Salam and Abdallah Yafi, former Prime Ministers and Mr. Kamal Junblat, Head of the Progressive Socialist Party.

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### **Communiqué issued by Maronite Patriarch Khreish outlining to need to organize the Palestinian presence in Lebanon<sup>19</sup>**

**Beirut, mid-January, 1976**

The purpose of delegating Archbishop Sfeir to the meeting was to relay our view to the conferees and their view to us. We have not had the opportunity of reading the [Maronite summit] communiqué,<sup>20</sup> but the way we see conditions and their solution is as follows: Fighting should cease once and for all and this should be accompanied by an honest and unequivocal pledge by all the concerned parties to discuss the causes of the crisis and to remove them in an atmosphere of calmness, stability and freedom.

The starting point should be a statement to the effect that all the Lebanese are eager to continue living together, safeguarding the sovereignty of the nation, its dignity and the integrity and security of its territory; while enjoying the same rights and obligations. This equality should be guaranteed, permanently and unequivocally, to one and all regardless of changes in numbers, to help overcome the Christians' complex of fear and the Moslems' complex of injustice.

The State should then be helped to reestablish its presence and to recover its authority by enforcing law and order without discrimination. Also, Palestinian presence on Lebanese territory should be organized and practical procedures for the implementation of the agreements concluded with the Palestinians should be set up.

Likewise, the carrying of arms by all the Lebanese and the people living on Lebanese soil should be organized. Simultaneously, the country should be developed politically, socially, economically, administratively and educationally, and a strong army should be established, through the adoption of a system of compulsory military service, to protect the security of the nation and to safeguard its sovereignty.

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### **Statement issued by the Council of Ministers of Egypt calling for non-intervention in the crisis in Lebanon<sup>21</sup>**

**Cairo, January 18, 1976**

The Council of Ministers has discussed the latest developments of the Lebanese crisis and the Egyptian stand in this context, starting with President Sadat's warning—made during the Riyadh meeting last April—about the dangers inherent in the escalation of the Lebanese situation. This warning is based on information collected by Egypt which indicates the existence of suspicious plans aimed at exploding internal Lebanese differences, which would consequently be exploited to strike at the Palestinian presence in Lebanon by drawing the Palestinians into the conflict and diverting them away from their heroic struggle to regain their legitimate national rights. Egypt was also aware of a parallel plan to drag in Arab forces outside Lebanon as a party to this conflict, with the aim of splitting Arab ranks whose unity had been reaffirmed during the October war. Egypt was, moreover, aware of plans for foreign intervention in Lebanon, the aims of which contradict higher Arab interests. On the basis of the above, President Sadat had called for all hands off Lebanon.

In pursuit of this policy Egypt has unambi-

<sup>19</sup> English text as published in *Monday Morning* (Beirut), January 19, 1976, p. 16.

<sup>20</sup> Doc. 189 above.

<sup>21</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), January 19, 1976.



guously condemned the irresponsible acts of certain Phalangist elements against concentrations of Palestinians. She has no less unambiguously condemned the irresponsible actions which have led to the Lebanese army being drawn into and becoming a party to the artificial struggle against the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. Egypt has clearly defined her attitude to the effect that she cannot remain silent in the face of this new escalation and has also made every effort to ensure that the Arab League should face up to its responsibilities, and has called on the Secretary of the League to take rapid action.

In the face of the continuing escalation of the incidents in Lebanon the Council hereby stresses Egypt's firm policy vis-à-vis the Lebanese conflict, so that it may be clear to all who are parties to the conflict, whether openly or secretly.

1. Egypt condemns the shedding of Arab blood by Arabs and affirms her belief that every dispute between Arab brothers can be confined, contained and then solved through constructive dialogue and good intentions.

2. Egypt is opposed to a policy of interference in the internal affairs of any Arab state, whether by another Arab country or by any foreign power, and within this framework is making every effort to reconcile viewpoints on a basis of right and justice.

3. Egypt affirms that the Palestinian presence in Lebanon is an extension of the Palestinian presence in the whole Arab nation, and has undertaken to support and strengthen it until the Palestinian people recover their legitimate rights.

4. As regards any possibility of Israeli intervention to exploit the incidents in Lebanon, Egypt has defined her attitude very clearly.

5. Egypt condemns all attempts to partition Lebanon as being part of a scheme directed not only against Lebanon but against the whole Arab nation.

6. Proud as she is of the Lebanese army, Egypt condemns attempts to draw it into the conflict.

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**Statement issued by the Directorate-General of the Presidency of Lebanon announcing agreement on a political settlement of the crisis in Lebanon (excerpt)<sup>22</sup>**

Beirut, January 22, 1976

Following contacts made by the Syrian delegation with a view to obtaining a comprehensive settlement of the crisis in Lebanon, agreement has been reached by all sides regarding the principles for a comprehensive political settlement of the crisis to cover all its various aspects. Agreement has been reached on the following points:

1. The formation of a higher Lebanese-Syrian-Palestinian military committee entrusted with making arrangements for a ceasefire, the resumption of normal life and supervision of implementation.

2. The formation of a number of supervisory sub-committees issuing from the Higher Committee to supervise and follow up on implementation of the ceasefire in the various regions and military positions.

3. The Higher Committee shall determine the ceasefire schedule, and shall announce arrangements related to the ceasefire as well as the stages of implementing it.

. . . . .

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**Press interview statement by PSP leader Junblat of Lebanon suggesting that the Palestine resistance should re-examine its political conscience<sup>23</sup>**

Beirut, late January, 1976

. . . . .

It is high time that the Palestine resistance movement re-examine its conscience and gradually put its house in order.

The guerrilla organizations must realize the necessity of better organization in their ranks and

<sup>22</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), January 23, 1976.

<sup>23</sup> Excerpted and translated from the French text of the interview conducted by Edouard Saab, *Le Monde* (Paris), January 27, 1976, p. 2.

they must subject their masses to a more vigorous discipline. Because disorder generates disorder and the same can be said for violence, the Palestinians must learn from past lessons. I say all of this knowing that the Lebanese have given the utmost example of disorder and that they have ended up contaminating them. I am willing to concede that the origins of the crisis are at one and the same time Lebanese-Palestinian and Lebanese-Lebanese; at the same time, how can one not retain the image of the total anarchy of which Lebanon had become the theatre before the triggering of the civil war?

## 195

### **Press interview statements by Fatah Central Committee member Khalaf regarding events in Lebanon and the discussion of the Palestine problem at the UN Security Council<sup>24</sup>**

**Early February, 1976**

*Q. With the crisis in Lebanon coming to an end, a restructuring of Lebanese-Palestinian relations becomes inevitable. The resistance has declared its adherence to the Cairo agreement and its appendices<sup>25</sup> while the other side has insisted upon strict implementation of the provisions of that agreement. How will it be possible to deal with more obscure clauses of that agreement, especially those relating to the question of heavy arms inside the camps?*

*A. To begin with, the problem of Lebanon is not related to the presence of the Palestine revolution. A problem has existed between the Lebanese regime and the resistance ever since the crisis of 1973 and this problem continued to exist until the crisis of 13 April, 1975. The question in my opinion is not related to the agreement nor to the*

implementation of some rather than of all its provisions nor has it to do at all with the excesses committed. The issue is deeper than all this and has to do with a plot against the Palestine revolution carried out by the isolationist faction. This plot began in 1973 and preparations were made for another round on April 13, 1975.

Hence, it is not a question of excesses. We ask ourselves: Can what happened in Lebanon be in any sense related to the damage sustained by Lebanon, its sovereignty and its interests, during the last ten months of war? No, it cannot and it is foolish and useless for them to depict the whole issue as if it were a question of Palestinian excesses committed against Lebanon's sovereignty. Therefore I maintain to begin with that if there is mutual trust between the authorities and the resistance, the problem would not lie in the text of agreements. The problem is one of trust between the two sides. Whenever this trust was absent, the isolationist side would imagine that by violence and force they could cut the Palestine revolution down to size. We in turn ask: What do we want from Lebanon? We want only that our stay in Lebanon be a temporary one until such time as we can move from all areas where we are present in the Arab world back to our country, Palestine. We have no ambitions to turn parts of Lebanon into an alternative homeland, nor do we aspire to rule in Lebanon or in any other part of the Arab world.

The isolationist side must come to believe that the Palestine revolution cannot be treated with violence. We for our part are ready to contribute with all our resources to the restoration of normal life in Lebanon. If excesses have been committed, the Palestine revolution and resistance are capable of dealing with them. More important than any agreement in my view is the return of trust between the official authorities and the resistance. We shall adhere to the implementation of agreements concluded in both letter and spirit.

As regards heavy weapons inside the camps, this question was not discussed with us. Israeli attacks force us to arm ourselves and protect our camps using all types of weapons. Therefore, these arms are not pointed at anyone in Lebanon but at Israel. If trust and good intentions are present, the Lebanese authorities ought to permit the presence of weapons to be used by the Palestinians to protect the Palestinian people.

<sup>24</sup> Interview granted to Agence France-Presse; translated from the Arabic text, *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), February 8, 1976.

<sup>25</sup> The basic Cairo agreement between the PLO and Lebanon is doc. 449 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969*. The authenticity of that text, which was supposed to have remained secret, was attested to by Charles Helou, who was president of Lebanon at the time, in an interview with *al-Nahar* (Beirut), September 7, 1976. The appendices or annexes to the agreement consist of a series of secret agreements and memoranda and the minutes of confidential meetings over the period January 1970 until May 1973. No official texts of these have been published, but an English translation of unofficial texts was published by *Arab World Files* (*Fiches du Monde Arabe*) in early 1977.

*Q. Observers believe that the Syrian presence in areas controlled by the nationalist forces and the Palestine resistance will contribute to reducing the Palestine resistance to size. Thus the return of the fighters inside the camps and the withdrawal of heavy weapons would remove the popular and military protective belt surrounding the camps.*

*A. No one on earth can reduce the resistance to size. This in any case is in my view a relative question. If the leadership accepts to reduce itself to size, it will do so regardless of whether there is a Syrian or Egyptian presence if this leadership believes in its people and in the slogans it has raised: "No tutelage and no subordination." Therefore no one on earth can reduce the resistance to size. I do not believe that the Syrians are thinking of reducing the resistance to size.*

*As for the return of the fighters to the camps, we do not aim at occupying Lebanon or at expanding beyond the camps. We are against any expansion beyond the camps. But there is a difference when a state of war is forced upon us and we need to deal with it by leaving our camps to protect ourselves and the national movement. The heavy weapons are anti-aircraft against Israeli planes and shall remain inside the camps. We wish that Lebanon would declare itself to be a confrontation state protecting itself and the camps. We would then be the first to agree to withdraw these weapons. But would Lebanon make such a declaration? That is the question!*

## 196

### **Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Syria of President Franjieh of Lebanon<sup>26</sup>**

**Damascus, February 7, 1976**

In response to the invitation addressed by President Hafiz Asad, President of the Syrian Arab Republic, to his brother, His Excellency President Sulayman Franjieh, President of the Lebanese Republic, His Excellency paid an official visit to the Syrian Arab Republic, at the head of an official delegation on Saturday, February 7, 1976.

His Excellency President Sulayman Franjieh was given a ceremonial official welcome which

reflected the close links between the two sister countries and the special qualities of these relations, which are an expression of the depth and genuineness that have characterized them throughout history.

In the course of this visit the two Arab Presidents had official talks in an atmosphere of brotherhood and mutual affection. The talks covered in particular the present situation in Lebanon in the wake of the painful trial through which that country has passed and which has caused so much distress to the citizens of both countries.

These discussions were attended by His Excellency Mr. Rashid Karami, the Lebanese Prime Minister.

On behalf of the Syrian side, they were attended by Messrs. Mahmud Ayyubi, Prime Minister, and Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

The two Presidents reviewed the bloody incidents that have taken place in Lebanon in recent months, the terrible loss of life and property they have occasioned and the extent of their effect on the Lebanese situation and on the Arab homeland which is fighting its battle of destiny against the enemies of the Arab nation, headed by Israel and world Zionism.

His Excellency the Lebanese President expressed his profound gratitude for and appreciation of the fraternal attitude adopted by the Syrian Arab Republic under the leadership of President Hafiz Asad, and his gratitude for the Syrian initiative which led to the ending of the trials through which Lebanon has passed and to the speedy restoration of stability and normal life in the country.

President Hafiz Asad assured his distinguished guest of his extreme concern at the course of events in Lebanon, in the light of the firm fraternal relations between the two countries and the common destiny that links them. He also expressed his confidence in and satisfaction with the foundations on which the settlement of the crisis in Lebanon rests.

In the course of these discussions the two Presidents reviewed the internal situation in Lebanon since the end of the crisis and discussed ways and means of ensuring continued quiet and stability in the country, and, first and foremost, the measures which will take place in Lebanon with the object of laying firm foundations that will ensure that Lebanese society will enjoy tranquility, prosperity

<sup>26</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), February 8, 1976.

and progress, and firmly establish Lebanese national unity which is the mainstay for the achievement of the goals which all groups of the Lebanese people have in mind.

They also reviewed the contacts that have taken place with the Palestine Liberation Organization with a view to implementing the Cairo agreement,<sup>27</sup> the two sides stressing their commitment to the implementation of all the clauses and provisions of that agreement. The Syrian side affirmed that Syria will guarantee the implementation of the agreement in letter and in spirit, since it is in the common interest of Lebanon and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The two Presidents reviewed bilateral relations between the two countries which are established on a firm basis of brotherhood, affection and good neighbourliness, the historical ties that link the two countries and the many interests they have in common in all fields, and agreed that these relations must be developed and promoted to the greatest possible extent so as to ensure that the aspirations of the peoples of the two countries are realized, to repel the common dangers that threaten them and to ensure their prosperity and progress.

His Excellency Sulayman Franjeh expressed his profound gratitude for the welcome and honour with which he and the delegation accompanying him were received, and invited his brother President Hafiz Asad to visit Lebanon. He accepted this invitation with thanks, and the date of the visit will be fixed later.

## 197

### **Message from King Hussein of Jordan to Prime Minister Rifai charging him with the formation of a new cabinet (excerpt)<sup>28</sup>**

**Amman, February 8, 1976**

. . . . .

As regards policy we are clear and serious so as to leave no room for any hesitation or doubt. We have a national mission that we inherited from our fathers and grandfathers; we have

believed in it throughout the long march of our country and our nation. We have never for a moment renounced it and it is impossible that we should ever do so. Our sacred cause has ever been and will ever be our guiding principle in every step we take; we do nothing whatsoever that is not in its service and its true interest.

Therefore our Arab relations are based on sincere commitment to defend the sacred cause of liberating Arab territory and recovering usurped Arab rights, and assisting the Palestinian Arab people in recovering their homeland and their rights.

So that we may achieve these ends and realize our highest national aspirations, we are taking pains to strengthen our natural fraternal relations with all our brothers and in particular with the confrontation and the supporting countries, in the vanguard of which is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Our Arab relations are to be seen at their culminating point in our relations with Syria; this is only natural and accords with the facts of history and our aspirations for the future, and we have every intention of building up these relations on even firmer foundations and maintaining them for all time. We hope that this state of affairs may achieve its full dimensions so that it may become a model that is copied in all parts of the great Arab homeland.

. . . . .

## 198

### **Statement to the press by National Liberal Party leader Chamoun of Lebanon expressing the hope that Syria will help implement the terms of the Syria-Lebanon joint communiqué<sup>29</sup>**

**Beirut, February 8, 1976**

We support the joint communiqué issued after the meeting between Presidents Franjeh and Asad and we accept it. This meeting was a culmination of the accord reached to end the fighting. In any event, the value of any agreement lies in its implementation. If, as appears so far, the intention to implement it is genuine, this would serve the interests of both Lebanon and Syria.

<sup>27</sup> See note to doc. 195 above.

<sup>28</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Amman), February 9, 1976.

<sup>29</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), February 9, 1976. The joint communiqué is doc. 196 above.

The most important part of the statement is the Syrian guarantee regarding the implementation of the Cairo agreement<sup>30</sup> in letter and spirit. This is an important matter because that agreement is the key to the whole problem. The destructive war raging between the Lebanese and the Palestinians and the constant conflict between the two parties were caused by non-compliance with the regulations of that agreement. When this agreement is implemented in letter and spirit, as President Asad says, that will restore peace of mind and inspire confidence. What we hope for most is that the meeting of the two presidents has created a new state of affairs between the Lebanese and the Palestinians and removed the causes of misunderstanding.

The joint communiqué has value to the extent that it will be implemented. We shall observe how this will be done for the sake of putting an end to any conflict in future between the Lebanese and the Palestinians.

*Q. How, in your opinion, will these guarantees be enforced?*

*A.* Our Syrian brothers have all the means necessary, especially the moral means. I suppose that when a man like President Asad says that he will guarantee the implementation of the Cairo agreement in letter and spirit, he presumably is confident that he is in a position to make such a declaration.

## 199

### **Statements by Foreign Minister Fahmi of Egypt regretting the recall of the Chamber of Deputies of Jordan and supporting the PLO's attitude<sup>31</sup>**

**Cairo, February 12, 1976**

King Hussein's recent decision to recall Parliament has robbed the PLO of its most important achievements at Rabat and the summit conferences, especially as the King has amended the constitution to make it possible to convene the Assembly

whenever necessary. This means that the meeting called by the King, which was held on February 5, was only one link in a continuous chain of incidents which are inconsistent with the PLO's right to represent the Palestinian people and which conflict with everything that has been achieved for them.

The claim that the King's decision was intended to prevent the Judaization of the West Bank is unacceptable because the way to deal with this problem is to spur the resistance into action in such a way as to ensure that the West Bank Palestinians do not cooperate with the Israeli authorities. The most important thing about King Hussein's decision is its timing, which leads one to believe that this decision is the first fruit of Syrian-Jordanian coordination and that it was taken with Syrian encouragement. For the King could not have taken such a step without the agreement of Syria, the only Arab quarter to defend his decision. The support came from the Syrian leadership, and also from Zuhair Muhsin, who represents the Syrian and not the Palestinian line in the PLO. Moreover, President Hafiz al-Assad himself has said that the King's decision was taken after the Syrian leadership and the PLO had been informed.

It is well known that the Palestinian attitude is to reject the Jordanian move; the Palestine News Agency described the Jordanian move, in its statement, as a link in the chain of Jordanian-Zionist schemes.

Of course, Egypt realizes this and you will agree with me that this situation requires a decisive stand to confront this grave threat to the Palestinian cause. We are not inciting the PLO against any quarter it may not be prepared to confront, nor are we exerting pressures, nor do we establish organizations. But the PLO should face up to its responsibilities, not vis-à-vis the Arab world, for we know the pressure to which it is being subjected, but vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Egypt will meet its national commitments, especially as regards its aid and support for the steadfast Palestinian people in Gaza and the West Bank. This is a matter of principle.

Egypt's strategic security is totally linked to the security and interests of the Palestinian people, not only as regards the creation of a Palestinian

<sup>30</sup> See note to doc. 195 above.

<sup>31</sup> Made before the parliamentary committees on Foreign Affairs and Arab Affairs; Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), February 13, 1976; partial English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), V, 3-4 (Spring-Summer 1976), p. 258-259.

entity, but also as regards Egypt's national security, which means the security of the whole Arab world.

Peace depends on Egypt, just as war depends on Egypt. No one can deny this. We never deviate or turn aside from our goals; we know what we are doing and we appraise every step we take and choose what is in conformity with our strategic goals. I can explain Egypt's attitude to you in the following six points:

1. The basic principles of Egypt's attitude are rejection of direct or indirect intervention in Palestinian affairs and condemnation of all attempts to cast doubt on their unity and fighting capability.

2. The Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and any denial of this is a flagrant violation of the Rabat Conference resolutions.

3. No tutelage over the PLO or the Palestinian people wherever they may be, for the PLO is the legitimate representative of this people.

4. The PLO should realize all this and oppose all attempts to fragment it, whether from inside or outside.

5. The PLO must make its position to [the recalling of the Jordanian parliament] clear to the Arab world and the rest of the world, otherwise the statements of certain of its leaders will be interpreted in a manner that may lead to serious consequences. The PLO must also bear its responsibilities and confront the situation in every respect.

6. No Arab country has the right to interfere in the affairs of the Palestinians. Consequently, the fact that certain Palestinians have been submitted to authority constitutes a threat to the Arab cause and the countries that exert pressure must bear the responsibility of their action.

200

**Press interview statements by Chairman Qassis of the Standing Conference of the Order of Maronite Monks of Lebanon announcing the need for a Palestinian government in exile<sup>82</sup>**

**Beirut, February 13, 1976**

*Q. How do you see Lebanese-Palestinian relations and could they be developed?*

*A.* After this violent war, it is time for us to take a close look at Palestinian-Lebanese relations with frankness and seriousness because these are bound to generate mutual trust—a basic condition for any kind of dealing among individuals and groups.

It is not my speciality to determine what is the best way for recovering or creating the Palestinian homeland. Nor would I involve myself in the ramified options taken by this or that of the complex Palestinian military organizations. But what I can firmly state is that the Palestinian organizations have passed the stage of underground commando organizations to become regular armies. Thus, it has become necessary to create a government-in-exile which would constitute the frame of political reference for any military action and its unification. Hence, the need to distinguish between the Palestinian people and the location of their agglomerations on the one hand and the Palestinian military camps on the other.

When we accept this logical distinction, it would become very easy to bolster Palestinian-Lebanese relations.

Regarding the (refugee) camps, I refuse henceforth to identify them as such. I would identify them as agglomerations of the Palestinian people which, therefore, should fall under the jurisdiction of the Lebanese State. It is the responsibility of the State to safeguard the security of these agglomerations and the rights of their inhabitants as much as it is responsible to safeguard any resident on Lebanese territory.

The government-in-exile would decide, through an agreement with the Lebanese government, the

<sup>82</sup> Interview conducted by Claude Khoury; excerpted from the text, *Monday Morning* (Beirut), February 16, 1976, p. 19.

military relations it will have with the Lebanese State and Army.

## 201

### **Declaration to the press by National Bloc Party leader Eddé of Lebanon outlining his party's view of the crisis in Lebanon (excerpts)<sup>33</sup>**

**Beirut, February 13, 1976**

The bloody events which began in Sidon last year and then in Ayn al-Rummana lasting ten months and declared to have been ended yesterday have resulted in 13,000 dead, 40,000 wounded, thousands of orphans and material losses estimated at 25 billion Lebanese pounds, not to speak of acts of pillage, robbery and deportation. Such acts did not have as their goal the wresting of the presidency of the republic from the Maronites nor the amendment of the Constitution or of the electoral law nor the realization of any other social demands.

These matters were not discussed except during the sessions of the Committee for Dialogue, i.e. during October 1975, six months after the beginning of the bloody events. But the topics discussed did not include revision of the tradition according to which the presidency of the republic has gone to the Maronite.

The questions now posed before the Lebanese people and to which an answer must be given are the following: What was the aim of the fighting? What were its results? Who is responsible for the death of innocents, the ruin, the destruction and the collapse of the state in every sense of the word? Who stood to benefit from all this? Who gained by all this?

I believe that Sulayman Franjieh, the president of the republic, bears prime responsibility for all that has taken place because of his actions.

In examining the events of April 1973, one discovers that when the Verdun Street incident took place, where three Palestine resistance leaders were killed by Israeli commandos who stayed for three hours in the heart of the capital and in the Ouzai suburb, the Lebanese army did not move

to repel this attack, given the fact that the army is at the disposal of the president of the republic.

Then a Lebanese army sergeant was kidnapped by Palestinian elements who were warned to return him. When he was not returned within the time specified, a battle erupted between the Lebanese army and the Palestinians where the airforce was called in by order of the President. The battle lasted a few days and the army was not able to overpower the resistance. Thereafter, a traditional reconciliation took place between the president and the chairman of the PLO, following a meeting during which the president informed the PLO chairman that it was his duty to arm the resistance in order to protect the Palestinian camps because the Lebanese army could not confront the Israelis, nor even defend the southern villages. Since that date, the Palestinian resistance has been fortifying itself with all types of weapons.

Thereafter, certain groups in the resistance began to abuse their arms in fields other than where they are permitted to use them, leading some Christians to grow apprehensive about the stockpiling of weapons in hands that were sometimes irresponsible. This in turn led them to arm themselves in order to protect themselves and their property, as is their right.

Israel then proceeded to implement a plan which resulted in an outbreak of fighting between some Lebanese and some Palestinians which gradually developed into a war among the Lebanese themselves. Israel did this to spare itself an attack on Lebanon. Disaster struck amidst an atmosphere of indifference exhibited by friendly Arab and foreign states.

Meanwhile, the president, in his capacity as chief executive, instead of adopting the Lebanese, Arab and international measures necessary to foil the conspiracy, Lebanon being a member of both the Arab League and the United Nations, took the side of one party against the other, thus forsaking his role as arbiter and his duty to protect the security of all Lebanese citizens, both Christian and Muslim.

Today, after having committed these terrible mistakes against the people of Lebanon and their history which led to loss of national sovereignty, he is attempting to justify his conduct to his own Maronite sect by stating that it was he who had saved the presidency for them through a

<sup>33</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), February 14, 1976.

written text and that if the post remains in Maronite hands, thanks are due to him. However, he conveniently forgets that no Christian or Muslim sect ever demanded the post of the presidency. The reverse is in fact true, especially since the Muslims quickly declared their opinion that the presidency should remain a Maronite post.

In all these events, what was the position of the National Bloc Party? The party has always been in favour of national unity and Lebanese sovereignty. It has never approved of any agreement that does harm to either and exposes the country to Israeli attacks. The party refused to take part in the bloody battles that have led to Lebanon's ruin and the collapse of sovereignty because of its conviction that such battles will not be in the interests of the Lebanese people. It has pointed to this fact on many occasions.

The National Bloc Party's opinion from the very beginning was that the bloody battles were aimed, among other things, at the partition of Lebanon. An Israeli conspiracy may be easily detected in this, bringing no benefit whatever to the Lebanese people, especially the Christians, because a small Christian Lebanon cannot exist economically, nor satisfy the aspirations of its sons nor exist after the emigration brought about by partition.

Accordingly, the party opposed the partition of Lebanon as well as the fighting among its citizens. It has spared and will spare no effort in order to prevent the conspiracy from achieving its final aims and will hold fast to a united, free, sovereign and independent Lebanon. Today it wishes to announce the following assurances and principles:

1. Lebanon is an Arab state and is a member of the Arab League bound by its charter and by the Joint Defence Pact.

. . . . .

As for the Palestine problem, the party has declared its commitment to the justice of its cause and its support for the brotherly Palestinian people to the end that it may regain its full rights to its sovereignty and homeland. As for the Palestinian presence and commando activity on Lebanese soil, the Cairo agreement<sup>34</sup> made specific mention of them. This agreement was signed by the Lebanese side on November 3, 1969, and ratified by majority vote of parliament on December 4,

1969, thus establishing their presence and activity as legal.

Finally, the attention of the Lebanese must be drawn to the fact that the conspiracy against Lebanon, which has lasted ten months and brought disaster in its wake, may be revived only if the Lebanese themselves want this to happen. Its inevitable end will be the destruction of Lebanon and its end as a state and an entity.

The Lebanese must remember at all times that their unique contribution to civilization and to the world is the choice they freely adopted for a Muslim-Christian coexistence. It was this that distinguished them from other nations, making them aspire to national fusion and rendering their cultural interaction an example to be emulated. This must be defended and protected and any conspiracy aimed against it must be foiled because this is the very epitome of their pride and the cause of their self-esteem.

. . . . .

## 202

### **Message to the people by President Franjieh of Lebanon outlining the bases for a constitutional settlement of the crisis in Lebanon (excerpts)<sup>35</sup>**

**Beirut, February 14, 1976**

People of Lebanon,

The initiative coming from Damascus at a time when the situation had become grave and the fires of war had grown more fierce was no mere accident. Lebanon has since ancient times kept an eye to sister Syria and Syria too to sister Lebanon, the eye of friendship and serenity. Hence the initiative of President Asad, who stood up to repel the harm being done to Lebanon, motivated by no other motive than the selfless desire to do good.

Fellow countrymen, you are entitled, since we live under a free democracy, to know the results of the talks held in Damascus, which had no need to be told about Lebanon and its identity. But we felt it necessary once more to define Lebanon's identity to the world, from Damascus, so as to confirm that Lebanon is a sovereign, free and independent Arab country; that it is the home

<sup>34</sup> See note to doc. 195 above.

<sup>35</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), February 15, 1976.



of ideologies that have illuminated the Arab world; that it represents a unique formula for coexistence among sects and religions; that it is a meeting place of world culture and a unique human laboratory; that it is the voice of the Arabs throughout the world as expressed by both its inhabitants and its emigrants. Nor have our Arab brethren failed to recognize that it is Lebanon's right to remain sovereign so that it can continue to act as an honest spokesman, espousing the cause of justice and protecting the interests of its brethren. Nor did the Palestinians need to be reminded that the Rabat summit conference had entrusted Lebanon with the task of defending their cause at the United Nations and that Lebanon fulfilled that task faithfully, driven by its conviction concerning the importance of Jerusalem, the home of Christ, the first direction for Muslim prayer and the third most sacred Muslim sanctuary. Lebanon was fully cognizant also of the significance of the Palestinian cause, a just and rightful cause.

Nor did the Palestinians need to be reminded that the logic of their revolution and the logic of Lebanese legitimacy coexisting on a small and dense piece of land such as Lebanon, which is not in essence the law of the revolution itself, presupposed a great deal of prescience, caution and vigilance on their part to avoid a clash between these two logics and thus produce an explosion. Nor do they need to be reminded that the situation today demands increased care on their part to abide by agreements and to commit themselves to their implementation, especially the Cairo agreement.<sup>36</sup>

Based upon the above and conscious of our responsibilities towards a people that remains ultimately what it is no matter how faltering its steps or how bloodied its soil; for the sake of a new and better life; in pursuit of a social justice that is better distributed, more widespread and more lasting in its effects on human life; for the sake of a justice and an equality which cannot, by their nature, be realized except in stages and at the end of the road; in order to triumph over fear and gain peace of mind; for the sake of erecting the foundations of a proud and well-established homeland; and in line with the views we developed through consultations and arrived at through various meetings and declarations; finally, in ac-

cordance with the realities of democratic tradition:

. . . . .

We have resolved to lay the foundations for a future Lebanon in accordance with principles the broad outlines of which we ourselves enunciated in our speech delivered upon the occasion of the unveiling of the statue of Fakhr al-Din in Baaqlin on August 23, 1975. We asked the cabinet to study these principles in open session at a time when demands had not yet crystallized in men's minds, and then stated the following: "The demands presented by one side or another are purely Lebanese and have no other character or identity. What springs from the very heart of a people springs also, automatically, from the conscience of their rulers. There is neither winner nor loser but merely a social justice deserved by all." We also said then: "The National Covenant which is a formula for brotherly and dignified coexistence among the Lebanese necessitated by the requirements of independence shall remain a formula for brotherly and dignified coexistence and shall forever respond to the desires of the Lebanese and keep pace with their aspirations within the framework of independence. The Constitution, in our view, is not a holy revelation but is to be developed by the circumstances of life itself. Our constitution has for long evolved in accordance with experience and shall continue to so evolve until we achieve what we aspire to. The necessity for change is one thing but undue insistence upon change is another." We also stated, "Our system is one we had all agreed upon and we gained prosperity and stability under its aegis. If freedom does not limit itself in Lebanon and establish its own self-controls, it will always be threatened with suffocation. What will become of us then and what will be our destiny?" We again said, "There can be no security in Lebanon until every Lebanese comes fully to trust his fellow Lebanese so that together they may come to believe that the land of Lebanon belongs to its sons and the fruits of this earth are for all of them to enjoy equally, in accordance with the labour and hard work of each person. Everyone will then come to see that concord, partnership and justice are normal attributes that occur spontaneously and need not be asked for."

Our meeting in Damascus took place in this

<sup>36</sup> See note to doc. 195 above.

spirit. In conformity with our own views as set forth in our speech in Baaqlin, the following topics were discussed:

1. The current custom of dividing the three presidencies was emphasized so that the president of the republic would be a Maronite, the Speaker of the Chamber a Shiite Moslem and the Premier a Sunni Moslem. Each office would be considered as representing all the Lebanese.

2. Parliamentary seats would be divided equally between Muslims and Christians and by ratio within each sect. Electoral laws would be amended accordingly so as to guarantee better representation of citizens.

3. The formulation of a defence policy and the strengthening of the army.

4. The establishment of a responsible freedom for the press which would ensure conformity with social policy in achieving national unity and in strengthening Lebanon's Arab and international relations.

5. Amending the nationality law.,

What are these principles being presented to you today and which will be put into effect following the implementation of the Cairo Agreement? They constitute a policy for national action set forth in a document approved by the cabinet whose text will also be presented to parliament. Side by side with the unwritten national covenant, it will be a new foundation to be added to the other foundations of national life in Lebanon and will derive its force from loyalty to Lebanon and faithfulness in its service.

People of Lebanon, whatever the judgement of history may be, we must today judge that Lebanon, the whole of Lebanon, is worthy of its sons' loyalty, all its sons. It deserves their fervent and total loyalty, unconditional and unmarred. Indeed, it deserves the loyalty of all those to whom it opened its doors wide. It is a loyalty that Lebanon deserves for its own sake as well as for the sake of enabling it to continue to perform its mission: its Arab mission and its mission of the coexistence of sects and religions. This coexistence which the world at present is pursuing in dialogues being held both in the east and in the west and at all levels is an actual reality in Lebanon and has been a wonderful way of life for hundreds of years.

203

**Statement by the Standing Committee of the Religious Communities of Lebanon on the Jewish-Christian conference to be held in Jerusalem<sup>37</sup>**

**Beirut, February 18, 1976**

On the basis of the historic Tripoli statement issued after the seminar for Christian-Islamic dialogue held from February 1-6, and in particular of paragraphs 20 and 21 of that statement,<sup>38</sup> which are to the effect that Zionism is an aggressive racist movement and also affirm the right of the Palestinian people to return to their homes and reject all projects for the Judaization, partition or internationalization of the Arab city of Jerusalem; and from their attachment to spiritual values and their determination to maintain the dignity of man and his right to life and freedom and to prevent any confusion between the precepts of the revealed religions and the aims of those enemies of humanity who conceal their intentions by assuming a religious guise, their Eminences and Reverences the members of the Standing Committee of the Religious Communities of Lebanon, meeting in Dar al-Fatwa on February 18, declare:

1. That it is impossible that the Jewish-Christian conference that is to be held in the city of Jerusalem should serve the interests of religions or promote their values, since world Zionism has long been controlling it and manipulating it for its own racist and colonialist purposes.

2. Those attending the meeting believe that the holding of such a conference in Arab Jerusalem of all places, and particularly in the present circumstances, amounts to an entirely unjustifiable recognition of Zionism in its political aspect which is trying by every means to secure recognition for the legitimacy of its control over Palestine and the religious symbols and values enshrined in it, which are sacred to both the Islamic and Christian worlds.

3. Those attending the meeting consider that the mere act of participation in any form in this conference, which is nothing more nor less than a conspiracy, is patently incompatible with what was agreed in the Tripoli closing statement,

<sup>37</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, as published in *Wafa* (Beirut), February 18, 1976, p. 9

<sup>38</sup> Doc. 49 above.

inasmuch as it is a clear denial of the lofty precepts of Christianity on adherence to pacts and engagements.

4. The Standing Committee of the Religious Communities of Lebanon would like to know for certain that the political implications of this conference are not unknown to the Apostolic See, which in recent years has had an increasingly brilliant record for upholding the right of peoples to self-determination.

## 204

### **Statement by PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi deploring the holding of the Conference on Soviet Jewry in Belgium (excerpts)<sup>39</sup>**

**Beirut, February 19, 1976**

We are greatly surprised that the Belgian government should agree to such a conference being held in its territory, for Belgium has always made a point of being one of the most civilized countries in Europe.

We are also surprised that Belgium, which was one of the countries which shared in laying the foundations on which the Commission on Human Rights rests, should permit the holding in her territory of such a conference; this can only be regarded as a blow struck at the Charter of Human Rights and the Helsinki agreement.

While this agreement permits freedom of movement, its whole purpose was to ensure that such freedom of movement is not turned into freedom to invade, in which one human being seizes the territory of another and leaves him without refuge. It was intended to prevent such freedom of movement being turned into freedom of aggression by virtue of which national rights are replaced by humiliation, and which the aggressor sees as giving him the legal right to expel people from their homes, their land and their country, replacing them by aliens who have been lured by Zionism, to perpetrate its crimes and its racist settlement plans at the expense of the freedom of others. At a time

when all international legislation and pacts safeguard the strengthening of the links of love between the peoples of the world, such a conference is being held in Brussels, of all places, to nurture the roots of hostility between human beings by organizing such waves of immigration that amount to invasion.

The Palestine Liberation Organization was the first to call for and to take action to ensure the safeguarding of the freedoms of Jews who live or used to live in the Arab countries; and it still supports and sponsors this call, to which many Arab countries have responded. Nor has it ever suffered from a complex of hostility towards any Jew. The protection it afforded to the Jews of Lebanon during the recent regrettable incidents is a striking example of how it practises what it preaches in the field of human coexistence.

The world Zionist movement, the danger of which to the peoples of the world is clearly shown by its racist ideology and its Nazi methods, as affirmed by United Nations resolution 3379 of 1975, is now sponsoring a conference whose real aim is to polarize racist blocs in a form even more dangerous to world peace. This is something that all the European peoples should not only condemn but make every effort to eradicate from Europe, which has always subscribed to the call for the building of civilized society.

At a time when world Zionism is taking over the role of Nazism in its treatment of the people of Palestine, the European peoples should rid themselves of the guilt complex that they suffer from as a result of the crimes of Nazism, for these crimes are being repeated today by those who represent themselves as being the victims of those crimes and are committing the same misdeeds and playing the same role against the people of Palestine and depriving them of their human rights in occupied Palestine.

<sup>39</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), February 19, 1976, p. 3. The resolution of the conference is doc. 52 above.

## 205

**Sermon delivered by Shaykh Mufti Khalid of Lebanon (excerpts)<sup>40</sup>****Beirut, February 20, 1976**

When we say of Lebanon that it is a meeting place of cultures or that it is the home of civilization and enlightenment or that it has a unique formula or that it is the voice of the Arabs in the world at large, none of these statements add to its stature unless they are accompanied, and to the same extent, by an increase in Lebanon's material and daily commitment to the major problems of Arabism. This is what necessitates Lebanon's commitment to the Arab cause of Palestine, just as Arabism itself is committed to human causes anywhere on earth.

Accordingly, and proceeding from our responsibilities before God and man, and motivated by our faith in the ethical side of religion which is the objective of any religion at all, and inspired by the words of the Prophet, upon whom be peace: "I have been sent to complete the refinement of character", and wishing to support a state of affairs where one does not turn back to the malodorous past but rather to the breezes of the future and to breathe therefrom the strength necessary to build a strong Arab Lebanon where Islamic culture can meet Christian culture in a noble setting, with mutual affection and cooperation and under the shadow of a unique Arab formula whose essence is quality not quantity, and whose object is missionary not mercantile, and having consulted the mass of Muslims in responsible positions on every level, we declare the following:

5. The reform programme<sup>41</sup> has enshrined, if it has enshrined anything at all, the following three realities:

a. Lebanon's Arab "belongingness" and the consequent commitment to the Arab cause in general policy on the level of Arab politics. At the head of these is Lebanon's commitment to the Palestinian Arab question and the protection of its revolu-

tionary gains everywhere. This also requires the resolve to create a new Lebanese individual: educationally, socially, on the Arab level and on the level of domestic politics.

b. The recognition of the necessity of developing the Lebanese system by stages and of the need to amend the constitution in a progressive manner. The reform programme itself may be considered a kind of progress whereby Lebanese society moves from total sectarian disparity to contractual sectarian equality. This we view as an acceptable prelude to full national equality.

c. Giving expression to the will to change among people by legislation, however strict it may be, so that the needs of the Lebanese and their social and cultural growth may be met and assured.

## 206

**Statement issued by the Phalangist Party of Lebanon outlining its understanding of the message of President Franjeh of Lebanon (excerpts)<sup>42</sup>****Beirut, February 23, 1976**

2. Lebanon's identity is in no need of attributes or descriptions. In its belonging to the Arab world, it needs no one's testimony. It was a founding member of the League of Arab states, rising in the heart of the Arab world, and has made outstanding contributions to it in thought, literature and learning, in addition to its being a pioneer of a movement and a vanguard of liberty. Lebanon will be faithful to Arabism to the extent that it is rooted in its Lebanese character.

This is why we believe that any controversy over this issue can have only one of two aims: either to incite Lebanon against Arabism and to render Lebanon inimical to it, or to incite Arabism against Lebanon and get the two to clash. We reject both alternatives because we believe that such a controversy is a mere masquerade which obscures a rational viewpoint and enshrines under-

<sup>40</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), February 21, 1976.

<sup>41</sup> See doc. 202 above.

<sup>42</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), February 24, 1976. The message of Franjeh is doc. 202 above.

development.

There is no doubt that any attempt to impose anything on anyone in Lebanon, by force and violence, will be met with an automatic refusal and similar reactions, which will waste even more opportunities to save the Lebanese formula.

7. As for the Palestine cause, we declare that Lebanon is committed to it inasmuch as it embodies a principle and a cause of a people that has legitimate national rights. It is not a question of a few kilometres of territory nor one of ideologies.

We believe that for proper relations to exist between the Lebanese and the Palestinians, the sovereignty of the host country must be respected, its potentialities must be taken into account and its absorptive capacity must be carefully considered. Its laws must be obeyed, its peculiar circumstances must not be exploited to explode temporary tensions or to deepen superficial divisions and to incite sectarian feelings. There must be no interference in its affairs because acts of excess, as we all remember, were basically responsible for the unfortunate and painful clashes. Such excesses must be avoided because while the revolution may have its own logic and realities, these do not necessarily conflict with Lebanon's logic and reality nor does state sovereignty necessarily conflict with the security of the resistance.

The time has come for the resistance, which is committed to liberation as an objective, to realize that it has no enemy in Lebanon except those who are working to exploit it and to divert it from its cause. Every Lebanese wishes it success in its endeavour, when this is done in an atmosphere that is far removed from bargaining, false claims and selfishness. The Palestinian peace begins in Lebanon. Democratic Palestine will not come about if democratic Lebanon is to fall.

## 207

### **Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Saudi Arabia of President Sadat of Egypt (excerpts)<sup>43</sup>**

Riyad, February 26, 1976

In response to the invitation of His Majesty King Khalid ibn Abd al-Aziz al Saud, King of Saudi Arabia, His Excellency President Muhammad Anwar Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, paid an official visit to Saudi Arabia from Safar 21–26, 1396, AH, February 21–26, 1976, AD.

The two sides discussed developments in the Middle East problem and the Palestine problem and the two leaders reaffirmed collective Arab responsibility for this problem, for leading it towards the desired just solution by all available means, and for achieving the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and recovering the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination and return to their territory and their homeland.

In the light of the decisions of the seventh Arab summit conference in Rabat,<sup>44</sup> the two Arab leaders affirm the need for the coordination of Arab efforts at this stage of the advance, for unity of Arab ranks and for the mobilization of all Arab resources to confront all attempts to shelve the problem, to ensure that the initiative remains with the Arab nation, to support Arab efforts to confront any aggressive policy pursued by Israel and to intensify Arab action in support of the just Arab cause in information, African and international, and all other fields.

The two leaders also stressed that it is essential that the PLO should participate in all international organizations, conferences and gatherings, in its capacity as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and that its efforts on behalf of the Arab cause and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people should be supported.

The two leaders again condemned all the measures Israel is taking in the occupied Arab

<sup>43</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), February 27, 1976.

<sup>44</sup> Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

territories, which are incompatible with human values and the sacred tenets of religion and involve the violation of the Islamic holy places in Jerusalem.

They affirmed that the holy war to secure the restoration of Jerusalem to Arab sovereignty would continue.

The two leaders also once more condemned Israel's establishment of settlements in the occupied Arab territories and the consequent alteration of the demographic and geographic character of these territories.

They expressed their absolute rejection of these measures which are illegal under international law, the United Nations Charter and the Geneva conventions which oblige the elimination of such measures and all their consequences.

The two leaders studied the situation in Lebanon and stressed the necessity for Lebanon's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity to be protected, for her Arab character to be maintained and for her cooperation with the Palestine resistance to continue.

## 208

### **Press conference statements by President Sadat of Egypt discussing the repercussions of the Sinai interim agreement<sup>45</sup>**

**Kuwait, February 29, 1976**

*Sadat:* Before answering your questions, I would like to take this opportunity to offer our congratulations to our kinsmen and brothers in Kuwait, to its people and government, led by our brethren the Sabah family, for the independence celebrations. I would have liked to take part in these celebrations were it not for prior commitments. I wish you many happy returns, progress and prosperity. Thank you.

*Q, [from Kuwait television]. Some have tried to suggest that the Arab Republic of Egypt has left the field of battle. What is your excellency's answer to these suggestions?*

*A.* Yes, indeed, there have been suggestions—

and they are nothing new. You all remember the period immediately after the war, in December, 1973. Only a month had passed since the ending of the war. All you hear today about the second disengagement agreement, completed five days ago, was said in December 1973, but in worse form. The Syrian foreign minister had come to see Emir Sabah and gone on to Saudi Arabia. I was astonished one day when Minister Abd al-Aziz Husayn came with a message from Emir Sabah, and the late Umar Saqqaf also came with a message from King Faisal. The messages relayed what Syria had told them. Note that this was in December, 1973, and Syria had told them that Egypt had left the battle. All that you hear today has been said before: in January 1974, 1975, 1976. Emir Sabah was truly shocked as was the late King Faisal, and so they sent me their foreign ministers. They had been told that Egypt had left the battle and had reached an agreement with the USA, and that Egypt was going off to Geneva on December 21 to announce the details of the agreement. The agreement, they were told, had been concluded and Egypt had left the battlefield. Other things were said which I cannot possibly mention because no decent man can possibly mention them. The two ministers came to me in a state of fright. I gave my answer to both King Faisal and Emir Sabah. Then I think we went to Geneva on December 21. I did nothing. As they said, we went out to announce the agreement. January came and the first disengagement agreement was made.<sup>46</sup> They repeated the same manoeuvre. Six months later, they had their own disengagement agreement.<sup>47</sup> Very well. Then we went on to the second disengagement agreement. And so it went on. Endless attempts have been made but we paid no attention.

The extent of Egypt's commitment to the Arab cause has a history behind it which you can follow. Egypt has a commitment; Egypt has a special status among its nation. It is very careful about its national responsibilities. As for the cause of Palestine, I hope you followed my last trip to the USA and my speech at the United Nations, where I presented a resolution passed by 101 votes to the effect that Palestine should attend all meetings that are related to the Middle East problem. I specifically had Geneva in mind. At the joint

<sup>45</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), March 1, 1976, p. 3. The agreement is doc. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>46</sup> Doc. 50 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

<sup>47</sup> Doc. 115 in *ibid*.

session of Congress,<sup>48</sup> I again explained the Palestine problem, in accordance with the dictates of Egypt's national duty. I do not think anyone else could have made the same presentation in the press conferences and meetings there. I hope you follow the news so that you would come to know what we are doing by way of fulfilling national responsibilities for the sake of Palestine.

*Q. Mr. President, you have declared your position as regards attending the Geneva conference and the Palestinians. Syria and Jordan, however, have announced that they will not attend, as did the PLO. Why this divergence of policies? And in case Syria, Jordan and the PLO do not attend, what position will Egypt adopt?*

*A.* A divergence of policies is unfortunately present. But, as I said, differences so far have been tactical not strategic. The basic strategy was laid down at the Rabat summit. That is that not a single inch of territory will be surrendered nor will there be any compromises regarding the rights of the Palestinians. Some people like to adopt certain policies that bring notoriety and attention to themselves. The example I just cited explains what I mean. When in December we stated that we were going to Geneva, we were not afraid of this. This is because it is Israel that is afraid of Geneva, not us. We can say either yes or no. In fact, it is in our interests to go to Geneva and bring Israel to account before the whole world. To gain notoriety, they said no in Syria. When I maintained that we should go to Geneva, they went off to the Gulf states with all that talk that Egypt had left the battle and agreed with the USA. All that you hear nowadays began then. Yes, there are divergent policies. In my UN speech,<sup>49</sup> you remember, I said, let us make 1976 the year of Palestine. Why 1976? Because we all know it is a US presidential election year when, according to tradition, the US president cannot take a decision so as not to bind his successor in any way.

Well, Egypt's policy in this regard is that the momentum must be maintained. We took the initiative from Israel in 1973. We forced it out of their hands and it still is in our hands after the October war. We must constantly push the problem forward. This is Egypt's policy. It does not allow Israel to catch its breath at all. Hence

we maintained that 1976 must be the year of Geneva. Israel will come along and will use the presence of the Palestinians as a pretext to wage a battle. The Palestinians must join the Geneva conference as an equal partner with the other sides.

This is why we called 1976 the year of Palestine before the UN and the whole world. Let us make it so. Then we sit and each side prepares its own draft for a final settlement, because a solution according to the step-by-step diplomacy is now out of the question. Now, the direction must be towards a final and comprehensive solution which guarantees peace.

A solution without the Palestinians is impossible, because the core of the problem is Palestine, not the Golan or the Sinai. This is why I stated that 1976 must be the year of Palestine where we prepare for a final settlement.

Once the US elections are over, we begin. Why wait for the US elections? Because I have already stated that the US plays a major role in solving this problem. If we ignore this fact, we would be kidding our own people and ourselves.

This was confirmed recently. At a most difficult time for the US president with problems inside the US because of Vietnam, the Watergate scandal and the conflict between the executive and Congress and despite all this, he was able to conclude a second disengagement agreement. Even now, he is prepared to arrange a second agreement on the Syrian front also. However, some people like to adopt policies that bring them notoriety. We have no objections if they want fame. But we are always concerned for the substance of our cause and we are not prepared to engage in any blackmail or bargaining.

*Q. Your Excellency has stated that 99% of the cards in the game are held by the USA. I believe that the picture has become clearer now. But you just stated that the USA plays a major role. A major role is a different thing from card games. Has this changed in any way or is it still the same?*

*A.* No, they have not changed at all. Perhaps I use different expressions but I still maintain that 99% of the cards in this game are held by the USA. That is correct. It is because the US is the party that supplies Israel with bread and butter as well as the gun and the Phantom aircraft. It is the only party that has any effect. So long as Israel enjoys American support, it does not

<sup>48</sup> Doc. 322 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>49</sup> See doc. 319 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

pay any heed to the UN, the Security Council or any other power in the world. But if the US were to adopt a certain stand, as was recently taken by the US president and as happened with the second disengagement agreement, Israel has to comply. This does not mean that we have no role. It is after all our problem. At the same time we must not delude ourselves. If we who are most directly concerned are not ready to shoulder our responsibilities, neither the US nor anyone else can do a thing for us, provided we are ready. We are of course the basis.

*Q. Observers talk about a new war next May. What will be the fate of the Sinai agreement if a war breaks out between some Arab states and Israel?*

*A.* Whether a war breaks out next May or not is a matter that concerns those who repeat this statement. What I want to say is this: Despite the frequent and ludicrous posturings which have been taking place since December 1973 until the present and despite the fact that they claim that Egypt made a secret agreement, despite all this, we are still standing fast and have not abandoned the battlefield. We did in fact conclude three secret agreements. When I sent off my vice president, he came to see you here, went off to Syria and also visited all the Arab countries. He showed you the three secret agreements. The lady is asking what they are? Well, the first is an American guarantee that Israel would not attack Syria. The second is an American undertaking to carry out a second disengagement agreement, along the lines of the first one, on the Syrian front and following the second agreement on the Egyptian front. The third is an American undertaking to do all it can to enable the Palestinians to participate in any settlement. There you are: these are the secret undertakings I obtained. I did not announce them then, even though I could have won cheap popularity if I had done so, and as some are doing today. We, however, are people who respect our own as well as other people's intellects. We keep such things secret and pursue our own path. The time has now come for me to make them public to you.

As for the question of war, it is one of two things. As I said, I have an American undertaking to prevent an Israeli attack on Syria. If Syria wants to aggravate the situation as it did in the war of attrition in 1974, let us then ask what did

the war of attrition accomplish? The ceasefire line I had told President Hafiz Asad about, I later obtained for him. It is the original line plus Quneitra. This is all that the war achieved. It was a needless war.

If the object however is to outbid each other and get our people involved and try to accomplish feats of heroism, that is another story. But if Israel attacks, this would violate the American undertaking and therefore the agreement itself. If it is a question of illusory heroism or bombastic heroics of the type we hear of today, then let the people concerned face the responsibility. As for their so-called war of attrition in 1974, they went ahead and concluded a disengagement agreement where they obtained exactly what I had told Hafiz Asad would be obtained. Boumedienne was a witness. They lost four positions in Mount Hermon as a result of the war of attrition. They recovered them, we had them recovered for him, in the first disengagement agreement.

We have a nationalistic commitment. Egypt is always committed, but does not shout or scream about this. It does not clown. If they want to aggravate the situation, let each person face his responsibilities.

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**Memorandum submitted by the PLO to the Arab League explaining its opposition to King Hussein's recall of the Chamber of Deputies of Jordan (excerpt)<sup>50</sup>**

**March 1, 1976**

In the first week of February the Jordanian government recalled the former members to the Jordanian Chamber of Deputies, which it had dissolved after the 1974 Rabat summit conference. Included among them were thirty former members from the West Bank. A session of the Chamber was held in which the powers that had been suppressed more than a year before were restored to parliament.

<sup>50</sup> *Al-Safir* (Beirut), March 2, 1976; partial English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), V, 3-4 (Spring-Summer 1976), pp. 259-260.



This restored to the parliament its role and was intended as a first step towards evading the resolutions of the Rabat summit, which recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people and which committed the Arab states to supporting the PLO in the exercise of its responsibilities at the national and international levels.

The [Jordanian] step has been taken at a time when all efforts are being concentrated on stopping the bloodshed in Lebanon and it follows on the American veto in the recent Security Council meetings devoted to the discussion of the Palestine problem, in the presence of their legitimate representatives.

This step is furthermore the culmination of a series of numerous other deviations on the part of the Jordanian government, including its failure to meet its commitments in conformity with the articles of the Rabat summit resolutions. The most important of these is Article 3 which states that the PLO is to be helped to meet its national and international responsibilities, meaning that it is to be assisted to maintain the atmosphere, circumstances and resources required for it to step up its armed struggle from Jordanian territory.

Moreover, the Jordanian government has, under a variety of pretexts, evaded holding the quadripartite meetings provided for by Article 4 of the Rabat summit resolutions, which were to have devised a formula for relations between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic and the Palestine Liberation Organization. The last of these meetings was held in Cairo in 1974. This means that a year and a half after the Rabat summit, the Jordanian authorities have still not implemented a single one of the agreed articles related to the Palestine problem. Without mentioning countermeasures can we not ask if Arab support for Jordan was not conditioned on her abiding by these resolutions?

All these moves, together with the illogical manner in which Jordan justifies her recall of the former Chamber of Deputies, and the accompanying measures which are part and parcel of current international moves in connection with the problem, are extremely questionable. They are a serious blow to Arab unanimity and to the cause itself. They call for a responsible Arab move to put things to rights and to prevent further

attempts to miscarry unanimous Arab decisions.

In calling attention to these improper actions, the Palestine Liberation Organization requests the Secretary-General of the Arab League to make its attitude known to the other Arab countries, to take appropriate measures on these moves as rapidly as possible, and to ensure that the articles of the Rabat resolutions be immediately and effectively enforced so as to protect the higher national interests of the Palestinian cause, the Palestinian people and the Arab nation. . .

## 210

### **Speech to the Twenty-Fifth Congress of the CPSU by PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi (excerpt)<sup>51</sup>**

**Moscow, March 1, 1976**

. . . . .

Our people and the Arab nation will always appreciate your support for our struggle, an example of which was the attitude you adopted during the October war of liberation when Soviet arms played an effective role in ensuring the Arab victory, and in bringing about the military successes and the political victories achieved by the PLO in the international field. They will moreover continue to struggle to strengthen Arab-Soviet friendship and to resist all the smear campaigns directed against that friendship.

Here it must be recalled that the forces of Zionism and world imperialism, alarmed by Arab solidarity and the cohesion in struggle between the Arab peoples and the peoples of the socialist camp, and in particular the people of the great USSR, have launched ferocious attacks in an attempt to make this cohesion ineffective. American imperialism has stepped up its conspiratorial activities in the area, in the form of Kissinger's step-by-step policy, one of the most important links in which was the recent Sinai agreement. Another link, intended to complement it, lies in the current moves of the reactionary Hashemite regime in Jordan in its desperate attempts to bypass the resolutions of the Rabat summit, which were an embodiment of Arab solidarity which

<sup>51</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), March 2, 1976, p. 2.

accepted the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

These achievements realized by our people through their unrelenting struggle, which have been enshrined in this resolution of the Rabat summit, have given our struggle an added impetus that is proving effective at more than one level. This has been manifested in the extensive mass support for the Palestine Liberation Organization from all sectors of our people, as has been shown by the violent demonstrations of our people in the occupied homeland in the last few months, in assertion of their support for their sole legitimate representative. There has also been an escalation of the heroic struggles of our people in the interior, led by the Palestine National Front, the strong right arm of the Palestine Liberation Organization inside the occupied territory.

Our people, who have confronted all conspiracies with inflexible determination, and resisted all moves against them and attacks on them with the greatest heroism, will continue in their just struggle, as they have courageously taken a stand against the Sinai agreement because of its grave danger to the advance of the Arab peoples, to Arab cooperation and to the united Arab stand. Just as they have stubbornly resisted the step-by-step policy and all the American initiatives aimed at entrenching Israeli occupation and imposing an American solution on the area, they will continue their stubborn resistance to all these Zionist and imperialist conspiracies. They will not hesitate to use all available weapons, military, political and economic, for the confrontation of every suspect move. They therefore highly appreciate the continuing efforts made by the friendly USSR towards a just peace in the Middle East area and the initiatives it takes from time to time with the object of creating an atmosphere favourable to a just and permanent solution that will safeguard the established rights of the Palestinian people.

**Memorandum from the Foreign Ministry of Egypt to the prime minister explaining the necessity of terminating the friendship treaty with the USSR<sup>52</sup>**

**Cairo, early March, 1976**

Since the bridges of cooperation between Egypt and the USSR were built, Egypt has made a point of strengthening and promoting this cooperation in the interests of the two countries and peoples, and in the interests of the battle of liberation we are fighting, along with the whole Arab nation. The bases of this link were the principles accepted by the international community for the regulation of relations between nations and peoples in such a way as to avoid exploitation, domination or control of one party by the other. To consolidate this policy, the two countries were in agreement in wishing to regularize the relations between them in a document defining their main lines and the mutual rights and obligations of both parties; and on May 27, 1971 the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the two countries was signed in Cairo.

Reference to the text of the Treaty, and also to the discussions that took place before it was signed, clearly shows that it rests on fundamental bases which may be called governing principles; they are the essential points that give the document its meaning and constitute its *raison d'être*. The first of these basic principles, as we know, is that dealings between the two parties in all fields should be governed by the principles of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, and equality of rights and mutual benefit. It was thus natural that the text should give prominence to these principles, which are the very essence of the Treaty, and that they should be set out in its Article 1. In this way it was accepted that the independence of any state and its right to manage its internal affairs without any outside interference from any source whatsoever is the cornerstone of its very existence, and something that no government can relinquish or detract from in any way.

Moreover, the essential aim of the Treaty was

<sup>52</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), March 16, 1976. The treaty is doc. 125 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

the strengthening of the defensive capacity of the Arab Republic of Egypt by all ways and means, through the USSR both supplying it with arms and equipment and by assisting it to increase the combat capacity of its armed forces to enable it to eliminate the consequences of aggression and to resist any aggression against it in general. This is enshrined in Article 8 of the Treaty, which reads as follows:

In the interests of strengthening the defence capacity of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the High Contracting Parties will continue to develop cooperation in the military sphere on the basis of appropriate agreements between them. Such cooperation will provide specifically for assistance in training Egyptian military personnel in mastering the armaments and equipment supplied to the Arab Republic of Egypt, with a view to strengthening its capacity to eliminate the consequences of aggression as well as increasing its ability to resist aggression in general.

There is no need to draw attention to the importance of this text or to stress how absolutely fundamental it is as far as both the Treaty and our desire to conclude it are concerned. It will be sufficient to cite excerpts from the report of the Foreign Relations Committee of the National Assembly of June 9, 1971, in which the Committee recommended that the Treaty be ratified. This report contains the following passage:

The battle is the basis and the foundation of this Treaty and the sole motive for every step we take in the present and towards the future, with a view to delivering Egyptians from the effects of backwardness, occupation and all forms of dependence.

Egypt for her part has been loyal to her commitments under the Treaty and has made every effort to strengthen and diversify the links between the two parties, as can be seen in the many agreements and protocols signed by the two parties after the conclusion of the Treaty and the various forms of activity they cover. It is sufficient to recall that the year in which the Treaty was signed witnessed the conclusion of six agreements between the two countries, covering cooperation between them in the fields of commerce, economics, science, technology and information. Last year, too, witnessed the signing of ten agreements and protocols covering most aspects of dealings and exchanges between the two countries. It is also sufficient to draw attention to the number of

visits made by the Egyptian ministers and officials to the USSR, and to the letters exchanged at all levels during that period.

In spite of this unswerving attitude on our part, the Soviet government adopted attitudes that gravely infringed both the letter and the spirit of this Treaty, especially the essential and dominant clauses on which the very existence of the Treaty depends. What was even more serious was that the adoption of these attitudes was clearly the result of political decisions taken by the Soviet leadership, and not merely a different procedural method.

We have recently observed a new phenomenon on the part of the Soviet authorities, which amounts to a withdrawal on their part from Article 1 of the Treaty. By this I mean that the Soviets have been meddling, directly or indirectly, in matters that are unmistakably the internal affairs of the Egyptian people. The most recent example of this procedure was what Comrade Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, said in his report of the 25th Conference on February 24, 1976 about "attempts to sabotage the social and political achievements of the Egyptian revolution."<sup>53</sup> Not satisfied with touching on these questions, which are Egypt's internal affairs, the Soviet leader went so far as to pursue the line of spreading fallacious ideas about the "strong pressure exerted by internal and external reaction."

Nor is this all. Regrettably, this distorted policy has been echoed in the correspondence that the Soviet leaders have recently addressed to the Egyptian leadership. This shows to what extent the Soviets are disregarding and failing to bear in mind the obligation that falls on both parties under Article 1 of the Treaty, by permitting themselves to meddle in Egypt's internal affairs in this way. This is something Egypt has never allowed herself to do under any circumstances. Indeed, she has not hesitated to stand resolutely by the USSR, at all sorts of international gatherings, against the tendentious campaigns aimed at meddling in the USSR's own internal affairs.

The Soviet leaders fail to realize that if they genuinely want to help Egypt to protect her revolutionary gains in accordance with Article 2 of the Treaty, the effective way to do so is not for Soviet

<sup>53</sup> See doc. 57 above.

authorities to beat about these gains or to shed crocodile tears over them, but to follow the course laid down in the Treaty, by strengthening Egypt's capacity to defend her people and her soil, to protect all that is most sacred to her and to support the Palestine revolution, which is one of the mainstays of Arab national action at the present juncture. For unless the land is recovered and unless the safety of the region and the honour of the masses are protected, the revolutionary gains can never be completed or entrenched as long as the security of the people and the strategic military security of the whole homeland are threatened.

It is no secret that the USSR's attitude to the question of strengthening Egypt's defensive capacity left much to be desired throughout the period following the 1967 war, when it was clear that Egypt and the whole Arab nation needed arms and equipment in sufficient quantities and of the right kind to enable their armed forces to repel aggression or eliminate its consequences, the most obvious of which is the occupation of parts of the beloved territory of Egypt, Syria and Palestine. The late President Gamal Abdal Nasser was distressed by this attitude and tried to bring the Soviet leaders to realize the gravity of their conduct and how essential it was that they should not be remiss in meeting our requests in the field of defence, as being a matter of destiny that is of vital importance to both the present and the future of the Arab nation.

The Soviet attitude in this regard has fluctuated between downright refusal and hesitation, despite the signing of the Treaty and despite the flood of arms that has flowed into Israel to an extent even greater than her requirements, at a time when she is occupying Arab land. Then, after the ceasefire in the last week of October 1973, in the light of a joint initiative in which the USSR took part, it became clear that the Soviets were not abiding by their commitments under Article 8 of the Treaty. For since then not only has the USSR failed to replace our losses in arms and equipment and to agree to new arms deals; it has actually withheld spare parts from Egypt and refused to undertake the repairs and overhauls required by our planes. Indeed, from their desire to blockade Egypt the Soviets have gone so far as to refuse to allow India, a friendly nonaligned country, to perform this task, in spite of the fact that the Indian government informed us that it

was ready to help us, as it was well able to do. Since then the Soviet authorities have persistently ignored successive requests and not even replied to or discussed them.

It was clear that the USSR, to the amazement and regret of Egypt, intended to deprive Egypt of the most important constituents of her strength and to leave our armed forces defenceless in the face of an enemy who continues to pile up arms in excess of his capacity and his requirements.

Egypt has explored every avenue in her attempts to consult with the USSR and to warn its leaders against this attitude of theirs and the disastrous consequences it is bound to lead to, but it is clear that it was not a matter of misunderstanding or a difference that could be resolved and surmounted through give and take, but a question of a firm political decision taken by the Soviet leaders for reasons which we neither know nor understand, although this is a patent violation of Article 8 of the Treaty and is incompatible with the essential spirit of the Treaty.

In the light of the above it is now certain that the USSR does not want the Treaty to be effective and is deliberately refusing to make it an actual fact that is embodied in the dealings of the two countries with each other and that effectively contributes to strengthening cooperation between the two countries and peoples. At best the Treaty has become a meaningless slogan, whereas honesty and loyalty to the masses of the Egyptian people, not to mention our affection for the Soviet people, require that the slogans employed should be consistent with the facts. Hence, there is now no alternative to considering the termination of the Treaty, with a view to remedying this state of affairs.

If it is now essential to take this measure so that the two peoples may not be deceived by the existence of a Treaty that the Soviet attitude has rendered meaningless, our recognition of this fact and our determination to set things within a proper framework derives from our concern for the future long-term relations between the two countries. It is more honourable for the Soviet and Egyptian peoples that they should apply themselves, sincerely and with good intentions, to changing this situation. Egypt will always be ready to respond to any move towards launching the relations between the two countries on a course towards a horizon that is in accord with their

common interest and mutual advantage. In this way the cooperation between the two countries will continue to be governed by the general principles that regulate the rights and obligations of states in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the general principles of international law.

The foreign ministry has the honour to raise the subject, requesting that it may be submitted to the president of the republic, in the hope that he may agree to terminate the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation concluded between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the USSR in Cairo on May 27, 1971.

## 212

### Television interview statements by President Asad of Syria explaining the status of Jews in Syria<sup>54</sup>

Damascus, early March, 1976

*President Hafez el Assad* [through translator]: It is true that the Syrian constitution has guaranteed freedom for all citizens, and has given equal rights and duties for all. But the Syrian Jews are not allowed to leave Syria, as this probably involves immigration to Israel. We say that we may allow them to emigrate to the United States if there is a guarantee from the United States that they would not leave the United States for Israel. How could anyone imagine that we can supply Israel with human resources while we are in a state of war?

*Wallace*: Do you worry about the loyalty of your Jewish citizens here?

*President Assad* [through translator]: No. I think that the Syrian Jews love their country, and they are satisfied with their way of life. The instructions to our ministers is to treat Jews like all other Syrian citizens. If there are individual cases, they will be treated as would similar cases of non-Jews. But this does not change the general rule, which is: Jews are citizens of this country.

<sup>54</sup> Interview conducted by Mike Wallace and broadcast on CBS's "Sixty Minutes" on March 21, 1976; transcript supplied, on request, by CBS. Copyright © 1976 by Columbia Broadcasting System. All rights reserved.

*Wallace*: You invite Jewish former Syrians to come back and visit their families, or American Jews to come here, go to the Jewish Quarter, be with their friends, relatives, perfect safety, and no reprisals against Syrian Jews who may have either emigrated in the old days or escaped recently?

*President Assad* [through translator]: We welcome them any time, and they will be in complete safety.

*Wallace*: And can go and visit in—

*President Assad* [through translator]: Any time, anywhere.

## 213

### Announcement by the faculty and students of Bethlehem University of a three-day suspension of classes in protest against the Israel occupation authorities' measures<sup>55</sup>

Bethlehem, March 11, 1976

The Faculty with the Students of Bethlehem University announces the suspension of classes for three days, on Thursday, Friday and Saturday, March 11th, 12th and 13th as a protest, with the support of the Administration against

1. The intrusion of the military into academic precincts
2. The attacking of students
3. The destruction of property.

This protest is a statement of solidarity with the members of Bir Zeit University and other educational institutions of the West Bank.

We would appreciate publication of this protest in your respective countries.

<sup>55</sup> English text, Groupe d'étude sur le Moyen-Orient, *Bulletin d'Information* (Geneva), no. 69 (March 30, 1976), p. 1.

## 214

**Communiqué no. 1 issued by Brigadier Ahdab, Commander of the Beirut Military Region, announcing his temporary assumption of the post of military governor of Lebanon<sup>56</sup>**

**Beirut, March 11, 1976**

For the sake of saving army unity, restoring harmony among military personnel and rescuing the country from deterioration, and since my continual warnings have had no effect, wishing to preserve Lebanon's higher interests and to restore harmony to the noble people of Lebanon, and inspired by my own conscience and my military tradition, and faithful to my responsibility before God and history, I decree the following:

1. I demand that the Lebanese government present its resignation within 24 hours. Otherwise, it will be considered as having resigned.

2. I demand that H.E. the President of the Lebanese Republic, for the sake of preserving national unity, follow the example set by his predecessor Shaykh Bishara Khuri and present his resignation from the presidency. Otherwise he will be considered as having resigned.

3. I ask all civilian and military sectors to support my reform movement and request them to maintain peace and quiet, for which they will be held responsible.

4. I declare a state of emergency throughout the country and declare a curfew in the Beirut region until further notice.

5. I call upon parliament to meet within seven days of this communiqué in order to elect a new president.

6. I call upon H.E. the new president to form a new government as soon as he is elected.

7. I call upon all directors-general to carry out their normal duties in their respective ministries.

8. I demand that all the armed forces fire at once at anyone who carries out acts of disorder or robbing; for this they will be held responsible.

9. I support the message of the army commander addressed to the army on March 10, 1976.

10. I support with all my power the fraternal

<sup>56</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), March 12, 1976.

Syrian initiative aimed at rescuing the country from its catastrophic crisis in which the various combatants are enmeshed.

11. I declare my commitment to previous agreements concluded between the Lebanese authorities and our Palestinian brothers.<sup>57</sup>

12. I declare that the army will undertake to protect President Franjieh for life.

13. I declare as of now that I am not ambitious for power and that I do not believe in military government except as a means of saving a collapsing regime. Therefore, I have decided to maintain my normal post as commander of the Beirut region and shall hand over power to its rightful owners as soon as a new president is elected. God is my witness. He is the best of helpers.

## 215

**Statements by President Sadat of Egypt announcing his intention of cancelling the friendship treaty with the USSR<sup>58</sup>**

**Cairo, March 14, 1976**

. . . . .

There is a difference between the situation before and after the battle. What did Kissinger say before the battle, and what did he do after it!

Of course I know that the greatest weapon used against me by my enemy for a quarter of a century was America's alignment with him, America's total alignment with Israel. This is the most dangerous weapon that Israel has used against us. But at that time America thought that Israel was invincible. However, after we had fought the war in which we smashed America's conviction that Israel was invincible, the party that was totally aligned with Israel, meaning America, came looking to us. Was I to turn it down? In whose interests? In the interests of my country, or otherwise? Was our hostility to America an article of faith that we had embraced? Or was it an unavoidable political necessity? And who changed this hostility, which reached its height

<sup>57</sup> See note to doc. 195 above.

<sup>58</sup> Made in a speech to the National Assembly; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), March 15, 1976. The treaty is doc. 125 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

when they cut off the wheat supplies, and all their lines to us? What changed America's attitude?

What changed America's attitude? Not pleading or honeyed words. What changed it was the proof given by the Arab people that they were ready to shed their blood and to raise their banners, to use oil, and to throw all they had into the battle if the battle was inevitable.

. . . . .

The important thing that I have come here to tell you is that we have reached the stage where for the last two years and more the Soviets have refused to supply me with arms. They have refused to reschedule the debts at a time when my economic situation is, as I have told you, a situation in which we are asking help from the Arab nation and from a consortium outside, from America, Japan, West Germany, France and all countries, and in fact they are all going along with us and responding to our requests.

The USSR has refused to reschedule the debts, and, what is worse, they are asking for the interest on the military debts. But they haven't paid America their own military debts granted in the Second World War. Military debts are not usually paid, because after a war reconstruction begins so that military debts are usually waived, or two thirds of them are waived, leaving only a symbolic sum to be paid.

I shall never forget how on December 23, 1973, they wrote to tell me that the Arab Republic of Egypt was late in paying the sum of 22.1 million roubles due from Egypt in April. This was the interest on the loans granted for the arms deals. They wanted not only the price of the arms but the interest on it. I am going to leave the correspondence with the Speaker of the Assembly, so that you can see what was said—I will leave it with the Speaker for you to see. This correspondence made it clear to me that the USSR is playing cat and mouse with me. In a year or a year and a half at the most, all the arms I have in Egypt are going to be scrap, because there are no spare parts—they are refusing to overhaul the planes, they are refusing to supply spare parts, they are refusing everything.

But then there is the most serious thing that ever happened which not only disturbed me, it pained me greatly. They made an agreement

allowing India to manufacture MiG-21s; that was ten years ago, and India has the MiG-21 and manufactures the engines and overhauls them and has spare parts. So I wrote to India saying that the USSR had stopped facilities for two years. The USSR had said that I could not get overhauls done there, they had no overhaul facilities for me. This meant that the planes whose engines could not be overhauled would have to be thrown away, withdrawn from my forces, so that there were dozens of engines and dozens of planes that were scrap. So I wrote to India, saying: Look, you have the MiG-21, give me spare parts and do overhauls for me. They replied that they would have to ask the USSR's permission. This took four months, and after four months India gave me her answer—it came during the last ten days—to the effect that we are sorry, but the USSR's answer was: No, don't give Egypt anything, not overhaul facilities or spare parts.

So it is clear that the operation is a blockade, economic pressure on me and military pressure on me—economic pressure because they can see my economic situation, and military pressure because in a year or a year and a half at the most my arms will all be scrap—unless I go down on bended knees to them, but I won't go down on bended knees to anyone but God.

What has been going on between us you will be able to see from the correspondence. They always try to make an excuse about the treaty. But if this is the way they honour the treaty and its provisions that I have told you about, if the Soviet leaders think that they can implement the treaty when they want to and not implement it when they don't, on the basis that they are the stronger party, the treaty becomes just a scrap of paper. I therefore submit to this honourable Assembly, which endorsed the treaty, the following draft law, so that it may express its view on it:

The President of the Republic,

Cognizant of the Constitution and of Republican Decision no. 884 of 1971, and with the approval of the National Assembly, resolves:

Article I—To terminate the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation concluded between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the USSR and signed in Cairo on May 27.

Article II—This decision shall be in force as from its date of promulgation.

. . . . .

## 216

**Decision of the government of Egypt to terminate the Egypt-USSR Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation<sup>59</sup>****Cairo, March 14, 1976**

The President of the Republic,  
Cognizant of the Constitution,  
And cognizant of Republican Decision no.  
884 of 1971,  
And with the approval of the National Assembly  
Has decided

**Article I**

To terminate the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation concluded between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and signed in Cairo on May 27, 1971.

**Article II**

This decision shall come into force as from its date of promulgation.

Issued by the Presidency of the Republic on Rabi I 13 1396 (March 14, 1976).

## 217

**Press interview statements by President Asad of Syria reviewing Syria's attitude to the crisis in Lebanon and considering the balance of forces in the Middle East<sup>60</sup>****Damascus, mid-March, 1976**

*Q. Mr. President, why did you choose France for your first visit to the western world?*

*A.* The cordial relations that exist between our two countries are not a secret to anyone. It is no longer a secret that France has been the first western European country to understand our just cause well.

General de Gaulle opened the way. He had to confront the anti-Arab camp directly. Without

of course minimizing the role of his successors, we cannot ignore the importance of his contribution. In doing so, he revealed the breadth of his vision of the French people's interests and the role that it can play.

*Q. Do you envision buying arms from France?*

*A.* Nothing prevents us from buying them if we find it necessary. The cooperative horizons between our two countries must be completely open. But we did not take a definite decision on this subject on the occasion of my visit to Paris. In any case, the cooperation between our two countries is excellent and it may in the future be extended to this realm.

*Q. How do you regard the French position on the Palestine problem?*

*A.* I would like to express my satisfaction with the position taken by France on the Middle East, including the Palestine problem. It is an exemplary position for all of Europe.

*Q. And on Lebanon?*

*A.* Syria and France have coordinated their views throughout the development of the Lebanese crisis and they have cooperated in a good and useful manner. Our friends in France were anxious, as we were, to see the fighting stop and to see Lebanon come out of this trial safe and sound. The attitude of your country has been extremely positive both in the form of Mr. Couve de Murville's mission and in the direct contacts with the Lebanese authorities. France has always kept us informed of these contacts. The contribution of the Vatican has also been very positive. We ourselves began our efforts to help our Lebanese brothers from the very first day. The crisis was due to factors on two levels:

1. External intervention aimed at facilitating the application of the Egyptian-Israeli Sinai agreement and at alleviating pressure that might have been put on Cairo to dissuade it from concluding it.

2. Internal factors in Lebanon, that is to say, the divisions and defects of Lebanese society which arose above all from political and social considerations.

We had to pursue our efforts for a long time with the aim of reaching a solution acceptable to all the parties and covering all aspects of the Lebanese crisis. Thanks to the cooperation of all,

<sup>59</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), March 14, 1976. The treaty is doc. 125 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

<sup>60</sup> Excerpted and translated from the French text of the interview conducted by André Fontaine, *Le Monde* (Paris), March 16, 1976, p. 21.



we have been able to put in effect the formula proposed by the President of the Lebanese Republic. We are currently working with all the parties to apply what they ratified and ease the after-effects of the crisis.

*Q. French opinion is preoccupied, as one can understand, with the future of the Christians in Lebanon. How do you see it?*

A. We do not have the feeling that France sees the problem of Lebanon in a confessional light. Neither in Lebanon nor in France, nor elsewhere do religious problems any longer constitute the basis of human relations nor of the definition of governmental policy. The events in Lebanon prove that one cannot consider this country in a confessional light. I look at it in the light of Arab considerations. Lebanon is an Arab country like Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia or any other. The future of the Christians in Lebanon is the future of all Arabs.

We have a common past and a common future. Of course, in this region, it is necessary to construct our life far from any religious fanaticism, especially as our countries are the cradle of Christianity and Islam. The Muslim Arab is a brother to the Christian Arab. When, in Syria, we helped our Lebanese brothers, we experienced a feeling of duty towards one another, without taking into consideration their religion. We are as enthusiastic for Christianity as for Islam.

*Q. There is an obvious connection between the expanding relations of the forces in the region and that of the search for a solution. Does the neutralization of the Egyptian army by the Sinai agreement<sup>61</sup> not noticeably weaken your position?*

A. You yourself just answered the question that you were asking me earlier as to why we were criticizing this accord. In reality our concern must be to change the balance of forces. One must not necessarily think, however, that Israel is stronger than the Arabs, even if the Egyptians are temporarily withdrawn from the front line.

*Q. You said just now that an imposed peace does not deserve to be called peace. Would you term peace, one that is forcibly imposed on Israel?*

A. The Israelis are the aggressors, and for this

reason peace which will put an end to aggression must be imposed on them. Dissuasive measures will be necessary. If Israel wants peace it should not feel the need to occupy the territory of others.

*Q. If the state of Israel were to accept to withdraw to her 1967 borders, would the Arab states be able to make peace with her and recognize her existence?*

A. There are two conditions to peace: withdrawal from the occupied territories and recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people.

*Q. What does this recognition imply? The creation of a Palestinian state?*

A. It is up to the PLO to express itself in this regard, since it is the sole representative of the Palestinian people. But I can say we find a guide to these rights in the resolutions of the United Nations. Whoever adheres to these United Nations resolutions shows that he is moderate and just in his aspirations because these resolutions reflect world opinion. There exists no better avenue to justice.

*Q. What will you do about the expiration of the UN Mandate in the Golan next May?*

A. We are discussing it; we haven't yet taken a decision.

*Q. In the past few weeks King Khalid of Saudi Arabia was received in Damascus. You made a visit to Tehran to meet the Shah of Iran. You concluded a federation agreement with King Hussein covering a number of areas. The heads of these three regimes are not among the most progressive in the region. How do you justify your relations with them?*

A. In Syria and in the Arab world, we believe in Arab unity, we struggle for Arab unity with tenacity and with all our means. All that we can do for Arab unity is positive, including the most modest means. The unity that we want to achieve is aimed at increasing our capability to defend our rights and our liberty. In the face of the Israeli danger, the quest for unity must have absolute priority.

<sup>61</sup> Doc. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

## 218

**Statement issued by the Sa'iqah General Command explaining its role in the Lebanese crisis<sup>62</sup>****March 25, 1976**

Certain quarters are trying to carry out a deliberate campaign of distortion in explaining the attitude of our organization to the current developments in Lebanon. To refute this campaign by these quarters and the deliberate deception, which is based on opportunist motives, the General Command of the Sa'iqah forces would like to explain the following facts:

(1) In defining its attitude to the developments taking place in the Lebanese arena, Sa'iqah cannot overlook the fact that it is a Palestinian group belonging to the PLO. Therefore, since the beginning, Sa'iqah's armed struggle against the isolationist forces has been aimed at defending the Palestine Resistance and the camps of our Palestinian people and masses in Lebanon. Sa'iqah adheres to the PLO's principled position in rejecting attempts aimed at dragging the PLO and its groups into any involvement in the domestic political struggle over power in Lebanon. It condemns the suspect motives of the quarters which are trying to drag the Resistance into involvement in Lebanon's domestic struggle.

(2) Proceeding from an Arab and Palestinian position, Sa'iqah opposes any attempt to partition Lebanon, regardless of the source of this attempt. Sa'iqah equally opposes every (?argument) aimed at escalating the bloody fratricide in Lebanon without any real justification and with its consequences in terms of tragedies and destruction for our Palestinian Arab people and the Lebanese Arab people. Sa'iqah believes that when it is possible to achieve a certain goal without resorting to fratricide and the loss of hundreds and thousands of victims, then resort to fighting, particularly in the current circumstances, which are engulfing the general political situation, becomes an act of conspiracy against the life and future of Lebanon and the Arab nation.

(3) Everyone knows Sa'iqah's role in fighting alongside the Palestine Liberation Army and the

honest nationalist Lebanese and Palestinian forces, particularly in January, in response to the massacres committed at Dubayyah, Karantina and Maslakh. This contributed to putting an end to these massacres and to the success of the Syrian initiative to stop the fratricide and save Lebanon from acts of dissension. Sa'iqah would like to ask: where were the advocates of fratricide when these battles were going on? And why did they stand by as spectators then? Were the battles of the last nine months unworthy of their efforts, while the battle for the Presidency of the Republic deserves such action?

(6) A malicious voice has been raised calling for the expulsion of the Sa'iqah from the PLO. Enemy radios have reiterated this call, and this has exposed the true identity of the one making this call. It is sufficient for us to say in this connection that this voice itself has left the PLO in order to become a plotter against Palestinian national unity. When he calls for expelling Sa'iqah from the PLO, while he is out of it, he is only trying to strike at and dismember the PLO.

All attempts at deception and distortion will be unable to stop our masses from maintaining a clear vision. These masses are asking: If the political solution of all issues in Lebanon has become possible thanks to the Syrian initiative, why, then, should we spill the blood of hundreds and thousands of strugglers? Is it not worthier to spare the lives and blood of our strugglers for our battles with the Zionist enemy as long as we are capable of avoiding continued fratricide in Lebanon?

Long live the Palestine Revolution, long live the nationalist and progressive forces in Lebanon! Victory belongs to the cause of our people.

<sup>62</sup> Broadcast on Damascus radio in Arabic; excerpted from the English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5171/A/1-2; reprinted by permission.

219

### **Speech by King Hussein of Jordan considering current developments<sup>63</sup>**

**Amman, March 27, 1976**

In the Name of God, the Compassionate and the Merciful. Brother compatriots greetings to every one of you, greetings full of love for you and pride in you and confidence and faith in your march. I am pleased to be speaking to you while I am getting ready to start my tour on your behalf and for our sacred cause to which we have dedicated ourselves, in our dear Jordan, for its service and sake.

I returned yesterday from Damascus where I conferred with my dear brother, President Hafiz al-Asad. Naturally, our talks were fully devoted to the conditions in the area in general and, in particular, to the painful ordeal from which our brothers in fraternal Lebanon are still suffering and to the blessed upheaval by our kinsfolk in the valiant West Bank.

Our word, as always, was one—clear and deep. Our position, as always, was one—faithful and dignified. Both of us were satisfied with the progress of our common march and the steps we have made along its blessed path and the new steps which, with God's help, we will make towards our precious sacred goals.

The conditions in the beloved West Bank and the will for freedom and steadfastness manifested by our kinsfolk there will occupy my mind and conscience. If the practices of the occupation in the wounded Bank have triggered off the upheaval by our courageous kinsfolk in the face of the occupation, then Israel's intransigence and arrogance and its continuation in its well-known political moves and its persistence in its designs for the whole region should prompt us towards further movement and action from every angle and in every direction.

The United States bears its share of responsibility towards peace and stability in the area and towards international peace and security. There are many attitudes that should be explained and stressed. There is a great deal of obscurity that should be clarified and removed. There are many facts

that deserve presentation with clarity and courage. I will do all of that there in such a way that attitudes will be defined, the road will become clear and the objectives will be defined.

The greatest help to me in my task will be my confidence that every one of you will remain at the level of responsibility and carry out his duty voluntarily and honestly, removed from all that might harm the safety of the march or pollute the atmosphere of the one family in which we are living with confidence, resolve and hope.

Every Jordanian citizen to me stands at the peak of patriotism and national nobility. None of you needs to prove his patriotism or consecrate his national inclinations by fabricating one act or another. You have a record of sacrifices and heroism with which I boast to the world and take pride among peoples. My heart remains with you while I am leaving you. I know that all of our hearts are with our kinsfolk west of the holy river, living the moments of glory they are creating with their invincible will. Goodbye to each one of you. May God bless our march and steps. May God help us to achieve our goals and realize our aspirations. May God's peace and mercy be upon you.

220

### **Statement issued after a meeting of Maronite leaders of Lebanon calling for a resumption of Syria's initiative towards attaining a ceasefire<sup>64</sup>**

**Bkirki, March 27, 1976**

On Saturday, March 27, 1976, a meeting was held in Bkirki between 11:00 and 12:30 attended by H.E. President Sulayman Franjieh, H.E. Camille Chamoun, Shaykh Pierre Gemayyel and Abbot Sharbil Qassis. The current situation was examined and agreement was reached regarding the necessity of resuming the Syrian initiative, a ceasefire and continued efforts to restore the country to normality.

In case that initiative fails, they agreed that all means necessary to preserve Lebanon's security and sovereignty will be used.

<sup>63</sup> Broadcast on Amman radio in Arabic; English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5171/A/2-3; reprinted by permission.

<sup>64</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), March 28, 1976

## 221

**Press interview statements by President Sadat of Egypt calling for the involvement of western Europe in guaranteeing a Middle East settlement and discussing his forthcoming visit to Europe<sup>65</sup>**

Cairo, late March, 1976

*Q. Mr. President, you have referred to the link between security in the Middle East and European security and proposed that Western Europe should provide guarantees for the solution of the Middle East problem. Could you explain what you mean?*

A. Yes. I certainly think that if you want permanent peace in this area guarantees must be provided for both sides. As regards these guarantees, the two great powers that are co-chairmen of the Geneva conference, the US and the USSR, have always refused to allow any other party to be associated with this. Last year I submitted my proposal first to France then to England; France plays a leading role in this. My proposal is that they should participate in providing guarantees. And I am glad to say that one of the chairmen of the conference, Mr. Brezhnev, said in his speech to his party,<sup>66</sup> that he agreed that France and England should join in providing guarantees. The time has now come for Germany also to join in providing guarantees. This is essentially the responsibility of Western Europe and Germany, because the guilt complex you have suffered from—I am sorry to say this—has caused us suffering here in this area. Therefore, you should share in guaranteeing permanent peace and forget all the past so that we may enjoy peace in this area.

*Q. Should these guarantees be political or military?*

A. Both, political and military. You may have some difficulties as regards the military aspect, but you can participate at the political level.

*Q. Could the military guarantees include participation by NATO or the stationing of NATO forces?*

A. No, we prefer the UN. We should prefer the force that comes under UN control.

<sup>65</sup> Interview granted to *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich); excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), March 30, 1976.

<sup>66</sup> See doc. 57 above.

*Q. Would the force be a European one?*

A. Why not? Whatever sort of force it is, we agree to guarantees being given to both sides.

*Q. Could armaments and arms deals be part of the guarantees?*

A. Yes, if and when Israel is prepared to return to the 1967 frontiers, we shall be prepared to discuss this, but not before Israel withdraws to the 1967 frontiers, and also, not before the Palestinians are given their rights as human beings.

*Q. But before that and until that happens you will have to seek sources of armaments?*

A. Yes, this is quite true, and because part of my territory is occupied and because part of other Arab territories is occupied, you cannot ask us to restrict our armaments or anything like that. But if and when Israel is prepared to return to the 1967 frontiers, we shall be prepared to discuss this.

*Q. In your talks with Chancellor Schmidt and other German politicians will the question of arms be raised?*

A. As I have always said in reply to this question: No comment, I say the same now.

*Q. But Your Excellency is also going to visit Italy and France, both of which are linked to Germany by arms production agreements, and there is nothing to prevent them as is the case with Germany, from sending armaments to areas of tension.*

A. I shall make the greatest efforts. In fact we have arms deals with France, and we have also bought various kinds of equipment from Italy and Britain. There is also a joint British-French project and a joint French-Italian project. There is also certain French equipment. We have in fact made a start with France, but not with Germany, not yet with Germany.

*Q. Will Your Excellency seek cooperation not only in arms deals but also in arms production?*

A. I do not want to comment on anything connected with arms for the simple reason that I do not want to make difficulties for Chancellor Schmidt before I meet with him. I do not want to put him in an embarrassing situation.

*Q. Everyone is anxious that a situation of no peace and no war should not arise again and Your Excellency has indicated that the next step must be the Geneva conference and a comprehensive solution.*

A. When I met President Ford in Salzburg<sup>67</sup> last year we discussed the whole problem and agreed on certain steps, and within the framework of these steps we believe that we should meet in Geneva in 1976. When the American elections are over in November, and by 1977 at the latest, we can start discussing a comprehensive solution, which we can prepare for in 1976. There are obviously difficulties in the way of holding the Geneva conference because the Syrians have their own point of view, but America and the USSR agree with our view. We have absolutely no difference with the Soviets on the question, so that if such difficulties do arise I shall continue to promote the peace operation until I am convinced that there is no chance of the Geneva conference being held. Then I shall reappraise the whole situation, always in the light of promoting the advance towards peace.

*Q. What about Egypt's position in the Arab world? Does she still play a leading role? One gets the impression that Egypt at present does not aspire to playing a leading role among the Arab countries.*

A. That is an exaggeration. I have to inform you that after the October war Egypt started to follow a new course as regards all her problems, a course based on realism and on the assumption that there is a new upsurge in the Arab world, and this is what is happening. The differences between us are not strategic ones at all; Syria and I and all the Arab countries have agreed on a two-point strategy; we agreed on it at the Arab summit conferences. The two points are that we do not relinquish an inch of Arab territory and that we do not accept compromise solutions at the expense of the rights of the Palestinians. We only disagree on tactics, but we are used to that. As regards Egypt, let me tell you frankly that Egypt is playing a leading role at present and she will continue to do so in the future.

222

**Statement issued by the National Command of the Baath Party of Syria on the occasion of the Day of the Land (excerpt)<sup>68</sup>**

**Damascus, March 29, 1976**

Our Arab Palestinian masses stand firm, thereby enshrining the unity of their struggle over the soil of the occupied homeland as well as their absolute rejection of occupation and assimilation within that foreign society that Zionism is attempting to construct on the soil of Palestine. They do so through their courageous rebellion, which grows in strength day by day, abiding by the decision of the Palestinian national movement inside Palestine. That movement had declared March 30 to be the "Day of the Land" inside the occupied homeland, a day upon which a total strike is to be called for and a day when acts of resistance are to be escalated against the occupying enemy. The object is to frustrate the continuing Zionist plot which aims at evicting Palestinian Arabs from their towns and villages in the occupied homeland, from Acre, Shafa Amr, Galilee and the Negev as well as from other territories occupied since 1948, in addition to the desecration of religious sanctuaries, the disfiguration of the city of Jerusalem and the establishment of colonies on the West Bank and Gaza.

This day has special importance in the history of the Palestinian Arab struggle against racist and fascist Zionism. It serves to establish a truth that our Palestinian Arab people have for so long shed their blood and sacrificed themselves. It affirms their continued existence in the face of all imperialist and Zionist attempts at obliterating that existence.

<sup>67</sup> See doc. 112 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>68</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), March 30, 1976.

## 223

**Statement issued by the Executive Committee of the PLO on the occasion of the Day of the Land (excerpt)<sup>69</sup>**

March 29, 1976

The popular uprising of the struggling masses of our people in the occupied West Bank, which has now lasted four months and is thus the longest-lasting popular uprising in the history of the Arab nation, reaffirms the following basic and vital facts in the life of our people, which may be summarized as follows:

1. The Palestinian masses do not merely reject the Zionist presence verbally. They do so by revolutionary action whose depth and scope increases day by day, not only in the West Bank and Gaza but throughout the occupied homeland, including territory occupied since 1948. There, our people are joining their fellow countrymen on the West Bank, having announced a general strike for March 30, 1976, a day which they have called "Day of the Land". This is an expression of their steadfast attachment to the soil of the homeland and an affirmation of their unshakeable steadfastness in the face of one of history's most horrible onslaughts whose object is to liquidate them and to distort their glorious history.

2. Upon examining the details of that popular uprising and its consequences, and having read the declaration of the municipalities in Galilee which declares the 30th of this month to be the day of attachment to the land in the face of Zionist confiscation and expropriation, it becomes clear that there is an obvious and logical link between our people's uprising on the West Bank and the uprising in the territories occupied since 1948. This latter has kept pace with the armed Palestine revolution since its inception. These masses, however, were bound to arise and to break out. The racist, colonialist and Zionist enemy has tried at times to dissipate that uprising, at others to enforce Jewish solutions and at yet others to uproot and drive our people into exile.

All in all, these events demonstrate the true dimensions of the Palestine problem. Thus all

the Zionist measures adopted by the racist Zionist authorities and enforced by systematic oppression, the use of force and the passage of time are now seen in their proper light, as they should have been a long time ago. They are to be identified with illegality and usurpation.

## 224

**Statement issued by pro-Syrian parties in Lebanon calling for the unification of nationalist and progressive forces behind Syria's initiative in Lebanon<sup>70</sup>**

Beirut, March 29, 1976

The homeland is currently the victim of a treacherous plot aimed at its unity, the unity of its sons, and its territorial integrity. This plot was planned by the USA as part of its campaign to liquidate the Palestine resistance and the Syrian regime, in order to reach its basic objective for which it is working in alliance with international Zionism and its agents, those Arab regimes that work against popular interests. This plot seeks to perpetuate the sectarian massacres in Lebanon and to escalate them on all fronts, leading to a partitioning of the country and occupation of a part of it by the Zionist enemy. It would then become possible to turn and liquidate the Palestine resistance finally, eradicating it from the Arab scene. The second objective would also be achieved, which is to embarrass the Syrian regime and put it on the defensive. The plot, in its new aspect, uses for agents parties that have long worn the mask of nationalism and progressivism, appropriating mass national slogans and playing on the emotions of the masses, by making them believe that a decisive result is now within their grasp and that they must continue to fight.

It is high time that the masses know the full truth and are made aware of the new steps being implemented by those who are playing with their destinies. These forces have been blinded by their conspiratorial activities and their lust for power; they have been deluded by the fact that some forces have rallied to their side and they have exploited

<sup>69</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), March 29, 1976, p. 2.

<sup>70</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), March 30, 1976. The statement was signed by the Organization of the Arab Baath Socialist Party, the Union of the Working People's Forces and the Syrian National Social Party.

the enthusiasm and honesty of these people who are struggling on behalf of the masses. The plot aims above all at bringing the Lebanese crisis to the point of no return, when coexistence among the sects will no longer be possible. This is to be effected by undermining the Syrian initiative and the achievements it has made regarding a political settlement of the crisis. This required an escalation of the fighting under the slogan that the isolationist forces are now about to be defeated and that they must be liquidated, that a political settlement is no longer appropriate because the "enemy" has been decisively beaten. No explanation, however, has been given of the reaction which these isolationist forces are capable of making in attempting to defend themselves and in using various measures and options open to them on both the local and international levels. This deliberate and planned falsification of reality on the part of these forces constitutes a major conspiracy which is currently being implemented against our people and homeland.

## 225

### **Speech by Prime Minister Salim of Egypt made on the occasion of the Day of the Land (excerpt)<sup>71</sup>**

**Cairo, March 30, 1976**

The October victory created a progressive image of the Arab nation in the world, and for the factors of power and unity shown through its military capabilities and its use of national weapons like oil. I have no doubt, brothers, nor should anyone doubt, that Arab differences that may arise have no deep roots and that the unity of Arab ranks and struggle shall forever remain, raising Arab and Palestinian rights above all other secondary conflicts or momentary emotional reactions.

The struggle of the people of Palestine inside the occupied Arab territories represents a noble struggle that cannot be extinguished. It is a voice

that proclaims every day the determination of the people of Palestine to recover their full rights. It is a bell that is rung every day to proclaim to the world, strongly and insistently, that the people of Palestine are alive and will not die.

The struggle of the Palestinian people in the cities of the West Bank and inside their occupied territories affirms the fact that there can be no peace without fulfilment of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and that Israel must comply with international realities and international law. Above and beyond this, Israel must learn the lesson and must recognize the true reality of the Arab scene and the genuineness of the Palestinian struggle.

Struggling brothers,

Our meeting today coincides with the start of a trip by President Sadat to some European countries where he intends to defend Arab rights in general and Palestinian rights in particular. He looks to our meeting today with hope and confidence, confidence that we shall proceed along our path and not lay down our arms until Israel withdraws from all occupied Arab territories and the people of Palestine recover their full rights, and hope for a glorious future when the Arab nation shall attain its objectives for freedom, progress and prosperity and when the flags of Palestine shall fly above its usurped hills and fields.

On the occasion of this meeting, and from this place and inspired by the sentiments and reason of President Sadat, I declare for all to hear that the Arab Republic of Egypt and Egypt's Arab people shall not forsake for one moment the rights of the fraternal people of Palestine and that, as we proceed along our fixed path of principle, we shall pay no heed to deceptive slogans, suspicious outbiddings and false assertions. I say to our struggling brothers inside the occupied Arab territories that we shall remain true to our word, our principles and our goals until God decrees victory for our nation.

<sup>71</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), March 31, 1976.

## 226

**Speech by President Sadat of Egypt made before the German Society for Foreign Affairs (excerpt)<sup>72</sup>****Bonn, March 30, 1976**

Our foremost duty is to serve the cause of peace. Several wars were forced upon us in our just cause to liberate our land and to defend the rights of our Palestinian brethren. We would like to put an end to human suffering and misery. We urgently need to free our economy from the heavy burden of the defence budget and military expenditures—means that we urgently need for our reconstruction. You have had experience of a reconstruction which has surprised the whole world and we would like to profit from your experience and know-how. But we have not yet secured peace; nor does peace seem realistic for the near future. History has taught us that permanent peace can only be based on justice and its basis is the honest sincerity of all parties involved.

Peace is not a slogan; peace is a dynamic process, but only when it coincides with certain principles and norms which are accepted by the community of nations.

In brief, peace must be based on the law of justice and not on that of the jungle. Nobody should be permitted to annex territory by force. Aggression should not be accepted or permitted. The natural rights of a people must be protected and defended against any kind of violation.

The right to have its own state should not be denied to any people so that individuals, as well as groups, can achieve their goals in a creative way.

I am sure you agree with me that the international community ignores the Palestinians—for reasons that are known to us.

This policy of neglect has brought about that which should have been avoided. If there is a glimmer of hope for the future of the Middle East, then it is due to the ever increasing recognition which the Palestinians have recently been receiving. This is the only way to convince them that peace

is possible. It is the only way to support the moderates against extremists and nihilists.

Never should we allow a feeling of hopelessness and isolation—that peace is unattainable.

We welcome the fact that the PLO exists and that the PLO sees negotiations as an alternative to war. This moderate group, whose goals are often distorted, is capable of accepting responsibility for the Palestinian people.

Most of all, the PLO is willing and ready to accept the challenge of peace.

Should the PLO be included in the process of peace making, as it should, then it would only be just to set preconditions. Like every other active participant, the PLO should be granted a right to its own position towards future developments. Why should the PLO make concessions before beginning talks? Why is it subjected to such treatment? How can it be expected to sign a blank cheque before peace negotiations even start?

Let me speak frankly to you. It is often mentioned that the Palestine problem is only of sentimental importance.

As always, I disagree with such a statement. I believe that no part of the past should darken the picture of the future. Only our conscience and love for truth should guide us on our way to the world of tomorrow.

Here we face a situation where a group of freedom fighters is recognized in the world as the representative of the Palestinian people. They are searching for peace, not war, constructive, not destructive, action. Should individual countries adopt a negative attitude towards them, this would be an invitation to violence and extremism. Rest assured, we do not ask you to support us blindly.

We only wish that you support us when we are right; should we be wrong, then you should tell us. But when you agree that we are in the right, then you should be among those that co-operate with us in our search for peace.

<sup>72</sup>Excerpted and translated from the German text supplied, on request, by the West German embassy in Beirut.



**Statement issued by the government of Syria reviewing Syria's involvement in and attitude to the war in Lebanon (excerpts)<sup>73</sup>**

**Damascus, March 31, 1976**

The bloody events in our sister country Lebanon have unfolded in this manner. The escalation of the fighting was linked to renewed negotiations for a Sinai agreement.<sup>74</sup> It was clear that events were being planned to proceed as follows:

1. To conclude a Sinai agreement and to mask its true significance.
2. To create a new crisis in the region which would rivet the attention of Arab citizens and divert them from the basic conflict between the Arab nations and the Zionist enemy.
3. To embroil the Palestine resistance in an internal Lebanese conflict with hateful sectarian overtones and to preoccupy the resistance with Lebanese events in order to prevent it from carrying out its task of confronting the enemy and thus ultimately to liquidate it.
4. To implicate Syria in the Lebanese crisis and thus to impede its progress along the path of national action aimed at foiling conspiracies being hatched against the Arab nation.
5. To create a state of fragmentation in Lebanese Arab society resulting in a *de facto* partition of Lebanon's unity and to establish small states therein with a hateful sectarian basis. This falls within the framework of the over-all policy of the racist and Zionist enemy whose object is to divide the Arab nation and to undermine the foundations of Arab nationalism, in order to justify the existence of its own racist entity.

Given this clear perception of the enormous conspiracy and of its true dimensions and motivated by ties of brotherhood between the two regions and their common interests; in answer to the call of national duty and in order to foil the conspiracy planned and put into effect through incitement to hateful sectarian fighting which, throughout history, has contravened the values and principles of the Arab nation; motivated by all these

considerations, President Hafiz Asad acted to stop the fighting and sent a delegation to our sister region, entrusting it with the directives necessary to stop the massacres.

The Syrian Arab delegation, after repeated efforts, was able to stop the fighting, remove the military government and install a new government in July, 1975. Then followed the formation of a committee of national dialogue entrusted with the formulation of new foundations for political, economic and social life, based upon the national unity of the Lebanese people and their Arab role. Nevertheless, the fighting would erupt again from time to time under external pressure due to the activities of *agents provocateurs* in the ranks of the combatants and because some of the Lebanese forces did not fully understand the nature of the conspiracy to which Lebanon, its people and the Arab cause in general were being subjected. Whenever the efforts being made to restore calm failed and the fighting escalated, the demands would increase for renewed Syrian efforts as the only means available to end the crisis. Early in January of this year, the fighting again escalated. The Syrian Arab region carried out an intensive series of talks with all sides. But while these political contacts were being made with the various parties to arrive at a definition of common denominators for a comprehensive political settlement of the internal Lebanese crisis and of Lebanese-Palestinian relations, a wave of violence and murder swept the country and thousands of innocent civilians died. On January 21, 1976, and following contacts with all the parties, a Syrian Arab delegation arrived in Beirut provided with detailed instructions which aimed at:

1. A ceasefire and arrangements for observing its enforcement.
2. Achieving a political settlement.
3. National reconciliation.
4. The formation of a government of national unity.
5. The implementation of Palestinian-Lebanese agreements.

Upon its arrival in Beirut, the delegation held extensive talks with President Sulayman Franjeh and with the other parties to the conflict. Agreement was reached to declare a ceasefire as of January 22, 1976 and to form a higher Lebanese-Syrian-Palestinian military committee entrusted with monitoring the ceasefire and supervising

<sup>73</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), April 1, 1976.

<sup>74</sup> Doc. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

the return to normality.<sup>75</sup> A number of joint sub-committees were also set up. On February 7, 1976, President Franjeh visited Damascus and agreement was then reached in a final form concerning a political settlement with the agreement of all the Lebanese parties to the conflict.<sup>76</sup> The text of the agreement was made public in a statement by the Lebanese President on February 14, 1976.<sup>77</sup>

The delegation then made further contacts to obtain full agreement for this text and to form a government, despite the obstacles placed in the way by one party and then another, demonstrating neither a sense of responsibility nor of true comprehension of what was taking place. Perhaps those who placed these obstacles in the way were themselves implicated in the attempt to escalate the fighting in furtherance of the major conspiracy and were driven to take this position by certain Arab and foreign powers who were interested in prolonging the conflict. The delegation, in any case, pursued its contacts until it was finally able to create common grounds for the formation of a cabinet in accordance with the previous formula. On March 8, 1976, a meeting was held which included President Franjeh, Prime Minister Karami and the Syrian delegation, during which preliminary agreement was reached regarding the formation of a cabinet of national unity. Agreement was also reached to continue contacts in order to discuss certain observations made by some of the parties. On March 10, 1976—and once news of the agreement to form a cabinet had become public—a new problem arose. This was the so-called “war of the barracks”. Its aim was to fragment the Lebanese army, a national institution which had hitherto preserved its unity because it represented the national unity of Lebanon itself. The Syrian delegation strove to convince the parties concerned of the seriousness of this new development and the necessity of arresting it. But it was clear that the hand which moved events in this direction was intent upon exploding the situation.

The same day, the Lebanese Army Command sent a memo to the Prime Minister asking him

to speed up the political settlement and to issue a decree of pardon for military personnel. The Air Force Commander also issued a similar statement. In the evening, the army commander issued a statement of pardon for military personnel for which he assumed personal responsibility. Thus it became clear that events were proceeding on a new course. The Syrian delegation tried to arrest this development by striving to get the President to issue the pardon and to form a cabinet. Its attempts were blocked by the fact that the parties concerned did not comprehend the true nature of the events taking place and the gravity of the consequences. On March 11, the Syrian delegation noted the following developments:

1. An increase in tension within the army indicating the possibility of a military coup.

2. The fact that circles close to the President did not fully understand the nature of events that might arise.

3. Activities undertaken by a number of politicians with the aim of driving certain circles in the army to explode the situation, embarrass the President, place him in a difficult spot and lead the country into a new crisis and renewed fighting. Given this situation, and since the parties concerned did not respond by adopting the measures necessary to forestall the new developments and stop the conflict, the Syrian delegation left Beirut on the evening of March 11, 1976, and returned to Damascus. A few hours later, Brigadier Ahdab carried out his coup and a new factor appeared on the scene: the demand that the President should resign.<sup>78</sup>

The Syrian government studied these new developments and held extensive talks with the various parties in a serious attempt to find a way out of the crisis and to stop the fighting, motivated by the following principles and considerations:

1. The Syrian Arab Republic rejects sectarian strife. It cannot tolerate a state of affairs where a citizen is murdered because of his religious affiliation because this is alien to Arab morality and principles. It further contravenes all religious teachings and principles and violates the ideals of toleration and love enshrined by Christianity and Islam. Accordingly, the Syrian Arab Re-

<sup>75</sup> Doc. 193 above.

<sup>76</sup> Doc. 196 above.

<sup>77</sup> Doc. 202 above.

<sup>78</sup> See doc. 214 above.

public can in no way become involved in sectarian strife. Rather, it will oppose it and condemn all who engage in it.

2. A single drop of blood shed by any citizen in Lebanon should be more precious than any post or personal advantage. The national security of the Lebanese people and of the Arab nation should come above all other considerations.

3. The aim of preserving national unity and territorial integrity should be held to be more noble than any sectarian conflict or local political gain.

With these principles in mind, the Syrian Arab Republic has once more moved forward to contact the parties concerned and has undertaken a new initiative along the following lines:

1. To stop sectarian massacres and resist violence.

2. To amend the Lebanese constitution so as to allow for the election of a new president immediately.

3. President Franjeh is to submit his resignation as soon as the new president is elected.

In furtherance of this new initiative, the Lebanese cabinet met, decided upon the draft law amending the constitution and referred it to parliament for a final vote. Although this new initiative clearly stipulated the resignation of the President, the parties to the conflict who demanded the President's resignation should have contributed to the creation of a positive atmosphere, thus preparing for the parliamentary session which was to pass the new amendment and to elect the new president. One of the parties, however, proceeded to escalate the military conflict and to further complicate the political scene. This group began to put forth a series of demands and slogans which are basically contrary to the prime causes of the fighting in Lebanon and are in no way related to what had previously been agreed upon by all the parties. This took place after the success of the Syrian initiative which had guaranteed the presence of the Palestine resistance in Lebanon as well as its right to act in accordance with prior agreements with the Lebanese authority. That initiative had further guaranteed Lebanon's sovereignty and had achieved a number of political and social demands forming part of what the Lebanese people had struggled for. All this had been enshrined in the document made public by President Franjeh on February 14, following his

visit to Damascus.

Once normality had begun to return to Lebanon and after about two months of calm, events took a new turn in the direction of renewed sectarian fighting. Villages and regions were besieged because of their religious affiliation. Peaceful citizens were attacked and innocents were murdered. Matters had gone far beyond all the ostensible reasons offered by the various parties to the conflict to justify their fighting. The more important hidden reasons were now exposed as the ultimate objectives of the conspiracy: the partition of Lebanon, the attempt to mask the Sinai agreement as well as the attempt to embroil the Palestine resistance in events that had nothing to do with its own basic objectives. This was to be accomplished by implicating it in the sectarian conflict in the Lebanon and by creating a diversionary battle involving the Syrian Arab Republic so that it would be sidetracked away from its continuing struggle against Zionist aggression on the Arab nation.

The Syrian Arab Republic will continue to do its utmost to preserve Lebanon's unity and independence as well as the continued existence of the Palestine revolution. It will exert all its efforts to foil the conspiracy against the people of Lebanon, motivated by its concern for its unity and territorial integrity and in affirmation of the fraternal relations between the Lebanese people and the Palestine revolution.

The Syrian Arab Republic believes that the determination to prolong this sectarian conflict on the part of any group represents in reality a determination to carry out the conspiracy against Lebanon and its people as well as the Arab nation. The Syrian Arab Republic accordingly warns all groups determined to continue the fighting and places a historic responsibility upon their shoulders, especially responsibility for partition, which is to be counted as the greatest crime one can commit against the Arab nation and against Lebanon and its people.

## 228

**Statement by PSP leader Junblat of Lebanon reviewing the situation in Lebanon after his meeting with PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat (excerpt)<sup>79</sup>**

**Beirut, March 31, 1976**

We reviewed the situation with Abu Ammar [Yasir Arafat] and the extent of the pressure which is being exerted on the Palestinians. We regret any pressure being brought to bear on the Resistance by way of the level of the supply of arms from any country. The Palestine Revolution is a holy slogan for every Arab, and it should have the status of a free country. No one should try to hamper its march and financing. Knowing the wisdom of some of our Syrian brothers in the Government, we still hope they will request the circles concerned to lift the embargo, which is harmful to the national movement and to our brothers in the Palestine Revolution, and that all supply depots in Syria, Iraq and every Arab state should be considered a trust in the hands of all Arabs.

There was a mistake in bringing a Syrian army into Lebanon since under no circumstances can it confront the national movement or the Palestine Revolution, because it is part of this movement.

We have always been confident that the Syrian Army, which has waged battles of honour and national dignity, will stand by those insisting on the Arabism of Lebanon and protecting the Resistance from any harm. The introduction of the Syrian Army in this manner and without permission from the ruling authority represented in the Government could have led to a counter-intervention by Israel. The Ayn Jalut forces and the Palestine Liberation Army should have been sufficient if necessary in the (?interim) stage. The issue then would not have been internationalized, nor would UN Secretary-General Waldheim have dared to raise the issue in the UN Security Council.<sup>80</sup>

Just as we welcomed the Syrian initiative at the beginning of its intervention, we welcome the Egyptian initiative in view of the traditional

friendship which links the Lebanese and Egyptian peoples. We do not forget the role which Jamal Abd an-Nasir played in the Lebanese crisis in 1958 and how he contributed to the strengthening of the national movement with arms and funds without receiving anything in return. Then a solution was reached to the problem in agreement with the big powers.

## 229

**Statement by the Communist Party of Egypt regarding the abrogation of the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship (excerpts)<sup>81</sup>**

**Late March, 1976**

If we examine the arguments advanced by the president of the republic in support of his abrogation of the treaty,<sup>82</sup> we find that they are anything but fair. Thus, he argues that the Soviet Union refused to make good our losses in weapons after the October war as it did with Syria. If this is in fact true, we must search for the true reasons in the very provocative behaviour of the Egyptian authorities towards the Soviet Union. This contravened the treaty in letter and spirit as well as the simplest requirements of friendship and gratitude. It is moreover a policy which accedes at all points to imperialism and is increasingly conforming with US policies in the region. In addition, the president bases his arguments on the Soviet Union's refusal to agree to Egypt's demands that the debts be re-scheduled. President Sadat feels that this constitutes economic pressure against us. But this argument is far from the truth. The Soviet Union has never refused to discuss this problem nor has it ever rejected any reasonable suggestion for solving it. It has, however, refused extremist positions and the blackmail and pressure brought against it by provocative elements inside the Egyptian regime, accompanied, as these were, by all manner of calumny and insult.

The facts of the economic situation prove that

<sup>79</sup> Broadcast on Beirut radio (Sanayi) in Arabic; English translation; BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5175/A/1-2; reprinted by permission.

<sup>80</sup> See doc. 12 above.

<sup>81</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text as published in *al-Talal* (Damascus), June 8, p. 20. The decision abrogating the treaty is doc. 216 above.

<sup>82</sup> See docs. 211 and 215 above.

this "argument" is contrived and has no visible effect upon the economic crisis from which the country is suffering as a result of bad economic planning. This is shown by the fact that the debt to be repaid to the Soviet Union this year amounts to 120 million pounds whereas the total of all outstanding debts this year was 1200 million pounds. The balance of payments deficit is 2400 million pounds. In other words, the debts outstanding to the Soviet Union are less than 5% of the total.

President Sadat further refers, in support of his cancellation of the treaty, to the remarks made by Comrade Brezhnev at the Twenty-fifth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party where he said that vicious attempts were being made by certain reactionary elements inside Egypt to subvert the progressive achievements of the July revolution. The president considers this an insult to the present Egyptian regime. However, in addition to the fact that Comrade Brezhnev is entitled to say what he wants at his party congress, what he said about Egypt does not contradict the palpable fact as perceived and accepted by every patriotic Egyptian and every fairminded foreign observer. To claim that his remarks are insulting to the Egyptian regime and to base this arbitrary decision upon such a claim is a matter far removed from objectivity. Rather, it represents deliberate escalation and the invention of an excuse to arrive at the desired objective. In the last resort, even if we assume that the conduct of the Soviet Union towards the Egyptian government or president is not above criticism or censure, would it not have been more proper for the Egyptian government and president to have worked to remove all causes of tension in their relations, out of concern for Egyptian-Soviet friendship and the great value that it represents both inside and outside the two countries? Should they not rather have requested a discussion of such problems and worked to solve them within a genuine framework of friendship and mutual understanding? It is clear, however, that this was not what the Egyptian government wanted to happen because of its foreign and domestic policies.

The cancellation of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty in this manner raises a number of questions and concerns among our masses, indeed among all our patriotic forces throughout our Arab world.

The cancellation of the treaty raises questions among the masses as to the true nature of government policy regarding such vital issues as the future action to be taken to liberate our occupied Egyptian and Arab territories, as well as the creation of a just solution to the Palestinian problem. This in turn necessitates action on the Arab and international scenes to deal with the problem of weapons to the army in the wake of the cancellation of the treaty and the deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union. Has the government in fact accepted the estimate of President Sadat that within a year and a half our arms will be just a heap of scrap? Will our army then lose its weaponry thus leaving no hope of resorting to military action, if the need arises, to liberate our lands? Or will the government rely fully on the USA and the West for rearming? How viable is this assumption which logic and past and present experience show to be false? How long will it be before this total change takes place in rearmament, if indeed it does take place? And, meanwhile, what happens to our struggle for liberation? The abrogation of the treaty raises further questions about the trend of economic development in our country and the means employed to overcome our suffocating economic problems. What is to be the future of our industry and foreign trade, not to mention the whole future of economic development?

President Sadat has said that the government has taken steps to overcome the effects of the abrogation of the treaty and has found a solution to the problems that may result. He has not, however, spelled out these means. It is the right of citizens to examine this statement carefully. They have the right to be suspicious and fearful regarding the seriousness and effectiveness of such a solution. These fears were already voiced by a small number of serious and honest members of the National Assembly when the question was being debated. Every honest citizen must wonder about the connection between the abrogation of this treaty and its timing and the moves and contacts, both public and secret, made recently by the Egyptian government with US government officials, as well as officials from "Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing Gulf States." To what extent is this abrogation linked with the economic and military aid programmes expected by the government to come from imperialist

countries and reactionary circles in the Arab world? All indications point to the fact that this move on the part of the Egyptian regime is part of a deal that has already been agreed upon and a token paid in advance by the Egyptian authorities as their custom in order to conclude that deal. It is the right of the citizen to be suspicious and apprehensive about all such deals that take place behind his back, for our long national history reveals that such deals have not been in our national interest.

The Egyptian government tried to justify cancellation of the treaty by claiming that the treaty was no longer effective and that cancellation was really a foregone conclusion and will have no effect upon Egypt's concern for Soviet friendship etc.. etc.. If this were true, then why cancel it? Why was it cancelled with such haste and such pomp, if the treaty was already negligible in any case? Such specious arguments are in reality designed to lessen the resulting shock felt by the Egyptian and Arab masses and to forestall any possible reactions.

Our party, motivated by its concern for the interests of the nation and of the Arab struggle for which Soviet-Egyptian friendship provides major support, records its vigorous objection to the cancellation of the treaty by the Egyptian government. It calls upon all citizens devoted to their nation's interests to voice their objections to this measure and to struggle in order to restore and strengthen the true ties of friendship with the Soviet Union. We call upon them to forestall the activities of rightist and reactionary forces inside and outside the regime. It is they who were behind this measure and they will continue to plot to apply pressure in order to increase the tension in our relations with our friend and our chief ally in our struggle. Our party believes that this serious and ill-advised measure adopted by the authorities in the course of a policy of appeasement towards imperialist and reactionary forces and of a rightist tendency adopted with regard to both domestic and foreign affairs, will be very harmful to our national interests. Its harm will be shouldered by our toiling masses and the Egyptian government bears full responsibility for its consequences.

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**Press interview statements by Phalangist Party leader Gemayyel evaluating the situation in Lebanon<sup>83</sup>**

**Beirut, April 2, 1976**

*Q. Could you evaluate the situation in Lebanon as you see it today?*

*A.* After these 11 months of crisis, I can definitely state that 90 percent of the Lebanese—Christians and Moslems—are convinced that the situation we have reached serves the interests of no one. It does not serve the interests of Lebanon or the Arabs or the cause of the Palestinians, who have presented the Lebanese formula (of coexistence) as a solution for their problem.

What has brought us to this situation is the fact that Lebanon—this small country which is wide open to the world, especially to the Arab world—agreed to host 400,000 Palestinian refugees. Unfortunately, many of these guests did not respect our hospitality. Lebanon is one of the few countries in this region which have adopted democracy and freedom as their way of life. Unfortunately, some of our Palestinian brothers abused this democracy and freedom, turning Lebanon into a battlefield in which they can conduct their struggles and settle their scores, and Lebanon soon became a place where Palestinian, Arab and international scores can be settled. The guests became the landlords, which created in Lebanon, alongside the Lebanese Government and Army, a number of governments and armies of undetermined identities. Parts of Lebanon's territory became totally free of Lebanese or Palestinian authority. Lebanon was turned into the refuge of the world's outlaws.

*Q. When do you expect a cease-fire to be called?*

*A.* Our experience in the various stages through which we have passed has taught us that agreements are useless in the absence of a strong authority which is capable of implementing them. We have so far had 33 cease-fire agreements, none of which have been implemented. In other words, we have turned into a court which can make decisions but is incapable of executing them.

<sup>83</sup> Interview conducted by A. Merhi; excerpted from the text, *Monday Morning* (Beirut), April 5, 1976, pp. 16-17.

For this reason, before we start talking about any kind of agreement or pact, we must agree among each other on an authority which can implement the agreements that we reach.

*Q. Where can Lebanon find such an authority now, with the Lebanese Army and Security Forces in such a state of disintegration?*

*A.* It is the disintegration of the Army and the Security Forces that prompted us to accept Syrian mediation, which without doubt was offered with the most sincere brotherly motivations. We pinned great hopes on that mediation, especially on the military committee which grouped representatives of the Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian armies—a committee which no one can accuse of sectarianism.

Unfortunately, however, this committee did not want to use force to implement the agreements. Peace cannot be proposed; it must be imposed. It is the fact that we contented ourselves with proposing peace that has brought us to the situation we are in today.

*Q. Do you intend to work toward a meeting of the U.N. Security Council to look into the Lebanese crisis?*

*A.* The deterioration of the situation in Lebanon and the failure of all mediation efforts prompted us, as founding members of the Arab League and the United Nations, to seek the assistance of these two organizations. We asked these organizations to take the initiative themselves, because we did not want to be involved in regional and international struggles. When both the U.N. and the Arab League ignored our request, and when Syria offered its assistance, we accepted, as a drowning man would grab any hand that is stretched out to him.

I concede that the Syrian mediation was sincere, honest and brotherly, but Syria, unfortunately, was either unwilling or unable to impose any agreement by force. Why didn't Syria use force? The answer is to be sought in Syria and Syria's situation. Perhaps Syria, as a socialist country, did not want to invite the opposition of socialist countries in and outside the Arab world. Syria opted for diplomacy and against force, but diplomacy takes time, and Lebanon's time, unfortunately, can be measured in hours. The longer the crisis lasts, the more complicated and destructive it gets.

Returning to your question about the U.N.,

I would say that we welcome any assistance regardless of its source, on condition that this assistance moves us toward an end to this destruction and out of the abyss in which we find ourselves.

*Q. Does this mean that you favor a meeting of the U.N. Security Council to look into the Lebanese crisis?*

*A.* We favor not only a Security Council meeting, but any initiative which can end this dangerous crisis. But if U.N. intervention is going to complicate the problem instead of solving it, we, of course, do not favor it.

*Q. Prime Minister Rashid Karami has publicly rejected a Security Council meeting on Lebanon...*

*A.* Premier Karami has his own views, and we have ours. He sees no need for a Security Council meeting; we consider a Security Council meeting more than justified. The chronic problems of our prime ministers is that they think as Arabs and Moslems first and as Lebanese second.

*Q. So we can quote you as saying that the Phalangist Party is in favor of calling a Security Council meeting?*

*A.* Yes, the Phalangist Party is in favor of calling such a meeting, but only if this move can pull us out of the crisis. If a Security Council meeting is going to widen the gulf between us (the Lebanese), however, we will not favor it.

Ten or 15 years ago, I proposed the internationalization of Lebanon, to turn it into another Switzerland, or another Austria. My proposal, however, was conditional on the acceptance of 90 percent of the Lebanese and 50 percent of the Arabs.

By the same token, I will not agree to the internationalization of the Lebanese crisis and the holding of a Security Council meeting unless 90 percent of the Lebanese and 50 percent of the Arabs also agree.

*Q. Do you consider the Syrian mediation effort over?*

*A.* Syria is continuing its mediation. Personally, I prefer to see Syria use force to implement the agreements and pacts. As far as I can make out, Syria has opted in favor of diplomacy.

*Q. Do you favor the interference of Syrian forces to keep the peace and impose the implementation of agreements?*

*A.* Various political complications and sensitivities would be involved in such a step. There

are a number of important conditions that must be met before such a step is taken. Any country in the world can ask another country for military assistance—but within clear and stringent conditions.

For instance, when Germany occupied France, France sought American assistance. Similarly, some Arab countries have sought assistance from other countries—within certain clear, well-studied conditions.

However, I would prefer Arab and international troops to the troops of any one country. If outside (military) assistance is found necessary, I would prefer this assistance to be under the supervision of the Arab League and the United Nations.

*Q. So you prefer Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's suggestion that joint Arab troops be sent to Lebanon?*

*A. I prefer to have any troops sent to Lebanon under the supervision of the Arab League and the United Nations—not the Arab League alone. It would be even better to send U.N. troops to Lebanon.*

*Q. What results do you expect from the mission of the American delegate, Dean Brown, in Lebanon?*

*A. We accept any assistance, even from the devil, which is offered in a spirit of sincerity and brotherhood.*

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### Television interview with King Hussein of Jordan discussing the war in Lebanon and the US role in the Arab-Israeli conflict<sup>84</sup>

Washington, April 4, 1976

*Clark: Your Majesty, welcome back to "Issues and Answers."*

*If the present cease-fire in Lebanon should collapse, would you favor direct intervention by Syrian troops to restore order?*

*King Hussein:* I understand that Lebanese authorities at the very highest levels, religious leaders on both sides have sought Syrian intervention in the recent past to help separate the warring factions and to give the Lebanese a chance to reorganize themselves in a way which would enable them to

maintain order within Lebanon, itself.

I hope that the present cease-fire may hold, but should there be a problem, and we can foresee the possibility, then Syria may decide to do whatever is possible to help avert further disaster.

There is danger, unfortunately, of other intervention, and this could bring about an explosion in the area of a larger magnitude. We have been in very close touch with Syria through all this crisis. We have watched the situation in Lebanon with great anxiety and a feeling of grief over the tremendous losses in life and the disintegration of a country that is dear to all of us. We have tried and are continuing to try with all the different parties involved to get them to stop the fighting and start within the Lebanese system, which must be preserved, a meaningful constructive dialogue that could solve some of the issues in a way that would be to the satisfaction of all concerned.

*Clark: You mentioned danger of other intervention in Lebanon. I assume you mean by the Israelis. Wouldn't any entry of Syrian forces into Lebanon almost automatically bring military intervention by the Israelis and a possible confrontation that could lead to a new Middle East war?*

*King Hussein:* This I understand is a danger. I do not see why Israel should intervene, when Lebanon asks a neighboring Arab state for help and when that Arab state is the only one that is in a position to offer help to stabilize the situation in the Lebanon before it is too late. But I suppose the fact exists of Israeli intervention and very serious consequences to follow.

*Scali: Your Majesty, if I recall correctly, the government of Israel has publicly warned that any intervention by outside forces would not be tolerated, and that is rather clear evidence that they would regard Syrian intervention as somehow changing the balance of power perhaps adversely against them, so presumably it would be for this reason that the Israelis would take a rather serious view of that. Do you accept that view, that perhaps it would change the balance of power?*

*King Hussein:* I accept the view that there is danger of an Israeli intervention. I have the feeling that the Israelis may be thinking in terms of changing realities on the ground as well, as a way of getting out from some of the pressures they face in this world, growing pressures. But in reality, I know the Syrian position, I know our position, and I know that if there is intervention it is because the system has almost disintegrated

<sup>84</sup> Interview conducted by Bob Clark and John Scali and broadcast on ABC's "Issues and Answers"; transcript supplied, on request, by ABC.



in terms of the Lebanese ability to provide internal security. Even the armed forces of Lebanon have suffered during the recent past. Some side has to come in and separate the warring factions, and the main objective is to keep Lebanon its sovereignty, its territorial integrity, and to insure that no side is a victor against another side within the Lebanon itself; that all Lebanese live in a country with equal rights, resolve their problems in a peaceful way.

*Scali: President Sadat of Egypt has proposed that the Arab countries contribute troops to an all-Arab force which would intervene if necessary to impose a peace in Lebanon. Would your government be willing to contribute troops to such a force?*

*King Hussein:* I respect President Sadat's view as his own, but in this particular problem I really don't see how such a force could be formed when maybe some of the participants would be involved in terms of support to one or the other side within the Lebanon itself.

I don't know that this approach would be a realistic one that has chances of achieving the objective of bringing peace to the Lebanon.

*Clark: Would you be willing, Your Majesty, to serve as a mediator in Lebanon between the warring factions in a way that might reduce the need or eliminate the need to bring in military forces?*

*King Hussein:* We have continued to try to play such a role. We are helping Syria as much as we can. We are helping in the Lebanon, itself, by being in touch with all the major parties involved and offering to help wherever possible.

*Clark: I am thinking of you perhaps playing a more formal role as a mediator.*

*King Hussein:* If that were accepted, by all means. But we know we have our own limitations in that regard.

*Clark: As you began your talks with President Ford this week you said, "Once again we are at a crossroads between war and peace in the Middle East."*

*What do you see is the most critical problem at those cross roads? Is it Lebanon, is it the continuing dispute over the occupied territories, or just what is the flash point that you are worried about?*

*King Hussein:* Well, Lebanon is a very dangerous situation at this time, and beyond that, lack of progress toward the establishment of a just and durable peace in the area.

We feel a stalemate exists, and time is passing, and a long period of time is not on the side of a solution to the problem.

We believe that the United States has more of an ability to influence events in the area than any other power in the world, and we really await, and hope, that the United States will contribute its full share for a solution to the problem in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and 767, as the basic formula must be withdrawing from all territories occupied in that area by Israel.

Israel has the choice of territory or peace, but she can't have both, and obviously that means also we can't have peace and the opportunity to devote our energies and resources to attaining a better future for the generations to come within that area.

*Scali: Your Majesty, if I understood you correctly, you said in the recent past—and I assume you mean in the last few days—all sides in Lebanon have asked the Syrian government to intervene to preserve a cease-fire. Does this specifically include the Christian side?*

*King Hussein:* It does include the Christian side to my knowledge, yes, and religious leaders on both sides, and I believe that the problem in Lebanon now is not, as I see it, a problem of some minor changes, of the election of a new President. At least one side feels there must be a total change in the Lebanon and in the system of the Lebanon, and this is what we oppose.

And this is what we are trying to affect.

*Clark: Senator Jackson, one of the Democratic Presidential contenders in this country, says the United States should have sent Marines into Lebanon when the civil strife first began to get serious. He would have done this under very careful conditions, and assuming they had been invited by the President of Lebanon. But would that have been a helpful move in your view?*

*King Hussein:* I don't know it would have been possible or helpful. However, I believe the United States has sent able people to the area to gather the facts and advise Washington of developments in that part of the world.

*Clark: Do you think there would have been an unfavorable reaction if we had sent Marines into Lebanon?*

*King Hussein:* I don't think it occurred in the minds of many of the area that was really a serious possibility.

*Clark: If it had been regarded as a serious possibility—of course we did this back in 1958 when President Eisenhower was in the White House. The question would be could we try to impose a similar solution today?*

*King Hussein:* I suppose it is up to the Lebanese to offer that, but to my way of thinking this—

*Scali: Your Majesty, if we could return to Lebanon for a moment, there are some people who believe that radical extremists are gaining ascendancy in Lebanon and that they would dominate a new Lebanese government. What do you think?*

*King Hussein:* I had the impression and have it that one side considers that it has the means and ability to control the situation in the Lebanon, score a major victory and change the country, its very structure, in a very basic way.

*Scali: Which side, Your Majesty?*

*King Hussein:* The more radical, more extreme side.

*Scali: In this case what do you believe can be done to prevent a total victory by either side, in addition to possible military intervention?*

*King Hussein:* All possible pressure and attempts at persuasion are carried out at this time to ensure that Lebanon is safe and the rights of all are ensured and that a meaningful dialogue would result in the solution to the basic problem.

*Clark: To turn to broader Middle East problems, Your Majesty, would you agree with those who say that Secretary Kissinger's step-by-step peace plan for the Middle East has dissolved perhaps for good without getting to the second step, which was supposed to deal with your country's demand for a return of the West Bank and of the occupied territories?*

*King Hussein:* I believe that a new look and a new approach must come to solve the problems of the area. In any event, that the Arab Summit about Jordan ceased to become involved directly and the Palestinian Liberation Organization was selected as the sole legitimate representative of the people of Palestine in regard to Palestinian rights in occupied Palestine. And I believe that what is needed is a kind of a massive effort, an effort that led the United States to reach the moon. What we need is a real massive effort and we feel that the emphasis should be on the entire problem, all the fronts, maybe more on the Palestinian aspect of it; then all the other problems, whether they pertain to Syria or Egypt, would be easily

resolved. So I believe the step by step approach as we knew it in the past may have come to an end. There may be some possibilities of some additional steps in that regard, but I have very serious doubts that there is any chance of success.

*Clark: You talk of a massive new effort. Are you talking of an effort that the United States should lead? Should there be a new Kissinger plan for peace in the Middle East or would you look elsewhere for this new effort?*

*King Hussein:* I believe the United States is more able than any in this world to influence events in the area toward the establishment of a just and durable peace. Maybe with the help of others in the world.

But our friends are hopeful, we think, in their positions and will do whatever is possible to implement 242 and 338 to establish it.

*Clark: Do you think, Your Majesty, that Henry Kissinger has kept faith with you, has kept the promises he has made to you in the past about the West Bank or other aspects of his overall plan for Middle East peace?*

*King Hussein:* I'd rather he answer this particular question, but I recognize the limitations and difficulties that he has had to cope with as Secretary of State at this particular time.

*Clark: You sound as if you do not feel that he has kept total faith with you.*

*King Hussein:* I believe he has tried his best.

*Scali: Your Majesty, what form should this new massive effort take? Should it be to go to Geneva with the Palestine Liberation Organization fully represented at that conference?*

*King Hussein:* I believe the Palestinians must be represented. Only they, after all, can decide for themselves what their future ought to be—speaking of the implementation of 242 and 338. In other words, Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied in June of '67.

We are for self-determination by the people of Palestine and whatever their decision we will respect it in total. But they are the major party involved in the problem and they must be there.

*Scali: Your Majesty, what was the major result of your meeting with President Ford this week? Did you discuss the possibility of additional American arms for your government?*

*King Hussein:* In a limited way, yes, we discussed some of our current programs and what our friends may or may not be able to do to help us along, and that was confined to a rather small area, really—

*Scali:* Some people say that the United States, during a period of election, is more or less immobilized in terms of being an active peacemaker in the Middle East. Is this your impression after your Washington visit?

*King Hussein:* My impression is that our friends here have many things on their minds, but I can see the dangers; I can see the problems, and I believe that they are genuinely concerned and are searching their minds as to what to do to help all concerned achieve a just and durable peace in the area.

*Clark:* There is some concern, Your Majesty, that you are not perhaps as active a peacemaker in the Middle East as you have been in the past and concern that you are moving closer to Syria, becoming a friend and supporter of its government at a time when Syria is strengthening its own relationship with the Soviet Union and getting massive new arms support from the Soviets. Is there a significant shift in your position?

*King Hussein:* Well, to begin with, Jordan may be the "odd man out" in the area. Israel received lots of military support from the United States. We have tried to build a modest capability to defend ourselves throughout the many years that have passed.

Others in the area received weapons from the Soviet Union. We will have to continue to do our best to maintain an ability to defend ourselves in the face of all threats.

This is one aspect of my answer.

The other is in relation to the relations with Syria. After a long period of time, very close contact with the President of Syria, I am impressed by his honesty, his ability, his courage, his wisdom, but, above all, by the fact that he is a patriot.

I believe that Syria is not under the influence of this or the other side in this world in terms of the major powers and what has developed between us, beyond friendship, is a genuine attempt to see and seek areas of mutual cooperation that will be meaningful and result in mutual benefits to our people. We have looked at the economy, what countries are embarking on new five year plans of economic development; we are examining the possibilities of fruits of cooperation to avoid

duplication of effort. We are looking at other resources, water resources, energy, education. We are looking at everything and examining it very, very carefully, and we are making progress and we hope this might be a nucleus for greater cooperation in the area for more ability and more progress. And politically we sit together at the very highest levels, examine every problem, every situation that confronts us, and we have to agree on how to handle ourselves and we believe that this is to the benefit of both countries and the area as a whole.

*Clark:* You mentioned, Your Majesty, that you had some discussion with President Ford about arms aid. Are you going ahead with plans to purchase the Hawk antimissile defenses that the United States has promised to make available to your country?

*King Hussein:* The side that was going to help us on the financial level, which is Saudi Arabia, it appears has some difficulties at this time in providing the material resources needed for it—agreed with us, as did our friends here, was the basic minimum requirement for a meaningful air defense of the capital city of Amman, various population centers to the north, and our average of 14 Hawk batteries of the advanced kind, and 100 Vulcan guns. So we are facing this problem right now. We do not know whether we are going to be able to have this system. If the funds are not forthcoming and we are unable to pay the cost, which has always been in our opinion well known to the Saudis, since they acquired the same equipment, then we would have to see how we can acquire systems to defend our skies and our country—

*Scali:* Your Majesty, are you indicating that you might turn to the Soviet Union as a supplier of anti-aircraft missiles if the present arrangement does not hold?

*King Hussein:* Our own feeling throughout has been that weapons that we get from any source are Jordanian weapons when they arrive in our hands and are for our protection and the protection of our country, in the face of any threat. That is all I can say at this time.

*Clark:* I am sorry, Your Majesty, we are just about out of time. Thank you for being with us on "Issues and Answers."

*King Hussein:* Thank you, very much.

**Press conference statement by Politbureau member Abu al-Abbas of the PFLP-GC stressing the importance of the alliance between the Palestine resistance and the National Movement of Lebanon**<sup>85</sup>

Beirut, April 7, 1976

We of the Palestine revolution, and of the Palestinian Rejection Front in particular, clearly defined from the start the nature of the rightist attack, when we said frankly that what was going on in this arena was only the start of an attack on the two wings of the Arab liberation movement: the Palestine resistance and the Lebanese National Movement. At the time we warned against the consequences of leniency towards any operation aimed at blunting the claws of the Lebanese National Movement, stressing, through our literature and through the attitudes we adopted, that not all the agreements in the world can safeguard the presence of the Palestine revolution in the Lebanese arena unless it draws its strength from the support and cohesion of the heroic Lebanese masses; for they are the real basis of our ability to hold out, and without their support we shall be deprived of our most important supporting front, so that the destiny of the Palestine revolution in the whole of the Arab homeland will be utterly at the mercy of hostile forces.

The organic relationship between the Palestine revolution and the Lebanese National Movement is no accident, nor is it due to the fact that the two are good neighbours, as some people imagine. It is one of the main constituents of our presence here, since it is through interaction between the two parties—the Palestine revolution and the Lebanese National Movement—that the will to hold out and for change has grown and developed, and the only way the Palestine revolution has contributed to the growth of the nationalist movement is by being a true ally in an alliance without which it can neither live nor develop.

**Communiqué issued by the Command of the Palestine revolution accusing the US of plotting its defeat**<sup>86</sup>

April 10, 1976

The Command of the Palestine revolution held a meeting to discuss the latest developments in Lebanon, especially current imperialist attempts to internationalize the crisis and to incite disagreement between the different factions within the nationalist ranks. The meeting reached the following conclusions:

1. The latest American manoeuvres and the claim by the American envoy, Brown, that he is on a mediation mission, clearly reveal the lines of the whole imperialist plan, from the beginning of the events to the present. The plan aims, under the pretext of effecting a political settlement to the crisis, to break the nationalist ranks that conducted unified battles in confrontation with the isolationist forces. The primary motive of the American role is to strike at the Palestine revolution by isolating it from its allies, and by weakening Syria's role in fulfilling its national obligations, especially with regard to capitulationist solutions and in confrontation of the Zionist enemy. The Americans further intend to nullify the achievements of the Lebanese National Movement because of the decisive role it plays in the current struggle against American domination over the Arab area and against the liquidation of the cause of the Palestinian people.

2. The Palestine revolution has from the beginning been adamant in rejecting all forms of reactionary Arabization and internationalization of the Lebanese crisis, and in stressing the necessity of solving it in keeping with the interests and aspirations of the Lebanese masses under the leadership of their national movement and commensurate with the existence of our revolution, its survival and its freedom of action.

In the face of the recently conducted manoeuvres, especially by the USA, either directly or through its allied and subservient forces, we reaffirm our rejection of and firm resistance to this imperialist conspiracy. We call on all national and honourable forces in Lebanon and the Arab area, and all

<sup>85</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Ila al-Amam* (Beirut), April 16, 1976, p. 6.

<sup>86</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), April 10, 1976, p. 2.

other forces who support our security and the Palestinian people, to be fully alert and to unify all their resources to confront and defeat this conspiracy. In this context, it is necessary for an immediate convening of the Arab Front Participating in the Palestine Revolution to play its part and discharge its responsibilities.

3. We have always affirmed the need to consolidate the alliance between Syria and the Palestine revolution and the Lebanese National Movement on sound bases, that will guarantee the ability of these forces to hold out in the battle against imperialism, Zionism and local reactionary forces.

In view of the emergence of the recent disagreements which have become public, it is obvious that this stage of the battle requires a fundamental and clear appraisal of the conflicting positions, particularly since the nature of the American plan has been clarified through the statements of Kissinger and the activities of the American envoy in Lebanon—a plan which is aimed at destroying the unity of the national ranks and increasing its many-faceted internal contradictions.

The solution of the present differences in a manner that will insure the basic demands of the national movement and the Palestine revolution, will provide Syria with a strong national base to support her steadfastness, protect her security and allow unified progress in the battle of destiny. For this purpose, we call for an immediate joint meeting between all these parties to restore the cohesion of the national ranks and repel all the enemy plots. Such a tripartite alliance constitutes a solid foundation for the unity of all the national forces and Arab states and a new test for their effective role in fighting imperialism and confronting its conspiracies.

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### **Speech by President Asad of Syria outlining the principles of Syria's policy towards the war in Lebanon<sup>87</sup>**

**Damascus, April 12, 1976**

Our fixed policy as regards events in Lebanon is that we are opposed to any side that wishes to continue fighting. We thus clearly declare our fixed and principled stand: we are for an end to the fighting and for continued discussion of solutions to all outstanding problems. We are for dialogue among the various parties. We shall not be tempted by any superficial or cheap gains at the expense of shedding blood in Lebanon. We shall not, under any circumstances, pursue slogans that appear attractive but are in reality insidious, aiming to place us in a position of aiding and abetting the bloodshed.

I realize, comrades, that our people everywhere wish me to speak in detail about Lebanese events, about our efforts in Lebanon and about the positions of the various groups in Lebanon. If I hesitate to speak at length about this issue, it is because I fear that some of what I might say would have the effect of further complicating a solution of the Lebanese problem. This is something we wish to avoid. Therefore, we are content with declaring our clear and frank objective: we are for an end to the fighting, we are against those who insist upon continuing the fighting, we are opposed to the conspiracy against the people of Lebanon, the Palestine revolution and the entire Arab nation. We adopt positions that increase our burdens but we do so out of a feeling of responsibility towards our national masses and the main Arab cause, the cause of Palestine. As I said, we shall not be driven to adopt positions totally against our will.

We shall not indulge in outbidding nor seek cheap gains. We shall behave in a responsible manner. Let everyone understand that we in this region have complete freedom of movement and can adopt any stand we want. No one can prevent us from adopting any stand we want.

<sup>87</sup> Made in a speech at the opening of the 2nd General Congress of the Union of Revolutionary Youth; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), April 13, 1976.

This is a major conspiracy against the Arab nation and the people of Palestine. Although we have, through direct contacts, called the attention of the Palestinian leadership to this conspiracy, I would still like to repeat here the following for all to hear. Our brothers in the Palestinian leadership must recognize the gravity of this conspiracy, of which they are the prime target. Opposing the conspiracy means, as I stated, that we have to take a burden on ourselves and we all know that we do not wish to bear additional burdens, something which is not in the interest of our region. But the Arab struggle is our primary concern; for its sake, we have in the past and shall in the future bear every burden, however heavy it may be.

We in this country, both Muslims and Christians, are ready to move into Lebanon and to protect those who are unjustly treated, irrespective of religious affiliation. We are ready to move into Lebanon to oppose aggression and to move against the unjust, irrespective of his religious creed.

Those who insist on prolonging the war in Lebanon know nothing of religion; they capitalize on religion as they do on progressivism and reaction. Their logic is contradictory and many-faceted. To some they claim that Syria is supporting the Muslims against the Christians and to others that Syria is supporting the Christians against the Muslims. They say that Syria is with the reactionaries against the progressives, but they also claim elsewhere that Syria stands by the progressives and communists, especially against the right and the reactionaries. This is what is being said in the Arab world. Why this ambivalent logic? Because they are not politicians but traffickers in politics, not progressives but traffickers in progress. They also attempt to traffic in Islam, but Islam is more powerful and more noble. Similarly with Christianity, but Christianity, too, is more powerful and noble than their attempts.

I suppose many who are listening to my remarks will be somewhat surprised because we are not used to speaking in such terms in our region. But since I have broached this subject, I want to use words as they are being used and to state things frankly so that the citizens may come to know what I know. I also want those traffickers in Lebanon, those bloodletters, to understand that nothing can embarrass us in this region. We have transcended all complexes. We became

free a long time ago because we proceeded to build the party state, the revolutionary state, from the moment we won our independence and even before. We have based ourselves upon genuine nationalist foundations. Instead of trafficking in such things and thereby creating a problem for the Arab nation, they ought rather to have highlighted this aspect, making it an object of pride for the Arab nation. Christianity and Islam were both born in our country. This is not a burden or problem for us but rather a point of pride for our masses. It is in our country that these values were born and in order for us to be worthy of life, a nation worthy of both Islam and Christianity, we must be true to these values and must show the whole world that we are worthy of them.

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**Press conference statements by President Sadat of Egypt discussing cooperation with China and insisting on the indivisibility of the Arab cause<sup>88</sup>**

**Vienna, April 13, 1976**

*Q. What is Egypt's reaction to recent reports to the effect that Israel has nuclear weapons?*

*A. I have said many times already that this does not frighten us at all. We shall never be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area, and if Israel does so she will have to bear the consequences. But I repeat, this is something that does not frighten us at all.*

*Q. What is the new relationship with China, and when did it start?*

*A. As I said before, we realized that there was a danger of being unable to get spare parts for our armaments from the USSR and being unable to have our planes overhauled there, we contacted China and India, because they both use the same planes and overhaul them themselves. China's reply was positive: they sent us some MiG engines and spare parts and when we asked for more, saying that we were ready to pay for them, they*

<sup>88</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), April 14, 1976. President Sadat was in Austria at the end of a visit to Western Europe which included West Germany, France and Italy.

said we are not armaments dealers. As regards India, by virtue of the agreement with her the USSR would not permit her to supply us with anything. So of course we sent a delegation to China as an expression of our appreciation of their attitude and also to discuss ways of cooperating with them.

*Q. Have you had any personal contact with Mao Tse-tung?*

A. I wrote to Mao Tse-tung and thanked him personally and I thanked the Chinese government. The Egyptian delegation to China will be headed by the deputy president of the republic, and when he returns from China we shall see how much cooperation there can be between us and China.

*Q. Do you expect China to take part in the Middle East problem?*

A. I always say that we do not want to get involved in the game of the great powers or become a party to it.

*Q. Will you use your influence with the PLO to persuade it to adopt a more moderate attitude?*

A. I do not think that the PLO are extremists; they are moderates. It is not extremist to call for a secular state. They have always condemned acts of terrorism in Europe, the hijacking of planes and the OPEC operation here in Vienna.<sup>89</sup> Therefore I do not think that they are extremist at all. There may be some extremist elements, but the PLO itself is moderate.

*Q. What about the PLO's charter?*

A. If you put yourself in their place you would adopt the same attitude. They are a people who have been deprived of everything, even the most basic human rights, for 27 years. Let us be just with them and not judge them from one point of view. Let us give them something to grasp and accord them just and humane treatment, and I think that everything will go as well as could be wished.

*Q. Do you think that it would be easier to reach an agreement between Egypt and Israel than an agreement between Israel and the Arab world?*

A. No, no, the Arab cause is indivisible. It is

not a problem of Sinai or of the Golan. It is the problem of Palestine and if we solve that problem it will be easy to solve the other problems, including Sinai and the Golan. I am an Egyptian, but I am responsible not only for my own country, but also for the future of the Arab world. Egypt has historic responsibilities in the Arab world which she can never relinquish.

## 236

### **Press interview statement by Deputy Chairman Hussein of the Revolutionary Command Council of Iraq outlining the basis for Arab action in the conflict with Israel<sup>90</sup>**

**Baghdad, mid-April, 1976**

*Q. [On the effect of the situation in Lebanon on the Palestine cause, whether these incidents affect the general situation as regards resolving the crisis, and what is new in Iraq's attitude.]*

A. The basis on which liberation with expanding goals rests is linked to the expansion of the capabilities of the Arab nation.

There are therefore principles of liberation that require faith and strategy; there are goals, some of which are interim goals, and there are the prerequisites for the achievement of these goals.

There is nothing new in our basic attitude, but Iraq does not imagine that the liberation it calls for can be achieved by the establishment of a unified Arab state now on the ruins of Israel.

We do not reject everything, but we believe in achieving our goals by stages, on condition that they are linked to a clear strategic goal and the requirements of political action at the regional and national levels.

But the operation is constantly changing, and we do not know why Syria and Jordan should reject the Geneva conference when they have accepted the Security Council resolution.

There is always a dialectical relationship between the expansion of the strategic goal and what we do to achieve this, and the resources of the Arab nation cannot grow when certain regimes are taking action against the will to liberation.

<sup>90</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Rose al-Yusuf* (Cairo), April 19, 1976, p. 3.

<sup>89</sup> See doc. 338 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

The proper basis for political calculation is what President Bakr referred to when he said in July 1975.<sup>91</sup> "From concern for the unity of Arab efforts and Arab ranks action must be taken to mobilize military, economic and political resources within the framework of a serious and long term policy of struggle."

We believe that the time has come for the immediate establishment of a northern front consisting of Iraq and Syria, and that Iraqi forces should be stationed in Syrian territory.

We believe that the time has come for the Jordanian front to be opened in confrontation of the enemy and that it should be reinforced militarily and economically with additional Arab resources. We also believe that the Egyptian front should be supported with very extensive Arab economic resources.

We believe that the fighting and continuing massacres that are taking place in Lebanon are a negative operation as regards the mobilization of the energies and resources of the Arab nation for the battle of liberation, and an attempt to dissipate efforts.

## 237

### Agreement between Syria and the PLO on a ceasefire in Lebanon<sup>92</sup>

Damascus, April 16, 1976

President Hafez al-Assad received Messrs.: Yasser Arafat, head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Zuhair Muhsin, Farouq Qaddoumi, Naif Hawatmeh, Salah Khalaf and Abou Saleh. Also present were: 'Abdul-Halim Khaddam, General Naji Jamil and General Hikmat al-Shihabi. The situation in the area in general and in Lebanon in particular was passed in review, and all aspects of the crisis in Lebanon were analysed and the dangers of its continuing assessed, and there was agreement on all points. The two sides stressed their concern for the Lebanese people and for their security, the integrity of their territory and their stability, and agreement was reached on the following points:

1. That the fighting should stop and that a unified attitude should be adopted against any quarter that resumes military operations.
2. That the tripartite Syrian-Palestinian-Lebanese Higher Military Committee should be reconstituted to establish, implement and supervise the cease-fire until the election of the new President, who will decide on such security measures as he deems appropriate in accordance with his constitutional powers.
3. To oppose all forms of partition and any action or measures liable to impair the unity of the people and the territory of Lebanon.
4. To reject the Arabization of the Lebanese crisis, especially should it lead to the introduction of Arab forces.
5. To reject American solutions and plans for Lebanon.
6. That the Syrian initiative should continue.
7. To reject internationalization or the introduction of international forces into Lebanon.

## 238

### Communiqué issued after a meeting of the National Movement of Lebanon held to consider the PLO-Syria ceasefire agreement<sup>93</sup>

Beirut, April 17, 1976

The Lebanese national movement highly values the motives for and the results of the fraternal and nationalist endeavour by the leadership of the Palestine Revolution during its recent visit to Damascus in which it aimed at resolving the Lebanese crisis within an Arab, democratic and patriotic (watani) framework, and at dealing with the contradictions among the forces that must face united the US plans and schemes for Lebanon, the Palestinian cause and the Arab region as a whole. Placing on record the importance of the talks between the Palestine Revolution delegation and officials in the Syrian Arab Republic and the results achieved by these talks, the progressive and nationalist parties and forces again emphasize their commitment to the following principled positions:

- (1) Cessation of the fighting and the consolidation of the truce on all Lebanese territory. They are prepared to participate in all measures aimed

<sup>91</sup> See doc. 265 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>92</sup> *Al-Safir* (Beirut), April 17, 1976; English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), V, 3-4 (Spring-Summer 1976), p. 275.

<sup>93</sup> Broadcast on Beirut radio (Sanayi) in Arabic; English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5187/A/5; reprinted by permission.



at consolidating the cease-fire within the present positions, and especially in order to provide the necessary security in Beirut for the election of a new President and the resignation of the present President.

(2) To resist US and Zionist plans and schemes in Lebanon in all forms and formulas, plans which are aimed at emasculating the Palestine Resistance, containing the national movement, and supporting the isolationist forces so as to preserve their own positions and privileges and impose their hegemony on Lebanon.

(3) To resist all internationalization schemes and partition plans which constitute the last link in the chain of the plot by the isolationist forces against the Arabism of Lebanon and the destiny of its people.

(4) The Lebanese national movement, which is anxious to preserve its independence and the independence and Arabism of nationalist Lebanon, believes that it has the right to ask all Arabs to provide financial and moral support for the Lebanese people in their struggle to foil the plot that is being hatched against them and against the fraternal Palestinian people. In this context, they stress their rejection of the attempts to deal with the Lebanese crisis by embroiling Arab military forces in Lebanon, because this is likely to drive the crisis into labyrinths which ultimately will benefit only the isolationist forces and the internationalization plans. On the basis of this understanding of their Arab foundation, the nationalist forces renew their welcome for every Arab initiative, and especially the Syrian initiative, as soon as the new President is elected and a new government is formed.

(5) The security situation which constitutes one of the basic pivots necessary for the ending of the crisis Lebanon is experiencing is a purely Lebanese issue, and the new President will have to face it within this internal framework, relying on all the Lebanese forces and on the basis of rebuilding the institutions as soon as possible.

(6) The progressive and nationalist parties and forces place on record their satisfaction with the results of the joint meeting they held today with the leadership of the Palestine Revolution headed by Brother Yasir Arafat, during which they studied the results of the visit of the Palestinian delegation to Damascus and the agreement with the Palestinian brothers to unite all efforts. In this context,

they express their pride in the cohesion of destiny which exists between the two fraternal Lebanese and Palestinian peoples, and in the firm solidarity of struggle that exists between the Palestine Resistance and the Lebanese national movement. They hope that the national efforts being exerted by the leadership of the Palestine Revolution will lead to the return of cohesion to the national Arab ranks in the face of the common enemy.

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**Statements by presidential candidate Sarkis of Lebanon outlining his attitude to the Palestinian presence in Lebanon and considering ways of ending the civil war<sup>94</sup>**

**Beirut, April 28, 1976**

While the Lebanese themselves must shoulder the burdens of a new Lebanon, present-day Lebanon with all its weaknesses and its limited capabilities is called upon to support the Palestine resistance in the context of agreements concluded with it until such time as it can realize for the people of Palestine their full national rights in their homeland.

Lebanon, a pioneer of Arab renaissance to which it has contributed in the fields of knowledge, culture, literature and politics, is called upon now more than ever before to remain faithful to this legacy and to continue to play that pioneering role, as well as to strengthen its solidarity with its Arab brethren and to maintain the closest possible ties of brotherhood with fellow Arabs. These mutual ties of brotherhood were the reason for Syria's offer of support to Lebanon in overcoming its ordeal and for the sake of restoring the country's security and stability.

*Q. What are your opinions regarding Lebanese-Palestinian relations? Are you likely to conclude new pacts or agreements with the Palestine revolution?*

*A. I said in my statement that present-day Lebanon with its weakness and its limited capabilities is called upon to support the Palestine resis-*

<sup>94</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), April 29, 1976.

tance in the context of agreements concluded with it until such time as it can realize for the people of Palestine their full national rights in their homeland. My position is clear.

*Q. If you are elected president, will this mean that Lebanon will join the military confrontation against Israel?*

A. Lebanon is a signatory state of the Joint Defence Pact. This pact requires signatory states to view any attack on any Arab country as an attack on them all. This requires, to begin with, a restructured army. Once the army regains its capabilities, Lebanon will be bound by its membership of the Joint Arab Defence Council to implement the provisions of the Joint Defence Pact.

## 240

### **Press interview statements by Foreign Minister Fahmi of Egypt discussing Egypt's international relations and reacting to reports of a possible Israeli nuclear capability<sup>95</sup>**

**Cairo, late April, 1976**

*Q. In the last few years Egypt has been knocking at the doors of the US and Western Europe. And now, this week, she has knocked at the door of China. What is your appraisal of Egypt's international relations at present and their influence on the Arab-Israeli conflict? And on what foundations are these relations established?*

A. Egyptian foreign policy is determined by clearly defined goals in accordance with the following priorities:

1. The national security and independence of Egypt and her people.
2. The link between Egypt's national security and the security of the Arab nation, and sometimes there is no difference between the two.
3. The fact that Egypt belongs to various groupings whose moves at the international level are guided by the fact that they believe in the same principles and are linked by a long history and a common future and this gives them weight in the field of international politics. For example, Egypt belongs

to the group of Arab countries and to that of the African countries, and also to the non-aligned group. There are also her moves in connection with other groupings, such as the Islamic grouping and the Mediterranean countries.

All these elements are taken into account in Egypt's moves and in the formulation of her foreign policy. In practice this means that if Egypt takes a decision it is the result of the concern of those who take it for Egypt's national security and its relations to Arab national security. There is also the effect of the decision on the groupings we belong to and vice versa. This is a difficult and complicated balance to maintain, but the taking of decisions is made easier if there is clear-sightedness and if the achievement of the principal goals is borne in mind, in which case the decision becomes the natural result of the awareness of the political leadership and its understanding of the realities of Egypt's course of action, her position and her political and strategic weight in the Middle East, the Arab world, the non-aligned world and Africa and the repercussions of this on the European, American, Soviet and Asian worlds.

*Q. What does Egypt expect from China?*

A. It should be understood that to have no dealings with a state like China is a mistake amounting to a political crime. There is a simple reason for this. It is: How can we ignore a country with a population of 800 million—nearly a quarter of the population of the world. Egypt was the first country outside the socialist bloc to recognize China in 1956, and American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles punished her for doing so by withdrawing the offer to finance the High Dam. Later Egypt's relations with a quarter of the world were broken off or suspended. Was this in Egypt's interests? How could this be an Egyptian decision based on the maintenance of Egypt's national security?

Egypt was deprived of her will in this field for twenty years. President Abdal Nasser contacted Chou En-lai in 1955 and recognized China, but after that relations were suspended. What is happening at present in the way of an Egyptian move towards China is something quite natural. And, incidentally, China is neither an imperialist nor a capitalist country.

<sup>95</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), April 30, 1976.

*Q. What is your view of Egyptian-Soviet relations at present, now that the treaty has been abrogated?*<sup>96</sup>

A. We shall not step up our differences with the USSR. We acknowledge the aid the USSR has given us, but at the same time we are entitled to ask why the USSR has adopted this attitude to Egypt, the largest state in the Middle East, since the 1973 ceasefire? The answer to this question is to be found in Moscow, not in Egypt. We have made superhuman efforts to make the Soviet leaders change their attitude and then, as you know, they prevented India from supplying us with spare parts for armaments, and President Sadat decided to terminate the treaty.

All the same, in the future relations will follow a course appropriate to two countries in whose interests it is that cooperation and dialogue should continue, though if either party thinks that its interests lie elsewhere, this will naturally have an effect on relations.

*Q. There is a great deal of talk at present to the effect that Israel possesses the atomic bomb. Is this merely a war of nerves intended to frighten, or is there any truth in it?*

A. If you want an answer to this question on the basis of the principles I set out at the beginning of this interview, Egypt will do the following:

She will link any final solution of the conflict to fundamental matters related to the national security of our people and of the Arab nation, both now and in the long term. In the event of a final solution being reached, if we can imagine this coming about, Egypt will insist on certain fundamental points, including the following:

1. There must be an agreement on freezing immigration to Israel for a period of at least 50 years, because immigration increases Israel's population, which means that land must be found to accommodate it and Israel therefore resorts to expansionist aggression at the expense of the Arabs. So there must be an agreement on putting an end to the main cause of expansion.

2. Any settlement must be linked to an agreement on the kind and amount of armaments in Egypt and Israel, as far as traditional weapons are concerned. No settlement can be accepted under the shadow of the vast stockpile of traditional

armaments that Israel has obtained from the US while Egypt has nothing comparable. Any settlement must achieve a balance in traditional armaments.

3. In any settlement Egypt will insist that Israel undertake not to manufacture or obtain nuclear weapons and should sign and endorse the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which Egypt has already signed. She must also agree to accept neutral international inspection of her nuclear activities. As far as we are concerned, we are ready to accept the same conditions.

I stress that if Israel explodes a nuclear weapon, Egypt will obtain or manufacture the same weapon; this is settled at both the political and military levels. In such an event the responsibility will fall exclusively on Israel and those who assist her in this field. What is required of the international community, and especially of Western and American society, is that it should exert pressure on Israel to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

## 241

### **Statements by President Sadat of Egypt affirming support for the Palestine revolution and counting the economic cost of the continuing state of war**<sup>97</sup>

**Suez, May 1, 1976**

We hereby decisively affirm two fundamental points, in the face of which it is out of the question for us to stand idly by.

The first is that we are absolutely opposed to any attempt to partition Lebanon in any way and from any quarter.

The second is that we are absolutely opposed to any attempt to injure the Palestine revolution or to impair its freedom of will.

We have had our differences with various Palestinian organizations but in our differences we have never attempted to weaken their resolution or their freedom of will. This will always be our way with them, whether we agree or disagree with

<sup>96</sup> See docs. 66, 211, 215 and 216 above.

<sup>97</sup> Made in a speech to mark Labour Day; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), May 2, 1976.

them, until the people of Palestine, who are the basis of the problem, get what they want. We have indeed received comfort in this time of trial from the people of Palestine themselves. We received comfort from the Palestinian people who are suffering under the yoke of Israeli occupation, when the West Bank rose up like one man and took to the streets, men, women and children, crying out against the occupation, pelting its dirty face with stones and expressing their determination to regain their freedom and to be represented by the resistance; and making it clear that Israel had failed to tame them or bring them to heel as she had hoped to do.

While talking of the Arab situation, brothers and sisters, I must mention my trip to six other Arab countries in the Arab east. I must also mention briefly my recent trip to Europe. These two trips were of the greatest importance for economic reasons, even though what we wanted from our brothers in the east was different from what we wanted from the West. As you know, we are quite honestly faced with an acute and complicated economic crisis. It is not an economic tragedy, as some people are trying to make out. We face a crisis and economic difficulties which were bound to confront us following our intense concentration for many years on certain aspects of development, while others were neglected, and as a consequence of the 1967 war, and the enormous expenses of the years of endurance, the rebuilding of the armed forces, and finally the terrible exhaustion of resources in the October war. Then on top of all this we have not been able to lay down our arms—indeed, to ensure political victory we have to be prepared to learn the lessons taught by the battle and to be ready for any new fighting. As you know, we have been obliged to diversify our sources of arms so that our sons, both officers and men, may always have the best and most modern armaments. In addition to this, there has been the increase in world prices of everything. This has meant that the cost of subsidizing basic commodities has been 511 million pounds in the 1976 budget, a sum we are paying to establish a reasonable insulator between the terrible rise in world prices and the home market, so that the latter's situation may not get worse during the difficult period of building for the broad base of

our people.

But all this does not alter the fact that life for the overwhelming majority is not easy. This is why I announced the open door policy, because Egyptian supplies are not sufficient for us to carry out all the projects we want, and because we must learn and employ modern technology for the production of our requirements in the largest quantities and at the lowest costs.

As regards my trip to the Arab countries, I am happy to report that the Arab brothers I visited did not fail us, and as you know we are at present discussing with them how to organize the whole operation within the framework of an investment fund devoting an annual sum to the realization of the required projects.

During my trip to Western Europe I found a high degree of understanding on both the economic and political levels, and the Israeli position has been seriously shaken in countries which Israel thought were strongholds of her influence. Chancellor Schmidt of Germany, whom I visited first, showed the highest degree of political and economic understanding and offered more than 300 million marks for works Germany is undertaking this year—and all of them were eager to offer us their expertise in all fields—this applied to France, Italy, Yugoslavia and Austria alike.

The third trip, or rather the third move, which was also extremely successful, was the trip made by Deputy President Husni Mubarak to the People's Republic of China. The greeting sent by the Chinese people to the Egyptian people and transmitted by the deputy president, was a very impressive greeting, far beyond what could have been expected.

We concluded commercial and military agreements of the greatest importance with them. I take this opportunity, on your behalf and on behalf of all the people of Egypt, of sending, from the field of heroism here in Suez, to Chairman Mao and to the great people of China, an expression of our profoundest appreciation and admiration for their understanding and appreciation of our difficult circumstances which, with God's help, we shall certainly surmount.

**Statement issued by the National Movement of Lebanon outlining the causes of the war in Lebanon and the factors required for its settlement (excerpts)<sup>98</sup>**

**Beirut, May 4, 1976**

Now that the Lebanese crisis has reached this decisive turning point, the nationalist and progressive parties and forces believe it to be their duty to submit to popular public opinion a full list of all the facts that constitute the real basis of this crisis and of the factors at work in it both at the internal level and the Arab and international levels.

1. The Lebanese crisis would not have been so explosive and prolonged if the conflict that broke out in Lebanon had been merely an internal conflict between backward reactionary forces seeking to perpetuate the semi-feudal system of confessional privileges and progressive forces aiming at democratic change. It is a fact that the plan of those who sparked off the crisis more than a year ago linked the conflict that is in progress to the Palestine cause, which has made the Lebanese crisis a crucial and fateful national crisis not only for Lebanon but also for the Palestinian people and for the future of the Arab-Zionist conflict.

2. The American step-by-step policy made great strides along the road of preparing for capitulationist solutions through its efforts to withdraw Egypt from the field of the Arab-Zionist conflict, and to invalidate the role played by the socialist countries and the USSR in supporting the Arab liberation struggle and the national battle of the Arabs against the Zionist enemy. When this had been achieved, the immediate goal of the American-Zionist plan became the destruction of the Palestine resistance, so that the main obstacle to capitulationist solutions might be eliminated.

For more than a year attempts were made to achieve this goal in the Lebanese arena through the internal forces of repression and the activities of the armed isolationist forces. When these attempts failed—thanks to the endurance of the Palestine revolution and its cohesion with the

Lebanese nationalist movement—and, with the collapse of the state institutions and the establishment of nationalist control over more than 80 per cent of Lebanese territory containing the overwhelming majority of the Lebanese people, both Muslim and Christian, American policy turned its attention to the implementation of another aspect of the same conspiracy. The attempts that are at present being made on the pretext of the “security vacuum”, to call in external instruments of repression were intended to achieve the various interconnected aspects of the basic goal: to destroy the Palestine revolution, to emasculate the Lebanese National Movement in order to enable the isolationist forces to regain control of Lebanon and, finally, to deprive the Palestinian people of their right to self-determination in their own land, and to obliterate the independent Palestinian personality within a united Arab kingdom forming part of a wider confederation, which it is intended shall include Jordan along with the part of Palestinian territory which will be added to it. The confederation is also intended to absorb Lebanon by subjecting it to all kinds of outside hegemony with the acceptance and collusion of the isolationist forces inside the country.

3. In confrontation of this plan, which we shall henceforth call the American-Arab-Israeli plan, the Lebanese National Movement is to a great extent in agreement with an important aspect of the attitude contained in the statement<sup>99</sup> on the Middle East crisis issued by the Soviet government a week ago.

The USSR declares that what is happening in and around Lebanon is an attempt to destroy the Palestine revolution and that the plan that is being implemented within this framework is based on calling on certain Arab instruments to do its work for it, on the basis of Arabs being used to destroy Arabs. The Soviets also maintain that it is the disregard of the Palestinians and the refusal to recognize their right to self-determination and to establish their independent state that constitute the real basis of the Middle East crisis, and that all solutions are unacceptable and out of the question if they are not based on recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian people. This declaration by the USSR is an indication of solidarity with the Lebanese and Palestinian

<sup>98</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Muharris* (Beirut), May 5, 1976.

<sup>99</sup> Doc. 91 above.

peoples that is greatly appreciated by the National Movement which sees it as a form of support for its struggle at this difficult period in the history of Lebanon and the Arab area.

4. The Lebanese National Movement emphatically welcomed the Syrian initiative, believing that all the Lebanese would see it as helping them to reach a democratic national solution that would realize the essential national interests of the whole Lebanese people, protect the Palestine revolution and maintain the rights of the Palestinian people. But by deviating from the course it should have followed, the Syrian initiative has rendered itself incapable of the proper performance of the role of intermediary.

. . . . .

6. The nationalist and progressive parties and forces, while continuing their battle to frustrate the American-Arab-Israeli plan aimed at destroying the Palestine revolution and limiting the National Movement, today regard themselves, as they unswervingly pursue the course they have always followed, as being entitled to insist on the democratic national solution which offers the only way out of the crisis in which Lebanon is involved and which will achieve the following interconnected goals for the masses who have lost thousands of martyrs and made such vast sacrifices:

—Protect the Palestine revolution so as to enable it to continue its armed and political struggle for the liberation of its homeland and to establish the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination in their own territory and to build their independent national state.

. . . . .

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### **Press interview statements by PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi reviewing his visit to Japan and China<sup>100</sup>**

**Early May, 1976**

. . . . .

*Q. What about your talks with the Japanese prime minister and their results?*

A. Before our visit ended, we held extensive talks with Prime Minister Miki who affirmed Japan's support for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to create an independent state. He emphasized the necessity of Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and stated that Security Council Resolution 242 was inadequate for the establishment of a just and permanent peace in the Middle East because it ignores the national rights of the Palestinian people. The prime minister added that the people and government of Japan will offer constant support to the Palestinian people in their attempt to regain their national rights. Japan further agreed to the opening of a PLO office there. The delegation transmitted an oral message from Yasir Arafat to the prime minister to the effect that the PLO, in sending a delegation during these difficult times in Beirut, wishes to indicate the PLO's great appreciation for Japan's position and is determined to create a deep understanding between Japan and the PLO. The delegation invited Prime Minister Miki to visit the Middle East in the near future since direct talks between the prime minister and Yasir Arafat would further mutual understanding. The PLO office in Japan will be opened in the near future.

*Q. What is the attitude of the Japanese opposition parties to our Palestine cause?*

A. These opposition parties, which include the Japanese Communist Party, the Komi Party and the Democratic Socialist Party, supported the establishment of direct links with the PLO.

*Q. How was the PLO delegation received at the popular level?*

A. It was received warmly and was especially welcomed when we visited a shipbuilding yard near Tokyo. Our visit to Japan lasted seven days and was an occasion for the people of Japan to get to know our cause.

*Q. Brother Abu Lutf, you proceeded from Japan to the People's Republic of China. What can you tell us about that visit?*

A. We travelled to China on April 27. The first day, we held talks at the foreign ministry with the minister, the deputy prime minister and a member of the politbureau. Our Chinese friends reaffirmed their principled support for the Palestinian people, their return to their homeland and the establishment of a democratic state

<sup>100</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Filastin-al Thawra* (Beirut), May 9, 1976, p. 26.

throughout the homeland. They also emphasized their non-recognition of Israel. The Chinese officials expressed their desire to deepen the ties of friendship with the PLO.

*Q. How did your talks proceed with our Chinese comrades?*

A. Our talks were frank and characterized by deep mutual understanding. We exchanged views regarding recent events in the Middle East and the Chinese expressed their concern for Arab solidarity. The Palestinian delegation joined the friendly Chinese people in celebrating Labour Day on May 1. The delegation also examined certain aspects of the scientific and cultural progress in China. Our Chinese friends affirmed their continued support for the PLO at all levels, political, moral and material. They praised the struggle of the people of Palestine and their armed revolutionary course.

## 244

### **Press interview statements by PFLP spokesman Abu Sharif considering current developments<sup>101</sup>**

**Beirut, early May, 1976**

*Q. Is it true that Syria has clamped down an embargo on the supply of arms and ammunition to the National Movement in Lebanon? If so, what are you doing to overcome the blockade?*

A. Very frankly, Syria's peace initiative (which was transformed into an outright intervention in Lebanon with the aim of preventing the victory of the Progressive Forces and the containment of the Palestinian resistance) presented us with certain obstacles. This incursion enabled the fascists to obtain arms and ammunition through the port of Jounieh and elsewhere, while it did limit the free flow of supplies and ammunition to the Progressive Forces.

These obstacles are not deadly. In the long run, we have the means to overcome them. The course of the battle shows that the Progressive

Forces have dealt the fascists severe military blows, be it in the town or in the mountains. Simply put, such obstacles, though irksome, are not fatal. Besides, the overwhelming majority of the masses are on our side, which is a source of great support.

*Q. How do you view the recent talks of Fateh leader Hani el-Hassan in Cairo and President Anwar Sadat's initiative in convening the United Nations Security Council to discuss conditions in Israeli-occupied territory?*

A. The present battles in Lebanon are the natural outcome of the imperialist plan to impose a "peaceful settlement". This requires the unification of the Arab-Right to strike against and subdue the Arab revolution. Hence, we can never overlook the treacherous role of any of the Arab regimes—particularly Egypt, which typified Arab capitulation through the Sinai Agreement.<sup>102</sup> Egypt has:

- a) Relinquished the political-economic independence of the Arab nation
- b) Disowned the Palestinian cause
- c) Pursued a policy of non-confrontation with the political-economic interests of imperialism in the region
- d) Developed an organic relationship with the forces of reaction.

Briefly, all these developments are political-economic prerequisites for imperialism to exploit the resources of the region, particularly oil. They are underpinned by the recognition of Zionism's right to exist at the expense of the national rights of our people.

In short, the sum total of the above points incorporates the basic components of capitulation.

In view of this, we are quite weary of the latest attempts to build or to extend bridges towards this capitulationist regime. We caution against such a rapprochement that we view to be organically linked to the plot directed at the Palestinian resistance and the Arab liberation forces. We are witnessing the bloody and violent dimensions of this plot in Lebanon.

*Q. Is the Lebanese crisis drawing you closer to Fateh or vice versa?*

A. In the context of the Palestinian revolution, there still remain two main trends: The PLO, as represented by its present executive committee;

<sup>101</sup> Excerpted from the text of the interview conducted by Nadia Salti Stephan, *Monday Morning* (Beirut), May 9–15, 1976, pp. 12–13.

<sup>102</sup> Doc. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

and the Rejection Front. In the course of the present battle—the reactionary plot to quell our movement—we have witnessed the development of unity among the militants of the various organizations to confront the fascists.

Naturally, relations with Fateh have also improved. In fact, we have decided to engage in a dialogue to coordinate our efforts in foiling the imperialist plot against the revolution in Lebanon.

Furthermore, the dialogue must probe into the reasons behind the differences that have existed ever since the October War. If in the course of our dialogue there occurs a development whereby Fateh clearly and officially declares itself to be out of the framework of the settlement, we will then be witnesses to a strong unity predicated on the correct political line.

*Q. What do you expect from the current Security Council meetings? Don't you think that they draw the attention of world public opinion to the plight of the Palestinian people under Israeli occupation?*

A. As a people struggling to liberate our homeland, it is our right to use all channels—be they informational, political or military to expound and forward our cause. In this context, the U.N. is one such forum. However, we must be cautious—why, how and for what purpose are we to make use of any of these channels? As long as we are serving the cause of liberation, without compromising on matters of principle, the U.N. could also serve our cause.

*Q. What is the significance of the uprising in occupied territory? Do you expect this uprising and the events in Lebanon to have repercussions on the Arab confrontation states?*

A. Our people throughout occupied Palestine have been engaged in the largest and broadest uprising against the Zionist enemy since 1948. The uprising has lasted for more than two months and it continues to grow and develop. It is obvious that Israel has gotten the message. There can be no peace as long as there exists a Zionist, racist entity. In Galilee, Nazareth, Haifa, Ramallah, Jeneen, Jerusalem and Nablus, the people have declared their opposition to the Zionist, racist entity. Instead they have made public their solution, namely the establishment of a democratic Palestine that resolves and encompasses the interests and rights of the Jews, Moslems and Christians.

Briefly, our masses' revolt is like a time-bomb clicking in the womb of Israeli society. As it acquires a broader perspective, it poses itself as the genesis of a new order, a new social system that is a negation of the racist, Zionist entity. Occupied Palestine is pregnant with a new social order, i.e. a democratic Palestine. The tide is irreversible.

As regards the impact of these developments, coupled with the ramifications of the battles in Lebanon, we already notice that the internal contradictions of Syria are on the rise. This fact explains the partial retreat of the Syrians from their offensive in Lebanon. Moreover, demonstrations in support of the resistance movement and the Progressive Forces of Lebanon have taken place in various Arab countries. This also has left quite an imprint.

However, so as not to sound presumptuous, we do not anticipate major revolts in the other countries tomorrow. We are satisfied as a Palestinian revolution to have set in motion the process of revolution in the whole region.

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### **Communiqué issued after a meeting of the Syria-Jordan Higher Command Council (excerpt)<sup>103</sup>**

**Damascus, May 10, 1976**

The Syrian-Jordanian Higher Command Council held its third round of meetings in Damascus from 8th to 10th May. The Council's discussions dealt with the following:

1. The Higher Command Council approved all the decisions, measures and steps taken by the Syrian-Jordanian joint Higher Committee on the path of co-ordination and integration between the two fraternal countries to achieve the cherished unity between them on the firmest and strongest bases. The two leaders blessed the achievements attained in the service of the great national goal and the mutual interests of the one people in the two countries. They issued instructions to go

<sup>103</sup> Broadcast on Amman radio in Arabic; partial English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5206/A/3-4; reprinted by permission.



ahead with the next steps in accordance with the programme agreed on by the two leaders.

2. The Council reviewed conditions in the area and the current Arab situation, and the two leaders' opinions on and assessments of events and their aspirations stemming from their unified national position were in agreement, identical and as one. The Council is of the opinion that the continuation of the explosive situation in the Middle East which endangers security in the area and the whole world is due to the Zionist enemy's insistence on seizing the land and the assistance and support it is getting in refusing to implement UN resolutions, especially complete withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and the guaranteeing of the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

The Council discussed means to enable the PLO to carry out its responsibilities at the national and international levels. The two leaders paid special attention to the brave popular uprising in the occupied Arab territory against the Israeli occupation and its daily practices to suppress the Palestinian Arab people's will for liberation as well as its recurrent aggression against the holy places and its flagrant plans to Judaize those territories.

The Council reviewed conditions in fraternal Lebanon. The two leaders expressed their profound pain over the bloody tragedy which had befallen the fraternal country and asserted their conviction that Lebanon and the area had been exposed to a grave plot aimed at fragmenting fraternal Lebanon.

King Husayn stressed his absolute support for the major role played by Syria under the direction of President Hafiz al-Asad to foil the plot, safeguard Lebanon's unity and independence and restore stability to it.

The two leaders expressed the hope that everyone in fraternal Lebanon would rise to the level dictated by domestic (watani) and national (qawmi) responsibilities so that Lebanon could resume its normal march in an atmosphere of fraternity, amity and stability now that a new President had been elected. They asserted their eagerness that the coming phase should result in the removal of all the causes and traces of the ordeal.

The Council decided to hold its next meeting in Amman in August.

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**Communiqué issued by the Command of the Palestine revolution accusing Syria of breaking the ceasefire agreement between it and the PLO (excerpts)<sup>104</sup>**

**Beirut, May 14, 1976**

Since the Damascus Agreement<sup>105</sup> the Command of the Palestinian Revolution has strictly adhered to the cease-fire and made every effort to facilitate the finding of a political solution in an atmosphere of quiet and stability. However, the isolationist side has launched an organized military attack on all fronts, with the clear intention of upsetting the security situation, exploiting the nationalist movement's adherence to its unilateral truce decision and the resistance's commitment to enforce the Damascus Agreement.

Not content with military escalation, especially after the session to elect the President, the isolationists have proceeded to launch a political attack, alluding to the security vacuum and the Palestinian presence, and suggesting that the problem might be Arabized and that Syrian or other Arab and international forces might be brought in.

It was against the background of attempts to thwart this obvious conspiracy that fighting broke out in Tripoli between the nationalist forces and the forces of the Ba'th Party Organization, supported by forces of the Palestine Liberation Army and elements of Sa'iqa. There were also regrettable incidents in Beirut which led to the shelling of Burj al-Barajneh camp and the western part of the city by elements of the Syrian forces and to the entry of Syrian forces without the knowledge of the Palestinian revolution command. The Palestinian command has therefore held two meetings this afternoon to study the deterioration of the situation on the isolationist front and the nationalist front.

In the light of its desire to correct the relations between Syria, the nationalist movement and the Palestinian revolution, and from a desire to restore this alliance so that it may be in a position to

<sup>104</sup> *Wafa* (Beirut), May 14, 1976; partial English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), V, 3-4 (Spring-Summer 1976), pp. 281-282.

<sup>105</sup> Doc. 237 above.

smash the imperialist conspiracy aimed at Arabizing the conflict in Lebanon with respect to the nationalist forces, Syria and the resistance, and from its determination to implement the provisions of the Damascus Agreement in full, the Palestinian command has decided:

1. To condemn all the acts of violence that preceded the Tripoli incidents against the PLA and the occupation of the office of the Ba'ath Party Organization. Also to condemn the bombardment by Syrian and Sa'iqa forces of Tripoli, Burj al-Barajneh camp and the western part of Beirut with artillery and rockets, and to call on all parties to abide by the decisions of the Lebanese-Palestinian Joint Commission of Inquiry calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of Syrian forces.

2. To warn the command of the Palestine Liberation Army not to throw the PLA, without the knowledge of the political command, into battles with the nationalist and progressive forces which have given the lives of their young men in defence of the Palestinian revolution and the Palestinian presence, and to hold the command responsible for involving the PLA in any task other than the goal for which these forces were created... and to call on the Executive Committee to exert its authority over this army and its command.

3. The Palestinian Command affirms that it is closely united with the nationalist movement and that it is fighting with it in the same trench against all attempts to liquidate or cripple it.

4. To call on the Syrian command to withdraw its barricades from the streets and ports, on land and sea, and to condemn the conduct of the elements manning these barricades who are arresting members of the Palestinian organizations, or picking quarrels with the nationalist forces, and to release members of these forces who have been arrested.

5. From our concern for Syria, the nationalist movement and the Palestinian revolution, we call on the Syrian command to beware of the conspiracy that is making every effort to push Syria into a bloody conflict with the nationalist movement and the Palestinian revolution. We therefore call for a thorough reappraisal of all that is going on so that close unity may be reestablished between the nationalist movement, the resistance and Syria, and so that all schemes aimed at breaking this firm triple unity may be frustrated.

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**Statement by Prime Minister Jallud of Libya reiterating Libya's support for the PLO and the National Movement of Lebanon (excerpt)<sup>106</sup>**

**Beirut, May 18, 1976**

The September Revolution supports the nationalist movement, the Lebanese Arab Army and the Palestinian resistance with all its strength. Political confessionalism must be abolished and there must be no tutelage over the nationalist movement, the Lebanese Arab Army and the Palestinian revolution.

Those who oppose the nationalist movement, the Lebanese Arab Army and the Palestinian revolution, and those who try to prevent the nationalist movement and the Lebanese Arab Army from exploiting victory to build the new Lebanon in which every Lebanese, Muslim or Christian, feels that he has the right to political, social, economic and cultural life and that he belongs to the Arab nation, are the enemies of the Libyan Arab Republic.

We believe that the national interest requires that Syria and the nationalist movement should be reunited; this can only be achieved through candid dialogue, with each party respecting the other's views and enabling the Lebanese to solve their own problems. The Libyan Arab Republic is profoundly concerned for the unity, security and stability of Lebanon.

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**Press interview statement by Phalangist Politbureau member Pakradouni discussing the need for an Arab summit conference<sup>107</sup>**

**Beirut, May 21, 1976**

. . . . .

*Q. How do you view postponement of the Riyad Conference for Syrian-Egyptian reconciliation?*

<sup>106</sup> Made after a meeting with leaders of the PLO and the Lebanese National Movement, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), May 19, 1976; partial English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), V, 3-4 (Spring-Summer 1976), pp. 286-287.

<sup>107</sup> Excerpted from the text, *Monday Morning* (Beirut), May 24, 1976, p. 26.

A. In the first place, I certainly hope the Arabs are not going to get involved in an axis struggle. I hope the postponement was aimed at helping to create one solid Arab front rather than conflicting fronts.

Secondly, I think the main objective of the Riyadh meeting was to unify Arab positions on the Sinai Agreement rather than to work out a solution to the Lebanese crisis—unless both questions are linked.

I feel an Arab Summit is needed. It will provide a forum for the Arabs to air their differences and reach agreement on the future course of their cause. As for the Riyadh Conference, I feel the postponement was good if the meeting was going to exacerbate Arab differences and lead to the creation of opposing camps.

The meeting was postponed, in my estimation, because of continued conflicts and unresolved problems among the Arabs. I certainly hope a meeting will be held and agreement reached because the future of Lebanon hinges on Arab cooperation and on the setting up of a united Arab front. The destiny, of the Palestine cause, in turn, is linked to the settlement of the Lebanese crisis. I am afraid the Lebanese crisis will become a major problem in itself, diverting attention from the central problem.

I do not want to get too involved in this analysis, because I might end up saying that some people discovered the Palestine problem was too big for them to solve. So they tailored smaller problems to fit their size. For this reason, among others, I feel the crisis in Lebanon is detrimental to the Arabs. It should also be remembered that Lebanon is an Arab country and the Lebanese are Arabs. The reproach of Lebanon is the reproach of the Arabs. Instead of completing the victory they started achieving in October, 1973, the Arabs are gradually losing ground because of the Lebanese crisis. Only by putting a quick end to the Lebanese crisis will the Arabs be able to conserve the gains of the October War.

Consequently, it is imperative that the Arabs meet, be it in Riyadh or elsewhere, to take steps to end the Lebanese crisis within the framework of the Syrian initiative in order to preserve the gains of their October War.

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**Press interview statements by Progressive Socialist Party leader Junblat of Lebanon reiterating support for the front of rejection states<sup>108</sup>**

**Beirut, May 21, 1976**

*Q. Why do you think Iraq, Algeria and Libya have waited so long to come out, openly, in favor of the Lebanese National Movement? Isn't their support rather too late?*

A. This support did not come too late. On the contrary, it was conveyed the minute isolationist aggression on Palestinian camps and the National and Progressive Parties took place. Iraq, for instance, sent its envoy more than once. Libya was invariably in solidarity with us and so were Algeria, Kuwait and others. But the recent reiteration of this collective support is important probably because it came at a time when contradictions between the National Movement and the Baath Party regime in Syria had emerged over objectives and a work plan.

*Q. In this perspective, what is your reaction to the postponement of the Riyadh Conference intended to reconcile Egypt and Syria? Do you think the said conference will still take place? If it does, wouldn't Egyptian-Syrian reconciliation have positive effects in the Arab world?*

A. I think adjournment was a sequel to the visit (last week) of Libyan Prime Minister Abdul-Salam Jalloud to Beirut and Damascus, his meetings with the National Movement in Lebanon, his subsequent trips to Baghdad and Damascus and his announcement of the project to set up the *Front of Rejective States*. Our friend Ali Ghanam, the representative of sisterly Iraq, has talked about this. All these factors contributed to the adjournment of the Riyadh Conference. The sponsors of the *Front of Rejective States* hope that Syria, which is a confrontation state, will join this group of states which reject partial settlements, capitulationist solutions and, as a matter of fact, any solution which does not enable the repatriation of at least the Palestinian Arabs evicted from their homes.

<sup>108</sup> Interview conducted by Nadim Abu Ghannam; excerpted from the text, *Monday Morning* (Beirut), May 24, 1976, p. 19.

*Q. What about the effects of Egyptian-Syrian reconciliation on the unity of Arab ranks?*

A. Setting up the *Front of Rejective States* contradicts the projected Riyadh parley, or, at least it contradicts the objectives of the said parley. Nevertheless, I personally think the parley could prove beneficial and I hope it will succeed fully.

*Q. Why have Jalloud's talks in Lebanon been so controversial in that some papers claimed he extended support to the National Movement in war and peace while other media said he supported Syria and its initiative in Lebanon?*

A. Libyan Prime Minister Maj. Abdul-Salam Jalloud was fully and unequivocally convinced of our point of view. The best proof was the repeated meetings he had with us. I can't say more.

*Q. Does the fact that you met President-elect Elias Sarkis this week in the presence of PLO leader Yasser Arafat indicative of full solidarity between the PLO and the Lebanese National Movement or of the PLO's eagerness to play the role of a mediator in the Lebanese crisis?*

A. My meeting with His Excellency President Elias Sarkis started as a *tête-à-tête*. Brother Abou Ammar arrived 45 minutes later, as agreed earlier. I intended to excuse myself and leave to allow for another *tête-à-tête* between President Sarkis and Abou Ammar. But both of them asked me to stay and I did. The meeting was in response to an initiative extended to us. The Palestinian Resistance and the Lebanese National Movement are in full and continued agreement.

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### **Resolution of the Arab Front Participating in the Palestine Revolution regarding the crisis in Lebanon<sup>109</sup>**

**Beirut, May 22, 1976**

1. The Front regards the events in Lebanon as a link in the chain of the US conspiracy to strike at the Palestinian Revolution, in order to implement the capitulationist US settlement of the Middle East question.

2. The Front salutes the steadfastness and unity

between the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese National Movement.

3. The Front is apprehensive as regards foreign intervention which aims to reestablish the balance of forces in favour of the isolationist forces. It sees the Syrian military intervention in Lebanon as an additional complicating factor in the Lebanese crisis, one which may lead to a conflict among forces that should be united in opposing the capitulationist settlements aimed at striking at the Palestinian revolution in its central base, Lebanon. For this reason, the Front calls for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, so that good relations between Syria and the Lebanese national movement can be reestablished, thus enabling Syria to play its natural role in supporting the struggle of the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples against the isolationist conspiracy. The Front also calls for the lifting of all forms of blockade on the national movement and the Palestinian revolution.

4. The Front adopts the stand of the Lebanese National Movement, which regards the security question as a Lebanese one that can only be solved on the basis of a national democratic political solution within the framework of reestablishing Lebanese institutions.

5. The Front declares its full support for the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese national movement and its concern for their independence and their rejection of all types of tutelage and containment. The Front affirms that it is the right of the national movement to struggle for a democratic, non-sectarian Arab Lebanon which will form the cornerstone in the struggle of all nationalist Arabs.

6. The Front will implement this support by declaring June 9 and 10 days of Arab solidarity with the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese national movement. It also calls on all the governments and parties of participating countries to take a public political stand supporting the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese national movement.

7. The Front decides to call for a meeting of the General Council as soon as possible in order to prepare a plan of political and material Arab support for the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese national movement.

<sup>109</sup> English text, *Wafa* (Beirut), May 24, 1976, 1st bulletin pp. 2-3.

251

**Statement issued by the National Movement of Lebanon rejecting France's offer to send troops to Lebanon (excerpts)<sup>110</sup>**

Beirut, May 23, 1976

The statements by the French president on his country's readiness to send a French force to Lebanon with a view to filling the "security vacuum" is a dangerous move in the direction of the adoption of international attitudes that can only lead to the further complication of the Lebanese crisis.

. . . . .

In the light of the above the National and Progressive Parties and Forces reaffirm their insistence on the following points:

1. The National Movement unequivocally rejects French military intervention in Lebanon and calls on the French authorities, in their dealings with the Lebanese crisis, to abide by the French policy of sympathy with the Arab world and with the interests and struggles of its peoples. This will be in conformity with the ancient democratic traditions of the French people and will strengthen their friendship with our people and with all the Arab peoples.

2. The National Movement again rejects the presence of any military force, Arab, foreign or international, on Lebanese territory and reaffirms its insistence that the security problem in Lebanon is a purely Lebanese problem that can only be dealt with as an internal affair on the basis of a democratic national solution and through the reconstruction of Lebanese institutions and in cooperation with the Palestine revolution. Starting from the basis of a genuine political solution of the crisis, the National Movement sees no reason why the army and the security forces should not be reorganized in such a way as to enable them to maintain security.

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**Communiqué issued by the PLO rejecting the sending of military units from France to Lebanon<sup>111</sup>**

Beirut, May 24, 1976

The Palestinian leadership has followed with great concern the latest declarations of French President Giscard d'Estaing after his talks with the US president regarding the sending of French military forces to Lebanon.

The Palestinian Command has long since noted the danger of such interventions in Lebanon, and sees that they aim first and foremost at striking at the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese National Movement, in spite of the justifications and rationales put forward. Thus the Palestinian leadership stresses the following:

1. Total rejection of any military intervention by France or any other country, considering it as aimed at the Palestinian revolution and a plot against it.

2. President Giscard d'Estaing's statements after his talks with the US president show that this intervention constitutes an implementation by French hands of US plans after the Palestinian revolution and the national forces have demonstrated their ability to foil all US and Zionist conspiracies. The Palestine revolution will face this with the same firmness and determination with which it has faced all previous conspiracies.

3. The new French position is a change in the nature of the relations between France and our Arab area. In asking France to reconsider such an irresponsible position and to adhere to correct ones, we call on all Arab countries to take the necessary measures to prevent this military intervention in Lebanon.

<sup>110</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), May 24, 1976. See doc. 105 above.

<sup>111</sup> English text, *Wafa* (Beirut), May 24, 1976, 1st bulletin, pp. 1-2. See doc. 105 above.

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**Message from Foreign Minister Bouteflika of Algeria to UN Secretary-General Waldheim regarding the possibility of France sending an expeditionary force to Lebanon<sup>112</sup>**

Algiers, May 25, 1976

The position taken by the French Government concerning the dispatch of an expeditionary force to Lebanon is likely to aggravate the Lebanese crisis in view of the tension which already prevails in the Middle East area. This position introduces a very dangerous precedent in the practice of international relations and one which is in flagrant contradiction with the fundamental principles of the United Nations concerning respect for political independence, national unity, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. Based on the spirit of colonial re-conquest, examples of which were provided in 1956 and 1958 in the form of direct intervention in the same area, it serves to confirm the development of a strategy involving a new distribution of tasks in the imperialist intervention in various regions of the third world.

It is significant in this respect that the threat of direct French intervention was made from United States territory at a time when the Lebanese political forces are making every effort to reach a solution within a strictly national framework. This scheme of foreign intervention is bound to create understandable apprehensiveness not only in the Arab world but in all third-world countries, particularly in the non-aligned countries, whose concerns are precisely to ensure respect for independence, the safeguarding of national unity and territorial integrity and the guarantee of a nation's security when faced with foreign interference and intervention. Since these threats have grave implications for international peace and security, I am certain, Sir, that you will not fail to make every effort to discourage a venture which is incompatible with any code of international morality and which is calculated to undermine seriously the very basis of the Charter of the United Nations, international détente, and, above all, the rules of conduct which should govern relations between large and small States.

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**Speech by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat made before the Non-Aligned Ministerial Coordination Bureau<sup>113</sup>**

Algiers, June 1, 1976

My visit to the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria and its militant leader Houari Boumedienne offers me a suitable opportunity to salute your conference in the name of our steadfast people and of the PLO and to express our appreciation for all your efforts to consolidate the firm bases and principles of the movement of non-aligned states in a world where economic and political blocs prevail. There is no doubt that your movement has proved its effectiveness in international conferences and in all political and economic fields. You have assisted struggling peoples to achieve their freedom, independence and sovereignty over their land, and have fought all forms of colonialism and racial discrimination.

You have the honour to contribute in international conferences towards the liberation of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and you have supported all liberation movements in the world.

And today, we can see in your movement states which, only yesterday, were still under the yoke of occupation and colonialism, and from which these have now been eliminated for all time, thanks to your support for their militant peoples.

Gentlemen, the question of Palestine has been and continues to be a question which has gained the interest of your movement since its establishment; and today it takes a prominent place in the work of your conference, representing an axis of the Arab-Israeli conflict and of the Middle East struggle.

The struggle of our Palestinian people has won your support in all forms and in all fields, enabling us to continue our just and legitimate struggle. I am fully confident that you, and your free militant peoples, will continue your support for our people in their just struggle to regain their inalienable national and patriotic rights.

There is no scope here for going into details regarding the latest developments, but I must praise here before you the great uprising of our

<sup>112</sup> Un doc. A/31/95, Annex. See also doc. 105 above.

<sup>113</sup> English text, *Wafa* (Beirut), June 2, 1976, 2nd bulletin, pp. 1-4.

people under the yoke of occupation, against the Zionist occupier in Palestine. The on-going revolutionary uprising is unequivocal proof of the direction taken by our people along their long and difficult path. It also shows our people's determination to reject the occupation of their homeland.

The elections, intended to put their puppets in official positions so that they might execute the conspiracy of self-rule announced by the Zionist minister of defence, were turned into a referendum on the integrity of these people and their support for their revolution. They proved, in fact, that the people are with the revolution and its militants, and that the PLO is their organization and their sole official spokesman. Thus one of the many on-going conspiracies against them was foiled.

The bloody conspiracies taking place in Lebanon today against the Palestinian revolution and the Palestinian and Lebanese people form a link in the chain of Israeli-imperialist conspiracies to Balkanize the region, Arabize the struggle and turn it into inter-Arab killing in the style of Vietnam: in other words, the Vietnamization of the war.

The US imperialist Zionist role was revealed, and further clarified, when the French president—after meeting with President Ford—announced his readiness to send French troops to Lebanon and to despatch certain units of the French fleet to reinforce the US Sixth Fleet currently inside Lebanese territorial waters. The aim behind such a move is to reinforce and impose the dangerous Balkanization, partition and Arabization plan, which entails tying down the Lebanese national and progressive movement and the Palestinian revolution, and overlooking the gains they have realized at great sacrifice.

But in spite of that, our people in occupied Palestine and outside it will continue to resist firmly and with unshakeable conviction all forms of oppression and all attempts to conspire against it.

Mr. President, once again, I refer to the great role played by your militant country in moving the non-aligned movement forward and in making a positive contribution towards the solution of many contemporary international questions.

You personally have had considerable influence at international conferences, in helping realize the hopes and aspirations for which the movement

of non-aligned states gave you responsibility when you headed the 29th session of the UN General Assembly. I still recall the great role you played during that session on behalf of our Palestinian cause.

That representation was intended to honour the struggle of your people and of all militant peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Once again, I wish your meetings every success in preparation for the Sri Lanka summit.

## 255

### **Cable from PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi to Arab League General Secretary Riyadh condemning Syria's intervention in Lebanon and calling for a meeting of the Arab League foreign ministers<sup>114</sup>**

Beirut, June 2, 1976

Over the past 14 months since the beginning of the dangerous crisis in Lebanon, the PLO has exerted the utmost effort with all concerned parties, in order to arrive at a political solution which would re-establish normal life in this country and safeguard its national unity, independence and progress.

But the dangerous results of outside intervention and continuous provocations at times pushed the situation towards military escalation, and at others towards a critical deterioration, preventing the success of these efforts whenever the crisis began to ease.

In spite of our pointing many times to the dangers of external and military intervention, it has become clear that the Syrian initiative is no longer able to achieve peace in Lebanon, and that this initiative, which completed its role by electing a new president of Lebanon, has lately involved dangerous measures undertaken by the Syrian authorities on the military level, whereby they advanced extensive armoured forces, in numbers exceeding any possible justification, and which are clearly moving towards the possibility of a dangerous clash with the Palestinian revolution. This, therefore, necessitates a concerted Arab move to play an immediate role, so that Syria alone does not bear the responsibilities and con-

<sup>114</sup> English text, *Wafa* (Beirut), June 2, 2nd bulletin, pp. 4-5.

sequences resulting from these dangerous possibilities.

The PLO, impressed by the implications of dangerous present circumstances and the necessity to work rapidly to end the expansion of the conflict and its escalation, which has taken an entirely new aspect threatening Arab solidarity as a whole, sees an urgent need for the holding of a rapid emergency Arab meeting on the foreign minister level to find a solution that would avert the possibilities of clashes between brothers, and would save Lebanon from its tribulations, laying down bases guaranteeing the stability, security and unity of the country and avoiding any attempt to impose a solution on any party.

Arriving at a peaceful solution of the Lebanese crisis based on the love, tolerance and participation of all is a necessity imposed by common Arab interests so as to protect the security of this country which was, and still is, the refuge of every Arab and the fortress of the Palestinian revolution.

We affirm that it is our national and patriotic duty to stress our firm and forceful stand with the fraternal Lebanese people against any threat to their freedom, honour, independence and unity.

The PLO feels that it is essential to hold an Arab summit meeting before the 5th summit conference of the Non-Aligned Bloc, so that the Arab world may stand on a firm base in its relations with its friends, and in its confrontation with the Zionist enemy and its allies, and so as to strengthen its solidarity embodied in the October War of Liberation.

The PLO while revealing the danger of this situation to you and urging that the Arab states are also informed thereof, requests you to convene an urgent conference of Arab foreign ministers as rapidly as possible.

256

**Decisions adopted at a joint meeting of the Palestine resistance and the National Movement of Lebanon held to discuss Syria's military intervention in Lebanon<sup>115</sup>**

Beirut, June 2, 1976

A joint meeting took place at noon today between the Lebanese National Movement and the

Palestinian revolution, during which the political and military developments in Lebanon were discussed, and the following decisions adopted:

*First:* The Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese National Movement affirm their political stand and their unified struggle in rejecting and resisting Syrian military occupation of Lebanon.

*Second:* Active joint measures will be taken in coordination between the Palestinian resistance, the Lebanese National Movement and the Lebanese Arab Army to confront the military aggression against the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples.

*Third:* The Syrian regime is responsible for the grave results of any clashes between the Syrian occupation forces and the Palestinian revolution and Lebanese National Movement.

*Fourth:* To carry on the internal political popular campaign to raise the voice of the Lebanese and Palestinian masses in rejecting the occupation, starting with a general strike on June 6 throughout Lebanon, and to ensure that all Lebanese political personalities and forces, official or non-official, shoulder their responsibilities and take a definite stand towards this occupation.

*Fifth:* To continue Arab and international political activity to secure broad Arab and international support for the national movement and the Palestinian revolution, as well as calling on the Arab states to take a frank official stand as regards Syrian military intervention in Lebanon, calling also on the Arab masses to raise their voices against this intervention, which harms not only Lebanon, but the joint national destiny of the Arab masses.

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**Memorandum from Foreign Minister Fahmi of Egypt to the General Secretariat of the Arab League regarding the current situation in Lebanon (excerpts)<sup>116</sup>**

Cairo, June 3, 1976

Egypt has constantly called for an end to the unmistakable outside intervention in the internal

<sup>115</sup> English text, *Wafa* (Beirut), June 2, 1976, 2nd bulletin, p. 9.

<sup>116</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), June 4, 1976.



affairs of Lebanon and attempts to add fuel to the fire, and for a collective Arab move to help rather than destroy Lebanon, protect rather than divide her, to bring her people closer together rather than aggravate the violent differences between them and feed the flames of confessional hatred.

When Kuwait called for an emergency meeting of the Arab foreign ministers to consider the situation, and to propose ways of dealing with the crisis collectively, it was all these considerations that induced the majority of the Arab governments to support the Kuwaiti initiative. You will recall that at the meeting of the Council on October 15, 1975, I made it clear that Egypt's attitude was based on the following principles:

1. That all kinds of outside intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon should cease.
2. That it should be replaced by a collective Arab effort, ensuring better control and greater objectivity.
3. That Israel should be warned against exploiting the incidents in Lebanon.
4. That our attitude to the various parties depends first and foremost on the extent of their commitment to maintain the Arab character of Lebanon.
5. Rejection of any suggestion of partition and isolationism.

6. Rejection of anything that could injure the Palestine revolution or in any way prejudice the interests of the Palestinian people.

However, certain parties known to all of us have opposed these collective Arab efforts, regarding it as a challenge to their vain claims, through which they have tried to take over the direction of the move. We have been hearing some very strange things, reminiscent of the ideas of the 19th century that used to see countries as spheres of influence and treat peoples as if they were playthings in a great game in which their role was restricted to submitting and obeying the orders of those who had absolute power.

Regrettably some quarters have gone along with these claims, either of their own free will or under compulsion, or from indecision and failure to rise to the challenge and their responsibilities. Although on October 16, 1975, the Council of Arab Foreign Ministers adopted a resolution<sup>117</sup> in which it declared its profound regret at what was hap-

pening and urged the Arab states to maintain the sovereignty of Lebanon and the unity of its territory and people, Arab and foreign intervention has continued and escalated until it has become a cancer eating away Lebanon, its institutions and its values, so that to condone it is as great a crime as the crime itself.

Not content with reiterating her attitude and refusing to be drawn into the game of intervention, Egypt has made urgent representations to the parties concerned in the hope that they might take the reins into their own hands and resolve the differences between them by their own efforts. With the situation even more tense and explosive as a result of outside intervention, it became clear that there was no alternative to a joint Arab effort to replace aggression against Lebanon and the instigation of its people to fight in return for base advantages, by a dialogue governed by logic and creating a common denominator on which all the Lebanese can agree, with the exception of an inconsiderable minority. This common denominator being the belief that both the short and the long term interests of Lebanon and her people lie in putting a stop to the bloodshed before it goes beyond the previously inconceivable level it has reached already.

Egypt, therefore, proposed another initiative on March 28, 1976, after all aspects of the situation had been studied by the National Security Council which met with President Muhammad Anwar Sadat in the chair. This initiative was to the effect that a token joint Arab security force should be sent to Lebanon to restore peace and quiet and to transfer the conflict from the battlefield to the negotiating table.

Perhaps the gravest aspect of this state of affairs, and one that requires that we take rapid and decisive action, is the fact that this new situation is a threat to the very existence of something the preservation of which is a sacred duty while any attempt to harm it is a crime. This is the Palestine revolution, which, as we all agree, it is our national duty to protect and support in every way, rather than stabbing it in the back and doing the enemy's work by rendering it ineffective and immobilizing it.

Those who were responsible for this intervention, and later for its escalation, should have realized that it was predestined to fail, that it

<sup>117</sup> Doc. 313 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

contains the seeds of its own collapse and that it brings discredit on all who take part in it or connive at it or show it any indulgence. It is suspect in both its planning and its implementation. It is suspect as regards the results it aims at, and suspect as regards those accomplices who have supported it, either secretly or openly. It is ridiculous that any Arab quarter should disarm the Palestinian revolutionaries who have absolutely refrained from intervening in any way in the present fighting in Lebanon, while their leaders have made a point of keeping them out of the Lebanese conflict, which must be settled by the Lebanese themselves. The mere fact of accusing the Palestine revolution of having been a factor in sparking off the troubles in Lebanon and a threat to her security is an unpardonable affront to the national Arab commitment to support the Palestine resistance, and, to speak frankly, such action is consistent with the goals and schemes of the Zionist enemy.

In the light of our concern for Arab solidarity, we should endeavour to ensure that it is based on a firm undertaking that we all agree to, on unambiguous principles as regards mutual treatment, and on inflexible criteria for distinguishing between right and wrong. We cannot agree on anything that is false or disregards the truth, but our consensus will have real significance if it is based on right and on higher national interests.

All this proves incontrovertibly that the situation in Lebanon will not be settled by further resort to the methods that have led to its aggravation and deterioration, but only by the total abandonment of these methods and a return to the line which, had it been followed, would have saved the lives of thousands of Lebanese and Palestinians and opened the door to a comprehensive solution of the crisis on which all parties could have agreed without threat or coercion.

In view of the above it is incumbent on us to perform our role and shoulder our responsibilities without delay, for to desist from taking action in such circumstances is a sin, and to hesitate between action and inaction is a negative attitude that the interests of the people of Lebanon and the Palestine revolution cannot permit. All this means that the Arab nation must respond to the request of the PLO and agree to the meeting of the Arab League Council at foreign minister level as soon as possible.

**Press interview statements by President Sadat of Egypt considering the possibility of achieving a Middle East settlement at the Geneva conference<sup>118</sup>**

Cairo, early June, 1976

*Q. With the renewed concentration on Egyptian nationalism, what do you think of the reactions in the Arab world as regards Egypt's destiny?*

A. Egypt is the heart of the Arab world politically, strategically and historically and from the point of view of civilization she is situated at the point where three continents meet. Egypt constitutes more than one third of the Arab world. We are part of the Arab world and our destiny is the Arab destiny. From time to time we are attacked but we have become used to that. It has repeatedly happened in the course of history and it will happen again, but our efforts will not cease. Consider what has happened. After two years the Palestinians have come to see the facts as they really are, and even in Lebanon they realize that I am right.

*Q. How did the Sinai agreement lead to a rearrangement of the political situation in the area?*

A. Recently, and after 27 years, peace has become a possibility. This has led to what I call a revival of Arab thinking. There are no more slogans and speeches. We gained confidence in ourselves in the October War; we no longer have complexes. We are ready for peace and we hope to devise a new method of thinking about problems and the way to deal with them. But this needs time.

Henry Kissinger visited me in November 1973 when we started working towards a strategy for a just peaceful settlement. Kissinger is a man of discernment. I have been associated with the government since 1952, as a member of the Revolutionary Council, as a minister, as president of the National Assembly and as deputy president of the republic, and I have had dealings with three American secretaries of state. But Henry Kissinger is a completely different sort of man. He studies all the dimensions of a problem, then

<sup>118</sup> Granted to the French magazine *Expansion*; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), June 8, 1976.

chooses the right way to solve it. The Arab-Israeli conflict is very complicated with psychological aspects and a heritage of violence, bitterness, hatred, war and bloodshed. Since we started working with Kissinger, first under Nixon, and then Ford, we have achieved a great deal.

*Q. You said that the Arabs are the sixth force in the world. How does this force express itself?*

A. This is the case for two reasons, the first being that we have proved ourselves in fighting and in the use of advanced weapons and electronic warfare. Secondly, we used the weapon that we had, the oil weapon. No one believed that the Arabs would impose an oil embargo. There is also the increased revenue from the rise in prices.

*Q. Are Egypt's relations with the Soviets helping to improve relations with the US?*

A. We have an important principle in our foreign policy: it is that we do not involve ourselves in the policy of the big powers. The US has shown us friendship and understanding and has received more than this from us. If the Soviets treat us in the same way they will have our friendship.

*Q. How would you describe your relations with the US?*

A. Our relations with the US are deep friendship for the most part; this is what we wanted. I have certainly not asked the US to abandon their special relationship with Israel, but I have asked them for objective understanding. I have found them sympathetic and I now ask them to show their sympathy by action.

*Q. You have often declared that the US holds 99 per cent of the cards. What do you mean by that?*

A. Israel relies on the US a hundred per cent for its food, guns, Phantoms, even for meeting her budget deficit. As far as the Israelis are concerned the US is the umbilical cord that keeps them alive.

Only the US can exert pressure on Israel to persuade the arrogant Israelis to accept a peaceful settlement leading to permanent peace in the area.

*Q. In view of the precedent of the C-130 planes, do you hope to get defensive weapons from the US after the American elections?*

A. Of course I do, but if I do not get them I

shall not enter a confrontation with America; for I have other sources in Western Europe.

*Q. Egypt recently signed a military and commercial agreement with the Chinese. What is the significance of this step?*

A. Our new relationship with China is extremely encouraging. Basically, we shall obtain the spare parts which will solve our armaments problem, because 90 per cent of Egypt's arms are of Soviet manufacture.

*Q. As president of Yugoslavia, a non-aligned country, could President Tito mediate between Egypt and the Soviets?*

A. I discussed this with President Tito in Brioni and I asked him to tell the Soviets that we are prepared to be friendly with them if they accept our policy as it is. President Tito is the only one of the four leaders, Tito, Nehru, Sukarno and Nasser who started the alliance of non-aligned countries, who is still alive.

*Q. In your speech on May 1 you reaffirmed Egypt's support for the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole representative of the Palestinians.<sup>119</sup> What does Your Excellency mean when you speak of the Palestinian entity?*

A. They must have a homeland in the Gaza strip and the West Bank.

*Q. What are your conditions for peace, and what is the next step?*

A. Let me tell you my whole theory of peace. I want the Geneva conference to meet with the Palestinians participating in it. I know that the Israelis will raise every possible obstacle and we shall have to fight at Geneva so that the Palestinians may occupy their seat. This means that we intend to reach a permanent peace. The Palestinians are the core of the whole problem and without them there can be no permanent peace. It is not a question of Sinai or the Golan, but of the aspirations of the Palestinian people. At Geneva let us try to devise a framework for a comprehensive solution in which all parties participate, and after the American elections let us work out a timetable on the basis of this framework. If we succeed in ending the state of war, with both sides—Israel and the Arabs—being given official guarantees

<sup>119</sup> Doc. 241 above.

through the Security Council or the great powers or any person Israel wants, we shall be able to pave the correct way to a permanent peace and the ending of the state of war will be recognized throughout the world. And my budget will not suffer from the military burden as it does at present.

*Q. What do you mean when you say that the restoration of normal relations with Israel will have to wait for the coming generation? How far are you prepared to go in this respect?*

*A.* With the heritage of bloodshed and violence we cannot advocate the establishment of diplomatic and commercial relations, as Rabin suggested recently. This is an arbitrary method; it means imposing their conditions. They must be reasonable. We shall try to end the state of war and to obtain guarantees. The frontiers must be those of 1967 and the Palestinians must recover their rights to have a homeland in Gaza and the West Bank. If we achieve this I think that our generation will have got what it wants one hundred per cent and there will be real peace.

*Q. Do you hope to get nuclear reactors from the US?*

*A.* Yes, for the desalination of sea water and for electric power.

*Q. Are the Palestinian extremists getting the upper hand over the moderates in the incidents in Lebanon and the West Bank?*

*A.* Yes, the extremists have started to get the upper hand over the moderates. I have asked President Ford and Dr. Kissinger to engage in a dialogue so that the moderates may be in command. It would make things easier for the Israelis if the Americans started a dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization.

*Q. Could the Geneva conference be reconvened before things are quiet in Lebanon?*

*A.* We are not raising any obstacles, and the USSR and the US are prepared to reconvene the conference any time we ask. But I do not know what is going on in Syria's mind, and the Palestinians are fully occupied with the Lebanese problem, and we must give them time.

*Q. You have shown the world that you are ready to take risks for the sake of peace. Should not Yasir*

*Arafat affirm his leadership by reconciling his public and private attitudes?*

*A.* It is up to the Palestinians to come forward frankly and provide the world with a clear-cut idea of what they want. For four years I have been advising the Palestinians to form a government. If they had done this most of the world would have recognized them by now, and frankly, they need time.

259

**Message from President Franjieh of Lebanon to General Secretary Riyad of the Arab League accusing the Palestinians of escalating the Lebanese crisis and expressing approval of Syria's role in Lebanon<sup>120</sup>**

**Kfur, June 8, 1976**

Regarding events currently taking place in Lebanon, and in my capacity as president of the Lebanese Republic, entrusted with the preservation of constitutional legitimacy, and since it is difficult at present to convene the Council of Ministers, I would like to inform you of the following:

Early in February, 1976, I reached an agreement with President Asad in Damascus, to which all the contending parties in Lebanon were privy and of which they approved, to the effect that a constitutional document would be proclaimed.<sup>121</sup> That document would contain all the basic principles according to which an end would be put to the civil war and to Lebanese-Palestinian disputes. Foremost among these principles is the guarantee offered by the Syrian Arab Republic that the Palestinian organizations would abide by agreements reached with the Lebanese authorities, especially the Cairo agreement<sup>122</sup> which you personally supervised. This would enable them to prepare themselves for the liberation of Palestine without, however, infringing upon the sovereignty and laws of Lebanon. The constitutional document was thus the product of a fraternal Syrian effort at mediation. It was welcomed by all Lebanese parties and the Palestinians would not have accepted any other. It

<sup>120</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), June 9, 1976.

<sup>121</sup> See docs. 193, 196 and 202 above.

<sup>122</sup> See note to doc. 195 above.

was further blessed by sister Arab states and by the international community.

Having been officially announced on February 14, its implementation became impossible. This is because the Palestinian side did not respect its guarantees to abide by the Cairo agreement. The various Palestinian groups escalated the war against a Lebanese group and caused the fragmentation of the Lebanese army and the regular security forces. They went as far as to attack villages far removed from their camps and situated in the heart of the Lebanese mountains.

They besieged the towns of Zahleh and the villages of Qubbayat, Andaqt and Qaa, threatening their inhabitants with starvation and murder and bombarding them with various types of heavy weapons. Given these circumstances, Syrian troops entered Lebanese territory, announcing their intention of separating the combatants, raising the siege of peaceful towns and villages and putting an end to the civil war. The Palestinian organizations resisted by force and clamoured all over the Arab and Third Worlds as if Lebanon were their own homeland. In this, the Palestinians acted in conformity with their sinister policy of vigorously opposing the presence of any regular non-Palestinian troops in Lebanon, whether such troops be Lebanese, Arab or international.

As President of the Lebanese Republic, I consider the armed Syrian presence in Lebanon to be an implementation of the contents of the constitutional document mentioned above. That document contained a Syrian guarantee of Palestinian conformity with agreements concluded with the Lebanese authorities. Such an armed presence is bound to be temporary and will end as soon as peace, security and stability are restored to Lebanon.

I take this opportunity of reaffirming to your Excellency what Lebanese authorities have so often declared in the past. These authorities have afforded the Palestinians in Lebanon a freedom of organization and action not enjoyed by them in any other Arab country. I reiterate our concern to provide the Palestinian resistance with the means necessary for it to liberate its occupied homeland as soon as possible. In return, the Palestinians are required to abide by one thing only, one thing that cannot be forfeited, namely, the duty of respecting the national territorial sovereignty of Lebanon over the whole of Lebanon's

soil. I ask that you circulate this message among member states of the League and that you read it to members of the League Council when it meets.

260

### **Resolutions of the Arab League Council regarding the war in Lebanon<sup>123</sup>**

**Cairo, June 9, 1976**

In the course of its session, the Arab League Council considered the deteriorating situation in Lebanon and the bloody incidents that are taking place there and, in the light of its responsibility to the Arab nation, resolves the following:

1. To thank the secretary general of the Arab League for his initiative in calling this extraordinary session to discuss this fateful issue.

2. To call on all parties to cease fighting immediately and to consolidate such a ceasefire.

3. To form a symbolic Arab security force under the supervision of the general secretary of the Arab League to maintain security and stability in Lebanon, which force should start to perform its task immediately, replacing the Syrian forces. The task of this Arab security force should be brought to an end if the president-elect of the republic of Lebanon so requests.

4. That a commission representing the League Council and consisting of the foreign minister of Bahrain, chairman of the session, the secretary of the Arab League and the heads of the Algerian and Libyan delegations, should be dispatched immediately to cooperate with the parties concerned in following up the situation and ensuring security and stability in Lebanon.

5. The Council calls on all the Lebanese parties to bring about comprehensive national conciliation under the auspices of the Lebanese president-elect, to ensure the maintenance of the unity of the Lebanese people and the unity of their territory and the country's sovereignty, security and stability.

6. To affirm Arab commitment to support the Palestine revolution and to protect it from all dangers, and to ensure that it is provided with

<sup>123</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), June 9, 1976.

everything that can increase its strength and effectiveness.

7. The Council will remain in session to follow up the situation.

## 261

**Communiqué issued by the Lebanese Front rejecting the decisions of the Arab League Council regarding Lebanon**<sup>124</sup>

Kfur, June 11, 1976

The Lebanese Front held an extraordinary meeting at 10 am today at Kfur in the presence of the president of the republic, Mr. Sulayman Franjieh, former President Camille Chamoun, Shaykh Pierre Gemayyel and Father Sharbil Qassis. The meeting continued until 1.00 pm, and after consultations the following communiqué was issued:

The Lebanese Front with the president announces that,

1. The decisions adopted by the League of Arab States on June 9–10, are void and not binding and will not be implemented.

2. Lebanon rejects, in all matters, and especially in matters relating to its destiny, submission to any will other than the will of its people. It will consequently not submit to a judgement passed against it in absentia, especially since it considers it not a judgement but an arbitrary condemnation.

3. Lebanon will not accept to have its security and peace supervised by any Arab state that is a party in the war being waged on Lebanese territory and has among those fighting, fighters who are nationals of these states, or fighters carrying arms supplied by them or in possession of money from them. How more so than if these states should have a brigade in the Palestine Liberation Army?

4. Lebanon condemns the discriminating positions taken by the League of Arab States, such as when a demand for intervention is rejected while another is accepted, depending on the identity of the suppliant rather than on the validity of the matter.

5. Lebanon will oppose, by all means at its disposal and with all its potential, any Arab force that enters its territory against its wish and without

its prior agreement, pointing out the many and grave repercussions that such intervention would cause on the international level.

6. Even if Lebanon should be shunned by all its brethren, every prophet of truth in the world is a brother and neighbour. Lebanon is therefore fully determined not to have its rights repressed nor its survival jeopardized.

## 262

**Statement issued by the Lebanese Front approving the initiative of the Arab League as regards the war in Lebanon**<sup>125</sup>

June 16, 1976

*First:* The position of the League of Arab States towards Lebanon, in its capacity as founder member of the League and as an effective element in it, has been rectified.

*Second:* The clarification made by the general secretary, Mr. Mahmud Riyad, whether on his own initiative or in response to the demand of the conferences, generates a sense of confidence that the League of Arab States and its member countries are all aware of the rights of Lebanon as a state with absolute sovereignty and full independence, as expressed in the two resolutions adopted by the Council of the League on June 9 and 10.

They especially recognize the freedom of action enjoyed by Lebanon with regard to these two resolutions and the means of their implementation.

*Third:* That all the topics discussed with the general secretary were within the framework of the Syrian initiative, which the Front affirmed and continues to affirm has been overwhelmingly useful in putting an end to the shedding of the blood of the innocent and the fighters in Lebanon. The Front also stressed that it will not relinquish this sincere and brotherly initiative, and this experience which proved successful, while maintaining the right of Lebanon to reject or accept the resolutions of the Council of the League. The Front further affirms that it welcomes the initiative of Arab states, as long as it has the same objective.

<sup>124</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), June 12, 1976. See also doc. 260 above.

<sup>125</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), June 17, 1976. See also doc. 260 above.

263

**Communiqué issued by the Office of the Presidency of Lebanon announcing agreement to the Arab League's initiative to end the war in Lebanon<sup>126</sup>**

Kfur, June 16, 1976

On June 15, 1976, between the hours of 11:30 and 15:30, H.E. President Sulayman Franjeh met at his residence in Kfur with Mr. Mahmud Riyad, general secretary of the Arab League. They discussed the question of implementing the two resolutions adopted by the League on June 9 and 10, concerning which Lebanon had expressed its reservations in three cables sent by the president to the general secretary. Following the clarifications and assurances presented by Mr. Riyad in answer to the reservations expressed by President Franjeh, and after the general secretary had affirmed the League's concern for Lebanon's sovereignty, independence and rights, the general secretary went on to explain that the basic purpose of these two resolutions was to help in restoring peace and stability to Lebanon and that their implementation will take place only within the context of national sovereignty and in agreement with the Lebanese authorities regarding all details, especially the size and nationality of the Arab troops which are to be sent to Lebanon. Their task would be confined to imposing compliance with the ceasefire and with the implementation of the Cairo agreement<sup>127</sup> in both letter and spirit. Accordingly, President Franjeh expressed his agreement to this collective Arab initiative within the limits set by assurances and clarifications offered by the general secretary in the name of the League, provided this initiative is coordinated with the fraternal Syrian initiative currently under way and to which Lebanon has acceded.

264

**Statement issued by the government of Saudi Arabia calling for a ceasefire in Lebanon<sup>128</sup>**

Riyad, June 20, 1976

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has supported and still supports the Arab League's resolution to send Arab security forces to supervise the establishment of peace in Lebanon,<sup>129</sup> from its belief that this measure would stop the shedding of Arab blood and halt a terrible massacre which has claimed the innocent lives of tens of thousands of our Arab brothers belonging to all groups and confessions in Lebanon.

It is with deep regret that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia sees the continued fighting in the Lebanese arena growing more violent and ferocious, and in calling on all the parties concerned in Lebanon to observe a ceasefire to enable the Arab forces to perform their task, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia expects all loyal members of the Arab nation to set the sovereignty of Lebanon, the unity of her territory and her Arab character above all other considerations, inasmuch as Saudi forces are in Damascus ready to enter Lebanon along with the forces of the other Arab countries as soon as the general secretary of the Arab League gives the sign.

265

**Statement issued by the Lebanese Front accusing the Palestine resistance and foreign intervention of prolonging the war in Lebanon (excerpt)<sup>130</sup>**

June 22, 1976

2. The Lebanese Front is more fervent than anyone else in safeguarding the national sovereignty of Lebanon and about non-intervention in its internal affairs. It is therefore concerned that the Lebanese should themselves be responsible for

<sup>128</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Riyad* (Riyad), June 21, 1976.

<sup>129</sup> Doc. 260 above.

<sup>130</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), June 23, 1976.

<sup>126</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), June 17, 1976. See also doc. 260 above.

<sup>127</sup> See note to doc. 195 above.

solving their own problems, though this is no longer feasible because of the activities of the Palestinian-Communist alliance on all fronts, in acts of killing and destruction which they have loudly and overtly avowed and testified to in words and deeds, and made others bear witness to. If the problem of the Palestine resistance is not dealt with from its roots in the context of joint Arab responsibility, the only course will be in resorting to deterrent forces to re-establish security.

3. The Palestinians and Communists, who today claim concern for Lebanese sovereignty and in its name demand neutrality, had in the past participated in the Aramoun summit which had requested Syrian military intervention to prevent this military defeat. It is they who would have continued to welcome this intervention had it remained in their favour and not risen to the level of being a neutral and deterrent force between the contending parties.

4. The new evidence indicting the Palestinian-Communist alliance and which nullifies its talk about foreign intervention, is what the Lebanese and the world at large witnessed in the way of attempts by this felonious alliance to incite such foreign states as France, the Soviet Union and countries of Eastern Europe to support it against the Syrian initiative. How, then, can foreign intervention be considered a violation of Lebanese sovereignty when requested by the Lebanese and not a violation when demanded by the Palestinian-Communist alliance?

In conclusion, the Lebanese Front believes that had it not been for the Palestinian-Communist alliance and for other interferences in the current Lebanese war in the form of money, arms and men, Lebanon would not have been in a state of war and consequently, it would not have been in need of any, even brotherly support. Furthermore, were it not for the efforts of certain Arab states to impede Syrian mediation, which is acceptable to all factions in Lebanon, and had they not sought to resolve their own differences whether chronic or new, over the soil of Lebanon, the fighting would not have escalated and continued to this day.

The Front consequently declares that if what is intended for the Lebanese—and the Lebanese desire this themselves—is that they should deal with their own problems, it is essential first of all that all criminal foreign intervention should be pre-

vented, especially intervention by the Palestinian side and those that move within its orbit. Otherwise, it will be imperative for the Lebanese to request military assistance from their brothers and friends in the world; for the Lebanese are determined to break this vicious circle whatever the price. They are confident that those of their Arab brothers who are sincere, support them in this.

266

**Message from Prime Minister Karami of Lebanon to the four-party conference of Arab prime ministers convened in Riyad to deal with the war in Lebanon (excerpt)<sup>131</sup>**

**Beirut, June 23, 1976**

In these painful days through which Lebanon, the Palestine revolution, indeed the entire Arab nation are passing, all hopes are being pinned upon the efforts being made to stop the bloodshed on the soil of Lebanon for the sake of preserving its unity, sovereignty and dignity and in pursuit of the joint struggle to liberate the land and uphold the cause of justice. As prime minister and acting foreign minister, and motivated by my feelings of responsibility before God and history, I see it as my duty to bring the following to your attention:

The responsibility of those meeting in Riyad today is a major Arab responsibility, and history will record with appreciation the efforts made to achieve an appropriate solution of our problem. For it is a problem in which many factors and elements commingle, increasing its complexity and making it almost impossible to solve. While the Lebanese aspect of the crisis is the basic one, this does not negate the existence of foreign, Arab and international influences. Perhaps the best proof of this is the fact that certain parties to the conflict link its solution to the solution of the Middle East conflict as a whole. Hence the importance of collective Arab responsibility which imposes on everyone the duty of recognizing the underlying causes of the conflict in order to treat them and to forestall their dangerous repercussions and effects on the Lebanese, Arab and international levels.

It is because of this that we have rejected partition

<sup>131</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), June 24, 1976.



in view of the danger it poses to Lebanon and to the Arabs. Instead, we held fast to the unity of the homeland, of its territory as well as its people, its legacy and its culture, and have emphasized the necessity of coexistence among citizens of the one homeland. For we reject racism, Israel's *raison d'être*, and in rejecting it, we reject the artificial entity based upon it.

Because of this also, we are led to be concerned about strengthening the bases of coexistence with the Palestine resistance and supporting its legitimate struggle by providing the right atmosphere which would reconcile state sovereignty with the efficacy and struggle of the Palestine revolution.

We utterly reject the idea of internationalization which one party is advocating, not because we fear for our rightful cause but because we ourselves are more capable and more worthy of solving our own problems. Our interests are governed at all times by our will lest our cause and our rights be threatened with extinction at the bargaining table.

In the light of the experience we have gone through, it is our view that we must emphasize, once more, that dialogue represents the most effective way out of this crisis, where positive and constructive solutions may be offered and meet with the approval of all. This is what made us call for national reconciliation and what impelled us to hold a round table conference in Lebanon to achieve the desired ends. This would take place in an atmosphere of calm and stability under the supervision of an Arab force which would ensure a ceasefire and implement the resolutions of the Arab Foreign Ministers' Conference held on June 9 and 10.<sup>132</sup>

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## 267

### **Communiqué issued after a meeting between the prime ministers of Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Syria<sup>133</sup>**

**Riyad, June 24, 1976**

From their belief in the importance of Arab solidarity in our battle of destiny, and with a view to ensuring the mobilization of Arab resources

and the confrontation of the Israeli aggression against Arab territory and in Palestine; and in the light of the glorious Ramadan war which was a major turning point in the history of the Arab nation and had major repercussions at the Arab and international levels; and from their conviction that political and military action in the coming stage, as in the past, require the closest cooperation between Egypt and Syria, inasmuch as their cohesion has positive repercussions on Arab interests as a whole and is the indispensable basis for joint Arab action to confront the enemy;

Because of the full commitment of all parties to the resolutions of the Rabat summit of October 1974<sup>134</sup> and of their consequent awareness of the necessity to make every effort to ensure cooperation and consultation with a view to coordination as regards the strategy to be adopted in implementing those resolutions; and in conformity with the goal the achievement of which was, and still is, the aim of the Riyadh meeting at which there were talks between King Khalid ibn Abd al-Aziz, President Muhammad Anwar Sadat and President Hafiz Asad;

In the light of the above, and from their appreciation of their responsibility to the Arab nation, the prime ministers of Saudi Arabia, the state of Kuwait, the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic agreed at the conference held in Riyadh on Jumada II 25–26, 1396 AH (June 23–24, 1976 AD), on the following:

1. To establish a political-military commission headed by the foreign ministers of Egypt and Syria, which shall call on the services of experts in various fields from the two countries:

a) To decide on the ways and means by which the two countries shall implement the resolutions of the Rabat conference.

b) To determine the principles and requirements of the military strategy for liberation.

c) To lay the foundations of political action which would serve the cause of liberation and help to achieve a just and permanent solution of both parts of the Middle East problem: the full liberation of the occupied Arab territories, and the national rights of the Palestinian people.

2. The commission shall submit its recommendations to the presidents of Egypt and Syria to pave the way for a summit meeting between the two countries.

<sup>132</sup> Doc. 260 above.

<sup>133</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), June 25, 1976.

<sup>134</sup> Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

3. The information media shall refrain from publishing material injurious to the other party, as this will ensure a favourable atmosphere for the achievement of this great goal of mobilizing efforts for joint Arab action.

4. In order to ensure a favourable atmosphere, the two countries' liaison offices shall be restored to ambassadorial level.

## 268

**Statement issued by the meeting of the prime ministers of Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Syria<sup>135</sup>**

**Riyad, June 24, 1976**

The prime ministers of the four Arab countries, meeting in Riyad, having studied the appeals addressed to them by a number of Lebanese personalities and groups, and having passed in review the development of the regrettable incidents in Lebanon, as also the resolutions and efforts of the Arab League relating to the reestablishment of security and stability in Lebanon,

Agreed on the following:

1. To support the decisions on the situation in Lebanon taken by the Arab League at its extraordinary meeting in Cairo on June 10, 1976,<sup>136</sup> and to make every effort to reach the required solutions, so as to put a stop to the bloodshed and to maintain the unity and sovereignty of Lebanon, and so as to enable the Palestinian people in Lebanon to perform their sacred duty, within the framework of the agreements concluded between the Lebanese authorities and the PLO, and to call on all parties to enable the Arab security force to perform its task as rapidly and completely as possible.

2. The assembled prime ministers express their full readiness to provide all assistance so as to ensure the convening of a meeting of conciliation and dialogue between the various parties, in any Arab country these parties may agree on, and within the framework of the resolutions of the Arab League. The participants assigned their foreign ministers to follow up this matter.

## 269

**Cable from President Franjieh of Lebanon to General Secretary Riyad of the Arab League regarding the role and composition of an Arab peace-keeping force in Lebanon<sup>137</sup>**

**Kfur, June 30, 1976**

1. We deeply regret the position of some of the esteemed foreign ministers, among them the Egyptian foreign minister, who concluded from the fighting occurring around some camps that there exists a conspiracy to liquidate the resistance, when Lebanon itself is being subjected to destruction and liquidation at the hands of the Palestinians and their allies. The whole world has been witness to the tragedy experienced by the people of Lebanon and the collapse of its political, economic and development institutions as a result of this conspiracy.

2. The two camps of Tall al-Zaatar and Jisr al-Basha, which were cited by the esteemed foreign ministers, have both been, since 1973, the direct cause of clashes and persistent bloody events, ever since the Palestinians transformed them into fortified strongholds, above and under ground. They set up complete military installations, equipped with the most modern and lethal weapons, heavy and long-range artillery and with huge ammunition dumps. The quantities involved are hardly available except to advanced war or confrontation fronts against the enemy, or to the modern army of a super-power. The Palestinians thereafter began to spread fear and practice terrorism in the areas around them, areas which are among the most densely populated suburbs of Beirut and in which are located the most vital industries of Lebanon.

3. During our joint meeting at Kfur, we urgently requested that the Arab peace-keeping force be a deterrent one, not only empowered to observe the ceasefire, but to consolidate the ceasefire and take action against those who violate it. This was predicated by our sincere desire and firm determination to realize a ceasefire in Lebanon in a real and permanent manner. For it is only we who have had, and continue to have, a real interest in maintaining Lebanon as a country and entity; no one is more concerned than us in having tran-

<sup>135</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), June 25, 1976.

<sup>136</sup> Doc. 260 above.

<sup>137</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), July 1, 1976.

quility prevail and prosperity and stability reign in our country, instead of the dispersal of our people, the destruction of our factories and of our homes over their inhabitants and instead of the collapse of our institutions and the annihilation of all reasons for our existence. But what can we do in the face of the conspiracy being executed by the Palestine Liberation Organization? Previous experience throughout the past sixteen months in which we concluded 48 ceasefire agreements, is clear evidence that the Palestinians and their allies have been responsible for violating the ceasefire, at times overtly abetted by the heads of certain Arab states.

It is here worth noting that the Lebanese side is composed of one faction and one group, subject to the orders of a unified command that has always had a real interest in a ceasefire and the return of stability to the country. The other side, by contrast, is composed of various alliances, including the leftist parties which alone include twenty-six different parties and of organizations which in most instances use Lebanon as the launching pad for practicing terror and destruction and for overthrowing Arab regimes. It also includes the many extremist Palestinian organizations, some of which have questionable established foreign affiliations, and strive for subversion and destruction. Even Fatah has not refrained from expressing in the words of one of its leaders, that the road to Palestine passes through peaceful Jounieh, Kisarwan and the mountains of Sannin, in the mountains of Lebanon and very far from the Palestinian camps.

As an example, we refer to the fact that the Lebanese side, during our meeting with your representative, Dr. Hassan Sabri Khuli yesterday, agreed to a ceasefire at 7.30 pm, but the other side did not abide by the decision.

4. A ceasefire is connected to the implementation of the agreements contracted between the Lebanese authorities and the Palestinians for regulating the latter's presence in Lebanon. It is therefore impossible to impose a ceasefire unless these agreements are implemented through the offices of a peace-keeping force with a deterrent authority, as we mentioned earlier. We alone demanded and continue to demand, that the Arab peace-keeping forces should have the authority of a deterrent one, despite the fears this arouses in some Lebanese quarters. Our insistence provides definite

evidence that must convince the Arab states and the whole world of our real desire for a final ceasefire and of the fact that the Palestinian organizations and their communist allies are the ones who violate the ceasefire agreements.

5. It is outside the jurisdiction of the Arab League to consider the bilateral relations between Lebanon and Syria, particularly with regard to their joint understanding based on the constitutional document approved by the Cabinet on February 14, 1976,<sup>138</sup> under the terms of which the Syrian forces entered Lebanese territory and are now undertaking the functions which pertain to any peace-keeping force. Those functions cannot but be the consolidation of the ceasefire and the implementation of the Cairo agreement and its annexes.<sup>139</sup> We strongly protest against the allegations of the Palestine Liberation Organization that it has the right to request the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, a right which is essentially part of Lebanese sovereignty.

6. We wish to point out to the Council of the League that the Fatah organization, in alliance with some extremist organizations, has for some time now been controlling—by means of military occupation and intellectual terror—the western sector of Beirut and many other areas in Lebanon, thereby imposing on politicians and journalists and religious figures who reside in these areas to take stands and make statements in opposition to their true convictions and positions. It has also taken over vital governmental services such as the PTT, banks and others. It has therefore become imperative to put an end to this occupation by an Arab peace-keeping force and by adopting an open resolution in this regard.

7. Yesterday, Tuesday June 29, the Prime Minister of Libya, currently in Lebanon, held a press conference in which he openly declared that his country is waging a struggle, on all levels including the military one, alongside the Palestinians in their confrontation with the Lebanese side. He has in fact issued orders to the Libyan contingent of the peace-keeping force to join the Palestinians and wage war with them. What we had feared has been realized and events have established that the apprehension and reservations we expressed have been realized even sooner than

<sup>138</sup> Doc. 202 above.

<sup>139</sup> See note to doc. 195 above.

we expected. The consequence of this aggression, which has no precedent in the history of countries and peoples, must be that Libya is in no way suitable to participate in the Arab peace-keeping force which is expected to have a neutral position in this conflict.

We strongly urge you to take all measures which will ensure neutrality in the quickest possible time, while reminding you of the reservations which we had expressed to you during our meeting in Kfur regarding the identity of the states that are to participate in the peace-keeping force and the neutral position they should have. We are meanwhile awaiting an immediate and decisive initiative on your part to put an end to this tragic farce which may be worsened gravely by the transformation of the Libyan contingent from a peace-keeping force under your jurisdiction to a fighting element hostile to the Lebanese in their own country.

8. This is our official position with regards to the subjects that might be open to discussion. We reserve our right to accept or reject any resolutions you may adopt in keeping with the provisions of article seven of the League's Covenant.

## 270

### **Statement by Prime Minister Karami of Lebanon to the Arab foreign ministers in response to the cable sent by President Franjieh of Lebanon<sup>140</sup>**

Beirut, July 1, 1976

I find myself forced to make a reply every time the president of the republic, Mr. Sulayman Franjieh speaks, over-reaching his authority, attempting to govern on his own and speaking in the name of Lebanon, claiming that he alone has the power to do so and to represent everyone.

1. In the first paragraph of his cable, the President regrets the position of some Arab foreign ministers who believed reports of clashes around some of the camps and considered them as proof that there exists a conspiracy to liquidate the Palestine resistance. Yes, what is happening in Lebanon is aimed, among other things, against the Palestine resistance, either to liquidate or

limit it, thus placing it in a position where it will have to accept what is proposed for it when the final solutions for the Middle East crisis come under discussion. I personally believe that what is currently taking place in Lebanon is the gateway towards the final settlement of the crisis in our area. The clearest evidence for this is provided by the statements made by Mr. Brown, Senator Fulbright and Mr. Kissinger himself that there is no hope of solving the Lebanese crisis, except by solving the Middle East one. Is there any clearer evidence of the truth of what I am saying?

2. The second paragraph of the cable mentioned that the two camps of Tall al-Zaatar and Jisr al-Basha have become fortresses above and below ground, and that their presence in the area has generated fear among the residents and led to roads being cut, etc. . . . I ask the president whether or not the whole of Lebanon is now in the same position as that being experienced in the eastern sector, as a result of the plot which was activated fifteen months ago. The president of the republic knows who allowed the establishment of militias, the importation of arms and the imprisonment of citizens, escalating to the final explosion from which everyone continues to suffer.

Bombardments, roadblocks and missiles of various ranges and all other types of arms—is this not enough to affirm that all Lebanon has become a fortress full of arms, killing and destruction?

What is being said about the camps of Tall al-Zaatar and Jisr al-Basha must be said about all other parts of Lebanon, otherwise we would be biased and untruthful.

3. In the third paragraph, it is said that an Arab Deterrent Force is what is considered desirable for putting an end to the fighting, for dominating the situation and for ending the unnatural situation existing throughout Lebanon, and that if the Arab peace-keeping force is not a deterrent force it will be incapable of fulfilling its role in the service of the peace we all aspire to. This is true, but only if no obstacles are placed in the face of this force which might prevent it from discharging its responsibilities because of the difficulties created and the reservations felt towards it, and by exacting conditions that are impossible to meet: for example, that we will not accept Arab forces from this or that state because they are biased against us, as is the case in relation to to forces that have already reached Beirut.

<sup>140</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), July 2, 1976. The cable of Franjieh is doc. 269 above.

If every time an Arab force enters we have reservations about it and accuse it of being biased, how can we obtain the resolutions we want from the Arab League and have it adopt a position which we expect to be decisive and capable of imposing peace, when we reject this force by our reservations and by the obstacles we place in its path?

4. It was said that the Palestine Liberation Organization is behind the conspiracy and is seeking to execute it and that the national side is composed of many parties and factions; communists, Palestinians and Muslims, and therefore lacking in command and without a responsible body capable of guaranteeing commitment to the agreements made, whereas the other side is unified in word and deed and therefore capable of fulfilling the agreements.

We question the validity of what is agreed upon but not executed so long as the Kfur Front carries out all kinds of practices, reactivates hot fronts, joins in the war whenever it wants and only stops the war when it wants. Had there not been two sides, there would not have been any fighting or contention. The Kfur Front, and particularly the president of the republic, attempts to place the responsibility on our front, and the president exonerates himself from any responsibility. But the real situation contradicts this, since there is clear evidence that they [the Lebanese Front] started the battles of Tall al-Zaatar and Jisr al-Basha, and it is they who have continued them to this day. It is they who by this action wish to achieve the elimination of the two camps from the area, as stipulated by the conditions they have made for accepting a ceasefire.

All the evidence provided, regardless of the eloquence in which it was written or the devious way in which facts and arguments were presented, cannot contradict the inherent reality which is that they are a party to the conspiracy and it is they who implement it, while believing that this serves the interests of Lebanon.

What is the service they are rendering this country, when their actions constituted the direct cause for inflicting on the country total ruin and wholesale destruction. If they were to reconsider the responsibility they invoke, they would find that their conscience would be disturbed most for keeping the people in total darkness, acute thirst, fear and hunger. If they were to pass judgement commensurate with this responsibility, I do not

know what the just penalty would be for the situation in which we find ourselves.

5. Is there a more serious statement than the one he [the president] made in the fourth paragraph: "The ceasefire is bound to the implementation of the agreements concluded between the Lebanese and Palestinian authorities for regulating the presence of the latter in Lebanon," which presumes that no ceasefire can be imposed without the implementation of these agreements through the mediation of a peace-keeping force that has a deterrence mandate, as was mentioned. Does this in itself not provide absolute evidence that they intend to continue the fighting until the agreements are implemented? If this were not so, would it not be logical to state the contrary of what was included in that paragraph: that a ceasefire should first be established to be followed by discussions about the means for achieving the objective? This is reasonable. I reiterate what I said before about our position with regard to the resolutions of the Arab League issued on June 10. We maintain this position and demand implementation. Here I affirm that the Arab League should undertake to discharge the consensus of the Arab foreign ministers, as stipulated in their resolutions, using all available means.

I wish to conclude by calling on all Arab brothers to understand that Lebanon has a democratic system based on equality and participation in the distribution of authority. The president, therefore, cannot under our democratic system take a personal initiative to communicate with the Arab League and transmit to it statements and memoranda, nor can he define positions and claim that in so doing he is representing the official Lebanese viewpoint. On the contrary, gentlemen, ministers and heads of states and kings, Lebanon does not have a presidential, but a consultative system, a democratic system, a system of equality. On this basis, I say that the president cannot act on his own, he has to act after governmental approval. Otherwise, every act emanating from him is worthless. He has invoked the constitutional document, which explicitly states that any act by the president of the republic must be agreed upon by the prime minister and bear the latter's signature.

## 271

**Statement by National Bloc leader Eddé of Lebanon expressing apprehension at the intended partition plan for Lebanon<sup>141</sup>**

Beirut, early July, 1976

I think I expressed my serious apprehensions about Lebanon's fate for the first time in the wake of the partitioning of Cyprus, back in 1974.

To my mind, the intended partition of Lebanon is aimed at the following:

1. To give Israel safe and secure borders on its northern flank through the creation there of several States of a confessional character in order to justify the exclusivist nature of the Zionist State. This would entail the partition of Lebanon first (as I will explain hereunder), and of Syria next. In fact, Syria would be split up into three States: an Alawite State, which would comprise the Alawite State as it existed under the French Mandate, in addition to Tripoli and the valleys of Akkar and Homs; a Sunni State, which would extend from the Euphrates to the Beka'a; and a Druze State that would include Djebel Druze and Houran.

The Druze State could remain part of South Lebanon, which would then be ceded to Israel, or it could merge into a joint Shiite-Druze State with access to the Mediterranean through Tyre. Once this happens, the waters of the Litani River would begin to be exploited.

2. To satisfy Israel's designs in solving the problem of the 400,000 Palestinians now in Lebanon (by settling them there permanently), and in occupying South Lebanon—up to the Litani. The latter river was claimed by Zionist leaders as far back as 1919. The claim was explicitly made in a letter addressed to David Lloyd George, then British prime minister, by Chaim Weizmann, the Zionist leader who influenced Britain to issue the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and later became the first President of the State of Israel. Said Weizmann in the letter (and I quote, verbatim): "For these reasons, we consider it essential that the Northern frontier of Palestine should include the Valley of the Litani, for a distance of about 25 miles above the bend, and the Western and Southern slopes of Mount Hermon, in order to ensure control of

the headwaters of the Jordan, and to permit re-afforestation of this region."

3. To compensate Syria for the Golan in the short run by allowing her to annex the Beka'a and Akkar valleys as well as Tripoli.

4. To realize the dream of the Christians, particularly the Maronites, who clamor for a mini-Christian Lebanon. The boundaries of this mini-Christian Lebanon would be Zghorta, Bsharre and the Cedars to the north; the summits of Mount Lebanon to the east; the Beirut-Shtaura highway (and I don't say the Beirut-Damascus highway) to the south; and the Mediterranean to the west.

Opposite Christian Lebanon, you would have a Moslem Lebanon limited by the Beirut-Shtaura road to the north; a line following the Mount Lebanon summits to the east; the Litani to the south; and the Mediterranean to the west.

As for Beirut, it could be made the federal capital in the event that a federation is established between Christian Lebanon and Moslem Lebanon. Or, it could become a free city.

The green light for cutting Lebanon to pieces has apparently been given by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The success or failure of the plot will depend on the Lebanese themselves and their ability to foil it.

One thing is certain, however. The Christians who want a mini-Christian Lebanon don't dare say so. I guess they would be more honest to come out in the open and try to partition the country through democratic and political means, rather than by the force of arms.

Personally, I have declared my avowed intention to oppose partition on more than one occasion for the following reasons:

1. As conceived, a Christian Lebanon of 2,000 to 3,000 square kilometers would not be economically viable.

2. Christian Lebanon is bound to become a country of emigration for the simple reason that its exclusively Christian population will not be able to subsist in it.

3. Within more or less a short period, this Christian Lebanon would be considered, by the Arab world, a second Israel. Because of its strength and malice, Israel itself will gradually establish amicable relations with the Arab world. It will then seek to provoke the Moslem Arabs against the Christians working in the Arab countries in order to step into their shoes. Whereas the errant Jew

<sup>141</sup> *Monday Morning* (Beirut), July 5-11, 1976, p. 7.

would have succeeded in carving himself a home, the Maronite would be uprooting himself from a mini-State that was forced on him and which cannot offer him either work or subsistence.

In the light of the above, my colleagues and I have decided to set up a National Union Front which will have a twofold objective:

1. To struggle against Lebanon's partition in seeking to maintain the country's territorial integrity within the limits set in the Constitution.

2. To press for the withdrawal of the Syrian Army from all Lebanese territory.

## 272

### **Interview with King Hussein of Jordan discussing negotiations with the USSR on the purchase of anti-aircraft defence systems and regretting the US attitude to Jordan on the question of arms<sup>142</sup>**

**Early July, 1976**

*Q. You have been negotiating a SAM anti-aircraft defense system with the Soviets as a possible substitute for the U.S. Hawk system, which is proving much costlier than originally anticipated. The fact that this was not mentioned in the final communiqué at the end of your Soviet visit<sup>143</sup> has led some observers to conclude that the negotiations have failed.*

*A.* Not at all. Quite the contrary. The negotiations were successful and we came back with a very attractive offer which would give us a compatible yet more flexible air defense system than the Hawk. Even though the financial terms offered are generous, in being less costly than the American system as it was offered prior to our negotiating with the Soviets, the fact remains that the Soviet deal is offered on a cash-on-delivery basis. Our problem then still is the financial one which we are attempting to resolve.

*Q. How do you explain the irony of pro-Western Jordan, erstwhile faithful ally of the U.S., turning to the Soviet Union for your most essential aspect of self-defense?*

*A.* Our inability to secure our needs in an adequate fashion from our traditional sources of

supply forced us to look elsewhere for our legitimate self-defense. But Soviet-supplied weapons will in no way differ from U.S. or European-supplied armaments. Once they are in our hands, they automatically become Jordanian and Arab regardless of source.

*Q. When did your perceptions of the U.S. begin to change and who do you feel is responsible for your own disenchantment?*

*A.* We began to feel let down by the U.S. in the summer of 1974 when your administration decided, after the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement, to follow Israeli advice and ignore the West Bank while shifting the U.S. diplomatic effort back to Sinai and a second disengagement agreement with Egypt. This led us to accept the Rabat summit decisions<sup>144</sup> on the Arab side and a year later we saw Sinai-2,<sup>145</sup> which, in turn, resulted in serious divisions in Arab ranks and wrecked the diplomatic process for an overall settlement.

The U.S., let's not forget, has also helped to create a tremendous imbalance between Israel on the one hand, and the Arab confrontation states, particularly Syria and Jordan, on the other. With America's generous assistance of \$2.4 billion a year to Israel, not to mention economic and other aid, it is all too obvious to us that when it comes to a balance between Israel and Jordan, we don't seem to count for much in Washington's eyes. This is not to say that we are ungrateful. Our disappointment grew with our unfortunate experience over the Hawk matter. In recent years, the U.S. has acted or reacted as if it were far more interested in placating foes than in conciliating friends. These trends, coupled with recent developments, have convinced us that we should diversify as much as possible our international relations in our own national interest.

*Q. Wouldn't a SAM agreement with the Soviets jeopardize further U.S. military and economic aid as some of our congressmen are bound to argue that the U.S., in effect, will be helping to pay for Jordan's Soviet weapons?*

*A.* We didn't shop for a Soviet alternative until we had spent years trying to obtain an adequate system from the U.S.—all to no avail so far. The

<sup>142</sup> Interview conducted by Arnaud de Borchgrave, *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), July 12, 1976, pp. 1-2. Copyright International Herald Tribune 1976.

<sup>143</sup> Doc. 126 above.

<sup>144</sup> Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

<sup>145</sup> Doc. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

Israeli lobby on Capitol Hill is far more powerful than the American public seems to realize. The U.S. has no monopoly on air-defense systems and no right to impose on us what we can or cannot have. And the same principle will apply should we buy Soviet. We have never even considered the possibility of U.S. assistance for Soviet weapons. The U.S. would not participate in the financing, even indirectly. I doubt very seriously that any have the right then to consider Arab financial help to Jordan as being American and I refuse to accept such an inference.

*Q. How much less costly will SAMs be than Hawks?*

A. As things stood, about 40 per cent less for a comparable, compatible system.

*Q. How long will a SAM system take to install?*

A. About the same time as a Hawk one—three years before it is fully operational.

*Q. How many Soviet technicians will the construction and operation of the system require?*

A. The basic understanding we have with the Soviets is that we would send our crews to Russia for training and that we would operate the system on our own. It was the same understanding with the U.S. before the Hawk deal collapsed and for all equipment we previously acquired.

*Q. Who will pay for the system?*

A. That's precisely our problem and what we're looking at now.

*Q. Is the Hawk deal dead?*

A. As things have stood, yes. Very frankly, we have an excellent Soviet offer that we are considering. I can't see any change unless a compatible or better offer is forthcoming. No more time can be wasted.

*Q. But I thought a U.S. counteroffer in the \$530-million range was now in the works as a result of your Soviet visit?*

A. We will consider any offer and make our final decision strictly on its merits and on the basis of our ability to finance the deal.

*Q. Was your rapprochement with Syria—rather than the \$800-million price tag—the reason why Saudi Arabia backed out of the Hawk deal?*

A. Certainly not. The cost of the 14 advanced

Hawk batteries without spares and supporting installations was \$350 million. The Saudis felt they were committed to that figure. We were never supposed to be involved in the financial end. Then, when the U.S. final price rose to \$792 million for Hawks and Vulcans as a result of adding the necessary software and allowing for inflation, the Saudis understandably balked.

*Q. When did you actually begin negotiations with the Soviets for an alternative air defense system?*

A. In early May we asked the Soviets to send a team to discuss our needs. A week later the air force commander and deputy defense minister, Marshal Pavel Kutakhov, came to Jordan to begin discussions. An offer was made in less than a month as in comparison with five years of frustrating endless negotiations with our traditional friends.

*Q. Will it be the whole range of SAMs—from twos to sevens?*

A. No. They will be the missiles and radar-guided anti-aircraft guns that fit our specific requirements and which we can handle in terms of manpower capabilities. The choice was entirely ours.

*Q. Isn't it a little ironic that you turn to the Soviets at a time when President Sadat has denounced Soviet military assistance as an infringement of Egyptian sovereignty through the manipulation of supplies and spares?*

A. President Sadat is entitled to his views and actions, we to ours. We have never had any experience with the Soviets but we always make sure that supplies and spares on hand are adequate and control is strictly Jordanian. However, I do feel I should say that if it hadn't been for Soviet equipment, Egypt could not have successfully crossed the canal in 1973. The October war was entirely conducted on both fronts with Soviet weaponry. This cannot be denied.

*Q. You have been highly suspicious of Soviet designs in the Mideast. What has changed your mind?*

A. Nothing has changed my views on the interests of the two superpowers and their attempts to control events in the area. We stand for the best possible relations with all sides and are open to, and hope to benefit from, experiences the world



over. But there can be no compromises with our own distinctive identity.

*Q. What is your explanation for the seemingly endless and senseless bloodshed in Lebanon now in its 16th month?*

A. First, a serious internal Lebanese problem that could have been resolved by the Lebanese themselves if the PLO had kept out of it. Second, Arab divisions that used Lebanon as the battleground. Third, an unforgivable error of judgment by the PLO leadership that has caused thousands of Palestinians to be involved in an armed struggle on non-Palestinian territory in a cause that is not a Palestinian one and in other than Palestinian and Arab interests.

*Q. How do you think the Lebanese civil war affects the Arab-Israeli equation?*

A. In a disastrous way. We have more divisions in the Arab world today than ever before. The PLO has weakened, perhaps irreparably, its argument that Jews, Moslems and Christians could live in harmony side by side in a future greater Palestine when it is seen that Arabs themselves, citizens of the same country, not only cannot co-exist but collide day and night. They have played Israel's game and diverted attention from the area's major problem—Israel's withdrawal to the pre-1967 war frontiers and the recognition of Palestinian rights on the West Bank and Gaza.

*Q. If there is no Mideast settlement without the PLO and apparently with the PLO either, where do we go from here?*

A. I believe that, regardless of its shocking performance in Lebanon, the PLO concept is a sound one. PLO leadership will have to mend its ways and then, if efforts for a peaceful solution are resumed, then a rejuvenated and wiser PLO must be involved in the diplomatic process.

*Q. In the light of recent riots on the West Bank, along with the results of local elections and your own contacts with West Bankers under Israeli occupation, what do you feel the Palestinians living there really want?*

A. An end to the occupation and to be left alone to establish their own rights on their own land. Local elections, which excluded East Jerusalem and were held under Israeli law, did nevertheless bring forth a new Palestinian leadership.

Only time and future PLO actions will tell whether it's pro-PLO or otherwise.

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**Statement issued by the government of Iraq commenting on the US Democratic Party's platform<sup>146</sup>**

**Baghdad, July 15, 1976**

We have been amazed to learn the contents of the political platform of the American Democratic Party, and we wish to comment on what it says about the Palestinian Arab people and their occupied homeland and about the situation in the Arab area.

The Palestinian Arab people, whose land and country are usurped by Zionism in collusion with and with the encouragement of world colonialism, have never and never will be a mere group of refugees. They are a struggling people who will continue to strive with all their strength and resolution to recover their established rights to their land and their country.

The Democratic Party's political platform puts the aggressor on an equal footing with the victims of aggression in the Arab area. Indeed, it denies, in an unprecedented manner, the rights of the Arab nation in general and the Palestinian people in particular to their homeland and their territory, and their right to self-determination and to build a free future in which they can once more, as they have done throughout history, share in building human civilization. Those who drew up the programme are clearly unaware of this fact, blinded as they are by narrow party electoral and selfish interests, to the extent that all they can see in the area is the Zionist entity which is based on falsehood, aggression and racialism.

Everything in the platform about the Middle East is a tendentious analysis of political phenomena which it deals with in a spirit utterly devoid of even a minimum of objectivity and responsibility, a spirit dictated one hundred per cent by the party electoral and selfish interests that want to eliminate the Palestinian Arab people once and for all and to subject the whole Arab nation to Zionist colonialism and aggression. This is a

<sup>146</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), July 16, 1976. The platform is doc. 119 above.

hostile attitude which is opposed to all accepted custom and to the United Nations and its principles, and indeed to all principles of justice in the world.

It is most regrettable that party rivalry in the US should be based on winning over an influential minority at the expense of other peoples. This leads to the adoption of a colonialist and racist policy. This is exactly the attitude that has increased the hatred for the US felt by the Arab and Islamic worlds, the countries of the Third World and all just and progressive men in the world.

Contrary to what the platform claims, such an immoral policy can only do further damage to US interests in the Arab area and hinder the chances of a real and permanent peace in the area.

## 274

### **Press interview statements by Shiite Imam Sadr of Lebanon discussing the need for reconciliation in Lebanon<sup>147</sup>**

**Beirut, July 16, 1976**

*Q. Do you consider yourself a mediator or a party to the conflict between Syria on the one hand and the Palestinian-Lebanese National Movement alliance on the other?*

*A.* In fact, I am neither a mediator nor a party to the conflict; but I am someone who is concerned—concerned about the country and its people. I am particularly concerned about the regions where my sons are living. That is why I am eager to promote dialogue and to reconcile Syria and the Palestinian Resistance.

I am convinced that Syria and the Palestinian Resistance are bound to cooperate together. Likewise, the Lebanese and the Palestinian Resistance are bound to cooperate between themselves too. The tension, struggle and conflict which we witnessed recently were unwarranted and could have been avoided. What I am saying is not an exercise in wishful thinking. I say this out of experience.

Strategically, there are no differences between Syria and the Palestinian Resistance. There are no differences either between Syria and the Lebanese national will. The contrary is true. The

objectives are identical and a lot of the means (to achieve these objectives) are common. That's why we should exert every effort possible—not as mediators or parties to the conflict, but as people who are concerned about the country's and the nation's interests—to rebuild the bridges and overcome the crisis.

*Q. Were your talks in Damascus to arrange for a ceasefire and to reconcile Syria with each of the Palestinian Resistance and the Lebanese National Movement encouraging?*

*A.* I am in fact optimistic, in the sense that I found the Syrians ready for that. And before leaving for Damascus, I had found Abu Ammar prepared for that too. But you should know that relations have become too complicated and intricate and the parties to the conflict too diverse for me to be content with optimism. We need to keep up our efforts to achieve our objective.

*Q. Did you obtain any specific promises from Syrian officials on these matters?*

*A.* Concerning the ceasefire, by the time I left Damascus, Syrian officials were adamant about its execution i.e. implementation of the ceasefire in the Northern Metn and North Lebanon. As for the reconciliation, I found they were ready for an encounter and the resumption of cooperation, even though they are sore.

*Q. What was your reaction to the recent clashes in the Beka'a and the purported occupation of the city of Baalbeck and the Palestinian refugee camp there?*

*A.* As far as I know, there are no clashes in the Beka'a, and certainly not in Baalbeck. Negotiations were held between the townspeople, the Syrian troops and the Palestinian Resistance. They discussed a lot of things, and the Syrian units did not force their way in order to avoid clashes. Hence, the alleged massacres and destructions there are pure fabrications by the information media. Baalbeck, Hermel, the whole region and the Palestinian refugee camps in the Beka'a are well and fine. They were not shelled or invaded.

*Q. Can Syria, in your opinion, resume its role as a mediator in the Lebanese crisis or has it become a party to the conflict? In other words, shouldn't the Syrian initiative give way to the initiative of the Arab League?*

*A.* The Syrian initiative does not run counter

<sup>147</sup> Excerpted from the text, *Monday Morning* (Beirut), July 19, 1976, pp. 6-7.

to the Arab initiative. You should know that the Syrian delegate participated and continues to participate in the Arab League parleys and coordinates with the Arab League initiative. All Arab initiatives, whether that of Saudi Arabia or of Libyan Premier Abdul Salam Jalloud, are launched from Damascus and in agreement with the Syrian authorities. That's why I don't see any conflict between these initiatives. I see them as complementary.

I would like to reiterate that despite all that has happened between Syria and the Palestinian Resistance, Syria maintains its strategic stand. And so does the Palestinian Resistance. Even today, Palestinian Resistance leaders are in Damascus. I met a few of them at Fateh's office in Syria. That's why I believe Syria continues to be in a position to handle the Lebanese crisis. Likewise, the Palestinian Resistance and the Lebanese National Movement continue to pin hopes on Syria. We should take advantage of this positive predisposition to turn a new page and to bury our differences which can only serve the enemy.

*Q. Why do you think Syria's military presence has been confined to areas controlled by the Palestinian-Lebanese National Movement alliance and why haven't Syrian troops intervened to lift the four-week siege on Tell el-Zaatar?*

A. I wouldn't like to sound like Syria's lawyer in Lebanon. But as I told you earlier, Syria's original intervention was on the specific request voiced at the meeting held in the house of (former minister) Malek Salam, in the presence of the "Aramoun summit leaders," as they were known at the time. The Syrian intervention force, then, entered the areas controlled by the so-called Aramoun leaders. Perhaps the force did not enter the other areas because the leaders controlling them did not express the same feeling of anxiety.

As for Tell el-Zaatar, the answer lies in the nature of your questions, which repeat claims that Syria has become a party to the conflict, that Syrian troops have forced their way into Baalbeck and that the withdrawal of Syrian troops has become a national demand. It sounds as if the Syrian Army has become an occupation army. How can you call the Syrian Army an occupation army and expect it to defend Tell el-Zaatar?

Nevertheless, during my stay in Damascus, I

asked Syrian leaders to use their influence on all parties in Lebanon to put an end to violence, to the hemorrhage and to war in Tell el-Zaatar. On the second day of my visit to Damascus, pressure and shellings were eased. I hope we can carry on to lift the danger on Tell el-Zaatar and the neighboring areas.

*Q. What meetings and steps do you envisage now to help end the stalemate?*

A. Since my arrival here from Damascus, I have met Mufti Hassan Khaled and I intend to return today a visit to Brother Abu Ammar. I plan to have several meetings of the kind to ease tension between Syria and the forces that opposed it in Lebanon. Once this is done, I guess we can proceed without much delay with the round-table conference in order to ease pressure and rekindle people's hopes.

I think the round-table talks should be chaired by the President-elect who will be the legitimate representative of Lebanon. The talks should revolve around the problems of security, the future and the building of a new Lebanon. This would basically be a Lebanese-Lebanese dialogue. I hope we can succeed in that.

As I told one Lebanese daily today, my earnest conviction is that the crisis cannot be solved except by the Lebanese themselves. All the others—including the Palestinians, Syrians and the rest of the Arabs—can help the Lebanese reach an agreement among themselves. I appeal to all the Lebanese without exception to ease tension between them and to bolster relations between them and the Palestinians on the one hand and the Syrians on the other. The Lebanese should not allow inter-Arab or international feuds to blow up in their face. They can avoid that by getting together.

I think the first step in that direction should come from a summit grouping Lebanon's religious leaders. This would be the first step towards rebuilding Lebanon's national unity. I have discussed this proposed summit already with Mufti Khaled and Patriarch Khreish. I will be sounding out my other colleagues on it soon.

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**Speech by President Asad of Syria discussing the war in Lebanon and Syria's attitude to it (excerpts)<sup>148</sup>**

**Damascus, July 20, 1976**

When discussing the incidents in Lebanon, we must go back a little and I shall try to go into only such details as are necessary to provide a clear picture.

Brothers, when the troubles in Lebanon started many months ago, we had our own interpretation of them, which we shared with many Arab forces which claim to be nationalist parties of Lebanon and with all sections of the Palestine resistance. We said that the troubles in Lebanon were the result of a colonialist scheme aimed at, firstly, covering up the Sinai agreement,<sup>149</sup> secondly, involving the resistance, striking at it and liquidating the camps, and involving Syria, and, thirdly, the partition of Lebanon. This is what we said, and this what they said. And I believe that if you were to ask them today they would still say the same thing. But why, it may be asked, should Syria be involved?

What has Syria to do with what is going on in Lebanon? This is a question I want you to turn your attention to, fellow citizens, because it is being raised by people outside Syria in the hope that they may penetrate our ranks at home. They are saying: What have we to do with the troubles in Lebanon? Firstly, one of the goals of the conspiracy is to destroy a cause which is the cause of every Syrian. If the conspiracy really aims at achieving the goals I have mentioned, including striking at the Palestine resistance and partitioning Lebanon, how can Syria just look on at a conspiracy aimed at achieving these goals? We are concerned with this conspiracy and we must prepare ourselves as far as we can to resist the conspiracy and the conspirators—it is something that concerns us, so that we must face up to it. Secondly, throughout history Syria and Lebanon have been one country, one people, as a result of which they have real common interests. Everyone must realize this;

real common interests, as a result of which there is real common security, as a result of which there are ties of close relationship between the people of the two countries. Many thousands of families in Syria have extensions in Lebanon, and very many thousands of families in Lebanon have extensions in Syria.

So today we are confronted with the results of this common history and geography and of the troubles: before the troubles there were a half a million Syrians in Lebanon, engaged in various activities—merchants, doctors, lawyers, workers and so on. As a result of the troubles these have returned to Syria, and now there are also at least a half a million Lebanese refugees in Syria, half a million of our people in Lebanon have come to Syria as refugees. Also about 150 thousand of our Palestinian brothers living in Lebanon have entered Syria as a result of the troubles, so that about a million people have entered Syria—a million people. I think that this gives some idea of the extent of the problem posed by the entry of a million people into a country with a population of less than nine million.

As for the partition of Lebanon, as we all know it is one of the historical objectives of world Zionism. Many of you have probably read the correspondence between the Zionist leaders, or some of them, on this subject in the fifties in which they stress the importance of the partition of Lebanon.

Brothers, it is not because of Lebanon's military importance that Israel wants the partition of Lebanon. Whether united or fragmented, Lebanon does not constitute a military burden on Israel at present nor can it be anticipated that it will be a military burden on Israel in the foreseeable future. Israel does not desire the partition of Lebanon because it constitutes a military burden. Israel desires the partition of Lebanon for political and ideological reasons. Briefly, Israel wants a number of confessional statelets established in this area so that she may be the strongest state. This is something that we have realized in the past, that we have mentioned in the past, and that we constantly repeat.

When Lebanon is partitioned the Israelis will say: Do not believe these Arabs. If they cannot

<sup>148</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), July 21, 1976.

<sup>149</sup> Doc. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

live together, if the Arab Muslim cannot live with the Arab Christian, how can they live with the Jews and with the non-Arab Jews who came from the West, who came from all over the world, the West and the East. This slogan will have to be dropped. Israel wants partition so that the charge of racialism may be dropped. The United Nations has adopted a resolution which says that Zionism is a racist movement; this is a great gain for the Palestine cause and for Arab struggle. Why racist? Because basically it is a state that assembles people from all over the world who have nothing in common but their religion to make them a people and to establish a state. When Lebanon is partitioned between Muslims and Christians, Israel will say to this people: Why do they say we are racist? Israel is established on the basis of religion, and in Lebanon also there is a state, or statelets, that are established on the basis of religion. So either all of us are racist or none of us. The partition of Lebanon will mean that the charge of racialism against Israel has to be dropped.

The partition of Lebanon would be a blow to the idea of Arab nationalism. We would be providing proof that Arab nationalism is not the true link that joins us all so that we can live under the aegis of Arab nationalism. If the Arabs of Lebanon cannot live together in a single state, although they have done so for so many years, they think that they will have tangible proof that there is nothing in Arab nationalism. Furthermore, the partition of Lebanon would be a great blow to Islam, as being the religion of the overwhelming majority of the Arab nation, because they hope to make out that Islam in the present age is a narrow-minded religion that prevents its supporters from living with others, even if they belong to the same nation. This is a conspiracy against Islam and the Muslims; I insist on this point, and I have no intention of mincing matters with anyone. I have often said this in my talks with those concerned, inside and outside Lebanon—that it is a conspiracy against Islam and Arabism in the interests of the enemy, of Zionism and of Israel.

We have said that this conspiracy can only achieve its aims through fighting. Therefore if we are to frustrate it we must stop the fighting. It is a perfectly simple piece of logic: The way for

the conspiracy to succeed is through fighting; therefore, so that the conspiracy may not achieve its aims, we must stop the fighting. And this is what we have to do. We have made political efforts, we have made military efforts, we have provided arms, brothers, to stop the fighting. We have provided ammunition, brothers, to stop the fighting. At one time the balance of forces was unequal so that it was impossible for the fighting to stop.

With this end in view we have been obliged to provide arms and ammunition. We have provided arms to those who were attacking us and denying our efforts and sacrifices—those who have denied the efforts and sacrifices of this people, although our efforts and the attitudes we have adopted have been as clear as daylight, as all realize and remember, not only in Syria but in most of the Arab countries. We have given arms and ammunition to these people; at one time we took arms from our soldiers, from our formations, to give to them. We have given all we could, and this political decision of ours to take action to stop the fighting had an Arab dimension and an international dimension. We have tried to confine the problem to Lebanon, because we and they thought that if this problem was extended to the Arab and international fields, this would assist the conspiracy, and now you can see what they are doing, what they are up to.

In spite of this, in spite of our political efforts, in spite of our military efforts in providing arms and ammunition of various kinds in large quantities—in spite of this the day came when the front of the nationalist parties collapsed, the front of the Palestine resistance collapsed and they could no longer stand on their feet, and they screamed for help, begging us to lose no time in making further efforts in addition to those we had already made. One day in the middle of January, as far as I can remember, the foreign minister got in touch with me saying that they had telephoned him from the Aramoun summit—I do not know Beirut well but the picture in my mind is of a place where the Mufti's house is situated, where the Mufti, the Imam, the prime minister and certain other Muslim personalities were meeting, along with the heads of the parties, including Kamal Junblat.<sup>150</sup> They contacted the foreign

<sup>150</sup> See doc. 190 above.

minister and requested him to ask me to contact President Sulayman Franjeh to ask him to stop the fighting, as the situation was very bad. I told the foreign minister that I would not do so, they must hold out. And in less than a quarter of an hour he contacted me again saying: They have contacted me again; things are going very badly for them; some quarters have fallen and armed Phalangist elements are storming the buildings and everything is collapsing before their eyes. I told him that I would not contact the president, and that they must hold out. I said this, brothers, not because I was hesitant or because I did not want to make any effort. I did so because I was surprised at such requests, because I knew, as it was only natural, that the resistance and the nationalist parties had more arms and ammunition than the whole of the Lebanese army, not only the Pahalangists and the Liberals. The resistance and the parties had far more arms and ammunition than the Phalangists, the Liberals and the Lebanese army.

Of course the Lebanese army was not involved in the fighting, was not a party to it at all. A little later he contacted me a third time, saying: Things are very bad, and they insist on my asking you to contact the president. In fact reports had been received of the fall of Maslakh, Karantina and other places, and they said if you don't contact the president immediately, the Phalangists will encircle the western district, the road is open to them. The western district is the area now controlled by armed men from the organizations and the parties. Here all I can say is worse luck for the western district. Then, I found that I had to contact the president. I did so and I told him, among other things, that a major massacre was taking place that would lead to complications everywhere; I beg you, I told him, to take rapid action to stop it and to avoid the risks involved in it. Everyone is being attacked—old people, women and children; this could have grave consequences. I beg you to look into the matter and do what you can, and we shall await the results of your efforts.

I had a discussion with President Franjeh on the telephone, and finally we agreed that there should be a ceasefire at such and such a time that night—I think it was eight or nine o'clock. After that reports kept coming in to the effect that the fighting was escalating and that things were getting

worse. We had a meeting here in Damascus. I met with some members of the command, and we debated what we could do to save the situation. We had made political efforts, we had given arms and ammunition, we had done all this, but it was not enough to save the situation. So all we could do was to intervene directly. Of course, brothers, we discussed all aspects of the situation, we discussed the dangers of intervention and the possibilities of war between us and Israel. Two courses were open to us: We could either not intervene, in which case the resistance in Lebanon would fall and be liquidated, seeing what the military situation was, and in view of its appeals for help. Or we could intervene and save the resistance at the risk of war. We discussed the possibility of war, and decided that there was a real possibility of it, but that it was not inevitable, for reasons which I do not want to disclose in detail at present. But briefly, if war with Israel did break out, it would lead to results contrary to the aims of the conspiracy in Lebanon. All the same, there was a real possibility of war; there was also a possibility of there being no war. So we said: We must intervene and save the resistance.

We decided to intervene in the guise of the Palestine Liberation Army, which started to enter Lebanon. This was not known to those who now speak in the name of Palestine and are so deluded that they disregard all the efforts we made on their behalf. They did not know of the decision to send in the Palestine Liberation Army, they did not know about it until the army had entered Lebanese territory. We did not consult either them or the nationalist parties, and of course none of them was prepared to discuss any measures with us; the important thing was that they were asking us to take measures to save them. After the calls from Aramoun, the leaders of the nationalist parties came to Syria on the same day and stayed at the foreign ministry until late at night.

Here they were, sitting in the Syrian foreign ministry, seeking a solution of the problem and an honourable way out of the situation they were in, while we were moving the army into Lebanon to defend them and the Palestine resistance. Next morning I received them in my house; Kamal Junblat was with them. Kamal Junblat had been at Aramoun when they telephoned the foreign minister. Later he came to Syria, and next morning

I received him with the party leaders.

I can remember, as can they—those of them who are listening to me today—what their morale was like at the time. It was certainly not good. I reassured them and said to them: We are with you and with the people of Lebanon. We shall oppose the massacres and the liquidations for this is in the interests of all, of all parties without exception. We have sent in the Liberation Army and other forces, and things will return to normal. While I was talking to them I contacted President Sulayman Franjich on the telephone and had a talk with him. We talked about various subjects, and there is no need for me to repeat the whole conversation. Here I must apologize to President Sulayman Franjich for discussing these things, and ask him to excuse me, because this is an important matter, the question of giving the people the facts. Let me tell you that he was an honourable man in his dealings, and he kept his word once he had given it to us. He told me that there were Syrian troops entering Lebanon. I reminded him of our conversation of the day before. I told him that the situation was grave and that I hoped that all Arabs would understand me. We had a firm attitude as regards the Palestinians, and that as far as the Palestinians were concerned there was a red line which we would allow no one whatsoever to cross.

We brought the resistance leaders to the foreign ministry in Damascus. They were headed by Yasir Arafat, and the other leaders were there too. We told them to write down what they wanted from Lebanon. And they did so, they themselves wrote what they wanted, and we took what they had written to the Lebanese authorities and discussed the matter with them. The Lebanese authorities agreed to everything they had written, without deleting a single letter of it, although I admit that what they had written and what they demanded was not all of it essential for the protection of the resistance and to ensure that it plays its role in the struggle against the enemy. However, the Lebanese authorities agreed to everything that was written without deleting a single letter, and I have the agreement in front of me now, and I think it would be a good thing for me to read it to you.

Palestinian-Lebanese relations. These are the words written by the Palestinian leaders themselves.

1. The PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinians in Lebanon, no other being recognized. This was meant to reinforce the prestige of the PLO so that no one might oppose its wishes and so that the state might not recognize any other quarter.

2. The PLO is responsible for the affairs of Palestinians inside the camps.

3. The PLO has the right to take measures inside the camps to ensure their security against any outside foreign aggression.

4. The PLO is entitled to exercise all the rights granted it under the Cairo agreement and its annexes.

5. Nothing shall be done to prejudice the Palestinian presence in Lebanon.

6. Nothing shall be done to impair or prejudice the security of the Palestine resistance or its presence in Lebanon.

What more could the resistance want, what more could the PLO want?

This is the part relevant to Lebanese-Palestinian relations. Was all of it necessary to ensure that the PLO should engage in its activities against Israel? I say No. Even so the Lebanese authorities agreed to everything I have read to you.

But now, as I hear from broadcasts, they want to mislead Arab, and perhaps world opinion, into believing that they are defending the Palestine resistance whereas in fact there are powers inside Lebanon and on the international scene that want to subject the Palestine resistance to their own tactical and strategic goals. The Palestine resistance is today fighting for the goals of others against the interests and the goals of the Palestinian Arab people.

After this was agreed on we said that there were certain national problems. We were prompted by a spirit of brotherhood and by our knowledge that there were many things wrong that could be remedied by the Lebanese authorities at this stage. For these reasons we said that we must exert fraternal efforts in the hope of being able to achieve something advantageous. There were many discussions, many meetings, and agreement was reached on a number of measures which were called national reforms. They were drawn up and written down on paper and the paper was later called the constitutional document. This document covered 90 per cent at least of what had been raised by the nationalist parties, and I can now

tell you that we added certain points here in Syria. We added certain points that had not been raised by these parties, such as a reference to the Arab character of Lebanon. The nationalist parties had not raised the point of Lebanon belonging to the Arab world.

The authorities agreed to this too, so agreement was reached on how Lebanese-Palestinian relations were to be regulated and on the constitutional document which contained the national reforms. As far as we here in Syria were concerned, through our contacts with the parties, we thought that what had been achieved in the document was a major victory for the nationalists, a victory for all the Lebanese people.

I repeat, President Sulayman Franjeh was honourable and high-minded, and we reached the agreement I have mentioned here on a previous occasion, in the light of these contacts and in the light of maintaining legality, to which all adhere, including those involved in the coup, as was shown by the contents of their first communiqué, and including, of course, the parties that call themselves the nationalist parties. In the light of all this it was agreed, firstly, to amend the constitution, or one of its articles, to the effect that the election of the new president of the republic should take place six months before the expiry of the old president's term of office; secondly, to elect the new president; thirdly, [to fix] the transitional period until the resignation of the present president. When we had reached this agreement, the situation exploded violently. There was the coup, and the question of the president's resignation was raised. Some of the nationalist parties had adopted this, and asked us to take steps, which we did, and when we had reached agreement on what all had asked in this connection, the situation exploded.

Fighting broke out and people said that the president should resign. At the time Yasir Arafat asked us to receive Kamal Junblat. We asked Yasir Arafat: why should we receive Kamal Junblat when he insists on continuing to fight, while we in Syria think, as you thought, and say that you still think—that fighting is the way to achieve the goals of the conspiracy. Why should we receive Kamal Junblat when he insists on a resumption of the fighting? What good can come of meeting him? He said: No, these statements

are for Lebanese consumption, take no notice of them, everything is going right. So we received Kamal Junblat and I had a long meeting with him, lasting several hours, during which we reviewed the incidents in Lebanon from the start.

He talked about secularization; he wanted a secular state in Lebanon. Of course, all I am saying is in the light of the contacts I had with the others over several months. I said that the Phalangists were enthusiastic for secularization. When the Phalangist Party visited us—the leadership of the Phalangist Party, headed by Shaykh Pierre Gemayyel—I myself asked him about this matter, and he said: I do not accept any alternative to secularization. I insist on Lebanon being a secular state. I put this to the Mufti of the Muslims, to Musa Sadr, to some of the prime ministers and speakers of the Chamber of Deputies, and they rejected it, because it is something related to the very essence of the Islamic religion. This is something you here in Syria should realize, brothers. There is a misleading impression here: it is the Muslims of Lebanon who do not want secularization, not the Christians, because it is something related to the very essence of Islam. The Phalangists insist on secularization, and so does Kamal Junblat. I told him [Kamal Junblat] that it was the Muslim religious leaders that did not accept secularization. He said: Do not bother about them, they do not represent anything. I said: It is not a question of representation, and here too I want to clear myself and say: I should not have said what I am saying if it were not a matter of making certain facts clear.

He said that they do not represent anything, and I said that it was not a question of representation but of the Islamic religion, and when it was a question of Islam it should not be underestimated. This is what I said to him at that meeting—it is not a matter of representation, of whether or not they represent anything, but of the Islamic religion, and this being the case the matter should not be underestimated. He said: Let us punish them. There must be a military decision—they have been ruling us for a hundred and forty years, we want to be rid of them!

I then saw that all the masks had fallen. It was not a matter of what we had said, or what had been said to us. It was not a dispute between



right and left, between progressives and reactionaries, between Muslims and Christians. It was a question of a heritage of feelings of vengeance going back a hundred and forty years. As a Muslim I am bound to oppose this trend, because Islam is love and justice, not hatred and malice.

. . . . .

Brothers, Kamal Junblat left this meeting leaving me with the impression that he insisted on fighting. I said to him: Do not depend on our help; we cannot go along with you on a course that we have already agreed is the course of the conspiracy.

The next day, or rather the same day, I sent for Yasir Arafat. I received him the next day, along with some of his colleagues. I had a long talk with them and repeated much of what I had said in my meeting with Kamal Junblat. I repeated what I have said just now and I discussed with them the dangers of the military decision that he was in favour of.

Here, brothers, I want to say something about this military decision. A military decision in a country like Lebanon, a military decision between two groups in one country, is impossible. A military decision in the case of any problem means the final liquidation of the problem. It means finding a radical solution of the problem. In this sense, in its fundamental sense, a military decision is impossible in a country like Lebanon, because it does not depend on the element of force alone, but on there being other elements that do not exist in Lebanon at present. I do not intend to theorize about this: I just want to say briefly that this is what a military decision means. A military decision in this sense is impossible in Lebanon, because the element of force is not the only condition that has to be met, there are other elements, other conditions, which do not exist at present.

If the military decision they desire created a state of coercion in Lebanon—if this happened, it would have dangerous, very dangerous consequences. If we tried to defeat the conspiracy by a military decision, we should achieve the opposite; the goals of the conspiracy would be realized. If there was a military decision in this sense the first consequence would be the emergence of a new problem in Lebanon and in this area. I do not know how to describe the problem that would emerge. Would it be the problem of a people? The problem of a religion? The problem of Leba-

non? The problem of part of Lebanon? It is difficult at present to decide what this problem should be called, if it emerged. But what we can be sure of, without hesitation or reservations, is that in the event of such a military decision, a grave and major problem would result, which would absorb our attention, the attention of the whole area, of the whole world. This problem would have a special character—it would be a problem of oppressed people, and the world would be sympathetic to it, for the world always sympathizes with the oppressed. This could be the first consequence of the military decision they want, if they were able to achieve it.

The second consequence would be that the world would try to solve this problem. As you have observed, the world likes to find solutions for all problems, in particular major problems, problems of peoples, problems of the oppressed. The world, the whole world, strives to find solutions of the problems of the oppressed, and the world would try to find a solution to this problem, if it emerged. What could this solution be? We can all appreciate that the only possible solution would be the partition of Lebanon, but a partition involving violence, oppression. This partition would lead to further major dangers, different from those that would arise if the partition were not achieved through violence. There would be a state of these oppressed people, a state full of hatred, its people inheriting hatred from the oppression they had suffered. They would deny all Arab values, all Islamic values, because, as I said, Islam is the religion of the majority of the people of the Arab homeland. There would be a state which—and I say this frankly and plainly—a state which would be more dangerous than Israel. There would be a state that would be more dangerous and more hostile than Israel, not because the people who would live in it would be Israelis or foreigners. No, they would be part of our people. This is not why this state would be more dangerous, more hostile than Israel; this is not the reason. They would be what they were as the result of the oppression they had suffered; because of oppression this state and those who lived in it would be more dangerous and more hostile than Israel.

The third point: you can all realize that this sort of military decision would open the doors wide to every kind of foreign intervention, especially by Israel. We can all imagine the extent of

the tragedy that could ensue if Israel intervened to save some Arabs from others.

The fourth point: the many negative repercussions this military decision would have on the Palestine cause, both inside Palestine and in the field of world public opinion and its support for the Palestine cause and Arab struggle.

The fifth point: all of us can imagine the major negative repercussions there would be in the Arab homeland, repercussions on Arab sentiment, on the Arab conscience. We can imagine the sort of system of relations that would arise in the area after this military decision. It is an ugly picture, involving the destruction of Arab interests and Arab goals.

The important thing is that at this meeting I asked Yasir Arafat to appreciate the gravity of the situation, the dangers of continued fighting, and especially the danger of Palestinian combatants playing a leading role in this fighting. I said to him then, and I say it now: I cannot see what the Palestinians' fighting in the high mountains of Lebanon has to do with the liberation of Palestine, I just cannot see it. Palestinians who fight in Mount Lebanon are definitely not fighting for Palestine. Those who want to liberate Jounieh and Tripoli do not want to liberate Palestine, however much they say they do. This is what they said in 1970. You remember, brothers, the slogans that used to be heard in Jordan in 1970: "All power to the resistance", "All power to the revolution", "We shall liberate Palestine through Amman". This is in essence what is being repeated in Lebanon today. During the meeting Yasir Arafat promised me that he would withdraw from the fighting, and went straight to Lebanon to tell the others so. I do not want to discuss all the details here and now, but I will say that this was not fully implemented. The fighting did indeed stop a few days later, but, as you recall, it stopped after Dean Brown arrived in Beirut. Let us cast our minds backwards: the fighting stopped after the arrival of Dean Brown in Beirut. As an Arab I am certainly grateful to anyone in the world who can stop the shooting, anyone in the world who tries to bring about a ceasefire in Lebanon. What is important is that this tragedy should cease, that this conspiracy should cease.

But I am surprised that the fighting did not stop until after Dean Brown returned to, or arrived in Beirut. What I mean to say is that if

America wants a ceasefire and tries to achieve it, we shall welcome their efforts. If any country, foreign or Arab, works for a ceasefire and is successful, we shall be only too glad.

Syria is the land of endurance, and all who are in favour of endurance must support Syria. Syria is the land of liberation, and all who are in favour of liberation must support Syria. Syria is the land of nationalism and progress, and all who are in favour of nationalism and progress must support Syria. Syria is the land of Palestinian struggle, and all who are in favour of Palestinian struggle must support Syria. All talk of war, all talk of liberating Palestine without Syria is folly, and misleads the masses.

Throughout this period we have maintained our contacts with the resistance in conformity with the principle that there must be no despair and no despondency in combatting the enemy of the nation and in combatting the conspiracies aimed at discrediting the causes and the aspirations of the nation. Our contacts with the resistance continued, and in about the middle of April we held a meeting with the resistance leaders, which lasted all night, as far as I can remember. At dawn we published the points we had agreed on. This was the statement or communiqué that we published on April 16, 1976;<sup>151</sup> it has written on it "4 a.m." The point is that the meeting was attended by Yasir Arafat, the Chairman of the Executive Committee, and Messrs. Zuhayr Muhsin, Faruq Qaddumi, Nayif Hawatma, Salah Khalaf and Abu Salih; also present were Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Naji Jamil and Hikmat Shihabi. There was a review of the situation in the area in general and the situation in Lebanon in particular. There was an appraisal and analysis of all aspects of the Lebanese crisis and of the dangers of its continuing, and viewpoints coincided on all points—I mean we were agreed on the matter I mentioned just now, and both sides stressed their concern for the Lebanese people and for their security, territorial integrity and stability, and called on them to stop the fighting and bloodshed. The two sides agreed on the following:

1. That there should be a ceasefire and that a unified stand should be taken against any quarter

<sup>151</sup> Doc. 237 above.

resuming hostilities. So we agreed, and effective measures were taken against any party that resumed the fighting. Of course it was these same people who agreed with us, who said this, that resumed fighting operations.

2. That the tripartite Syrian-Palestinian-Lebanese Supreme Military Committee be reconstituted to achieve and implement and supervise a ceasefire until the election of the new president of the republic, when we would decide what security measures should be taken in accordance with what he saw fit in conformity with his constitutional powers.

3. To combat partition in any form and any action or measure liable to prejudice the unity of the territory and the people of Lebanon.

4. To reject American solutions and schemes in Lebanon.

5. That the Syrian initiative in Lebanon should continue.

6. To reject internationalization and the entry of any international forces into Lebanon.

7. To reject the Arabization of the Lebanese crisis.

As regards its implementation, this agreement never saw the light of day.

What happened was that on June 6—after this agreement—Fatah, certain other Palestinian organizations and a number of the parties that call themselves nationalist, launched a comprehensive planned attack on the offices of the Forces of the Working People in Lebanon, the offices of Saiqa and the Baath Party, the headquarters and offices of the Palestine Liberation Army and the offices of the other sections of the National Front in Lebanon, without any warning. I had with me in my office Major Abd al-Salam Jallud, the Libyan prime minister, who, as you know, was still in Damascus, and Abd al-Karim ben Mahmud, the Algerian minister of education, when we heard that Fatah and the other organizations that I have already mentioned were carrying out extensive attacks in all parts of Beirut. We had of course agreed that measures should be taken against any quarters that started fighting and it was they who started fighting operations but against Palestinian and Lebanese nationalist groups and against the Palestine Liberation Army. We dispatched some of our forces towards Beirut with the intention of restoring the situation to normal, and then stopped their advance before they reached

Beirut, at the insistence of our Algerian and Libyan brothers.

What is both comic and tragic is that these people are trying to cover themselves, to conceal their weaknesses by making charges against Syria. I am sure that you have heard people saying that Syria is conspiring with America in Lebanon, that there is an American-Syrian conspiracy. I can say with all frankness, pride and confidence that had Syria agreed to the American schemes for the area, or had Syria assumed a neutral attitude to them, the implementation of such schemes would have met with no obstacle in the Arab area. Just as our attitude is constant and unswerving in its support of the Palestine cause, so it is in Lebanon in support of the Lebanese cause. We shall not make concessions or bargain. During the Lebanese crisis we have made many contacts and with all sorts of countries, and I should like to review with you some of these contacts.

I should like those who did not realize it before to realize how high-minded and honourable have Syria's dealings been with all, and especially with her friends. I want to read to you some paragraphs of the minutes of two separate contacts, which give an idea of what our dealings are like and of the manner in which we conduct our contacts. The first contact was between us and the Americans on October 16, 1975. Of course the minutes are very long, but as you can see, I shall not read them all to you, only certain paragraphs. On that date the American ambassador met me; naturally he brought a message, and he said:

First I want to correct the impression that has arisen in certain quarters in Syria—that the US supports the hard line of the Christian extremists in Lebanon. This does not mean that we are not concerned for the situation of the Christian communities in Lebanon, but there is an obvious difference between the attitudes of the extremist and the moderate Christians in Lebanon. It is clear to us, and this is America's attitude, that for a solution to be durable it must be acceptable to the moderate Christians and must not endanger their security, because for them to have such a feeling of security is a principal element in a durable solution. We should like to hear how Syria sees the situation, what is Syria's plan? Our considered opinion, and I want to be sure that we are not

misunderstood on this, is that Israel will regard the entry of foreign armed forces as a very great threat, and that whatever we say to her, she will intervene (this shows that America supports Syrian intervention in Lebanon and especially armed intervention!), and we frankly want to avoid such a situation arising. I should like to make it quite clear that this does not imply any joint talks between Israel and the US. I think it is clear to all our brothers what is meant by these words.

This was the basic theme in this meeting on this matter. Let me also tell you what I replied.

In fact I spoke at length, but I will only tell you the gist of my reply:

What we are doing in Lebanon we are doing in the light of the fact that we are members of a single Arab nation. Therefore the reason why we are so interested in what is going on in Lebanon is that we are greatly perturbed by the tragedy that is being enacted on the Lebanese scene. We are concerned for all Lebanese, Muslims and Christians; they are all members of our Arab nation and rally round the banner of Arab nationalism. This is the reason for our concern for what is happening in Lebanon and why we are dealing with it as we are. This is why we are trying to stop the fighting through understanding and co-operation with the various political forces in Lebanon. We are trying to create a favourable atmosphere for the solving of their other internal problems in a democratic manner and through dialogue among themselves. As for the impression that you referred to, (the American envoy had said to me: We want to repudiate the impression that America supports the Christian extremists) as for the impression which is said to exist in certain quarters, to the effect that the US is supporting the Christian extremists—as far as I know this impression does not exist. The impression that does exist is that the US is playing a role in the fighting in Lebanon for other political goals, and first and foremost to help support the Sinai agreement.<sup>152</sup> For everyone in this area has the impression that the US is not interested in religious matters anywhere in the world. Were the situation otherwise—if the strategy of the US was based on defending Christians throughout the world, as you say, the US would first have to defend Christ Himself by fighting Israel, because it was the

Jews who crucified Christ, so you say. If then we really believe that the US is interested in religious matters, how to explain this profound contradiction—that in one place you appear to be interested in a problem that concerns Christians, while elsewhere you give your full support to those who crucified Christ? Thus it is impossible to explain any American views on Lebanon on a religious basis; they must be explained on a political basis.

As regards Israel, as I said a short time ago (of course I am still referring to my talk with the American envoy), we believe that the problem in Lebanon is one related to the Arab nation. It is thus an internal Arab problem and Israel, even if she is a state with a long history in the area—if we accept such a hypothesis—although it is an unreasonable one—she has no right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Arab nation, for Israel is an alien presence as far as Lebanon, Syria and Jordan are concerned. Syria, on the other hand, is not an alien presence as far as Lebanon is concerned, and Lebanon is not an alien presence for Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and so on. The Arabs are a single nation; Israel is alien to this nation and has nothing to do with its goals. This is self-evident and does not require further discussion. If Israel wants to intervene it is because since her establishment (of course, brothers, I was replying to what he meant to say, for obviously what he meant was that if you intervene Israel will intervene), if Israel wants to intervene it is because since her establishment she has been seeking circumstances favourable to expansion and aggression. She will expand and be aggressive; that has been confirmed by experience ever since Israel was established. In our attitude to the incidents in Lebanon we shall not take into account what Israel may do. We shall perform our duty to Lebanon fully at all times and we shall do all in our power to stop the fighting, because it is fighting between groups of our people and kin, and if our brothers in Lebanon want to call on our military resources, our armed forces, we shall place all they want at their disposal in any part of Lebanese territory, from the farthest south to the farthest north of Lebanon, and we shall not be prevented from performing this duty by what Israel intends to do. Any time that Israel tries to confront us, we shall not feel any restraint, and we shall be ready to resist Israel—and not only in Syrian territory, but anywhere in the Arab

<sup>152</sup> Doc. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

homeland. This is my reply to the American attitude, and this is conclusive evidence, so some people say, that Syria is acting in conformity with an American plan and that Syria's attitude in Lebanon is an American-Syrian conspiracy!

Then there was another contact on April 14, 1976. On April 9, as far as I can remember, we dispatched a force as far as Masnaa only; we did not enter the Bekaa or other areas beyond the Bekaa. The contact was made after this move. There was a clear warning against intervention, a threat of what would happen if we intervened. On April 14 they brought us the ultimatum—the report is long, but it was to the same effect. On the 12th, three days after our move to Masnaa, the Israeli government informed us that they regarded Syrian actions in Lebanon as having reached a certain point and that if they went beyond it, Israel would find herself obliged to take steps and measures in connection with these moves (the wording is extremely clear); and the US is alarmed lest the impression should arise in Syria that the absence of any open Israeli reaction means that Israel attaches no importance to the Syrian moves, contrary to what we [the U.S.] have repeatedly told Damascus in the last few weeks (meaning that it was not a matter of contacts, of efforts, between our two countries). This message was transmitted to Dr. Adib Daudi, the political adviser. He read the message and afterwards sent it to me and I wrote him the answer on a piece of paper, so that he might pass it on:

1. Syria considers that the contents of the letter amount to an ultimatum, and she unequivocally rejects this ultimatum.

2. Syria is not prepared now, and will not be prepared in the future, to accept any ultimatum from any quarter in the world.

3. What is happening in Lebanon is an internal Arab affair, and the Arabs alone are competent to deal with it.

4. The only consideration that has determined and will in the future determine the extent of Syrian intervention in Lebanon, including the size and location of Syrian forces, is the interests of the people of Lebanon, because we have a common history, a common future and a common destiny.

This was my reply to the letter that came to us from the US, to the ultimatum that came to us from the US.

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**Declaration of the Independent Nasserite Movement (Murabitun) affirming the solidarity of the Palestine revolution and the National Movement of Lebanon (excerpts)<sup>153</sup>**

Beirut, July 20, 1976

4. We hereby declare that our military attitude is that we shall hold out in our positions and continue the struggle against the conspiracy that is being implemented against the resistance and the nationalist movement, and we shall refuse to lay down our arms until we are sure that the Palestine resistance is not going to be neutralized by any force whatsoever, and that the struggle of the Lebanese people has borne fruit and brought about the radical changes for which they have been fighting.

5. Political activity has taken several forms, all of which must be examined. The proposed political solutions of the crisis revolve in the orbit of a Lebanese-Lebanese solution and a Lebanese-Palestinian settlement, and they are accompanied by specific internal moves in the nationalist area, and the establishment of fronts with various names. Our attitude to those moves is as follows:

a) We reject all suggestions that a Lebanese-Palestinian solution should be reached before a Lebanese-Lebanese solution, regarding this as a step away from the true goal, which is to escape from the crisis. What has to be done is to establish a new united Lebanese authority representing all Lebanese. This authority must then be the Lebanese party to the negotiation of a Lebanese-Palestinian solution which takes into account the interests both of the revolution and the Lebanese people. We regard any suggestions of moves in any other direction as explosive and calculated to impede the reaching of a final national solution of the crisis.

b) As regards the Lebanese-Palestinian solution, in the light of our revolutionary nationalist attitude and of our unionist understanding of the right of the Palestine resistance to fight its battle from Lebanese territory, we believe that the 1969

<sup>153</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Murabit* (Beirut), July 24, 1976, p. 8.

agreements<sup>154</sup> achieved by the former regime do not reflect the real situation of Lebanon since the start of the struggle as we understand it and would like it to be. The new Lebanon must be more closely attached to the Arab cause as a whole and the Palestine cause in particular. Further steps must therefore be taken to affirm the legitimacy of Palestinian struggle from Lebanese territory and to give the resistance greater freedom of movement in its struggle against Zionism and Israel.

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**Speech by President Sadat of Egypt to the National Assembly on the anniversary of the July revolution (excerpts)<sup>155</sup>**

**Cairo, July 22, 1976**

Brothers and sisters. The Egyptian people, and along with them the peoples of the Arab nation and the whole world, will recall that I declared at the United Nations on October 29 last,<sup>156</sup> that Egypt called for 1976 to be the year of Palestine, meaning the year in which activities and efforts should be dedicated to confirming the victories won by the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and to advancing towards the national goal of the Arabs—the recovery of the established national rights of the Palestinian people. With this end in view, at the United Nations General Assembly on the same date I put forward an initiative aimed at ensuring that the PLO should participate in all peace efforts, and in particular the United Nations peace conference, on an equal footing with all other parties. This was approved by the General Assembly in a resolution which was supported by a large majority—101 votes—the best possible indication of the great international support for the rights of the people of Palestine and of the great appreciation there is for the efforts of the Arabs and for the Palestinian advance, led by the PLO,

towards the recovery of the rights of that great people.

No sooner was this move made and all of us were preparing to advance towards our goals with firm steps, than it became clear that there was a dangerous scheme afoot directed against the Arab nation in general and the people of Lebanon and the Palestine resistance in particular. The aim of this plan is to destroy the solidarity and the advance of the Arab nation and to invalidate the victories it has realized. The crisis in Lebanon broke out as a result of foreign scheming and outside interference on the part of quarters that reject the goals of the Arab nation and deny it the right to life, freedom and progress. From the start of this crisis Egypt has been saying: Hands off Lebanon, and let her people decide their own destiny, correct their course and let all that is positive in their nature prevail over what is negative. Egypt did not adopt this slogan for purposes of outbidding; it was the result of a carefully considered attitude based on a sound understanding of the realities of the Arab nation and also on an understanding of the dimensions of the conspiracies from outside the country and the destructive moves inside it that are threatening Lebanon.

In this respect Egypt's attitude is based on the following considerations:

1. That all outside interference in Lebanon should cease.
2. That the Arabs should make a collective effort regardless of axes and of the interests of any individual Arab state or group of Arab states.
3. That this Arab effort should be made through and within the framework of the Arab League.
4. That Arab action should start with the achievement of a ceasefire.
5. That the aim of the Arab solution should be to maintain the unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity and Arab character of Lebanon.
6. To preserve the existence of the Palestine resistance and its role and to ensure that nothing is done to injure it.

The plot has thickened. It has rejected what it calls "Arabization" and resisted any idea or proposal that could lead to collective Arab action or rescue Lebanon and the Palestine revolution from the clutches of the terrible plan directed against the whole Arab nation. The result has been that things have worsened there and we are now confronted with a situation in which the

<sup>154</sup> See note to doc. 195 above.

<sup>155</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), July 23, 1976.

<sup>156</sup> Doc. 319 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

Palestine resistance is being attacked in Lebanon, and along with it the nationalist forces. We must here ask ourselves: In whose interest is the Palestine resistance being attacked? In whose interest are the Lebanese nationalist forces being attacked? At whom are Syrian shells and rockets being fired? Is all this of service to the Arab cause? Or is this situation having a negative effect on the Arab advance towards liberation and self-determination for the Palestinian people?

Egypt cannot allow the Palestine resistance to be threatened or the Lebanese nationalist forces to be attacked. She insists that the grievous bloodshed in Lebanon must be stopped and is doing everything in her power to ensure that it is halted. Nor can Egypt support an invasion of Lebanon by Arab forces, whether they be Syrian or non-Syrian, for she is convinced that what has happened is the result of miscalculations by the conspirators that have led to the escalation of military operations in Lebanon, for all the arrogant justifications that were being offered so short a time ago. In the light of this it is essential that the Syrian forces should withdraw after the failure they have encountered, to be replaced by the security forces constituted by the Arab League in order to establish a ceasefire. A ceasefire is, first and foremost, a political decision and when, and only when, it is reached can political dialogue start in a different and suitable atmosphere. It is not only Egypt that insists on this; it is an Arab demand at the level of the whole Arab nation and it was in this context that I put forward the Egyptian initiative after we had discussed all aspects of the Lebanese situation in the Egyptian National Security Council. This initiative called for the following: firstly, an immediate ceasefire; secondly, that collective Arab action should be taken to save the deteriorating situation in Lebanon; thirdly, that an Arab peace force should be formed to actually come between the warring forces and supervise the ceasefire. When outside interference was stepped up and the clash between Syria and the Palestinians took place, with resulting bloodshed, the PLO approached the Arab League asking that an emergency meeting of the League Council be held to discuss the situation arising therefrom. Thus started the Arab action which had been avoided, indeed, impeded, for fourteen consecutive months as the result of shortsightedness, arrogance and conceit.

As I say, this Arab action started fourteen months late. The League Council decided that collective Arab action was essential and important and set up a committee to go to Beirut and Damascus to reconcile the parties to the crisis and the conflict—i.e. Syria, the Palestinians and all groupings of the Lebanese. The Council also decided to form an Arab security force to replace the Syrian forces and to take the necessary steps to restore order and prepare for the establishment of peace. As I say, the League Council at last decided in June and July of this year what it should have done, as we had asked it to, a full year before, and if the parties had appreciated the interests of the Arab nation as they should have done and listened to what we said, we could have avoided the situation in which we find ourselves at present. An Arab solution of the crisis has always been, and still is, the only way of solving it. To call for internationalization is an unpatriotic and irresponsible attitude, the aim of which is to open the door to suspect intervention or to re-establish foreign tutelage. We are as strongly opposed to this as we are to foreign intervention and invasion and everything that threatens Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity, attempts at partition and plans for intimidation. In saying this I warn against any attempt to injure the Palestine resistance and its national role. Some people have been raising the banner of constitutional legality in Lebanon—as if there was any legality left in Lebanon! Lebanon is being burned and destroyed, and her president, Franjieh, talks of legality! Lebanon is perishing and her corrupt leaders raise marginal issues! Legality is not a word to be bandied about in a frivolous manner; it means responsibility, honour and leadership, all of which, I am sorry to say, are non-existent in Lebanon, where such things have been done in the name of legality and the meaning of honour has been so distorted that the word has become utterly meaningless. We are confronted with a problem that has three branches: the Syrian-Palestinian clash, which must be dealt with immediately, so as to save the resistance, and also to save Syria. The second branch is Palestinian-Lebanese relations, which are governed by the Cairo agreement and its annexes—and this is something that has to be stressed. The third branch is the Lebanese problem itself for which the Lebanese leaders must bear the responsibility. We support them

and give our blessing to every step they take for the sake of unity and concord in Lebanon. The Arab League's resolutions on Lebanon must be implemented and the Arab forces must be given the opportunity to take action and to replace the Syrian forces, which the whole of Arab public opinion insists must withdraw. Egypt is prepared to support the Arab forces with the arms and equipment necessary for them to take action and defend themselves against any act of folly committed against them, so that they may be able to move to the sensitive area to separate the warring forces and help to stop the shedding of Arab blood. Only Israel and the enemies of the Arab nation benefit from what is happening in Lebanon, from the shedding of Arab blood and what is befalling the resistance; and although we believe that Israel will not intervene, because what she wants is being achieved without her having to fire a single shot, yet she will certainly lose no time in making her dreams come true if the plan continues its infamous advance toward the partition of Lebanon. Then Israel might move to get what she can of the spoils. We are all faced with a grave setback to our advance, indeed to our very destiny. From this platform I warn Israel and all who are involved in this terrible plot which is aimed at all of us, that we shall continue to support the Palestine resistance so that it may be able to stand up to those conspiracies and schemes.

. . . . .

Before I conclude what I have to say about the Arab situation I want to consider some of the lessons to be learned from all this. The principal lesson is that Egypt has always played, and still does, the principal, pivotal role in the Arab nation. It is therefore impossible for Egypt to try to renounce this role, and any attempt by other parties to isolate Egypt is doomed to failure and ridicule. It is not a role we have asked for, nor do we boast of it; it is a role imposed on us by history and by circumstances, and we mention it so that we may shoulder our responsibilities.

. . . . .

After the Arab situation I reviewed with you the African situation and the non-aligned situation. Talking of the non-aligned situation brings us to our relations with the two superpowers. These are governed by a single set of principles and

standards. Our dealings with each of them are on the basis of their readiness to respect our sovereignty and independence of will, not to interfere in our internal affairs and to cooperate in building a firm edifice of peace in the area on the basis of Israel's withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and the achievement by the Palestinian people of their national rights. Our relations with neither of the superpowers are based on complexes or specific barriers, for it is the weak who are fettered by complexes and dominated by slogans and apprehensions: the strong confront strong action with full confidence in themselves and in their ability.

We have put to the test the change that has taken place in American Middle East policy and responded to it positively, and we regard with satisfaction the present cooperation between the two countries in the field of bilateral relations, although we observe that certain complications with which we are familiar are making the American move towards supporting the Arab position slow and hesitant. We are also aware that the US and other countries are following the course that serves their own interests and goals. We do not deny that they have the right to do so, but we do take it into account when we formulate our policies and plans. As for the USSR we do not deny its support for the Arab's right to recover their territory and their rights, but we ask it to translate this support into definite practical stands that will strengthen the Arab front and increase our ability to resist the continuous aggression against our territory. We ask it to refrain from everything that could injure the unity of Arab ranks and to abstain from the establishment of axes and polarization. To the extent that the USSR is prepared to pursue a policy of openness and to rid itself of the complexes and negative attitudes of the past, Egypt will be prepared to go along with it and to rebuild her bridges with it.

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**Appeal by Phalangist Party leader Gemayyel of Lebanon to the Muslims of Lebanon to join in asserting Lebanon's sovereignty in the face of the Palestine resistance (excerpt)<sup>157</sup>**

Beirut, July 24, 1976

It so happened that the Palestinians had an armed and dense presence amongst us, exceeding all limits, regulations and principles, and reaching the point of undermining sovereignty and independence. Were the Christians expected to bless this tyranny and to sit and watch while international communism exploited this situation beyond all limits? They expected you to make common cause with them instead of with tyranny. When you did not do so, this ordeal took place whose end is not yet in sight.

But we must put an end to it. It will not end until solidarity among the Lebanese is restored. Nor will this take place until we go back to the roots, to your own historic role, you Muslims in Lebanon, to your feelings which are not confined to the fact that you are Arab Muslims like the rest but the expression of such feelings in a manner that inspires confidence rather than caution and suspicion. Your role is to prove through the example of Lebanon, that Arabism is not a sectarian or religious bias. Your role is to inspire in Christian hearts a faith in the pioneering formula for coexistence. Nor do I think this role to be difficult or impossible. It is indeed extremely simple. It would be enough for you so to conduct yourselves as to prove that Lebanon shall not become a Muslim state for the whole problem to be solved in a radical manner. The Christians would then remain the most faithful of people to the Arabs and Arab causes.

It is not in the interest of the Christians to be a second Israel in Lebanon. Neither their religion nor their culture permits such racism, not to speak of the fact that their isolation from their environment would deprive them of a vital and widespread sphere of action. Are they so stupid as to invite upon themselves the enmity of the Arab peoples? However, when it is a question of humiliation,

freedom and dignity, all other considerations are put aside and only considerations of dignity and freedom remain.

Brother Muslims, the presence of the Palestinians amongst us is not the issue nor is the cause of Palestine the issue. One cannot dispense with a Palestine revolution, with sacrifice and fedayeen. But who amongst you can accept chaos?

It so happened that the Palestine revolution was practised in our country in a manner that made it nearer to chaos than to a genuine revolution. This caused the objections and the rejection of it. It appeared to you that tolerance was preferable to a hard line position where the Palestinians were concerned. We too did not reject tolerance. Indeed, we exhibited the utmost in toleration, but whereas the Christians demanded that it should stop at a certain point, you insisted upon further tolerance. It has now become clear to both of us that this point was unjustifiable and that tolerance was harmful to you, to the Christians and to the Palestine cause. Accordingly, there can be no alternative but to return to genuine sovereignty and to demonstrate clearly the limits of that sovereignty and the need to respect it. Is this possible if your solidarity with us is to fall short of your toleration of chaos? Is this possible if you do not declare, in one way or another, your firm support for that solidarity?

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**Joint communiqué of Syria and the PLO announcing agreement on a ceasefire in Lebanon (excerpts)<sup>158</sup>**

Damascus, July 29, 1976

Motivated by national responsibility, in recognition of the importance of solidarity of the confrontation forces against the enemy, and in affirmation of the historic and special links between Syria and the PLO, a series of meetings was held in Damascus between July 22 and 29, 1976.

<sup>158</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), July 30, 1976. The PLO delegation consisted of Faruq Qaddumi, Yasir Abd Rabbu, Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzir and Talal Naji of the Executive Committee, Mahmud Abbas and Muhammad Ghunaym of Fatah, Salih Raafat of the DFLP and Fadl Shuru of the PFLP-GC.

<sup>157</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), July 25, 1976.

During these meetings, the Arab situation was reviewed especially after the imperialist and Zionist campaign which culminated in the Sinai agreement,<sup>159</sup> one of whose most notable consequences was the fragmentation of the Arab position and the sorrowful events in Lebanon. The situation in Lebanon was also reviewed and analysed. Agreement was reached about the gravity of the situation, not only as regards Lebanon's unity and the Palestine cause but also as regards the Arab nation.

As a result of this review, total agreement was reached regarding the necessity of working to preserve the unity of Lebanon's land and people, respect of its sovereignty and non-interference in its internal affairs. Total accord was also reached regarding the right of the resistance to struggle on all Arab soil, including Lebanon, provided that the Cairo agreement and its appendices as well as the document promulgated on February 14, 1976, should regulate relations between the Palestinian and Lebanese sides.

The two sides emphasized the necessity of expending every effort to restore confidence among the various Lebanese sides and to encourage dialogue among them for the sake of preserving the national unity of this sister country.

The Syrian side affirmed its fixed and continued support for the PLO, the representative of the Palestinian people, in its struggle against the Israeli enemy and for the sake of liberation. Syria was and shall remain a base of the struggle of the Palestinian people in its national struggle against the Zionist presence.

The Palestinian side praised the stand of the Syrian Arab region regarding the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people and the cause of Palestine, as well as the support extended by Syria to the Palestine resistance in its struggle against the Zionist enemy.

The two sides also emphasized the necessity of working to strengthen Arab solidarity in accordance with the Rabat summit resolutions and in a manner that would put this solidarity at the service of liberation opposing all imperialist and Zionist plots to which the Arab nation is being subjected.

The two sides agreed upon the bases they consider necessary to put an end to the fighting in

Lebanon and upon the speedy and necessary measures to be put into effect.

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### **Agreement between Syria and the PLO on a ceasefire in Lebanon** <sup>160</sup>

**Damascus, July 29, 1976**

From an appreciation of national responsibility and of the dangers of continued fighting, and in harmony with the resolutions of the Arab League stressing the necessity of an end to the fighting in Lebanon the following has been agreed:

1. That all parties should declare their acceptance of a ceasefire in all Lebanese territory at such time as may be determined by the committee mentioned in paragraph 2 of this agreement.

2. Until such time as the President-elect assumes his constitutional duties, a Lebanese-Syrian-Palestinian higher committee shall be formed immediately, headed by a representative of the Arab League, to supervise the ceasefire, enforce security and draw up a programme for the elimination of armed manifestations in ten days, using the Arab Security Forces at present in the country and such other forces as it sees fit.

3. The Lebanese situation:

From concern for the unity of the people and the territory of Lebanon and for her independence and territorial integrity, and from the conviction that there must be reforms in the state that will guarantee real and effective participation in government by all groups, the two sides, Syrian and Palestinian, encourage all parties to engage in a national dialogue, chaired by President Elias Sarkis, on the basis of the document published on February 14, 1976,<sup>161</sup> and of any other Lebanese topic agreed on by the parties.

The Palestinian and Syrian sides also encourage all Lebanese parties to make every effort to form a government of national unity that will make a point of restoring and unifying the state institutions and implementing the reforms that are agreed on.

<sup>160</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), July 30, 1976.

<sup>161</sup> Doc. 202 above.

<sup>159</sup> Doc. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

#### 4. Lebanese-Palestinian relations:

In the light of Lebanon's right to expect that the Palestinian side shall not interfere in Lebanese internal affairs, and of the right of the resistance to carry on its struggle from the Lebanese arena in conformity with the agreements concluded between the resistance and the Lebanese authorities, it was agreed that relations should be defined on the basis of the attached Syrian working paper on Palestinian-Lebanese relations published on February 14, 1976, and agreed on by all the parties, and on the basis of the Cairo agreement and its annexes,<sup>162</sup> and that a Lebanese-Palestinian committee shall be formed to work out a timetable for the application of these basic principles, including the Cairo agreement and its annexes.

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#### **Press statement by PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi commenting on the PLO-Syria joint communiqué<sup>163</sup>**

**Beirut, July 31, 1976**

The joint communiqué which was issued on the occasion of the signing of the Palestinian-Syrian agreement was intended to clear the atmosphere and to restore the feeling of solidarity experienced by the Arab nation after the October 1973 war.

Out of concern for this Arab solidarity, especially in this critical stage of Palestinian and Arab struggle, which the PLO is seeking to realize by all available means, it finds it necessary to clarify the wording appearing in the joint communiqué regarding the Sinai agreement,<sup>164</sup> which has raised a great deal of confusion.

The PLO clearly sees that its relations with one Arab country should not be at the expense of any other Arab country, especially since our national struggle to regain our occupied land can only be the result of Arab solidarity in all its dimensions on the national level.

Therefore, what was meant by mentioning this phrase in its correct form is nothing but a review of events in the Arab region since 1967, and its

aim was not to harm fraternal Egypt, whose role in support of the Palestinian Revolution during the Lebanese crisis has been a prominent one.

On this occasion, the PLO wishes to stress that in all circumstances, it remains concerned for the aims of the glorious Arab nation, which can only be realized within the framework of an atmosphere of Arab solidarity and unity.

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#### **Working paper regarding the causes and solutions of the crisis in Lebanon adopted by the Islamic Grouping in Lebanon (excerpts)<sup>165</sup>**

**Beirut, August 5, 1976**

In the National Charter, the Muslims never abandoned the ideal of working for Arab unity, even though they had abandoned their demand for a union with Syria which had been an urgent demand among the Muslim masses. They have been and remain convinced that their homeland, Lebanon, is sovereign, free and independent, that it is an Arab country and that its people are an inseparable part of the Arab nation. The difference between the attitude of the Muslims and of the others towards national issues is the result of a mistaken understanding of Arabism, not a Muslim rebellion against Lebanon. The Lebanese are all Arabs, Christian as well as Muslim, and the duties of Arabism are the same for all. There was once a time when the Christians were the vanguard of Arab awakening and liberation.

Before and after the appearance of the Palestine resistance in Lebanon, and in every national battle fought by any Arab country, the reaction in Lebanon was always based on the fact that any Arab cause is the cause of all Arabs, deserving support and aid from Lebanon. Thus, popular movements in Lebanon have for long expressed the free conscience of the Arabs and their voice. Undoubtedly, Lebanese democracy, despite its failings, has contributed to this state of affairs.

<sup>162</sup> See note to doc. 195 above.

<sup>163</sup> English text, *Wafa* (Beirut), July 31, 1976. The joint communiqué is doc. 279 above.

<sup>164</sup> Doc. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>165</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), August 6, 1976.

As for the Lebanese-Palestinian problem, this is the result of errors committed in understanding and in coping with this problem over a number of years. The freedom afforded by the Lebanese environment was not accompanied by actions on the part of the state, either on the defence or on the Arab levels, calculated to inspire the Palestinians with confidence in the intentions of the state towards them. Where there is freedom but no confidence, the door is open to unbalanced relations, excesses are committed, the crisis grows bigger and the point of bloody conflict is soon reached. This is especially so because the Palestinians have developed sensitivities as a result of tragic experiences undergone both on Lebanon's soil and elsewhere.

This does not mean that one should ignore the responsibility of our Palestinian brothers as manifested in excesses committed or in conduct that is contrary to agreements or in their Arab conflicts that were reflected within their ranks on the soil of Lebanon with all the consequences and complexities that this may entail.

And while the legacy of liberty is dear to the heart of every Lebanese, making Lebanon a shining light among nations, and making each Lebanese unwilling to abandon that liberty at any cost, yet the Lebanese should have buttressed that liberty by the confidence they inspire in others regarding the genuineness of their policy and good faith in their dealings, in addition to strength.

Instead of armed groups and militias, the Lebanese should have constructed a national army intent upon waging war and committed to the common Arab destiny in the face of the common enemy.

As for the Lebanese-Arab problem, and despite the fact that the outward appearance of Lebanese-Arab relations suggested that these relations are on the whole untarnished, the reality as proven by events and consequences was quite otherwise. In its Arab relations, Lebanon paid the price not only of its failings but also of its virtues. The freedom allowed and abused turned Lebanon into an open arena of conflict among Arab regimes where a battle of words, ideologies, groups and arms was waged. Progress and prosperity, on the other hand, attracted Arabs and foreigners in droves to share in developing the country and to constitute, at the same time, a social and secu-

rity burden which Lebanon did not know how to shoulder.

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**Message to Arab heads of state by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat calling on them to act to end the conspiracy in Lebanon<sup>166</sup>**

**Beirut, August 10, 1976**

At this critical time, when plots against the Palestinian people are on the increase, the inhabitants of the militarily beleaguered camp of Tall al-Zaatar, which is deprived of food and water, and where, in fact, each glass of water is paid for in blood, are confronting a force that does not know the meaning of dignity, morality or religion, a force which besieges and starves women and children, and subjects them to a continuous barrage of artillery shells and machine-gun fire.

Almost two months have passed during which the isolated camp's heroic inhabitants have stood firm against the criminal elements besieging them like wolves that wait for the surrender of their prey in order to attack it.

All this is happening within sight and sound of our Arab nation from the Gulf to the Atlantic. At a time when our forces are engaged in these fierce battles imposed by the military escalation of the isolationist forces in Lebanon, another force is diverting the efforts of our troops and tying down large numbers of them.

The isolationists are meanwhile exploiting this new balance of forces in order to carry out their criminal acts against Tall al-Zaatar, whose Palestinian and Lebanese inhabitants are enduring incredibly difficult circumstances intolerable for any human being.

What took place a few days ago in the besieged Lebanese area of Nabaa, which the isolationist criminals eradicated, is the greatest proof of the danger of what awaits the nationalist forces in Lebanon, whether Christian or Muslim, in the way of destruction, liquidation and mass emigra-

<sup>166</sup> English text, *Wafa* (Beirut), August 11, 1976.

tion. All this is taking place within the sight and sound of the Arab Security Forces.

I urge you all to shoulder this grave responsibility with me in order to preserve innocent lives, in confrontation of this oppressor and his criminality in the violation of all moral and human values, hoping that your action will come before it is too late, putting an end to this vicious conspiracy and whatever dangerous repercussions and reactions it may entail.

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**Statement by the government of Saudi Arabia calling for a halt to the war in Lebanon<sup>167</sup>**

Riyad, August 14, 1976

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, having witnessed the sad end of the bitter and heroic struggle of Tall al-Zaatar and the resultant tragedies and sorrows that are a source of shame to humanity as well as the bitterness and feelings of revenge engendered in the hearts of the various Lebanese and Palestinian groups, urges all Arab leaders to consider with care the future destiny of our Arab nation, now that the events in Lebanon have begun to fragment that nation and to embroil it in diverse foreign currents in order to increase its fragmentation.

Brothers, the Arab nation broke the bonds of imperialism through its struggle. It entered the glorious Ramadan war united in ranks like a well compacted building, each part supporting the others, relying upon God and the justice of their cause. God decreed victory for it. By its solidarity and cooperation, our nation won the esteem and admiration of the whole world. But this state of affairs did not please international Zionism and the imperialism that backs it in its various shapes. Thus, they schemed to destroy Arab solidarity and began by attempting to partition Lebanon and to widen the gap among brothers.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia calls upon leaders of the Arab nation to come together and to meet at any level for the purpose of stopping Arab blood being shed on the soil of Lebanon

before the feelings of bitterness grow so much that they become entrenched in Arab hearts, thus allowing the Zionist enemy to implement its schemes with ease. We ask our Lord to lead us to success and to the right path.

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**Press interview statements by General Secretary Muhsin of Saiqa reviewing Syria's role in the war in Lebanon and explaining Saiqa's differences with the rest of the PLO<sup>168</sup>**

Mid-August, 1976

*Q. May we know your assessment of the role of the Saiqa organization in Lebanon since the beginning of the crisis there?*

A. From April 1975 until March 1976, our organization played a major role, perhaps more important than that of any other group, in protecting the revolution. This is how we view the basic aim of the fighting throughout the first nine months, i.e. from April 1975, until January 1976. The object was to protect the resistance and the revolution only. Any other gains were, in our view, secondary and were not the basic objective in the fighting. Political reform in Lebanon was not one of our goals, nor was it even a goal for the national movement at that stage. Nor did we declare as our goal the acquisition of any new positions or gains for the resistance and neither did we think of making any gains for Syria or for anyone else's benefit. Our objective was to protect the resistance after the balance of power had swung to the enemy's side following Egypt's exit from the arena of the Arab-Israeli conflict through its ratification of the Sinai agreement.

We were at all times concerned to stop the fighting without delay. We were the party that wanted the fighting to stop, together with Syria and the national movement, whereas it was the other side which was implementing the conspiracy at that time. I am referring to the isolationists,

<sup>167</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Riyad* (Riyad), August 15, 1976.

<sup>168</sup> Interview granted to *al-Qabas* (Kuwait); excerpted and translated from the partial Arabic text, *al-Talai* (Damascus), August 17, 1976, pp. 4-5, August 24, 1976, pp. 6-7, August 31, 1976, pp. 6-7.

the Phalangists and their allies. It was they who wanted to exploit the imbalance in the Arab position, the result of Egypt's exit from the arena of conflict and its increasing isolation from Syria. They wished to exploit the differences between Egypt and the Palestinians over the agreement and calculated that the circumstances created by that agreement had weakened the position of Syria and of the resistance. This was their chance to attack the resistance and to stop the national tide which had drawn strength from the presence of the resistance and Syria's influence in Lebanon. Lebanon was once more to be removed from a position of confrontation with the enemy.

This group, which represents the Christians, especially the Maronites, led the battle from April 1975 until January 22, 1976. It insisted upon escalating the fighting while we wanted peace, although not a peace that would be against our interests so that we would have to accept it as the defeated party or a peace made under difficult circumstances forcing us to make certain concessions which we could not then accept.

*Q. At that time, did you have no other goal except to stop the fighting?*

A. We had no other goal except that, provided the other side also had no other objective. We accepted our status as defined by the Cairo agreement and its appendices which regulated our relations with the state. We presented all this in an official memo to the Committee for National Dialogue in October, 1975.<sup>169</sup> We repeatedly told Prime Minister Karami and the authorities that our basic demand was that the fighting should stop, not just a mere ceasefire. We maintained that neither we nor the national movement had any conditions for a stop to the fighting. Kamal Junblat himself joined us at one of these sessions with Rashid Karami in October. Karami was about to resign. He told Karami that neither the resistance nor the national movement had any preconditions for stopping the fighting provided the other side would accept this. Normality could then return and the struggle for the other objectives would be left up to political action within democratic institutions and through the normal channels. In January, the pro-regime groups insisted upon

scoring major military victories in order to justify to their popular base their escalation of the fighting. These groups were intent upon scoring a military victory before the fighting came to an end so that they and their constituency could emerge from the conflict in high spirits and thus be in a position to impose their conditions, or at least their own interpretations of the texts of the agreements and to be in a good negotiating position once negotiations commenced between us. Early in 1976, and after having stood fast for nine months, our position as well as that of Syria improved. It was therefore possible to stop the fighting after having scored victories. We had in any case tried to avoid victory because we believed that victory in the war in Lebanon was as dangerous as defeat. We knew this well but it was the other side that had forced us to win these victories. We were in any case concerned to limit these victories so that matters would not get out of hand leaving us unable to control the course of events. In January, the other side bombarded Maslakh and evicted most of its inhabitants and then besieged Tall al-Zaatar. This had a visible effect on the morale of our masses. As a result, all the Muslim leaders, including Kamal Junblat, Saib Salam, Rashid Karami and certain religious notables, met in the house of Malik Salam and all in turn spoke on the phone with President Asad,<sup>170</sup> begging him to apply pressure to stop the fighting and assuring him that they had no demands. This took place before the fall of Maslakh. Following the Maslakh battle, I went to Damascus, met the leaders of the Palestine Liberation Army and requested that army contingents be sent into Lebanon to redress the military and moral balance. The political leaders in Syria agreed of course to allow regiments of the PLA to enter Lebanon, having rearmed these units with heavy artillery. Thus units from the PLA entered Lebanon as a result of a Syrian political decision. Support was provided by Syrian artillery from beyond the borders in the Beqaa and the North, and these units were able once more to restore the military balance in favour of the resistance and the national movement. They also inflicted heavy defeats upon official Lebanese troops which were then and still are united under command of the president, the Phalangists, the Zghorta forces and the Chamounists. The other

<sup>169</sup> Doc. 312 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>170</sup> See Doc. 275 above.

side was thus forced to accept a ceasefire and the Syrian initiative. And here one must state that when the Muslim leaders meeting in the house of Malik Salam—at the so-called Aramoun summit—were begging President Asad to stop the fighting unconditionally, President Asad replied that the fighting could not stop without achieving certain demands and reforms, and that we could impose no conditions whatsoever on the other side to stop the fighting after they had been so blatantly aggressive.

Accordingly, these conditions turned out to be what the other side finally accepted, i.e. the contents of the constitutional document. This had been formulated a month or two before the ceasefire. The leaders of the resistance and of the national movement actually wrote it out in their own handwriting. It was all written in Damascus. The part concerning the Palestinians was written by the resistance and not one letter was added or removed. The part having to do with Lebanese political reforms was partially written by representatives of the national movement and of other major groups in the western sector, including representatives of Junblat, the Communist Party, the Communist Action Organization, the Arab Socialist Baath Party and the Murabitun.

Naturally, the other side took their time about agreeing to it and rejected many of its provisions until the military battle of January 21 settled the matter decisively. It appeared thereafter that the other side was totally in favour of peace, especially since they agreed to open up all roads, remove all armed manifestations and take back all soldiers that had fled from the army without disciplinary action. More important than all this was that they agreed to remove all cement road blocks and fortifications that they had erected in the streets of the eastern sector.

Six weeks passed, from January 22 until March 10. Real peace returned to the country and institutions, schools, markets and banks returned to normal. The only task left for the Syrian delegation was the formation of a new cabinet which had to restructure a new army command in accordance with the provisions of the constitutional document. Even on March 10, we did not feel that there was any difference in viewpoint between ourselves and any other group in the national movement or the resistance. On the contrary, we felt we were closer and more united than ever before,

with the exception of certain differences with Kamal Junblat. He obstructed the formation of a new cabinet whereas we wanted this to take place as soon as possible since we felt that this would strengthen peace and stability, re-establish an army structure and put an end to sectarian fragmentation that had already affected the army, the country and the state. We did not know what Junblat was thinking of when he deliberately obstructed the formation of a cabinet despite the fact that the proposed government would have satisfied the demands of Junblat and the national movement far beyond what they had themselves envisaged. Then the March 11 coup took place.<sup>171</sup> Junblat and the Fatah leadership played a crucial role in arranging that coup and in implementing it. It then became apparent why he had obstructed the formation of a cabinet.

. . . . .

*Q. Can we proceed with our earlier review of events? I would like to make one comment. I am wondering why it was that the Saiga forces blocked the path of the forces of Brigadier Ahdab and some Lebanese Arab Army units that were on the way to force President Franjieh to submit his resignation?*

*A. . . .* The Christian side had lost its capacity to resume fighting after January 25. Sadat and Kissinger found in Junblat and in the resistance leadership precisely what they were looking for. Sadat began to send large quantities of arms to his new allies. He also sent the Ayn Jalut forces to Lebanon. It was clear that he was preparing for some new development especially if we keep in mind that Sadat had not sent a single bullet to the resistance and the national movement in the first nine months. All the arms came through Syria and this was no secret. All the arms sent to Junblat and Fatah after the fighting ended also came via Syria. The Ayn Jalut forces came via Syria. The justification offered then was that they would take up positions in the Arqub region facing Israel because the border posts had been abandoned by the fighters who had gone off to other battle areas. As for Ahdab's slogan, i.e. the resignation of Franjieh, this was a mere slogan masking the real aims of that coup which were primarily to drive Syria out of Lebanon and

<sup>171</sup> See doc 214 above.

hence to weaken the position of the resistance by weakening Syria's political and military position in the region. This, unfortunately, was an eventuality that resistance leaders had not foreseen or perhaps did not comprehend. As soon as Syria's enemies succeed in weakening her political and military position in the region, the position of the resistance would be automatically weakened also, even if Syria's sentiments were to remain wholeheartedly with the resistance as they had been all these years. This is because the resistance in Lebanon derives much of its power from Syrian power and cannot by itself deal with all its own as well as Syria's enemies combined.

I know that when the Muslims pressured for Franjeh's resignation, the Christian forces pressed him not to resign, even after Syria's intervention. This was because it was felt that such a resignation would appear to have taken place as a result of the pressure applied by one sect against another. This is exactly like a state of total victory or total defeat. Hence, neither Ahdab's communiqués nor the cables broadcast by Radio Beirut nor any troop parades could force Franjeh to resign. Syrian intervention alone could convince Franjeh to resign in a manner consistent with dignity.

On the fourth day following the coup, Syria reached a settlement with Franjeh that would fulfill the demand for his resignation and at the same time enable the Maronites to preserve their sense of dignity and not to feel insulted or defeated. As a result, agreement was reached that article 73 of the Constitution would be amended, Franjeh would resign and the new president would assume office. The only necessary precondition for this agreement was the restoration of peace.

On March 11, when the coup took place, and until March 15, the only shots fired were shots celebrating the coup. It is true that both sides began to prepare themselves but there was no military engagement until March 16. I had myself informed Jumblat and other national movement leaders that the question of Franjeh was settled and that all that needed to be done now was to reach agreement about the best candidate for president. When Jumblat learnt about this, he expressed his "satisfaction" but the very next day proceeded to call for a renewal of the fighting. He called upon Ahmad Khatib to join Ahdab and

to fight Syria on the pretext that there was now a Syrian occupation. This incidentally was what Chamoun used to say in the past, although no Syrian occupation had in fact occurred and the only Syrian military personnel in Lebanon at that time were the Syrian officers who were members of the Security Committees.

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**Letter from Interior Minister Chamoun of Lebanon to the president of the 5th Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries reacting to statements about Lebanon made at the conference<sup>172</sup>**

**Beirut, August 17, 1976**

The conditions prevailing in Lebanon have prevented the President of the Lebanese Republic and myself from attending the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries. We have previously expressed our regret in this regard.

Reports have reached us about what was stated at the first meeting of the Conference with regard to the war taking place in Lebanon. This compels us to clarify some of the facts, which we request be brought to the attention of the members of the Conference. These facts are as follows:

First: It was stated that the Palestinian revolution and the Palestinian people are subjected to a campaign of liquidation and extermination in Lebanon. This is a false allegation. In fact it is Lebanon itself which is the victim of an ugly conspiracy which has demolished in full view and knowledge of the whole world its prosperity, the vestiges of its civilization and economy. Tens of thousands of its nationals have been killed. Its public institutions such as the army, the security forces, administration and justice have been destroyed. Its constitutional and democratic practices

<sup>172</sup> Text as transmitted to the UN Secretary-General by Lebanon's Permanent Representative Ghorra and published in UN doc. A/31/179, Annex, dated August 19, 1976. The president of the non-aligned conference was Prime Minister Bandaranaike of Ceylon. For Lebanese Prime Minister Karami's response to this letter see doc. 289 below.



which have made Lebanon famous throughout its history have been disrupted.

Second: The Palestinian revolution is the prime executor of the conspiracy against Lebanon. The Palestinians came to Lebanon 28 years ago as refugees. They were established in camps which they have transformed gradually into military fortifications and in which they set up bases for training terrorists from various nationalities. They have breached the accord concluded with the Lebanese authorities in 1969 by installing heavy weapons in the camps and by preventing the Lebanese security forces from performing their duties therein. They have even occupied the UNRWA offices in the camps. Palestinian elements conspicuously circulated in the cities, streets and public squares with their arms. They set up barriers to check the identity of the peaceful passers-by. Many were kidnapped, tortured and killed. Others were imprisoned for years without any knowledge about their fate. It was only natural that these excesses were bound to lead to an explosion between the Palestinian outlaws and aggressors and the aggrieved Lebanese population. The continuing war since 13 April 1975 has daily revealed new evidence of the Palestinian determination to dominate the country. In their efforts to dominate Lebanon, the Palestinians often hid behind self-styled patriotic parties in Lebanon. And by pretending to support the demands of one group, they have succeeded in causing a division among the Lebanese. The Palestinians besieged cities and villages in the heartland of the Lebanese mountains and their remote summits, far away from the Palestinian camps, and have nothing to do with Palestine. They have also caused the dispersal of the Lebanese Army and security forces. They have continuously rejected the establishment of any regular force in Lebanon to restore and maintain law and order, be it Lebanese, Syrian or foreign. Thus, they were able to effect an unveiled occupation of a part of the city of Beirut and of south Lebanon, whereby nothing could be undertaken without their permission. They have taken over the centres of communication such as the Department of Post, Telegraph and Telephone, the Beirut International Airport, and the two harbours of Saida and Tyre. This is outright occupation of Lebanese territory, and a stop must be put to it, if there is a real will to end the present war.

Third: The reported statement by the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Colombo demanding the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon is nothing but a new and blatant breach of Lebanon's sovereignty and an infringement upon the responsibilities and jurisdiction of its constitutional authorities. Irrespective of the legal basis for the entry of the Syrian forces into Lebanon on 1 June 1976, it remains the absolute right of the legal Lebanese authorities alone to determine the permissibility or otherwise of the Syrian presence in the country. These authorities have the sole right to request the Syrian forces to withdraw from Lebanon. The bitter and dubious fact is that the Palestinians are deliberately disregarding the truth and international law, because their main concern is first and last to prevent the presence in Lebanon of any armed force other than theirs in order to complete their conspiracy against Lebanon's integrity, unity and independence, and to make out of it an alternative national home to their Palestinian homeland which they have abandoned for what they consider to be an easier objective to attain. It is our hope that your Conference will take a clear and courageous step by communicating to the Palestine Liberation Organization, while it is talking about the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon, that it has a duty to begin itself by withdrawing, for Lebanon's land is not its own, but a free and sovereign State whose destiny cannot be determined except by its people alone.

Fourth: I wish at the same time to protest against false statements made by some Arab States calling for the withdrawal of the Syrian forces from Lebanon. I reiterate that this matter can only be determined by Lebanon itself. Any statement in this regard made by other people without our consent is an interference in our affairs and a breach of our sovereignty, which we categorically reject. I request Your Excellency kindly to distribute this communication as an official document of the Conference.

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**Speech made by PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi to the Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries explaining the current situation in Lebanon**<sup>173</sup>

Colombo, Sri Lanka, August 19, 1976

You are undoubtedly aware that a large part of the Palestinian people was forced into exile in Lebanon and other Arab countries as a result of Israeli occupation of our land in 1948 and 1967. And as you also know, the refugees from among our people, wherever they are, consider their stay there as temporary and will accept nothing less than return to their homeland, Palestine.

But Israel was not satisfied with dispersing our people: it tried to liquidate them and followed them to their places of refuge, subjecting their camps and areas of concentration in Lebanon to continuous air and sea raids, thus forcing our people to use force for self-defence inside their camps. And in implementation of the imperialist-Zionist plot, the right-wing fascist forces in Lebanon, supported by the imperialist power, have carried out a most ugly liquidation operation against the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples. Thousands of women and children were killed and several national residential sectors were destroyed and Palestinian camps burned, while a military, food and medical siege was imposed for several months. Only a few days ago, the fascists murdered over 3 thousand women and children in one day at the steadfast camp of Tall al-Zaatar, which has become to us and to all militant peoples a symbol of steadfastness and defiance.

While condemning the massacres committed by the fascist forces against our people and the Lebanese people, we call for an immediate ceasefire in Lebanon and for an end to any and all kinds of foreign intervention in its internal affairs. We have already assured you, and continue to do so, of our concern to preserve the unity and independence of Lebanon, and that we consider the on-going crisis in Lebanon as a social and political one, which must be solved through political dialogue between the Lebanese themselves and without any foreign intervention.

On the other hand, we declare unhesitatingly our commitment to the Cairo agreement and its annexes,<sup>174</sup> signed by the Lebanese government and ourselves in 1969, and which organized the relationship between us. Finally, we call for the implementation of the Arab League resolutions concerning the situation in Lebanon, hoping that the Arab initiative will help both to restore peace to fraternal Lebanon and to implement the Damascus agreement between the PLO and the Syrian Arab Republic.

Today, we are facing in Lebanon an imperialist-Zionist plot aimed at liquidating our people and the Lebanese National Movement. But in spite of the difficult and complex situation we are living through there, which has been escalated by external military intervention, our faith in our people, your support, and the support of all forces of liberation and progress in the world assure us that defeat will be the fate of all imperialist plots. We therefore ask you to condemn this ugly imperialist plot against the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples who are both members of the non-aligned movement, and to declare your stand with the unity and independence of Lebanon and its people.

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**Statement issued by the foreign ministry of Tunisia regarding events in Lebanon**<sup>175</sup>

Tunis, August 19, 1976

The Tunisian government is following, with great sorrow and pain, the news of the continuing deterioration of the situation in Lebanon and the worsening acts of destruction. Following the appearance of a ray of hope that reason might overcome emotion and higher interests might be put above private feelings of revenge, we now unfortunately observe a vicious escalation of the fighting and the diminution of the chances for understanding and harmony.

The efforts undertaken by the Arab League did not lead to the stopping of merciless Arab bloodshed nor to the ending of the frightful war

<sup>174</sup> See note to doc. 195 above.

<sup>175</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Amal* (Tunis), August 19, 1976.

of extermination presently raging on the soil of Lebanon. In fact, events have deteriorated in a horrible manner and the whole Arab nation is now faced with an ordeal affecting its very destiny. The Arab nation must deal with this by taking rapid, decisive and common action to save the Lebanese people and the Palestine resistance, to preserve Lebanon's entity, sovereignty and territorial integrity and to affirm the commitments of all Arab states without exception towards the Palestine resistance.

Throughout these painful events, the Tunisian government has made extensive efforts to try to stop the fighting among brothers and contributed to all sincere efforts made in this regard.

President Habib Bourguiba has warned on numerous occasions of the dangers threatening the entire Arab nation if matters are not brought under control soon. Hence the initiative undertaken by the governments of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait by calling for an Arab summit conference to deal with the situation in Lebanon represents a last chance to find a way out of this tragedy and ward off the dangers threatening the Arab nation.

The Tunisian government supports this call to a summit fully, and urges the Arab states to do their utmost to unify their positions at this grave juncture of events and to place higher Arab interests above all else.

President Habib Bourguiba and the Tunisian government hope that Arab efforts this time will succeed in bringing about a settlement that would restore peace and amity to Lebanon and guarantee the continued existence of the Palestine resistance.

## 289

### **Letter from Prime Minister Karami of Lebanon to UN Secretary-General Waldheim reacting to a letter from Interior Minister Chamoun of Lebanon<sup>176</sup>**

Beirut, August 25, 1976

Since Mr. Camille Chamoun, Minister of the Interior in my Government, has requested of

you through the Permanent Mission of Lebanon the circulation of his letter addressed to the President of the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Colombo as an official document of the United Nations which he signed as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, I find it necessary to reaffirm my telegrams sent to you on 20 June, 2 and 5 July and 21 August 1976, in which I brought to your attention that the appointment of Mr. Chamoun as Minister of Foreign Affairs is null and void because such an appointment constitutes a violation of the practice of the Constitution, the principle of participation in governing and the spirit of the national pact in Lebanon.

Regarding the substance of the letter I would like to make the following observations:

1. To say that the Palestinian people did not lose anything in Lebanon, that there were no attempts to liquidate them, and that Lebanon alone was a victim of a vicious conspiracy which destroyed its economy, caused the loss of tens of thousands of its citizens and destroyed its institutions, etc.; to say that Lebanon alone was the victim is simply looking at the problem with one eye and does not express the true aspect of the situation.

The Palestinian people have been subjected to considerable losses in human life, in their interests, and in their potential capacity to achieve their legitimate struggle, which is recognized by the United Nations and endorsed by its resolutions. Perhaps Mr. Chamoun would recall with me that historic session of the General Assembly in 1974 when both Mr. Suleiman Franjeh, President of Lebanon, and Mr. Yasser Arafat, Head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, addressed the world community and thus crowned the international recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and their legitimate struggle.<sup>177</sup>

The truth of the matter is that what is taking place in Lebanon is directed against both Lebanon and the Palestinian people, and the harm inflicted on our country is also inflicted on the Palestinians.

For this reason the support given by the Lebanese to the Palestinian people in their struggle to achieve their national aspirations is one of the basic elements of Lebanon's national policy and at the same time is a necessity which serves the

<sup>176</sup> UN doc. A/31/184 dated August 26, 1976; the letter was sent directly to the Secretary-General, rather than through Lebanon's official delegation to the UN. Chamoun's letter is doc. 286 above.

<sup>177</sup> Docs. 11 and 9 respectively in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

interest of both the Lebanese and the Palestinian peoples.

2. To say that the Palestinian revolution is the main party carrying out a conspiracy against Lebanon is a matter of personal interpretation. We believe that several parties play a principal role in the conflict. If we assume for the sake of argument that the Palestinians bear responsibility, it cannot be theirs alone. Perhaps our responsibility as Lebanese is far greater because Lebanon, which is being destroyed, is ours.

3. It is true that Palestinians came to Lebanon after being evicted by Israel in 1948 and they settled in camps. But since then they have been exposed to all kinds of fear, misery and aggression by Israel. The wanton attacks by the Israelis against the refugee camps caused thousands of victims, and the numerous complaints of Lebanon against Israel to the Security Council are probably still fresh in the minds of Members of the United Nations. As a result of these attacks the Palestinians, in self-defence, felt the need to arm and this led to the conclusion of agreements between them and the Lebanese authority.

4. The Agreement between the Lebanese authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1969<sup>178</sup> regulates the Palestinian armed presence on Lebanese soil which was also approved by the Lebanese Parliament. However, certain Lebanese parties which criticize excesses by some Palestinians regarding the Agreement do not recognize it themselves. It is noted that some excesses take place every now and then because the concept of revolution differs from the concept of a State. At any rate the solution of this problem cannot be reached by violence and fighting which is destructive to all, as this crisis has shown, but rather through dialogue and mutual confidence.

5. The differences between the Lebanese and the presence of various conflicting parties in the Lebanese arena are known to all and are due to political, economic, social and intellectual reasons and are certainly not of Palestinian making alone, as some claim.

6. The responsibility for the Lebanese crisis which undermined the basis of the State and its institutions lies with all the conflicting parties in the Lebanese arena, and if they were to come to an agreement the crisis would end and then it

would become possible to achieve an understanding with the Palestinians to implement the Agreement concluded with them. For this reason it is in the interest of peace in Lebanon that all parties concert their efforts to eliminate their differences through dialogue.

7. We do not believe the allegation that the Palestinians contemplate making Lebanon their home instead of Palestine. The Palestinian people have made great sacrifices in order to achieve their noble and just cause and to return to their homeland. Their revolution has found its way to the conscience of all free peoples of the world and has received their full support. The Palestinians will never replace Palestine by any other home and no one except Israel, of course, could entertain such an idea.

8. I am still convinced that the consideration of the Lebanese problem by the United Nations would result in escalating the differences between the Lebanese and would foil Arab peace efforts, especially at a time when the Special Envoy of the Arab League endeavours to achieve a cease-fire and preparations are under way to convene the Arab summit conference whose aim is to find a lasting peace in Lebanon. The interest of peace in Lebanon requires the creation of a proper atmosphere to ensure the success of these efforts.

We conclude by saying that it is not in the interest of anyone in the world to further complicate the Lebanese crisis.

I request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

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**Press interview statements by Fatah Central Committee member Khalaf discussing the current stage of the war in Lebanon<sup>179</sup>**

**Beirut, August 30, 1976**

*Q. At what stage is the crisis at present and do you expect it to end soon?*

*A. The parties to the Lebanese crisis can be classified as follows:*

<sup>178</sup> See note to doc. 195 above.

<sup>179</sup> Made to an AP correspondent; translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), August 30, 1976, p. 3.

The parties that cannot control their decisions and those that can. As far as we are concerned, as a nationalist movement and a Palestine revolution, I categorically affirm that the decision is in our hands, and we shall do everything in our power to end this dirty war. No one in his senses can believe that the excesses of certain Palestinians are the cause of what has happened. There has been a conspiracy that has been paid for by all groups and confessions of the Lebanese people, a conspiracy whose basic aim was to liquidate the revolution. I do not agree with the term "cutting the revolution down to size"—either the revolution will be destroyed, or the conspiracy will fail.

So vile were those who concocted this conspiracy that they were prepared to sacrifice everything—the people of Lebanon in their thousands and the image of Lebanon—for the sake of liquidating the revolution. And when the isolationists failed to achieve this aim and they were losing, Syria came in on the pretext of protecting the Christians—as if the world was that stupid! She tried to give the impression that the war was between two confessional groups, and they thought that we Palestinians were capable of sinking into this confessionalist bog. I therefore assert that we are determined to do everything in our power to end this crisis by making full use of our capacity to take decisions, unaffected by Arab or international pressures. But the other parties should be asked this question: Did they receive the order? The conspiracy has not succeeded and will never succeed and every day that passes means the shedding of innocent blood, the ruin and destruction of this country. This question should be put to the Syrians and the isolationists.

It is useless to talk of ending the crisis unless a political decision to that end is taken by the quarters that gave instructions for the troubles to start in the first place. Failing such a decision, the crisis will not end and the conflict in Lebanon will develop and take more violent and savage forms. For example, the latest American move—was it intended to end the crisis before the elections, or to keep it going until after the elections? We do not know the answers to these questions.

Only the Americans know the answer. And once again the time has come for the Arab regimes to take action—and quickly—to call an Arab summit conference to discuss the situation in Lebanon. We are opposed to any mini-summit

that excludes Arab parties that could contribute to solve the crisis. All the Arab rulers must meet and face up to the Lebanese crisis, so that they may put their signatures to the final solution of the crisis, for what has happened in Lebanon is not unconnected with these regimes. This is my idea of a comprehensive and genuine solution of the Lebanese crisis.

Hence the low-level talks and meetings that are taking place, which are acclaimed by certain news media. They are helping to mislead public opinion, throwing the ranks into confusion and dealing with things superficially, and this can only lead to the greater confusion of citizens who are already shattered by the crisis, and no one can imagine that the isolationists or other insignificant parties can solve the Lebanese crisis.

As I said, the solution of the Lebanese crisis depends on an international decision to end it, on an Arab decision to end it, and on all parties except the Palestine revolution and the Lebanese nationalist movement being ordered to end it. This is the decisive solution, and we are not deceiving people.

## 291

### **Letter from PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi to UN Secretary-General Waldheim reacting to a letter from Interior Minister Chamoun of Lebanon<sup>180</sup>**

September 1, 1976

I refer to the letter circulated at the request of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon (A/31/179). In answer to the allegations and accusations contained therein, I would like to make the following observations:

1. The presence of the Palestinians in Lebanon is not a voluntary act, not an act of their own choice. In order to create an exclusive racist homeland of their own, the Zionists forcibly expelled and evicted the Palestinian people from their country 28 years ago. A part of them was driven by the force of arms across the Palestine-Lebanese frontiers to become reduced to the

<sup>180</sup> Transmitted by North Yemen and published in UN doc. A/31/204, Annex, dated September 8, 1976. Chamoun's letter is doc. 286 above.

status of refugees in Lebanon, living in appalling misery and wretchedness. They were, and continue to be, denied many of their basic human rights, including the right to work, the right to any form of social security and the right to move freely in and out of the country.

2. The struggle of the Palestinian people to regain their homeland and to liberate it from the racist, Zionist yoke—a struggle recognized as legitimate by the United Nations and an ever increasing majority of States—was opposed by the Israelis with massive attacks on Palestinian refugee camps and Lebanese villages. Their avowed purpose was the physical liquidation and massive destruction of the Palestinians. To achieve that, incessant attacks—by air, land and sea—were launched in addition to assassinations by the mining of private cars and by the dispatching of letter and parcel bombs. The several complaints lodged by the Lebanese Government before the United Nations are sufficient evidence of this.

3. The severe and unceasing attacks of the Israelis were no deterrent to the Palestinians. The struggle continued unabated. To ward off the dangers of indiscriminate and systematic killings and in an effort aimed at self-protection and self-defence against Israeli raids, the Palestinians had to arm themselves, particularly in view of the proven inadequacy of the Lebanese defences. This was done within the framework of Lebanese sovereignty and with the knowledge and consent of the Lebanese authorities. To that effect, the PLO in November 1969 concluded with the Lebanese authorities an accord, known as the Cairo Agreement, to which a number of annexes were appended.

4. When their policy of direct confrontation failed, the Israelis, aided and abetted by imperialist circles, adopted a policy of instigating and fomenting trouble inside Lebanon. Instead of directly achieving its aims, Israel resorted to indirect means—to implementing its plans by proxy—a practice revealed by the recent statements of Israeli leaders. The PLO firmly believes that this is the crux and the main cause of the Lebanese crisis. The Lebanese Government itself foresaw and predicted the situation since 1970. In an official statement dated 18 March 1970 transmitted by the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the Security Council (S/9713) and to the Secretary-General (A/7964), the Lebanese Government stated:

Through its threats and aggression Israel intends to compel Lebanon to force its 300,000 Palestinian refugees, through the use of armed force, to resign themselves indefinitely to the miseries of their exodus, under penalty of itself suffering further aggression by Israel. Thus Israel's aim is none other than to destroy Lebanon either from inside or from outside, by confronting it with the alternatives of undergoing Israeli raids against its own territory and its population or practising towards its own brothers who are resident in its territory a permanent policy of violence and civil war.

5. It is futile to deny that the Lebanese crisis has its own internal causes also, that lie in the political structure and the socio-economic set-up of the Lebanese society. Throughout the crisis several attempts were made to reform Lebanon's political and socio-economic structure. One such attempt was the constitutional document, proposed by the President of the Republic, which aimed at introducing a number of basic constitutional changes in the system and which was refused as inadequate. These attempts at reform and the over two-thirds majority vote of the Lebanese parliament asking the immediate resignation of the President indicate the reality of the internal causes in the Lebanese civil war.

6. Whether caused by Israeli designs or internal Lebanese dynamics, the Lebanese crisis is not the responsibility of the Palestinians in Lebanon. The Palestinians and the Lebanese people together are its direct victims. The PLO and the Palestinians in Lebanon are greatly affected by, and hence concerned with, the Lebanese crisis. Our position is quite clear: we keep our arms in self-defence against any attack, for our survival and for the continuation of our struggle for liberation and for regaining our homeland, in accordance with the agreements concluded with the Lebanese authorities.

7. In addition to that, the PLO has been guided throughout the Lebanese crisis by the following principles:

(a) The PLO supports the security, stability, sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of Lebanon and the unity of its people.

(b) The PLO continues its struggle for liberation of its homeland Palestine and does not accept any substitute. Hence the PLO considers the presence of the Palestinians in Lebanon as transitory.

(c) The PLO adheres to the strict application of the agreements concluded with the Lebanese

authorities and considers them an adequate basis for the regulation of their relationship.

(d) At present the PLO is sustaining sacrifices to alleviate the hardships and suffering inflicted by the present fighting on both the Palestinian and the Lebanese people. It shall continue its efforts for restoration of security, peace and stability in Lebanon and shall spare no effort to that effect.

## 292

### **Press interview statements by Fatah Central Committee member Khalaf discussing the Cairo agreement and Palestinian relations with the Arab states (excerpts)<sup>181</sup>**

Beirut, early September, 1976

*Q. Much has been said lately about the Cairo Agreement of 1969 between the Lebanese authorities and the Palestinian resistance, especially what was said by President Franjieh... as well as President Helou who said yesterday that the Cairo Agreement has been overtaken by events. What is your view of this?*

A. Let's begin with President Helou, since the agreement was signed during his tenure of office. There were many reasons for the signing of the agreement, the most important being that a battle had taken place and had to stop. President Nasser then intervened and forced a Palestinian-Lebanese meeting. I was one of the people who witnessed the signing of the agreement. President Helou was then apprehensive about the Cairo Agreement but the cabinet crisis which had lasted seven months under Prime Minister Karami led to the signing of the agreement. The Cairo Agreement exists and there is nothing in it that bears any relation to what President Franjieh mentioned, unless President Helou did not show him the text of the agreement.

Incidentally, I remember the only occasion on which I met President Franjieh. I was in the company of Abu Ammar and this was a little after the April 1975 events. After a heated exchange, President Franjieh said, in the presence of both the Egyptian and Saudi Ambassadors,

"Take the Cairo Agreement and amend it any way you please in favour of the resistance and I will agree." Also present were all officers of the Lebanese army general staff. Moreover, he said, "I have no objection if Palestinian camps become arsenals of weapons, especially anti-aircraft weapons," because he said he could not protect the camps. This is why I am surprised by what President Franjieh said about the Cairo Agreement. At that meeting Franjieh admitted that it was he who had ordered the arming of the Phalangist and National Liberal parties. His reasoning was: How can the Palestinians have the right to carry arms and not the Lebanese, especially the Christians among them? This is why he said he was contravening all the laws on the subject of arms. But he admitted that the resistance had the right to be armed and this applies to the camps and shelters as well as to our state of preparedness.

As for President Helou's statement, I had respected the man's mind, and thought him an intellectual rather than a ruler. We always heard his views as regards the events in Lebanon. But recently he has gone off course and begun to draw nearer to the Kfour Front, trying to disavow the Cairo Agreement at every opportunity, as if it were a crime.

If Lebanon finally achieves the peace we all want, there can be no basis for discussing Lebanese-Palestinian relations except the Cairo Agreement. I am not prepared to abrogate any agreement arrived at by consent of the Lebanese, which in this case means the majority of the deputies in the Chamber. Perhaps the only person who did not accept the agreement was Raymond Eddé, who opposed it openly and frankly. But he did not carry arms to fight the Palestinians. He opposed the agreement and was consistent in doing so. Those who signed the agreement later carried arms against us while those who opposed it are said to be pro-Palestinian!

*Q. You stated recently that the Palestinian resistance was prepared to make concessions. Do these include the implementation of the Cairo Agreement?*

A ... I did not say we will make concessions. I said we are ready to implement the Cairo Agreement. I do not think that this is a concession on our part. As for the excesses committed by certain individuals on our side, these are a result of the current war. And if I see there is a conspiracy to liquidate the Palestinian revolution, I may find

<sup>181</sup> Interview conducted by Nabil Nasser, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), September 5, 1976; excerpted from the partial English text, the *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), VI, 2 (Winter 1976), pp. 182-185. For the Cairo agreement see note to doc. 195 above.

it to my advantage to choose any means to defend my camps and might move to a place not specified in the Cairo Agreement, but such a position would be temporary. When the war is over and the conspiracy aimed against me has been foiled, I am ready to withdraw from that position. I do not regard this as a concession. Rather, I would say it was the other side which had conceded and I had returned to my original position assuming my enemy had abandoned his conspiracy or had been deterred from carrying it through.

*Q. Is it possible to implement the Cairo Agreement in deed rather than in word? Are you capable of getting all organizations in the resistance to implement this agreement?*

A. When the Kfour Front—which calls itself Lebanon's legal authority even though it has lost all legality—talk about the Cairo Agreement they always describe it as a unilateral commitment. For instance, when President Camille Chamoun says that the Palestinians must implement the Cairo Agreement and everything will be ended... with whom do we implement this agreement? Chamoun then goes back and says we are not ready to implement the Cairo Agreement. We are not committed to implement the Cairo Agreement with the Phalange, the Liberals or Abu Arz. We are committed to implement the agreement with Lebanon's legal authorities. But this does not prevent us from all action, if peace required that we withdraw from this or that position. Nevertheless, the Cairo Agreement cannot be put into effect before there occurs a Lebanese-Lebanese meeting resulting in a legal authority which can then tell us to start implementing the Cairo Agreement.

Hence any talk about enforcing this agreement is sheer deception of public opinion, because enforcement of the agreement depends upon the success of a Lebanese-Lebanese solution, i.e., the existence of a legal authority. When President Sarkis assumes office, part of this legality will have returned to the country, at which point the Lebanese factions may decide to end the fighting and agree on reforms they have been debating about for so long. If the authorities then begin to assume any of their functions, we will be able to implement our agreements with the Lebanese authorities quickly and easily.

*Q. So you are waiting for President Sarkis to assume his constitutional authority before a dialogue takes place. What is your view of President Sarkis and what are you prepared to offer by way of facilities and aid to restore peace and quiet to Lebanon?*

A. I am not about to assess President Sarkis because only the future can tell, depending upon what he does. But in principle, we as Palestinians did not feel hurt or insulted by anything President Sarkis has said. We have not heard a single bad word from him nor a single bad action. So naturally we are completely open to the new regime and ready to do anything to facilitate his task and his new regime. But events do not depend upon us only. There are the Lebanese factions and the Syrian side, as well as us. If all three do not facilitate President Sarkis' job, it is not enough for us alone to state that we are ready to implement the Cairo Agreement for order to be restored. The two Lebanese sides as well as the Syrians must have the sincere intention and behave in the proper manner in order to facilitate President Sarkis' task. For our part, we have announced that we are ready to implement all agreements concluded with the Lebanese authorities. We are opposed to this war raging in Lebanon which has no rhyme or reason. It is a war which no sane person can believe resulted from some acts of excess or certain violations. For if we were to compare these Palestinian excesses committed from 1969 until April 1975 with the massacres that took place in the last seventeen months, these would be a drop in an ocean. Let us not deceive ourselves by saying that the war was a result of these excesses. The war was the result of a conspiracy against the Palestinian revolution which then exploded certain issues among the Lebanese...

With all this as background, I tell you that we are prepared to carry out all that is required of us irrespective of all the propaganda we hear from the Phalange and Amchit radio stations and the campaign against the Palestinians, to whom are sometimes added the communists. But this is erroneous. The war is not between Palestinians and communists on the one hand and Christians on the other, nor between some who want to liberate Lebanon and are anxious for its sovereignty as they cheer the Syrian occupation. They say that we are an occupying power.

We were forced to seek refuge in this country



and in others under the well-known circumstances in 1948. We are not an occupation force. The fact is that a revolution arose among this nation and it carried arms wherever it was possible. We carried arms in Jordan. It is true that a conspiracy was carried out against us but we are still present in Jordan in one form or another. The world will realize that we are still present in Jordan, even though not in the form of an open revolution. In Syria too we were present. It is true that our presence may be passive in one form or another but we do have an armed presence in Syria despite the battles in Beirut and elsewhere. I know this presence is passive. But this is not our fault; the fault is that of the Syrian regime.

. . . . .

Once this war against us ends, the greater danger will come from Israel which is preparing things for us in the South [of Lebanon] in order to engage us in a long war. I will repeat, therefore, that in spite of all this we are ready to facilitate the task of President Sarkis and to do all he asks, provided this is proportionate to other concessions made by the other parties to the conflict, and specifically the isolationists.

*Q. What you have just said leads us to ask about the nature of current relations between Syrians and Palestinians. Are any serious efforts being made to reconcile you to Damascus?*

*A.* . . . Relations have neither progressed nor regressed. Efforts are of course being made and we are concerned with the well-being of Syria and the Syrian army. This is why we demand the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon despite the fact that this demand annoys our brethren in Syria. We must, however, put an end to this nightmare which has descended upon certain regions in Lebanon. This is why we are anxious for Syrian army withdrawal, but if this withdrawal does not take place, this strangulation will continue.... After having followed the same line as Syria, there are now people trying to mediate between us and the Syrians. Others threaten either a political or a military show-down. I would like to state that we are not afraid, no matter how loud or violent these declarations are...for we have nothing to lose in Lebanon except the Cairo Agreement.... Hence all we can say is that our Syrian brothers must withdraw from Sofar and

Jezzine in accordance with Arab peace plan no. 4. In return, we shall make similar withdrawals and this may become the first step towards restoring confidence among the various sides. This lies in the hands of the Syrians alone.

*Q. There is talk of a proposed confederal union between Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Since you as Palestinians are present in all three states, this proposal concerns you, too. What is your opinion of this union?*

*A.* We, in principle, are for any Arab union. Would that Arab unity should be attained! But any unity founded on a suspicious basis, namely with the object of achieving a settlement with Israel, we shall oppose to the very end. So far, all talk of union has been linked with a settlement. Any union bound by one united front against the enemy we would welcome with enthusiasm and help to accomplish. But any form of union which comes into being in order to absorb the Palestinians and their cause or to restrain the Palestinian people and harness the revolution for the sake of signing a settlement whereby the West Bank would be the Palestinian state proposed for a confederation with Syria, Jordan and Lebanon—that sort of union we are opposed to because it has no content as a force for struggle. Any other union which has a potential for struggle, we are ready to join. Indeed, I wish this would take place....The views of a major nationalist front in this country must also be taken into account. Nor do I believe that their view in this matter differs from mine. We agree to a union which is a force for struggle but we do not accept a union designed to repress the resistance.

. . . . .

## 293

**Speech by President Sarkis of Lebanon made to the Chamber of Deputies after having taken the constitutional oath (excerpt)<sup>182</sup>**

**Chtaura, September 23, 1976**

Gentlemen,

The broad outline of policy that I have sketched can only be implemented in an atmosphere of calm security. It is our unanimous wish that security be restored to the country and calm to the spirit of its citizens. This can only be attained if we cooperate sincerely with each other to restructure the army and the security forces in a manner that would render them all-inclusive, compact units working for a single homeland and ready and able, by number and equipment, to defend the homeland and preserve security within it.

Gentlemen,

At no time was Lebanon secluded, either in sorrow or in hope, from its Arab reality. The nature of its attachment to that reality has carved for it a destined role but a role which was also chosen freely by it. Moved by the choice, Lebanon carried the torch forward, in the realm of action and thought, finance and politics. Lebanon, which is an Arab country, shall remain faithful to every Arab cause and its role within its Arab family is no different from the role of any other member of that family, both as to rights and obligations. The Palestine cause, specifically, is Lebanon's cause inasmuch as it is the cause of any Arab country and, indeed, of any country anywhere that recognizes the true meaning of right and justice. Lebanon will spare no effort or sacrifice in this regard and will use its own special qualities in order to carry out its role in confronting the Israeli danger and in helping the Palestinian people to achieve their national objectives. The Palestinian people would then recover their soil and their homeland and the whole region would then enjoy peace and security.

Lebanon's relationship with the Palestine resistance and what it engendered by way of fighting and of events that are still unfolding on the soil

of this homeland, must be treated and based on a foundation of frankness and confidence, in a manner that would ensure respect for state sovereignty and the inviolability of pacts and agreements. This would in future prevent all transgression and thus protect Lebanon's interests and save the Palestine cause from all harm.

A revitalized Lebanon will not be satisfied with a merely calm relationship with its Arab brethren; it will concern itself with becoming a factor making for conciliation and solidarity, for the good of the Arabs and of Lebanon. In return, it hopes that its Arab brethren will be aware of the precariousness of its present circumstances and will in all honesty and sincerity help it to overcome this difficult stage in its history.

While noting with appreciation the concern expressed by sister states for Lebanon and its ordeal, we point to Syria's special relationship with us within a context determined by brotherhood, neighbourliness and common struggle, making for proximity, solidarity and cooperation. The presence of Syrian troops falls within this very context. I can therefore announce that the future of this Syrian presence and anything related to it are subject to the jurisdiction of Lebanon's constitutional authority which can, in accordance with the responsibilities it bears, adopt towards that presence the attitude that, in its view, best befits Lebanon's higher interests in the current circumstances.

We hold out the hand of sincerity to all our brothers so that together we may strive, in a dedicated and brotherly spirit, to serve our common causes, chief of which is the tragedy of Lebanon. A sincere effort is needed if we are to escape from it. It is patently obvious that sincere cooperation would serve all our Arab causes.

We also record our appreciation for the concern shown towards our tragedy by the Arab League and the United Nations and we remember with gratitude the sentiments displayed by friendly states and the serious efforts being made to help Lebanon emerge from its ordeal. This is not surprising, because Lebanon itself has been and shall remain open to the world, faithful to human and cultural values and to its international obligations.

<sup>182</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), September 24, 1976.

## 294

**Letter from PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat to President Sarkis of Lebanon on his assuming the presidency (excerpt)<sup>183</sup>**

Beirut, September 23, 1976

I greet you, on my own behalf and on behalf of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization and of the Palestinian Arab people, and wish you every success. From today you will be occupying the position of the highest responsibility in the state, as the symbol of a single unified Lebanon, and we thoroughly appreciate the immensity of this responsibility and the vast extent of the difficulties that confront you and the complicated nature of the situation in which you find yourself.

Mr. President,

You are familiar with Lebanon and what confronts her, and with Palestine and what she has suffered and still suffers, and you have, of course, lived in the midst of the tragic events that have convulsed the two for more than eighteen months; you have been acquainted with them in detail, you have appraised them precisely from your sense of national responsibility, and before you assumed office, you exerted the most praiseworthy efforts which we all hope may continue and be successful.

You have, of course, realized that what is taking place in the beloved land of Lebanon was not inescapably predestined, but the fruit of a conspiracy directed against Lebanon and against the Arab nation, a conspiracy planned and implemented by forces that have been frightened by the victories won by the Palestine revolution, and by Lebanese-Palestinian cohesion and by the increasingly Arab role played by Lebanon in the field of politics, economics and thought, and of support for the struggle against Zionism and colonialism.

The moves made in recent months in particular have disclosed that the most prominent of the forces hostile to both Lebanon and Palestine are the same: American colonialism and the Zionist enemy. The latter usurped Palestine and part of Lebanese territory in 1948, expanded into

other Arab territories in 1967, and still has designs on a beloved part of Lebanese territory, the South and the waters of its rivers; its racist leaders declare that the life of their artificial entity depends on the Arabs being divided into parties and factions, and that this aggressive racist entity must come to an end if the Arabs are united against it, its conspiracies and its ambitions. There are certainly numerous other forces, both external and internal, whose interests coincide to varying degrees with those of the Zionist enemy; some of these have encouraged and incited, others have cooperated and followed, others again have been afraid and held aloof and yet others have exploited and taken advantage, with the result that we have been faced with this tragic fighting—so injurious to the Arab nation as a whole and in particular to its sons in Palestine and Lebanon, who have paid for it with their own and their children's lives, with their peace of mind and their possessions. And, more important than all this, they have been forcibly prevented from continuing the fight against the Zionist enemy.

Like an octopus, the conspiracy aims at invalidating the fruits of the Arab national struggle against the Zionist enemy, at outflanking the victories achieved by our people in blood and sacrifice. It hopes to smash the unity of the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples, to liquidate their struggle and to partition Lebanon to make it easier for the Zionist enemy to detach the South. It diverts Arab attention from its preparations and from resisting Zionist aggression and expansion.

The main outlines of the conspiracy indicate the defeat of those who planned and implemented it, and the ugly details of the fighting show that racist Zionism is deeply involved in what is happening. For the contemptible methods employed in the fighting are nothing new to us—we have seen these before and we can still see them in our homeland, Palestine; they are firmly fixed in our memories. We can never forget what happened in Deir Yasin, which has been repeated in our lifetime in Jerusalem, Nablus, Nazareth and Jenin.

The broad outlines disclose the character of the conspiracy, while the details strengthen our faith that Arabs are in no way involved in the brutal and savage acts of reprisal that are being carried out, and which can only be the fruit of

<sup>183</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), September 23, 1976, 2nd bulletin, p. 2.

fascist racist thinking, whatever guise they assume.

Mr. President,

In spite of all that has happened, we are confident in the inevitable victory of our just cause and of the joint destiny of our two countries and peoples. We believe that the fighting, forced upon us and the people of Lebanon by a conspiracy, can be halted, and we look forward hopefully to the time when civil war is replaced by restored Lebanese brotherhood growing ever stronger until it becomes an impregnable stronghold capable of repelling all attempts to disunite it and to sow discord among the people of Lebanon. For it is certainly in the interests of Palestine that stability should return to a Lebanon that is one, united and sovereign over all its territory.

Similarly it is certainly in the interests of the Palestine revolution that all Lebanese should be united and thus provide a model of what we are fighting for—a democratic Palestine in which there is no distinction or discrimination on the basis of race, religion or colour.

Again, the only course for our two peoples to follow is that of close cohesion, not only because both of them belong to the Arab nation, but also because they are united both by history and destiny in their confrontation of the Zionist enemy and his expansionist designs on the territory of both countries. They must be indissolubly united.

Mr. President,

Thus it is no less important for the cause of Palestine than for Lebanon herself that quiet, stability and unity should be restored.

Certainly the establishment of relations between the organizations of the Palestine revolution in Lebanon and Lebanese official institutions, on an agreed and clearly defined basis, will in the future play an important role in restoring quiet and stability.

And once again, as so often before, we affirm our commitment to the agreements we have concluded, stressing that confidence is the best way of abiding by the spirit as well as the letter of agreements.

Mr. President,

We realize how many difficulties lie ahead of you but we are confident that you are willing and

able to surmount them and to set Lebanon on the course of unity and prosperity.

Therefore, Your Excellency, you will always find us ready to support you in your efforts to restore peace and quiet and to safeguard the sovereignty, independence, unity and security of Lebanon.

## 295

### **Statement by the Central Political Council of the National Movement of Lebanon pointing to the necessity of arriving at a settlement of differences among the Lebanese parties before settling Lebanese-Palestinian relations<sup>184</sup>**

**Mukhtara, September 24, 1976**

The Central Political Council began by reviewing the period following September 23, when President Sarkis entered upon his constitutional responsibilities. While the Council is continuing to formulate a comprehensive view of the future, it wishes today to make certain basic and urgent observations on the occasion of talks which commenced in Shtaura last week. The most noticeable point is the fact that the Syrian delegate insisted that discussion be confined to Lebanese-Palestinian relations, thus excluding any discussion of the presence of Syrian forces and of a Lebanese-Lebanese solution, arguing that such matters are the sole concern of President Sarkis.

The political council would like to affirm the following in this regard:

1. While the ending of the regime of Sulayman Franjeh and the assumption of office by President Sarkis is, in our view, a positive step, it cannot by itself constitute a Lebanese-Lebanese solution. While Sarkis represents the principle of legitimacy and is a symbol of the country's unity, he cannot represent legitimacy without a premier by his side. Until now, the various positions he has taken do not express the views of all parties to the Lebanese conflict. This is true of his attitude towards projected political reform as well as his manner of dealing with the crisis, both as regards the Syrian presence and as regards his conduct in

<sup>184</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), September 26, 1976.

general with respect to ending the fighting in Lebanon and attaining a political solution that would preserve the country's unity, consolidate Lebanese-Palestinian relations and guarantee Lebanon's Arabism and democratic progress.

2. We believe that a Lebanese-Lebanese solution must precede any other discussion. Such a dialogue would then lead to a united Lebanese stand concerning the Palestinian presence, Lebanon's Arab role, political reform, governmental institutions and the military establishment. Thus all aspects of Lebanese legitimacy, both officially and on the popular level, would be completed and would constitute a basis for negotiation with the Palestinian presence, guaranteeing the implementation of agreements concluded with it.

3. The subject of withdrawal from the mountains can only be discussed in the context of a comprehensive political solution. It would then constitute one aspect of that solution, for it would be balanced by the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and of isolationist forces from national villages in the Upper Metn like Dhur Shuwayr, Muruj, Btighrin, Khunshara, Bayt Shabab and elsewhere and from Tall al-Zaatar, Nabaa, Hawsh al-Umara, Dbayyeh, Sibnayh, Harat al-Ghawarina, Karantina, Kura and the return of all refugees to them.

The quarter of a million Lebanese who have abandoned these large regions are part of the masses belonging to the National Movement which has had a traditional mass following in the mountains and on the coast and has for decades fought lengthy political battles, through their progressive parties and national leaders, against the isolationists in these regions. Therefore, one cannot deal with the subject of the mountains and ignore its Lebanese national context. The political council wishes to affirm that no one has the right to raise the subject of withdrawal from the mountains or from anywhere else or even to discuss such a topic without the participation of the National Movement.

4. To ask the Palestine resistance to withdraw from the mountains, it being a part of the joint forces of the National Movement and the resistance, might appear to suggest that the resistance is the heart of the problem. In point of fact, two years ago, the Palestine resistance had directed all its activity towards commando action in occupied Palestine. A conspiracy was designed to

embroil the resistance in a pre-planned internal conflict. What is wanted is for this conspiracy to stop so that the resistance can resume its armed struggle in the occupied territories.

5. The National Movement sees no objection to a Shtaura meeting discussing a ceasefire and its implementation since the movement has always been positive where a ceasefire was concerned. But to discuss any further topics can only be accomplished by agreement among the Lebanese combatants.

The National Movement regards a Lebanese solution as the only way towards a solution that puts a final end to the fighting in a serious manner and creates the foundations for comprehensive and lasting relations among the Lebanese and between them and the Palestine resistance. It affirms that for a discussion of Lebanese-Palestinian relations to precede a Lebanese solution is clear evidence that the plotters behind this conspiracy are still actively seeking to implement their objectives which are to attack the Palestine resistance and the Lebanese National Movement. This is a danger which the movement will continue to confront on the basis of a union of destiny with the Palestine revolution.

## 296

### **Press interview statements by President Asad of Syria detailing his objections to the role of the Palestine resistance in Lebanon and to the Egypt-Israel interim agreement<sup>185</sup>**

**Damascus, late September, 1976**

*Q. Would you tell us where you agree with the resistance and where you disagree with it?*

*A. We do not disagree with the Palestine resistance on the problem of Palestine, but we do disagree with it on the problem of Lebanon. The Palestine resistance has the right to be in Lebanon or in any other Arab country, but they do not have the right to intervene or to exert any efforts in connection with the internal problems of the countries that host them. The resistance's*

<sup>185</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Hawadith* (Beirut), October 1, 1976.

interference in Lebanese affairs is a conspiracy against the Palestine cause.

*Q. The Palestinians say that what sparked off the difference between you and them was the secret agreement of undertaking you gave President Franjeh in January, 1976, which made him accept the Constitutional Document.*

*A. What secret undertaking?*

*Q. The undertaking to expel the Palestinians who have entered Lebanon since the conclusion of the Cairo agreement in November, 1969.<sup>186</sup>*

*A. That is not true. There is no undertaking or agreement on the Palestinians except the agreements the Palestinians know about and that they wrote with their own hands. And the seventeen articles of the Constitutional Document<sup>187</sup> which President Franjeh approved were written by Yasir Arafat himself.*

*Q. It would seem that he was basing his calculations on President Franjeh rejecting the Document.*

*A. If so, the PLO Chairman was basing his calculations on prophecy, and as far as I know the age of prophecy is past.*

*Q. Is it true that the USSR is exerting pressure on you to halt your military intervention within present limits?*

*A. The Soviets sent us a personal letter which has been published in certain sections of the foreign press.<sup>188</sup> I was very surprised at its publication, and wonder how it was leaked to the press. In this letter Leonid Brezhnev asked me to withdraw the Syrian army from Lebanon. I considered this request merely the expression of a point of view. We have another point of view which does not allow us to humour anyone, as it derives from the principles of our Arab policy and Syrian national interests. I should have expected our Soviet friends to understand that our attitude on this question was a matter of principle, and to choose our side. We are in Lebanon to stop the killing and to prevent parti-*

*tion and to prevent the liquidation of the Palestine revolution. I do not believe that our friends the Soviets are unaware that we are in Lebanon in response to popular and official requests, and that if a referendum were held it would show that more than 97 per cent of the Lebanese people want our presence, if only to give them security.*

*Q. How long will your military presence in Lebanon last?*

*A. Until the lawful institutions tell us: We do not want you here any longer. Then we shall withdraw from Lebanon. We did not enter Lebanon to achieve regional ends or for selfish opportunist interests. On the contrary, our presence in Lebanon is at the expense of our economy and our people's piece of bread. Did our Soviet friends expect us to do nothing when Lebanese in all parts of the country were calling on us—as they still are—to save them from death, destruction, bloody fighting and assassinations? The fighting has stopped completely in the areas we have entered. We have stopped the bloodshed, and anyone who goes to the Beqaa, the North and the South, where our troops are stationed, can see how we have succeeded in restoring quiet and stability and restoring life to normal, as it was before the Lebanese war. Our Soviet friends also know that if the Syrian army had not entered these areas Israel would have entered and the leaders of the Palestine resistance would have been refugees in Syria, and that when we withdrew from Sidon to Jezzine, at the insistence of our Arab brothers, over ten thousand Lebanese fled from the areas between the two towns. People were terrified by the reports of the confessional massacres that had taken place in various mixed areas, and if we had withdrawn completely the inhabitants would have fled from their villages and homes. It is no longer a secret how much the Lebanese, who were forced by the fighting to take refuge in Syria, are costing us. There are more than half a million of them, in addition to not less than one hundred and fifty thousand Palestinians.*

*Q. Do you think that time is on your side? Time is usually on the side of those who hold all the threads of the crisis or most of them at least.*

*A. I do not think that anyone can hold all the threads of the Lebanese crisis. Syria's geographical and historical situation perhaps makes*

<sup>186</sup> See note to doc. 195 above.

<sup>187</sup> Doc. 202 above.

<sup>188</sup> President Asad is probably referring to a letter which was published in *Le Monde* (Paris), July 20, 1976, p. 6. In this letter, Brezhnev is quoted as blaming Syria for the continuing fighting in Lebanon and inviting Asad to withdraw Syrian troops from the country.

her more capable than any quarter in the world to hold a large part of these threads and thus to influence the crisis. But that does not mean that we hold all the threads. The threads are widely distributed in a frightening manner.

*Q. Syria's point of view is well known, but what about the Soviet's point of view? Is it true that when he visited you, on the eve of your military intervention, Alexei Kosygin warned you of the consequences and said to you: "You are depriving the nationalist forces of their opportunity to establish a progressive regime in Lebanon"?*

*A. The two letters were to this effect, but Kosygin did not say anything of this kind in our talks.*

I do not want to say why I think President Sadat behaved in this way, but I do have the right to say that his conduct is not in accord with adherence to the strategic alliance that there should be between Egypt and Syria. On the contrary, it is quite incompatible with the most elementary principles of solidarity between two countries that entered the war together and won victories which should never have been renounced or endangered in this way.

*Q. Mr. President, I think you are right in your complaint: the Sinai agreement<sup>189</sup> is bad and should be attacked. But which is worse, the Sinai agreement or the collapse of solidarity between Egypt and Syria?*

*A. No one denies that solidarity between Egypt and Syria is historically inevitable, but that does not mean that any regime in Syria should agree with any regime in Egypt.*

In any case it is the Egyptian, not the Syrian regime, that is responsible for the harm that has been done to our joint struggle.

*Q. Does that mean that we are to stop all dialogue?*

*A. We are in contact through our Arab brothers—we have not broken off contacts, and discussions are continuing. We in Syria never allow ourselves to think exclusively of Syrian interests; we think of the interests of Syria, Egypt and every part of the Arab nation.*

*Q. Mr. President, do you not think that you are under an information blockade? It is almost unanimously*

*agreed that the Palestinians are better at waging the information war than you are. Do you think that a military or political victory can be won in the shadow of an information defeat?*

*A. We do not see ourselves as fighting any war with the Palestinians, neither a military war, nor a political one nor an information one. We believe that if we entered a war and defeated them, that would mean a loss to both them and us. We are not seeking to defeat them, because we do not want to defeat ourselves. We do not believe that those who attack us are serving the cause of Palestine. Everyone knows that there can be no Palestinian victory without Syria. The leaders of certain Palestinian organizations who are levelling accusations and insults against us know this and have themselves repeatedly affirmed it.*

*Q. Regardless of whether their attitude is right or wrong, the Palestinians have shown that they are extremely competent in the information field.*

*A. These were not the capabilities of the Palestinians alone. There are world forces that have been active and organized things. Any neutral observer can easily see that this is so.*

*Q. How do you see the Lebanese crisis being surmounted?*

*A. Through the implementation of the agreements concluded between the Palestinian organizations and the Lebanese authorities.*

*Q. And the demands of the Lebanese left?*

*A. Without the Palestinians the left is incapable of sparking off a war in Lebanon.*

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### **Press interview statements by DFLP leader Hawatma discussing Palestinian relations with Syria and other Arab states<sup>190</sup>**

**Beirut, late September, 1976**

*Q. Why have relations between the Palestine resistance and the Syrian authorities moved towards open conflict?*

*A. The deterioration goes back at least to February 1976, when it was becoming more and*

<sup>189</sup> Doc. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>190</sup> Translated from the French text of the interview conducted by Lucien George, *Le Monde* (Paris), September 28, 1976, p. 5.

more obvious to the Palestine resistance than the Syrian regime wanted to impose its hegemony and tutelage over it through Lebanon and at the same time it wanted to impose a bourgeois confessional solution on the Lebanese National Movement and not a national bourgeois solution to the class conflict in Lebanon.

The conflict between the PLO and Damascus continues. The Syrian-Lebanese-Palestinian meeting in Shtaura did not have any great significance on the level of Syrian-Palestinian relations. It was the result of difficulties that Syria encountered in the application of her plan and of the many pressures exerted on the Damascus regime. Even though the Syrians had difficulties, they did not at all renounce their fundamental objectives in Lebanon. As a consequence the whole problem remains.

*Q. The resistance is split between several currents. What are they?*

A. Essentially they can be reduced to three: right, centre and left, or rather the national bourgeoisie, the petite bourgeoisie and the progressive wing. The essential force of the resistance is constituted by the centre-left alliance that determines the daily strategy and policy of the Palestine revolution. The right is isolated, and relatively weak because the Syrian rightist and Arab reactionary forces are playing the principal role in the execution of the American-Israeli plan. The Palestinian masses are aware of it. The Rejection Front has been considerably weakened following its nihilistic positions and its failure to propose a general policy and tactics, especially in the difficult circumstances we are passing through.

*Q. Is it possible to resolve the Lebanese crisis before the Syrian-Palestinian crisis?*

A. The Lebanese crisis is triangular, not bilateral, since Syrian hegemony over the Palestinians is exercising itself in Lebanon. Without a doubt, and as a consequence, a solution to the Syrian-Palestinian crisis would facilitate a settlement. But our conflict with Damascus is not the sole cause of this crisis, the essential elements of which arise from internal Lebanese contradictions and the refusal of the Christian and Moslem right to accept independent evolution and undertake democratic reforms.

*Q. Do you think Syria can be replaced as principal*

*ally of the Palestine resistance?*

A. There is no doubt that due to her geographic situation and her tradition of hostility to colonialism and Zionism, Syria constitutes a strategic base for the Palestine resistance. This base is definitely irreplaceable. We can only struggle to rectify Syrian policy, whose deviations from the Palestine resistance do not date from yesterday.

*Q. Do you think Egypt really supports the Palestine resistance or that she adopts this attitude as a tactic?*

A. Without a shadow of doubt, this position is a tactic. Since the rightist coup d'état by President Sadat on May 15, 1971, her policy towards us oscillates between total hostility and full solidarity. The Egyptian head of state is as much, if not more, tied to American projects than his Syrian counterpart, and Egypt, with Saudi Arabia, constitutes the main axis of United States policy in the Arab world. That suffices to define the nature of the Egyptian position towards the resistance. Egypt tries to use us as a card in its conflict with Syria on the regional level and in the execution of the American plan. Is it also necessary to recall President Sadat's campaign against the resistance and his honeymoon in the first months of the Lebanese crisis with Franjeh and Gemayyel?

*Q. Who are the current allies of the Palestine resistance in the Arab world?*

A. Libya, Iraq, Algeria and South Yemen are friends whose degrees of solidarity with us do however vary. It isn't possible, at this time, to divulge the degree of solidarity manifested by these countries. However, we can only express our appreciation to Libya for her attitude, especially during the first days of the Syrian military intervention.

*Q. What lies behind Algeria's silence with regards to the development of the crisis in Lebanon?*

A. It is unjustifiable, and we can find no satisfactory explanation at a time when the Palestinian people is being murdered and the resistance physically liquidated.

*Q. There is much talk about an accord between the two superpowers for a settlement of the Lebanese crisis. What about this?*

A. It is necessary to distinguish between détente based on peaceful coexistence and an accord.



The facts have shown that the American-Soviet entente is non-existent in South America, Africa, Southeast Asia and even in Europe. In the Middle East, there is neither entente nor détente. This is why all international decisions relative to this area of the world—disregarding our own position towards them—have remained a dead letter.

The United States is preoccupied with implementing its plan in Lebanon in collaboration with Syria, Arab reactionary forces and the Lebanese right; whereas the Soviet Union has followed a policy of clear and distinct support for the Palestine resistance and the Lebanese National Movement, a policy notably expressed in the message from Brezhnev published by *Le Monde* and whose authenticity I confirm.<sup>191</sup>

The rumours about an agreement between Washington and Moscow on Lebanon are based on an article appearing in *Pravda* on September 8. It is enough to take the trouble to read this article in its entirety to dispense with reading between the lines for hidden meanings. It is composed of a long diatribe against the American plan and the Syrian role and ends with a small phrase implying a critique of the tactics followed by certain elements of the Lebanese left and the Palestinians, which emphasizes that a certain flexibility could be used to gain time, prepare the forces and enlarge to the maximum the international Arab and internal front, in order to oblige Syria to withdraw her troops from Lebanon. It is a simple, limited critique of a purely tactical nature.

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**Statement issued by the National Command of the Baath Party of Syria reviewing the consequences of the October war and tracing the causes of the war in Lebanon to the Sinai interim agreement<sup>192</sup>**

**Damascus, October 5, 1976**

The Arab war of liberation in October, fought by our own Syrian Arab armed forces and by the other Arab armies on the battlefields of the Golan and Sinai, accompanied by the fighting vanguard of our Arab people, was able to effect, by unlimited sacrifice, a radical and qualitative change in modern Arab history and in the Arab future. The war represented a significant contribution to the progress of mankind and to the struggle of all nations for progress and liberation.

Qualitative changes are alone capable of creating new facts and new balances of power as well as new political and intellectual foundations. Everything that had once been taken for granted in the unequal battle with the Zionist enemy was now overturned. Gone was the old image of the Arab, the distortion of his past and present and a legacy that had once impeded his revolutionary and progressive path, with all the illusions and complexes it had created. There then collapsed a whole series of international calculations that were based on wrong and subjective premises and according to which the world had for so long dealt with the Arabs throughout a long history of defeat, bitterness and blackmail.

Thus the October war forced the whole world to re-examine the new military, political and economic facts created by the war and to reassess its strategies and views accordingly.

Three years after the war, it may be confidently affirmed that most significant international decisions and most of the important changes in world public opinion and in its views of the Arab cause are in origin traceable to the repercussions created by the October war and to its effects, both positive and negative, upon the structure of the international community and of international affairs.

<sup>192</sup> Statement made on the occasion of the 3rd anniversary of the October war; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), October 6, 1976.

<sup>191</sup> *Le Monde* (Paris), July 20, 1976, p. 6.

Because the October war was in fact a major turning point in the Arab situation, embracing all its aspects, and because the Arab Baath Party movement led by Comrade Hafiz Asad is the one movement, objectively speaking, capable of continuing to effect such major change and fit by its ideology and its conduct to do so, it inevitably became necessary for the imperialist and Zionist forces to move to block this process of change. The repercussions of this change had to be circumscribed and limited to prevent similar changes from taking place in our Arab homeland. The potentialities for further exploiting these repercussions, set off by the October war in the direction of escalating the Arab struggle further, had therefore to be frustrated.

It was no simple achievement for the October war to arrest the momentum of Zionist aggression, thus effecting a stage of retreat in Zionist strategy and paralyzing the Zionist role of frustrating the aspirations of the Arab nation for unification and liberation.

Arab masses, the vicious attempt to foil and liquidate the achievements of October began from the moment the ceasefire came into effect on the Egyptian front by a unilateral decision of the Egyptian regime, at a time when the military situation of the Arab forces did not allow for such a decision. The finger of accusation is thus pointed at the real reasons behind that decision, which were later to be fully exposed when the Sinai agreement, with its secret appendices, was concluded.

Lebanon, by reason of its political and military structure, its social make-up and the conduct of its corrupt leadership, provided an ideal setting for an explosion of bloody violence. The goal was to embarrass Syria on its western flank and preoccupy it in the struggle to foil the conspiracy there so that the conflict would become inter-Arab. The resistance would then be embroiled in internal strife in a non-Palestinian arena. An attempt would then be made to create new partitions of Arab territory establishing sectarian states that would add a new burden to the Arab struggle, do harm to the humanitarian content of the Arab cause and serve the interests of the Zionist programme, based as it is upon sectarianism and

racism, thus justifying its continued existence.

This was why Syria adopted a principled stand in Lebanon and why it expended all its efforts to arrive at a settlement which would save Lebanon and the resistance from the conspiracy aimed against them both. Accordingly, Syria will continue to devote its energy and activity to save Lebanon in accordance with the requirements of national interest and Arab security to the end that a final and comprehensive solution to the problem may be arrived at which would preserve Lebanon's territorial integrity and its people as well as the resistance. Syria, in all this, is merely expressing its concern in practice to preserve the spirit of the October War and its absolute faith in the eternal values of October as well as the necessity of perpetuating the will to fight which had brought about the October war.

Thus the military mission being undertaken by the Syrian Arab forces in Lebanon to foil the conspiracy there is, by the logic of the struggle, a continuation of the national mission begun by our army in October. This was a mission which was halted by the conspiratorial action of the Egyptian regime and by its abandoning the complementary military plan for the two war fronts. For the loss of Lebanon or any part thereof for any reason whatever is strategically no less significant than the loss of any other national territory. The achievements of our armed forces in Lebanon will thus be an important addition to their glorious national history after the October and Golan wars.

Struggling masses, the anniversary of the October war provides an opportunity for Syria to affirm its basic policies regarding Arab action which is to be based upon consolidating Arab solidarity. That solidarity is to be regarded as a positive and important postulate to be developed for the service of the Arab struggle and the achievement of its interim goals, after having demonstrated its efficacy during the October war. We shall work to isolate and expose all the forces and parties that try to defy Arab unanimity and to undermine Arab solidarity.

Syria will do its utmost to create stronger and more durable inter-Arab relations in order to bolster our common effort against the enemy. In drawing closer to the brotherly region of Jordan, Syria is inspired by that national will which

requires that we form a solid military and political front in facing the enemy, to act as an alternative to those other Arab forces whose suspicious contacts prevent them from contributing in any material way to the fight against Zionism.

It must here be emphasized that the fore-ordained connection between Syria and the Palestine resistance and the strengthening of the strategic alliance between them is an inevitable prerequisite for the creation of a nucleus of an attacking group capable of standing fast and of acting as a deterrent within a belt of eastern confrontation states that must include Syria, Jordan, the PLO and Lebanon. This front must be ready to coordinate with all other confrontation fronts throughout our Arab homeland and for all military, economic and human contributions that serve the common objective, so that an objective military and human balance may be established to make up for the loss of the Iraqi and Egyptian power factors. These two regimes have removed their countries from the battle until such a time as the Arab masses in the two regions can again act to bring the two Arab armies back to their rightful place on the borders of the occupied homeland.

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#### **Statement by a PLO spokesman denouncing the attack on the Syrian embassy in Rome<sup>193</sup>**

**Beirut, October 11, 1976**

The Palestinian Revolution has previously condemned and always will condemn this kind of irresponsible act which it considers to be directed against the Palestinian struggle and an attempt to distort the militant image of the Palestinian revolution. On this basis, the revolution stresses that it has no connection whatsoever with this incident.

The revolution also stresses that these acts, coming at precisely this time, aim at creating pretexts for new blows against the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese National Movement, along the lines of what took place after the Semiramis hotel incident.

The Palestinian revolution calls upon all infor-

mation media to stop linking the name of the revolution with such contemptible operations.

### 300

#### **Policy statement of Prime Minister Khulayfawi of Syria (excerpts)<sup>194</sup>**

**Damascus, October 12, 1976**

##### *Regarding Arab politics*

Our Syrian region, which has played and is still playing a leadership role in the Arab struggle, bears today, as it has borne in the past, great national responsibilities at a time when Zionist and imperialist conspiracies are intensifying. Faithful to its responsibilities and in pursuit of the objectives for which it is struggling and of the present tasks it is seeking to perform, our region emphasizes the following principles in the field of Arab politics:

3. Strengthening and deepening Arab solidarity and striving to mobilize the potentialities of the Arab nation in the military, financial and political spheres in the service of the main battle. The principal conflict at this stage must be considered to be the one between the Arab nation on the one hand and the Zionist enemy and its imperialist supporters on the other. Accordingly, differences among Arab states are regarded as secondary when compared to the foremost danger threatening their very existence and future. Thus, the government will do its utmost to bolster Arab solidarity, mobilize Arab potentialities and exploit any initiative towards that end by overcoming all obstacles that may arise in this regard.

4. Efforts will be made to achieve an effective coordination of Arab action to increase the isolation of the Zionist enemy in the political, military and economic spheres and to make use of all the means necessary to achieve that end.

The Palestine resistance movement is an inseparable part of the Arab liberation movement.

<sup>193</sup> English text, *Wafa* (Beirut), October 11, 1976, p. 8.

<sup>194</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), October 13, 1976.

Relations between the resistance and the Syrian Arab region have always been determined by common destiny. The principled and steady commitment of the Syrian region to the cause of Palestine, and its view of that cause as the axis of the Arab liberation struggle against the Zionist enemy and the imperialist forces supporting it, has dictated and still dictates the expending of increased efforts and sacrifices in the face of the dangers, which along with the attendant conspiracies and deviations, are threatening it. The government shall spare no effort in furnishing aid and support to the cause of Palestine and the Palestine resistance so that the Arab people of Palestine may regain their full rights in their homeland.

*Regarding international politics*

1. The Arab liberation movement is an inseparable part of the world liberation movement which affects its struggle and is itself affected by its triumphs. It cooperates with it in the common struggle against Zionism and imperialism.

2. Our relations with any state in the world are determined in the light of their attitude towards our national causes, at the forefront of which is the Palestine cause.

3. Strengthening ties of cooperation with friendly socialist countries on the basis of mutual respect and reciprocal interests, of the common struggle against Zionism and imperialism and of non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

4. Consolidating cooperation with friendly states that understand the nature of the Zionist aggression against our land and adopt policies that are favourable to our cause. We shall also strive to develop the policies of other states in the same direction.

5. We shall continue our efforts with the states and peoples of Western Europe with the object of developing their policies towards support of our just Arab cause.

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**Press interview statements by Fatah Central Committee member Khalaf reviewing negotiations regarding a ceasefire and explaining the political interest of the Palestine resistance in the fighting in Mount Lebanon<sup>195</sup>**

Beirut, mid-October, 1976

*Q. How far have you got in your dialogue with the Syrians, and why are your meetings with them secret?*

A. Firstly, there is nothing secret in Lebanon, so the meetings are not secret. Secondly, if what is being discussed at the meetings is being kept secret, this is out of concern for their success.

*Q. I mean your meetings in Sofar with General Naji Jamil, the Syrian deputy defence minister?*

A. I have had two meetings with General Naji Jamil, and I have made a point of not disclosing what passed between us at either of them, and stressed that there was no need for reports on them to be published. It is the Syrian information media that have published the news. I myself have made no reference to the meetings, because in my view they were not successful.

*Q. Since, as you say, the principle of secrecy has been infringed by the Syrian information media, could you tell us why the meetings were not successful.*

A. The ceasefire was the main point of discussion at both meetings, and we agreed that a committee of members representing all the warring parties should announce a ceasefire in a statement signed by all of them. Naji Jamil thought that there should be a meeting of the resistance, the National Movement and the Lebanese Front, as well as the Syrians, the meeting also being attended by representatives of the National Front (Qansu, Shatila, Wakim and the Amal Organization). However, our allies, the National Movement, refused to sit down at the same table with representatives of the National Front in the belief that the question did not concern the latter. I strongly supported their refusal and in order to facilitate the peace talks between us and the Syrians, I proposed that there be a statement of ceasefire which would be passed on to all warring parties, and which could also be signed by representatives

<sup>195</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Hawadith* (Beirut), October 15, 1976.

of the National Front, this being as far as we could go in the way of making concessions; but my proposal was rejected by the Syrians.

*Q. So much for the first steps towards reaching a solution. What about the solution itself?*

A. There were three problems involved in reaching a solution:

1. The security vacuum and how it was to be dealt with.

2. What form the Lebanese-Lebanese solution was to take.

3. What form the Palestinian-Lebanese solution, within the framework of the Cairo agreement, was to take.

After that it was possible for a joint line to be laid down for the implementation of the provisions of the three agreements in accordance with a time schedule. But what happened? Two things were practically sacred to the Syrians. The first was their insistence that the meeting of the warring parties should be attended by representatives of the National Front, and they would not accept a statement signed, as with the other parties, by members of the Front as an alternative to the meeting. The second was a difference of opinion about balanced withdrawals from the mountains—a partial Palestinian withdrawal in return for a partial Syrian withdrawal. I discovered that the Syrians were not prepared to budge from their positions in Sofar and Jezzine, and refused even so much as to discuss withdrawing from Sofar to Mudeirij (a distance of about half a kilometre). These two points were sacred to the Syrians, and they would not give way on them at all.

*Q. The Syrians regard your obstinate refusal to allow representatives of the National Front to attend the meeting as an interference in Lebanese affairs.*

A. Meaning what?

*Q. Meaning that it was up to the Lebanese, not the Palestinians, to say whether or not Najah Wakim, Asim Qansu and Kamal Shatila should attend, and that it was not up to the resistance to decide whether they should accept or refuse?*

A. How so? The resistance has Lebanese allies who have borne arms in defence of its existence and in the same trench against the isolationist and Syrian attack, and they have laid down their lives just as we have. What sort of loyalty is it that abandons a comrade in struggle? It is

not the custom of the resistance to abandon its comrades, or to allow anyone to dishonour them. Where our comrades and allies are concerned we know nothing of axes or parties. Everyone in the nationalist areas of Lebanon is dear to us and his sufferings are ours.

*Q. But the Syrians blame you for your special support of the National Movement headed by Kamal Junblat, which includes the extreme leftists and the communists.*

A. We support all who are in the nationalist areas and the nationalists throughout Lebanon, and we have nothing at all to do with Lebanese internal groupings involved in the conflict over different kinds of reform, such as secularization and so on. Only the Lebanese can choose the form of government they want, and we support whatever the Lebanese agree on. Therefore, we want to be friendly with Saib Salam and Raymond Eddé as much as with Kamal Junblat.

*Q. In that connection, Saib Salam accused you on British television—and many Muslim quarters do the same—of having been lured by the left into the Lebanese quicksands, and especially into the battle for Mount Lebanon, at a time when you would have done better to keep out. Saib Salam said that Kamal Junblat was mainly responsible for this, and that he [Junblat] wants to fight to the last Palestinian.*

A. Unlike Saib Salam, I do not think that anyone is capable of luring the resistance, nor would the resistance agree to be drawn in by any group against its will. The fact is, some people try to ignore facts that they know very well exist—they try to ignore the conspiracy against the Palestinians, paying no attention to the Lebanese conflict. I should like to ask my friend Saib Salam, the hero of the 1958 revolution: Were there any Palestinians in the arena at that time?

As a Palestinian living in Lebanon and in a dangerous situation, I am prepared to side with any quarter that supports me, backs me and bears arms for me. So I was bound to side with the National Movement which threw its full strength into the battle in defence of my existence. In the course of the fighting, basic Lebanese demands came to the fore and imposed themselves on the struggle regardless of whether we approved or not, as a result of which the conflict took its Lebanese-Lebanese character.

In this inter-Lebanese conflict, without any

interference at all on our part, natural conditions emerged between the so-called traditional leaders and the young men who had assumed their role on the field of struggle. We of the Palestine revolution have made a point of being neutral in this matter. We have meetings with all quarters without becoming a party to the dispute, and as a general rule, we are not asked to bear arms with Saib Salam against the National Movement or with the National Movement against Saib Salam.

I greatly esteem Saib Salam, but this does not prevent me saying what I think about his recent television statement. What I think is that this statement is of service to the Syrian plan which is always referring to the communist danger and the danger of Kamal Junblat. And I do not think that the statement does any good at this stage.

*Q. There remains the charge of your being lured into the battle for Mount Lebanon in contravention of the Cairo agreement.*

A. That is a long story and closely linked to the conspiracy against the Palestine resistance. The question has been asked in the Arab world: What are the Palestinians doing in Mount Lebanon? And even: What has Mount Lebanon to do with the Cairo agreement?<sup>196</sup> It must be agreed that the frontiers of the Cairo agreement are political rather than geographical. As a Palestinian, I am to be found wherever I feel that I am defending the Cairo agreement, and the siting becomes political rather than geographical.

We are committed to a return to the Cairo agreement, whether or not representatives of the National Movement are to be found in such and such an area, and our conditions for final commitment to it are that the conspiracy against us should be thwarted, that those who call for our liquidation should be silenced, and that those who say that the last Palestinian must be expelled from Lebanon should hold their peace. As for our withdrawing from Mount Lebanon, it is the Syrians themselves who are responsible for the delay.

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**Statement issued by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait expressing the hope that current talks in Lebanon will lead to an end to the war<sup>197</sup>**

Riyad, October 13, 1976

In view of the present state of the Arab nation and of the conspiracies threatening it, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Kuwait are aware of the gravity of the situation and of the attendant dangers. Accordingly we called for a mini-summit and a quadripartite meeting at prime minister level which was in fact held on Jumada II 25, 1396 AH, corresponding to June 24, 1976 AD,<sup>198</sup> this to be followed by a meeting at heads of state level.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Kuwait, aware of the gravity of the current situation in the Arab world, expect much from the summit scheduled for October 18, 1976, and hope that the Arab nation will benefit from it. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have followed with great concern past and present fragmentation in Arab relations and they appeal to the various parties concerned in Lebanon to adopt the mode of positive dialogue, adhere to the spirit of cooperation and replace enmity with understanding in order that the bloodshed in Lebanon may be stopped.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Kuwait, while following the meetings in Shtaura among the parties concerned, affirm their concern for the need to bring these meetings to a successful conclusion that would be in everyone's interests and to prepare the atmosphere for the desired settlement. They hope that circumstances in the Arab world will be such as to ensure a better atmosphere and greater chance of success for the coming summit meeting; in this way resolutions worthy of Arab aspirations will be taken, thereby restoring the atmosphere of Arab solidarity—a solidarity that was seen at its strongest during the glorious Ramadan war. We ask God to bestow His blessings upon all.

<sup>197</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Riyad* (Riyad), October 14, 1976.

<sup>198</sup> See docs. 267 and 268 above.

<sup>196</sup> See note to doc. 195 above.

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**Statement by General Secretary Ismail of the National Front of South Yemen expressing support for the Palestine resistance and the National Movement of Lebanon (excerpt)<sup>199</sup>**

Aden, October 14, 1976

The Arab situation at present is deteriorating... The Lebanese incidents do not mean the liquidation of the Lebanese progressive nationalist movement, nor do they mean the liquidation of the Palestine Resistance; they mean the liquidation of the Arab liberation movement in its entirety. For this reason we say that our stand is a firm principled one with the nationalist and progressive movement in Lebanon and with the Palestine Resistance, because their defeat is a defeat for us and their victory is a victory for us. We support the unity of Lebanon, and we support the sovereignty and oppose the partition of Lebanon. We support the Lebanese progressive nationalist movement and the Palestine resistance. We will offer all the support we can until the imperialist, Zionist and reactionary designs in Lebanon are (?foiled)...

On this occasion, when we are (?celebrating) the anniversary of the eruption of our revolution, we hail with esteem the Lebanese nationalist and progressive movement and the Palestine Resistance for their splendid steadfastness and courage in the face of death and for the struggle they waged with rare valour and courage (?in defence) of their legitimate right to life and in defence of their interests and [word indistinct].

<sup>199</sup> Made on the occasion of the 14th anniversary of the October Revolution; broadcast by Aden radio in Arabic; excerpted from the partial English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5341/A/1; reprinted by permission.

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**Press interview statements by President Numairi of Sudan describing Sudan's role in the conflict with Israel<sup>200</sup>**

Khartoum, October 15, 1976

*Q. Following the Jiddah meeting between Your Excellency, HM King Khalid Bin Abd al-Aziz and President Sadat, features of a political and economic region, namely the Red Sea, have started to appear. What steps will be taken to realize this? What will be the effect on Arab and international strategy if its achievement becomes possible?*

A. I beg to differ from you when you say that features of a political and economic region, namely the Red Sea, have begun to appear. The words features of a region imply that the region did not previously exist. They also mean that this region is the child of circumstances which might be temporary or might be permanent. The Red Sea and the states bordering it have long constituted a natural unity. The economic and political conformity of this region has existed for a long period. The Jiddah meeting merely endorsed what already existed, and had as its objective a definition of the steps which had to be taken to maintain conformity, co-operation and coordination in a well-defined strategy in the service of the Arab nation and, indeed, of other nations too. This conformity and co-operation has existed through all the battles waged by the Arab nation. Sudan constituted a depth [Arabic: *umq*] for Egypt during the 1967 and 1973 wars. Saudi Arabia was an extension of the fateful war arena on the Egyptian front in the long struggle against the Zionist enemy. Conformity has been a support and strength for Saudi Arabia and Sudan in facing treacherous conspiracies. If the Red Sea has become one of the new hot beds of conflict between the big states, indeed if the Red Sea constitutes a big gain for communism, there is no doubt that the responsibility devolving to the Red Sea states goes beyond a limited vision, and extends to the comprehensiveness of the future in all its dimensions.

The identity of the Red Sea is no longer a subject

<sup>200</sup> Interview given to the Saudi weekly *al-Yamama* and broadcast on Omdurman radio in Arabic; partial English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5342/A/1-2; reprinted by permission.

of debate or discussion. This places on the region great burdens within the framework of the common and continuing struggle against the enemy who has usurped Arab territory and who looks forward with insolence and vanity not only to the retention of the occupied lands, but also to further expansion and more usurpation. There is no doubt that the consolidation and strengthening of the states of the Arab region of the Red Sea [word indistinct] economic and political, as I have said, will have a definite and far-reaching effect on international strategy—and not only Arab strategy—such as by blocking the path of red infiltration in the Red Sea, by ensuring the industrial and agricultural development of the states of the area, by building up an armed Arab force to ensure the protection of the region and its borders, and by guaranteeing effective participation in the process of exterminating the state of usurpation and (?violence). All this is the future towards which we are working and, indeed, towards which we have worked... [Passage omitted: Sudan's economic programme].

*Q. The Arab summit which will be held in Cairo. Has Sudan a working paper to be submitted to the conference? How does Sudan conceive the elements of Afro-Arab co-operation, in view of the fact Sudan is one of the states activating and defining such relations? Of late, it has been observed that there is some coolness in Afro-Arab relations. In what ways, in Sudan's view, can these relations be promoted and more firmly established?*

*A.* I do not believe that Afro-Arab relations are passing through a period of coolness, as you have put it. Afro-Arab relations are now passing through a period of political calm. In other words they are passing through a period of careful study with the aim of promoting co-operation and coordination. Perhaps this is the reason behind the fact that they have not come to the fore recently. I have always believed that the destiny which has brought the Arab nation together is the same one which governs the African continent. Both the Arab nation and the African continent are in the same situation—facing the greed of the covetous and the dreams of adventurers. They are experiencing the same problems and circumstances.

I believe that Afro-Arab solidarity at the present time is a wise goal to be worked towards in the interests of the two peoples. Indeed, I believe that

the Arab states have a momentous role which we should not [word indistinct] relax dealing with them, because we do not forget and we shall not forget the active and glorious role assumed by the African continent during the glorious October war... The economic, political and social co-operation between the peoples of the Arab nation and the peoples of the African continent should crystalize along clear lines, to promote agricultural and industrial investment in the African continent. In fact this should be covered and defined by study projects in the industrial areas. It should even reflect on social life in both regions...

*Q. The wave of hijacking of Arab aircraft and the new methods of terrorism: Do you not think it would be fitting to evolve a common Arab strategy to wage war against them? Has Sudan any particular view on this?*

*A.* Sudan has always condemned the barbarous practice of publicizing a particular cause by hijacking aircraft, Arab or not. It is neither acceptable nor reasonable that a protest for a particular cause should result in the killing of other people. [Words indistinct] through random killing the legitimacy of a cause of whatever kind is nullified. If the wave of hijackings of Arab aircraft is now evident, I do not believe it will continue for long. The Egyptian aircraft which was hijacked—the aim of its hijacking was not the announcing of an honourable stand nor even the demanding of legitimate rights; it was just a continuation of the desperate terrorist wave led by that ill-fated Colonel. It was for the release of other terrorists, whose object was murder and whose bent is sabotage. If there is [word indistinct] solution and common Arab action to fight this phenomenon, then I do not believe it beyond us to isolate terrorism or to encircle the champions of terrorism. The position of terrorism is well-known. The exporters of terrorism are notorious and rejected.

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**Communiqué issued by the six-power Arab summit conference held to discuss the war in Lebanon**<sup>201</sup>

Riyad, October 18, 1976

The following met in Riyad from October 16–18: President Muhammad Anwar Sadat of the Arab Republic of Egypt, President Hafiz Asad of the Syrian Arab Republic, President Elias Sarkis of the Lebanese Republic, Mr. Yasir Arafat, head of the PLO, His Highness Shaykh Sabah al-Salim, Emir of the State of Kuwait and His Majesty Khalid ibn Abd al-Aziz, in a six-country conference, to discuss the crisis in Lebanon, to study means of resolving it, and to agree on the necessary steps to stop the bloodshed and to ensure that fighting is replaced by dialogue, while ensuring that the security, safety, independence and sovereignty of Lebanon are maintained and that the Palestine resistance as embodied in the PLO is protected.

Aware of their historic national responsibility and of the need to reinforce collective Arab action with a view to settling things in Lebanon and preventing any future explosion; from their determination to rise above the negative heritage of the past and their realization of the need to move towards the future in a constructive spirit of conciliation and peace, and to provide the necessary guarantees to ensure that normal life in Lebanon continues, that its political, economic and other institutions are preserved, and that Lebanon's sovereignty is maintained, and also that Palestinian endurance continues; those attending the conference studied the situation in Lebanon, considered what steps and measures should be taken to restore normal life within the framework of the country's stability, sovereignty and independence and of the solidarity of the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples, and discussed what guarantees could be provided to ensure the above.

The conference resolved that a ceasefire should be declared to stop the fighting once and for all, and that all parties should abide by it. It also resolved to reinforce the present Arab security forces so that they may constitute a deterrent

force to operate in Lebanon under the personal orders of the president of the Lebanese republic.

The conference unanimously rejected the partition of Lebanon in any form, whether *de jure* or *de facto*, explicit or implicit, and stressed its commitment to maintaining the national unity and territorial integrity of Lebanon and its determination that nothing should be done to impair the unity of its territory and that there should be no interference in its internal affairs.

The conference called on all Lebanese parties to initiate a political dialogue with a view to achieving national conciliation and to strengthening the unity of the Lebanese people. It was agreed that the Cairo agreement and its annexes,<sup>202</sup> to which the chairman of the PLO has declared total commitment, should be implemented. In this connection it was resolved to form a committee consisting of representatives of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic and the State of Kuwait, to coordinate with the president of the Lebanese Republic on matters related to the implementation of the Cairo agreement, this committee to remain in existence for a period of ninety days as from the announcement of the ceasefire.

The conference stressed its commitment to the resolutions of the seventh Arab summit conference held in Rabat to the effect that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and the undertaking of all the member states of the Arab League to support the PLO and not to interfere in its affairs. The PLO affirmed its policy of not interfering in the affairs of any Arab country. In this connection the conference stressed that the countries attending it guarantee the integrity, unity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon.

The conference also discussed the question of the reconstruction of Lebanon and the financial resources required to eliminate the consequences of the armed struggle and the damage done to the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples. The resolutions of this conference will be submitted to the forthcoming expanded Arab summit conference.

<sup>201</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), October 19, 1976.

<sup>202</sup> See note to doc. 195 above.

## 306

**Resolution of the six-nation Arab summit conference held to consider the war in Lebanon<sup>203</sup>**

Riyad, October 18, 1976

The limited Arab summit conference held in Riyadh, Shawwal 25–28, 1396 AH (October 16–18, 1976 AD), on the initiative of His Majesty King Khalid ibn Abd al-Aziz al-Saud of Saudi Arabia and His Highness Shaykh Sabah al-Salim Sabah, Emir of the State of Kuwait, having reviewed the resolutions adopted by the Council of the Arab League at its extraordinary sessions held June 8–10 1976<sup>204</sup>, and on June 23, 1976, and July 1, 1976, and at its session of September 4, 1976, and in the light of the national commitment to maintain the unity, security and sovereignty of Lebanon, and also to protect the Palestine resistance, as represented by the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, in conformity with the Rabat resolutions, and to enhance its capacity to hold out in the face of all attacks on the entity of the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination and to recover their national soil; from a belief in the common goals and destiny of the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples and the impossibility of any conflict of interests arising between them; and from the conviction that the past and its negative heritage must be forgotten so that the future may be faced in a spirit of conciliation, dialogue and cooperation; and from appreciation of the need for rapid action to ensure the re-establishment of normal life in Lebanon and to strengthen its political, economic and other institutions, and to enable the PLO to achieve its national goals; and in the light of the positive and constructive spirit evinced by the leaders attending this conference, which disclosed that they were all moved by a sincere desire to end the crisis in Lebanon once and for all and to contain any dispute that might arise in the future, resolves the following:

1. That all parties shall stop fighting and observe a final ceasefire throughout Lebanese territory as from 6 a.m. on October 21, 1976, and that the parties shall adhere to this decision.

2. That the present Arab security forces be reinforced so as to constitute a deterrent force to operate in Lebanon under the personal orders of the president of the Lebanese Republic. The force shall number not more than thirty thousand men and its principal tasks shall be the following:

a) To impose adherence to the ceasefire, to separate conflicting parties and to prevent any violations.

b) To enforce the Cairo agreement and its annexes.

c) To maintain internal security.

d) To supervise the withdrawal of armed elements to the positions they occupied before April 13, 1975, and to eliminate armed manifestations in accordance with the time-table in the attached annex.

e) To supervise the collection of all heavy armaments, including artillery, mortars, rocket-launchers, armoured vehicles, etc., under the control of the parties concerned.

f) To assist the Lebanese authorities, when necessary, to take over public utilities and institutions in preparation for resuming control of them, and to protect military and civil installations.

3. That normal life in Lebanon, as it was before the incidents started, that is before April 13, 1975, shall be restored as a first step in conformity with the time-table in the attached annex.

4. That the Cairo agreement and its annexes<sup>205</sup> shall be implemented and adhered to in letter and in spirit, under guarantees provided by the Arab countries here assembled, and a committee consisting of representatives of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria and Kuwait shall be formed to co-ordinate with the president of the Lebanese Republic on matters related to the implementation of the Cairo agreement and its annexes, this committee to remain in existence for ninety days as from the announcement of the ceasefire.

5. The Palestine Liberation Organization affirms its respect for the sovereignty and integrity of Lebanon and that it has no intention of interfering in its internal affairs, in the light of its total commitment to the national goals of the Palestine cause, and the legitimate Lebanese authorities similarly guarantee the presence and operation of the Palestine Liberation Organiza-

<sup>203</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), October 19, 1976.

<sup>204</sup> Doc. 260 above.

<sup>205</sup> See note to doc. 195 above.

tion in Lebanese territory within the framework of the Cairo agreement and its annexes.

6. The Arab states here assembled undertake to respect Lebanon's sovereignty and integrity and the unity of its people and territory.

7. The Arab states here assembled affirm their commitment to the resolutions of the Algiers and Rabat summit conferences<sup>206</sup> to support and assist the Palestine resistance and to respect the right of the Palestinian people to struggle by all available means for the recovery of their national rights.

#### 8. Information Affairs

a) All parties shall refrain from information campaigns and negative psychological mobilization.

b) Information activity shall be directed towards securing a ceasefire, achieving peace and promoting a spirit of cooperation and brotherhood.

c) Efforts shall be made to unify official information activity.

9. The attached time-table for the implementation of these resolutions shall be regarded as an integral part of them.

*Time-table for the implementation of the resolutions of the Riyad conference:*

1. A ceasefire shall be declared and fighting by all parties shall stop once and for all in all Lebanese territory as from 6 a.m. on October 21, 1976.

2. Once buffer zones have been established, observation posts shall be set up in locations of tension to enforce the ceasefire and stop the fighting.

3. Armed elements and all heavy arms shall be withdrawn and armed manifestations shall be eliminated in accordance with the following time-table:

a) Mount Lebanon: within five days.

b) The South: within five days.

c) Beirut and its environs: within seven days.

d) The North: Within ten days.

4. The reopening of main roads

a) The following main roads shall be reopened within five days: Beirut-Masnaa, Beirut-Tripoli-the frontier, Beirut-Tyre, Beirut-Sidon-Marjayun-Masnaa.

b) Observation patrol points manned by members of the Deterrent Forces shall be set up on

insecure roads by agreement with the parties concerned and the commander of the said forces.

5. The legitimate Lebanese authorities shall take over public utilities, installations and institutions, both military and civil, the following measures being taken:

a) They shall be cleared of armed elements and all who do not regularly work in them, and the Arab Deterrent Force shall be called in to guard them to facilitate their operation by their regular employees, when they have taken them over, which shall take place within ten days.

b) They shall be handed over to an official Lebanese central committee which in turn shall entrust sub-committees, one for each utility or installation, with the task of taking inventories of their contents before handing them over.

6. The forces required to reinforce the Arab Deterrent Forces shall be formed by agreement with the president of the Lebanese Republic, and these forces shall arrive within two weeks.

7. The Cairo agreement and its annexes shall be implemented as a second stage. This applies particularly to arms and ammunition in the camps and the departure of Palestinian forces which entered after the start of the incidents. This shall be implemented within 45 days of the formation of the Arab Deterrent Force.

### 307

#### **Statement issued by the National Command of the Baath Party of Iraq on the six-nation Arab summit and the war in Lebanon (excerpts)<sup>207</sup>**

**Baghdad, October 21, 1976**

The conspiracy against the Arab cause is entering on a new stage with the holding of the six-nation summit on the Lebanese crisis in Riyad on October 16-18 and the resolutions adopted by that conference.<sup>208</sup>

For, in addition to being obscure and indistinct, these resolutions reflect the manner in which the conference was convened and the way in which

<sup>206</sup> Docs. 333 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973* and 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

<sup>207</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), October 22, 1976.

<sup>208</sup> Doc. 306 above.

its transactions were conducted. They totally disregard the nature of the conflict and its real causes at the Lebanese level, being content to assert in the strongest terms that it is a Lebanese-Palestinian crisis. The aim of this is to ignore the social character of the crisis and thus to deny the existence of the nationalist and progressive forces. The intention is also to isolate these forces from the resistance, then to isolate one part of the resistance from the other and, finally, to make the forces of endurance in Lebanon, both Lebanese and Palestinians, appear responsible for what has happened in Lebanon.

These resolutions also provide for the Arab security forces to be increased to thirty thousand men, so that they may constitute a deterrent force whose principal task is to maintain internal security in Lebanon—that is to detain, hunt down and maltreat the nationalist and progressive forces—against the Arabism of Lebanon, the unity of her people and her sovereignty. They also use the Cairo agreement<sup>209</sup> as a pretext for weakening the Palestine resistance as a prelude to fragmenting it and to taming such sections of it as they can, in the hope of drawing them into the orbit of reaction and the settlement plan.

Thus after a year and a half of agony and of activities detrimental to the destiny of Lebanon, the lives of her people and all human values—after the long prelude to the conspiracy against Arab destiny, the Arab nation has become aware of these decisions which have given countenance to the conspiracy and herald a further round of crimes and liquidation at the expense of the unity and freedom of Lebanon and its struggling nationalist and progressive forces, exactly as happened in Jerash and Ajlun after the signing of the agreement with the Jordanian regime. The reactionary conspiracy that these resolutions embody ignores a basic fact, which is that crises are not resolved by tricks, by ignoring their essential factors, by disregarding the forces influencing the conflict and failing to take into account the principal party concerned with the problem—the Lebanese masses, their progressive demands and their determination to protect the resistance and to enable it to perform its national tasks.

Sons of our glorious nation,

It is because the Baath Party has been determined to put an end to the tragedy of Lebanon, the disunity and the squandering of blood in the service of the imperialist Zionist-reactionary scheme, that it has always sought an early and satisfactory solution of this critical problem. But this same determination has always made it insist that the essential thing is to deal with the essence of the problem, to concentrate on the causes that have led to its growing so serious, to withhold no facts from the masses and to disclose the latest developments in the conspiracy against the unity of the Arabs in their struggle against their principal enemy as represented by the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary alliance. The Baath Party and the revolutionary government of Iraq will cooperate with all honourable and devoted peace-loving forces of good will, whether governments or organizations, in achieving these positive goals.

Crises and complicated situations are dealt with by showing candour and courage, by rising above narrow ephemeral interests and falling in with the interests of the Arab nation and its principal cause in Palestine and in every Arab country, against which the conspiracy is directed, in the hope of paralyzing their struggling forces.

If certain reactionary regimes think that because of their financial resources they can have an adverse effect on the course of the Arab revolutionary movement, and if they have achieved some measure of temporary success, thanks to the current major conspiracy, they should realize that for all their financial resources and reserves and the American support they enjoy, they will be unable to hold out in the face of the anger of the Arab masses who will never abandon their honour, dignity, national rights and national goals. The recent and not so recent history of the Arab nation and of the world offers many lessons from which clear-sighted and intelligent men can benefit. The government of Iraq, the government of the Baath Party, regards it as an honour and a sacred trust to defend the national cause everywhere in the Arab world. It therefore cannot permit any forces whatsoever to destroy the nationalist movement and the resistance in Lebanon, and warns those who go along with this scheme of the danger of what they are doing. It will do everything in its power to resolve the crisis in Lebanon and to restore

<sup>209</sup> See note to doc. 195 above.

security to the country by resisting the forces and factors that have been the real cause of this crisis, rather than by avoiding them and resorting to emotional, obscure and superficial formulas which are being used as instruments for prolonging the crisis or setting it on a new course, which can only involve those who are seeking to resolve their crises in Lebanon in a new and graver predicament.

The Baath Party is aware that in view of the national task it is entrusted with in these critical circumstances, it is required to reinforce endurance throughout Arab territory and to unite the nationalist and progressive forces in a large national front that will enable Arab struggle to abandon its defensive positions for offensive ones, and to protect the forces fighting in the arenas of struggle from the conspiracies against the Arab cause.

Aware as it is of what is expected of it, the Baath Party addresses itself to the Arab masses and their nationalist forces, regimes, parties and popular bodies, and calls on them to adopt an unambiguous attitude to what is going on in Lebanon. It warns them that the success of the reactionary-Zionist-imperialist scheme and the new ways in which it is being implemented could encourage certain deluded adventurists to implement it in other parts of the Arab homeland.

On this basis also revolutionary Iraq will give full expression to its views at the summit conference, so that the Arab masses may make themselves heard there and that Arab sentiments may be made known at the official and popular level.

Iraq's participation in the summit conference will in no way affect her inflexible principles or her determination to continue her efforts to ensure that the courageous voice of the Arab masses and their advance vanguards is heard on that platform.

## 308

**Memorandum sent by the National Movement of Lebanon to the 8th Arab summit conference regarding the bases for a settlement of the crisis in Lebanon (excerpts)<sup>210</sup>**

**Beirut, October 23, 1976**

Your Majesties and Excellencies, Arab Kings and Presidents,

Greetings. As your conference is being held only a few days after the ending of the six-party summit in Riyadh to discuss the Lebanese crisis and to seek effective solutions for it, the Lebanese National Movement feels it incumbent upon itself to place before you the facts of the current situation in Lebanon including all the relevant political and military aspects as well as its own views of the issues dealt with by the six-party summit, since your own conference is meeting to complete discussion thereof and to issue the necessary directives regarding them.

In its statement issued on October 20, 1976, the central political council of the movement expressed its total agreement with the ceasefire embodied in the accord reached by participants in the Riyadh conference.<sup>211</sup> Nevertheless, the National Movement doubts now whether the adherence expressed by all sides to the ceasefire does in fact represent a decisive end to the events. This doubt is justified by what may be observed of the conduct of the isolationist side and by the serious gaps in the resolutions of the six-party summit which render these resolutions incapable of penetrating to the heart of the problem and formulating the required solutions for it.

Allow us therefore to place before you a summary of our observations in this regard, hoping that your honourable conference will pay them the attention they deserve.

1. Concerning the necessity for a total and comprehensive Arab initiative:

Despite the fact that the six-party summit was held during the critical circumstances in which the Lebanese crisis was passing through two weeks ago, and thus represented a step within the context

<sup>210</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), October 25, 1976. The memorandum was read at a press conference by the chairman of the Political Council of the National Movement, Kamal Junblat.

<sup>211</sup> Doc. 306 above.

of the Arab initiative to face that crisis, the National Movement firmly believes that an expanded Arab summit conference is a more suitable forum to organize the necessary Arab efforts to help solve the Lebanese crisis, since this would establish a comprehensive Arab initiative on the plane of politics and security and, in the name of all Arabs, would lay down the bases for dealing in a decisive manner with the fighting in Lebanon. This initiative, in the name of all the Arabs, would then undertake to implement the plans agreed upon.

Unilateral interference, be it political or military, on the part of the Syrian regime in Lebanon's internal affairs and for the service of goals that have nothing to do with fraternal aid to solve the Lebanese crisis, was a major factor in escalating the conflict and pushing it to the point of explosion whose repercussions we are still experiencing today. The Lebanese crisis cannot be solved unless this unilateral interference is replaced by a comprehensive Arab initiative, on the plane of politics and security, embodying the collective Arab will to save Lebanon and the Palestinian people.

2. Concerning the danger of a collapse of the ceasefire as a result of the combined Israeli-isolationist plan:

The ceasefire declared and contained in the accord reached in Riyadh is now threatened with total collapse as a result of the Israeli-isolationist plan whose aim is to make the Lebanese South fall into hands of the Zionist enemy and of those who chose to become internal agents acting in the service of the expansionist ambitions of that enemy in our country.

Under the umbrella of a formal acceptance of the ceasefire, the isolationist forces, with the open military support of Israel, are continuing their military operations against southern villages with the aim of attacking the political and military presence of the nationalists and of making it impossible for the Cairo agreement to be implemented. That agreement had granted the Palestine resistance the right to exist in the south and to be active therefrom. The other objective of this plot is to entrench the policy of open bridges between Israel and southern Lebanon through isolationist control.

Faced with the insistence of the Israeli-isolationist alliance upon implementing this most dangerous segment of the conspiracy to which

our country had been subjected for the past eighteen months, the Lebanese National Movement finds itself forced to fight to defend its homeland, the Palestine revolution and the Arab national cause. Thus, the ceasefire becomes merely a formal manoeuvre undertaken by the isolationists to accomplish their own as well as Israel's real intentions as regards the Lebanese south.

4. Concerning the formation and role of the Arab security forces:

In order for the Arab security forces to carry out their supposed role as the military arm of the comprehensive Arab political initiative, and to put an end to the fighting, preserve the peace and help to restore normal life to the country, the following principal considerations must be taken into account as regards their formation and manner of operation:

a) Wide and comprehensive Arab participation in the formation of these forces is essential if these are truly to reflect the combined Arab will. In this regard, no veto can be placed on any Arab country's participation merely because the isolationist side and their allies require this.

b) The formation of the Arab security forces must be balanced in a manner that would inspire political confidence so that these forces do not fall under the domination of any single party. The National Movement feels entitled to declare at this juncture its unwillingness to accept any Syrian military participation in the Arab forces before Syrian occupation troops presently stationed on our territories are withdrawn from Lebanese territory. Only then will it be possible to discuss Syria's participation in these forces on an equal footing with other Arab states.

c) We insist upon the necessity of placing these forces under a balanced and trustworthy Arab military command and that these forces be provided with the independence necessary to fulfill their task.

d) As regards the ties linking these forces to the Lebanese authorities, the text of the Riyadh agreement which places these forces under the personal command of the Lebanese president must in practice be translated into a text linked with constitutional principles that specify how the President is to exercise this authority through the state and its institutions, once the said institu-

tions are restructured in a manner that transcends the illegality that collapsed during the Franjeh regime and whose effects are still apparent.

e) Above all, there remains an extremely important point. It is essential that the role of the Arab forces in ending the fighting and preserving peace should be a comprehensive one that takes in all Lebanese territory without exception. We wish to point out in advance the gravity of satisfying the demands of the isolationist side that these forces should not enter areas where that side exercises its military terror. This will turn these Arab forces into a deterrent weapon in the service of one side against another.

Such a division in security, requested by the isolationists, is meant to constitute a basis for consolidating the *de facto* partition presently imposed on the country as a result of the war. It is something which flatly contradicts the declared Arab objective of preserving Lebanon's unity of land and people. We have too high an opinion of the Arab initiative as to suspect it of falling into the pattern of imperialist interference in our country following every civil war, when protocols and regulations would be imposed entrenching a special sectarian regime for the Christians of the mountain or of parts of it at least, thus effectively isolating it from the rest of Lebanon.

5. Concerning the return of the refugees to their areas:

The question of the return of Lebanese and Palestinian refugees of all sects and creeds to their original homes was not dealt with in the resolutions of the six-party Arab summit conference and must receive the attention of your honourable conference. The tragedy of emigration and forced eviction imposed upon the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples cannot be tolerated. To deal with this tragedy is an essential pre-requisite for the recovery of Lebanon's national unity as dictated by the simplest considerations of trust in the implementation of agreements concluded between the Lebanese authorities and the PLO as regards the place of residence of the Palestinian people in Lebanon.

## 309

### Speech by President Sadat of Egypt made to the 8th Arab summit conference (excerpt)<sup>212</sup>

Cairo, October 25, 1976

1. A ceasefire and the prevention of a resumption of fighting are essentially a political decision. It is the very essence of this agreement and the basis of peace in Lebanon. We cannot accept that this principle should be infringed upon or that there should be any retreat from it, and none of us can afford to be complacent in our adherence and commitment to it.

2. The Lebanese people are capable of solving their internal disputes and putting their affairs in order without any prompting or outside interference. I can only appeal to all Lebanese parties to settle their differences through quiet and responsible dialogue within the framework of a national unity which rejects partition and fragmentation. It is more appropriate for them that they should be governed by sense, wisdom and common interests, while we call for the convening of a round-table conference at which our Lebanese brothers can deal with their problems with their well-known political shrewdness and awareness.

3. At the same time, it is our duty to support the Palestine resistance, and in particular the PLO, which the Palestinian people have accepted as expressing their hopes and aspirations and as their legitimate representative and the defender of their rights and interests.

Some people maintain that the struggle of the Palestinian people has suffered a setback as a result of the bloody incidents in Lebanon. To this we must make a decisive retort by providing greater support for the PLO and its leadership, by reaffirming the commitment of the Arab nation to support the people of Palestine and by tending the wounds of Palestinians who rightly believe that we share their responsibility and their destiny.

At this juncture we must also remember our brothers who are confronting the enemy in the occupied Arab territories with unparalleled heroism, teaching the whole world a lesson in revolutionary consciousness and glorious human struggle

<sup>212</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), October 26, 1976.

and who, with their inflexible will which knows nothing of weakness, are defying brutal terrorism and repression. To all of them, on behalf of this conference, we address our warmest greetings and I renew our pledge to continue to march with them along the road of liberation and deliverance until, with God's help, victory is won.

4. Our enemies in Israel and elsewhere are miscalculating if they for a moment imagine that they have again succeeded in exporting disunity and defeatism to the Arab nation. We have followed this course to the point of no return, and the enemy is becoming engulfed in his tragedy. We shall never relinquish the glorious spirit of October and we shall all resist the moves Israel is making against South Lebanon with all our strength and resolution.

Brother kings and presidents of the Arab states, the greatest challenge that confronts us at this historic turning point is to turn this tragic page and set out towards the horizons of the future. We are resolutely determined to seek our inspiration in the glorious spirit of October and in Arab solidarity on the part of all of you so as to consolidate the unity of Arab ranks and to eliminate the differences that are troubling Arab relations or threatening their cohesion.

The regrettable incidents in Lebanon have proved that the Arab people unanimously see Arab solidarity as the bulwark that protects them from dangers and complications and defends them from the machinations of deceivers and the ambitions of the envious. They have also taken it upon themselves to ensure that from this day forward nothing shall prejudice their unity and to spare no effort to protect the unity of their entity and their destiny. Permit me to address to you from this platform, and in the name of the Arab people of Egypt a sincere fraternal appeal, that transcends all the differences that separate us and divide us, and call on you to strengthen Arab solidarity to an extent as yet unknown.

Depend all of you on God's help and be not divided. Peace be upon you.

310

### **Speech by President Asad of Syria at the opening session of the 8th Arab summit conference<sup>213</sup>**

**Cairo, October 25, 1976**

Brothers, it is natural that the Arab nation and its masses should direct their attention to our conference today and it is natural also for them to expect us to end this conference more united and powerful than before. They expect us to end this conference after achieving a settlement of the problem for the sake of which we are meeting today. They expect us to come out of this meeting as we did recently from the Riyadh conference,<sup>214</sup> after having truly revived Arab solidarity so that the Arabs might move forward into a splendid and dignified future.

As I see it, brothers, the future will be dark and grim unless we heed the dangers surrounding us and take the necessary steps to ward them off. The future will indeed be grim if we do not take account of the gravity of time lost, of time that passes by without our exploiting it by preparing to foil the repeated attempts made to frustrate Arab aspirations to freedom and progress. Our lands are occupied, our people are driven into exile, war is being prepared against us everywhere. Meanwhile, we are caught in a series of secondary battles the end of which is not in sight. If we desire to see an end to this and to reach that end in one bound, we must direct our attention and concentrate in a real and palpable manner upon our occupied territory and our fellow Arab refugees.

We meet today, brothers, with the tragedy of Lebanon before us. It is a tragedy because Lebanese and Palestinians are being killed. It is a tragedy because the Lebanese are leaving Lebanon and because the Palestinians are now leaving Lebanon after first leaving Palestine. It is a tragedy also because we are all living a battle that is not our real battle. It is a tragedy because the strength of us all is being depleted and the credit we all accumulated as a result of the October war is being wasted away rather than preserved and increased.

My brothers, our worth as leaders of this nation

<sup>213</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), October 26, 1976.

<sup>214</sup> See docs. 305 and 306 above.



at this stage of its history is assessed by the extent to which we sincerely pursue its goals and place ourselves at their disposal. We must all rise above our private wounds and shoulder our responsibilities seriously. We must stop the fighting and bloodshed in Lebanon by implementing the solution that would restore Lebanon's unity, security and stability as well as its natural role in Arab action and would restore to the Palestine resistance its vitality and efficacy in the struggle to regain its usurped rights, within the context, naturally, of the Arab struggle against the usurper enemy. By doing so, brothers, we would have taken a major and important step forward towards our solidarity and unity and thus render ourselves optimistic about a prosperous, dignified and splendid future. Peace be with you.

### 311

#### **Speech by President Sarkis of Lebanon made at the 8th Arab summit conference<sup>215</sup>**

**Cairo, October 25, 1976**

Mr. Chairman, Your Royal Majesties, Your Excellencies,

Despite the pain that I and all the Lebanese feel living under the weight of our tragedy, I would like to express my satisfaction at the holding of this conference upon which we pin our hopes. Your concern for our problem, my brothers, has been given concrete form in repeated fraternal initiatives which culminated in the recent Riyadh conference<sup>216</sup> and in this conference today which we hope will crown with success the sincere and generous efforts that have been made. I shall not give you an account of the painful events we are living through. You have lived them with us, sharing their sorrows and comprehending their dimensions. The preliminary results of the Riyadh conference were encouraging and this spurs us to work so that the result may be a return to normal life in Lebanon.

The Riyadh conference examined the Lebanese tragedy from all its aspects and laid down prag-

matic bases for solving it in a manner that would guarantee Lebanon's sovereignty and independence and the unity of its land and people and would also enable the Palestine cause to reach its national objectives within the framework of agreements that have been reached. You, my brothers, have seen the Riyadh resolutions. In accordance with these resolutions, a ceasefire came into effect last Thursday morning and was adhered to in an encouraging manner. This demonstrates the good intentions of most combatant parties because the ceasefire came as a result of political decisions adopted by the Riyadh conference as well as the political decisions of combatant parties in Lebanon in adherence to the Riyadh resolutions and in the absence of a deterrent force. According to these resolutions also, the Arab peace keeping troops in Lebanon have begun to supervise the implementation of the ceasefire while waiting to be boosted in both men and material so as to become an effective force capable of ending the fighting, overseeing the implementation of agreements and helping to preserve security inside Lebanon until such time as, with God's help, we succeed in reconstructing our own army and internal security forces. The Lebanese have begun to feel satisfied with what has taken place and are looking forward in great hope to the speedy implementation of these measures as indicated in the Riyadh resolutions. This should cause no surprise for every day of fighting costs tens, even hundreds, of victims in addition to destruction and damage.

The duty of solving the Lebanese problem is entrusted to the conscience of Arab leaders. I entreat you to answer the call of your conscience in this difficult moment and history itself will record the stand you adopt. Is it asking too much if we prove to the world that we are capable of solving our own problems, however complex they may be and no matter how involved the enemy is in them? Is it asking too much to prove to the world that we are courageous enough to face the facts and rectify errors?

Arab dignity and glory are dependent upon Arab solidarity and cooperation. The summit conference, with all the power and consciousness of historic responsibility that it represents, is capable of playing a basic and vital role in putting an end to the evil war taking place on Lebanon's soil, a war which threatens not Lebanon alone but the entire future of the Arabs. This conference

<sup>215</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), October 26, 1976.

<sup>216</sup> See docs. 305 and 306 above.

is also capable of creating an atmosphere of honest intentions and unified sentiments thus strengthening cooperation among brothers for the sake of a better future.

We are very hopeful that Lebanon will regain its health and vitality and thus serve all its brothers. This is not too much to expect given the vitality of the Lebanese themselves. How much more realistic will this hope become if the efforts of all the Arab brothers are united. Every aid you give to Lebanon will bear fruit and I am confident that you will furnish this aid.

Finally, brothers, in the name of the Lebanese and in my personal capacity, I thank you all for your honorable and fraternal efforts whose beneficial results have already begun to appear in Lebanon and the rest of the Arab world.

## 312

**Cable from President Bourguiba of Tunisia to the 8th Arab summit conference<sup>217</sup>**

**Tunis, October 25, 1976**

Mr. Chairman, Your Majesties,

I had very much hoped that my health would not prevent me from attending this comprehensive Arab meeting and contributing with you to putting a final end to a crisis that has touched us to the core, separated us from our objectives and diverted us from our principal battle to liberate the land and to enable the fraternal people of Palestine to recover their national rights. The Riyadh conference,<sup>218</sup> to which we gave our blessing, succeeded in restoring confidence, creating an atmosphere of harmony and fraternity at a time when we stood most in need of closing our ranks, gathering up our divided energies and supporting Arab solidarity, a major factor in achieving the glorious victory of Ramadan.

My brothers, the kings and presidents, laid down at Riyadh the principles required to help in establishing peace and security in Lebanon, protecting the unity of its land and people and safeguarding the continued existence of the Palestine resistance

in a manner calculated to foil the conspiracies of the Israeli enemy. These conspiracies aim, among other things, at destroying the noble values of culture symbolized by Lebanon and at severing the links that bind Lebanon in struggle to Palestine. I am convinced that your meeting today will succeed in burying the past and in opening a new and glorious chapter in Lebanese-Palestinian relations primarily and in Arab relations in general.

We have received with pleasure the news that signs of relaxation in tension have appeared both in Lebanon, where the fighting has decreased in intensity, and on the Arab scene, following the Egyptian-Syrian rapprochement. We sincerely hope that this will be followed by a rapprochement among the rest of the Arab countries concerned so that Arab solidarity might be strengthened and our struggle for liberation and reconstruction might meet with success.

Brothers, my heart and sentiments are with you. The government and people of Tunisia are following your activities and are confident that this historic conference will be a turning point and will mark the beginning of a new era founded on trust, concord and common action to achieve the goals of our nation: freedom, dignity and prosperity.

## 313

**Communiqué issued by the 8th Arab summit conference convened to discuss the ending of the war in Lebanon<sup>219</sup>**

**Cairo, October 26, 1976**

The kings and presidents of Arab League states meeting in Cairo at the Arab League headquarters on Dhu al-Qaada 2-3, 1396 AH, corresponding to October 25-26, 1976, AD; having examined the current situation in Lebanon and the resolutions adopted by the six-party Arab summit held in Riyadh in October 1976;<sup>220</sup> having in mind the importance of Arab solidarity, resolve the following:

**I. The current situation in Lebanon**

1. To ratify the communiqué, resolutions and appendices issued by the six-party Arab summit

<sup>217</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Amal* (Tunis) October 26, 1976.

<sup>218</sup> See docs. 305 and 306 above.

<sup>219</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), October 27, 1976.

<sup>220</sup> Docs. 305 and 306 above.

conference held in Riyad on October 18, 1976.

2. Each Arab country is to contribute, in accordance with its capability, to the reconstruction of Lebanon and to furnish the financial aid necessary to remove the traces of armed conflict and the damage sustained by the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples. The Arab states are to offer speedy aid to the Lebanese government and the PLO.

## II. *Strengthening Arab solidarity*

Arab kings and presidents reaffirm their commitment to the provisions of the resolutions of summit conferences and of the Arab League Council in this regard, especially to the provisions of the Arab Solidarity Pact issued at the Casablanca Summit on September 15, 1965, and to work to implement these provisions at once.

## III. *Financing the Arab security force*

The Arab summit conference, desiring to furnish the necessary funds to be spent upon the Arab security forces in Lebanon as stipulated by the second of the Riyad summit resolutions, and having examined the report of the Military Secretariat of the Arab League in this regard, resolves the following:

1. To set up a special fund which would be responsible for meeting the requirements of the Arab security forces in Lebanon.

2. Each Arab member state of the League is to contribute to this fund at a percentage ratio to be determined by each state in accordance with its abilities.

3. The president of the Lebanese republic is to supervise this fund and to formulate, in consultation with the General Secretariat of the Arab League and with states contributing at least 10 percent, general regulations governing this fund and outlining the means of payment and of liquidating the fund when its term is ended. The present system currently followed with respect to the Arab forces shall be maintained until new regulations are formulated.

4. The fund shall operate for a period of six months which may be renewed by decision of the League Council which would meet at the request of the president of the Lebanese republic.

## 314

### **Resolutions of the 8th Arab summit conference convened to discuss the ending of the war in Lebanon<sup>221</sup>**

Cairo, October 26, 1976

The kings and presidents of Arab League states meeting in Cairo to discuss the crisis in Lebanon and the means for resolving it; in order to maintain Lebanon's security, sovereignty and unity and to protect the Palestine resistance as represented by the PLO; in furtherance of Arab solidarity and motivated by a sense of national and historic responsibility regarding the necessity for a collective Arab role in order to ensure a decisive settlement in Lebanon and to prevent a future explosion; in furtherance of guarantees necessary for the return of normal life and stability; in order to protect Lebanon's political, economic and other institutions and to preserve Lebanon's sovereignty as well as the Palestine resistance; convinced that the liberation of Arab lands occupied by Israel and the recovery of Palestinian national rights, foremost among which is their right to return and to establish their independent state upon their national soil, that all these require the strengthening of Arab solidarity and the direction of all Arab efforts and potentialities towards the service of the cause of destiny; motivated by their feelings regarding the necessity of helping Lebanon to overcome its ordeal and to rebuild its economy, institutions and public utilities to the end that normal life may be restored and Lebanon may once more play its effective role in the Arab sphere;

The conference examined the current situation in Lebanon with a view to preserving its sovereignty and independence as well as the solidarity of the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples. The conference welcomed the resolutions of the six-party Arab summit conference in Riyad and expressed its appreciation for what it had accomplished regarding a settlement of the crisis in Lebanon, protection for the Palestine resistance and actions adopted to bolster Arab solidarity.

The conference decided to ratify the resolutions adopted by the six-party summit conference on

<sup>221</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), October 27, 1976.

October 18, 1976.<sup>222</sup> The Arab kings and presidents reaffirmed their resolve to work in order to furnish the guarantees required for consolidating the ceasefire declared to have come into effect at 6.00 a.m. on October 21, 1976, and bringing all the fighting, whatever its form, to an end, in preparation for the return to normal life. They further affirmed the need to strengthen the Arab peace keeping force in order that it may become a deterrent force operating in Lebanon under personal command of the Lebanese president. They unanimously agreed to reject any partition of Lebanon, in any guise or any legal or actual form, explicit or implicit. They affirmed their commitment to protect Lebanon's national unity and territorial integrity and to refrain from harming its territorial unity and from interfering in its internal affairs in any way. They examined with great care the situation in South Lebanon, expressing their concern regarding the escalation of Israeli attacks on Lebanese territory, especially in the South, as well as Israel's insistence upon following a policy of aggression and expansion against Arab lands. They emphasized the necessity of implementing the Cairo agreement<sup>223</sup> and its annexes to which the chairman of the PLO has expressed his full commitment. They agreed to form a committee to include representatives from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic and the State of Kuwait entrusted with coordinating action with the president of Lebanon regarding the implementation of the Cairo agreement. Its term of office shall be for a period of 90 days following announcement of the ceasefire.

The Arab kings and presidents reaffirmed their commitment to the resolutions of the seventh Arab summit held in Rabat<sup>224</sup> which declared the PLO to be the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and where all Arab member states of the League undertook to support the PLO and not to interfere in its affairs. The PLO in turn affirmed its policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of any Arab country. The Arab kings and presidents agreed that the Arab states should contribute to the reconstruction of Lebanon and to removing the traces of armed

conflict and the damage sustained by the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples and to furnish them with aid quickly.

The Arab kings and presidents paid special attention to the question of strengthening Arab solidarity as an essential condition for the success of common Arab efforts and for the realization of the objectives of the Arab nation for liberation and development.

They further reasserted their total commitment to abide by the provisions of the resolutions of Arab summit conferences and of the Arab League Council in this regard, especially the Arab Solidarity Pact issued by the Casablanca summit on September 15, 1965, and their determination to implement them.

They expressed the gravest concern in their discussions of the explosive situation inside the occupied Arab territories, which has resulted from continued Israeli occupation, and the escalation of acts of suppression, terrorism, and expropriation and of acts of sacrilege against religious sanctuaries, especially the sanctuary of Abraham. These acts are being committed by the occupying authorities and constitute a glaring violation of international law and of the UN Charter. They salute the Arab people who are standing fast in the occupied territories and salute their legitimate national struggle. They affirm the solidarity of the Arab states with them. They call upon the states and peoples of the world to condemn this Israeli aggression and to foil it. They call upon them to cease any dealings with Israel that might contribute to the entrenchment of Israeli occupation of Arab lands or of Israeli repressive measures against their inhabitants.

<sup>222</sup> Docs. 305 and 306 above.

<sup>223</sup> See note to doc. 195 above.

<sup>224</sup> Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

**Statement by President Bourguiba of Tunisia calling for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of the 1947 UN partition resolution**<sup>225</sup>

Tunis, October 26, 1976

It was intolerable that we should be blamed for the misdeeds of others and that the atrocities of Nazism should be atoned for in the heart of our land, our homes and our fields.

We therefore decided that we must fight to recover our usurped rights and to put an end to this injustice which is without precedent in modern history.

After nearly a third of a century we realized that this was impossible without exposing the security of the area—and perhaps world peace—to the gravest dangers.

We therefore decided that the maintenance of peace must be preferred to the cause of the homeland, to our love of it and our passionate attachment to it.

Therefore I have come to you today bearing an olive branch in both hands, calling for the implementation of the resolution adopted in 1947, hoping that the passage of time may gradually bring about détente between the two communities, that as the years go by links of mutual exchange and cooperation may be established between them and that rapprochement in one form or another may lead to the two groups coexisting in a single community. This at any rate is the one wager to which we should direct our hopes and energies. This is what I have said to the international community, although I know how heavy is the responsibility involved in this decision, and the reactions it may give rise to in certain circles of the Palestine revolution. In the past I staked all on just such a wager as regards Tunisia, thereby risking my reputation and my life.

But the leader must not be afraid to take decisions leading to peace which, although they appear to indicate weakness, are really, and in the sight of

history, revolutionary decisions.

If Abu Ammar did this he would be entitled to as prominent a place in the register of freedom fighters as those who daily lay down their lives in Nablus, Acre and Jerusalem.

If he did this he would open up to Palestine a new era of hope for the building of honour and self-respect.

If he did this it would also be the prelude to many benefits for the Eastern Arab countries which have been trying since the fifties to achieve a reconciliation between two irreconcilable things, between war against Israel and war against backwardness, between the cost of armaments and planning for development. One of them is certainly important, but the second is vital as regards our destiny and it is therefore in my view more important, as without it the other goals and objectives cannot be achieved.

The most important of our duties as Arabs, in both the East and the West, is to give priority to organized and planned development so that we may rescue our peoples from backwardness and promote them to the ranks of the nations that are developing, growing and becoming strong enough to control not only their political destiny, but also, and in particular, their economic destiny, because in our times economic capacity is the key to political capacity.

**Press interview statements by Phalangist Party leader Gemayyel of Lebanon asserting that peace is not possible until Lebanon's sovereignty is restored.**<sup>226</sup>

Beirut, late October, 1976

*Q. Are you satisfied with the Cairo summit resolutions and its peace plan for Lebanon?*<sup>227</sup>

A. I will be fully satisfied only when I witness, with my own eyes, the implementation of the said resolutions.

I have been disappointed so many times that I don't dare be more emphatic.

<sup>225</sup> Made in a speech delivered on Bourguiba's behalf by Prime Minister Nuwaira at the opening of the new session of Tunis's National Assembly; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Amal* (Tunis), October 27, 1976.

<sup>226</sup> Interview conducted by Claude Khoury; excerpted from the text, *Monday Morning* (Beirut), November 1, 1976, pp. 15–16.

<sup>227</sup> Docs. 313 and 314 above.

I am sure, however, that peace prospects look better than before—and for three specific reasons.

Firstly, Syria and Egypt were reconciled at the summit and both the Lebanese and Palestinian delegations were in agreement there. And the fact that both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait will serve as witnesses to the new accord which has been endorsed by all Arab League member states, with the exception of Iraq, is a good augury.

Secondly, unlike all its predecessors, the new peace plan provides for a military deterrent force to impose its application. Previous accords were stillborn because they did not provide for someone to enforce them. We were like a magistrate passing fair sentences without being able to execute them because he didn't have the necessary marshals.

Thirdly—and this is as important a reason as the two preceding ones—there is a timetable for the execution of the peace plan.

For all three reasons, I am more hopeful this time.

If all the concerned parties keep up their good will, we shall succeed.

*Q. Speaking of the strengthened Arab League peace-keeping force, would you accept its deployment throughout Lebanese territory or do you have reservations on that?*

A. This security force has been placed under the command of the President of the Republic and we have full confidence in him. I am sure he will do only what is in the country's interest.

To my mind, this (Arab) deterrent task force should be deployed everywhere—throughout Lebanon. The reason is that, unfortunately, we don't have a task force or a security force of our own. We have no Lebanese army, police or gendarmery to replace the said force.

Moreover, we tried hard to find a substitute to our gendarmery and police, but—to tell you frankly—we weren't very successful. We succeeded in certain cases and in a number of places, but that wasn't it. No one can replace the State.

I imagine the (Arab) deterrent force will be positioned almost everywhere in Lebanon—as an army. But I think the police and gendarmery will be left in the hands of the Lebanese themselves.

Both the National Liberal and Kataeb parties will not hesitate to place all their potentials at the disposal of the army, the police and the gendarmery.

Under the circumstances then, the Arab deterrent force will fulfill its duty as an army, while the role of the police will be assumed by the Lebanese.

*Q. So you think Lebanon is on the road to peace?*

A. Lebanon will not be on the road to peace before it recuperates its sovereignty and re-assumes its responsibilities. For the moment, I can't say more.

Lebanon will not recover its strength, dignity and sovereignty before our Palestinian brethren start comporting themselves as brethren, friends and refugees rather than as masters of the house or as enemies.

*Q. What imminent steps do you foresee for the return to normalcy in Lebanon?*

A. I just told you. The first step is for the Lebanese State to become the only State on Lebanese territory, thereby doing away with the four or five other anonymous "states" on hand. When this happens, we wouldn't have anymore five or six unidentified armies on Lebanese soil. Nor would there be strongholds left which are neither under the control of Lebanon, nor under the control of the Palestinian Resistance.

*Q. Would the round-table conference be the next logical step to bring peace to Lebanon?*

A. Before talking about the round-table conference, let us first stop hostilities and make the ceasefire hold.

Round-table talks cannot get underway under pressure. That would be tantamount to dialoguing with a revolver in hand.

As things stand today, the choice is not "the purse or your life," it is "both the purse as well as your life." No one can accept that.

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**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Sudan of King Khalid of Saudi Arabia (excerpt)<sup>228</sup>**

**Khartoum, November 1, 1976**

As regards Arab issues, a total accord in views was reached by the two leaders who reaffirmed their firm conviction of the necessity to maintain and support Arab solidarity embodied in the two summit resolutions of Riyadh and Cairo. The two leaders expressed their total satisfaction with the positive results of the two summit meetings as regards putting an end to the Lebanese crisis, in a manner that would actualize Lebanon's sovereignty, freedom and territorial integrity as well as safeguarding the Palestine resistance led by the PLO, the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. They call upon the warring parties to adhere to agreements concluded at the Riyadh and Cairo summits.<sup>229</sup>

The two leaders further expressed their resolve to continue in their support of the Palestine cause and to stand by the people of Palestine in their just struggle to restore their usurped rights, their cause being the foremost among Arab causes.

The two leaders urged the international community to shoulder its responsibilities as regards this problem by implementing UN resolutions applicable to the rights of the Palestinian people and Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories.

The two leaders strongly condemn continued Israeli violations carried out with the purpose of changing the historic landmarks of the city of Jerusalem and of desecrating religious sanctuaries in occupied Palestine.

. . . . .

<sup>228</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Riyad* (Riyad), November 2, 1976. The visit took place October 30–November 2, 1976.

<sup>229</sup> Docs. 305, 306, 313 and 314 above.

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**Statement by Permanent UN Representative Tarazi of the PLO to the Security Council discussing Zionist practices in the occupied territories (excerpts)<sup>230</sup>**

**New York, November 1, 1976**

The Zionist forces of occupation have completely disregarded world public opinion and the concern of the international community. A state of tension has persisted in the areas under occupation and culminated in the recent situation and events...

One stops to wonder... A few months ago this council was seized with a grave situation arising from the desecration of the Haram Al-Sharif in Jerusalem. Now the Council is seized with an explosive situation arising from the desecration of Haram Al-Ibrahimi in Hebron. Are these 'incidents' spontaneous? Certainly not...

The establishment of a settlement in the occupied territories is in itself a violation—but when it is coupled with the behaviour of the settlers it becomes volatile.

These events were definitely planned and were not spontaneous. On September 21, 1976 Jewish Zionist settlers opened fire in the center of Hebron. The Qiryat Arba' settlers had been holding a demonstration near the Hebron municipality. When Arab inhabitants of Hebron tried to prevent the demonstration, the Zionist settlers responded by firing shots. Settlers have been encouraged to move into the heart of the town of Hebron. On September 18, a few days before this 'incident' the Zionist religious affairs minister, Yitzhak Raphael, demanded that Jews be permitted to settle in Hebron—and not just in the neighbouring Qiryat Arba'. Was this demand the green light to the settlers of Qiryat Arba' to move into Hebron?

The situation in the Palestinian territories under Zionist occupation is a direct result of occupation per se and also of the behaviour of the Zionists towards the Palestinian people.

We have noted the silken treatment accorded the perpetrators of evil, those who violated peace and provoked the peaceful inhabitants at gun-point—but what action did the authorities of occupation take towards the victims of such violations and provocation?

<sup>230</sup> English text, *Wafa* (Beirut), November 4, 1976, pp. 5–6.

One would immediately think of compensation. But in what form? Immediately after the desecration of the Moslem sanctuary was discovered, there was an impulsive reaction that took the form of retaliation by the Palestinians in Hebron and the town of Hebron was severely punished. . .

The fears and apprehensions of our people were heightened when they learned that the worst was yet to come. They are aware of a project designed to disperse systematically the Palestinian presence in Palestine—a dispersion that will inevitably lead to their elimination. The northern district commissioner of the ministry of interior, Israel Koenig, submitted a secret document defined as the Koenig plan, which pretends to suggest ways to handle the Arabs of Palestine.

No appraisal of the events I have described can be adequate unless it takes into account the following fundamentals of the situation. First, the root of the problems in the occupied territories is the occupation itself. Secondly, aggravating the fact of occupation is the character of the occupying regime—its racist character and its expansionist aims. Thirdly, the occupation strives to perpetuate itself by the establishment of settlements in the occupied territories and by the eviction of the settled indigenous population—in other words, by the creation of physical and demographic changes accompanied by consequential purported politico-juridical changes whose aim and import is to entrench and perpetuate the occupation. Fourthly, in the process of subjugating the inhabitants of the occupied territories, the occupation forces perpetrate gross violations of their fundamental human rights. Fifthly, the population of the occupied territories is not the sole victim of the occupation and its practices. The very purposes and principle of the sanctity of international treaties, such as the Geneva conventions, are also principal casualties of the occupation and of the policies and practices of the occupying authorities.

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**Announcement by Commander Hajj of the Arab Deterrent Forces in Lebanon made on the assumption of his duties<sup>231</sup>**

Beirut, November 9, 1976

On the occasion of my assuming command of the Arab Deterrent Forces, a responsibility which, despite its great burdens, I am honoured to assume, I would like to announce to citizens the tasks of these forces and the manner of their operation.

*First*, as regards the tasks of these forces, they shall implement the following:

A. An end to the fighting. This is to be done through:

1. The withdrawal of all armed men to positions occupied before April 13, 1975.
2. Ending all armed manifestations.
3. Collecting all heavy weapons.
4. Opening roads.
5. Taking possession of all public utilities and institutions and protecting them, thus providing the proper atmosphere for a return to normal work in all walks of life.

All this shall be put into effect in accordance with the schedule specified in the security plan.

B. Ensuring the implementation of the Cairo agreement and its appendices,<sup>232</sup> also according to the schedule set for this purpose.

C. Maintaining security throughout Lebanese territory.

*Second*, as regards the manner of operations:

The Arab Deterrent Forces shall carry out their tasks justly and firmly and shall work for the interests of all without partiality or distinction. In calling upon everyone to facilitate the execution of their mission, they declare their resolve to use deterrent force whenever security so requires. I am hopeful and confident that this statement shall meet with the full and desired response from everyone.

<sup>231</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), November 10, 1976.

<sup>232</sup> See note to doc. 195 above.



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**Press interview statements by PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi discussing Arab plans to counter Israel's presence in South Lebanon<sup>233</sup>**

Beirut, mid-November, 1976

*Q. What are some of the most significant results of the talks conducted by Abu Ammar and yourself in North Africa, Egypt, Europe and elsewhere?*

*A.* We conducted extensive discussions in several parts of the world. We held talks in several socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania, as well as several West European countries, including France, Sweden, Italy and the Vatican.

The Lebanese conflict and the latest Middle East developments were also the main topics of my talks with foreign ministers from around the world who were in New York for the 31st ordinary session of the UN General Assembly, which I attended for some weeks. On the way back from the United States, I stopped over in Austria and France to discuss the Lebanese crisis and the Middle East conflict in general.

In all my meetings with senior government officials, I stressed the need for world cooperation to resolve the Lebanese crisis. I urged different countries to apply pressure on the warring factions to end the fighting and settle their differences peacefully.

*Q. Do you expect the election of Jimmy Carter as President to have any impact on the Palestinian issue? What changes, if any, do you foresee in either the Arab or American sides?*

*A.* The transfer of power from the Republicans to the Democrats will undoubtedly have an impact on American policies, but I do not anticipate dramatic changes. America's policies on the Palestinian issue are well-known. There might be minor alterations, but the general outline of America's approach remains one of ignoring the national rights of the Palestinian people and refusing to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Anybody who follows the speeches delivered by Carter, both before the election and since, can

easily detect the extent of his support for Israel and for its existence in the area. Frankly, we do not expect the new president to adopt the just Palestinian cause.

On the other hand, it is not easy to predict the future course of US policies, because President-elect Carter is expected to draw up bold and innovative policies on the Middle East conflict once in office. It is these declared policies, and not the vague pronouncements of the election campaign, which will provide world opinion with concrete insight into the official American position.

*Q. To what extent are you coordinating efforts with President Sarkis and the Arab peace forces commander Col. Ahmad Hajj to ensure the implementation of the Cairo Agreement?<sup>234</sup>*

*A.* We really want to facilitate the President's mission, and we hope to extend all possible assistance to enable him to fully exercise his constitutional powers. That is clear from the resolutions of the Riyadh summit. We are executing these resolutions, particularly those related to the Cairo Agreement, in order to help in restoring peace and security to Lebanon. Naturally, we want all parties involved to meet their obligations and to observe positions which will speed the return of normal life to Lebanon.

*Q. Is the Palestinian Resistance willing to hand over its heavy weapons? Would such a move reduce it to a political movement?*

*A.* In the first place, the handing over of heavy weapons does not imply that we are about to become a political movement. Before the Lebanese crisis we had medium weapons, and we have nevertheless been pressing our struggle against Israel within occupied territory for the past ten years.

In the second place, we will retain control of our other weapons. The question is simply that there should be no heavy weapons within the camps, which is one of the provisions of the Cairo Agreement. Our medium weapons will stay in our hands.

*Q. Are you uneasy about continued autonomy of the Palestinians following the deployment of Arab forces in all parts of Lebanon? Do you fear that the Arab forces could drive a wedge between you and the Lebanese National Movement?*

<sup>233</sup> Interview conducted by Nadim Abu Ghannam, *Monday Morning* (Beirut), November 15, 1976, pp. 17-19.

<sup>234</sup> See note to doc. 195 above.

A. We have no fears in this respect. We have had and still have an autonomous presence in many Arab countries. In fact, the restoration of normalcy to Lebanon will ease matters for us. Our relations with the National Movement and the Lebanese people will remain strong because the Palestinian cause is not the cause of the Palestinians alone, but that of every Arab.

I believe that the Lebanese people will continue to give support to the Palestinian people and their Revolution. The Lebanese have already contributed significantly to the growth and development of the Palestinian movement, both directly and indirectly.

While our relations with the National Movement will be unaffected, we will also seek to improve our relations with all sections of Lebanese opinion, in order to enlist the whole of Lebanon in support of the Palestinian cause.

*Q. Will the PLO pursue its information efforts in Beirut and the Arab world in view of increasing talk of plans to abolish, or at least curb, the freedom of the press in Lebanon, as it has been in other Arab countries?*

A. In the final analysis, we are engaged in an armed struggle within occupied territory. The muzzling of the press does not imply that the Arab press will refrain from carrying news of the Palestinian Revolution and its activities, especially within occupied territory. The Palestinian Revolution and its moves are of interest to all Arab media, and news of it will continue to be covered, without any news blackout.

The restriction of press freedom in Lebanon is an entirely different issue, but, on the level of the Palestinian cause, I believe that the Arab world will adopt this cause.

Measures and regulations taken against the press in the different Arab countries are within the jurisdiction and authority of each country, and are part of each country's internal affairs.

*Q. How do you envisage the implementation of the Cairo Agreement in view of the continued Israeli presence in South Lebanon? How serious is the situation there?*

A. A problem of such proportions requires not only the careful study of the Palestinian Revolution, but the careful consideration of all the Arab confrontation states and of the Arab world in general.

As a matter of principle, I can put it this way: the basic function of the Palestinian Revolution is to maintain the struggle against Israel. This is a

permanent and continuing mission which must be maintained for the realization of our national goals.

There can be no doubt that the situation in the South is very serious. The Arabs must unite their efforts to prevent continued Israeli occupation of sections of South Lebanon. We of the Palestinian Revolution will maintain our struggle against the Israeli forces. Our struggle will not stop, since it is the reason for our existence as a revolution and as a movement.

*Q. Is there any specific plan in mind to cope with the Israeli aggression in the South?*

A. Yes. As I said, there must be coordination among the Arab parties involved in the confrontation with Israel. These questions are actually the subject of much study and intensive consideration.

*Q. What are the main features of the plan to confront this Israeli aggression?*

A. I am not at liberty to disclose this plan, since it involves the Arabs. It is only reasonable that the Arabs should adopt appropriate decisions to protect the South, without infringing on Lebanon's sovereignty or security, and within the framework of Palestinian presence under the Cairo Agreement.

*Q. Is it true that the PLO and Syria are now on a "second honeymoon"? If so, what are its features, and to what extent have Palestinian-Syrian relations improved?*

A. We have always wanted to maintain good relations with Syria because we regard the Syrian army and people as basic supportive elements for the Palestinian Revolution within the Arab World. Frankly, we never at any time wanted our relations with Syria to deteriorate, and we always tried to cultivate our brotherly ties with Syria. We might differ on many issues, but we must all keep in mind the need to restore and maintain good relations in keeping with Arab summit directives, in order to safeguard Arab solidarity. We have always advocated regulating our relations with any Arab country on the basis of the principles drawn up by the Algiers and Rabat<sup>235</sup> summits, as well as in the light of the latest Arab gatherings in Riyadh and Cairo.<sup>236</sup>

We will do our best to restore our relations with Syria to what they were before the Lebanese crisis.

<sup>235</sup> Docs. 331-333 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973* and 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

<sup>236</sup> Docs. 305, 306, 313 and 314 above.

These relations must be built on a well-defined and well-understood basis. They must incorporate the Cairo summit decisions which confirm the Palestine Liberation Organization as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinians, which forbid any interference in PLO internal affairs, and which reiterate Arab support for the establishment of an independent Palestine on Palestinian territory.

In my contacts with Syrian officials and prominent figures, I felt a strong desire on their part to restore relations with us to that which prevailed before the Lebanese crisis.

*Q. What is your reaction to reports that the Riyadh summit asked the PLO to adopt within two months, a clear-cut position on a peaceful settlement in the area that would include a specific attitude towards Israel?*

A. That question was not raised. The Riyadh summit was convened specifically to consider the Lebanese crisis. No Arab leader asked the PLO to take any specific decision on its attitude towards a peaceful settlement in the area.

*Q. What is the earliest possible date for the convening of the Palestine National Council, and what are the most important questions it will be asked to consider, especially in view of continued Arab pressure on you for a clear-cut position on a peaceful settlement to the Middle East crisis?*

A. We are under no pressure from any Arab country for a hasty decision on a peaceful Middle East settlement. In fact, this question has not even been discussed.

We feel that there will be no peaceful settlement until after the new American Administration takes over and gives the Middle East careful and long consideration. It is therefore possible to say that there is no pressure and there is no peaceful solution.

It is imperative, however, that the Palestine National Council meet in the aftermath of the Lebanese crisis, and in the wake of PLO efforts to extricate itself from this crisis and to cooperate with the Arabs in putting an end to it. The National Council should meet to adopt a position on the future of the Palestine cause and to work out strategy for the future in the light of latest developments in the area.

*Q. Will the Council discuss changes in the Palestinian leadership?*

A. It is only natural that a new Executive Committee be installed to share in the responsibility of facing important events which will confront the

Palestinian people. This is a normal order of business. The composition of the Committee might be changed, but this does not necessarily reflect any outside pressure.

*Q. Is it true that you are under constant Arab pressure to cut your special ties with the Lebanese National Movement? What course of action do you contemplate following in this respect?*

A. No Arab country has exerted pressure on us to define our relationship with the National Movement. The Palestine Liberation Organization is an independent movement that rejects the tutelage of any outside power, and it will not agree to follow any guidelines which are unacceptable to it.

The Lebanese National Movement is a friendly and allied force, and under no circumstances will the Palestinian Resistance be disloyal to its principles and objectives, because these forces have stood by its side through thick and thin.

*Q. Is it true that the Fahmi-Gromyko meetings took place as a result of the Riyadh conference, so that Fahmi could notify the Soviet Union that it would be receiving a cut of Arab oil revenues?*

A. I don't think the meeting of the Egyptian and Soviet foreign ministers took place as a result of the Riyadh summit. It was probably held within the context of Egyptian-Soviet relations. In fact, the PLO had an active role in arranging this meeting.

As for the report that the Soviets will receive a share in the oil revenues, this is not true. This question was not raised at the Riyadh summit.

*Q. Will the National Council consider the revision of PLO policies?*

A. The National Council will undoubtedly discuss the details of the latest developments. It will also seek to define new policies on various issues that face the Palestinian movement.

*Q. Do you feel that the entry of Arab forces into Lebanon spells the end of the Lebanese crisis, or does it merely represent a new stage in the continuing conflict?*

I believe that the Arabs have taken a firm decision to deal with the Lebanese situation. Consequently, I believe that this effort will be crowned with success, and that the end of the crisis is at hand.

I certainly hope that Lebanon will soon return to normal conditions of security and stability and to its unity and territorial integrity. I sincerely wish that this country, which has suffered much

and which has made great sacrifices, will be returning to normal life in the very near future.

Lebanon is definitely worthy of Arab support. The Palestinian people stand side by side with the Lebanese, fully ready and willing to cooperate with them in building a new Lebanon on the principles of democracy to which the Lebanese people aspire.

## 321

**Press interview statements by King Khalid of Saudi Arabia outlining his views on oil prices, the Arab boycott and US arms sales to Saudi Arabia<sup>287</sup>**

Riyad, mid-November, 1976

*Q. Mr. Carter says that the Arab boycott against Israel will stop when he gets into the White House.*

*A.* The boycott is a retaliatory economic measure that the Arabs use to guarantee their security and to lessen Israel's ability to declare war on the Arab people and occupy their land. Therefore, the boycott is not directed against any other country and it is not based on racial or religious discrimination. And the Arabs are not the first, nor the only nation, that applies the boycott.

The U.S. is in the forefront of the nations calling for the use of boycott when its interests are threatened. Wouldn't the United States exert all of its efforts if it became the victim of a foreign invasion or occupation in order to expel the invaders, including the use of economic pressures against companies that assist and support the enemy, and didn't it do more than that against the German occupation of Europe in World War II? Didn't it apply the boycott against China and Cuba and doesn't it still do so?

*Q. And what do you plan to do about new U.S. legislation?*

*A.* The Arab boycott against Israel has been in existence for the last 20 years and it is therefore very strange that it should only now be a major issue in Arab-American relations, especially at a

time when the U.S. volume of trade with the Arab world has increased tremendously and is expected to continue to climb. And it seems that the companies that assisted Israel and deprived themselves of doing business with the Arab world have been encouraged by Israeli pressure groups to try and prevent other parties from dealing with the Arabs.

U.S. legislation, encouraged by the Israeli lobby, is designed to penalize and thus prevent U.S. firms from trading with the Arabs. If this trend continues the inevitable result will be to cut American companies from the Arab world, which has a population of 120 million. And naturally, we're always wondering whether such legislation serves the interests of the American people because you will be hurting yourselves, not the Arabs. As far as the Arabs are concerned, they have taken the decision to end the boycott the moment a just solution to the Middle East problem has been achieved.

*Q. Can you foresee circumstances under which there might be another oil embargo?*

*A.* We're not even thinking of applying a new oil embargo and we hope that circumstances will not force us to do so.

*Q. What about congressional moves—supported by Mr. Carter—to cut back on arms sales to Saudi Arabia?*

*A.* All we want from the U.S. is that its policy in the Middle East be just and fair and that you will be balanced and equitable in dealing with all the countries in the area, bearing in mind your own national interests and the preservation of your relations with your friends. Saudi Arabia, as its history will testify, has never attacked anyone and it is not our policy to do so. Our objective in arming ourselves is first and foremost self-defense.

The kingdom is a vast country suffering from a relative manpower shortage in relation to its size. So it's inevitable that we take this factor into account when drawing up our military strategy and armaments requirements. We have to compensate for it as much as possible by using sophisticated equipment and military technology. We are certain that friendly governments producing arms, including the United States, will appreciate the kingdom's motivations and objectives in this regard.

<sup>287</sup> Excerpted from the partial transcript of the interview conducted by Arnaud de Borchgrave for the *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), November 15, 1976, pp. 1-2. Copyright International Herald Tribune 1976.

## 322

**Working paper drawn up by a preparatory conference of Muslim leaders of Lebanon (excerpt)<sup>238</sup>**

**Beirut, November 14, 1976**

*1. Introduction: The causes and dimensions of the crisis:*

The Lebanese crisis represents a challenge to our ability, whether Muslim or Christian, to move forward in a truly historic fashion to build a new Lebanon. The crisis has deep roots in ourselves, our conduct, and in the nature of our regime ever since the Lebanese state came into being and from the moment we achieved independence until the present. It has immediate causes relating to what we have been suffering from in the past two years and it has Lebanese, Palestinian, Arab and international dimensions. It has tragic and savage aspects which exploded into civil war, turning Lebanon from a land of civilization into a jungle and completely destroying the Lebanese state.

While our primary duty now is to cooperate with the Arab deterrent force in order to bring the fighting to a final end and to establish security throughout Lebanon, we must also move as one national team to reconstruct Lebanon with the help of our Arab brethren and our friends in the world, and to rebuild it on new foundations. We must also stand by the Palestine revolution so that it may achieve its aims, foremost among which is the return of the Palestinian people to its homeland. Our crisis was a tragic ordeal. We, however, must turn it into a rare opportunity to fill the vacuum of institutions by building a better future.

We can best do so if we stop blaming others for what has befallen us and account our own responsibility before bringing others to account. Lebanon along with the Palestine revolution was the victim of an Israeli and imperialist plot which turned Lebanon into the point of explosion of the Middle East conflict. The object of the plot was to erase Lebanon's image of national coexistence, to waste away the Palestinian potential in

a war in the Lebanese arena and to divert its energies from the armed struggle in the occupied land, and to exhaust the new energies in the fields of development, national defence and international affairs acquired by the Arabs thanks to the October war and to their oil wealth. The conspiracy of our enemies was not unexpected, yet we fell into it. Herein lies the evil for which an individualistic and sectarian regime bears responsibility. It was this regime which, due to its social and political injustice as well as its economic burden, made us lose the national immunity that is necessary to face external and internal crises and to adapt to national, Arab and international changes. Some rulers are guilty of complicity with the plot directed against the safety of Lebanon and of the Palestine revolution. They disguise their role by blaming the Palestine revolution for what happened. The truth is that both the Lebanese and the Palestinian peoples were the victims of what took place.

We, the Muslims of Lebanon, deal with our problems of destiny in a national not a sectarian fashion. This national stand was met with a distorted interpretation of the reality of Islam, of Arab nationalism, of the Palestine revolution and of our national and popular demands. This deformed understanding was current among imperialist, Zionist and other circles and it affected the stability of our regime; it was instrumental in incitement to sectarian strife and in bringing about the tragedy of 1958, the events of 1973 and the war of 1975 and 1976.

The Palestine revolution, as we imagine it to be and as we support it, is a revolution based on justice, self-sacrifice and heroism. Although some of our brothers in resistance have been guilty of errors and excesses, these must not be allowed to weaken our support for the Palestine revolution. The Palestinians with their just revolution are striving to liberate Palestine, not to occupy Lebanon. They are struggling to regain their legitimate rights in their homeland, not to tip the scales for or against a particular sect in our homeland. The excesses committed do not justify at all the incitement to civil war, especially since they were caused more than anything else by the laxity of the state in applying the law to everyone equitably and by the state's negligence to consolidate Lebanon's

<sup>238</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), November 15, 1976. The conference, chaired by Mufti Hasan Khalid and attended by some 100 leaders of the various Islamic confessions, prepared this paper for presentation to a possible national conference on reform.

military capability in order to guarantee defence of Lebanese frontiers and of the Palestine revolution. Lebanon was enjoined to defend that revolution by its commitment to the cause of Palestine, to the Arab League and to the Cairo agreement.<sup>239</sup>

## 323

**Statement issued by the National Command of the Baath Party of Syria affirming its commitment to the unity of Lebanon<sup>240</sup>**

Damascus, November 15, 1976

Therefore, faced with these grim dangers and their effects upon the Arab scene as a whole and in conformity with these same principles for which the Syrian region has fought and sacrificed and in order to foil the conspiracy for partition and the creation of abhorrent sectarian states, the Syrian region felt impelled to redouble its efforts and to provide the conditions necessary such that action to save Lebanon and the Palestine resistance would be a collective Arab responsibility.

The resolutions adopted at the Riyadh mini-summit<sup>241</sup> were an affirmation of the soundness of this policy and of its foundations. The Arabs rose to their responsibilities and demonstrated the necessary degree of seriousness in order to foil the continuing conspiracy against Lebanon which is of concern to the entire Arab nation. The Syrian Arab region will continue to make all sincere efforts to implement the resolutions of these two conferences, to overcome all obstacles and to stand firmly against any side or power that works to hinder their implementation. Syria feels optimistic about President Sarkis' leadership at this new stage of reconstructing the new Lebanon.

The party reaffirms its policy of Arab solidarity, viewing this as a national and comprehensive effort that eschews all power blocks and having as its goal the unity of Arab ranks and a unified Arab position on all levels in the face of the Zionist enemy with the ultimate objective of liberating all oc-

cupied Arab territory and of restoring the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

Accordingly, our party affirms that the question of Palestine is the axis upon which our continuing struggle revolves. It reaffirms its basic and principled stand and its nationalist foundations, founded upon the unity of the Arab nation. It believes that the national aspect of the problem of Palestine is a basis for the Arab struggle because Palestinian potentialities by themselves cannot stand up to the challenge of international Zionism. At the same time, and given this national Arab framework for the struggle, the party emphasizes the importance of developing the Palestinian potential at all levels and of bolstering the struggle of the Arab people of Palestine as well as supporting all their legitimate rights.

## 324

**Memorandum sent by the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Lebanon to party organizations appraising the current situation (excerpts)<sup>242</sup>**

Beirut, November 18, 1976

On the basis of these facts the essential tasks confronting the Lebanese National Movement and the Lebanese Communist Party at this stage may be summed up as follows:

1. The party has always been in favour of a ceasefire and of an end to the bloodshed and destruction. It has only resorted to arms in defence of itself, the resistance and the Arab character and unity of Lebanon. Every serious proposal or decision for a ceasefire has met with a favourable response from the party. Similarly the party, and all sections of the Nationalist Movement, have adopted a positive attitude to the security aspects of Arab decisions on stopping the fighting and eliminating armed manifestations, and exerted pressure to ensure that the implementation of the security solution should be a balanced one. On this basis it agreed to the deterrent forces entering

<sup>239</sup> See note to doc. 195 above.

<sup>240</sup> Issued on the occasion of the 6th anniversary of the "corrective movement," excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), November 16, 1976.

<sup>241</sup> Docs. 305 and 306 above.

<sup>242</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nida* (Beirut), November 19, 1976.

Lebanon and called for a positive attitude that would help them to perform their task within this framework.

2. The party has always accorded particular importance to the struggle against the Zionist enemy, and called on the inhabitants of the front-line villages, and of villages in the South in general, to defend their villages by all available means, including the purchase of arms and the defence of the frontiers and the soil of the homeland. Today it stresses the special importance of this matter in the South, in view of the increasing perils of the Israeli-isolationist conspiracy on the frontier.

3. The party warns against the delusion that there is no longer any danger of a renewed outbreak of fighting. The Zionist enemy will do everything in its power to make things explode again, and Israeli-isolationist coordination is all too clear. There are also pressures being exerted by colonialism and Arab reaction with the aim of ensuring that the Arab solution helps in the achievement of the same goals once more.

. . . . .

4. In calling for vigilance the party is relying, as it has done in the past, on unremitting struggle to consolidate the unity of the national and progressive forces and to affirm their cohesion with the Palestine resistance. These circles are agreed on how far the measures can be allowed to go, and they adopt a unified attitude if this red line is crossed. Throughout the crisis the party has not acted on its own; it has always done all it can to ensure that the communists should be a part of a wider Lebanese nationalist alignment and belong to the alliance of Lebanese-Palestinian forces. The communists have no demands of their own and no battles of their own.

. . . . .

6. The party accords special importance to strengthening cohesion in struggle with the Palestine resistance in the new and difficult circumstances that confront it. Here stress must be laid on the need for resolute resistance to the attempts by hostile forces to exaggerate negative features and excesses with a view to distorting the image of the Palestine revolution, damaging its relations with the masses and making it appear responsible for all the difficulties we have experienced.

The party believes that a return to the situation that prevailed in the country before April 13, 1975,

by implementing the first stage of the resolutions of the Arab summit,<sup>243</sup> including the ceasefire and the elimination of armed manifestations must be accompanied by immediate attempts to reach a Lebanese-Lebanese solution through the achievement of political, economic and social reforms.

### 325

#### **Letter sent to Arab heads of state by Chairman Jumblat of the Central Political Council of the National Movement of Lebanon<sup>244</sup>**

**Beirut, November 19, 1976**

South Lebanon is being exposed to huge political and military dangers as a result of the existing coordination between the Israeli and isolationist forces as part of one plot aiming to destroy the Arab peace project on the one hand, and enforce their control over the southern region of Lebanon on the other.

The escalation of Israeli-isolationist military operations along the southern Lebanese border with occupied Palestine, and the attempt to occupy more of the southern Lebanese villages, in spite of the cease-fire declared in the other areas of Lebanon, expose the seriousness of the conspiracy which South Lebanon, and with it all of Lebanon, are facing.

The Israeli-isolationist alliance aims at foiling the summit meeting resolutions and destroying the Arab peace mission by escalating the fighting in the South. We believe that this alliance is determined to go ahead with this plan until they actually establish a buffer zone along the southern border, controlled by the Israelis and isolationists, in order to prevent the implementation of the Cairo agreement with the Palestinian revolution, foil the Arab solution to the Lebanese crisis and pave the way for internationalization so as to detach Lebanon from the Arab World and establish open bridges between Israel and Lebanon.

By putting the facts of this conspiracy and its dangerous results before you, we believe that the defence of South Lebanon and the protection of its Arabism is an Arab national responsibility, which calls for your quick intervention to make

<sup>243</sup> Docs. 305, 306, 313 and 314 above.

<sup>244</sup> English translation, *Wafa* (Beirut), November 19, 1976.

the Arab Deterrent Forces cover all of Lebanon, including the areas along the border with occupied Palestine. The movement of the Arab Deterrent Forces to the South would surely halt the conspiracy and check the Israeli-isolationist plan.

The Lebanese National Movement affirms its determination to carry out its duty of defending the South, and hopes that Arab leaders will take a stand commensurate with their commitments to the national cause and defend Lebanon and protect its national independence and the unity of its soil.

## 326

**Press interview statements by President Sadat of Egypt discussing Egypt's willingness to end the state of belligerency with Israel and prospects for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East<sup>245</sup>**

Cairo, mid-November, 1976

*Q. What about the timetable for Middle East peace initiatives?*

A. I have heard that Carter has promised to take some action next spring, which is more or less the timetable I advised. But I do think the Middle East should be given priority. We have been delayed twice already—once by Watergate and again by the American elections. I think we have shown that we are patient, but this problem should not be unduly delayed.

My view is that in 1977 we should convene the Geneva Conference to decide the framework for an overall settlement. There is no need for any more "step by step." The Golan Heights is so small that it is not necessary to talk about further Israeli withdrawal before the final withdrawal. The second Sinai disengagement agreement defused the Israeli-Egyptian front.<sup>246</sup>

*Q. How do you feel about Kissinger's departure?*

A. The absence of one man will not do major harm. But I will say for Henry, he is the first Sec-

retary of State with whom I dealt—and I've dealt with four—who changed the image of America for the better. He was not fond of the big stick like Dulles, weak like Rusk or naive like Rogers. He came here during a turning point, when the Arabs had won their first victory over Israel, and he proved to be a man of his word. Israel and the Arabs needed someone in whom both could have confidence. Henry was this man.

*Q. What about your relations with Israel?*

A. I am in favor of signing a document formally, legally, publicly ending the state of belligerency between us. I would insist on complete Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. If the Israelis don't take my word that I will allow free shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba, I am willing to accept a U.N. force. Also, I am willing to accept a U.N. force along our frontier.

I have been told that Rabin insists also on an immediate exchange of ambassadors, open borders and trade. I would say that after ending the state of belligerency, our relations with Israel would be like America's relations with China. You ended your Korean War and coexisted with China for a couple of decades, but during that time you had no relations. In time, circumstances brought you together. The same could happen here.

*Q. Why must a Geneva Conference include the Palestinians?*

A. Without the Palestinians, there cannot be any peace. The problem is not Sinai or the Golan, it is the Palestinians. I know that under this pretext the Israelis will try to stay away from Geneva. You must bring the Israelis to reason. The big issue is peace, and peace is available. I predict that the Palestinians will eventually be invited to Geneva and will eventually accept. But it is important to offer them something that their moderate leaders can sell to their own people, like a West Bank-Gaza state.

*Q. Why did you change your mind about Syria's role in Lebanon?*

A. I condemned the Syrian intervention when Syria was acting for its own ends. But when Syria put its forces under the umbrella of the Arab League, I approved. In the beginning, if Syria had intervened and imposed a cease-fire on both sides, I would have applauded, but they took one side against the other.

<sup>245</sup> Interview conducted by Wilton Wynn; partial text, *Time* (New York—International edition), November 29, 1976, p. 16. Reprinted by permission from Time, the weekly newsmagazine; copyright Time Inc. 1976.

<sup>246</sup> Doc. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.



327

**Press interview statements by President Qadhafi of Libya discussing possible solutions to the Palestine question<sup>247</sup>**

**Tripoli, November 20, 1976**

*Q. There is speculation of imminent reconciliation between President Qadhafi and President Sadat. Is there any hope that this "peace" will take place?*

*A. If this peace will be good for the unity, progress and freedom of the Arab world, it is welcome; otherwise, it will lead nowhere.*

*Q. Are there any concrete hopes?*

*A. While there is life there is hope.*

*Q. Yasir Arafat told me previously here in Tripoli that Minister Bin Amir is ready to go to Cairo where he will meet with President Sadat precisely to set the basis for "peace" which would be concluded in Damascus?*

*A. In fact, we have agreed upon this with Arafat.*

*Q. You are the most ardent defender of the Palestine cause. You have told Chancellor Kreisky of Austria that there may be a disposition to accept any solution of the Palestine problem, provided it is acceptable to the Palestinians.*

*A. We are not more Palestinian than the Palestinians. We are not more royalist than the king, as the saying goes. But I have to say that, personally, I don't believe in any possible acceptable political solution. The problem always remains the same: the return of the Palestinians to their land. A peaceful solution will be possible only if the Israelis withdraw.*

*Q. But the recent statement of Faruq Qaddumi at the UN makes it clear that Arafat and the PLO favour the creation of a Palestinian entity on the West Bank and Gaza. In short, they have reduced their ambitions. What do you wish for the Palestinian people: do you think that this small entity could be the first step towards an independent state?*

*A. I cannot speak for Arafat. I think a solution must be acceptable to all the Palestinians. In my opinion, the reason why Arafat and many others of the Palestinians today seem in favour of the idea of a mini-state is that they think that this power may in the long run lead to the destruction of Is-*

*rael. An agreement which leads to the creation of two separate states—a Palestinian and an Israeli state between Jordan and the sea—can never have a permanent character. One or the other of these two states will one day vanish. In my opinion if we take into account the forces which sustain the Palestinians they may be able eventually to destroy Israel. And it is for this reason that Arafat and the others accept the principle of a mini-state.*

*Q. If one day Egypt and Syria agree on a peace settlement with Israel, how will Libya react?*

*A. This is not a problem which affects Libya only, but the entire Arab world. And all the Arab people will act negatively.*

*Q. Therefore Libya also?*

*A. Certainly.*

*Q. Do you think that the accession of Carter as president of the US can influence positively the solution of the Middle East problem?*

*A. Any judgement is premature. We know, however, that President Carter is a very religious man, therefore it will be natural that he will do something good.*

*Q. How would you advise Carter to act in the Middle East?*

*A. I don't think President Carter will take my advice into consideration and I don't think his advisors will fail him. In any event, I don't remember that America has ever acted precipitately.*

*Q. Do you share the opinion of President Sadat that America holds the key to the Middle East problem?*

*A. No. The keys are in the hands of those who struggle for the proper cause. The Arabs must know that the solution is in their hands and not in the hands of others.*

*Q. War or peace in the Middle East? Reconciliation between Syria and Egypt, between Libya and Egypt, rapprochement between Egypt and the USSR, all allow the observer to think that the Arabs are preparing for a war. Do you agree with this type of analysis?*

*A. It seems to me a reasonable conclusion.*

*Q. Someone accused you of having signed a pact with the USSR in exchange for a big arms deal. Aren't you afraid that through these deals Marxist and Communist ideas can infiltrate into Libya?*

*A. We do not fear any infiltration of ideas be-*

<sup>247</sup> Translated from the Italian text of the interview conducted by Igor Man, *La Stampa* (Turin), November 21, 1976, pp. 1-2.

cause we have proclaimed our new socialist idea—the third theory—which is the product of contradictions between communism and capitalism. On the contrary, we are convinced that the idea of our “new international left” will make its way in the world. And don’t be surprised that the “third theory” was born here: The Levant, as a matter of fact, has through the ages seen the birth of great civilizations, religions, philosophers and prophets.

*Q. Is it true that you have granted bases and given facilities to the Russians in exchange for arms supplies?*

*A.* Does it seem logical that, after we have struggled so much to drive the British and Americans out of our country, we should grant military bases to foreigners?

*Q. Do you think that the USSR has a role to play in the Middle East?*

*A.* The Middle East problem is an international one. Therefore Russia has a part to play as well. We must take into consideration that the USSR is our friend, so its presence in the region is welcome.

*Q. President Qadhafi then considers the USSR a friendly country. What does he think of the USA?*

*A.* In the past the USA’s attitude towards us has been an aggressive one; if this changes we will be happy. We are the friends of friends and the enemies of enemies. The US can alter its policy. We here have a close friendship with the USSR; we cannot say the same about the USA.

*Q. Last question. How do you judge the present relationship between Libya and Italy?*

*A.* The relationship between Libya and Italy is good, but it can be better still. It has to develop sensibly, but it seems difficult at the moment because of the struggle among the various political parties in Italy.

328

**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Morocco of Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia (excerpt)<sup>248</sup>**

**Rabat, November 22, 1976**

In response to an invitation from HM King Hasan II, HRH Prince Fahd Bin Abd al-Aziz, the Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister of the fraternal Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, made an official visit to the Moroccan Kingdom from 11th to 22nd November 1976. HM King Hasan II received HRH Prince Fahd Bin Abd al-Aziz. During the meeting, King Hasan received a private message from his brother, HM King Khalid Bin Abd al-Aziz. The talks between HM King Hasan II and his honourable guest dealt with relations between the two countries in various fields. The talks, which also dealt with the international, Islamic and Arab situation, took place in an atmosphere of full understanding. A spirit of sincere brotherhood prevailed.

Regarding the Middle East issue, HM King Hasan II and HRH Prince Fahd Bin Abd al-Aziz asserted their determination to continue their efforts towards consolidating Arab rights and supporting the frontline countries and the Palestinian people until Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories was achieved, until Holy Jerusalem was liberated, and until the Palestinian people regained their legitimate rights and usurped homeland.

Regarding the situation in fraternal Lebanon, His Majesty and his esteemed guest praised the various Arab efforts which had been made to settle the Lebanese crisis. They asserted the need to preserve Lebanon’s integral unity, so that Lebanon might remain an example of coexistence among religions and the communities which exist there. They expressed their satisfaction with the positive results of the six-sided Arab summit conference in Riyadh and the extraordinary Arab summit in Cairo.<sup>249</sup>

On Arab affairs, HM the King and his great guest stressed the need to support the unity of Arab

<sup>248</sup> Broadcast on Rabat radio in Arabic; excerpted from the English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5372/A/8-9; reprinted by permission.

<sup>249</sup> Docs. 305, 306, 313 and 314 above.

ranks and to develop the existing co-operation among Arab countries, out of their desire to reach the desired objective of Arab solidarity.

### 329

#### **Communiqué issued after a meeting of the leaders of the Palestine resistance movement<sup>250</sup>**

**Beirut, November 26, 1976**

The events in Lebanon were not a mere coincidence, nor a result of Palestinian violations of the Cairo agreement,<sup>251</sup> as the isolationists claim. They were, and still are, part of a conspiracy, a continuation of the Jordan massacres. This conspiracy aims at liquidating the Palestinian revolution, which has been defended by its brave fighters for the past 11 years, in spite of the fierceness of the Zionist-imperialist attack on the revolution and the numerous tools and methods used in this attack. The Palestinian revolution, however, has continued to face all conspiracies firmly and bravely and has remained victorious and confident by crushing these plans and the tools which try to control the fate of this cause and this revolution.

Today, after the latest developments in Lebanon following the Cairo-Riyad summit meetings,<sup>252</sup> the revolution sees it necessary to clarify what has happened and is still happening to its masses. For with all our reservations and opposition to the Syrian military intervention, out of our concern to direct all potential towards the Zionist enemy and not to clash with the Syrian forces, with whom we have shared the same trench on many a battlefield, after the Cairo and Riyad summit meetings, we facilitated the entrance of the Arab Deterrent Forces, which are mainly composed of Syrian forces, and executed our commitments under the terms of the Cairo agreement concerning our withdrawal from all regions we were positioned in to defend our revolution and people. We did this in spite of the restrictions placed by the security forces on the movement of our cadres and members while, at the same time, the isolationists are allowed

numerous privileges, such as freedom of movement and the transport of weapons, and are allowed to cooperate with Israel to establish a demilitarized area in the south to prevent our presence there on the basis of the Cairo agreement.

In spite of all this, we are still keeping ourselves in check, ignoring the provocations carried out by the forces which accompanied the Arab Deterrent Forces, under Palestinian cover, to terrorize the masses and practice their piratical methods against them.

On the basis of this quick review of events, we register the following facts, in order that the responsibility for the following stage be clear to the Arab and Palestinian masses and to the whole world.

*First:* The Palestinian leadership stresses the unity of all its factions throughout the Arab world and in occupied Palestine, out of their commitment to preserve the Palestine cause from liquidation or from any attempt to harm its sacredness under various slogans. This commitment only has relevance practically if the Palestinian revolution remains strong and free from all forms of tutelage and subjugation and from attempts to weaken or liquidate it.

*Second:* The Palestinian revolution, which is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian masses, warns against international and Arab moves aimed at liquidating the Palestine cause and dealing a blow to the aspirations of the Palestinian people who have stood firm using all means to prevent any Arab or international party from harming their national rights on their own land and their right to self-determination.

*Third:* The attempts by Israel, imperialism and certain Arab regimes to create an alternative Palestinian leadership, as well as talk about "extremists" and "moderates", aim to create confusion and distortion, and rob Palestinian revolutionary activity of its tools of struggle, creating leaderships servile to the regimes, behind which these regimes can hide. These attempts are ultimately aimed at betraying our people and nation with a pre-planned settlement whose pillars are the project for a confederal union or a "United Kingdom",<sup>253</sup> or other projects which aim to end the state of belligerency with Israel and to achieve reconciliation with and recognition of it.

<sup>250</sup> English text, *Wafa* (Beirut), November 27, 1976.

<sup>251</sup> See note to doc. 195 above.

<sup>252</sup> Docs. 305, 306, 313 and 314 above.

<sup>253</sup> See doc. 187 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

We stress that the leadership of the revolution has emerged from the Palestinian masses and was not appointed by any Arab desire or regime. In this sense, it represents the independent will of our people and the independent Palestinian decision. It will remain committed to the leadership of this people and to the protection of their cause and revolution, until their national and patriotic aspirations of complete national independence are realized.

*Fourth*—The Arab regimes are held responsible for any solution based on the liquidation of the Palestine cause, and the Arab people will be responsible for bringing their regimes to account for any deviation or treason in that direction.

It further calls upon the states that participated in the Cairo summit to be faithful to their commitments, so as to enable the resistance to exercise its right to a presence, to take action and to continue the struggle against the Zionist enemy.

*Fifth*: The leadership of the Palestinian revolution will stand firm in the face of any international-Arab settlement project in the region which does not include the pre-conditions of full-scale Palestinian national independence on Palestinian soil. The Palestinian leadership further reaffirms its rejection of resolution 242 as a basis for the solution of the Palestine problem.

*Sixth*: What is currently taking place in South Lebanon in the way of an overt Israeli-isolationist alliance, after the implementation by the Palestinian revolution of the Cairo agreement in accordance with the Cairo summit resolutions, makes it imperative for all Arab and international patriotic forces to declare their complete unity with the Palestinian revolution, enabling it to exercise its rights as stipulated in the Cairo agreement.

The Palestinian revolution also reasserts its determination to confront the Israeli-isolationist plot in the South with all means and resources at the disposal of the Palestinian and Lebanese masses.

*Seventh*: The leadership of the revolution, while reiterating its unity with the Lebanese National Movement and the heroic Lebanese masses, is confident that this unity will be reinforced by the awareness of the Lebanese masses of their patriotic and national role, and that this unity will persist until the conspiracy is repulsed and the will of the Lebanese people and their National Movement is victorious.

In this context, the Palestinian leadership

stresses its concern to halt the bloodshed in Lebanon, and its concern for the unity of the land and people of Lebanon, and for its national independence. It declares its support for any action aimed at realizing a democratic overall political solution, which would restore normality to the country.

*Eighth*: The Palestinian revolution, which is proudly following up the uprising of the Palestinian people against Zionist occupation and against the intrigues of the Jordanian regime to impose liquidationary and capitulationist settlements, pledges to our people to continue the struggle—steadfast in the face of all conspiracies and conspirators—so as to enable the Palestinian people to regain their national rights and impose their will to achieve self-determination over their national soil.

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**Press interview statements by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat commenting on the effects of the war in Lebanon on the PLO and the PLO's position towards a Middle East settlement<sup>254</sup>**

Beirut, late November, 1976

*Q. What does the Israeli buildup on Lebanon's southern frontier mean?*

*A.* I believe that what has happened in Lebanon was partly initiated by the Israelis. This is clear from Israeli pronouncements and the supplies and support they have given to the isolationists. The military concentration is an extension of what has happened and is still happening in south Lebanon, where at least seven villages are occupied by isolation forces supported by Israel. This is a threat to our forces, who must be situated in the south under the Cairo agreement.<sup>255</sup> It is also a threat to the Syrian peace-keeping forces, which are being told not to cross a "red line" that seems to be movable.

*Q. Was the PLO weakened by the Lebanese war?*

*A.* The war did keep us preoccupied for a long

<sup>254</sup> Interview conducted by Wilton Wynn and Abu Said Abu Rish; *Time* (New York—International edition), December 13, 1976, pp. 19–20. Reprinted by permission of Time, the weekly newsmagazine; copyright Time Inc. 1976.

<sup>255</sup> See note to doc. 195 above.

time. But instead of being weakened, we gained valuable military experience. Politically, you can see that we are stronger by noting the recent United Nations vote calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Ninety nations voted for it. Remember, votes aren't cast out of mere sympathy.

We also showed our strength at recent Arab summits whose resolutions<sup>256</sup> not only reaffirmed that the PLO was the only representative of the Palestinians, but developed that idea by emphasizing the right of the Palestinian people to establish an independent state in their homeland.

*Q. In the past you called for a united Palestine where Arabs and Jews would live together. Has this view changed?*

*A.* We are prepared to establish an independent regime in any territory that we liberate or from which Israel withdraws. We have some reservations about the recent U.N. resolution, but we still consider it a victory for our cause. Remember, the resolution was introduced by a 20-state committee and not by the PLO. This is important.

*Q. Does this mean you will accept a West Bank-Gaza state if it is offered?*

*A.* I follow the resolutions [passed in 1974] of our Palestine National Council, which state that we will establish a national authority on any part of Palestine liberated from Israel or which Israel will evacuate.<sup>257</sup> This is clear.

*Q. President Sadat of Egypt has launched a peace offensive aimed at a negotiated settlement with Israel. To what extent will you cooperate?*

*A.* We will cooperate with all our Arab brothers and all our allies. But the degree of support given us by our allies is not identical. We accept from each one the degree of support he gives our cause. Naturally, we cannot oblige others to support us exactly according to our wishes and thoughts.

*Q. Sadat predicts a 1977 Geneva Conference to reach an Arab-Israeli settlement. Will the PLO attend?*

*A.* Where is the invitation? Rabin is still saying he is not ready to think of Geneva if the Palestinians participate. But this is not a question of an Arafat state but of a Palestinian state.

We are obviously an important element in the

Middle East area. Nobody can ignore this fact if he is looking for a permanent solution.

*Q. Christians and Moslems who had lived together killed each other in the Lebanese war. Do you still believe Arabs and Jews can live peacefully together in Palestine?*

*A.* We Palestinians don't have such complexes. Our leadership includes both Christians and Moslems. During the Lebanese civil war, the isolationists attacked Christian Palestinian refugee camps, in the same way as they attacked Moslem Palestinian camps. In Israel, many Palestinian Christians are locked away in prison. But as I have mentioned often before, a unified Palestine is my dream—and I have the right to dream.

*Q. What about improving relations between the PLO and the U.S.?*

*A.* We had hoped to establish a PLO office in Washington, but our representative, Sabri Jiryis, was kicked out of your country on a technicality.<sup>257a</sup> This pained us. We tried but your reply was to kick out our representative.

*Q. The U.S. recently supported a U.N. resolution condemning Israeli behavior in the occupied Arab territories. Doesn't this indicate a basic change in American policy?*

*A.* I am desperate, I am sorry to say, regarding U.S. policy. Until now the U.S. was only on the side of Israeli aggression. Now things depend on President-elect Jimmy Carter. It's up to him to decide whether he will continue this policy against our displaced people.

I hope Carter will have some understanding of our people and of our cause. But I don't know whether the Palestinian people should bet too much on this.

*Q. Are you prepared to give up your arms in Lebanon?*

*A.* We are prepared to discuss this with the four-party high committee set up by the Riyadh conference: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Syria.<sup>258</sup>

<sup>256</sup> Docs. 305, 306, 313 and 314 above.

<sup>257</sup> Doc. 246 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

<sup>257a</sup> Jiryis' visa was not renewed because his application falsely indicated that he had been born in the Sudan, whose passport he carries. The State Department added, however, that "from a foreign policy standpoint, we do not believe it a propitious moment for the PLO to establish an office in Washington." [orig. note]

<sup>258</sup> See doc. 305 and 306 above.

## 331

**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Jordan of President Asad of Syria (excerpt)<sup>259</sup>**

Amman, December 8, 1976

The two leaders also reviewed the current situation in the Arab world and Middle East developments. They affirmed their resolve to continue to work in unison to channel Arab potentialities in the service of the common objective which is the liberation of Arab lands and the safeguarding of the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine on Palestinian soil, in order to create a just and permanent peace in the region.

The two leaders expressed their firm conviction that Arab solidarity is the surest guarantee to achieve these aims. They also expressed their satisfaction with the return of calm and stability to sister Lebanon as a result of the Syrian Arab initiative and of Arab support embodied in the two summit meetings of Riyadh and Cairo.<sup>260</sup>

## 332

**Communiqué issued at the end of a meeting of the PLO Central Committee<sup>261</sup>**

Damascus, December 14, 1976

At the invitation of the PLO Executive Committee, the PLO Central Council convened in Damascus between the 12th and 14th of December 1976. The meeting, which came in the wake of the latest developments of the dangerous Lebanese crisis, was held in Syria as an expression of the depth of strategic relations between Syria and the Palestinian revolution, and of Palestinian-Syrian concern to consolidate and reinforce these relations, out of a belief in the historic role of the Egyptian-Syrian-Palestinian alliance in building Arab solidarity capable of confronting the forces of Zionism

and imperialism and of realizing the aims of our Arab nation in liberating our occupied land and regaining our usurped rights.

It was therefore natural that the Council should analyse and evaluate the Lebanese crisis and should draw lessons from it, in order to guarantee the safety of the Arab and Palestinian struggle. In this context, the Council welcomed the end of the fighting and the return to normalcy in fraternal Lebanon.

The Council moreover expressed support for the resolutions of the Cairo and Riyadh Summits,<sup>262</sup> and commitment to the necessity of struggle towards ensuring the success of these resolutions; and warned against attempts to sabotage them, particularly by the Zionist entity. The Council also reiterated the PLO's firm stand of commitment to the Cairo Agreement<sup>263</sup> and its annexes and in considering it the formula organizing Lebanese-Palestinian relations. The Council saluted the Lebanese people for their stand with our cause and the struggle of our people, and expressed the hope that they will continue their political dialogue for the prosperity, unity and independence of Lebanon.

The Central Council reviewed the question of Palestinian national unity and praised highly the restoration of normal relations between the factions of the resistance movement and between comrades-in-arms. It called for the necessity of securing national unity on democratic and frontal bases, and of consolidating the role of the PLO's institutions at all levels and in all fields. The Council requested the continuation of a democratic dialogue in order to strengthen the bases of national unity.

In the context of Palestinian-Arab relations, the Central Council called for more efforts to consolidate Arab solidarity, in accordance with the resolutions of the Algiers, Rabat and Cairo Summits, and in the service of the objectives of Arab and Palestinian struggle against Zionism and imperialism, and in order to foil all suspect liquidationary projects.

The Council welcomed the restoration of normal relations between the PLO and Syria, and confirmed the PLO's desire to maintain this relationship and strengthen it so as to serve the common

<sup>259</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Rai* (Amman) December 9, 1976. The visit took place December 6-8, 1976.

<sup>260</sup> Docs. 305, 306, 313 and 314 above.

<sup>261</sup> English text, *Wafa* (Beirut), December 15, 1976.

<sup>262</sup> Docs. 305, 306, 313 and 314 above.

<sup>263</sup> See note to doc. 197 above.

national aims, support the Arab nationalist movement and escalate the struggle of our Palestinian people.

The Council reviewed the conditions of our people in the occupied territories and highly praised their steadfastness, their fierce uprising and their absolute rejection of the occupation and its racist policies of settlement, annexation and local administration and the violation of the holy places.

The Council then took the necessary decisions to support the steadfastness of our people and to guarantee the continuation of their courageous national struggle, and to support their national institutions.

The Council also saluted the cohesion between the struggle of our people inside and outside the occupied territories and their rallying around the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The Council then listened to an overall report on the political activities undertaken by the PLO Executive Committee on the international level, at the United Nations as well as bilateral contacts. The Council highly praised all the successes registered by the PLO in terms of widening the scope of international recognition of our people's national rights, the latest of which was the success at the 31st session of the UN General Assembly, where increasing international support for our struggle and increasing isolation of Israel and the USA became obvious.

The Council noted that the liquidation of Israeli occupation in the occupied territories and the recognition of Palestinian national rights, particularly the right to return to Palestine, to self-determination and the right to establish their independent state on their national soil, are the subject of international unanimity, with the exception of the Zionist enemy and its ally, the USA.

The Council, in this domain, is happy to express its appreciation to all its friends in the international theater, especially the Non-Aligned group, the USSR, Popular China, the Socialist countries, the Islamic and African groups, and all democratic forces in the world which are fighting to support our just struggle.

The Council discussed the holding of the Palestine National Congress and the necessity of increasing the number of members in the new Congress, in light of the decisions taken previously. The date of the meeting will be decided as soon as possible, and will be announced no later than

February of next year.

In its discussions, the Council stressed the nature of the different dimensions of the current phase and the action necessary within the context of a provisional political program.

At the end of their meetings, the members of the PLO Central Council met with Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad. A frank and fraternal discussion took place on current issues in general and Palestinian-Syrian relations in particular. A fraternal and positive atmosphere prevailed during the meeting which was inspired by common national interest and the realization of the national goals of our people.

The Council's meetings ended with agreement on the continuation of contacts between the various institutions of the PLO and groups of the resistance movement, in order to carry out the directions and recommendations of the Council.

### 333

#### **Report of press interview by King Hussein of Jordan considering the future of the occupied West Bank<sup>264</sup>**

**Amman, mid-December, 1976**

"My optimism is based upon new developments in the general situation of the Middle East question. It is also based upon positive policies that have recently been adopted in the Arab world. There is also a new US administration that is freed from the pressures of an election year and a better appreciation of the Arab position within the USA."

His Majesty added, "In any case, if solid progress is not made the Arab world may lose hope. I fear that the Arab world might become desperate and turn towards extremism."

His Majesty expressed his belief that tremendous efforts must be made in the direction of a comprehensive settlement in the near future. He added that he does not oppose a phased withdrawal from occupied territories provided that Israel is committed to total withdrawal.

His Majesty rejected the Israeli foreign minister's plan (the Allon plan)<sup>265</sup> whereby Israel

<sup>264</sup> Interview published in *The Washington Post*, December 17, 1976; translated from the Arabic report, *al-Rai* (Amman), December 18, 1976.

<sup>265</sup> See doc. 163 above.

would return the West Bank—except Jerusalem—to the Arabs while retaining a number of settlements that would constitute a security belt for it in the Jordan valley. Israel had annexed Arab Jerusalem, declaring that the city would never be divided again. Jordan, however, insists upon Arab sovereignty over the Arab sector of the city. His Majesty stated that Jerusalem cannot remain under Israeli sovereignty. Otherwise, there can be no peace.

The *Washington Post* said, "You must remember that Jordan agreed during the 1974 Rabat summit that the PLO would assume the responsibility of spokesman for the inhabitants of the West Bank."<sup>266</sup> His Majesty replied, "I believe the future will witness some sort of federal or confederal union, in accordance with the desires of all concerned. But we insist that the Palestinians should retain the right of self-determination and should do so in total freedom." His Majesty added, "Jordan is prepared to participate in direct talks with Israel if all Arab states including the Palestinians, accept this." He asserted that if Jordanian efforts bear fruit and the West Bank is restored as desired by the Arabs, then "we do not want the West Bank territories to be restored to Jordan." He added, "If the Arabs, however, do not request us to do so, then we will not be in a position to bargain with Israel over the return of a single inch of Palestinian territory. This we cannot do."

He ended the interview with the *Washington Post* by saying, "We believe that it is imperative for the Palestinians to exercise their rights and to become responsible for their future if peace is to have a genuine meaning and effect."

## 334

**Radio interview statements by President Asad of Syria regarding relations with Egypt, Jordan and the PLO, the reconvening of the Geneva conference and the situation in Lebanon**<sup>267</sup>

**Damascus, December 17, 1976**

*Q. The Syrian-Egyptian alliance in October 1973 on the field of battle was a decisive factor in deterring Israel*

*and in restoring Arab dignity. What is your excellency's estimate of future Syro-Egyptian moves in the coming period, on the political and military levels?*

A. We may say that we have now, thank God, overcome the obstacles of a past period and that an atmosphere of amity and friendship has been restored to our relations. We shall endeavour to maintain these calm and undisturbed relations because matters so require and because our present and future battle also requires this. We shall work on the political, military and other levels. We face a battle which requires us to use all the means and resources available. As regards political activity, we and our brethren in Egypt are making continuous efforts through the UN and our bilateral international contacts with the two superpowers, with other friendly states and with the non-aligned bloc with the object of clarifying our cause and of obtaining maximum support for ourselves in this question.

The current problem is that we prepare ourselves to go to Geneva and to work there for a just and permanent peace. While this political mission is being accomplished, we must also work—and we are doing so at present—to improve our military capabilities as well as our potential in other fields.

*Q. The recent UN General Assembly resolution regarding the convening of the Geneva conference before the end of next March with PLO participation was a historic victory in the progress of the Palestine problem. What, in your excellency's opinion, will be the practical steps to be taken in order to implement that resolution in accordance with the Arab policy trend?*

A. The practical steps are that we must contact the UN and the two superpowers as well as perhaps other states in order to activate an action plan, and that the UN Secretary-General, especially, should fulfill his role by contacting the various parties and the two superpowers, so that the end result would be moving towards the Geneva conference.

*Q. Your excellency has held frequent meetings with King Hussein; in fact, you visited Amman only a few days ago. Is the eastern front being revived, especially since now General Gamasi has been appointed to command both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts?*

A. Relations between Syria and Jordan are progressing well and there is coordination on the military as well as other levels. This serves general Arab interests and there is no doubt that

<sup>266</sup> Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

<sup>267</sup> Interview granted to Cairo radio; translated from the Arabic text distributed by the Syrian Arab News Agency and published in *al-Rai* (Amman), December 18, 1976.



increased cooperation and coordination among confrontation states is a very necessary and important matter. As I said, we have achieved much by way of coordination between Syria and Jordan and we shall achieve even more.

*Q. What, in your excellency's opinion, are the bases of common Arab action inside the Geneva conference and of further Arab action to be taken, whether the conference succeeds or not?*

*A.* When we go to that conference, we shall have a clear objective. This I described a little while ago as total withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 and safeguarding of the rights of the people of Palestine. During the conference, we shall strive to accomplish that objective, or rather these two objectives, if it is proper to separate the two. If the conference does not achieve what we desire, then we shall look to other means. In my view, if we continue to work in a purposeful manner, we will be able to use such other means as will assuredly achieve what we aspire to.

What we aspire to is just. We do not want to attack anyone. We want to repel aggression. We do not want to occupy the territory of others. We want merely to recover our occupied lands.

*Q. Does your excellency believe that the presence of Palestinians in a unified Arab delegation is a compromise solution among others being suggested for the convening of the conference?*

*A.* There is nothing to prevent PLO representation within one Arab delegation provided this delegation includes representatives of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the PLO and provided this does not imply non-recognition of the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

*Q. This means that the Arabs will decide upon the delegation to be formed and that the PLO will be present as a representative of the Palestinian people?*

*A.* So long as Egypt, Syria and Jordan are recognized as states and the PLO is recognized as an organization responsible for the Palestinian struggle, there would be no harm, indeed it would be useful if one unified delegation is sent, because, as I said above, it does not mean non-recognition of the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

*Q. With your excellency's permission, we move to Lebanon. Just as the Arab nation followed with great attention the sorrowful developments of the Lebanese*

*crisis, so it followed with joy the developments that led to limiting this crisis. Does your excellency believe that Syrian troops will have some other mission in Lebanon once the Arab Deterrent Force has accomplished its task?*

*A.* The fact is that the Arab Deterrent Force is made up basically of Syrian troops. If the Arab force is withdrawn, it would mean that Syrian troops have withdrawn. The Syrian troops have no other mission in Lebanon than to work to achieve peace and stability in sister Lebanon. This is what we wanted to happen in Lebanon right from the beginning of events and this is what we want now and in the future.

It is necessary for me to state here that the Syrian efforts in Lebanon have been of inestimable service to the whole Arab nation. I would like to point out that Syria's political and military efforts prevented Israel from acquiring a different status in Lebanon. I do not mean that our entry into Lebanon prevented Israel by force from realizing its objectives or some of its objectives. What I mean to say is that Syria's presence in Lebanon prevented many reverberations of the Lebanese problem which, if left to take their course, would have created the right atmosphere and circumstances for Israel to achieve much of what it aspires to. This has to do not only with the occupation of territory but in other spheres as well, including the partition of Lebanon into small sectarian states which would help to remove the racist character of the state of Israel.

*Q. As regards the Lebanese South, Israel has massed its troops on Lebanon's southern frontier in order to impede peaceful efforts and using as a pretext the massing of Syrian and Palestinian forces in South Lebanon. What is your excellency's view of this situation?*

*A.* Israel benefited from the fighting in Lebanon and does not want it to stop. Israel now wants to create a problem in South Lebanon. In any case, the South is part of Lebanon and Lebanon is an independent state and a member of the UN. The president of Lebanon has the right to order the forces under his command to proceed to any place in Lebanon and if he asks the Arab forces in Lebanon to move into the southern region, they will move there.

*Q. Regarding relations between Jordan and the PLO, is there a possibility of reconciling these two?*

*A.* As a matter of fact, we have not in the past made any effort to reconcile the PLO and Jordan

nor are we at present contemplating such a reconciliation. We are of course very happy whenever a misunderstanding between any two Arab sides is removed and this applies to all our Arab brethren anywhere. In this regard, we hope that the misunderstanding between the PLO and our brethren in Jordan will end, to the advantage of everyone. But we in Syria have not made any efforts, as I stated, nor are we at present thinking of making such an effort.

If we are asked to make such an effort, we will discuss the matter when it arises.

*Q. In general, does your excellency accept US initiatives, seeing that the US can pressure Israel more than any other state can?*

*A.* It seems to me that it is the Geneva conference which is being discussed at present. Doubtless, no one can deny the importance of the US to the Middle East problem, when one bears in mind the extensive US interests in the region on the one hand and its special responsibility as a great power and a permanent member of the Security Council on the other. We Arabs hope, naturally, that the US role will be consonant with its extensive interests and its special responsibility. Here I would like to remark that US relations with the Arabs have improved in recent years, but this has not affected the US policy of unwavering support for Israel. US support ought really to be given to the Geneva conference to ensure its effectiveness. No doubt, if the US does not want the conference to succeed, it will not succeed.

*Q. (He stated the following regarding relations with the USSR.)*

Soviet relations with the Arab states are subject to periodic changes and fluctuations. While noting with appreciation the Soviet support for our just cause, we hope this support will be more efficacious and substantial.

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### **Statement issued by the Arab communist parties surveying developments in the Middle East (excerpts)<sup>268</sup>**

**Mid-December, 1976**

The following are the main trends of the imperialist offensive:

1. Striking at the progressive regimes in an attempt to liquidate their national and social achievements and gains, or to change their anti-imperialist course.

2. Striking at the Palestine revolution and the PLO, and attempting to contain them and change their leadership.

3. Splitting Arab ranks, wrecking the nationalist and progressive alliance and fronts and striking at the revolutionary parties and forces on the assumption that the unity of progressive Arab ranks and national unity are an obstacle to imperialist plans and to the aggressive and expansionist ambitions of the Israeli leaders.

4. Among the most important goals of American imperialism, Zionism and reaction is that of destroying Arab-Soviet friendship and driving a wedge between the progressive Arab countries and the USSR, along with the other countries of the socialist camp, and isolating the Arab national liberation movement from its strongest and most loyal friend and supporter, so that imperialism may weaken, attack and smash it.

Arab reaction joins the imperialist-Zionist alliance as a partner in the implementation of their plans, in order to preserve their power and class interests and guarantee that the Arab area is linked to and subordinate to imperialism.

The solution of the Middle East crisis is an essential link in the battle the Arab liberation movement is waging against imperialism and Zionism. In addition to the obvious aims of Israel's continued occupation of the Arab territories occupied in 1967, and its refusal to implement United Nations resolutions, aggressive imperialist circles

<sup>268</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nida* (Beirut), December 19, 1976.

are trying to keep the Middle East area a focus of world tension which they can exploit in their own interests.

Since the June aggression, the struggle between the Arab national liberation movement and the imperialist-Zionist enemy has centred on the problem of eliminating the consequences of that aggression; and the Arab liberation movement's prospects of subsequent development have become dependent, to a great extent, on how this problem is solved.

As a result of this, two principal trends have emerged in the Arab world:

- A national liberationist trend.
- A capitulationist trend.

The October 1973 war of liberation embodied, to a very high degree, resolute Arab resistance to imperialist Israeli aggression, while the Sinai agreement, made possible by the step-by-step and capitulationist policy, was an embodiment of the lowest depths of apathy vis-à-vis that aggression.

If they are to confront the current situation and the stage that lies just ahead, the national and progressive forces in the Arab countries must double their efforts and their cohesion in the struggle to foil this imperialist-Israeli plan; and all of them must rally around the national liberationist trend so as to reach a just and sound settlement of the Middle East problem. Such a settlement must secure the withdrawal of Israel from all the Arab territories she occupied in 1967, recover the Palestinians' national rights to return, to self-determination and to the establishment of an independent national state, and close the door to any attempt to deny this right, in whatever guise such an attempt is made.

The USSR has constantly supported this national liberationist trend, and has provided, and is still providing, comprehensive aid to the liberated Arab countries. It has always called for an overall settlement of the Middle East crisis ensuring withdrawal from all Arab territories and the recovery of Palestinian national rights. It has affirmed that the Geneva conference is the proper venue for the settlement of the problem and for the achievement of a durable peace in the area. It has also stressed that the PLO must participate in

this conference from the start, as an essential party and on a basis of equality. The USSR has taken many initiatives and launched wide-ranging campaigns in support of this trend, the last being the initiative it submitted to the parties concerned at the beginning of October 1976, which has received extensive support as providing the right framework for the solution of this grave crisis which continuously threatens to lead to renewed explosions.

It is essential that a just solution of the Palestine problem be found, if the Middle East crisis is to be resolved, and this problem occupies a special position in the Arab world.

Similarly the Palestine resistance movement occupies a salient position in the Arab national liberation movement; it is a vanguard of that movement and constitutes an important force in the struggle against imperialism and Zionism.

The achievement of the goals of the Palestine revolution requires a closer cooperation among the anti-imperialist nationalist and progressive Arab forces, and between them and the Palestine revolution. There must also be increased support for the PLO as being the framework comprising all sections of the resistance and all nationalist Palestinian forces; there must be resistance to all attempts by reaction to strike at it, change its nationalist trend and impede the establishment of the independent Palestinian state.

It is also essential that the struggle of the Palestinian masses in the West Bank under the leadership of the National Front should be supported and expanded, and that settlement operations in the occupied territories, the brutal oppression of Palestinian nationalists and the unjust sentences passed by the courts of the Israeli occupation should be condemned.

The unity of ranks of the Palestinian resistance must be ensured, the dead hand of the past must be thrown off, and the efforts of all Palestinians, whatever their affiliations, must be directed towards the principal goals of the Palestinian people, which are return and self-determination. Capitulationist and surrenderist and adventurist trends must be rejected. All this will play an increasingly important role in expanding the field of the successes of the Palestine resistance, while more extensive cooperation between the PLO and the forces of progress, freedom and socialism through-

out the world will play a major role in strengthening these struggles and consolidating these victories.

It was within the framework of the struggle of the nationalist forces in the Arab world and in Lebanon against partial and individual settlements, and against the Sinai agreement and the policy of surrender it embodies, and in support of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people, and because of the important successes achieved by the Lebanese National Movement in promoting the struggle of the masses against confessionalism for democratic change, that imperialism and Lebanese reaction sparked off the crisis in Lebanon, it being a country in which the forces of the Palestine resistance enjoy a presence and through which it enjoys the right to struggle. The Lebanese civil war has led to many disasters and sacrifices, the shedding of innocent blood and vast material losses.

The following tasks confront the communist and labour parties in the Arab countries and all nationalist and progressive forces:

1. Intensifying the struggle against world imperialism, and in particular American imperialism, and its monopolies, and against Zionism and its schemes which are hostile to the Arab national liberation movement and the Palestine resistance.

2. Struggle for the total liberation of the Arab territories occupied during the 1967 aggression, and support for the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people under the leadership of the PLO for return to their homeland and for self-determination in their own land and their right to establish an independent national state.

5. Intensifying the struggle against the capitulationist policy embodied in the Sinai agreement<sup>269</sup> and against partial and individual solutions and the policy of bargaining with American imperialism.

6. Strengthening and deepening cooperation and alliance in struggle between the Arab national liberation movement, with all its regimes and progressive factions, and the USSR and the countries of the socialist camp, and resolute and vigilant resistance to the destructive machinations

of imperialism directed against Arab-Soviet friendship and cooperation.

8. Solidarity with the Lebanese National Movement and the Lebanese Communist Party in their struggle to maintain the sovereignty of Lebanon and the unity of her territory and people, and to consolidate the foundations of democratic life there.

### 336

**Memorandum by students and parents of detainees in Israeli prisons addressed to the UN Secretary-General, the General Secretary of the Arab League, the International Red Cross, the Commission on Human Rights and the Arab Lawyers Union.**<sup>270</sup>

Nablus, mid-December, 1976

We, the undersigned, from all parts of the occupied territories of Palestine, meeting in the Nablus Municipality in protest against the bad conditions in the city; and on the basis of the hunger-strike by political detainees which threatens their lives, and the massive arrests of students, depriving them of education, and their transfer from their schools to distant villages, as well as the storming of schools and houses; in protest also against the imposition of the value-added tax, demand the following:

1. The implementation of the Declaration of Human Rights, Article 5 of which says that no political detainee is to be subjected to punishment or be deprived of the necessary food, medicine or other care; and Article 9 of which says that no punishment should be inflicted on any human being; Article 25 confirms the right of motherhood, childhood and protective care; Article 12 says that every person has the right to legal protection and that all people, young and old, are equal in rights and dignity.

2. A neutral international committee to visit the prisoners.

3. The freeing of the detained students to allow them to attend school.

<sup>269</sup> Doc. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>270</sup> English text, *Wafa* (Beirut), December 21, 1976, p. 4.

4. Assigning international lawyers to defend the detainees.

5. The abolition of the fines and bail imposed on Palestinian citizens, and an end to the storming of houses and schools.

6. An end to the confiscation of land and to the establishment of new Zionist settlements.

7. A halt to the constant arrest and trial of students.

We, in the Holy Land, call for your immediate intervention to enable all persons to live freely and securely on their own land.

### 337

#### **Announcement of the establishment of a joint political command between Syria and Egypt<sup>271</sup>**

Cairo, December 21, 1976

The government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Arab Republic of Egypt, responding to the will of the Arab people in the two brother regions; discerning their historic responsibilities and national obligations; faithful to the spirit of the martyrs of the glorious October battles; wishing to increase their capabilities when facing the challenge to the Arab nation at the present stage of joint Arab struggle; motivated by their firm belief in a common destiny and common interests; confident that the future of the Arab nation, its freedom and its dignity are all dependent upon their progress along the path to Arab unity; and inspired by the principles of the Arab League Charter and the constitutional provisions of the Federation of Arab Republics as they relate to the strengthening of cooperation in all fields of national endeavour,

Have resolved the following:

*Article 1.* The establishment of a joint political command between the two states by order of the presidents of the SAR and the ARE.

*Article 2.* The joint political command shall lay down, as soon as possible, the foundations required for strengthening and developing the ties of unity between the two states and shall supervise the implementation of measures taken to attain it.

*Article 3.* The joint political command shall form joint committees from the two states to examine and formulate the foundations upon which relations of unity between the two countries can be strengthened and developed in the various spheres.

*Article 4.* The joint political command shall decide upon and announce the final form of the bases upon which agreement has been reached.

### 338

#### **Executive order establishing a joint political command between Syria and Egypt<sup>272</sup>**

Cairo, December 21, 1976

In implementation of the announcement issued in Cairo, dated December 21, 1976, corresponding to Muharram 1, 1397 AH, relating to the establishment of a joint political command between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Arab Republic of Egypt,<sup>273</sup>

Presidents Hafiz Asad of the Syrian Arab Republic and Muhammad Anwar Sadat of the Arab Republic of Egypt have resolved the following:

#### *Article 1.*

A joint political command shall be established between the two states.

#### *Article 2.*

The joint political command shall formulate as soon as possible the principles required for strengthening and developing the ties of unity that bind the two states together.

#### *Article 3.*

The joint political command shall supervise the implementation of measures to be adopted in this regard.

#### *Article 4.*

The joint political command shall form joint committees from the two states to study and formulate the foundations upon which relations of unity between the two countries can be strengthened and developed in the following spheres: constitutional affairs, national defence and security, foreign policy and information, financial and

<sup>271</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), December 22, 1976.

<sup>272</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), December 22, 1976.

<sup>273</sup> Doc. 337 above.

economic affairs, education, science and culture, legislation and administrative and financial systems.

*Article 5.*

These committees are to present reports of work in progress, one by one, to the joint political command so that it can adopt the measures it deems necessary to implement them.

*Article 6.*

The joint political command shall decide upon and announce the final form of the bases upon which agreement has been reached.

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**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Egypt of President Asad of Syria (excerpts)<sup>274</sup>**

Cairo, December 21, 1976

1. At the invitation of President Muhammad Anwar Sadat of the Arab Republic of Egypt, President Hafiz Asad of the Syrian Arab Republic paid an official and fraternal visit to the Arab Republic of Egypt in the period December 18–21, 1976, corresponding to Dhu al-Hijja 27–30, 1396 AH.

2. The government and people of Egypt extended an official and popular welcome to President Asad expressing the deep ties linking the Arab peoples in the Egyptian and Syrian regions as well as Egypt's sentiments of sincere brotherliness towards its sister Syria and its belief in the ties of Arab unity and in the unity of goals and destiny and comradeship in the struggle to achieve the objectives of the Arab nation: the liberation of its territory, the recovery of its rights, the achievement of its unity and the attainment of a better future for its children. All of these principles were best and most fully expressed in the glorious October war.

3. The two presidents held talks in an atmosphere of complete understanding, based upon the brotherhood of the two countries and of total comprehension of the requirements of the present

stage of Arab struggle, which makes Arab solidarity the most effective weapon in facing present and future challenges.

5. During these talks, the means necessary to achieve progress on the road to the unity of the two countries were discussed. That unity had been, throughout history, a protective shield for the Arab nation in the face of foreign schemes aimed at subjecting and fragmenting that nation, undermining its sovereignty and security and exploiting its wealth and resources. The two presidents discussed current bilateral relations and instructed the relevant authorities in the two republics to begin at once to study the present state of relations in the economic, social and cultural fields and to suggest practical measures to expand such relations and to achieve coordination in these spheres. The two presidents decided to establish a joint political command for the two countries.

6. As regards the situation in the Middle East, the two presidents reaffirmed their firm stand and complete conviction of the necessity for establishing a just and permanent peace in the region, so that the Arab nation may move forward towards reconstruction, development and the achievement of economic, social and scientific progress. They further affirmed that this peace cannot come about or be lasting until the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab lands and the restoration of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people to return to their homeland, and to determine their own destiny, sovereignty and independence, are concluded.

7. The two presidents discussed the problems relating to the reconvening of the Middle East peace conference being held under the auspices of the United Nations. They discussed the necessity of reconvening it within a period not extending beyond the end of next March, in order to review the situation in the Middle East created by continued Israeli occupation and denial of the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine. In this regard, they reaffirmed their firm stand concerning the necessity of the participation of the PLO as an independent party to the conference on a footing of equality with all the other parties and in all the discussions held with a view to establishing a just and permanent peace in the region, especially at the projected peace conference.

<sup>274</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), December 22, 1976.

This is because the PLO is the sole and legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine in accordance with the unanimous decision of the Arab summit conference in Rabat, and because the Palestine problem is the core of the conflict in the Middle East. Thus, there can be no just peace if this problem is not tackled and solved in a just manner guaranteeing to the Arab people of Palestine the recovery of their full rights, including their right to establish their own independent state on the soil of Arab Palestine.

8. The two presidents condemn all attempts at obstruction and prevarication which hinder the path to peace. They call upon the USA and the Soviet Union, in their capacity as co-chairmen of the Middle East peace conference and because of their responsibilities for international peace and security, to present, quickly and clearly, their own views and plans regarding peace in the Middle East, on the basis of the principles outlined in the UN Charter and resolutions. The two presidents also call upon the Secretary-General of the UN to commence the necessary contacts immediately with all parties to the Middle East conflict, including the PLO, in order to prepare for the convening of the peace conference in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 3162, of December 9, 1976, which obtained the votes of the great majority of the members. The two presidents also emphasized the important role of the Security Council in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region.

9. In this regard, the two presidents renewed their appeal to all countries granting aid to Israel to stop such aid, since such aid has the effect of consolidating the Israeli occupation and of encouraging Israel to continue to plunder the wealth of Arab lands and peoples and to continue to take measures that contravene human rights and international agreements. The two presidents expressed their appreciation for the policies adopted by member states of the United Nations and for their support of the just Arab position.

10. In this regard, the two presidents emphasize their common stand and their insistence that the year 1977 must witness moves in the direction of ending the occupation and of the recovery by the Arab people of Palestine of their rights, especially their right to establish their own independent state. The Arab nation, now passing through its tenth year under Israeli occupation and its

thirtieth year since the usurpation of Palestinian Arab rights, shall use all means at its disposal to end the current situation, achieve justice and restore rights to its possessors and the land to those who hold sovereignty over it. This will be accomplished within the framework of the principles of the UN Charter and of UN resolutions relating to the Palestine problem and the Middle East crisis.

11. The two presidents take this opportunity to salute the Arab people living in the occupied territories, standing steadfastly against the occupation and struggling in order to liberate themselves from it. They express their solidarity with the struggle of that people and their support for it. At the same time, they strongly condemn the measures adopted by Israel in the occupied Arab territories with regard to the demographic and geographical changes effected as well as the exploitation of the natural resources of this Arab land. They firmly reject all the results that Israel is trying to bring about in adopting such measures. They reaffirm their determined position that these changes cannot engender any obligations or rights under any circumstances because of the occupation. They therefore reserve their right to request just compensation for all that has been and is being done by way of exploitation, plunder and changes being made on this Arab land.

12. In this regard, the two presidents emphasize the importance of Arab solidarity in all its aspects as well as the ending of all disputes that may cloud inter-Arab relations. They express their resolve to play an effective role in this matter so that the Arab nation can move forward in united ranks towards the attainment of its ultimate objectives: freedom, dignity and progress. They call for the complete and careful implementation of the Rabat summit resolutions relating to the attainment of effective Arab coordination in the political, military and economic spheres and to the strengthening of Arab self-capabilities in order to serve the cause of common Arab action and the common Arab road towards a better future.

13. The two leaders discussed the situation in Lebanon in the light of the resolutions adopted at the Riyadh and Cairo summits, which were based upon the commitment to the national and historic responsibility for bolstering the collective Arab role. They expressed their appreciation for the efforts being made to stop the bloodshed in that sister Arab country as well as their conviction

that the national unity of that country will be attained, so that the country may be rebuilt in a manner that would preserve the unity of the land and people of Lebanon as well as the continued existence of the Palestine resistance.

## 340

**Press conference statements by Foreign Minister Fahmi of Egypt discussing the implications of the unified political command established by Egypt and Syria<sup>275</sup>**

Cairo, December 21, 1976

*Q. Is there any contradiction between this bilateral unity and the trilateral union of Egypt, Syria and Libya?*

*A. There is absolutely no contradiction between this bilateral step and the tripartite union; it is not in opposition to it; it strengthens Arab unity.*

*Q. Could Libya join this unified political command between Egypt and Syria?*

*A. You had better ask Libya that question.*

*Q. Does this political communiqué mean that Egypt and Syria will go to the Geneva Conference as a single delegation?*

*A. We shall go as two independent delegations unless it is decided before the conference meets that we should be one delegation. But it will be better if there are independent delegations.*

*Q. Have the basic principles of this agreement been discussed?*

*A. Before the Cairo meeting these steps were agreed on in Cairo, and the basic principles have been in existence since October, and before that.*

*Q. Does this political communiqué, which mentions cooperation, defence and national security, mean that Egypt will have a more positive role as regards the Arab peace force [in Lebanon]?*

*A. If you mean more consultation and exchange of views, that is possible. Is there not a Syrian role in the security forces? These forces were established by the decision of the Arab heads of state.*

*Q. Can any Arab state join this political command?*

*A. We shall welcome any Arab state that wants to join this effort. But we must start with Egyptian-Syrian cooperation. You will know from this statement the results of the meeting.*

*Q. Is there any possibility of a single Arab delegation to Geneva being formed?*

*A. There is no chance of that.*

*Q. Do the Arab states advocate comprehensive Arab unity?*

*A. Do you mean the establishment of a unified Arab state including twenty states? My answer is that if we start with this step there will be a chance of greater unity and cooperation. The communiqué makes it clear that we shall not discuss that stage until this union is constitutionally established. Then it will be possible to start discussing the possibility of joining us. But the political philosophy behind this will not change. We are following a unionist policy for the unification of all the Arab states.*

*Q. Will the Palestinians join this unity?*

*A. That depends on them. We should welcome them, and the two Presidents are going to discuss this with the Palestinians.*

*Q. What is Egypt's attitude to the Palestinians being represented at Geneva?*

*A. The two Presidents agreed that the Organization should send an independent delegation to the Conference. Anyway, this was agreed on at the Rabat summit conference.<sup>276</sup>*

*Q. Is there any disagreement between Egypt and Syria as regards the political systems in force in the two states?*

*A. We may recall that there were differences between Egypt and Syria when full unity was announced. That union was established in a hurry, and it ended with the unfortunate secession. Therefore we are making a start with our eyes open on a wise, sensible and realistic basis, being guided by our past experience, and we know how to face these problems. That is why we decided to form six committees to study the problems of unity.*

*Q. Has the disagreement between Egypt and Syria over the disengagement agreement<sup>277</sup> ended?*

<sup>275</sup> Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), December 22, 1976; partial English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), VI, 3 (Spring 1977), pp. 180-182.

<sup>276</sup> See Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

<sup>277</sup> Doc. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.



A. The principles included in this statement give the impression that what happened between Egypt and Syria was regrettable, but will have no effect on the basic principles and the links that exist between the two peoples.

*Q. What will the next diplomatic moves be?*

A. I am waiting for Waldheim to arrive; he said that he would be here before the end of January, that he had started contacts in New York and that he would contact the parties when he comes to the area. Then we shall be able to see the picture clearly, and this operation will continue so that the Geneva Conference may meet in March. This is based on an Egyptian move in the light of the resolution of the General Assembly and its request to Waldheim to get in touch with the Palestinians.

*Q. What do you think of the present Israeli crisis and the elections that are to be held in Israel in May?*

A. It is a matter of acrobatics on the part of Israel. I had expected it and said so in my press interview some weeks ago. I said that the Israelis would try to freeze any efforts made in 1977 by exerting pressure on the Americans, either by the Israeli government resigning or by declaring that Rabin's government was too weak to do anything. Then, when the summer comes, they would say that they cannot make any move until the autumn, because they are preparing for the elections. I said in the interview that all Israel's efforts were aimed at freezing all peace efforts; they do not want peace and they do not want the Geneva peace conference. Then suddenly Rabin announced that he had become head of a caretaker government, next he will resign and then hold elections that will take up half the year, saying that he has no power or authority. Rabin may be returned as Prime Minister, or it may be Peres or Golda Meir. It is all acrobatics. We shall push them towards peace to prove to the world that they fear peace, that they are afraid of a final settlement because they do not want peace in the area, and they are playing around with peace...

*Q. Will there be contacts with Carter after this step [declaration of the union]?*

A. This step does not depend on Carter or on Brezhnev, and we hope it will not affect their attitude.

*Q. Why are you opposed to a single delegation at Geneva?*

A. We do not think that it is the best way to deal with the problems of the area.

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**Press interview statements by PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi concerning the Egypt-Syria joint communiqué as it relates to the Palestine question<sup>278</sup>**

Beirut, December 23, 1976

*Q. What is your evaluation of the joint Egyptian-Syrian communiqué,<sup>279</sup> particularly as regards the PLO and the Palestine question?*

A. The joint communiqué has reaffirmed the decisions of the Rabat and Cairo summit meetings, which had confirmed that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It also supported the resolutions of the 12th Palestine National Congress on the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on any part of Palestinian soil liberated from the enemy.

The communiqué, moreover, destroyed any doubt as to the confirmation of these resolutions; for there is no longer any doubt that the PLO, with full Arab approval, is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The communiqué also stressed the independence of Palestinian action in all fields, whether on the level of decisions, attitudes, activities or political moves.

*Q. Do you believe that the Joint Egyptian-Syrian communiqué has definitely blocked the path to any force other than the PLO representing the Palestinian people?*

A. The communiqué was undoubtedly clear in determining the independence of Palestinian activity and in confirming Palestinian aims, and support for these on all levels, both Arab and international. The communiqué also clearly pointed out the achievements made by the Palestinians on both the Arab and international levels.

<sup>278</sup> Interview conducted by Wafa, English text, *Wafa*, (Beirut), December 23, 1976, pp. 1-4.

<sup>279</sup> Doc. 339 above.

*Q. The communiqué mentioned the Geneva conference; what is the position of the PLO on this question?*

*A.* The emphasis on the independence of the Palestinian role is an important element of Arab policy. On the Arab level, this situation gives the PLO more freedom of choice and of refusal with regard to political moves on the international level.

We are undoubtedly a people seeking a just and lasting peace, on condition that our national rights, including the right of return and self-determination, sovereignty and independence, which are mentioned in the communiqué, are achieved.

As regards the Geneva conference, this issue will be put before the Palestine National Congress, which will convene next February. But it is important to point out that the Congress has already decided that the PLO will not participate in the Geneva conference on the basis of Security Council resolution 242. The omission of any mention of resolutions 242 and 338 in the Syrian-Egyptian communiqué is an important matter.

Since the resolutions of the Twelfth Palestine National Congress, we have worked in the service of our cause on the international level, through the UN General Assembly and the Security Council, and have achieved important and advanced resolutions supporting our national rights. It is worth noting that the Syrian-Egyptian communiqué has taken note of the General Assembly resolutions concerning the Palestine question, and the importance of the Security Council in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region.

*Q. How do you view the resignation of the Israeli Cabinet in light of the mention in the communiqué of the question of peace?*

*A.* The resignation of the Israeli Cabinet is evidence of political embarrassment in Israeli ruling circles faced with growing international pressure and support for our national rights. This clearly reveals that Israel is not willing to have a just and lasting peace, as it is at the same time continuing its aggressive and expansionist policy, which will inevitably lead to a new war. Meanwhile, US policy continues to back Israel in its aggressive and colonialist designs. Therefore, we should stress the role of our friend the USSR in its support for Arab potential in confronting Israeli aggression, for the regaining of occupied Arab territories and for the achievement of the Pales-

tinian people's national rights.

After the negative and dangerous effects on Arab solidarity of Kissinger's step-by-step policy, and the splits and local wars this policy has brought about, the role of the USSR has become clearer, emerging as a positive constructive and friendly one in confronting the US-Israeli alliance against our Arab nation.

Therefore, it is imperative that we strengthen and develop Arab-Soviet ties of friendship, and the PLO is in a position which enables it to realize this step.

*Q. Do you believe that the coming Arab-Israeli conflict will only be a political one, or are there new possibilities of war?*

*A.* The Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be only political, for Israel is a military arsenal and the USA is determined on developing and supporting the Israeli military machine. The likelihood of a new war is on the horizon, in spite of the repeated calls for peace in the Arab region, which Israel continually insists on ignoring.

*Q. What about Arab solidarity and clearing the Arab atmosphere in light of the joint communiqué?*

*A.* We hope that more Arab efforts will be exerted to clear the Arab atmosphere of disputes and set an effective framework for Arab solidarity and support of the Arab confrontation forces.

There is no doubt that Iraq, with its military and economic potential and its militant history, plays an important role in confrontation and in the Arab march towards liberation and unity. Iraq is one of the Arab confrontation states which participated in the October War, and with all its military potential it played an important role in reinforcing Arab solidarity. Such participation constitutes a real nucleus for confrontation, around which all Arab countries can rally.

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**Policy statement presented by the new government of Lebanon to parliament (excerpt)<sup>280</sup>**

Beirut, December 23, 1976

In connection with foreign policy, the Government proceeds from a basic principle, namely, that Lebanon is an indivisible part of the Arab world. Lebanon adheres to the Arab League Charter and calls for bolstering it and increasing its capability since that Charter has proved its efficacy in dealing with numerous Arab problems and issues. The commendable role played by the League in handling the Lebanese crisis induces us to further adherence to that position.

On this occasion, as the Government thanks the Arab kings and presidents for their efforts to stop the bloodshed in Lebanon, the Government particularly thanks sisterly Syria. The relations of Lebanon with Syria are characterized by the nature of brotherhood, neighbourliness, joint history and common aspirations. The noble initiative of Syria has had an efficacious effect on achieving security and stability in the country. The Government also thanks the friendly states and the international organizations which have shown their interest in Lebanon during its tribulation. The Government believes that the development of Lebanon's relations with other friendly states and the international organizations reinforces Lebanon's role in the world and in the area. As the Government depends on Lebanon's friendships abroad, it understands the effect which the Lebanese expatriates throughout the world have on strengthening and bolstering those friendships.

The Government affirms Lebanon's faith in the Palestine causes, and notes that Lebanon's relations with the PLO will be based on frankness, trust, respect for the state's sovereignty and observance of the agreements signed<sup>281</sup> and the resolutions of the recent Riyadh and Cairo summit conferences.<sup>282</sup>

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**Message from PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat on the occasion of the twelfth anniversary of the Palestine revolution<sup>283</sup>**

Beirut, December 31, 1976

The year of challenge and confrontation—with all its harshness and violence, its pain and suffering and all the heroism and legends generated by the blood and sacrifices of our martyrs and enriched by the steadfastness of our people inside and outside the occupied homeland—has ended.

Nineteen seventy-six has ended, but its lessons and experiences have left their mark on the great march of the revolution.

For the revolution and its revolutionaries, 1976 did not just represent days and months; it was a year which will remain eternal in the annals of the history of our revolution and of our heroic people, and which will provide a source of courage, patience, steadfastness, dignity and manliness for coming generations.

Despite its bitterness, harshness and pain, the year of challenge and confrontation also witnessed a great upsurge of revolutionary struggle and courage by this great people, which will enrich the progress of the whole Arab nation towards a life of pride and glory—and not the life sought for it by the US imperialist-Zionist-agent conspiracy.

The stories of steadfastness in the year of steadfastness; of challenge and confrontation in the year of challenge and confrontation; of suffering and pain; and of sacrifice; will be told to coming generations and chronicled in the pages of history.

As for the dangerous colonialist plot—its objectives, the aims of its conspirators and the scheming imperialist-Zionist forces—it must be confronted with conscious logic, meticulous analysis and overall study so that all its dimensions, repercussions and fronts can be dealt with. We must not lose ourselves in a maze, but must instead deal with facts and realities with the greatest care, firmness and revolutionary faith.

For example, after the 1974 Rabat summit,<sup>284</sup> Kissinger said, in the presence of one of the friendly

<sup>280</sup> Read by Prime Minister Hoss and broadcast on Beirut radio in Arabic; excerpted from the partial English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5399/A/2-3; reprinted by permission.

<sup>281</sup> See note to doc. 195 above.

<sup>282</sup> Docs. 305, 306, 313 and 314 above.

<sup>283</sup> English text, *Wafa* (Beirut), December 31, 1976, pp. 6-9.

<sup>284</sup> See doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

leaders, that what had taken place at Rabat had disrupted all his plans and calculations. He subsequently found it necessary to strike at the essence of Arab steadfastness and, particularly, the allies of the October war: Egypt, Syria and the Palestinian revolution; and then to disarm the Arabs of the oil weapon as an effective factor in the battle between the Arab nation and the Zionist-imperialist assault against it.

We must admit that Kissinger has achieved a remarkable success in his counter-attack.

We must also register the importance of what we have achieved at both the Riyadh and Cairo conferences,<sup>285</sup> in terms of putting an end to the bloodshed in Lebanon and to the fighting between us and Syria, as well as the reestablishment of Egyptian-Syrian relations and consequently of Syrian-Egyptian-Palestinian unity as a basic pillar in the Arab-Zionist conflict, and subsequent action towards the use of oil as an effective weapon in the present confrontation.

Here we touch on the broad lines of the overall picture in the region and of the huge conspiracy against us; starting from an essential and important point, which is that the American imperialist-Zionist conspiracy has not yet ended. On the contrary, we must be aware that the conspiracy will become fiercer in the next phase, taking on new forms, and that there will be concentration on the Palestinian revolution as a main and basic factor in the on-going struggle in the region. For the Palestinian revolution is at the centre of this vicious current confrontation.

For this reason, the conspiratorial imperialist-Zionist forces have concentrated their efforts on liquidating the Palestinian revolution in its capacity as the complicating factor in their invidious plan for the region. For if the imperialist forces are unable to liquidate the revolution completely, then they are not averse to taming it or trimming its wings, and turning it into a disarmed, restricted entity, devoid of the active militant spirit that troubles the thoughts of imperialists and Zionists; thus making it acceptable as part of the change and exchange taking place in the region on the basis of imperialist plans.

The will to challenge in our Arab nation has enough honest awareness, enough reserves and enough power to confront the plots against it—

this great and giving nation—just as it has confronted many generations of attackers and plotters. Each attacker or conqueror who came eventually left, while this nation remained, defying time and tragedy, watering with its blood every inch of its soil, and feeding with its soul every one of its holy places. This land will remain for us and our children, for we have inherited it from our ancestors in order to hand it down to our grandsons, free from fanaticism, chauvinism and fascism.

In this overall picture, our heroic revolutionaries have heavy responsibilities to bear, for we are recording for history this trust which generations before us have carried with awareness, determination and pride; the trust of struggle, the dignity of the revolution and the ability of our people and revolutionaries to bear this responsibility.

For how great is the message borne by this generation of our people—a message for the sake of which we must struggle, sacrifice all and die, a message for contemporary history and future generations.

The place of our revolutionaries is in the vanguard of the Marathon, firm as rocks, strong, proud and intrepid, unmoved by the storm, steadfast in their convictions and confident in their worth in the face of all these difficulties, tribulations and conspiracies.

As revolutionaries, we confront all this with greater firmness, courage, revolutionary self-sacrifice and unity, with further and stronger national unity, cohesion, fraternity and love.

In this understanding, our people in occupied Palestine are writing legends with their bare hands, with stones, with Molotov cocktails, with patience and great pride, with continuous defiance of the enemy, their greatness coinciding with the greatness of their people outside the occupied homeland.

And thus the march of our revolutionaries and people advances, overcoming pain and difficulties with an iron will and rare determination and persistence, creating a procession on the road of liberation and return. This is the fate which we have chosen for ourselves because we address and even make history.

May our march continue and may the incentive in this coming year be explosive enough to make your great revolution legendary, so that we may protect and enrich our march, and so that our giving may be worthy of the revolution and our

<sup>285</sup> Docs. 305, 306, 313 and 314 above.

thrust forward strengthened through further victories on all levels.

It is our duty in this commemoration of the launching of your revolution to recall with love and gratitude the heroic Lebanese people and their

loyal national movement. It is also our duty on this 1st of January to remember with pride the innocent martyrs who fell on the long path of struggle, pledging to march forward until liberation.



# Appendices





## A. Egypt's Cabinet in 1976

<i>Head of State</i>	Muhammad Anwar Sadat
<i>Prime Minister</i>	Mamduh Salim
<i>Deputy Prime Minister</i>	Rifaat Mahgub
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Higher Education</i>	Muhammad Hafiz Ghanim
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs</i>	Ismail Fahmi
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Defence</i>	Muhammad Gamasi
<i>Manpower</i>	Abd al-Latif Baltiya
<i>Economy</i>	Muhammad Zaki Shafei
<i>Finance</i>	Ahmad Abu Ismail
<i>Irrigation</i>	Abd al-Azim Abu al-Ata
<i>Scientific and Technological Research</i>	Muhammad Abd al-Maabur al-Gubayli
<i>Interior</i>	Sayyid Fahmi
<i>Transport</i>	Mahmud Fahmi Abd al-Rahman
<i>Industry</i>	Issa Shahin
<i>Foreign Trade</i>	Zakariya Tawfiq Abd al-Fattah
<i>Planning</i>	Ibrahim Hilmi Abd al-Rahman
<i>Justice</i>	Adil Yunis
<i>Communications</i>	Muhammad Kamal al-Din Hasanayn
<i>Waqf and Azhar Affairs</i>	Muhammad Hasan Dhahabi
<i>Social Affairs</i>	Aishah Ratib
<i>Power</i>	Ahmad Sultan
<i>Agriculture and Land Reclamation</i>	Uthman Badran
<i>Military Production</i>	Ahmad Kamil Badri
<i>Information and Culture</i>	Yusuf Sibai
<i>Health</i>	Fuad Muhy al-Din
<i>Local Government and Popular Organization</i>	Muhammad Hamid Mahmud
<i>Petroleum</i>	Ahmad Izz al-Din Hilal
<i>Housing and Reconstruction</i>	Uthman Ahmad Uthman
<i>Tourism</i>	Ibrahim Nagib
<i>Education</i>	Mustafa Kamal Hilmi
<i>Supply and Internal Trade</i>	Abd al-Rahman Shadhili
<i>State for Cabinet Affairs</i>	Abd al-Fattah Abdallah
<i>State for National Assembly Affairs</i>	Albert Barsum Salama

## NEW CABINET: MARCH 19

<i>Prime Minister</i>	Mamduh Salim
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Social Services</i>	Muhammad Hafiz Ghanim
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs</i>	Ismail Fahmi
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, War and War Production</i>	Muhammad Gamasi
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Production, Electricity and Energy</i>	Ahmad Sultan
<i>Manpower and Vocational Training</i>	Abd al-Latif Baltiya
<i>Social Affairs and Social Security</i>	Aishah Ratib
<i>Health</i>	Ahmad Fuad Muhy ad-Din
<i>Housing and Reconstruction</i>	Uthman Ahmad Uthman
<i>Education</i>	Mustafa Kamal Hilmi
<i>Justice</i>	Adil Yunis
<i>Interior</i>	Sayyid Fahmi
<i>Waqf and Azhar Affairs</i>	Muhammad Husayn Dhahabi
<i>Information and Culture</i>	Gamal Utayfi
<i>Petroleum</i>	Ahmad Izz ad-Din Hilal
<i>Transport and Communications</i>	Abd al-Fattah Abdallah
<i>Maritime Transport</i>	Mahmud Fahmi
<i>Industry and Mineral Resources</i>	Issa Shahin
<i>Agriculture and Irrigation</i>	Abd al-Azim Abu al-Ata
<i>Tourism and Aviation</i>	Ibrahim Nagib
<i>Trade and Supply</i>	Zakariya Tawfiq Abd al-Fattah
<i>Finance</i>	Ahmad Abu Ismail
<i>Planning</i>	Muhammad Mahmud Imam
<i>State for Housing and Reconstruction</i>	Muhammad Bahgat Hasanayn
<i>State for War Production</i>	Gamal Sidqi
<i>State for Agriculture and Sudanese Affairs</i>	Abd al-Aziz Husayn
<i>State for National Assembly Affairs</i>	Albert Barsum Salama
<i>State for Local Government and Popular and Political Organizations</i>	Muhammad Hamid Mahmud
<i>State for Scientific Research and Atomic Energy</i>	Ahmad Abd al-Maabud Gubayli
<i>State for Foreign Relations</i>	Muhammad Riyad
<i>State for Cabinet Affairs and Administrative Development</i>	Fuad Sharif

## CHANGES: MAY 2

<i>Justice</i>	Ahmad Samih Talaat
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## AUGUST 8

<i>State for Cabinet Affairs and National Assembly Affairs</i>	Albert Barsum Salama
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## NEW CABINET: NOVEMBER 9

<i>Prime Minister</i>	Mamduh Salim
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Financial and Economic Affairs</i>	Abd al-Munim Qaysuni
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Social Services</i>	Muhammad Hafiz Ghanim
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs</i>	Ismail Fahmi
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, War and War Production</i>	Muhammad Gamasi
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Production, Electricity and Energy</i>	Ahmad Sultan
<i>Manpower and Vocational Training</i>	Abd al-Latif Baltiya
<i>Tourism and Aviation</i>	Ibrahim Nagib
<i>Social Affairs and Social Security</i>	Aishah Ratib
<i>National Assembly Affairs</i>	Ahmad Fuad Muhy ad-Din
<i>Petroleum</i>	Ahmad Izz ad-Din Hilal
<i>Transport, Communications and Maritime Transport</i>	Abd al-Fattah Abdallah Mahmud
<i>Local Government and Popular and Political Organizations</i>	Muhammad Hamid Mahmud
<i>Education</i>	Mustafa Kamal Hilmi
<i>Interior</i>	Sayyid Husayn Fahmi
<i>Trade and Supply</i>	Zakariya Tawfiq Abd al-Fattah
<i>Agriculture and Irrigation</i>	Abd al-Azim Abu al-Ata
<i>Industry and Mineral Resources</i>	Issa Shahin
<i>Information and Culture</i>	Gamal Utayfi
<i>Planning</i>	Muhammad Mahmud Imam
<i>Justice</i>	Ahmad Samih Talaat
<i>Housing and Construction</i>	Hasan Muhammad Hasan
<i>Economy and Economic Cooperation</i>	Hamid Abd al-Latif Saih
<i>Health</i>	Ibrahim Gamil Mustafa Badran
<i>Finance</i>	Mahmud Salah ad-Din Hamid
<i>Waqf and Azhar Affairs</i>	Muhammad Mutawalli Abd al-Hafiz Shadrawi
<i>State for Scientific Research and Atomic Energy</i>	Muhammad Abd al-Maabud Gubayli
<i>State for War Production</i>	Gamal ad-Din Muhammad Sidqi
<i>State for Foreign Relations</i>	Muhammad Mahmud Riyad
<i>State for Agriculture and Sudan Affairs</i>	Abd al-Aziz Husayn
<i>State for Administrative Development</i>	Ali Abd al-Magid Abdu
<i>State for Cabinet Affairs and Oversight</i>	Albert Barsum Salama

**B. Israel's Cabinet in 1976***Head of State*

Ephraim Katzir

*Prime Minister*

Yitzhak Rabin (Labour—Mapai)

*Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs*

Yigal Allon (Labour—Ahdot Ha'vodah)

*Defence*

Shimon Peres (Labour—Rafi)

*Education*

Aharon Yadlin (Labour—Mapai)

*Labour*

Moshe Baram (Labour—Mapai)

*Commerce and Industry*

Haim Bar-Lev (Labour—Mapai)

*Police*

Shlomo Hillel (Labour—Mapai)

*Interior*

Yosef Burg (National Religious Party)

*Health*

Victor Shemtov (Mapam)

*Social Welfare*

Zevulun Hammer (National Religious Party)

*Tourism*

Moshe Kol (Independent Liberal)

*Immigrant Absorption*

Shlomo Rosen (Mapam)

*Housing*

Avraham Ofer (Labour—Mapai)

*Transport*

Gad Yaacobi (Labour—Rafi)

*Finance*

Yehoshua Rabinowitz (Labour—Mapai)

*Justice*

Haim Zadok (Labour—Mapai)

*Religious Affairs*

Yitzhak Rafael (National Religious Party)

*Agriculture*

Aharon Uzan (Labour—Mapai)

*Without Portfolio*

Israel Galili (Labour—Ahdot Ha'vodah)

*Without Portfolio*

Gideon Hausner (Independent Liberal)

## CARETAKER CABINET: DECEMBER 19

<i>Prime Minister</i>	Yitzhak Rabin (Labour—Mapai)
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs</i>	Yigal Allon (Labour—Ahdot Ha'vodah)
<i>Defence</i>	Shimon Peres (Labour—Rafi)
<i>Education</i>	Aharon Yadlin (Labour—Mapai)
<i>Labour</i>	Moshe Baram (Labour—Mapai)
<i>Commerce and Industry</i>	Haim Bar-Lev (Labour—Mapai)
<i>Police</i>	Shlomo Hillel (Labour—Mapai)
<i>Health</i>	Victor Shemtov (Mapam)
<i>Tourism</i>	Moshe Kol (Independent Liberal)
<i>Immigrant Absorption</i>	Shlomo Rosen (Mapam)
<i>Housing</i>	Avraham Ofer (Labour—Mapai)
<i>Transport</i>	Gad Yaacobi (Labour—Rafi)
<i>Finance</i>	Yehoshua Rabinowitz (Labour—Mapai)
<i>Justice</i>	Haim Zadok (Labour—Mapai)
<i>Agriculture</i>	Aharon Uzan (Labour—Mapai)
<i>Without Portfolio</i>	Israel Galili (Labour—Ahdot Ha'vodah)
<i>Without Portfolio</i>	Gideon Hausner (Independent Liberal)

The portfolios of Interior, Social Welfare and Religious Affairs were vacant following the dismissal of the three ministers from the National Religious Party.

**C. Jordan's Cabinet 1976***Head of State*

King Hussein ibn Talal

*Prime Minister, Defence, Foreign Affairs*

Zaid Rifai

*Economy*

Raja Muashshir

*Interior*

Tharwat Talhuni

*Justice*

Naji Tarawna

*Development and Reconstruction*

Subhi Amin Amr

*Communications*

Ahmad Shawbaki

*Information and Culture*

Salah Abu Zaid

*Education*

Dhuqan Hindawi

*Transport*

Khalid Hasan

*Social Affairs*

Sami Ayyub

*Tourism*

Ghalib Barakat

*Supply*

Ali Hasan Awda

*Agriculture*

Marwan Hammud

*Public Works*

Mahmud Hawamda

*Health*

Trad Qadi

*Municipal and Rural Affairs*

Muhammad Zabin

*State for Foreign Affairs*

Sadiq Shari

*State for Prime Minister's Office*

Rakan Jazi

*Finance*

Salim Masaada

## NEW CABINET: FEBRUARY 8

*Prime Minister, Defence, Foreign Affairs*  
*Interior*  
*Finance*  
*Information and Culture*  
*Reconstruction and Development*  
*Education*  
*Transport*  
*Labour*  
*Tourism*  
*Communications*  
*Supply*  
*Agriculture*  
*Religious Affairs*  
*Public Works*  
*Justice*  
*Health*  
*Municipal and Rural Affairs*  
*Trade and Industry*  
*State for Foreign Affairs*  
*State for Cabinet Affairs*

Zaid Rifai  
 Tharwat Talhuni  
 Salim Masaada  
 Salah Abu Zaid  
 Subhi Amin Amr  
 Dhuqan Hindawi  
 Mahmud Hawamda  
 Issam Ajluni  
 Ghalib Barakat  
 Muhammad Zabin  
 Salah Jumaa  
 Marwan Hammud  
 Abd al-Aziz Khayyat  
 Ahmad Shawbaki  
 Naji Tarawna  
 Trad Qadi  
 Ismail Armuti  
 Raja Muashshir  
 Hasan Ibrahim  
 Rakan Jazi

## NEW CABINET: JULY 13

*Prime Minister, Defence, Foreign Affairs**Interior**Finance**Education**Information and Culture**Health**Tourism**Public Works**Justice**Municipal and Rural Affairs**Transport**Trade and Industry**Agriculture**Reconstruction and Development**Labour**Islamic Affairs**Communications**State for Prime Minister's Office*

Mudar Badran

Sulayman Arar

Salim Masaada

Dhuqan Hindawi

Adnan Abu Awda

Muhammad Bashir

Ghalib Barakat

Ahmad Shawbaki

Ahmad Abd al-Karim Tarawna

Marwan Hammud

Mahmud Hawamda

Raja Muashshir

Salah Jumaa

Hasan Ibrahim

Issam Ajluni

Kamil Sharif

Abd al-Rauf Rawabida

Marwan Qasim



## NEW CABINET: NOVEMBER 28

<i>Prime Minister</i>	Mudar Badran
<i>Education</i>	Abd al-Salam Majali
<i>Information</i>	Adnan Abu Awda
<i>Health</i>	Muhammad Bashir
<i>Tourism</i>	Ghalib Barakat
<i>Justice</i>	Ahmad Abd al-Karim Tarawna
<i>Agriculture</i>	Salah Jumaa
<i>Reconstruction and Development</i>	Hasan Ibrahim
<i>Labour</i>	Issam Ajluni
<i>Islamic Affairs</i>	Kamil Sharif
<i>Supplies</i>	Marwan Qasim
<i>Interior</i>	Sulayman Arar
<i>Communications</i>	Abd al-Rauf Rawabida
<i>Municipal and Rural Affairs</i>	Ibrahim Ayyub
<i>Culture</i>	Sharif Fawwaz Sharaf
<i>Finance</i>	Muhammad Dabbas
<i>Trade and Industry</i>	Najm ad-Din Dajani
<i>Public Works</i>	Said Binu
<i>Transport</i>	Ali Suhaymat

**D. Syria's Cabinet in 1976**

<i>Head of State</i>	Hafiz Asad
<i>Prime Minister</i>	Mahmud Ayyubi
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs</i>	Abd al-Halim Khaddam
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Economic Affairs</i>	Muhammad Haydar
<i>Defence</i>	Mustafa Tlas
<i>Interior</i>	Ali Zaza
<i>Supply and Internal Trade</i>	Ahmad Qabalan
<i>Public Works and Water</i>	Abd al-Ghani Qannut
<i>Education</i>	Shakir Fahham
<i>Higher Education</i>	Muhammad Hashim
<i>Culture and National Guidance</i>	Fawzi Kayyali
<i>Tourism</i>	Abdallah Khani
<i>Industry</i>	Shutaywi Sayfawi
<i>Economy and Foreign Trade</i>	Muhammad Imadi
<i>Justice</i>	Adib Nahawi
<i>Communications</i>	Umar Sibai
<i>Waqfs</i>	Abd al-Sattar Sayyid
<i>Health</i>	Madani Khiyami
<i>Social Affairs and Labour</i>	Husayn Kuwaydir
<i>Local Administration</i>	Adib Milhim
<i>Cabinet Affairs</i>	Fayiz Nasir
<i>Housing and Utilities</i>	Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi
<i>Transport</i>	Numan Zayn
<i>Power</i>	Hani Sawwaf
<i>Finance</i>	Muhammad Sharif
<i>Information</i>	Ahmad Iskandar Ahmad
<i>Agriculture</i>	Mursil Abu Umar
<i>Oil and Mineral Resources</i>	Adnan Mustafa
<i>Euphrates Dam</i>	Subhi Kahhala
<i>State for Planning</i>	Nurallah Nurallah
<i>State</i>	Anwar Hammada
<i>State</i>	Zuhayr Abd al-Samad

## NEW CABINET: AUGUST 11

<i>Prime Minister</i>	Abd al-Rahman Khulayfawi
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs</i>	Abd al-Halim Khaddam
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Economic Affairs</i>	Jamil Shaya
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Public Services</i>	Fahmi Yusufi
<i>Defence</i>	Mustafa Tlas
<i>Interior</i>	Adnan Dabbagh
<i>Local Administration</i>	Taha Khayrat
<i>Public Works and Water</i>	Nazim Qaddur
<i>Euphrates Dam</i>	Subhi Kahhala
<i>Education</i>	Shakir Fahham
<i>Culture and National Guidance</i>	Najah Attar
<i>Justice</i>	Adib Nahawi
<i>Communications</i>	Umar Sibai
<i>Supply and International Trade</i>	Muhammad Ghubash
<i>Economy and Foreign Trade</i>	Muhammad Imadi
<i>Social Affairs and Labour</i>	Anwar Hamada
<i>Health</i>	Madani Khiyami
<i>Tourism</i>	Ghassan Dhalhub
<i>Higher Education</i>	Muhammad Ali Hashim
<i>Housing and Utilities</i>	Muharram Tayyara
<i>Industry</i>	Shutaywi Sayfawi
<i>Transport</i>	Numan Zayn
<i>Power</i>	Ahmad Umar Yusufi
<i>Finance</i>	Sadiq Ayyubi
<i>Information</i>	Ahmad Iskandar Ahmad
<i>Agriculture</i>	Ahmad Qabalan
<i>Oil and Mineral Resources</i>	Isa Darwish
<i>Waqfs</i>	Abd al-Sattar Sayyid
<i>State for Presidential Affairs</i>	Adib Milhim
<i>State for Cabinet Affairs</i>	Husayn Ahmad Kuwaydir
<i>State for Foreign Affairs</i>	Abd al-Karim Aadi
<i>State for Planning Affairs</i>	George Huraniyya
<i>State</i>	Sharif Qush
<i>State</i>	Diya Malluhi
<i>State</i>	Zuhayr Abd al-Samad
<i>State</i>	Yusuf Juaydani

**E. Palestine Liberation Organization, Executive Committee in 1976**

Yasir Arafat (Fatah)—Chairman

Faruq Qaddumi (Fatah)

Zuhayr Muhsin (Saiqa)

Adib Abd Rabbou (DFLP)

Abd al-Wahhab Kayyali (Arab Liberation Front)

Talal Naji (PFLP—General Command)

Hamid Abu Sitta (Independent)

Muhammad Nashashibi (Independent)

Abd al-Aziz Wajih (Independent)

Elia Khoury (Independent)

Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar (West Bank)

Abd al-Jawwad Salih (West Bank)

Walid Qamhawi (West Bank)

**F. Voting on UN General Assembly resolutions, 31st session**

Y=Yes N=No A=Abstention NP=Not Present

RESOLUTION	31/15					31/20	31/61	31/62	31/71	31/106				31/110	31/186
	A	B	C	D	E					A	B	C	D		
Afghanistan	Vote not recorded	Adopted unanimously	Adopted unanimously	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Albania				NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Algeria				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Argentina				Y	Y	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Australia				Y	Y	N	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A
Austria				Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A
Bahamas				Y	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	A
Bahrain				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bangladesh				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Barbados				Y	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y
Belgium				Y	Y	N	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A
Benin				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bhutan				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bolivia				NP	NP	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A
Botswana				Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Brazil				Y	Y	NP	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bulgaria				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP	Y	Y	Y
Burma				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Burundi				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Byelorussian SSR				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Canada				Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A
Cape Verde				NP	NP	Y	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP
Central African Republic				Y	Y	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Chad				NP	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Chile				NP	NP	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP	Y	Y	Y
China				Y	Y	Y	NP	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Colombia				Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y
Comoros				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP	NP
Congo				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP	Y
Costa Rica				N	N	N	N	A	Y	A	Y	N	N	A	A
Cuba				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cyprus				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Czechoslovakia				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Democratic Kampuchea				Y	Y	Y	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP
Democratic Yemen				Y	Y	Y	NP	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Denmark				Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A
Dominican Republic				NP	NP	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A
Ecuador				Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	NP	Y
Egypt				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
El Salvador				Y	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y
Equatorial Guinea				NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ethiopia				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Fiji				Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	NP	NP	NP	NP	A	Y
Finland				Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y

RESOLUTION	31/15					31/20	31/61	31/62	31/71	31/106				31/110	31/186
	A	B	C	D	E					A	B	C	D		
France	Vote not recorded	Adopted unanimously	Y	Y		A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A
Gabon			Y	Y		Y	NP	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Gambia			Y	Y		A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP
German Democratic Republic			Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
German Federal Republic			Y	Y		N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A
Ghana			Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Greece			Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Grenada	..	Adopted	NP	NP		A	Y	Y	Y	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Guatemala	..	..	NP	NP		N	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	A	A
Guinea	..	..	NP	NP		Y	Y	Y	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Guinea-Bissau	..	..	NP	NP		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Guyana	..	..	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Haiti	..	..	NP	NP		N	NP	NP	NP	N	A	N	A	NP	NP
Honduras	..	..	NP	NP		NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP
Hungary	..	..	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Iceland	..	..	Y	Y		N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A
India	..	..	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Indonesia	..	..	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Iran	..	..	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Iraq	..	..	Y	Y		Y	NP	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ireland	..	..	Y	Y		A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A
Israel	..	..	N	N		N	N	N	A	N	A	N	N	N	N
Italy	..	..	Y	Y		A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A
Ivory Coast	..	..	Y	Y		A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y
Jamaica	..	..	NP	NP		A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Japan	..	..	Y	Y		A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y
Jordan	..	..	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kenya	..	..	Y	Y		Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kuwait	..	..	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lao Peoples' Democratic Republic	..	..	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lebanon	..	..	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lesotho	..	..	Y	Y		A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Liberia	..	..	Y	NP		Y	NP	Y	Y	A	Y	A	A	Y	Y
Libyan Arab Republic	..	..	Y	Y		Y	NP	NP	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP
Luxembourg	..	..	Y	Y		N	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A
Madagascar	..	..	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Malawi	..	..	A	A		A	A	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	Y	A
Malaysia	..	..	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Maldives	..	..	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mali	..	..	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Malta	..	..	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mauritania	..	..	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mauritius	..	..	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mexico	..	..	Y	Y		A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mongolia	..	..	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Morocco	..	..	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mozambique	..	..	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP
Nepal	..	..	Y	Y		A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Netherlands	..	..	Y	Y		N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A
New Zealand	..	..	Y	Y		A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A

RESOLUTION	31/15					31/20	31/61	31/62	31/71	31/106				31/110	31/186
	A	B	C	D	E					A	B	C	D		
Nicaragua	Vote not recorded : 														

**G. Chronology***January*

- 4 The Israeli Cabinet affirms its decision to boycott the forthcoming UN Security Council debate on the Palestine question.
- 11 Units of the Palestine Liberation Army enter Lebanon.
- 12 The UN Security Council commences a debate on the Palestine question with the PLO present.
- 14 The Palestinian refugee camp of Dbayye, north of Beirut, falls to forces of the Lebanese right.
- 20–21 The town of Damour, south of Beirut, falls to combined Palestinian and Lebanese leftist forces.
- 21 The slum area of Karantina and Maslakh in East Beirut falls to forces of the Lebanese right.
- 22 A ceasefire is declared in Lebanon and takes effect under the supervision of a joint Lebanese-Syrian-Palestinian Higher Military Committee.
- 27–29 US President Ford, Secretary of State Kissinger and Prime Minister Rabin of Israel meet in Washington.

*February*

- 2 Israeli Prime Minister Rabin ends an 11-day visit to the US.
- 14 President Franjieh of Lebanon announces a new constitutional agreement.
- 29 The Israeli government announces a development plan for Galilee involving compulsory land purchases and Jewish settlements.

*March*

- 6 Arab mayors in Israel announce their intention of opposing the government's settlement plans in Galilee.
- 11 A military coup takes place in Lebanon led by the commander of the Beirut region, Brig. Aziz Ahdab.
- 12 Israeli Foreign Minister Allon meets US Secretary of State Kissinger in Washington.
- 14 President Sadat announces the cancellation of the Egypt-USSR Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.
- 16 The ceasefire in Lebanon collapses with widespread fighting and indiscriminate shelling.
- 16 A series of continuing strikes and demonstrations by Arabs in Israel and the West Bank breaks out.
- 30 "Day of the Land" is marked in Israel and the West Bank to protest compulsory purchase of lands in Galilee. In Beirut it is celebrated at a rally where PLO leader Yasir Arafat and George Habash of the PFLP announce reconciliation between their two groups.



*April*

- 9 Units of the Syrian army enter Lebanon.
- 12 West Bank local elections bring in many municipal councils sympathetic to the PLO.
- 24 Lebanese President Franjieh signs a constitutional amendment to allow an early presidential election.

*May*

- 8 Elias Sarkis is elected to succeed Sulayman Franjieh as President of Lebanon.
- 26 The UN Security Council ends a debate on the situation in the occupied territories, agreeing to a consensus statement deploring Israeli measures in occupied territory.

*June*

- 1 Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin begins a 4-day visit to Damascus.
- 5 Egypt recalls its diplomatic mission in Damascus and asks Syria to recall its people in Cairo.
- 6 Pro-Syrian forces start an offensive against Palestinian and Lebanese leftist positions around Beirut.
- 8 A Syrian armoured advance into the port of Sidon, south of Beirut, fails.
- 8–9 Arab foreign ministers meeting in Cairo decide to send a joint Arab peace-keeping force to Lebanon.
- 16 US Ambassador Francis Meloy and two companions are assassinated while crossing from West to East Beirut.
- 20 The US Sixth Fleet carries out the first of a number of evacuations of foreigners from Beirut with the PLO providing security.
- 21 The first units of the joint Arab peace-keeping force arrive in Beirut.
- 22 Forces of the Lebanese right begin a siege of Tal al-Zaatar and Jisr al-Basha refugee camps in East Beirut.
- 28 An Airbus of Air France, hijacked after take-off from Athens the previous day, lands at Entebbe airport in Uganda.
- 28 King Hussein of Jordan ends a visit to Moscow.
- 30 The Palestinian refugee camp of Jisr al-Basha falls to the besieging forces of the Lebanese right.

*July*

- 3–4 An Israeli commando unit frees the hostages held at Entebbe airport in the hijacked Air France plane.

*August*

- 12 The Palestinian refugee camp of Tal al-Zaatar falls to forces of the Lebanese right after a 52-day siege.
- 28 The PLO announces general conscription of Palestinians.

*September*

- 4 Arab foreign ministers meet in Cairo to discuss the Lebanese situation.
- 6 The PLO is admitted to the status of full member in the Arab League.
- 17 A series of Lebanese-Syrian-Palestinian meetings start in the Lebanese town of Chtaura to discuss a ceasefire and the status of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon.
- 23 Elias Sarkis is sworn in as President of Lebanon.
- 26 Four guerrillas holding hostages in a Damascus hotel are overwhelmed by Syrian troops; the three survivors are executed the following day.
- 30 After two days of fighting Syrian troops force the combined Palestinian and Lebanese leftist forces out of their mountain positions.

*October*

- 16 A ceasefire ends the Syrian offensive in Lebanon.
- 17–19 In Riyadh a summit meeting of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the PLO agrees on terms for an end to the war in Lebanon and the dispatch there of a 30,000 man deterrent force.
- 25–26 A 14-power Arab summit conference in Cairo endorses the agreements reached in Riyadh.

*November*

- 2 Jimmy Carter is elected to become the next US president.
- 2 Foreign Ministers Fahmi of Egypt and Gromyko of the USSR meet in Bucharest.
- 10–15 Troops of the Arab Deterrent Force enter Beirut and open the main roads.
- 21 Troops of the Arab Deterrent Force enter Sidon and Tripoli.

*December*

- 9 A Lebanese cabinet of technocrats is formed under Prime Minister Salim Hoss.
- 21 Egypt and Syria announce the formation of a unified political command.
- 28 Syria ends restrictions on its Jewish citizens.

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f = following page

ff = following two pages

*pass.* (*passim*) = intermittent references

## *abbreviations*

CP = Communist Party

LNLM = Lebanese National Movement

ME = Middle East

OAT = Occupied Arab Territories

UNGA = United Nations General Assembly

UNSC = United Nations Security Council

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